\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: SUMMITBRIDGE NATIONAL INVESTMENTS III, LLC, Creditor - Appellant, v. Ollie William FAISON, Debtor - Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-2441\\n\\n\\nSUMMITBRIDGE NATIONAL INVESTMENTS III, LLC,\\n\\n Creditor - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nOLLIE WILLIAM FAISON,\\n\\n Debtor - Appellee.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\\nRaleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge. (5:17-cv-00384-BO)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 30, 2018 Decided: February 8, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Donald C. COGGINS, Jr., United\\nStates District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.\\n\\n\\nReversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which\\nJudge Floyd and Judge Coggins joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Christopher Paul Schueller, BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY PC,\\nPittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. John Arlington Northen, NORTHEN BLUE,\\nLLP, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Vicki L. Parrott,\\nNORTHEN BLUE, LLP, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fPAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n The question in this appeal is whether the Bankruptcy Code bars a creditor from\\n\\nasserting an unsecured claim for attorneysβ fees, if those fees are incurred after the filing\\n\\nof a bankruptcy petition but guaranteed by a pre-petition contract. We join other federal\\n\\ncourts of appeals in holding that the Code does not preclude such claims. Accordingly,\\n\\nwe reverse the contrary determination of the district court and remand for further\\n\\nproceedings.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n From 2003 through 2012, Branch Banking and Trust Company (βBB&Tβ) loaned\\n\\n$2.1 million to Ollie William Faison. To effectuate the loans, Faison signed three\\n\\npromissory notes secured by deeds of trust for farmland that Faison owned in North\\n\\nCarolina. Faison agreed that if the notes were placed with an attorney for collection, he\\n\\nwould pay βall costs of collection, including but not limited to reasonable attorneysβ\\n\\nfees.β J.A. 73, 101, 129.\\n\\n On January 3, 2014, Faison filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the\\n\\nBankruptcy Code. During the ensuing bankruptcy proceedings, BB&T filed three proofs\\n\\nof claims β documents providing proof of a right to payment β for the outstanding\\n\\nprincipal and interest due on its promissory notes as of the date of Faisonβs petition.\\n\\nThose three claims were entitled to preferential treatment under the Code because the\\n\\npromissory notes underlying them were secured by collateral β namely, Faisonβs\\n\\nfarmland in North Carolina. See Welzel v. Advocate Realty Invs., LLC (In re Welzel), 275\\n\\n 2\\n\\fF.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (describing the provisions of the Code that\\n\\ngive preferential treatment to secured claims). That preferential treatment meant that\\n\\nBB&Tβs claims would be satisfied from the value of the farmland before any\\n\\ndistributions were made to lower-priority unsecured claims. See Stubbs & Perdue v.\\n\\nAngell (In re Anderson), 811 F.3d 166, 168 (4th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n BB&T assigned its interest in the promissory notes β and in turn, the three\\n\\nbankruptcy claims based on those notes β to SummitBridge National Investments III,\\n\\nLLC (βSummitBridgeβ) in January 2015. Now holder of the notes, SummitBridge began\\n\\nto defend the three claims in Faisonβs bankruptcy proceedings, incurring attorneysβ fees\\n\\nin the process.\\n\\n Almost two years after BB&T assigned its claims to SummitBridge, Faison\\n\\nproposed a plan for repaying his creditors, ultimately approved by the bankruptcy court.\\n\\nThe plan treated SummitBridgeβs three claims as one aggregate secured claim for\\n\\n$1,715,000, the value of the farmland securing the three notes. That amount was enough\\n\\nto cover the outstanding principal and pre-petition interest on the three notes, as well as a\\n\\nportion of SummitBridgeβs post-petition interest and attorneysβ fees. To the extent that\\n\\nSummitBridge had incurred excess attorneysβ fees not covered by the farmlandβs value,\\n\\nthe plan made clear, SummitBridge could file an unsecured claim to recover those fees.\\n\\n SummitBridge did just that, filing the claim at issue here: an unsecured claim\\n\\nagainst Faisonβs estate for the remainder of the post-petition attorneysβ fees it had\\n\\nincurred. Faison objected to SummitBridgeβs claim on two alternative grounds. First,\\n\\nFaison argued that SummitBridgeβs underlying contractual claim for attorneysβ fees was\\n\\n 3\\n\\funenforceable under North Carolina law because SummitBridge had failed to comply\\n\\nwith state-law notice requirements. And second, Faison raised the federal-law issue we\\n\\naddress today, arguing that βthe Bankruptcy Code does not provide for allowance of an\\n\\nunsecured claim for post-petition attorneysβ fees or costs.β J.A. 265.\\n\\n The bankruptcy court addressed only Faisonβs federal-law argument, agreeing\\n\\nwith him that the Code does not allow creditors like SummitBridge to assert unsecured\\n\\nclaims for post-petition attorneysβ fees. SummitBridge appealed the bankruptcy courtβs\\n\\norder to the district court, and the district court affirmed.\\n\\n This timely appeal followed.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n βWhen considering an appeal from a district court acting in its capacity as a\\n\\nbankruptcy appellate court,β this court conducts βan independent review of the\\n\\nbankruptcy courtβs decision, reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal\\n\\nconclusions de novo.β Depβt of Soc. Servs., Div. of Child Support Enfβt v. Webb, 908\\n\\nF.3d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The sole question\\n\\nbefore us today is one of law: Under the Code, may a creditor assert an unsecured claim\\n\\nfor post-petition attorneysβ fees based on a pre-petition promissory note?\\n\\n A.\\n\\n As the bankruptcy and district courts recognized, we are not the first courts to\\n\\nconfront this issue. On the contrary: Bankruptcy and district courts long have wrestled\\n\\nwith this question, disagreeing as to whether creditors may assert unsecured claims for\\n\\n 4\\n\\fpost-petition attorneysβ fees based on pre-petition contracts. See In re AugΓ©, 559 B.R.\\n\\n223, 229 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2016) (citing cases).\\n\\n In 2007, however, the Supreme Court provided important guidance in Travelers\\n\\nCasualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007).\\n\\nThere, the Court rejected a Ninth Circuit rule disallowing claims for post-petition\\n\\nattorneysβ fees under one set of circumstances β specifically, where those post-petition\\n\\nfees were incurred while litigating issues of federal bankruptcy law. 549 U.S. at 445. In\\n\\npassing on that particular bar on claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees, the Court applied\\n\\na presumption of broader significance: β[W]e generally presume that claims enforceable\\n\\nunder applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly\\n\\ndisallowed.β Id. at 452. Because nothing in the Code disallowed claims for post-petition\\n\\nattorneysβ fees that are incurred in connection with federal bankruptcy law issues, the\\n\\nCourt concluded, the Ninth Circuitβs rule was unfounded. Id. at 452β54.\\n\\n The Travelers Court stopped short of deciding whether the Code might provide\\n\\nsome different and independent basis for disallowing post-petition attorneysβ fees\\n\\naltogether. Id. at 456. But as other courts have recognized, the Supreme Courtβs\\n\\nβanalysis and rationaleβ in Travelers is βequally applicable to post-petition costs arising\\n\\nout of pre-petition contracts more generally.β Ogle v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 586\\n\\nF.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2009). And in the years since Travelers was decided, both the\\n\\nSecond and Ninth Circuits have concluded that there is no basis in the Code for barring\\n\\nunsecured claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees arising out of pre-petition contracts. Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\fat 146β49; SNTL Corp. v. Ctr. Ins. Co. (In re SNTL Corp.), 571 F.3d 826, 839β45 (9th\\n\\nCir. 2009). 1\\n\\n B.\\n\\n We turn now to the text of the Code, and β as instructed by Travelers β consider\\n\\nwhether it expressly disallows unsecured claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees based on\\n\\nvalid pre-petition contracts. Faison argues, and the bankruptcy and district courts agreed,\\n\\nthat creditors are barred from asserting such claims by two provisions of the Code:\\n\\nΒ§ 502(b) and Β§ 506(b). We take those provisions in turn, and like our sister circuits,\\n\\nconclude that neither expressly disallows a creditor like SummitBridge from asserting an\\n\\nunsecured claim for post-petition attorneysβ fees based on a valid pre-petition contract.\\n\\nAccord Ogle, 586 F.3d at 146β49; In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 839β45.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n We begin with Β§ 502 of the Code, which, as its title explains, governs the\\n\\nβ[a]llowance of claims or interestsβ in bankruptcy proceedings. When, as here, a party\\n\\nlike Faison objects to a creditorβs claim, then Β§ 502(b) provides that βthe court, after\\n\\nnotice and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Indeed, even before Travelers, courts of appeals had begun to converge on that\\nresult. Both the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits had held that over-secured creditors can\\nassert unsecured claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees, and had assumed that unsecured\\nand under-secured creditors can do so, as well. In re Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1319; Joseph F.\\nSanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1986). And the\\nSixth Circuit had held that at least where solvent debtors are concerned, the Code permits\\nunsecured claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees. Official Comm. of Unsecured\\nCreditors v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 456 F.3d 668, 683 (2006).\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\ffiling of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amountβ unless one of nine\\n\\nenumerated exceptions applies. 11 U.S.C. Β§ 502(b). Section 502(b), in other words, does\\n\\nnot bar SummitBridge from recovering post-petition attorneysβ fees, so long as two\\n\\nconditions are met: First, SummitBridge must have had a βclaimβ for those fees as of the\\n\\npetition date; and second, that claim must not fall within one or more of the nine\\n\\nenumerated exceptions. Cf. Travelers, 549 U.S. at 449β50 (explaining that a claim within\\n\\nthe meaning of the Code must be allowed under Β§ 502(b) unless one of the nine\\n\\nenumerated exceptions applies). Faison does not dispute that none of the nine exceptions\\n\\nis implicated here. So the only question is whether SummitBridge had a βclaimβ under\\n\\nthe Code for post-petition attorneysβ fees as of the petition date.\\n\\n Faisonβs position is that because no attorneysβ fees were incurred until after\\n\\nbankruptcy proceedings began in this case, SummitBridge could not have had a valid\\n\\nβclaimβ for those fees on βthe date of the filing of the petition.β We disagree. It is true\\n\\nthat the right to payment of attorneysβ fees under Faisonβs promissory notes was\\n\\ncontingent on a future, post-petition event β namely, the notes being placed with an\\n\\nattorney for collection. But the Code defines βclaimβ broadly, and expressly includes\\n\\nβright[s] to paymentβ that are βcontingent.β 11 U.S.C. Β§ 101(5)(A) (defining βclaimβ as\\n\\nβa right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,\\n\\nunliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\fequitable, secured, or unsecuredβ). 2 What matters is that the right to those fees arose pre-\\n\\npetition, when Faison signed the promissory notes in question. That is enough, as the\\n\\nNinth Circuit has explained, to make the fees βpre[-]petition in nature, constituting a\\n\\ncontingent pre[-]petition obligation that bec[omes] fixed post[-]petition when the fees\\n\\n[are] incurred.β In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 844 (quoting 5 Collier on Bankruptcy\\n\\nΒΆ 553.03[1][i] (15th ed. 2007)).\\n\\n Faison resists this straightforward conclusion by pointing to the Β§ 502(b)\\n\\nrequirement that a bankruptcy court βdetermine the amount of [the] claim . . . as of the\\n\\ndate of the filing of the petition,β and allow the claim βin such amount.β According to\\n\\nFaison, because post-petition fees, by definition, have not been incurred βas of the date of\\n\\nthe filing of the petition,β their βamountβ cannot be βdetermine[d]β on that date β unless,\\n\\nthat is, the βamountβ is deemed to be zero. For two reasons, we again must disagree.\\n\\n First, we think a fair reading of the Supreme Courtβs decision in Travelers\\n\\nprecludes this argument. Like the fees here, the attorneysβ fees at issue in Travelers also\\n\\nwere incurred post-petition, and, as a result, the amount of those fees also was uncertain\\n\\nas of the petition date. See 549 U.S. at 446β47. Under Faisonβs reading of Β§ 502(b), that\\n\\n\\n 2\\n A βright to paymentβ under this definition βusually refer[s] to a right to payment\\nrecognized under state law.β Travelers, 549 U.S. at 451. For purposes of this appeal, the\\nparties do not dispute that SummitBridge had a valid and enforceable right to payment of\\nattorneysβ fees under North Carolina law: In the promissory notes underlying each loan,\\nFaison agreed to βpay, in addition to principal, interest and late fees, if any, all costs of\\ncollection, including but not limited to reasonable attorneysβ fees.β J.A. 73, 101, 129.\\nOn remand, however, Faison may pursue his argument that SummitBridgeβs contractual\\nright to attorneysβ fees is unenforceable because SummitBridge failed to satisfy state-law\\nnotice requirements.\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\fwould be enough to end the Travelers case: Because no βamountβ for the purported\\n\\nclaim β other than zero β could be determined by the bankruptcy court on the date of the\\n\\npetition, there would be no valid βclaimβ at all. But the Supreme Court did not resolve\\n\\nthe case on that ground. Instead, it went on to consider whether any of the nine\\n\\nenumerated exceptions to Β§ 502(b) applied β an analysis that would be wholly\\n\\nunnecessary if post-petition fees could not constitute βclaimsβ at all β and, finding that\\n\\nnone did, held that claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees incurred in connection with\\n\\nfederal bankruptcy litigation are not disallowed under Β§ 502. See id. at 449β54. As the\\n\\nSecond Circuit has explained, in rejecting the same argument that Faison raises here,\\n\\nTravelers βproceeds along lines that, reasonably extended, would suggest . . . that section\\n\\n502(b)βs requirement β that the court βshall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of\\n\\nthe date of the filing of the petitionβ β does not bar recovery of post-petition attorneysβ\\n\\nfees.β Ogle, 586 F.3d at 147.\\n\\n Second, we think Faisonβs argument is inconsistent with the whole of Β§ 502. If it\\n\\nwere the case, as Faison contends, that a βclaimβ with no value on the petition date\\n\\ncannot be allowed under Β§ 502(b) β or may be allowed only in the amount of zero β then\\n\\nthere would be no need for Β§ 502(b)(2), an enumerated exception to Β§ 502(b) that\\n\\nspecifically disallows claims for βunmatured interest.β See 11 U.S.C. Β§ 502(b)(2). Nor\\n\\ncan Faisonβs position be squared with Β§ 502(c), which expressly directs bankruptcy\\n\\ncourts to βestimate[] for purpose of allowanceβ the value of claims that are contingent or\\n\\nunliquidated, to avoid undue delay in the administration of a bankruptcy. See id. Β§\\n\\n502(c). If, as Faison would have it, the value of a βclaimβ must be fixed as of the petition\\n\\n 9\\n\\fdate, then there would be no need for such estimates. And, indeed, Faison concedes that\\n\\nthe bankruptcy court could have used that very provision to estimate the attorneysβ fees at\\n\\nissue in this case.\\n\\n In sum, like our sister circuits, we can find nothing in Β§ 502(b) that expressly\\n\\ndisallows unsecured claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees. See Ogle, 586 F.3d at 147;\\n\\nIn re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 844.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Faison next contends that a different provision of the Code β Β§ 506(b) β disallows\\n\\nSummitBridgeβs unsecured claim for post-petition attorneysβ fees. Unlike Β§ 502, Β§ 506,\\n\\ntitled β[d]etermination of secured status,β does not speak directly to the allowance or\\n\\ndisallowance of claims. But Β§ 506(b) does refer to attorneysβ fees, providing that\\n\\ncreditors with over-secured claims β that is, creditors with collateral that exceeds the\\n\\namount of their claims β may add to their secured claims both interest and reasonable\\n\\nattorneysβ fees:\\n\\n To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value\\n of which . . . is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be\\n allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any\\n reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement or State\\n statute under which such claim arose.\\n\\n11 U.S.C. Β§ 506(b). That Β§ 506(b) expressly allows creditors with over-secured claims to\\n\\nadd attorneysβ fees to their claims, Faison argues, implies that creditors who are\\n\\nunsecured or, as here, under-secured may not assert such claims.\\n\\n The first problem with Faisonβs position is that this kind of argument by negative\\n\\ninference cannot carry the day under Travelers. The Travelers Court made clear that\\n\\n 10\\n\\fclaims enforceable under state law are presumed allowable, and that this presumption\\n\\nmay be overcome only by an express disallowance. See 549 U.S. at 452 (β[W]e generally\\n\\npresume that claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy\\n\\nunless they are expressly disallowed.β). And Β§ 506(b) never mentions, let alone\\n\\nexpressly disallows, unsecured claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees. See 11 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 506(b). 3 A section that is βcompletely silent with regard to the allowance/disallowance\\n\\nissueβ at hand, In re Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1317, cannot rebut the Travelers presumption. It\\n\\nwas βdecisive in Travelers that the Code says nothing about unsecured claims for\\n\\ncontractual attorneyβs fees incurred while litigating issues of bankruptcy law . . . [and] it\\n\\nis decisive here that [Β§ 506(b)] says nothing about such fees incurred litigating things\\n\\nother than issues of bankruptcy law.β Ogle, 586 F.3d at 148 (internal quotation marks\\n\\nand citation omitted).\\n\\n The second problem with Faisonβs argument is the reason that Β§ 506(b) is silent on\\n\\nthis point: Section 506(b) has nothing to do with the allowance or disallowance of\\n\\nclaims. That function, as described above, is performed by Β§ 502, aptly titled\\n\\nβ[a]llowance of claims or interests.β What Β§ 506 is concerned with, as its title makes\\n\\nequally clear, is the βsecured statusβ of claims already allowed or presumed allowed. See\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Nor, we note, does Β§ 506(b) mention post-petition attorneysβ fees, as opposed to\\npre-petition fees. See In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 841 (citation omitted). Nothing\\nabout Β§ 506(b), in other words, can be read to address the distinction between pre- and\\npost-petition fees that is at the heart of Faisonβs case. Instead, on Faisonβs reading of\\nΒ§ 506(b), it appears that pre-petition as well as post-petition attorneysβ fees would be\\nexcluded from the claims of all but over-secured creditors, see id. β a result that Faison\\nneither acknowledges nor defends.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f11 U.S.C. Β§ 506 (βDetermination of secured statusβ). 4 Section 502, in other words,\\n\\nanswers βthe threshold question of whether a claim should be allowed or disallowed,β\\n\\nwhile βΒ§ 506 deals with the entirely different, more narrow question of whether certain\\n\\ntypes of claims should be considered secured or unsecured.β In re Welzel, 275 F.3d at\\n\\n1318; see also In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 842. That more narrow question is\\n\\nimportant, to be sure; in specifying that over-secured creditors may treat as secured their\\n\\nclaims for reasonable attorneysβ fees, Β§ 506(b) gives those claims priority over other\\n\\ncreditorsβ unsecured claims. See In re Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1318 (describing the Codeβs\\n\\npreferential treatment of secured claims). 5 But Β§ 506(b) does not address baseline\\n\\nallowability, and Faisonβs effort to read into that provision a disallowance of unsecured\\n\\nclaims for post-petition attorneysβ fees βincorrectly conflate[s]β the functions of Β§ 506\\n\\nand Β§ 502. In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 842; see also In re Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1317\\n\\n(β[Section] 506 is meant to address βa number of important rules specifying the\\n\\n 4\\n The text of Β§ 506, like its title, makes clear that the role of Β§ 506 is limited to\\nclassifying as secured or unsecured claims that already are presumed allowed. Under\\nΒ§ 506(a), β[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the\\nestate has an interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditorβs\\ninterest in the estateβs interest in such propertyβ (emphasis added). And under Β§ 506(b),\\nthe provision addressing over-secured claims on which Faison focuses, β[t]o the extent\\nthat an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which . . . is greater\\nthan the amount of such claim,β the secured claim includes βreasonable fees, costs, or\\nchargesβ (emphasis added).\\n 5\\n For that reason, we do not think it is the case, as the district court suggested and\\nFaison echoes on appeal, that allowing βSummitBridgeβs unsecured claim for post-\\npetition fees under Β§ 502 arguably renders the language of Β§ 506(b) superfluous.β J.A.\\n409. Section 506(b) does not speak to allowability, but it does serve a significant\\nfunction by setting out the circumstances under which an allowed claim for attorneysβ\\nfees may be treated as secured.\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\fdetermination of the secured status of a claim, [not] the allowance or disallowance of the\\n\\nunderlying claim itself.ββ (alteration in original) (quoting 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ΒΆ\\n\\n506.01 (15th ed. 2001))).\\n\\n It is no surprise, then, that when Congress intends to disallow a claim for\\n\\nattorneysβ fees, it does so in Β§ 502, not Β§ 506. See In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 841 (βIf\\n\\nCongress . . . had wanted to disallow claims for post[-]petition attorneysβ fees, the logical\\n\\nplace for it to have done so was surely in 11 U.S.C. Β§ 502(b).β). Section 502(b), as\\n\\ndescribed above, provides for the allowance of claims, but also enumerates nine\\n\\nexceptions. And among those exceptions is one for a βclaim . . . for services of an insider\\n\\nor attorney of the debtorβ where the claim βexceeds the reasonable value of such\\n\\nservices.β 11 U.S.C. Β§ 502(b)(4) (emphasis added). Congress, in other words, knows\\n\\nhow to draft a provision that expressly disallows a claim for certain attorneysβ fees. And\\n\\nas the Supreme Court explained in Travelers, the βabsence of an analogous provision\\n\\nexcludingβ claims for a different category of fees β in this case, unsecured claims for\\n\\npost-petition fees β is strong evidence that the Code does not expressly disallow those\\n\\nclaims. 549 U.S. at 453.\\n\\n Finally, like other courts to consider this issue, we are unpersuaded by Faisonβs\\n\\ncitation to United Savings Assβn of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.,\\n\\n484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988), and its reference to Β§ 506(b) as βdenying under[-]secured\\n\\ncreditors post[-]petition interest on their claims.β As the wording on which Faison relies\\n\\nmakes clear, the Court in Timbers was addressing the allowability of claims for post-\\n\\npetition interest, not attorneysβ fees. And that distinction matters, because claims for\\n\\n 13\\n\\funmatured interest (unlike attorneysβ fees) are expressly disallowed under Β§ 502(b)(2), so\\n\\nthat post-petition interest (unlike attorneysβ fees) may be recovered only if Β§ 506(b)\\n\\ncreates a βlimited exceptionβ β for over-secured creditors β to that general rule against\\n\\nallowance. Ogle, 586 F.3d at 148. As other courts have explained at length, because\\n\\nΒ§ 502(b) does βnot contain a similar prohibition against [allowance of] attorneysβ fees,\\n\\nthe comparison between the current issue and that presented in Timbers is not\\n\\npersuasive.β In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 844; see also Official Comm. of Unsecured\\n\\nCreditors v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 456 F.3d 668, 682 (6th Cir.\\n\\n2006).\\n\\n Again, we emphasize that under Travelers, the question before us is whether there\\n\\nis anything in Β§ 506(b) that could be deemed an express disallowance of unsecured\\n\\nclaims for post-petition attorneysβ fees. Like the Second and Ninth Circuits, we think\\n\\nthere is not. See Ogle, 586 F.3d at 147β48; In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 841β43.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Faisonβs final argument is an appeal to policy considerations. Faison focuses on\\n\\nSummitBridgeβs status as a secured creditor, guaranteed recovery on its principal. It\\n\\nwould be unfair, Faison argues, to allow SummitBridge also to assert unsecured claims\\n\\nfor attorneysβ fees, because those claims would reduce the pool of assets available to\\n\\nwholly unsecured creditors who have yet to recover any principal, let alone fees. And\\n\\nthat result, Faison finishes, would be inconsistent with a central purpose of the Code,\\n\\nwhich is to secure equality among similarly situated creditors.\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\f As a threshold matter, we agree with the courts that have considered similar policy\\n\\narguments for barring claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees: Because the text of the\\n\\nβBankruptcy Code itself provides the answer to this issue (by not specifically disallowing\\n\\npost[-]petition fees),β we must defer to Congressβs chosen policy, In re SNTL Corp., 571\\n\\nF.3d at 845, and may not reach βa contrary result based on equitable considerations,β In\\n\\nre Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1318. We add only that Faisonβs particular argument from fairness\\n\\nβ that only unsecured creditors, and not secured (but under-secured) creditors like\\n\\nSummitBridge, should be allowed to assert unsecured claims for post-petition attorneysβ\\n\\nfees β itself has no basis in the text of the relevant Code provisions. What matters under\\n\\nΒ§ 502 and Β§ 506(b) is the status of a given claim, not the status of the creditor asserting it:\\n\\nUnder Β§ 502, it is a βclaimβ that is allowed or disallowed, see 11 U.S.C. Β§ 502(b)\\n\\n(directing that a βclaimβ shall be allowed unless subject to an enumerated exception), and\\n\\nunder Β§ 506(b), an βallowed secured claimβ will include reasonable attorneysβ fees under\\n\\nspecified circumstances, see id. Β§ 506(b). Faisonβs effort to differentiate between types\\n\\nof creditors, in other words, brings his policy argument not one but two steps away from\\n\\nthe statutory text.\\n\\n And in any event, the equitable considerations here are not as one-sided as Faison\\n\\nsuggests. It is true, as Faison argues, that if otherwise secured creditors recover on\\n\\nunsecured claims for post-petition attorneysβ fees, those payments may come at the\\n\\nexpense of unsecured creditorsβ ability to recover fully on their claims to principal. But a\\n\\nbasic tenet of bankruptcy law is that secured creditors are privileged over unsecured\\n\\ncreditors. See In re Welzel, 275 F.3d at 1319. And Faisonβs rule would flip this privilege\\n\\n 15\\n\\fon its head: By allowing unsecured but not under-secured creditors to assert claims for\\n\\npost-petition attorneysβ fees, it would put βunsecured creditors . . . in a more protected\\n\\nposition than a group of secured creditors.β Id. (emphasis added).\\n\\n Faisonβs policy argument also upsets a second basic principle of federal\\n\\nbankruptcy law: βthat state law governs the substance of claims, Congress having\\n\\ngenerally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankruptβs estate to\\n\\nstate law,β Travelers, 549 U.S. at 450β51 (internal quotation marks omitted). Allowing\\n\\ncreditors, like SummitBridge, who have bargained specifically for attorneysβ fees under\\n\\nstate law to enforce those rights in bankruptcy is fully consistent with that principle, even\\n\\nif it reduces the pool of assets otherwise available. Those creditors, it is presumed, βgave\\n\\nvalue, in the form of a contract term favorable to the debtor . . . in exchange for the\\n\\n[attorneysβ fees] provision.β Ogle, 586 F.3d at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\nSo allowing them to assert unsecured claims for those fees, far from βproviding an\\n\\nundeserved bonus for one creditor at the expense of others,β simply βeffectuates the\\n\\nbargained-for terms of the loan contract.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And in\\n\\nthe end, if there is any tension between this policy of vindicating contract rights\\n\\nenforceable under state law and other bankruptcy principles, βit is the province of\\n\\nCongress,β not the courts, to adjust accordingly. In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 845.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and\\n\\nremand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n 16\\n\\f REVERSED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n17\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":555,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588886,"string":"4,588,886"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Evangeline J. PARKER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. REEMA CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., Defendant - Appellee. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; National Women's Law Center; A Better Balance; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO; American Association of University Women; American Sexual Health Association; Black Women's Roundtable; National Coalition on Black Civic Participation ; California Women Lawyers ; Champion Women; District of Columbia Coalition Against Domestic Violence ; End Rape on Campus; Equal Rights Advocates; Family Values @ Work; Feminist Majority Foundation; Gender Justice ; Girls for Gender Equity; Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America, Inc.; Harvard Law School Gender Violence Program; Lawyers Club of San Diego; League of Women Voters of the United States; Legal Aid at Work ; Legal Momentum, the Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund; Legal Voice; Maine Women's Lobby ; Medical Students for Choice; National Asian Pacific American Women's Forum ; National Alliance to End Sexual Violence; The National Crittenton Foundation; National Employment Law Project; National Employment Lawyers Association; National Organization for Women (Now) Foundation; National Partnership for Women and Families; National Women's Political Caucus; Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice; People for American Way Foundation; Service Employees International Union; SisterReach ; Southwest Women's Law Center ; Stop Sexual Assault in Schools; The National Urban League; Women's Law Center of Maryland, Inc Orporated; Women Employed ; Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia; Women's Bar Association of the State of New York; Women's Law Project, Amici Supporting Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Evangeline Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1206"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Niemeyer, Agee, Diaz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887983/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"035concurrenceinpart\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887984/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1206\\n\\n\\nEVANGELINE J. PARKER,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nREEMA CONSULTING SERVICES, INC.,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee.\\n\\n----------------------------------------------------\\n\\nEQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; NATIONAL\\nWOMENβS LAW CENTER; A BETTER BALANCE; AMERICAN\\nFEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO;\\nAMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN; AMERICAN\\nSEXUAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION; BLACK WOMENβS ROUNDTABLE;\\nNATIONAL COALITION ON BLACK CIVIC PARTICIPATION; CALIFORNIA\\nWOMEN LAWYERS; CHAMPION WOMEN; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\\nCOALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE; END RAPE ON CAMPUS;\\nEQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; FAMILY VALUES @ WORK; FEMINIST\\nMAJORITY FOUNDATION; GENDER JUSTICE; GIRLS FOR GENDER\\nEQUITY; HADASSAH, THE WOMENβS ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF\\nAMERICA, INC.; HARVARD LAW SCHOOL GENDER VIOLENCE\\nPROGRAM; LAWYERS CLUB OF SAN DIEGO; LEAGUE OF WOMEN\\nVOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES; LEGAL AID AT WORK; LEGAL\\nMOMENTUM, THE WOMENβS LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND;\\nLEGAL VOICE; MAINE WOMENβS LOBBY; MEDICAL STUDENTS FOR\\nCHOICE; NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN WOMENβS FORUM;\\nNATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE; THE NATIONAL\\nCRITTENTON FOUNDATION; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT;\\nNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL\\nORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN (NOW) FOUNDATION; NATIONAL\\nPARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES; NATIONAL WOMENβS\\n\\nPOLITICAL CAUCUS; OKLAHOMA COALITION FOR REPRODUCTIVE\\nJUSTICE; PEOPLE FOR AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION; SERVICE\\nEMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION; SISTERREACH; SOUTHWEST\\nWOMENβS LAW CENTER; STOP SEXUAL ASSAULT IN SCHOOLS; THE\\nNATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE; WOMENβS LAW CENTER OF MARYLAND,\\nINCORPORATED; WOMEN EMPLOYED; WOMENβS BAR ASSOCIATION\\nOF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; WOMENβS BAR ASSOCIATION OF\\nTHE STATE OF NEW YORK; WOMENβS LAW PROJECT,\\n\\n Amici Supporting Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:17-cv-01648-RWT)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 8, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the\\nopinion, in which Judge Agee joined in full and Judge Diaz joined except as to Part IV.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366139/\", \"author_raw\": \"NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"Judge Diaz wrote a separate opinion concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"Judge Diaz wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Dennis A. Corkery, WASHINGTON LAWYERSβ COMMITTEE FOR\\nCIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Donald\\nJames Walsh, WRIGHT, CONSTABLE & SKEEN, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for\\nAppellee. Julie Loraine Gantz, UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT\\nOPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus United States Equal\\nEmployment Opportunity Commission. ON BRIEF: Andrew R. Kopsidas, Daniel\\nTishman, Min Suk Huh, FISH & RICHARDSON, P.C., Washington, D.C.; Tiffany\\nYang, WASHINGTON LAWYERSβ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN\\nAFFAIRS, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Gregory P. Currey, WRIGHT,\\nCONSTABLE & SKEEN, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. James L. Lee,\\nDeputy General Counsel, Jennifer S. Goldstein, Associate General Counsel, Anne Noel\\nOcchialino, Acting Assistant General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, UNITED\\nSTATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington,\\nD.C., for Amicus United States Equal Opportunity Commission. Kathleen R. Hartnett,\\nAnn OβLeary, Palo Alto, California, Melissa Shube, Brent Nakamura, BOIES,\\nSCHILLER, FLEXNER, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Fatima Goss Graves, Emily Martin,\\n\\n 2\\n\\nSunu Chandy, Sarah David Heydemann, NATIONAL WOMENβS LAW CENTER,\\nWashington, D.C., for Amici National Womenβs Law Center, et al.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\nNIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In this appeal, the central question presented is whether a false rumor that a female\\n\\nemployee slept with her male boss to obtain promotion can ever give rise to her\\n\\nemployerβs liability under Title VII for discrimination βbecause of sex.β We conclude\\n\\nthat the allegations of the employeeβs complaint in this case, where the employer is\\n\\ncharged with participating in the circulation of the rumor and acting on it by sanctioning\\n\\nthe employee, do implicate such liability. Therefore, we reverse the district courtβs order\\n\\ndismissing Count I of the complaint, which makes a claim on that basis, as well as\\n\\nCount II, which alleges retaliation for complaining about such a workplace condition.\\n\\nWe affirm, however, the courtβs dismissal of Count III because the employee failed to\\n\\nexhaust that claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.\\n\\n\\n I\\n\\n The facts before us are those alleged in the complaint. And, in the present\\n\\nprocedural posture where the district court granted the defendantβs motion to dismiss\\n\\nunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept those facts as true. See E.I. du\\n\\nPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). They\\n\\nshow the following.\\n\\n From December 2014 until May 2016, Evangeline Parker worked for Reema\\n\\nConsulting Services, Inc., (βRCSIβ) at its warehouse facility in Sterling, Virginia. While\\n\\nshe began as a low-level clerk, she was promoted six times, ultimately rising to Assistant\\n\\nOperations Manager of the Sterling facility in March 2016.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\n About two weeks after Parker assumed that position, she learned that βcertain\\n\\nmale employees were circulating within RCSIβ βan unfounded, sexually-explicit rumor\\n\\nabout herβ that βfalsely and maliciously portrayed her as having [had] a sexual\\n\\nrelationshipβ with a higher-ranking manager, Demarcus Pickett, in order to obtain her\\n\\nmanagement position. The rumor originated with Donte Jennings, another RCSI\\n\\nemployee, who began working at RCSI at the same time as Parker and in the same\\n\\nposition. Because of her promotions, however, Parker soon became Jenningsβ superior,\\n\\nmaking him jealous of and ultimately hostile to her achievement.\\n\\n The highest-ranking manager at the warehouse facility, Larry Moppins,\\n\\nparticipated in spreading the rumor. In a conversation with Pickett, Moppins asked, βhey,\\n\\nyou sure your wife ainβt divorcing you because youβre f--king [Parker]?β As the rumor\\n\\nspread, Parker βwas treated with open resentment and disrespectβ from many coworkers,\\n\\nincluding employees she was responsible for supervising. As she alleged, her βwork\\n\\nenvironment became increasingly hostile.β\\n\\n In late April 2016, Moppins called a mandatory all-staff meeting. When Parker\\n\\nand Pickett arrived a few minutes late, Moppins let Pickett enter the room but βslammed\\n\\nthe door in Ms. Parkerβs face and locked her out.β This humiliated Parker in front of all\\n\\nher coworkers. Parker learned the next day that the false rumor was discussed at the\\n\\nmeeting.\\n\\n The following day, Parker arranged a meeting with Moppins to discuss the rumor,\\n\\nand at that meeting Moppins blamed Parker for βbringing the situation to the workplace.β\\n\\nHe stated that he had βgreat thingsβ planned for Parker at RCSI but that βhe could no\\n\\n 5\\n\\nlonger recommend her for promotions or higher-level tasks because of the rumor.β He\\n\\nadded that he βwould not allow her to advance any further within the company.β\\n\\n Several days later, Parker and Moppins met again to discuss the rumor. Moppins\\n\\nagain blamed Parker and said that he should have terminated her when she began\\n\\nβhuffing and puffing about this BS rumor.β During the meeting, Moppins βlost his\\n\\ntemper and began screamingβ at Parker.\\n\\n Later that same day, Parker filed a sexual harassment complaint against Moppins\\n\\nand Jennings with RCSIβs Human Resources Manager.\\n\\n Several weeks later, in mid-May, Jennings submitted a complaint to the Human\\n\\nResources Manager, alleging that Parker βwas creating a hostile work environment\\n\\nagainst him through inappropriate conduct,β and Parker was then instructed, based on\\n\\nJenningsβ complaint, to have no contact with Jennings. While she asserts that Jenningsβ\\n\\ncomplaint was false, she followed the instruction. Supervisors, however, permitted\\n\\nJennings to spend time in Parkerβs work area talking to and distracting employees she\\n\\nmanaged. On these occasions, Jennings stared at Parker at length and smirked and\\n\\nlaughed at her. Parker raised this situation with her supervisor and the Human Resources\\n\\nManager, but neither addressed it, allegedly exacerbating Parkerβs experience of a hostile\\n\\nwork environment.\\n\\n On May 18, 2016, Parker was called to a meeting with Moppins, the Human\\n\\nResources Manager, and RCSIβs in-house counsel, and at that meeting, Moppins\\n\\nsimultaneously issued Parker two written warnings and then fired her. One warning was\\n\\nbased on Jenningsβ complaint against Parker, and the other asserted that Parker had poor\\n\\n 6\\n\\nmanagement ability and was insubordinate to Moppins. In her complaint, Parker alleges\\n\\nthat both warnings were unfounded. She also alleges that RCSI failed to follow its βthree\\n\\nstrikesβ rule under which employees are subject to termination only βafter receiving three\\n\\nwritten warnings.β She had received no prior warnings. She alleges further that the rule\\n\\nβwas disparately enforced such that male employees were generally not fired even after\\n\\nthree or more warnings, while some female employees were terminated without three\\n\\nwarnings or with all three warnings being issued at once.β\\n\\n Based on these facts, Parker alleges, in Count I, a hostile work environment claim\\n\\nfor discrimination because of sex, in violation of 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000e-2; in Count II, a\\n\\nretaliatory termination claim under Β§ 2000e-3; and in Count III, a discriminatory\\n\\ntermination claim alleging that RCSI terminated her employment contrary to its three-\\n\\nwarnings rule, in violation of Β§ 2000e-2.\\n\\n By order dated January 19, 2018, the district court granted RCSIβs motion to\\n\\ndismiss Parkerβs complaint for failure to state a claim. The court explained its reasoning\\n\\nfrom the bench, stating with respect to Count I:\\n\\n [I]t would be truly offensive to me or anybody else to have someone spread\\n a rumor that I or any other person received a promotion because of sexual\\n favors or having sexual relations with the person who made the decision.\\n That goes right to the core of somebodyβs merit as a human being to\\n suggest that they were promoted and the promotion was not based upon\\n merit, but rather was based upon the giving of sexual favors.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n The problem for Ms. Parker is that her complaint as to the establishment\\n and circulation of this rumor is not based upon her gender, but rather based\\n upon her alleged conduct, which was defamed by, you know, statements of\\n this nature. Clearly, this woman is entitled to the dignity of her merit-based\\n\\n 7\\n\\n promotion and not to have it sullied by somebody suggesting that it was\\n because she had sexual relations with a supervisor who promoted her. But\\n that is not a harassment based upon gender. Itβs based upon false\\n allegations of conduct by her. And this same type of a rumor could be\\n made in a variety of other context[s] involving people of the same gender\\n or different genders alleged to have had some kind of sexual activity\\n leading to a promotion. But the rumor and the spreading of that kind of a\\n rumor is based upon conduct, not gender.\\n\\nThe court also concluded that the alleged harassment was not severe or pervasive. In\\n\\ndismissing Count II, the retaliatory termination claim, the court stated that βbecause the\\n\\ncomplaint fail[ed] to establish that the matters alleged in Count [I] were discriminatory,\\n\\n[Parker] has failed to establish, therefore, that her belief was objectively reasonable and,\\n\\ntherefore, she cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation.β Finally, in dismissing\\n\\nCount III, the discriminatory termination claim, the court gave as its reason that Parker\\n\\nhad not exhausted the claim with the EEOC.\\n\\n From the district courtβs order of dismissal, Parker filed this appeal.\\n\\n\\n II\\n\\n The core reason given by the district court to dismiss Count I was that the\\n\\nharassment Parker suffered was βnot . . . harassment based upon gender. It [was] based\\n\\nupon false allegations of conduct by her.β (Emphasis added). In addition, the court\\n\\nconcluded that the harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to have altered the\\n\\nconditions of Parkerβs employment because βthe temporal element here [was] very short\\n\\nin terms of how long this rumor was in circulation. Just a matter of a few weeks. And a\\n\\nfew slights that she [has] referenced here do not rise up to the level that would suffice for\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\nit being severe and pervasive.β For these reasons, the court concluded that Count I failed\\n\\nto state a claim under Title VII for a hostile work environment based on sex.\\n\\n Title VII provides that it is an unlawful employment practice βto discharge . . . or\\n\\notherwise to discriminateβ against an employee βwith respect to . . . conditions . . . of\\n\\nemployment, because of such individualβs . . . sex . . .; or to limit, segregate, or classify\\n\\n[such] employee[] . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive [the employee]\\n\\nof employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [the employeeβs] status as an\\n\\nemployee, because of such [employeeβs] . . . sex.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000e-2(a). An employee\\n\\nclaiming a severe or pervasive hostile work environment because of her sex can obtain\\n\\nrelief under Title VII. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). To state a\\n\\nclaim under Title VII for a hostile work environment because of sex, the plaintiff must\\n\\nallege workplace harassment that (1) was βunwelcomeβ; (2) was based on the employeeβs\\n\\nsex; (3) was βsufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and\\n\\ncreate an abusive atmosphereβ; and (4) was, on some basis, imputable to the employer.\\n\\nBass v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); see also\\n\\nEEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 313β14 (4th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n In this appeal, only the requirements that the harassment be based on sex and that\\n\\nit be sufficiently severe or pervasive are at issue. We address each in order.\\n\\n\\n A\\n\\n RCSI contends first, as the district court concluded, that its actions toward Parker\\n\\nwere taken not because she was a female but rather because of her rumored conduct in\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\nsleeping with her boss to obtain promotion. It argues that this rumor was not βgender\\n\\nspecificβ but rather was βsolely about [Parkerβs] conduct and insufficient to support\\n\\nclaims of an illegal hostile work environment for women.β Because β[t]here is no dispute\\n\\nthat Parker believes that the rumor was started βby a co-worker who was jealous of her\\n\\nsuccess at the companyβ and not because she was a woman,β it thus contends that because\\n\\nβthere is no doubt that his rumor was solely about her conductβ and could have been\\n\\nlevelled against a man, it is insufficient to support a claim of discrimination based on sex.\\n\\n We conclude, however, that RCSIβs argument fails to take into account all of the\\n\\nallegations of the complaint, particularly those alleging the sex-based nature of the rumor\\n\\nand its effects, as well as the inferences reasonably taken from those allegations, which\\n\\nmust be taken in Parkerβs favor, as required at this stage of the proceedings. See Nemet\\n\\nChevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n As alleged, the rumor was that Parker, a female subordinate, had sex with her male\\n\\nsuperior to obtain promotion, implying that Parker used her womanhood, rather than her\\n\\nmerit, to obtain from a man, so seduced, a promotion. She plausibly invokes a deeply\\n\\nrooted perception β one that unfortunately still persists β that generally women, not\\n\\nmen, use sex to achieve success. And with this double standard, women, but not men, are\\n\\nsusceptible to being labelled as βslutsβ or worse, prostitutes selling their bodies for gain.\\n\\nSee McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259β60 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that rumors\\n\\nof a womanβs βsleeping her way to the topβ βcould constitute a form of sexual\\n\\nharassmentβ); Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 448 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that a\\n\\nrumor that a woman gained influence over the head of the office because she was\\n\\n 10\\n\\nengaged in a sexual relationship with him was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to\\n\\nconclude the a woman suffered the harassment alleged because she was a woman); see\\n\\nalso Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250β51, 258, 272β73 (1989) (plurality\\n\\nand concurring opinions) (noting that gender stereotypes can give rise to sex\\n\\ndiscrimination in violation of Title VII).\\n\\n The complaint not only invokes by inference this sex stereotype, it also explicitly\\n\\nalleges that males in the RCSI workplace started and circulated the false rumor about\\n\\nParker; that, despite Parker and Pickettβs shared tardiness, Parker as a female, not Pickett\\n\\nas a male, was excluded from the all-staff meeting discussing the rumor; that Parker was\\n\\ninstructed to have no contact with Jennings, her male antagonist, while Jennings was not\\n\\nremoved from Parkerβs workplace, allowing him to jeer and mock her; that only Parker,\\n\\nwho complained about the rumor, but not Jennings, who also complained of harassment,\\n\\nwas sanctioned; and that Parker as the female member of the rumored sexual relationship\\n\\nwas sanctioned, but Pickett as the male member was not.\\n\\n In short, because βtraditional negative stereotypes regarding the relationship\\n\\nbetween the advancement of women in the workplace and their sexual behavior\\n\\nstubbornly persist in our society,β and βthese stereotypes may cause superiors and\\n\\ncoworkers to treat women in the workplace differently from men,β it is plausibly alleged\\n\\nthat Parker suffered harassment because she was a woman. Spain, 26 F.3d at 448; see\\n\\nalso Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250β51, 258, 272β73 (plurality and concurring\\n\\nopinions); McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 259β60; cf. Passananti v. Cook Cty., 689 F.3d 655,\\n\\n665β66 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that use of the word βbitchβ to demean a female can\\n\\n 11\\n\\nsupport a sexual discrimination claim even though the word may sometimes be directed\\n\\nat men); Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 810 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n\\n(en banc) (same); Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 47 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding\\n\\nactionable the denial of a promotion because the employee was a working mother with\\n\\nyoung children); Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119β\\n\\n21 (2d Cir. 2004) (same).\\n\\n Thus, the dichotomy that RCSI, as well as the district court, purports to create\\n\\nbetween harassment βbased on genderβ and harassment based on βconductβ is not\\n\\nmeaningful in this case because the conduct is also alleged to be gender-based. We\\n\\nconclude that, in overlooking this, the district court erred.\\n\\n\\n B\\n\\n RCSI also contends that the harassment Parker alleged in the complaint was not\\n\\nsufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment. And the district\\n\\ncourt adopted this view, noting that the rumor circulated for only βa few weeksβ and\\n\\ninvolved only βa few slights.β Parker argues, on the other hand, that her complaint\\n\\nalleges harassment that was severe or pervasive, as it was βfrequent,β βmaliciously\\n\\ndesigned,β βhumiliating,β βpermeated throughout her workplace,β and caused βopen\\n\\nresentment and disrespectβ from her coworkers. Indeed, she maintains that her\\n\\nharassment even had a physical component.\\n\\n In determining whether the harassment alleged was sufficiently severe or\\n\\npervasive, we must βlook[] at all the circumstances,β including the βfrequency of the\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\ndiscriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it [was] physically threatening or\\n\\nhumiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfere[d] with\\n\\n[the] employeeβs work performance.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.\\n\\n We conclude that the complaintβs allegations and the inferences that may\\n\\nreasonably be drawn from them support Parkerβs claim that the harassment she\\n\\nexperienced was severe or pervasive such that it altered the conditions of her employment\\n\\nand created an abusive atmosphere.\\n\\n The complaint alleges that, over the period from Parkerβs promotion to Assistant\\n\\nOperations Manager in March 2016 until she was fired on May 18, 2016, the rumor and\\n\\nits adverse effects harmed Parker. The frequency alleged in the complaint was greater\\n\\nthan what the district court characterized as βa few slights.β Indeed, the harassment was\\n\\ncontinuous, preoccupying not only Parker, but also management and the employees at the\\n\\nSterling facility for the entire time of Parkerβs employment after her final promotion.\\n\\n The harassment began with the fabrication of the rumor by a jealous male\\n\\nworkplace competitor and was then circulated by male employees. Management too\\n\\ncontributed to the continuing circulation of the rumor. The highest-ranking manager\\n\\nasked another manager, who was rumored to be having the relationship with Parker,\\n\\nwhether his wife was divorcing him because he was βf--kingβ Parker. The same manager\\n\\ncalled an all-staff meeting, at which the rumor was discussed, and excluded Parker. In\\n\\nanother meeting, the manager blamed Parker for bringing the rumor into the workplace.\\n\\nAnd in yet another meeting, the manager harangued Parker about the rumor, stating he\\n\\nshould have fired her when she began βhuffing and puffingβ about it. During this period,\\n\\n 13\\n\\nParker was also told that because of the rumor, she could receive no further promotions in\\n\\nthe company. She then faced a false harassment complaint launched by the male\\n\\nemployee who started the rumor and was sanctioned based on that complaint β first,\\n\\nwith the instruction to stay away from the rumormonger and second, with the termination\\n\\nof her employment. If we are to take the allegations from the complaint and the\\n\\nreasonable inferences therefrom as true, as we must, the harassment related to the rumor\\n\\nwas all-consuming from the time the rumor was initiated until the time Parker was fired.\\n\\n The harassment emanating from the rumor also had physically threatening aspects,\\n\\neven though harassment need not be physically threatening to be actionable. At an all-\\n\\nstaff meeting at which the rumor was discussed, the warehouse manager slammed the\\n\\ndoor in Parkerβs face, and at another meeting, he screamed at Parker as he lost his temper\\n\\nwhile blaming Parker for the rumor. That this harassment came from Parkerβs supervisor\\n\\nmade it all the more threatening. See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763\\n\\n(1998) (β[A] supervisorβs power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a\\n\\nparticularly threatening characterβ).\\n\\n In addition, the harassment related to the rumor was humiliating. As the district\\n\\ncourt rightly noted, it βgoes right to the core of somebodyβs merit as a human beingβ to\\n\\nsuggest they were promoted not on worth but for sexual favors. The rumor and its\\n\\nconsequences thus entailed βopen resentment and disrespect from her coworkers,β\\n\\nincluding those she was responsible for supervising.\\n\\n Finally, the harassment interfered with Parkerβs work. She was blamed for\\n\\nbringing the controversy to the workplace; she was excluded from an all-staff meeting;\\n\\n 14\\n\\nshe was humiliated in front of coworkers; she was adversely affected in her ability to\\n\\ncarry out management responsibility over her subordinates; she was restrained in where\\n\\nshe could work, being told to stay away from the rumormonger; and she was told she had\\n\\nno future at RCSI because of the rumor. In addition, she alleges that her employment\\n\\nwas terminated because of the rumor and, as stated by management, because of the\\n\\nrumormongerβs complaint. In short, RCSIβs managementβs entire relationship with\\n\\nParker, as well as Parkerβs employment status, was changed substantially for the worse.\\n\\n Thus, based on the allegations of Parkerβs complaint and the reasonable inferences\\n\\nflowing therefrom, we conclude that Parker adequately alleges the severe or pervasive\\n\\nelement of illegal harassment. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.\\n\\n Accordingly, because Parkerβs complaint plausibly alleges a hostile work\\n\\nenvironment claim under Title VII for discrimination because of sex, we reverse the\\n\\ndistrict courtβs ruling dismissing Count I.\\n\\n\\n III\\n\\n The district court also dismissed Parkerβs retaliatory termination claim alleged in\\n\\nCount II, holding that βbecause the complaint fails to establish that the matters alleged in\\n\\n[Count I] were discriminatory, [Parker] has failed to establish . . . that her belief [that she\\n\\nwas subject to gender discrimination] was objectively reasonable and, therefore, she\\n\\ncannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation.β Because we conclude that the\\n\\ncomplaint does indeed allege a plausible claim of a hostile work environment based on\\n\\nsex, in violation of Title VII, we reverse the dismissal of Count II alleging a retaliatory\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\ntermination claim. See Boyer-Liberto v. Fountainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 285 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that because alleged harassment met elements of hostile\\n\\nwork environment claim, complaining about such harassment was necessarily protected\\n\\nactivity for purpose of retaliation claim).\\n\\n\\n IV\\n\\n Finally, the district court dismissed the discriminatory termination claim alleged in\\n\\nCount III, concluding that Parker had not exhausted this claim with the EEOC.\\n\\nSpecifically, the district court held that the allegations of RCSIβs disparate enforcement\\n\\nof its three-strikes policy, as described in Parkerβs complaint, were absent in her EEOC\\n\\ncharging document. We agree with the court.\\n\\n Parker must exhaust her claims with the EEOC by including them in charges filed\\n\\nwith the agency. In determining whether she exhausted her claims, we give her credit for\\n\\ncharges stated in her administrative charging document, as well as βcharges that would\\n\\nnaturally have arisen from an investigation thereof.β Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55\\n\\nF.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995). But when the claims in her court complaint are broader\\n\\nthan βthe allegation of a discrete act or acts in [the] administrative charge,β they are\\n\\nprocedurally barred. Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 508β10 (4th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n In this case, Parkerβs EEOC charge made no reference to the need to receive\\n\\nwarnings or a violation of RCSIβs three-strikes policy. She did not refer to the policy or\\n\\nthe allegation that RCSI treated men and women differently in applying the policy. She\\n\\nmerely asserted sex-based termination based on the facts relating to the rumor and the\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\nconduct that followed from it. Accordingly, RCSI was not βafforded ample notice of the\\n\\nallegations against itβ with respect to Count III. Sydnor v. Fairfax County, 681 F.3d 591,\\n\\n595 (4th Cir. 2012). We thus affirm the dismissal of the discriminatory termination claim\\n\\nalleged in Count III, as it alleges a broader pattern of misconduct than is stated in the\\n\\nadministrative charging document.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n In sum, we reverse the district courtβs order dismissing Counts I and II and affirm\\n\\nits order dismissing Count III.\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366139/\", \"author_raw\": \"Judge Diaz wrote a separate opinion concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:\\n\\n After Evangeline Parker gained six promotions in just over a year, reaching a post\\n\\nfew women at her company had ever occupied, a false rumor started that she owed her\\n\\nrise not to hard work and skill, but to a sexual affair. Adding injury to this insult,\\n\\nParkerβs supervisor then disciplined her more harshly than the male coworker who spread\\n\\nthe rumor and treated her less respectfully than the male manager she supposedly slept\\n\\nwith. These facts in combinationβthe spreading of a rumor rooted in base stereotypes\\n\\nabout female professionals, plus Parkerβs disparate treatment compared with members of\\n\\nthe opposite sexβfairly permit the inference that Parker was treated with less dignity\\n\\nbecause she is a woman. I am therefore pleased to join the portions of Judge Niemeyerβs\\n\\nopinion holding that Parker has alleged harassment based on her sex and reversing the\\n\\ndismissal of Parkerβs hostile work environment and retaliation claims.\\n\\n I write separately, however, because I would also reverse the district courtβs\\n\\ndismissal of Parkerβs wrongful termination claim. Respectfully, I cannot agree that\\n\\nParkerβs failure to mention a βthree-strikesβ policy in her EEOC paperwork bars her from\\n\\nasserting this claim. The majorityβs approach to exhaustion, in my view, demands more\\n\\nspecificity and foresight from an EEOC claimant than our precedents or good sense\\n\\nrequire.\\n\\n In enforcing the requirement that a Title VII plaintiff first file charges with the\\n\\nEEOC, our cases strike a careful balance between Title VIIβs administrative framework\\n\\nand judicial remedies. See Stewart v. Iancu, 912 F.3d 693, 707 (4th Cir. 2019). On the\\n\\none hand, we want employers and the EEOC to know about alleged discrimination so that\\n\\n 18\\n\\nthey may, if possible, resolve matters before a slow and expensive lawsuit becomes\\n\\nnecessary. Sydnor v. Fairfax County, 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012); Chacko v.\\n\\nPatuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005). * Allowing plaintiffs to conjure new\\n\\nclaims and allegations in federal court would undermine this congressionally designed\\n\\nsystem.\\n\\n Yet weβve also been mindful that βlaypersons, rather than lawyers,β are expected\\n\\nto begin this remedial process. Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594 (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v.\\n\\nHolowecki, 522 U.S. 389, 402β03 (2008)). Administrative charges typically arenβt\\n\\ncompleted by lawyers. (Parker, for instance, filled hers out herself.) Courts thus\\n\\nβconstrue them liberally,β Chacko, 429 F.3d at 509, lest exhaustion become a βtripwire\\n\\nfor hapless plaintiffsβ or erect βinsurmountable barriers to litigation out of overly\\n\\ntechnical concerns.β Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594.\\n\\n Accordingly, an EEOC charge outlinesβbut does not rigidly fixβthe shape of\\n\\nlitigation. As long as a plaintiffβs claims in her judicial complaint βare reasonably related\\n\\nto her EEOC charge and can be expected to follow from a reasonable administrative\\n\\ninvestigation,β she may advance them in court. Id. (quoting Smith v. First Union Natβl\\n\\nBank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000)). This permissive approach reconciles\\n\\ncompeting concerns about employer notice, agency administration, and fairness to (often\\n\\npro se) EEOC claimants. It also, not unimportantly, reflects the EEOCβs considered\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n *\\n Sydnor was an Americans with Disabilities Act case, but that statute incorporates\\nTitle VIIβs enforcement scheme. See Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 593.\\n\\n 19\\n\\npolicy that an adequate charge is one precise enough to βidentify the partiesβ and\\n\\nβdescribe generally the action or practices complained of.β 29 C.F.R. Β§ 1601.12(b).\\n\\n Our cases thus tolerate some discrepancy between the EEOC charge and the\\n\\nformal lawsuit. For instance, in Smith, we held that a Title VII complaint was reasonably\\n\\nrelated to the plaintiffβs EEOC charge where the legal claim (retaliatory termination)\\n\\ndidnβt change though the form of alleged retaliation (threatened termination versus\\n\\nreassignment and withheld job opportunities) varied. 202 F.3d at 248; accord Gregory v.\\n\\nGa. Depβt of Human Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004) (β[J]udicial claims are\\n\\nallowed if they amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the allegations in the EEOC\\n\\ncomplaint.β (quotation omitted)). Likewise, in Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Service, we said\\n\\nthat an EEOC charge generally alleging discrimination in promotions notified the\\n\\nemployer that βthe entire promotional system was being challenged,β not just aspects\\n\\nspecifically noted in the charge. 665 F.2d 482, 491 (4th Cir. 1981). And in Sydnor, we\\n\\nagain excused discrepancies between the EEOC document and lawsuit because both\\n\\nβinvolved the same place of work and the same actorβ and βfocused on the same type of\\n\\ndiscrimination.β 681 F.3d at 594β96; accord Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d\\n\\n1109, 1118 (7th Cir. 2001) (β[T]he EEOC charge and the complaint must, at minimum,\\n\\ndescribe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals.β (citation omitted)).\\n\\n We should be similarly accommodating in this case. Although Parkerβs lawsuit\\n\\ndiffers from her EEOC charge in mentioning the three-strikes policy, our precedents\\n\\nsuggest the two are similar enough to be reasonably related. As in Sydnor, Parkerβs\\n\\ncharge and complaint involve the same place and actors (RCSI, Parker, Moppins, and the\\n\\n 20\\n\\nrest) and the same type of discrimination (Moppins firing Parker allegedly because of her\\n\\nsex). And as in Smith, Parkerβs complaint alleges the same type of discrimination as her\\n\\ncharge but adds greater detail: the charge alleges a firing based on the rumor and its\\n\\naftermath, and the complaint says it also involved a disparately enforced three-strikes\\n\\npolicy. Both involve the same parties, the same event, and the same type of\\n\\ndiscrimination.\\n\\n In contrast, when we have previously dismissed Title VII claims, the plaintiffβs\\n\\nEEOC papers βreference[d] different time frames, actors, and discriminatory conductβ\\n\\nthan the judicial complaint. Chacko, 429 F.3d at 506. Parker, however, did not allege\\n\\ndiscrimination based on a different protected trait or assert a different category of\\n\\nunlawful conduct. See Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132β33 (4th Cir. 2002)\\n\\n(no exhaustion where charge mentioned only race discrimination, but lawsuit also alleged\\n\\ndiscrimination based on sex and skin tone); Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297,\\n\\n301 (4th Cir. 2009) (same when complaint alleged unlawful discrimination, but charge\\n\\nmentioned only retaliation). She didnβt recast a single gripe about uneven discipline into\\n\\na full-scale assault on her professional history with her employer. Dennis v. County of\\n\\nFairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1995). Nor did her lawsuit allege a decades-long\\n\\nsaga of discriminatory harassment when her EEOC charge described only three specific\\n\\nincidents. Chacko, 429 F.3d at 511.\\n\\n Instead, Parkerβs EEOC charge described her termination by RCSI based on sex,\\n\\nand her formal complaint just provides a fuller factual story of how and why it came\\n\\nabout. In my view, the charge gave RCSI ample notice that the circumstances of Parkerβs\\n\\n 21\\n\\ntermination were under scrutiny. Reasonable investigation of that firing would have\\n\\nuncovered the facts alleged in her complaintβincluding the fact that her firing allegedly\\n\\ninvolved two written warnings instead of three.\\n\\n I would therefore let Parker seek judicial relief for her allegedly discriminatory\\n\\ntermination. Accordingly, I join all but Part IV of Judge Niemeyerβs opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366139/\", \"author_raw\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NIEMEYER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"AGEE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DIAZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":5,"string":"5"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588886/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Evangeline J. PARKER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. REEMA CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., Defendant - Appellee. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; National Women's Law Center; A Better Balance; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO; American Association of University Women; American Sexual Health Association; Black Women's Roundtable; National Coalition on Black Civic Participation ; California Women Lawyers ; Champion Women; District of Columbia Coalition Against Domestic Violence ; End Rape on Campus; Equal Rights Advocates; Family Values @ Work; Feminist Majority Foundation; Gender Justice ; Girls for Gender Equity; Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America, Inc.; Harvard Law School Gender Violence Program; Lawyers Club of San Diego; League of Women Voters of the United States; Legal Aid at Work ; Legal Momentum, the Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund; Legal Voice; Maine Women's Lobby ; Medical Students for Choice; National Asian Pacific American Women's Forum ; National Alliance to End Sexual Violence; The National Crittenton Foundation; National Employment Law Project; National Employment Lawyers Association; National Organization for Women (Now) Foundation; National Partnership for Women and Families; National Women's Political Caucus; Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice; People for American Way Foundation; Service Employees International Union; SisterReach ; Southwest Women's Law Center ; Stop Sexual Assault in Schools; The National Urban League; Women's Law Center of Maryland, Inc Orporated; Women Employed ; Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia; Women's Bar Association of the State of New York; Women's Law Project, Amici Supporting Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1206\n\n\nEVANGELINE J. PARKER,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nREEMA CONSULTING SERVICES, INC.,\n\n Defendant - Appellee.\n\n----------------------------------------------------\n\nEQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; NATIONAL\nWOMENβS LAW CENTER; A BETTER BALANCE; AMERICAN\nFEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO;\nAMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN; AMERICAN\nSEXUAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION; BLACK WOMENβS ROUNDTABLE;\nNATIONAL COALITION ON BLACK CIVIC PARTICIPATION; CALIFORNIA\nWOMEN LAWYERS; CHAMPION WOMEN; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\nCOALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE; END RAPE ON CAMPUS;\nEQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; FAMILY VALUES @ WORK; FEMINIST\nMAJORITY FOUNDATION; GENDER JUSTICE; GIRLS FOR GENDER\nEQUITY; HADASSAH, THE WOMENβS ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF\nAMERICA, INC.; HARVARD LAW SCHOOL GENDER VIOLENCE\nPROGRAM; LAWYERS CLUB OF SAN DIEGO; LEAGUE OF WOMEN\nVOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES; LEGAL AID AT WORK; LEGAL\nMOMENTUM, THE WOMENβS LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND;\nLEGAL VOICE; MAINE WOMENβS LOBBY; MEDICAL STUDENTS FOR\nCHOICE; NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN WOMENβS FORUM;\nNATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE; THE NATIONAL\nCRITTENTON FOUNDATION; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT;\nNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL\nORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN (NOW) FOUNDATION; NATIONAL\nPARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES; NATIONAL WOMENβS\n\nPOLITICAL CAUCUS; OKLAHOMA COALITION FOR REPRODUCTIVE\nJUSTICE; PEOPLE FOR AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION; SERVICE\nEMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION; SISTERREACH; SOUTHWEST\nWOMENβS LAW CENTER; STOP SEXUAL ASSAULT IN SCHOOLS; THE\nNATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE; WOMENβS LAW CENTER OF MARYLAND,\nINCORPORATED; WOMEN EMPLOYED; WOMENβS BAR ASSOCIATION\nOF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; WOMENβS BAR ASSOCIATION OF\nTHE STATE OF NEW YORK; WOMENβS LAW PROJECT,\n\n Amici Supporting Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:17-cv-01648-RWT)\n\n\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 8, 2019\n\n\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the\nopinion, in which Judge Agee joined in full and Judge Diaz joined except as to Part IV.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Evangeline J. PARKER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. REEMA CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., Defendant - Appellee. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; National Women's Law Center; A Better Balance; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO; American Association of University Women; American Sexual Health Association; Black Women's Roundtable; National Coalition on Black Civic Participation ; California Women Lawyers ; Champion Women; District of Columbia Coalition Against Domestic Violence ; End Rape on Campus; Equal Rights Advocates; Family Values @ Work; Feminist Majority Foundation; Gender Justice ; Girls for Gender Equity; Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America, Inc.; Harvard Law School Gender Violence Program; Lawyers Club of San Diego; League of Women Voters of the United States; Legal Aid at Work ; Legal Momentum, the Women's Legal Defense and Education Fund; Legal Voice; Maine Women's Lobby ; Medical Students for Choice; National Asian Pacific American Women's Forum ; National Alliance to End Sexual Violence; The National Crittenton Foundation; National Employment Law Project; National Employment Lawyers Association; National Organization for Women (Now) Foundation; National Partnership for Women and Families; National Women's Political Caucus; Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice; People for American Way Foundation; Service Employees International Union; SisterReach ; Southwest Women's Law Center ; Stop Sexual Assault in Schools; The National Urban League; Women's Law Center of Maryland, Inc Orporated; Women Employed ; Women's Bar Association of the District of Columbia; Women's Bar Association of the State of New York; Women's Law Project, Amici Supporting Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1206\\n\\n\\nEVANGELINE J. PARKER,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nREEMA CONSULTING SERVICES, INC.,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee.\\n\\n----------------------------------------------------\\n\\nEQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION; NATIONAL\\nWOMENβS LAW CENTER; A BETTER BALANCE; AMERICAN\\nFEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO;\\nAMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN; AMERICAN\\nSEXUAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION; BLACK WOMENβS ROUNDTABLE;\\nNATIONAL COALITION ON BLACK CIVIC PARTICIPATION; CALIFORNIA\\nWOMEN LAWYERS; CHAMPION WOMEN; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\\nCOALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE; END RAPE ON CAMPUS;\\nEQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; FAMILY VALUES @ WORK; FEMINIST\\nMAJORITY FOUNDATION; GENDER JUSTICE; GIRLS FOR GENDER\\nEQUITY; HADASSAH, THE WOMENβS ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF\\nAMERICA, INC.; HARVARD LAW SCHOOL GENDER VIOLENCE\\nPROGRAM; LAWYERS CLUB OF SAN DIEGO; LEAGUE OF WOMEN\\nVOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES; LEGAL AID AT WORK; LEGAL\\nMOMENTUM, THE WOMENβS LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND;\\nLEGAL VOICE; MAINE WOMENβS LOBBY; MEDICAL STUDENTS FOR\\nCHOICE; NATIONAL ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN WOMENβS FORUM;\\nNATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE; THE NATIONAL\\nCRITTENTON FOUNDATION; NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT;\\nNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL\\nORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN (NOW) FOUNDATION; NATIONAL\\nPARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES; NATIONAL WOMENβS\\n\\nPOLITICAL CAUCUS; OKLAHOMA COALITION FOR REPRODUCTIVE\\nJUSTICE; PEOPLE FOR AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION; SERVICE\\nEMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION; SISTERREACH; SOUTHWEST\\nWOMENβS LAW CENTER; STOP SEXUAL ASSAULT IN SCHOOLS; THE\\nNATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE; WOMENβS LAW CENTER OF MARYLAND,\\nINCORPORATED; WOMEN EMPLOYED; WOMENβS BAR ASSOCIATION\\nOF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; WOMENβS BAR ASSOCIATION OF\\nTHE STATE OF NEW YORK; WOMENβS LAW PROJECT,\\n\\n Amici Supporting Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:17-cv-01648-RWT)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 8, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the\\nopinion, in which Judge Agee joined in full and Judge Diaz joined except as to Part IV.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":556,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4589556,"string":"4,589,556"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Samuel Pratt"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-4489"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before MOTZ, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-4489\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSAMUEL PRATT, a/k/a Promise,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at\\nColumbia. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District Judge. (3:16-cr-00207-TLW-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: September 28, 2018 Decided: February 8, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore MOTZ, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote\\nthe opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Agee joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: David Bruce Betts, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID B. BETTS, Columbia,\\nSouth Carolina, for Appellant. James Hunter May, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Beth Drake,\\nUnited States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,\\nSouth Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Samuel Pratt was convicted of eight counts related to sex trafficking and child\\n\\npornography. He appeals on two grounds. On the first ground, we hold that the district\\n\\ncourt should have suppressed evidence from Prattβs cellphone. That error was not\\n\\nharmless because the remaining evidence does not satisfy the elements of the two child\\n\\npornography counts. On the second ground, we hold that the district court did not err in\\n\\nadmitting hearsay statements. Accordingly, we vacate Prattβs convictions on the two\\n\\nchild pornography counts, affirm his other six convictions, vacate his sentence, and\\n\\nremand to the district court.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n FBI agents in the Carolinas investigated Samuel Pratt for running a prostitution\\n\\nring that included juveniles. The agents found a post on Backpage.com in which Pratt\\n\\nadvertised the sexual services of seventeen-year-old βRMβ 1 at a hotel in Columbia, South\\n\\nCarolina. An agent scheduled a βdateβ with RM at the hotel for February 3, 2016. When\\n\\nthe agent entered the hotel room, he identified himself to RM as law enforcement. She\\n\\nagreed to speak with several agents. RM told them she was seventeen and working as a\\n\\nprostitute at the hotel. She said her βboyfriendβ Pratt brought her across state lines from\\n\\nNorth Carolina. J.A. 66. Responding to an agentβs question, she said she had texted\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We refer to minor victims solely by their initials.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fnude photographs of herself to Prattβs phone. RM allowed FBI agents to take her\\n\\ncellphone.\\n\\n At the same time, two FBI agents spoke to Pratt in the hotel parking lot. Agent\\n\\nStansbury, who had spoken with RM, joined them. Stansbury confronted Pratt, who was\\n\\nholding an iPhone. Pratt told Stansbury the phone was his. Stansbury asked if Pratt had\\n\\nnude photos of RM on the phone. Pratt responded βyes, Iβve got pictures of her on the\\n\\nphone.β J.A. 67.\\n\\n Stansbury then seized the phone, telling Pratt the FBI would get a search warrant.\\n\\nPratt refused to consent to the seizure or disclose the phoneβs passcode. And the FBI\\n\\ndidnβt get a warrant to search the phone until March 4, 2016βa full 31 days after seizing\\n\\nit. When agents finally searched the phone, they found nude images of RM and\\n\\nincriminating text conversations with RM and others.\\n\\n Soon after, a federal grand jury indicted Pratt. 2 At Prattβs initial appearance, the\\n\\nmagistrate judge ordered him to have no contact with anyone βwho is a witness, or may\\n\\nbe a witness, or a victim.β J.A. 524. Despite that order, Pratt repeatedly called his\\n\\nmother from prison to coordinate continued prostitution operations. In several calls, he\\n\\nhad his mother put RM on the phone. He repeatedly told RM not to testify or cooperate.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The nine counts were: (1) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, (2) producing\\nchild pornography, (3) sex trafficking of a minor, (4) attempt to commit sex trafficking,\\n(5) possession of child pornography, (6) coercion or enticement of a minor, (7) felon in\\npossession of a firearm, (8) obstruction of justice, and (9) interstate travel to carry on an\\nunlawful activity. The government dismissed count nine before trial.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Before trial, Pratt moved to suppress evidence from his phone. In his written\\n\\npleadings, Pratt only contended that the seizure of the phone was unconstitutional. But at\\n\\nthe suppression hearing, he also argued that the delay between the seizure and obtaining\\n\\nthe search warrant was unconstitutional. The government explained that the delay came\\n\\nfrom the need to decide whether to seek a warrant in North Carolina or South Carolina.\\n\\nRuling from the bench, the district court denied the suppression motion, finding the\\n\\nseizure justified and the delay reasonable.\\n\\n The government tried to get RM to testify. Several months after Prattβs calls from\\n\\njail, the FBI served her with a subpoena. When agents later spoke to her, she refused to\\n\\ntestify. The FBI obtained a material witness warrant for her, but the U.S. Marshals\\n\\ncouldnβt find her. Several other women would testify at trial that Pratt would beat any\\n\\nprostituteβincluding RMβwhom he considered disobedient.\\n\\n With RM unavailable, the government sought to introduce her statements to FBI\\n\\nagents about the prostitution ring and about the nude images she sent Pratt. The district\\n\\ncourt overruled Prattβs hearsay and confrontation objections, ruling that Pratt forfeited\\n\\nthose objections by intimidating RM into refusing to testify. An agent then recounted\\n\\nRMβs statements.\\n\\n In addition, the government introduced evidence from Prattβs cellphone. That\\n\\nevidence included 28 images alleged to be child pornography, metadata for the images,\\n\\ntext message conversations, and advertisements Pratt placed for prostitution. The\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fgovernment also introduced an βextraction reportβ on data from RMβs phone. It included\\n\\ntext messages but didnβt include photos or videos. 3\\n\\n The jury convicted Pratt on all eight counts. The district court imposed life\\n\\nsentences on four counts and concurrent time on the other four. Pratt appeals the denial\\n\\nof his suppression motion and the admission of RMβs prior statements.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Pratt contends that the district court should have suppressed information from his\\n\\ncellphone because the FBI unreasonably delayed getting a search warrant. He does not\\n\\ncontend that the seizure of the phone itself was unconstitutional. To justify the delay, the\\n\\ngovernment points to the difficulty of coordinating the various law enforcement agencies\\n\\ninvolved in the Pratt investigation and deciding where to seek a search warrant for the\\n\\nphone. In the alternative, the government argues that it could keep the phone indefinitely\\n\\nbecause it was an instrumentality of Prattβs crimes.\\n\\n We review the factual findings in a suppression motion for clear error and the\\n\\nlegal conclusions de novo. 4 See United States v. Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232, 237 (4th Cir.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n An agent testified that the extraction report is βjust like the call logs, the text\\nmessages . . . I donβt think this has the videos, or any videos or pictures.β J.A. 187. The\\nprosecutor asked, βSo, just to be clear, Exhibit 21, forensic download, absent videos and\\nphotographs?β Id. The agent responded, βCorrect.β Id.\\n 4\\n The government contends that we should apply plain error review because Pratt\\ndidnβt mention unreasonable delay in his motion papers. We disagree. Pratt pressed the\\nargument at the suppression hearing and the district court expressly ruled from the bench\\non the claim of delay in obtaining the search warrant. See United States v. Williams, 504\\n(Continued)\\n 5\\n\\f2018). If the district court erred, we must assess whether any such error was harmless.\\n\\nSee Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 231 (4th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n We hold that the district court erred by denying the suppression motion and that\\n\\nthe error was not harmless regarding the child pornography counts.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The constitutional question is whether the extended seizure of Prattβs phone was\\n\\nreasonable. A seizure that is βlawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory\\n\\ninterests.β United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (citing United States v.\\n\\nPlace, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)). To determine if an extended seizure violates the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment, we balance the governmentβs interest in the seizure against the individualβs\\n\\npossessory interest in the object seized. See Place, 462 U.S. at 703; United States v. Van\\n\\nLeeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252β53 (1970).\\n\\n A strong government interest can justify an extended seizure. See, e.g., Illinois v.\\n\\nMcArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332β33 (2001) (suspect prevented from entering home for two\\n\\nhours while officers obtained a warrant); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473\\n\\nU.S. 531, 541β44 (1985) (suspected alimentary canal smuggler detained for 16 hours);\\n\\nVan Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252β53 (package detained for 29 hours while seeking a\\n\\nwarrant). But if the individualβs interest outweighs the governmentβs, an extended\\n\\n\\n\\nU.S. 36, 41 (1992) (argument is preserved if pressed or passed upon). Pratt therefore\\npreserved this argument and the plain error standard does not apply.\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\fseizure may be unreasonable. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615β16\\n\\n(2015) (traffic stop extended for dog sniff without reasonable suspicion); Place, 462 U.S.\\n\\nat 698β99 (travelerβs luggage detained at airport for 90 minutes to conduct dog sniff). An\\n\\nindividual diminishes his interest if he consents to the seizure or voluntarily shares the\\n\\nseized objectβs contents. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1162β63\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n Here, Pratt didnβt diminish his possessory interest in the phone. He didnβt consent\\n\\nto its seizure or voluntarily share the phoneβs contents. The governmentβs only\\n\\nexplanation for the 31-day delay in obtaining a warrant was that Pratt committed crimes\\n\\nin both North Carolina and South Carolina and agents had to decide where to seek a\\n\\nwarrant. We find this explanation insufficient to justify the extended seizure of Prattβs\\n\\nphone.\\n\\n Prattβs case parallels United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009).\\n\\nThere, an agent seized a computer but failed to obtain a search warrant for 21 days. Id. at\\n\\n1351. The agent explained that he left town for a lengthy training and didnβt think the\\n\\nwarrant was urgent. Id. The Eleventh Circuit considered the seizure unreasonable\\n\\nbecause the agent could have applied for a warrant before he left or passed the case to\\n\\nsomeone else. Id. at 1351β52. But the court cautioned that overwhelmed police\\n\\nresources or other βoverriding circumstancesβ could justify extended delays. Id. at 1353.\\n\\n The Eleventh Circuit has applied this standard in two later cases. In United States\\n\\nv. Vallimont, 378 F. Appβx 972, 975β76 (11th Cir. 2010), it upheld a 45-day delay in\\n\\ngetting a search warrant for a seized computer. The delay was reasonable because the\\n\\n 7\\n\\finvestigator was diverted to other cases, the countyβs resources were overwhelmed, and\\n\\nthe defendant diminished his privacy interest by giving another person access to the\\n\\ncomputer. Id. And in United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 616β17 (11th Cir. 2012), the\\n\\ncourt upheld a 25-day delay in getting a search warrant for a seized computer. The delay\\n\\nwas reasonable because the agents worked diligently on the affidavit; they were\\n\\nresponsible for investigations in ten counties; and the defendant consented to the seizure\\n\\nand had been allowed to keep certain files, diminishing his privacy interest. Id. Other\\n\\ncircuits have upheld equivalent delays where the government could justify them. 5\\n\\n Prattβs case is closest to Mitchell because the government has no persuasive\\n\\njustification for the delay in obtaining a search warrant for Prattβs phone. Unlike the\\n\\nagencies in Vallimont and Laist, the FBIβs resources were not overwhelmed. Simply put,\\n\\nthe agents here failed to exercise diligence by spending a whole month debating where to\\n\\nget a warrant. See United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1033β34 (7th Cir. 2012)\\n\\n(describing diligence as an important factor). That decision shouldnβt have taken a\\n\\nmonth. It is unlikely that the forum for a warrant would affect a later prosecution: a point\\n\\nthe government conceded at oral argument. 6 And unlike in Vallimont and Laist, Pratt had\\n\\n\\n 5\\n See, e.g., United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2002) (magistrate\\nunavailable); United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (delay fell over\\nweekends and Christmas); United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 230β31 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n(delay to transport package for dog sniff); United States v. Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049, 1050,\\n1054 (7th Cir. 1989) (delay over weekend to corroborate tip and procure drug-sniffing\\ndog).\\n 6\\n The Seventh Circuit did accept a six-day delay for an officer to seek a warrant\\nfor a cellphone where he needed to consult with prosecutors and with the officer who\\n(Continued)\\n 8\\n\\fan undiminished possessory interest in the cellphoneβhe didnβt consent to the seizure\\n\\nand he wasnβt allowed to retain any of the phoneβs files. Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S.\\n\\nCt. 2473, 2494β95 (2014) (describing the strong privacy interest in a cellphone). Given\\n\\nPrattβs undiminished interest, a 31-day delay violates the Fourth Amendment where the\\n\\ngovernment neither proceeds diligently nor presents an overriding reason for the delay.\\n\\n We decline to affirm on the governmentβs alternative argument that it could retain\\n\\nthe phone indefinitely because it had independent evidentiary value, like a murder\\n\\nweapon. Only the phoneβs files had evidentiary value. The agents could have removed\\n\\nor copied incriminating files and returned the phone. Prattβs phone is thus distinct from\\n\\nthe suitcase in United States v. Carter, 139 F.3d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). In\\n\\nCarter, the police arrested a man at an airport for stealing another travelerβs bag. Id. We\\n\\naffirmed that the police could retain the manβs own suitcase as evidence he didnβt take\\n\\nthe other bag by mistake. Id. But here, the phone itself is evidence of nothing.\\n\\n We hold that the delay in obtaining a search warrant was unreasonable. The\\n\\ndistrict court therefore erred in denying Prattβs motion to suppress.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nseized the phone. See Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033β34. But the Seventh Circuit criticized\\nthat delay, and Prattβs delay was more than five times as long. See id.\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f But even though the district court should have suppressed evidence from Prattβs\\n\\ncellphone, we must examine whether the error was harmless. 7 See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at\\n\\n231. On appeal, β[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect\\n\\nsubstantial rights must be disregarded.β Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The essential question is\\n\\nwhether βit [is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the\\n\\ndefendant guilty absent the error.β United States v. Garcia-Lagunas, 835 F.3d 479, 488\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).\\n\\n To answer that question, we look to the strength of the governmentβs remaining\\n\\nevidence, the centrality of the issue, steps taken to mitigate any error, and the closeness of\\n\\nthe case. See United States v. Recio, 884 F.3d 230, 238 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v.\\n\\nInce, 21 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 1994). The government bears the burden of establishing\\n\\nharmlessness. See Ince, 21 F.3d at 582.\\n\\n After examining the trial evidence, we are not satisfied that the government met its\\n\\nburden for counts two and five. Count two charges Pratt with producing images\\n\\ncontaining child pornography, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2251(a); count five charges him with\\n\\npossessing images containing child pornography, id. Β§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). Both charges\\n\\n\\n 7\\n The following harmless error discussion only applies to count two (producing\\nchild pornography) and count five (possessing child pornography). Prattβs phone is\\nirrelevant to counts seven (felon in possession) and eight (obstruction of justice). The\\nerror does affect the sex trafficking and enticement charges (counts one, three, four, and\\nsix), for which text messages from Prattβs phone were evidence. But the error was\\nharmless for those four counts because the government introduced duplicates of many of\\nthose text messages from RMβs phone and elicited extensive testimony about the\\nprostitution operation.\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\frequire the government to prove that the images depict a minor engaging in βsexually\\n\\nexplicit conduct.β See id. §§ 2251(a), 2252A(a)(5)(B). The two offenses include slightly\\n\\ndifferent categories of conduct. See id. §§ 2251(a), 2256(2)(A) (count two); id.\\n\\n§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(2)(B), 2256(8)(B) (count five). But under both definitions, the\\n\\nonly relevant category is βlascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.β 8 Id.\\n\\nΒ§ 2256(2)(A), (2)(B). Thus, if the trial evidence that did not come from Prattβs phone is\\n\\ninsufficient to find that the images fit into this category, the error cannot be harmless.\\n\\n Beyond Prattβs phone, the government introduced insufficient evidence that the\\n\\nimages meet the statutory requirements. As evidence for the child pornography counts,\\n\\nthe government introduced Agent Stansburyβs recollection of statements RM and Pratt\\n\\nmade at the hotel. Those statements were admissible under the hearsay exception for\\n\\nforfeiture by wrongdoing, as discussed in Part III below. Stansbury recounted RMβs\\n\\nstatements about the photos twice. First, he recounted her saying βhe did have naked\\n\\nphotos of her, that they sent each other naked photos . . . . [H]eβs got naked photos of me\\n\\non his cell phone.β J.A. 66. Second, he recounted her saying she βsent him nude\\n\\nphotographs of herself and that he had nude photographs of her on his phone . . . . [H]e\\n\\nhas naked pictures of me on his cell phone.β J.A. 66β67. 9 And Stansbury said he asked\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n From the trial testimony, we canβt infer that the images contained any of the\\nother categories of conductβsexual intercourse, masturbation, bestiality, or sadistic or\\nmasochistic abuse. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2256(2)(A), (2)(B).\\n 9\\n Another agent said RM suggested that βthere was child pornographyβ on Prattβs\\nphone. J.A. 57. But the agent appears to have used βchild pornographyβ colloquially, not\\n(Continued)\\n 11\\n\\fPratt β[D]o you have naked pictures of [RM] . . . on the phone?β to which he says Pratt\\n\\nresponded βyes, Iβve got pictures of her on the phone.β J.A. 67. 10\\n\\n In each statement, the photos are described solely with the generic terms βnakedβ\\n\\nor βnude.β Some βnakedβ or βnudeβ photos are lascivious and display the genitals or\\n\\npubic area. But many photos an ordinary viewer would describe as βnakedβ or βnudeβ\\n\\nare not lascivious or do not depict the genitals or pubic area. Thus, without more, we\\n\\ncanβt infer that the photos contain sexually explicit conduct as defined by statute.\\n\\n Considering all the trial testimony, there was insufficient evidence for a βrational\\n\\ntrier of factβ to find the βessential element[]β that the photos contained sexually explicit\\n\\nconduct. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Given this failure of proof, the\\n\\nerror was not harmless regarding counts two and five. We therefore vacate Prattβs\\n\\nconvictions for the two child pornography offenses. 11\\n\\n C.\\n\\n\\n\\nas a legal conclusion. No witness testified that the photos depicted the genitals or pubic\\narea.\\n 10\\n At trial, FBI agents described the images from Prattβs phone as βnudeβ photos of\\nRM. J.A. 174, 359. At least one of those descriptions derived from viewing the photos.\\nJ.A. 174. That description should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States,\\n371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (β[T]estimony as to matters observed during an unlawful\\ninvasionβ is also subject to exclusion.). In any event, the agentsβ generic description of\\nthe photos adds nothing new.\\n 11\\n When the government addressed harmless error at oral argument, it incorrectly\\nstated that it had introduced copies of pornographic images from RMβs phone. In a post-\\nargument submission, the government conceded that no such images had been\\nintroduced.\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f We must also decide whether to vacate Prattβs entire sentence in light of this error.\\n\\nβ[A]n appellate court when reversing one part of a defendantβs sentence βmay vacate the\\n\\nentire sentence . . . so that, on remand the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing\\n\\nplan.ββ Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011) (quoting Greenlaw v. United\\n\\nStates, 554 U.S. 237, 253 (2008)). This court has recognized that district courts consider\\n\\nall counts when crafting sentencing packages. See United States v. Smith, 115 F.3d 241,\\n\\n246 (4th Cir. 1997). We do have discretion to vacate only the sentences for vacated\\n\\nconvictions. See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 482β83 (4th Cir. 2006);\\n\\nUnited States v. Berry, 369 F. Appβx 500, 502β03 (4th Cir. 2010). But because sentences\\n\\nare often interconnected, a full resentencing is typically appropriate when we vacate one\\n\\nor more convictions. See United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n Here, the district court likely crafted a sentencing package with all eight\\n\\nconvictions in mind. A resentencing might not change how long Pratt stays in prison,\\n\\ngiven that the district court imposed multiple life sentences. But βthere may be some\\n\\nchance that other parts of [Prattβs] sentence may be affected byβ vacating the child\\n\\npornography counts. United States v. Jones, No. 95-5370, 1998 WL 19620, at *7 (4th\\n\\nCir. Apr. 22, 1998). The district court is in the best position to make that judgment. We\\n\\ntherefore vacate Prattβs entire sentence. On remand, the government may retry Pratt for\\n\\nthe child pornography counts. Once the government has retried him or declined to do so,\\n\\nthe district court shall resentence Pratt and βmake any correction to his sentence it deems\\n\\nappropriate.β Id. We express no opinion on whether the district court should modify his\\n\\nsentence.\\n\\n 13\\n\\f III.\\n\\n In addition to his Fourth Amendment argument, Pratt contends that the district\\n\\ncourt erred by admitting an FBI agentβs recollection of RMβs statements about the\\n\\nprostitution business and the nude images she sent him. Unlike most evidentiary issues,\\n\\nwe review this ruling de novo because it implicates the Confrontation Clause. See United\\n\\nStates v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2011). We see no error.\\n\\n The district court admitted RMβs statements under the βforfeiture by wrongdoingβ\\n\\nexception to the hearsay rule. Under this exception, a district court may admit hearsay\\n\\nstatements βoffered against a party that wrongfully causedβor acquiesced in wrongfully\\n\\ncausingβthe declarantβs unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.β\\n\\nFed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). The elements are (1) wrongful conduct, (2) intended to cause\\n\\nthe witnessβs unavailability, and (3) actually causing the witnessβs unavailability. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Jackson, 706 F.3d 264, 267β69 (4th Cir. 2013). The Constitution\\n\\nnormally forbids testimonial statements from an unavailable witness whom the defendant\\n\\nhad no previous chance to cross-examine. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Crawford v.\\n\\nWashington, 541 U.S. 36, 68β69 (2004). But the Supreme Court has recognized that\\n\\nwrongfully and intentionally causing a witnessβs unavailability estops a defendant from\\n\\nasserting confrontation rights. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008);\\n\\nCrawford, 541 U.S. at 62.\\n\\n Several times, Pratt called his mother from jail and had her put RM on the phone.\\n\\nThe government contends that Pratt threatened RM in these calls. Those calls plus Prattβs\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\fhistory of violence against women caused RM not to testify, in the governmentβs view.\\n\\nPratt denies that he intended to threaten RM and that his calls caused her unavailability.\\n\\n There is no question Pratt engaged in wrongful conduct when he violated the\\n\\nmagistrate judgeβs order and contacted a potential witness (and victim) from jail. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099, 1103β04 (10th Cir. 2005) (violating order not\\n\\nto contact witness is wrongful). Thus, the only questions are intent and causation.\\n\\n In his phone conversations with RM from jail, Prattβs intent to make RM\\n\\nunavailable is plain. As an ineffective ruse, Pratt would pretend to be talking to someone\\n\\nother than RM. In the first call he said, speaking of RM, β[f]or some reason they saying\\n\\nthat sheβs a witness . . like she cooperating or something . . . Iβm saying donβt even try\\n\\nand speak to her or nothing because even if . . . anybody tries to speak to her Iβm gone get\\n\\nin trouble understand.β J.A. 676. He followed up with, βI hope you donβt think sheβs\\n\\ncooperating right.β Id. RM said she was not cooperating. Id. Pratt then said, βI hope if\\n\\n[RM] is talking to [βAMβ (another minor victim)] . . . I hope she can find out if [AM is]\\n\\ncooperating too.β Id. βI just hope neither one of them is cooperating,β he continued. Id.\\n\\nOver and over, Pratt tried to dissuade RM from testifying.\\n\\n In a second call, he told her β[RM] and [AM] need to speak cause . . . thatβs the\\n\\ntwo pieces to the puzzle that . . . get me out of here donβt you talk to them.β J.A. 677\\n\\n(emphasis added). In a third call, he urged her to deny that he used the alias βPromise,β\\n\\nwith which some witnesses would identify him at trial. J.A. 679. Pretending that he was\\n\\nspeaking to RMβs cousin, he told her the government was calling RM a βwitnessβ and\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\fwould question her. Id. He urged her to deny any knowledge. J.A. 680. In all three\\n\\ncalls, Pratt tried to get RM not to testify or not to testify honestly.\\n\\n Those calls caused RMβs unavailability. Standing alone, the calls sound like\\n\\nveiled threats. But the threats become obvious against the backdrop of the graphic\\n\\ntestimony of several women at trial who detailed how Pratt would beat prostitutesβ\\n\\nincluding RMβwhom he considered disobedient. See Montague, 421 F.3d at 1102β04\\n\\n(recognizing forfeiture from wrongdoing through threatening phone calls and history of\\n\\nabuse); State v. Maestas, 412 P.3d 79, 90β91 (N.M. 2018) (same). RM would have\\n\\nreceived the message that Pratt would hurt her in the future if she disobeyed Pratt and\\n\\ntestified against him.\\n\\n Pratt contends that the time lapse between the phone calls and the trial reduced the\\n\\nsalience of any threat. But given Prattβs history of abusing RM, we think it unlikely that\\n\\ntime eroded the sense of threat. That threat caused RM not to testify. Her personal\\n\\nfeelings for Prattβwhom she considered her boyfriendβmay have played a role too.\\n\\nBut those feelings were tied up in the same abusive relationship.\\n\\n The district court did not err by admitting an agentβs recollection of RMβs\\n\\nstatements.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n In sum, the district court erred by refusing to suppress information from Prattβs\\n\\ncellphone. The error was not harmless because the governmentβs other evidence could\\n\\nnot establish the statutory elements of counts two and five. On the evidentiary issue, the\\n\\n 16\\n\\fdistrict court did not err by admitting RMβs hearsay statements under Federal Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 804(b)(6). Accordingly, we vacate Prattβs convictions for counts two and five\\n\\nand affirm the remaining convictions. We also vacate Prattβs sentence and remand to the\\n\\ndistrict court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366809/\", \"author_raw\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MOTZ"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"AGEE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DIAZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"MOTZ\": \", Circuit\", \"AGEE\": \", Circuit\", \"DIAZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589556/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Samuel Pratt\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-4489\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nSAMUEL PRATT, a/k/a Promise,\n\n Defendant β Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at\nColumbia. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District Judge. (3:16-cr-00207-TLW-1)\n\n\nArgued: September 28, 2018 Decided: February 8, 2019\n\n\nBefore MOTZ, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote\nthe opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Agee joined.\n\n\nARGUED: David Bruce Betts, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID B. BETTS, Columbia,\nSouth Carolina, for Appellant. James Hunter May, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\nATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Beth Drake,\nUnited States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,\nSouth Carolina, for Appellee.\n\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\n\n Samuel Pratt was convicted of eight counts related to sex trafficking and child\n\npornography. He appeals on two grounds. On the first ground, we hold that the district\n\ncourt should have suppressed evidence from Prattβs cellphone. That error was not\n\nharmless because the remaining evidence does not satisfy the elements of the two child\n\npornography counts. On the second ground, we hold that the district court did not err in\n\nadmitting hearsay statements. Accordingly, we vacate Prattβs convictions on the two\n\nchild pornography counts, affirm his other six convictions, vacate his sentence, and\n\nremand to the district court.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n FBI agents in the Carolinas investigated Samuel Pratt for running a prostitution\n\nring that included juveniles. The agents found a post on Backpage.com in which Pratt\n\nadvertised the sexual services of seventeen-year-old βRMβ 1 at a hotel in Columbia, South\n\nCarolina. An agent scheduled a βdateβ with RM at the hotel for February 3, 2016. When\n\nthe agent entered the hotel room, he identified himself to RM as law enforcement. She\n\nagreed to speak with several agents. RM told them she was seventeen and working as a\n\nprostitute at the hotel. She said her βboyfriendβ Pratt brought her across state lines from\n\nNorth Carolina. J.A. 66. Responding to an agentβs question, she said she had texted\n\n\n\n 1\n We refer to minor victims solely by their initials.\n\n\n 2\n\fnude photographs of herself to Prattβs phone. RM allowed FBI agents to take her\n\ncellphone.\n\n At the same time, two FBI agents spoke to Pratt in the hotel parking lot. Agent\n\nStansbury, who had spoken with RM, joined them. Stansbury confronted Pratt, who was\n\nholding an iPhone. Pratt told Stansbury the phone was his. Stansbury asked if Pratt had\n\nnude photos of RM on the phone. Pratt responded βyes, Iβve got pictures of her on the\n\nphone.β J.A. 67.\n\n Stansbury then seized the phone, telling Pratt the FBI would get a search warrant.\n\nPratt refused to consent to the seizure or disclose the phoneβs passcode. And the FBI\n\ndidnβt get a warrant to search the phone until March 4, 2016βa full 31 days after seizing\n\nit. When agents finally searched the phone, they found nude images of RM and\n\nincriminating text conversations with RM and others.\n\n Soon after, a federal grand jury indicted Pratt. 2 At Prattβs initial appearance, the\n\nmagistrate judge ordered him to have no contact with anyone βwho is a witness, or may\n\nbe a witness, or a victim.β J.A. 524. Despite that order, Pratt repeatedly called his\n\nmother from prison to coordinate continued prostitution operations. In several calls, he\n\nhad his mother put RM on the phone. He repeatedly told RM not to testify or cooperate.\n\n\n\n 2\n The nine counts were: (1) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, (2) producing\nchild pornography, (3) sex trafficking of a minor, (4) attempt to commit sex trafficking,\n(5) possession of child pornography, (6) coercion or enticement of a minor, (7) felon in\npossession of a firearm, (8) obstruction of justice, and (9) interstate travel to carry on an\nunlawful activity. The government dismissed count nine before trial.\n\n\n 3\n\f Before trial, Pratt moved to suppress evidence from his phone. In his written\n\npleadings, Pratt only contended that the seizure of the phone was unconstitutional. But at\n\nthe suppression hearing, he also argued that the delay between the seizure and obtaining\n\nthe search warrant was unconstitutional. The government explained that the delay came\n\nfrom the need to decide whether to seek a warrant in North Carolina or South Carolina.\n\nRuling from the bench, the district court denied the suppression motion, finding the\n\nseizure justified and the delay reasonable.\n\n The government tried to get RM to testify. Several months after Prattβs calls from\n\njail, the FBI served her with a subpoena. When agents later spoke to her, she refused to\n\ntestify. The FBI obtained a material witness warrant for her, but the U.S. Marshals\n\ncouldnβt find her. Several other women would testify at trial that Pratt would beat any\n\nprostituteβincluding RMβwhom he considered disobedient.\n\n With RM unavailable, the government sought to introduce her statements to FBI\n\nagents about the prostitution ring and about the nude images she sent Pratt. The district\n\ncourt overruled Prattβs hearsay and confrontation objections, ruling that Pratt forfeited\n\nthose objections by intimidating RM into refusing to testify. An agent then recounted\n\nRMβs statements.\n\n In addition, the government introduced evidence from Prattβs cellphone. That\n\nevidence included 28 images alleged to be child pornography, metadata for the images,\n\ntext message conversations, and advertisements Pratt placed for prostitution. The\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\fgovernment also introduced an βextraction reportβ on data from RMβs phone. It included\n\ntext messages but didnβt include photos or videos. 3\n\n The jury convicted Pratt on all eight counts. The district court imposed life\n\nsentences on four counts and concurrent time on the other four. Pratt appeals the denial\n\nof his suppression motion and the admission of RMβs prior statements.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n Pratt contends that the district court should have suppressed information from his\n\ncellphone because the FBI unreasonably delayed getting a search warrant. He does not\n\ncontend that the seizure of the phone itself was unconstitutional. To justify the delay, the\n\ngovernment points to the difficulty of coordinating the various law enforcement agencies\n\ninvolved in the Pratt investigation and deciding where to seek a search warrant for the\n\nphone. In the alternative, the government argues that it could keep the phone indefinitely\n\nbecause it was an instrumentality of Prattβs crimes.\n\n We review the factual findings in a suppression motion for clear error and the\n\nlegal conclusions de novo. 4 See United States v. Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232, 237 (4th Cir.\n\n\n 3\n An agent testified that the extraction report is βjust like the call logs, the text\nmessages . . . I donβt think this has the videos, or any videos or pictures.β J.A. 187. The\nprosecutor asked, βSo, just to be clear, Exhibit 21, forensic download, absent videos and\nphotographs?β Id. The agent responded, βCorrect.β Id.\n 4\n The government contends that we should apply plain error review because Pratt\ndidnβt mention unreasonable delay in his motion papers. We disagree. Pratt pressed the\nargument at the suppression hearing and the district court expressly ruled from the bench\non the claim of delay in obtaining the search warrant. See United States v. Williams, 504\n(Continued)\n 5\n\f2018). If the district court erred, we must assess whether any such error was harmless.\n\nSee Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 231 (4th Cir. 2008).\n\n We hold that the district court erred by denying the suppression motion and that\n\nthe error was not harmless regarding the child pornography counts.\n\n A.\n\n The constitutional question is whether the extended seizure of Prattβs phone was\n\nreasonable. A seizure that is βlawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth\n\nAmendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory\n\ninterests.β United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (citing United States v.\n\nPlace, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)). To determine if an extended seizure violates the Fourth\n\nAmendment, we balance the governmentβs interest in the seizure against the individualβs\n\npossessory interest in the object seized. See Place, 462 U.S. at 703; United States v. Van\n\nLeeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252β53 (1970).\n\n A strong government interest can justify an extended seizure. See, e.g., Illinois v.\n\nMcArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332β33 (2001) (suspect prevented from entering home for two\n\nhours while officers obtained a warrant); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473\n\nU.S. 531, 541β44 (1985) (suspected alimentary canal smuggler detained for 16 hours);\n\nVan Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252β53 (package detained for 29 hours while seeking a\n\nwarrant). But if the individualβs interest outweighs the governmentβs, an extended\n\n\n\nU.S. 36, 41 (1992) (argument is preserved if pressed or passed upon). Pratt therefore\npreserved this argument and the plain error standard does not apply.\n\n\n 6\n\fseizure may be unreasonable. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615β16\n\n(2015) (traffic stop extended for dog sniff without reasonable suspicion); Place, 462 U.S.\n\nat 698β99 (travelerβs luggage detained at airport for 90 minutes to conduct dog sniff). An\n\nindividual diminishes his interest if he consents to the seizure or voluntarily shares the\n\nseized objectβs contents. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1162β63\n\n(10th Cir. 2013).\n\n Here, Pratt didnβt diminish his possessory interest in the phone. He didnβt consent\n\nto its seizure or voluntarily share the phoneβs contents. The governmentβs only\n\nexplanation for the 31-day delay in obtaining a warrant was that Pratt committed crimes\n\nin both North Carolina and South Carolina and agents had to decide where to seek a\n\nwarrant. We find this explanation insufficient to justify the extended seizure of Prattβs\n\nphone.\n\n Prattβs case parallels United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009).\n\nThere, an agent seized a computer but failed to obtain a search warrant for 21 days. Id. at\n\n1351. The agent explained that he left town for a lengthy training and didnβt think the\n\nwarrant was urgent. Id. The Eleventh Circuit considered the seizure unreasonable\n\nbecause the agent could have applied for a warrant before he left or passed the case to\n\nsomeone else. Id. at 1351β52. But the court cautioned that overwhelmed police\n\nresources or other βoverriding circumstancesβ could justify extended delays. Id. at 1353.\n\n The Eleventh Circuit has applied this standard in two later cases. In United States\n\nv. Vallimont, 378 F. Appβx 972, 975β76 (11th Cir. 2010), it upheld a 45-day delay in\n\ngetting a search warrant for a seized computer. The delay was reasonable because the\n\n 7\n\finvestigator was diverted to other cases, the countyβs resources were overwhelmed, and\n\nthe defendant diminished his privacy interest by giving another person access to the\n\ncomputer. Id. And in United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 616β17 (11th Cir. 2012), the\n\ncourt upheld a 25-day delay in getting a search warrant for a seized computer. The delay\n\nwas reasonable because the agents worked diligently on the affidavit; they were\n\nresponsible for investigations in ten counties; and the defendant consented to the seizure\n\nand had been allowed to keep certain files, diminishing his privacy interest. Id. Other\n\ncircuits have upheld equivalent delays where the government could justify them. 5\n\n Prattβs case is closest to Mitchell because the government has no persuasive\n\njustification for the delay in obtaining a search warrant for Prattβs phone. Unlike the\n\nagencies in Vallimont and Laist, the FBIβs resources were not overwhelmed. Simply put,\n\nthe agents here failed to exercise diligence by spending a whole month debating where to\n\nget a warrant. See United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1033β34 (7th Cir. 2012)\n\n(describing diligence as an important factor). That decision shouldnβt have taken a\n\nmonth. It is unlikely that the forum for a warrant would affect a later prosecution: a point\n\nthe government conceded at oral argument. 6 And unlike in Vallimont and Laist, Pratt had\n\n\n 5\n See, e.g., United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2002) (magistrate\nunavailable); United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (delay fell over\nweekends and Christmas); United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 230β31 (9th Cir. 1990)\n(delay to transport package for dog sniff); United States v. Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049, 1050,\n1054 (7th Cir. 1989) (delay over weekend to corroborate tip and procure drug-sniffing\ndog).\n 6\n The Seventh Circuit did accept a six-day delay for an officer to seek a warrant\nfor a cellphone where he needed to consult with prosecutors and with the officer who\n(Continued)\n 8\n\fan undiminished possessory interest in the cellphoneβhe didnβt consent to the seizure\n\nand he wasnβt allowed to retain any of the phoneβs files. Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S.\n\nCt. 2473, 2494β95 (2014) (describing the strong privacy interest in a cellphone). Given\n\nPrattβs undiminished interest, a 31-day delay violates the Fourth Amendment where the\n\ngovernment neither proceeds diligently nor presents an overriding reason for the delay.\n\n We decline to affirm on the governmentβs alternative argument that it could retain\n\nthe phone indefinitely because it had independent evidentiary value, like a murder\n\nweapon. Only the phoneβs files had evidentiary value. The agents could have removed\n\nor copied incriminating files and returned the phone. Prattβs phone is thus distinct from\n\nthe suitcase in United States v. Carter, 139 F.3d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). In\n\nCarter, the police arrested a man at an airport for stealing another travelerβs bag. Id. We\n\naffirmed that the police could retain the manβs own suitcase as evidence he didnβt take\n\nthe other bag by mistake. Id. But here, the phone itself is evidence of nothing.\n\n We hold that the delay in obtaining a search warrant was unreasonable. The\n\ndistrict court therefore erred in denying Prattβs motion to suppress.\n\n B.\n\n\n\n\nseized the phone. See Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033β34. But the Seventh Circuit criticized\nthat delay, and Prattβs delay was more than five times as long. See id.\n\n\n 9\n\f But even though the district court should have suppressed evidence from Prattβs\n\ncellphone, we must examine whether the error was harmless. 7 See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at\n\n231. On appeal, β[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect\n\nsubstantial rights must be disregarded.β Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The essential question is\n\nwhether βit [is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the\n\ndefendant guilty absent the error.β United States v. Garcia-Lagunas, 835 F.3d 479, 488\n\n(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).\n\n To answer that question, we look to the strength of the governmentβs remaining\n\nevidence, the centrality of the issue, steps taken to mitigate any error, and the closeness of\n\nthe case. See United States v. Recio, 884 F.3d 230, 238 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v.\n\nInce, 21 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 1994). The government bears the burden of establishing\n\nharmlessness. See Ince, 21 F.3d at 582.\n\n After examining the trial evidence, we are not satisfied that the government met its\n\nburden for counts two and five. Count two charges Pratt with producing images\n\ncontaining child pornography, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2251(a); count five charges him with\n\npossessing images containing child pornography, id. Β§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). Both charges\n\n\n 7\n The following harmless error discussion only applies to count two (producing\nchild pornography) and count five (possessing child pornography). Prattβs phone is\nirrelevant to counts seven (felon in possession) and eight (obstruction of justice). The\nerror does affect the sex trafficking and enticement charges (counts one, three, four, and\nsix), for which text messages from Prattβs phone were evidence. But the error was\nharmless for those four counts because the government introduced duplicates of many of\nthose text messages from RMβs phone and elicited extensive testimony about the\nprostitution operation.\n\n\n 10\n\frequire the government to prove that the images depict a minor engaging in βsexually\n\nexplicit conduct.β See id. §§ 2251(a), 2252A(a)(5)(B). The two offenses include slightly\n\ndifferent categories of conduct. See id. §§ 2251(a), 2256(2)(A) (count two); id.\n\n§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(2)(B), 2256(8)(B) (count five). But under both definitions, the\n\nonly relevant category is βlascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.β 8 Id.\n\nΒ§ 2256(2)(A), (2)(B). Thus, if the trial evidence that did not come from Prattβs phone is\n\ninsufficient to find that the images fit into this category, the error cannot be harmless.\n\n Beyond Prattβs phone, the government introduced insufficient evidence that the\n\nimages meet the statutory requirements. As evidence for the child pornography counts,\n\nthe government introduced Agent Stansburyβs recollection of statements RM and Pratt\n\nmade at the hotel. Those statements were admissible under the hearsay exception for\n\nforfeiture by wrongdoing, as discussed in Part III below. Stansbury recounted RMβs\n\nstatements about the photos twice. First, he recounted her saying βhe did have naked\n\nphotos of her, that they sent each other naked photos . . . . [H]eβs got naked photos of me\n\non his cell phone.β J.A. 66. Second, he recounted her saying she βsent him nude\n\nphotographs of herself and that he had nude photographs of her on his phone . . . . [H]e\n\nhas naked pictures of me on his cell phone.β J.A. 66β67. 9 And Stansbury said he asked\n\n\n\n 8\n From the trial testimony, we canβt infer that the images contained any of the\nother categories of conductβsexual intercourse, masturbation, bestiality, or sadistic or\nmasochistic abuse. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2256(2)(A), (2)(B).\n 9\n Another agent said RM suggested that βthere was child pornographyβ on Prattβs\nphone. J.A. 57. But the agent appears to have used βchild pornographyβ colloquially, not\n(Continued)\n 11\n\fPratt β[D]o you have naked pictures of [RM] . . . on the phone?β to which he says Pratt\n\nresponded βyes, Iβve got pictures of her on the phone.β J.A. 67. 10\n\n In each statement, the photos are described solely with the generic terms βnakedβ\n\nor βnude.β Some βnakedβ or βnudeβ photos are lascivious and display the genitals or\n\npubic area. But many photos an ordinary viewer would describe as βnakedβ or βnudeβ\n\nare not lascivious or do not depict the genitals or pubic area. Thus, without more, we\n\ncanβt infer that the photos contain sexually explicit conduct as defined by statute.\n\n Considering all the trial testimony, there was insufficient evidence for a βrational\n\ntrier of factβ to find the βessential element[]β that the photos contained sexually explicit\n\nconduct. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Given this failure of proof, the\n\nerror was not harmless regarding counts two and five. We therefore vacate Prattβs\n\nconvictions for the two child pornography offenses. 11\n\n C.\n\n\n\nas a legal conclusion. No witness testified that the photos depicted the genitals or pubic\narea.\n 10\n At trial, FBI agents described the images from Prattβs phone as βnudeβ photos of\nRM. J.A. 174, 359. At least one of those descriptions derived from viewing the photos.\nJ.A. 174. That description should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States,\n371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (β[T]estimony as to matters observed during an unlawful\ninvasionβ is also subject to exclusion.). In any event, the agentsβ generic description of\nthe photos adds nothing new.\n 11\n When the government addressed harmless error at oral argument, it incorrectly\nstated that it had introduced copies of pornographic images from RMβs phone. In a post-\nargument submission, the government conceded that no such images had been\nintroduced.\n\n\n 12\n\f We must also decide whether to vacate Prattβs entire sentence in light of this error.\n\nβ[A]n appellate court when reversing one part of a defendantβs sentence βmay vacate the\n\nentire sentence . . . so that, on remand the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing\n\nplan.ββ Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011) (quoting Greenlaw v. United\n\nStates, 554 U.S. 237, 253 (2008)). This court has recognized that district courts consider\n\nall counts when crafting sentencing packages. See United States v. Smith, 115 F.3d 241,\n\n246 (4th Cir. 1997). We do have discretion to vacate only the sentences for vacated\n\nconvictions. See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 482β83 (4th Cir. 2006);\n\nUnited States v. Berry, 369 F. Appβx 500, 502β03 (4th Cir. 2010). But because sentences\n\nare often interconnected, a full resentencing is typically appropriate when we vacate one\n\nor more convictions. See United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 2017).\n\n Here, the district court likely crafted a sentencing package with all eight\n\nconvictions in mind. A resentencing might not change how long Pratt stays in prison,\n\ngiven that the district court imposed multiple life sentences. But βthere may be some\n\nchance that other parts of [Prattβs] sentence may be affected byβ vacating the child\n\npornography counts. United States v. Jones, No. 95-5370, 1998 WL 19620, at *7 (4th\n\nCir. Apr. 22, 1998). The district court is in the best position to make that judgment. We\n\ntherefore vacate Prattβs entire sentence. On remand, the government may retry Pratt for\n\nthe child pornography counts. Once the government has retried him or declined to do so,\n\nthe district court shall resentence Pratt and βmake any correction to his sentence it deems\n\nappropriate.β Id. We express no opinion on whether the district court should modify his\n\nsentence.\n\n 13\n\f III.\n\n In addition to his Fourth Amendment argument, Pratt contends that the district\n\ncourt erred by admitting an FBI agentβs recollection of RMβs statements about the\n\nprostitution business and the nude images she sent him. Unlike most evidentiary issues,\n\nwe review this ruling de novo because it implicates the Confrontation Clause. See United\n\nStates v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2011). We see no error.\n\n The district court admitted RMβs statements under the βforfeiture by wrongdoingβ\n\nexception to the hearsay rule. Under this exception, a district court may admit hearsay\n\nstatements βoffered against a party that wrongfully causedβor acquiesced in wrongfully\n\ncausingβthe declarantβs unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.β\n\nFed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). The elements are (1) wrongful conduct, (2) intended to cause\n\nthe witnessβs unavailability, and (3) actually causing the witnessβs unavailability. See\n\nUnited States v. Jackson, 706 F.3d 264, 267β69 (4th Cir. 2013). The Constitution\n\nnormally forbids testimonial statements from an unavailable witness whom the defendant\n\nhad no previous chance to cross-examine. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Crawford v.\n\nWashington, 541 U.S. 36, 68β69 (2004). But the Supreme Court has recognized that\n\nwrongfully and intentionally causing a witnessβs unavailability estops a defendant from\n\nasserting confrontation rights. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008);\n\nCrawford, 541 U.S. at 62.\n\n Several times, Pratt called his mother from jail and had her put RM on the phone.\n\nThe government contends that Pratt threatened RM in these calls. Those calls plus Prattβs\n\n\n\n 14\n\fhistory of violence against women caused RM not to testify, in the governmentβs view.\n\nPratt denies that he intended to threaten RM and that his calls caused her unavailability.\n\n There is no question Pratt engaged in wrongful conduct when he violated the\n\nmagistrate judgeβs order and contacted a potential witness (and victim) from jail. See\n\nUnited States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099, 1103β04 (10th Cir. 2005) (violating order not\n\nto contact witness is wrongful). Thus, the only questions are intent and causation.\n\n In his phone conversations with RM from jail, Prattβs intent to make RM\n\nunavailable is plain. As an ineffective ruse, Pratt would pretend to be talking to someone\n\nother than RM. In the first call he said, speaking of RM, β[f]or some reason they saying\n\nthat sheβs a witness . . like she cooperating or something . . . Iβm saying donβt even try\n\nand speak to her or nothing because even if . . . anybody tries to speak to her Iβm gone get\n\nin trouble understand.β J.A. 676. He followed up with, βI hope you donβt think sheβs\n\ncooperating right.β Id. RM said she was not cooperating. Id. Pratt then said, βI hope if\n\n[RM] is talking to [βAMβ (another minor victim)] . . . I hope she can find out if [AM is]\n\ncooperating too.β Id. βI just hope neither one of them is cooperating,β he continued. Id.\n\nOver and over, Pratt tried to dissuade RM from testifying.\n\n In a second call, he told her β[RM] and [AM] need to speak cause . . . thatβs the\n\ntwo pieces to the puzzle that . . . get me out of here donβt you talk to them.β J.A. 677\n\n(emphasis added). In a third call, he urged her to deny that he used the alias βPromise,β\n\nwith which some witnesses would identify him at trial. J.A. 679. Pretending that he was\n\nspeaking to RMβs cousin, he told her the government was calling RM a βwitnessβ and\n\n\n\n 15\n\fwould question her. Id. He urged her to deny any knowledge. J.A. 680. In all three\n\ncalls, Pratt tried to get RM not to testify or not to testify honestly.\n\n Those calls caused RMβs unavailability. Standing alone, the calls sound like\n\nveiled threats. But the threats become obvious against the backdrop of the graphic\n\ntestimony of several women at trial who detailed how Pratt would beat prostitutesβ\n\nincluding RMβwhom he considered disobedient. See Montague, 421 F.3d at 1102β04\n\n(recognizing forfeiture from wrongdoing through threatening phone calls and history of\n\nabuse); State v. Maestas, 412 P.3d 79, 90β91 (N.M. 2018) (same). RM would have\n\nreceived the message that Pratt would hurt her in the future if she disobeyed Pratt and\n\ntestified against him.\n\n Pratt contends that the time lapse between the phone calls and the trial reduced the\n\nsalience of any threat. But given Prattβs history of abusing RM, we think it unlikely that\n\ntime eroded the sense of threat. That threat caused RM not to testify. Her personal\n\nfeelings for Prattβwhom she considered her boyfriendβmay have played a role too.\n\nBut those feelings were tied up in the same abusive relationship.\n\n The district court did not err by admitting an agentβs recollection of RMβs\n\nstatements.\n\n\n\n IV.\n\n In sum, the district court erred by refusing to suppress information from Prattβs\n\ncellphone. The error was not harmless because the governmentβs other evidence could\n\nnot establish the statutory elements of counts two and five. On the evidentiary issue, the\n\n 16\n\fdistrict court did not err by admitting RMβs hearsay statements under Federal Rule of\n\nEvidence 804(b)(6). Accordingly, we vacate Prattβs convictions for counts two and five\n\nand affirm the remaining convictions. We also vacate Prattβs sentence and remand to the\n\ndistrict court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n\n\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED\n\n\n\n\n 17\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Samuel Pratt\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-4489\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSAMUEL PRATT, a/k/a Promise,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at\\nColumbia. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District Judge. (3:16-cr-00207-TLW-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: September 28, 2018 Decided: February 8, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore MOTZ, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote\\nthe opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Agee joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: David Bruce Betts, LAW OFFICES OF DAVID B. BETTS, Columbia,\\nSouth Carolina, for Appellant. James Hunter May, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Beth Drake,\\nUnited States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,\\nSouth Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Samuel Pratt was convicted of eight counts related to sex trafficking and child\\n\\npornography. He appeals on two grounds. On the first ground, we hold that the district\\n\\ncourt should have suppressed evidence from Prattβs cellphone. That error was not\\n\\nharmless because the remaining evidence does not satisfy the elements of the two child\\n\\npornography counts. On the second ground, we hold that the district court did not err in\\n\\nadmitting hearsay statements. Accordingly, we vacate Prattβs convictions on the two\\n\\nchild pornography counts, affirm his other six convictions, vacate his sentence, and\\n\\nremand to the district court.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n FBI agents in the Carolinas investigated Samuel Pratt for running a prostitution\\n\\nring that included juveniles. The agents found a post on Backpage.com in which Pratt\\n\\nadvertised the sexual services of seventeen-year-old βRMβ 1 at a hotel in Columbia, South\\n\\nCarolina. An agent scheduled a βdateβ with RM at the hotel for February 3, 2016. When\\n\\nthe agent entered the hotel room, he identified himself to RM as law enforcement. She\\n\\nagreed to speak with several agents. RM told them she was seventeen and working as a\\n\\nprostitute at the hotel. She said her βboyfriendβ Pratt brought her across state lines from\\n\\nNorth Carolina. J.A. 66. Responding to an agentβs question, she said she had texted\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We refer to minor victims solely by their initials.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fnude photographs of herself to Prattβs phone. RM allowed FBI agents to take her\\n\\ncellphone.\\n\\n At the same time, two FBI agents spoke to Pratt in the hotel parking lot. Agent\\n\\nStansbury, who had spoken with RM, joined them. Stansbury confronted Pratt, who was\\n\\nholding an iPhone. Pratt told Stansbury the phone was his. Stansbury asked if Pratt had\\n\\nnude photos of RM on the phone. Pratt responded βyes, Iβve got pictures of her on the\\n\\nphone.β J.A. 67.\\n\\n Stansbury then seized the phone, telling Pratt the FBI would get a search warrant.\\n\\nPratt refused to consent to the seizure or disclose the phoneβs passcode. And the FBI\\n\\ndidnβt get a warrant to search the phone until March 4, 2016βa full 31 days after seizing\\n\\nit. When agents finally searched the phone, they found nude images of RM and\\n\\nincriminating text conversations with RM and others.\\n\\n Soon after, a federal grand jury indicted Pratt. 2 At Prattβs initial appearance, the\\n\\nmagistrate judge ordered him to have no contact with anyone βwho is a witness, or may\\n\\nbe a witness, or a victim.β J.A. 524. Despite that order, Pratt repeatedly called his\\n\\nmother from prison to coordinate continued prostitution operations. In several calls, he\\n\\nhad his mother put RM on the phone. He repeatedly told RM not to testify or cooperate.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The nine counts were: (1) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, (2) producing\\nchild pornography, (3) sex trafficking of a minor, (4) attempt to commit sex trafficking,\\n(5) possession of child pornography, (6) coercion or enticement of a minor, (7) felon in\\npossession of a firearm, (8) obstruction of justice, and (9) interstate travel to carry on an\\nunlawful activity. The government dismissed count nine before trial.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Before trial, Pratt moved to suppress evidence from his phone. In his written\\n\\npleadings, Pratt only contended that the seizure of the phone was unconstitutional. But at\\n\\nthe suppression hearing, he also argued that the delay between the seizure and obtaining\\n\\nthe search warrant was unconstitutional. The government explained that the delay came\\n\\nfrom the need to decide whether to seek a warrant in North Carolina or South Carolina.\\n\\nRuling from the bench, the district court denied the suppression motion, finding the\\n\\nseizure justified and the delay reasonable.\\n\\n The government tried to get RM to testify. Several months after Prattβs calls from\\n\\njail, the FBI served her with a subpoena. When agents later spoke to her, she refused to\\n\\ntestify. The FBI obtained a material witness warrant for her, but the U.S. Marshals\\n\\ncouldnβt find her. Several other women would testify at trial that Pratt would beat any\\n\\nprostituteβincluding RMβwhom he considered disobedient.\\n\\n With RM unavailable, the government sought to introduce her statements to FBI\\n\\nagents about the prostitution ring and about the nude images she sent Pratt. The district\\n\\ncourt overruled Prattβs hearsay and confrontation objections, ruling that Pratt forfeited\\n\\nthose objections by intimidating RM into refusing to testify. An agent then recounted\\n\\nRMβs statements.\\n\\n In addition, the government introduced evidence from Prattβs cellphone. That\\n\\nevidence included 28 images alleged to be child pornography, metadata for the images,\\n\\ntext message conversations, and advertisements Pratt placed for prostitution. The\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fgovernment also introduced an βextraction reportβ on data from RMβs phone. It included\\n\\ntext messages but didnβt include photos or videos. 3\\n\\n The jury convicted Pratt on all eight counts. The district court imposed life\\n\\nsentences on four counts and concurrent time on the other four. Pratt appeals the denial\\n\\nof his suppression motion and the admission of RMβs prior statements.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Pratt contends that the district court should have suppressed information from his\\n\\ncellphone because the FBI unreasonably delayed getting a search warrant. He does not\\n\\ncontend that the seizure of the phone itself was unconstitutional. To justify the delay, the\\n\\ngovernment points to the difficulty of coordinating the various law enforcement agencies\\n\\ninvolved in the Pratt investigation and deciding where to seek a search warrant for the\\n\\nphone. In the alternative, the government argues that it could keep the phone indefinitely\\n\\nbecause it was an instrumentality of Prattβs crimes.\\n\\n We review the factual findings in a suppression motion for clear error and the\\n\\nlegal conclusions de novo. 4 See United States v. Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232, 237 (4th Cir.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n An agent testified that the extraction report is βjust like the call logs, the text\\nmessages . . . I donβt think this has the videos, or any videos or pictures.β J.A. 187. The\\nprosecutor asked, βSo, just to be clear, Exhibit 21, forensic download, absent videos and\\nphotographs?β Id. The agent responded, βCorrect.β Id.\\n 4\\n The government contends that we should apply plain error review because Pratt\\ndidnβt mention unreasonable delay in his motion papers. We disagree. Pratt pressed the\\nargument at the suppression hearing and the district court expressly ruled from the bench\\non the claim of delay in obtaining the search warrant. See United States v. Williams, 504\\n(Continued)\\n 5\\n\\f2018). If the district court erred, we must assess whether any such error was harmless.\\n\\nSee Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 231 (4th Cir. 2008).\\n\\n We hold that the district court erred by denying the suppression motion and that\\n\\nthe error was not harmless regarding the child pornography counts.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The constitutional question is whether the extended seizure of Prattβs phone was\\n\\nreasonable. A seizure that is βlawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory\\n\\ninterests.β United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (citing United States v.\\n\\nPlace, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)). To determine if an extended seizure violates the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment, we balance the governmentβs interest in the seizure against the individualβs\\n\\npossessory interest in the object seized. See Place, 462 U.S. at 703; United States v. Van\\n\\nLeeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252β53 (1970).\\n\\n A strong government interest can justify an extended seizure. See, e.g., Illinois v.\\n\\nMcArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332β33 (2001) (suspect prevented from entering home for two\\n\\nhours while officers obtained a warrant); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473\\n\\nU.S. 531, 541β44 (1985) (suspected alimentary canal smuggler detained for 16 hours);\\n\\nVan Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252β53 (package detained for 29 hours while seeking a\\n\\nwarrant). But if the individualβs interest outweighs the governmentβs, an extended\\n\\n\\n\\nU.S. 36, 41 (1992) (argument is preserved if pressed or passed upon). Pratt therefore\\npreserved this argument and the plain error standard does not apply.\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\fseizure may be unreasonable. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615β16\\n\\n(2015) (traffic stop extended for dog sniff without reasonable suspicion); Place, 462 U.S.\\n\\nat 698β99 (travelerβs luggage detained at airport for 90 minutes to conduct dog sniff). An\\n\\nindividual diminishes his interest if he consents to the seizure or voluntarily shares the\\n\\nseized objectβs contents. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1162β63\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2013).\\n\\n Here, Pratt didnβt diminish his possessory interest in the phone. He didnβt consent\\n\\nto its seizure or voluntarily share the phoneβs contents. The governmentβs only\\n\\nexplanation for the 31-day delay in obtaining a warrant was that Pratt committed crimes\\n\\nin both North Carolina and South Carolina and agents had to decide where to seek a\\n\\nwarrant. We find this explanation insufficient to justify the extended seizure of Prattβs\\n\\nphone.\\n\\n Prattβs case parallels United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009).\\n\\nThere, an agent seized a computer but failed to obtain a search warrant for 21 days. Id. at\\n\\n1351. The agent explained that he left town for a lengthy training and didnβt think the\\n\\nwarrant was urgent. Id. The Eleventh Circuit considered the seizure unreasonable\\n\\nbecause the agent could have applied for a warrant before he left or passed the case to\\n\\nsomeone else. Id. at 1351β52. But the court cautioned that overwhelmed police\\n\\nresources or other βoverriding circumstancesβ could justify extended delays. Id. at 1353.\\n\\n The Eleventh Circuit has applied this standard in two later cases. In United States\\n\\nv. Vallimont, 378 F. Appβx 972, 975β76 (11th Cir. 2010), it upheld a 45-day delay in\\n\\ngetting a search warrant for a seized computer. The delay was reasonable because the\\n\\n 7\\n\\finvestigator was diverted to other cases, the countyβs resources were overwhelmed, and\\n\\nthe defendant diminished his privacy interest by giving another person access to the\\n\\ncomputer. Id. And in United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d 608, 616β17 (11th Cir. 2012), the\\n\\ncourt upheld a 25-day delay in getting a search warrant for a seized computer. The delay\\n\\nwas reasonable because the agents worked diligently on the affidavit; they were\\n\\nresponsible for investigations in ten counties; and the defendant consented to the seizure\\n\\nand had been allowed to keep certain files, diminishing his privacy interest. Id. Other\\n\\ncircuits have upheld equivalent delays where the government could justify them. 5\\n\\n Prattβs case is closest to Mitchell because the government has no persuasive\\n\\njustification for the delay in obtaining a search warrant for Prattβs phone. Unlike the\\n\\nagencies in Vallimont and Laist, the FBIβs resources were not overwhelmed. Simply put,\\n\\nthe agents here failed to exercise diligence by spending a whole month debating where to\\n\\nget a warrant. See United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1033β34 (7th Cir. 2012)\\n\\n(describing diligence as an important factor). That decision shouldnβt have taken a\\n\\nmonth. It is unlikely that the forum for a warrant would affect a later prosecution: a point\\n\\nthe government conceded at oral argument. 6 And unlike in Vallimont and Laist, Pratt had\\n\\n\\n 5\\n See, e.g., United States v. Gill, 280 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2002) (magistrate\\nunavailable); United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (delay fell over\\nweekends and Christmas); United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 230β31 (9th Cir. 1990)\\n(delay to transport package for dog sniff); United States v. Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049, 1050,\\n1054 (7th Cir. 1989) (delay over weekend to corroborate tip and procure drug-sniffing\\ndog).\\n 6\\n The Seventh Circuit did accept a six-day delay for an officer to seek a warrant\\nfor a cellphone where he needed to consult with prosecutors and with the officer who\\n(Continued)\\n 8\\n\\fan undiminished possessory interest in the cellphoneβhe didnβt consent to the seizure\\n\\nand he wasnβt allowed to retain any of the phoneβs files. Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S.\\n\\nCt. 2473, 2494β95 (2014) (describing the strong privacy interest in a cellphone). Given\\n\\nPrattβs undiminished interest, a 31-day delay violates the Fourth Amendment where the\\n\\ngovernment neither proceeds diligently nor presents an overriding reason for the delay.\\n\\n We decline to affirm on the governmentβs alternative argument that it could retain\\n\\nthe phone indefinitely because it had independent evidentiary value, like a murder\\n\\nweapon. Only the phoneβs files had evidentiary value. The agents could have removed\\n\\nor copied incriminating files and returned the phone. Prattβs phone is thus distinct from\\n\\nthe suitcase in United States v. Carter, 139 F.3d 424, 426 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). In\\n\\nCarter, the police arrested a man at an airport for stealing another travelerβs bag. Id. We\\n\\naffirmed that the police could retain the manβs own suitcase as evidence he didnβt take\\n\\nthe other bag by mistake. Id. But here, the phone itself is evidence of nothing.\\n\\n We hold that the delay in obtaining a search warrant was unreasonable. The\\n\\ndistrict court therefore erred in denying Prattβs motion to suppress.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nseized the phone. See Burgard, 675 F.3d at 1033β34. But the Seventh Circuit criticized\\nthat delay, and Prattβs delay was more than five times as long. See id.\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f But even though the district court should have suppressed evidence from Prattβs\\n\\ncellphone, we must examine whether the error was harmless. 7 See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at\\n\\n231. On appeal, β[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect\\n\\nsubstantial rights must be disregarded.β Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The essential question is\\n\\nwhether βit [is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the\\n\\ndefendant guilty absent the error.β United States v. Garcia-Lagunas, 835 F.3d 479, 488\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)).\\n\\n To answer that question, we look to the strength of the governmentβs remaining\\n\\nevidence, the centrality of the issue, steps taken to mitigate any error, and the closeness of\\n\\nthe case. See United States v. Recio, 884 F.3d 230, 238 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v.\\n\\nInce, 21 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 1994). The government bears the burden of establishing\\n\\nharmlessness. See Ince, 21 F.3d at 582.\\n\\n After examining the trial evidence, we are not satisfied that the government met its\\n\\nburden for counts two and five. Count two charges Pratt with producing images\\n\\ncontaining child pornography, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2251(a); count five charges him with\\n\\npossessing images containing child pornography, id. Β§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). Both charges\\n\\n\\n 7\\n The following harmless error discussion only applies to count two (producing\\nchild pornography) and count five (possessing child pornography). Prattβs phone is\\nirrelevant to counts seven (felon in possession) and eight (obstruction of justice). The\\nerror does affect the sex trafficking and enticement charges (counts one, three, four, and\\nsix), for which text messages from Prattβs phone were evidence. But the error was\\nharmless for those four counts because the government introduced duplicates of many of\\nthose text messages from RMβs phone and elicited extensive testimony about the\\nprostitution operation.\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\frequire the government to prove that the images depict a minor engaging in βsexually\\n\\nexplicit conduct.β See id. §§ 2251(a), 2252A(a)(5)(B). The two offenses include slightly\\n\\ndifferent categories of conduct. See id. §§ 2251(a), 2256(2)(A) (count two); id.\\n\\n§§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(2)(B), 2256(8)(B) (count five). But under both definitions, the\\n\\nonly relevant category is βlascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.β 8 Id.\\n\\nΒ§ 2256(2)(A), (2)(B). Thus, if the trial evidence that did not come from Prattβs phone is\\n\\ninsufficient to find that the images fit into this category, the error cannot be harmless.\\n\\n Beyond Prattβs phone, the government introduced insufficient evidence that the\\n\\nimages meet the statutory requirements. As evidence for the child pornography counts,\\n\\nthe government introduced Agent Stansburyβs recollection of statements RM and Pratt\\n\\nmade at the hotel. Those statements were admissible under the hearsay exception for\\n\\nforfeiture by wrongdoing, as discussed in Part III below. Stansbury recounted RMβs\\n\\nstatements about the photos twice. First, he recounted her saying βhe did have naked\\n\\nphotos of her, that they sent each other naked photos . . . . [H]eβs got naked photos of me\\n\\non his cell phone.β J.A. 66. Second, he recounted her saying she βsent him nude\\n\\nphotographs of herself and that he had nude photographs of her on his phone . . . . [H]e\\n\\nhas naked pictures of me on his cell phone.β J.A. 66β67. 9 And Stansbury said he asked\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n From the trial testimony, we canβt infer that the images contained any of the\\nother categories of conductβsexual intercourse, masturbation, bestiality, or sadistic or\\nmasochistic abuse. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2256(2)(A), (2)(B).\\n 9\\n Another agent said RM suggested that βthere was child pornographyβ on Prattβs\\nphone. J.A. 57. But the agent appears to have used βchild pornographyβ colloquially, not\\n(Continued)\\n 11\\n\\fPratt β[D]o you have naked pictures of [RM] . . . on the phone?β to which he says Pratt\\n\\nresponded βyes, Iβve got pictures of her on the phone.β J.A. 67. 10\\n\\n In each statement, the photos are described solely with the generic terms βnakedβ\\n\\nor βnude.β Some βnakedβ or βnudeβ photos are lascivious and display the genitals or\\n\\npubic area. But many photos an ordinary viewer would describe as βnakedβ or βnudeβ\\n\\nare not lascivious or do not depict the genitals or pubic area. Thus, without more, we\\n\\ncanβt infer that the photos contain sexually explicit conduct as defined by statute.\\n\\n Considering all the trial testimony, there was insufficient evidence for a βrational\\n\\ntrier of factβ to find the βessential element[]β that the photos contained sexually explicit\\n\\nconduct. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Given this failure of proof, the\\n\\nerror was not harmless regarding counts two and five. We therefore vacate Prattβs\\n\\nconvictions for the two child pornography offenses. 11\\n\\n C.\\n\\n\\n\\nas a legal conclusion. No witness testified that the photos depicted the genitals or pubic\\narea.\\n 10\\n At trial, FBI agents described the images from Prattβs phone as βnudeβ photos of\\nRM. J.A. 174, 359. At least one of those descriptions derived from viewing the photos.\\nJ.A. 174. That description should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States,\\n371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (β[T]estimony as to matters observed during an unlawful\\ninvasionβ is also subject to exclusion.). In any event, the agentsβ generic description of\\nthe photos adds nothing new.\\n 11\\n When the government addressed harmless error at oral argument, it incorrectly\\nstated that it had introduced copies of pornographic images from RMβs phone. In a post-\\nargument submission, the government conceded that no such images had been\\nintroduced.\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f We must also decide whether to vacate Prattβs entire sentence in light of this error.\\n\\nβ[A]n appellate court when reversing one part of a defendantβs sentence βmay vacate the\\n\\nentire sentence . . . so that, on remand the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing\\n\\nplan.ββ Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 507 (2011) (quoting Greenlaw v. United\\n\\nStates, 554 U.S. 237, 253 (2008)). This court has recognized that district courts consider\\n\\nall counts when crafting sentencing packages. See United States v. Smith, 115 F.3d 241,\\n\\n246 (4th Cir. 1997). We do have discretion to vacate only the sentences for vacated\\n\\nconvictions. See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 482β83 (4th Cir. 2006);\\n\\nUnited States v. Berry, 369 F. Appβx 500, 502β03 (4th Cir. 2010). But because sentences\\n\\nare often interconnected, a full resentencing is typically appropriate when we vacate one\\n\\nor more convictions. See United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n Here, the district court likely crafted a sentencing package with all eight\\n\\nconvictions in mind. A resentencing might not change how long Pratt stays in prison,\\n\\ngiven that the district court imposed multiple life sentences. But βthere may be some\\n\\nchance that other parts of [Prattβs] sentence may be affected byβ vacating the child\\n\\npornography counts. United States v. Jones, No. 95-5370, 1998 WL 19620, at *7 (4th\\n\\nCir. Apr. 22, 1998). The district court is in the best position to make that judgment. We\\n\\ntherefore vacate Prattβs entire sentence. On remand, the government may retry Pratt for\\n\\nthe child pornography counts. Once the government has retried him or declined to do so,\\n\\nthe district court shall resentence Pratt and βmake any correction to his sentence it deems\\n\\nappropriate.β Id. We express no opinion on whether the district court should modify his\\n\\nsentence.\\n\\n 13\\n\\f III.\\n\\n In addition to his Fourth Amendment argument, Pratt contends that the district\\n\\ncourt erred by admitting an FBI agentβs recollection of RMβs statements about the\\n\\nprostitution business and the nude images she sent him. Unlike most evidentiary issues,\\n\\nwe review this ruling de novo because it implicates the Confrontation Clause. See United\\n\\nStates v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2011). We see no error.\\n\\n The district court admitted RMβs statements under the βforfeiture by wrongdoingβ\\n\\nexception to the hearsay rule. Under this exception, a district court may admit hearsay\\n\\nstatements βoffered against a party that wrongfully causedβor acquiesced in wrongfully\\n\\ncausingβthe declarantβs unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.β\\n\\nFed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). The elements are (1) wrongful conduct, (2) intended to cause\\n\\nthe witnessβs unavailability, and (3) actually causing the witnessβs unavailability. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Jackson, 706 F.3d 264, 267β69 (4th Cir. 2013). The Constitution\\n\\nnormally forbids testimonial statements from an unavailable witness whom the defendant\\n\\nhad no previous chance to cross-examine. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Crawford v.\\n\\nWashington, 541 U.S. 36, 68β69 (2004). But the Supreme Court has recognized that\\n\\nwrongfully and intentionally causing a witnessβs unavailability estops a defendant from\\n\\nasserting confrontation rights. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008);\\n\\nCrawford, 541 U.S. at 62.\\n\\n Several times, Pratt called his mother from jail and had her put RM on the phone.\\n\\nThe government contends that Pratt threatened RM in these calls. Those calls plus Prattβs\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\fhistory of violence against women caused RM not to testify, in the governmentβs view.\\n\\nPratt denies that he intended to threaten RM and that his calls caused her unavailability.\\n\\n There is no question Pratt engaged in wrongful conduct when he violated the\\n\\nmagistrate judgeβs order and contacted a potential witness (and victim) from jail. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Montague, 421 F.3d 1099, 1103β04 (10th Cir. 2005) (violating order not\\n\\nto contact witness is wrongful). Thus, the only questions are intent and causation.\\n\\n In his phone conversations with RM from jail, Prattβs intent to make RM\\n\\nunavailable is plain. As an ineffective ruse, Pratt would pretend to be talking to someone\\n\\nother than RM. In the first call he said, speaking of RM, β[f]or some reason they saying\\n\\nthat sheβs a witness . . like she cooperating or something . . . Iβm saying donβt even try\\n\\nand speak to her or nothing because even if . . . anybody tries to speak to her Iβm gone get\\n\\nin trouble understand.β J.A. 676. He followed up with, βI hope you donβt think sheβs\\n\\ncooperating right.β Id. RM said she was not cooperating. Id. Pratt then said, βI hope if\\n\\n[RM] is talking to [βAMβ (another minor victim)] . . . I hope she can find out if [AM is]\\n\\ncooperating too.β Id. βI just hope neither one of them is cooperating,β he continued. Id.\\n\\nOver and over, Pratt tried to dissuade RM from testifying.\\n\\n In a second call, he told her β[RM] and [AM] need to speak cause . . . thatβs the\\n\\ntwo pieces to the puzzle that . . . get me out of here donβt you talk to them.β J.A. 677\\n\\n(emphasis added). In a third call, he urged her to deny that he used the alias βPromise,β\\n\\nwith which some witnesses would identify him at trial. J.A. 679. Pretending that he was\\n\\nspeaking to RMβs cousin, he told her the government was calling RM a βwitnessβ and\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\fwould question her. Id. He urged her to deny any knowledge. J.A. 680. In all three\\n\\ncalls, Pratt tried to get RM not to testify or not to testify honestly.\\n\\n Those calls caused RMβs unavailability. Standing alone, the calls sound like\\n\\nveiled threats. But the threats become obvious against the backdrop of the graphic\\n\\ntestimony of several women at trial who detailed how Pratt would beat prostitutesβ\\n\\nincluding RMβwhom he considered disobedient. See Montague, 421 F.3d at 1102β04\\n\\n(recognizing forfeiture from wrongdoing through threatening phone calls and history of\\n\\nabuse); State v. Maestas, 412 P.3d 79, 90β91 (N.M. 2018) (same). RM would have\\n\\nreceived the message that Pratt would hurt her in the future if she disobeyed Pratt and\\n\\ntestified against him.\\n\\n Pratt contends that the time lapse between the phone calls and the trial reduced the\\n\\nsalience of any threat. But given Prattβs history of abusing RM, we think it unlikely that\\n\\ntime eroded the sense of threat. That threat caused RM not to testify. Her personal\\n\\nfeelings for Prattβwhom she considered her boyfriendβmay have played a role too.\\n\\nBut those feelings were tied up in the same abusive relationship.\\n\\n The district court did not err by admitting an agentβs recollection of RMβs\\n\\nstatements.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n In sum, the district court erred by refusing to suppress information from Prattβs\\n\\ncellphone. The error was not harmless because the governmentβs other evidence could\\n\\nnot establish the statutory elements of counts two and five. On the evidentiary issue, the\\n\\n 16\\n\\fdistrict court did not err by admitting RMβs hearsay statements under Federal Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 804(b)(6). Accordingly, we vacate Prattβs convictions for counts two and five\\n\\nand affirm the remaining convictions. We also vacate Prattβs sentence and remand to the\\n\\ndistrict court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":557,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4589555,"string":"4,589,555"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Caleigh WOOD, Plaintiff - Appellant, and John Wood; Melissa Wood, on Behalf of Her Minor Child, C.W., Plaintiffs, v. Evelyn ARNOLD; Shannon Morris, Defendants - Appellees, and Board of Education of Charles County; Charles County Public Schools, Defendants, Christian Action Network, Amicus Supporting Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Caleigh Wood v. Evelyn Arnold"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1430"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Keenan, Wynn, Harris\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1430\\n\\n\\nCALEIGH WOOD,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\nand\\n\\nJOHN WOOD; MELISSA WOOD, on behalf of her minor child, C.W.,\\n\\n Plaintiffs,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nEVELYN ARNOLD; SHANNON MORRIS,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees,\\n\\nand\\n\\nBOARD OF EDUCATION OF CHARLES COUNTY; CHARLES COUNTY\\nPUBLIC SCHOOLS,\\n\\n Defendants,\\n\\n------------------------------\\n\\nCHRISTIAN ACTION NETWORK,\\n\\n Amicus Supporting Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\\nGeorge Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:16-cv-00239-GJH)\\n\\fArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 11, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore KEENAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn\\nand Judge Harris joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Kate Oliveri, THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for\\nAppellant. Andrew G. Scott, PESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for\\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: B. Tyler Brooks, Richard Thompson, THOMAS MORE LAW\\nCENTER, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Edmund J. OβMeally, Lisa Y. Settles,\\nPESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. David W.T. Carroll,\\nCARROLL, UCKER & HEMMER LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fBARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In this case, we consider whether two statements concerning Islamic beliefs,\\n\\npresented as part of a high school world history class, violated a studentβs First\\n\\nAmendment rights under either the Establishment Clause or the Free Speech Clause. The\\n\\nstudent, Caleigh Wood, contends that school officials Evelyn Arnold and Shannon Morris\\n\\n(the defendants) used the statements about Islam to endorse that religion over\\n\\nChristianity, and compelled Wood against her will to profess a belief in Islam.\\n\\n Upon our review, we conclude that the challenged coursework materials, viewed\\n\\nin the context in which they were presented, did not violate Woodβs First Amendment\\n\\nrights, because they did not impermissibly endorse any religion and did not compel Wood\\n\\nto profess any belief. We therefore affirm the district courtβs judgment awarding\\n\\nsummary judgment in favor of the defendants.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n During the 2014-2015 school year, Wood was an eleventh-grade student at La\\n\\nPlata High School, a public high school in Charles County, Maryland. Arnold was La\\n\\nPlataβs principal, and Morris was employed as one of the schoolβs vice-principals.\\n\\n As an eleventh-grade student, Wood was required to take a world history course,\\n\\nwhich was part of the schoolβs social studies curriculum. The year-long course covered\\n\\ntime periods from the year β1500 to the [p]resent.β Among the topics covered in the\\n\\ncourse were the Renaissance and Reformation, the Enlightenment period, the Industrial\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\fRevolution, and World Wars I and II. The topics were divided into separate units, with\\n\\neach unit generally being taught over a period of between ten and twenty days.\\n\\n The smallest unit of the world history course, encompassing five days, was\\n\\nentitled βThe Muslim World.β The unit was βdesigned to explore, among other things,\\n\\nformation of Middle Eastern empires including the basic concepts of the Islamic faith and\\n\\nhow it along with politics, culture, economics, and geography contributed to the\\n\\ndevelopment of those empires.β\\n\\n As part of the βMuslim Worldβ unit, Woodβs teacher presented the students with a\\n\\nPowerPoint slide entitled βIslam Today,β which contrasted βpeaceful Islamβ with βradical\\n\\nfundamental Islam.β The slide contained the statement that βMost Muslimβs [sic] faith is\\n\\nstronger than the average Christianβ (the comparative faith statement) (underlining in\\n\\noriginal). The schoolβs content specialist, Jack Tuttle, testified that use of the\\n\\ncomparative faith statement was inappropriate, and that he would have advised a teacher\\n\\nwho was considering teaching this statement β[n]ot to do that.β\\n\\n Wood also was required to complete a worksheet summarizing the lesson on\\n\\nIslam. The worksheet addressed topics such as the growth and expansion of Islam, the\\n\\nβbeliefs and practicesβ of Islam, and the links between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.\\n\\nPart of the worksheet required the students to βfill in the blanksβ to complete certain\\n\\ninformation comprising the βFive Pillarsβ of Islam. Included in that assignment was the\\n\\nstatement: βThere is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah[,]β a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fportion of a declaration known as the shahada (the shahada assignment). 1 For ease of\\n\\nreference, we collectively refer to the comparative faith statement and the shahada\\n\\nassignment as the βchallenged materials.β\\n\\n Woodβs father objected to the use of the challenged materials. He asserted to the\\n\\ndefendants that Islam should not be taught in the public school and demanded that his\\n\\ndaughter be given alternative assignments. He directed his daughter to refuse to complete\\n\\nany assignment associated with Islam on the ground that she was not required to βdo\\n\\nanything that violated [her] Christian beliefs.β Woodβs failure to complete the\\n\\nassignments that, in her view, βpromot[ed] Islam,β resulted in Wood receiving a lower\\n\\npercentage grade for the course but did not affect her final letter grade.\\n\\n Wood later sued the defendants, 2 alleging that they violated the Establishment\\n\\nClause by βimpermissibly endors[ing] and advanc[ing] the Islamic religion.β Wood\\n\\nfurther alleged that the defendants violated the Free Speech Clause of the First\\n\\nAmendment by requiring her to complete the shahada assignment, thereby βdepriv[ing]\\n\\n[her] of her right to be free from government compelled speech.β 3 The district court\\n\\ngranted the defendantsβ motion for summary judgment. Wood now appeals.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The underlined words reflect the parts of the statement that the students were\\nrequired to complete.\\n 2\\n At the time the complaint was filed, Wood was a minor. Therefore, the suit was\\ninitially brought on Woodβs behalf by her parents. The complaint later was amended to\\nname Wood as a plaintiff once she reached the age of majority.\\n 3\\n Woodβs father also asserted separate claims for retaliation under the First\\nAmendment and due process violations related to Arnoldβs decision to ban him from the\\n(Continued)\\n 5\\n\\f II.\\n\\n We review the district courtβs award of summary judgment de novo. See Buxton\\n\\nv. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 2017). Wood contends that the district court\\n\\nerred in awarding summary judgment to the defendants on both her Establishment Clause\\n\\nclaim and her Free Speech Clause claim. We address each claim in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with Woodβs Establishment Clause claim. Wood contends that through\\n\\nthe comparative faith statement, βMost Muslimβs [sic] faith is stronger than the average\\n\\nChristian,β the defendants endorsed a view of Islam over Christianity in violation of the\\n\\nEstablishment Clause. Wood also argues that the assignment requiring students to write a\\n\\nportion of the shahada impermissibly advanced the Islamic religion and compelled Wood\\n\\nto βden[y] the very existence of her God.β According to Wood, the challenged materials\\n\\nlacked any secular purpose and had the βeffect of promoting and endorsing Islam.β We\\n\\ndisagree with Woodβs argument.\\n\\n The Establishment Clause provides that βCongress shall make no law respecting\\n\\nan establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.β U.S. Const.\\n\\namend. I, cl. 1. In evaluating an Establishment Clause claim, we apply the three-prong\\n\\ntest set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Mellen v. Bunting, 327\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nLa Plata High School premises. Those claims were dismissed by the district court, and\\nhave not been pursued on appeal.\\n\\n 6\\n\\fF.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (β[W]e have emphasized that the Lemon test guides our\\n\\nanalysis of Establishment Clause challenges.β); Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th\\n\\nCir. 1999) (β[T]his Court must rely on Lemon in evaluating the constitutionality of\\n\\n[government action] under the Establishment Clause.β (internal quotation marks and\\n\\ncitation omitted)). Under this test, to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, βgovernment\\n\\nconduct (1) must be driven in part by a secular purpose; (2) must have a primary effect\\n\\nthat neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) must not excessively entangle church\\n\\nand State.β Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. 7, 683 F.3d 599, 608 (4th Cir. 2012)\\n\\n(citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). The government violates the Establishment Clause if\\n\\nthe challenged action fails any one of the Lemon factors. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 432\\n\\n(quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)).\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Before applying the Lemon test, we must determine the proper scope of our\\n\\ninquiry, namely, whether we should examine the challenged materials in isolation or in\\n\\nthe broader context of the world history curriculum. Wood asserts that we must analyze\\n\\neach statement on its own, apart from the subject matter of the class. We disagree with\\n\\nWoodβs contention.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has emphasized that for purposes of an Establishment Clause\\n\\nanalysis, context is crucial. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh\\n\\nChapter, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (β[T]he effect of the governmentβs use of religious\\n\\nsymbolism depends on its context.β), abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v.\\n\\nGalloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). To β[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of\\n\\n 7\\n\\fany activity would inevitably lead to [the activityβs] invalidation under the Establishment\\n\\nClause.β Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1984). Thus, when determining the\\n\\npurpose or primary effect of challenged religious content, courts, including this Circuit,\\n\\nconsistently have examined the entire context surrounding the challenged practice, rather\\n\\nthan only reviewing the contested portion. See Lambeth v. Bd. of Commβrs of Davidson\\n\\nCty., 407 F.3d 266, 271 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.\\n\\nCity of Warren, 707 F.3d 686, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2013); Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 168\\n\\n(5th Cir. 2010); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688-89 (7th Cir.\\n\\n1994); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 787 (9th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Bd. of Sch.\\n\\nCommβrs of Mobile Cty., 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987).\\n\\n Indeed, common sense dictates a context-driven approach. Viewing the\\n\\nchallenged statements in isolation would violate the analysis mandated by the Supreme\\n\\nCourt in Lemon. As we have stated, Lemon first requires us to consider whether teaching\\n\\nthe challenged materials had some secular purpose. Moss, 683 F.3d at 608. Such a\\n\\ndetermination can only be made by considering the academic framework in which those\\n\\nmaterials were presented. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005);\\n\\nAdland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2002) (β[C]ontext is critically important in\\n\\nevaluating a stateβs proffered secular purpose.β). And in requiring us to determine\\n\\nwhether the primary effect of the challenged materials was to advance or inhibit religion,\\n\\nMoss, 683 F.3d at 608, Lemon necessarily requires consideration of the contextual setting\\n\\nin which those materials were used, see Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 271 (explaining that the\\n\\nβproper analysisβ of Lemonβs second prong requires examining the effect of a religious\\n\\n 8\\n\\fdisplay βin its particular settingβ). Thus, any attempt on our part to strip statements from\\n\\ntheir context invariably would lead to confusion and misinterpretation when applying the\\n\\nLemon test.\\n\\n Manifestly, if courts were to find an Establishment Clause violation every time\\n\\nthat a student or parent thought that a single statement by a teacher either advanced or\\n\\ndisapproved of a religion, instruction in our public schools βwould be reduced to the\\n\\nlowest common denominator.β Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d\\n\\n1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994). Such a focus on isolated statements effectively would\\n\\ntransform each student, parent, and by extension, the courts, into de facto βcurriculum\\n\\nreview committee[s],β monitoring every sentence for a constitutional violation. Id.\\n\\n School authorities, not the courts, are charged with the responsibility of deciding\\n\\nwhat speech is appropriate in the classroom. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484\\n\\nU.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683\\n\\n(1986)). Although schools are not βimmune from the sweep of the First Amendment,β\\n\\nacademic freedom is itself a concern of that amendment. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,\\n\\n180-81 (1972); see also Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226\\n\\n(1985); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603\\n\\n(1967). Such academic freedom would not long survive in an environment in which\\n\\ncourts micromanage school curricula and parse singular statements made by teachers.\\n\\nBecause the challenged materials were presented as part of Woodβs world history\\n\\ncurriculum, it is in that context that we examine them.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n 9\\n\\f The first prong of the Lemon test asks whether the governmentβs conduct has an\\n\\nβadequate secular object.β McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 865. This directive requires an\\n\\nβinquiry into the subjective intentions of the government.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372\\n\\n(emphasis added). This part of the Lemon test imposes a βfairly low hurdle,β requiring\\n\\nthe government to show that it had a βplausible secular purposeβ for its action. Glassman\\n\\nv. Arlington County, 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). Notably, the governmentβs\\n\\npurpose need not be βexclusively secular.β Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2001) (citations omitted). Rather, it is only β[w]hen the government acts with the\\n\\nostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religionβ that it violates the\\n\\nEstablishment Clauseβs βtouchstoneβ principle of religious neutrality. McCreary County,\\n\\n545 U.S. at 860 (emphasis added). So long as the proffered secular purpose is βgenuine,\\n\\nnot a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective,β that purpose will satisfy\\n\\nLemonβs first prong. Id. at 864; see Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 270 (βA legitimate secular\\n\\npurpose is . . . sufficient to pass muster under the first prong of the Lemon test, unless the\\n\\nalleged secular purpose is in fact pretextual.β).\\n\\n The Supreme Court has recognized the secular value of studying religion on a\\n\\ncomparative basis. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255\\n\\n(1963) (β[I]t might well be said that oneβs education is not complete without a study of\\n\\ncomparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of\\n\\ncivilization.β). In this case, the comparative faith statement was part of an academic unit\\n\\nin which students studied Middle Eastern empires and the role of Islam. The unit did not\\n\\nfocus exclusively on Islamβs core principles, but explored βamong other things, formation\\n\\n 10\\n\\fof Middle Eastern empires including the basic concepts of the Islamic faith and how it\\n\\nalong with politics, culture, economics, and geography contributed to the development of\\n\\nthose empires.β Nothing in the record indicates that the comparative faith statement was\\n\\nmade with a subjective purpose of advancing Islam over Christianity, or for any other\\n\\npredominately religious purpose. Nor does the record show that the proffered secular\\n\\npurpose of teaching about Muslim empires in the context of world history was pretextual.\\n\\nSee Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 270. Thus, on its face, the comparative faith statement was\\n\\nintroduced for a genuine secular purpose.\\n\\n Similarly, the shahada assignment was a tool designed to assess the studentsβ\\n\\nunderstanding of the lesson on Islam. In total, the worksheet included 17 questions with\\n\\n27 blank entries to be completed by the students on the history of Islam, βbeliefs and\\n\\npracticesβ of Muslims, and links between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. The students\\n\\nwere not required to memorize the shahada, to recite it, or even to write the complete\\n\\nstatement of faith. Instead, the worksheet included a variety of factual information\\n\\nrelated to Islam and merely asked the students to demonstrate their understanding of the\\n\\nmaterial by completing the partial sentences. This is precisely the sort of academic\\n\\nexercise that the Supreme Court has indicated would not run afoul of the Establishment\\n\\nClause. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (βNothing we have said here indicates that such\\n\\nstudy . . . of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of\\n\\neducation, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.β (emphasis\\n\\nadded)). Because the school had a predominately secular purpose in teaching world\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\fhistory, we conclude that both the comparative faith statement and the shahada\\n\\nassignment satisfy the first prong of Lemon.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n To meet the second prong of Lemon, the challenged government action βmust\\n\\nhave a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.β Moss, 683 F.3d at 608.\\n\\nThis requirement sets an objective standard, which βmeasure[s] whether the principal\\n\\neffect of government action is to suggest government preference for a particular religious\\n\\nview or for religion in general.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). We have\\n\\nβrefine[d]β this analysis by incorporating the Supreme Courtβs βendorsement test,β which\\n\\nasks whether a reasonable, informed observer would conclude that government, by its\\n\\naction, has endorsed a particular religion or religion generally. See id.; see also County of\\n\\nAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94 (adopting the endorsement test in the Establishment\\n\\nClause context). Thus, in this Circuit, the primary effect prong asks whether,\\n\\nβirrespective of governmentβs actual purpose,β a reasonable, informed observer would\\n\\nunderstand that βthe practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or\\n\\ndisapprovalβ of a religion. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). We presume that a\\n\\nβreasonable observer in the endorsement inquiryβ is βaware of the history and context of\\n\\nthe . . . forum in which the religious speech takes place.β Good News Club v. Milford\\n\\nCent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.\\n\\nPinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (OβConnor, J., concurring in part and concurring in\\n\\nthe judgment)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f The use of both the comparative faith statement and the shahada assignment in\\n\\nWoodβs world history class involved no more than having the class read, discuss, and\\n\\nthink about Islam. The comparative faith statement appeared on a slide under the\\n\\nheading βPeaceful Islam v. Radical Fundamental Islam.β The slide itself did not\\n\\nadvocate any belief system but instead focused on the development of Islamic\\n\\nfundamentalism as a political force. And the shahada assignment appeared on the\\n\\nstudent worksheet under the heading βBeliefs and Practices: The Five Pillars.β Thus, the\\n\\nassignment asked the students to identify the tenets of Islam, but did not suggest that a\\n\\nstudent should adopt those beliefs as her own.\\n\\n This is not a case in which students were being asked to participate in a daily\\n\\nreligious exercise, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992) (holding that\\n\\nrequiring students to stand for graduation prayer constituted compelled participation in\\n\\nreligious ritual); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (striking down state-\\n\\nsponsored prayer due to the inherently religious nature of prayer), or a case in which\\n\\nIslamic beliefs were posted on a classroom wall without explanation, see Stone v.\\n\\nGraham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (holding that posting the Ten Commandments on a\\n\\npublic school classroom wall violated the Establishment Clause). Rather, the challenged\\n\\nmaterials were βintegrated into the school curriculumβ and were directly relevant to the\\n\\nsecular lessons being taught. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42. These types of educational\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\fmaterials, which identify the views of a particular religion, 4 do not amount to an\\n\\nendorsement of religion. See id.; see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 106 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2008) (βPublic schools are not obliged to shield individual students from ideas which\\n\\npotentially are religiously offensive, particularly when the school imposes no requirement\\n\\nthat the student agree with or affirm those ideas.β). A reasonable observer, aware of the\\n\\nworld history curriculum being taught, would not view the challenged materials as\\n\\ncommunicating a message of endorsement.\\n\\n Additionally, we note that the challenged materials constituted only a very small\\n\\npart of the schoolβs world history curriculum. As we have explained, we must view the\\n\\neffect of the challenged materials within the context in which they were used. See\\n\\nLambeth, 407 F.3d at 271 (examining the primary effect of a religious display βin its\\n\\nparticular settingβ). Wood does not argue that the world history class itself advanced any\\n\\nreligion. Indeed, she readily admits that it is permissible to teach βhow the Islamic faith\\n\\ncontributed to the development of politics, culture, and geography.β As a matter of\\n\\ncommon sense, an objective observer would not perceive a singular statement such as the\\n\\n 4\\n Although scholars could debate endlessly the content of the comparative faith\\nstatement and its suitability for use in an educational context, the βprimary effectβ prong\\nof the Lemon test βmust be assessed objectively.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374. Thus,\\nWoodβs argument that the comparative faith statement is a βsubjective, biased statementβ\\nabout Islam is outside the bounds of our consideration whether use of the statement was\\nconstitutional. For the same reason, Woodβs contention that she viewed the comparative\\nfaith statement as offensive, and that some school officials thought the statement was\\ninappropriate, is unavailing. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (βWe do not hold that every state\\naction implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.β); Brown,\\n27 F.3d at 1383 (β[A] childβs subjective perception that a state action disapproves of or is\\nhostile toward his or her religion is not, by itself, sufficient to establish an Establishment\\nClause violation.β).\\n\\n 14\\n\\fcomparative faith statement, or a lone question about a religionβs core principle on a fill-\\n\\nin-the-blank assignment, as an endorsement or disapproval of religion. Therefore, we\\n\\nconclude that the primary effect of both the comparative faith statement and the shahada\\n\\nassignment was to teach comparative religion, not to endorse any religious belief.\\n\\nAccordingly, the use of the challenged materials satisfies Lemonβs second prong.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n The final prong of the Lemon test asks whether the governmentβs action created\\n\\nβan excessive entanglement between government and religion,β Lambeth, 407 F.3d at\\n\\n272-73 (internal quotation marks omitted), which βis a question of kind and degree,β\\n\\nLynch, 465 U.S. at 684. Excessive entanglement βtypicallyβ involves βthe governmentβs\\n\\nβinvasive monitoringβ of certain activities in order to prevent religious speech,β or the\\n\\nfunding of religious schools or instruction. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 433; Comm. for Pub. Ed.\\n\\n& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973) (βPrimary among those evils\\n\\n[targeted by the Establishment Clause] have been sponsorship, financial support, and\\n\\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.β (citation omitted)). Excessive\\n\\nentanglement may also be shown when the governmentβs entanglement has βthe effect of\\n\\nadvancing or inhibiting religion.β See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).\\n\\n We need not dwell long on the entanglement prong. As already discussed, neither\\n\\nthe comparative faith statement nor the shahada assignment advanced or inhibited any\\n\\nreligion. And there is no evidence in the record that these materials were obtained from a\\n\\nreligious institution or benefited any such institution. Finally, there is no evidence that\\n\\nuse of the challenged materials resulted in βinvasive monitoringβ of activities to prevent\\n\\n 15\\n\\for advance religious speech. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens,\\n\\n496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990). Under the world history curriculum, it appears that lessons on\\n\\nthe Muslim world constituted, at most, five days of a year-long course. Thus, we\\n\\nconclude that neither the comparative faith statement nor the shahada assignment\\n\\nresulted in an excessive entanglement with religion. Because the challenged materials\\n\\nsatisfy all three prongs of the Lemon test, we hold that the district court properly granted\\n\\nsummary judgment to the defendants on Woodβs Establishment Clause claim. 5\\n\\n B.\\n\\n We next consider Woodβs Free Speech Clause challenge. Wood argues that the\\n\\ndefendants violated her free speech rights by requiring her to complete in writing two\\n\\nmissing words of a portion of the shahada, namely, that β[t]here is no god but Allah and\\n\\nMuhammad is the messenger of Allah.β In her view, βthe curriculum implemented and\\n\\nsupervised by [d]efendants compelled [Wood] to confess by written word and deed her\\n\\nfaith in Allah.β We disagree with Woodβs position.\\n\\n Generally, when a governmental entity requires a person βto utter or distribute\\n\\nspeech bearing a particular message,β we subject that requirement to βrigorous scrutiny.β\\n\\nGreater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 879\\n\\n\\n 5\\n In Woodβs amended complaint, she objects to other portions of the world history\\ncurriculum, such as the fact that that Wood was βinstructed from the text of the Qurβan,β\\nthat Wood was βinstructed . . . that [r]ighteous women are . . . obedientβ to men, and that\\nthe course devoted only a single day to the study of Christianity while multiple days were\\nspent studying Islam. Wood waived these arguments by failing to raise them in her\\nopening brief. Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Intβl LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (βA\\nparty waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening brief.β).\\n\\n 16\\n\\fF.3d 101, 107 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). In the public school setting, students do\\n\\nnot βshed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the\\n\\nschoolhouse gate,β but retain their First Amendment rights βapplied in light of the special\\n\\ncharacteristics of the school environment.β Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,\\n\\n393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that studentsβ\\n\\nFirst Amendment rights in public schools βare not automatically coextensive with the\\n\\nrights of adults in other settings.β Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266.\\n\\n In considering the right against compelled speech in the public school context, the\\n\\nThird Circuit has explained:\\n\\n First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that the educational process\\n itself may sometimes require a state actor to force a student to speak when\\n the student would rather refrain. A student may also be forced to speak or\\n write on a particular topic even though the student might prefer a different\\n topic. And while a public educational institution may not demand that a\\n student profess beliefs or views with which the student does not agree, a\\n school may in some circumstances require a student to state the arguments\\n that could be made in support of such beliefs or views.\\n\\nC.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 187 (3d Cir. 2005). We agree with the\\n\\nThird Circuitβs reasoning. Although a studentβs right against compelled speech in a\\n\\npublic school may be asserted under various circumstances, that right has limited\\n\\napplication in a classroom setting in which a student is asked to study and discuss\\n\\nmaterials with which she disagrees.\\n\\n In the present case, the record is clear that the shahada assignment did not require\\n\\nWood to profess or accept the tenets of Islam. The students were not asked to recite the\\n\\nshahada, nor were they required to engage in any devotional practice related to Islam.\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\fCf. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1943) (distinguishing between\\n\\ncompelling students to declare a belief through mandatory recital of the pledge of\\n\\nallegiance, and βmerely . . . acquaint[ing students] with the flag salute so that they may be\\n\\ninformed as to what it is or even what it meansβ). Instead, the shahada assignment\\n\\nrequired Wood to write only two words of the shahada as an academic exercise to\\n\\ndemonstrate her understanding of the world history curriculum. On these facts, we\\n\\nconclude that Woodβs First Amendment right against compelled speech was not violated.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For these reasons, we affirm the district courtβs judgment.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366808/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KEENAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WYNN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HARRIS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589555/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Caleigh WOOD, Plaintiff - Appellant, and John Wood; Melissa Wood, on Behalf of Her Minor Child, C.W., Plaintiffs, v. Evelyn ARNOLD; Shannon Morris, Defendants - Appellees, and Board of Education of Charles County; Charles County Public Schools, Defendants, Christian Action Network, Amicus Supporting Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1430\n\n\nCALEIGH WOOD,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\n\nand\n\nJOHN WOOD; MELISSA WOOD, on behalf of her minor child, C.W.,\n\n Plaintiffs,\n\n v.\n\nEVELYN ARNOLD; SHANNON MORRIS,\n\n Defendants - Appellees,\n\nand\n\nBOARD OF EDUCATION OF CHARLES COUNTY; CHARLES COUNTY\nPUBLIC SCHOOLS,\n\n Defendants,\n\n------------------------------\n\nCHRISTIAN ACTION NETWORK,\n\n Amicus Supporting Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\nGeorge Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:16-cv-00239-GJH)\n\fArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 11, 2019\n\n\nBefore KEENAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn\nand Judge Harris joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Kate Oliveri, THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for\nAppellant. Andrew G. Scott, PESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: B. Tyler Brooks, Richard Thompson, THOMAS MORE LAW\nCENTER, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Edmund J. OβMeally, Lisa Y. Settles,\nPESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. David W.T. Carroll,\nCARROLL, UCKER & HEMMER LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\fBARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\n\n In this case, we consider whether two statements concerning Islamic beliefs,\n\npresented as part of a high school world history class, violated a studentβs First\n\nAmendment rights under either the Establishment Clause or the Free Speech Clause. The\n\nstudent, Caleigh Wood, contends that school officials Evelyn Arnold and Shannon Morris\n\n(the defendants) used the statements about Islam to endorse that religion over\n\nChristianity, and compelled Wood against her will to profess a belief in Islam.\n\n Upon our review, we conclude that the challenged coursework materials, viewed\n\nin the context in which they were presented, did not violate Woodβs First Amendment\n\nrights, because they did not impermissibly endorse any religion and did not compel Wood\n\nto profess any belief. We therefore affirm the district courtβs judgment awarding\n\nsummary judgment in favor of the defendants.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n During the 2014-2015 school year, Wood was an eleventh-grade student at La\n\nPlata High School, a public high school in Charles County, Maryland. Arnold was La\n\nPlataβs principal, and Morris was employed as one of the schoolβs vice-principals.\n\n As an eleventh-grade student, Wood was required to take a world history course,\n\nwhich was part of the schoolβs social studies curriculum. The year-long course covered\n\ntime periods from the year β1500 to the [p]resent.β Among the topics covered in the\n\ncourse were the Renaissance and Reformation, the Enlightenment period, the Industrial\n\n\n\n 3\n\fRevolution, and World Wars I and II. The topics were divided into separate units, with\n\neach unit generally being taught over a period of between ten and twenty days.\n\n The smallest unit of the world history course, encompassing five days, was\n\nentitled βThe Muslim World.β The unit was βdesigned to explore, among other things,\n\nformation of Middle Eastern empires including the basic concepts of the Islamic faith and\n\nhow it along with politics, culture, economics, and geography contributed to the\n\ndevelopment of those empires.β\n\n As part of the βMuslim Worldβ unit, Woodβs teacher presented the students with a\n\nPowerPoint slide entitled βIslam Today,β which contrasted βpeaceful Islamβ with βradical\n\nfundamental Islam.β The slide contained the statement that βMost Muslimβs [sic] faith is\n\nstronger than the average Christianβ (the comparative faith statement) (underlining in\n\noriginal). The schoolβs content specialist, Jack Tuttle, testified that use of the\n\ncomparative faith statement was inappropriate, and that he would have advised a teacher\n\nwho was considering teaching this statement β[n]ot to do that.β\n\n Wood also was required to complete a worksheet summarizing the lesson on\n\nIslam. The worksheet addressed topics such as the growth and expansion of Islam, the\n\nβbeliefs and practicesβ of Islam, and the links between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.\n\nPart of the worksheet required the students to βfill in the blanksβ to complete certain\n\ninformation comprising the βFive Pillarsβ of Islam. Included in that assignment was the\n\nstatement: βThere is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah[,]β a\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\fportion of a declaration known as the shahada (the shahada assignment). 1 For ease of\n\nreference, we collectively refer to the comparative faith statement and the shahada\n\nassignment as the βchallenged materials.β\n\n Woodβs father objected to the use of the challenged materials. He asserted to the\n\ndefendants that Islam should not be taught in the public school and demanded that his\n\ndaughter be given alternative assignments. He directed his daughter to refuse to complete\n\nany assignment associated with Islam on the ground that she was not required to βdo\n\nanything that violated [her] Christian beliefs.β Woodβs failure to complete the\n\nassignments that, in her view, βpromot[ed] Islam,β resulted in Wood receiving a lower\n\npercentage grade for the course but did not affect her final letter grade.\n\n Wood later sued the defendants, 2 alleging that they violated the Establishment\n\nClause by βimpermissibly endors[ing] and advanc[ing] the Islamic religion.β Wood\n\nfurther alleged that the defendants violated the Free Speech Clause of the First\n\nAmendment by requiring her to complete the shahada assignment, thereby βdepriv[ing]\n\n[her] of her right to be free from government compelled speech.β 3 The district court\n\ngranted the defendantsβ motion for summary judgment. Wood now appeals.\n\n\n 1\n The underlined words reflect the parts of the statement that the students were\nrequired to complete.\n 2\n At the time the complaint was filed, Wood was a minor. Therefore, the suit was\ninitially brought on Woodβs behalf by her parents. The complaint later was amended to\nname Wood as a plaintiff once she reached the age of majority.\n 3\n Woodβs father also asserted separate claims for retaliation under the First\nAmendment and due process violations related to Arnoldβs decision to ban him from the\n(Continued)\n 5\n\f II.\n\n We review the district courtβs award of summary judgment de novo. See Buxton\n\nv. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 2017). Wood contends that the district court\n\nerred in awarding summary judgment to the defendants on both her Establishment Clause\n\nclaim and her Free Speech Clause claim. We address each claim in turn.\n\n A.\n\n We begin with Woodβs Establishment Clause claim. Wood contends that through\n\nthe comparative faith statement, βMost Muslimβs [sic] faith is stronger than the average\n\nChristian,β the defendants endorsed a view of Islam over Christianity in violation of the\n\nEstablishment Clause. Wood also argues that the assignment requiring students to write a\n\nportion of the shahada impermissibly advanced the Islamic religion and compelled Wood\n\nto βden[y] the very existence of her God.β According to Wood, the challenged materials\n\nlacked any secular purpose and had the βeffect of promoting and endorsing Islam.β We\n\ndisagree with Woodβs argument.\n\n The Establishment Clause provides that βCongress shall make no law respecting\n\nan establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.β U.S. Const.\n\namend. I, cl. 1. In evaluating an Establishment Clause claim, we apply the three-prong\n\ntest set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Mellen v. Bunting, 327\n\n\n\n\nLa Plata High School premises. Those claims were dismissed by the district court, and\nhave not been pursued on appeal.\n\n 6\n\fF.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (β[W]e have emphasized that the Lemon test guides our\n\nanalysis of Establishment Clause challenges.β); Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th\n\nCir. 1999) (β[T]his Court must rely on Lemon in evaluating the constitutionality of\n\n[government action] under the Establishment Clause.β (internal quotation marks and\n\ncitation omitted)). Under this test, to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, βgovernment\n\nconduct (1) must be driven in part by a secular purpose; (2) must have a primary effect\n\nthat neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) must not excessively entangle church\n\nand State.β Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. 7, 683 F.3d 599, 608 (4th Cir. 2012)\n\n(citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). The government violates the Establishment Clause if\n\nthe challenged action fails any one of the Lemon factors. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 432\n\n(quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)).\n\n 1.\n\n Before applying the Lemon test, we must determine the proper scope of our\n\ninquiry, namely, whether we should examine the challenged materials in isolation or in\n\nthe broader context of the world history curriculum. Wood asserts that we must analyze\n\neach statement on its own, apart from the subject matter of the class. We disagree with\n\nWoodβs contention.\n\n The Supreme Court has emphasized that for purposes of an Establishment Clause\n\nanalysis, context is crucial. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh\n\nChapter, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (β[T]he effect of the governmentβs use of religious\n\nsymbolism depends on its context.β), abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v.\n\nGalloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). To β[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of\n\n 7\n\fany activity would inevitably lead to [the activityβs] invalidation under the Establishment\n\nClause.β Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1984). Thus, when determining the\n\npurpose or primary effect of challenged religious content, courts, including this Circuit,\n\nconsistently have examined the entire context surrounding the challenged practice, rather\n\nthan only reviewing the contested portion. See Lambeth v. Bd. of Commβrs of Davidson\n\nCty., 407 F.3d 266, 271 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.\n\nCity of Warren, 707 F.3d 686, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2013); Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 168\n\n(5th Cir. 2010); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688-89 (7th Cir.\n\n1994); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 787 (9th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Bd. of Sch.\n\nCommβrs of Mobile Cty., 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987).\n\n Indeed, common sense dictates a context-driven approach. Viewing the\n\nchallenged statements in isolation would violate the analysis mandated by the Supreme\n\nCourt in Lemon. As we have stated, Lemon first requires us to consider whether teaching\n\nthe challenged materials had some secular purpose. Moss, 683 F.3d at 608. Such a\n\ndetermination can only be made by considering the academic framework in which those\n\nmaterials were presented. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005);\n\nAdland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2002) (β[C]ontext is critically important in\n\nevaluating a stateβs proffered secular purpose.β). And in requiring us to determine\n\nwhether the primary effect of the challenged materials was to advance or inhibit religion,\n\nMoss, 683 F.3d at 608, Lemon necessarily requires consideration of the contextual setting\n\nin which those materials were used, see Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 271 (explaining that the\n\nβproper analysisβ of Lemonβs second prong requires examining the effect of a religious\n\n 8\n\fdisplay βin its particular settingβ). Thus, any attempt on our part to strip statements from\n\ntheir context invariably would lead to confusion and misinterpretation when applying the\n\nLemon test.\n\n Manifestly, if courts were to find an Establishment Clause violation every time\n\nthat a student or parent thought that a single statement by a teacher either advanced or\n\ndisapproved of a religion, instruction in our public schools βwould be reduced to the\n\nlowest common denominator.β Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d\n\n1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994). Such a focus on isolated statements effectively would\n\ntransform each student, parent, and by extension, the courts, into de facto βcurriculum\n\nreview committee[s],β monitoring every sentence for a constitutional violation. Id.\n\n School authorities, not the courts, are charged with the responsibility of deciding\n\nwhat speech is appropriate in the classroom. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484\n\nU.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683\n\n(1986)). Although schools are not βimmune from the sweep of the First Amendment,β\n\nacademic freedom is itself a concern of that amendment. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,\n\n180-81 (1972); see also Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226\n\n(1985); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603\n\n(1967). Such academic freedom would not long survive in an environment in which\n\ncourts micromanage school curricula and parse singular statements made by teachers.\n\nBecause the challenged materials were presented as part of Woodβs world history\n\ncurriculum, it is in that context that we examine them.\n\n 2.\n\n 9\n\f The first prong of the Lemon test asks whether the governmentβs conduct has an\n\nβadequate secular object.β McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 865. This directive requires an\n\nβinquiry into the subjective intentions of the government.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372\n\n(emphasis added). This part of the Lemon test imposes a βfairly low hurdle,β requiring\n\nthe government to show that it had a βplausible secular purposeβ for its action. Glassman\n\nv. Arlington County, 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). Notably, the governmentβs\n\npurpose need not be βexclusively secular.β Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th\n\nCir. 2001) (citations omitted). Rather, it is only β[w]hen the government acts with the\n\nostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religionβ that it violates the\n\nEstablishment Clauseβs βtouchstoneβ principle of religious neutrality. McCreary County,\n\n545 U.S. at 860 (emphasis added). So long as the proffered secular purpose is βgenuine,\n\nnot a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective,β that purpose will satisfy\n\nLemonβs first prong. Id. at 864; see Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 270 (βA legitimate secular\n\npurpose is . . . sufficient to pass muster under the first prong of the Lemon test, unless the\n\nalleged secular purpose is in fact pretextual.β).\n\n The Supreme Court has recognized the secular value of studying religion on a\n\ncomparative basis. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255\n\n(1963) (β[I]t might well be said that oneβs education is not complete without a study of\n\ncomparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of\n\ncivilization.β). In this case, the comparative faith statement was part of an academic unit\n\nin which students studied Middle Eastern empires and the role of Islam. The unit did not\n\nfocus exclusively on Islamβs core principles, but explored βamong other things, formation\n\n 10\n\fof Middle Eastern empires including the basic concepts of the Islamic faith and how it\n\nalong with politics, culture, economics, and geography contributed to the development of\n\nthose empires.β Nothing in the record indicates that the comparative faith statement was\n\nmade with a subjective purpose of advancing Islam over Christianity, or for any other\n\npredominately religious purpose. Nor does the record show that the proffered secular\n\npurpose of teaching about Muslim empires in the context of world history was pretextual.\n\nSee Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 270. Thus, on its face, the comparative faith statement was\n\nintroduced for a genuine secular purpose.\n\n Similarly, the shahada assignment was a tool designed to assess the studentsβ\n\nunderstanding of the lesson on Islam. In total, the worksheet included 17 questions with\n\n27 blank entries to be completed by the students on the history of Islam, βbeliefs and\n\npracticesβ of Muslims, and links between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. The students\n\nwere not required to memorize the shahada, to recite it, or even to write the complete\n\nstatement of faith. Instead, the worksheet included a variety of factual information\n\nrelated to Islam and merely asked the students to demonstrate their understanding of the\n\nmaterial by completing the partial sentences. This is precisely the sort of academic\n\nexercise that the Supreme Court has indicated would not run afoul of the Establishment\n\nClause. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (βNothing we have said here indicates that such\n\nstudy . . . of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of\n\neducation, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.β (emphasis\n\nadded)). Because the school had a predominately secular purpose in teaching world\n\n\n\n 11\n\fhistory, we conclude that both the comparative faith statement and the shahada\n\nassignment satisfy the first prong of Lemon.\n\n 3.\n\n To meet the second prong of Lemon, the challenged government action βmust\n\nhave a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.β Moss, 683 F.3d at 608.\n\nThis requirement sets an objective standard, which βmeasure[s] whether the principal\n\neffect of government action is to suggest government preference for a particular religious\n\nview or for religion in general.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). We have\n\nβrefine[d]β this analysis by incorporating the Supreme Courtβs βendorsement test,β which\n\nasks whether a reasonable, informed observer would conclude that government, by its\n\naction, has endorsed a particular religion or religion generally. See id.; see also County of\n\nAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94 (adopting the endorsement test in the Establishment\n\nClause context). Thus, in this Circuit, the primary effect prong asks whether,\n\nβirrespective of governmentβs actual purpose,β a reasonable, informed observer would\n\nunderstand that βthe practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or\n\ndisapprovalβ of a religion. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). We presume that a\n\nβreasonable observer in the endorsement inquiryβ is βaware of the history and context of\n\nthe . . . forum in which the religious speech takes place.β Good News Club v. Milford\n\nCent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.\n\nPinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (OβConnor, J., concurring in part and concurring in\n\nthe judgment)).\n\n\n\n 12\n\f The use of both the comparative faith statement and the shahada assignment in\n\nWoodβs world history class involved no more than having the class read, discuss, and\n\nthink about Islam. The comparative faith statement appeared on a slide under the\n\nheading βPeaceful Islam v. Radical Fundamental Islam.β The slide itself did not\n\nadvocate any belief system but instead focused on the development of Islamic\n\nfundamentalism as a political force. And the shahada assignment appeared on the\n\nstudent worksheet under the heading βBeliefs and Practices: The Five Pillars.β Thus, the\n\nassignment asked the students to identify the tenets of Islam, but did not suggest that a\n\nstudent should adopt those beliefs as her own.\n\n This is not a case in which students were being asked to participate in a daily\n\nreligious exercise, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992) (holding that\n\nrequiring students to stand for graduation prayer constituted compelled participation in\n\nreligious ritual); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (striking down state-\n\nsponsored prayer due to the inherently religious nature of prayer), or a case in which\n\nIslamic beliefs were posted on a classroom wall without explanation, see Stone v.\n\nGraham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (holding that posting the Ten Commandments on a\n\npublic school classroom wall violated the Establishment Clause). Rather, the challenged\n\nmaterials were βintegrated into the school curriculumβ and were directly relevant to the\n\nsecular lessons being taught. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42. These types of educational\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\fmaterials, which identify the views of a particular religion, 4 do not amount to an\n\nendorsement of religion. See id.; see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 106 (1st Cir.\n\n2008) (βPublic schools are not obliged to shield individual students from ideas which\n\npotentially are religiously offensive, particularly when the school imposes no requirement\n\nthat the student agree with or affirm those ideas.β). A reasonable observer, aware of the\n\nworld history curriculum being taught, would not view the challenged materials as\n\ncommunicating a message of endorsement.\n\n Additionally, we note that the challenged materials constituted only a very small\n\npart of the schoolβs world history curriculum. As we have explained, we must view the\n\neffect of the challenged materials within the context in which they were used. See\n\nLambeth, 407 F.3d at 271 (examining the primary effect of a religious display βin its\n\nparticular settingβ). Wood does not argue that the world history class itself advanced any\n\nreligion. Indeed, she readily admits that it is permissible to teach βhow the Islamic faith\n\ncontributed to the development of politics, culture, and geography.β As a matter of\n\ncommon sense, an objective observer would not perceive a singular statement such as the\n\n 4\n Although scholars could debate endlessly the content of the comparative faith\nstatement and its suitability for use in an educational context, the βprimary effectβ prong\nof the Lemon test βmust be assessed objectively.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374. Thus,\nWoodβs argument that the comparative faith statement is a βsubjective, biased statementβ\nabout Islam is outside the bounds of our consideration whether use of the statement was\nconstitutional. For the same reason, Woodβs contention that she viewed the comparative\nfaith statement as offensive, and that some school officials thought the statement was\ninappropriate, is unavailing. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (βWe do not hold that every state\naction implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.β); Brown,\n27 F.3d at 1383 (β[A] childβs subjective perception that a state action disapproves of or is\nhostile toward his or her religion is not, by itself, sufficient to establish an Establishment\nClause violation.β).\n\n 14\n\fcomparative faith statement, or a lone question about a religionβs core principle on a fill-\n\nin-the-blank assignment, as an endorsement or disapproval of religion. Therefore, we\n\nconclude that the primary effect of both the comparative faith statement and the shahada\n\nassignment was to teach comparative religion, not to endorse any religious belief.\n\nAccordingly, the use of the challenged materials satisfies Lemonβs second prong.\n\n 4.\n\n The final prong of the Lemon test asks whether the governmentβs action created\n\nβan excessive entanglement between government and religion,β Lambeth, 407 F.3d at\n\n272-73 (internal quotation marks omitted), which βis a question of kind and degree,β\n\nLynch, 465 U.S. at 684. Excessive entanglement βtypicallyβ involves βthe governmentβs\n\nβinvasive monitoringβ of certain activities in order to prevent religious speech,β or the\n\nfunding of religious schools or instruction. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 433; Comm. for Pub. Ed.\n\n& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973) (βPrimary among those evils\n\n[targeted by the Establishment Clause] have been sponsorship, financial support, and\n\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.β (citation omitted)). Excessive\n\nentanglement may also be shown when the governmentβs entanglement has βthe effect of\n\nadvancing or inhibiting religion.β See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).\n\n We need not dwell long on the entanglement prong. As already discussed, neither\n\nthe comparative faith statement nor the shahada assignment advanced or inhibited any\n\nreligion. And there is no evidence in the record that these materials were obtained from a\n\nreligious institution or benefited any such institution. Finally, there is no evidence that\n\nuse of the challenged materials resulted in βinvasive monitoringβ of activities to prevent\n\n 15\n\for advance religious speech. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens,\n\n496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990). Under the world history curriculum, it appears that lessons on\n\nthe Muslim world constituted, at most, five days of a year-long course. Thus, we\n\nconclude that neither the comparative faith statement nor the shahada assignment\n\nresulted in an excessive entanglement with religion. Because the challenged materials\n\nsatisfy all three prongs of the Lemon test, we hold that the district court properly granted\n\nsummary judgment to the defendants on Woodβs Establishment Clause claim. 5\n\n B.\n\n We next consider Woodβs Free Speech Clause challenge. Wood argues that the\n\ndefendants violated her free speech rights by requiring her to complete in writing two\n\nmissing words of a portion of the shahada, namely, that β[t]here is no god but Allah and\n\nMuhammad is the messenger of Allah.β In her view, βthe curriculum implemented and\n\nsupervised by [d]efendants compelled [Wood] to confess by written word and deed her\n\nfaith in Allah.β We disagree with Woodβs position.\n\n Generally, when a governmental entity requires a person βto utter or distribute\n\nspeech bearing a particular message,β we subject that requirement to βrigorous scrutiny.β\n\nGreater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 879\n\n\n 5\n In Woodβs amended complaint, she objects to other portions of the world history\ncurriculum, such as the fact that that Wood was βinstructed from the text of the Qurβan,β\nthat Wood was βinstructed . . . that [r]ighteous women are . . . obedientβ to men, and that\nthe course devoted only a single day to the study of Christianity while multiple days were\nspent studying Islam. Wood waived these arguments by failing to raise them in her\nopening brief. Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Intβl LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (βA\nparty waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening brief.β).\n\n 16\n\fF.3d 101, 107 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). In the public school setting, students do\n\nnot βshed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the\n\nschoolhouse gate,β but retain their First Amendment rights βapplied in light of the special\n\ncharacteristics of the school environment.β Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,\n\n393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that studentsβ\n\nFirst Amendment rights in public schools βare not automatically coextensive with the\n\nrights of adults in other settings.β Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266.\n\n In considering the right against compelled speech in the public school context, the\n\nThird Circuit has explained:\n\n First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that the educational process\n itself may sometimes require a state actor to force a student to speak when\n the student would rather refrain. A student may also be forced to speak or\n write on a particular topic even though the student might prefer a different\n topic. And while a public educational institution may not demand that a\n student profess beliefs or views with which the student does not agree, a\n school may in some circumstances require a student to state the arguments\n that could be made in support of such beliefs or views.\n\nC.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 187 (3d Cir. 2005). We agree with the\n\nThird Circuitβs reasoning. Although a studentβs right against compelled speech in a\n\npublic school may be asserted under various circumstances, that right has limited\n\napplication in a classroom setting in which a student is asked to study and discuss\n\nmaterials with which she disagrees.\n\n In the present case, the record is clear that the shahada assignment did not require\n\nWood to profess or accept the tenets of Islam. The students were not asked to recite the\n\nshahada, nor were they required to engage in any devotional practice related to Islam.\n\n\n 17\n\fCf. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1943) (distinguishing between\n\ncompelling students to declare a belief through mandatory recital of the pledge of\n\nallegiance, and βmerely . . . acquaint[ing students] with the flag salute so that they may be\n\ninformed as to what it is or even what it meansβ). Instead, the shahada assignment\n\nrequired Wood to write only two words of the shahada as an academic exercise to\n\ndemonstrate her understanding of the world history curriculum. On these facts, we\n\nconclude that Woodβs First Amendment right against compelled speech was not violated.\n\n\n\n III.\n\n For these reasons, we affirm the district courtβs judgment.\n\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\n 18\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Caleigh WOOD, Plaintiff - Appellant, and John Wood; Melissa Wood, on Behalf of Her Minor Child, C.W., Plaintiffs, v. Evelyn ARNOLD; Shannon Morris, Defendants - Appellees, and Board of Education of Charles County; Charles County Public Schools, Defendants, Christian Action Network, Amicus Supporting Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1430\\n\\n\\nCALEIGH WOOD,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\nand\\n\\nJOHN WOOD; MELISSA WOOD, on behalf of her minor child, C.W.,\\n\\n Plaintiffs,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nEVELYN ARNOLD; SHANNON MORRIS,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees,\\n\\nand\\n\\nBOARD OF EDUCATION OF CHARLES COUNTY; CHARLES COUNTY\\nPUBLIC SCHOOLS,\\n\\n Defendants,\\n\\n------------------------------\\n\\nCHRISTIAN ACTION NETWORK,\\n\\n Amicus Supporting Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\\nGeorge Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (8:16-cv-00239-GJH)\\n\\fArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 11, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore KEENAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn\\nand Judge Harris joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Kate Oliveri, THOMAS MORE LAW CENTER, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for\\nAppellant. Andrew G. Scott, PESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for\\nAppellees. ON BRIEF: B. Tyler Brooks, Richard Thompson, THOMAS MORE LAW\\nCENTER, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Edmund J. OβMeally, Lisa Y. Settles,\\nPESSIN KATZ LAW, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. David W.T. Carroll,\\nCARROLL, UCKER & HEMMER LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fBARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In this case, we consider whether two statements concerning Islamic beliefs,\\n\\npresented as part of a high school world history class, violated a studentβs First\\n\\nAmendment rights under either the Establishment Clause or the Free Speech Clause. The\\n\\nstudent, Caleigh Wood, contends that school officials Evelyn Arnold and Shannon Morris\\n\\n(the defendants) used the statements about Islam to endorse that religion over\\n\\nChristianity, and compelled Wood against her will to profess a belief in Islam.\\n\\n Upon our review, we conclude that the challenged coursework materials, viewed\\n\\nin the context in which they were presented, did not violate Woodβs First Amendment\\n\\nrights, because they did not impermissibly endorse any religion and did not compel Wood\\n\\nto profess any belief. We therefore affirm the district courtβs judgment awarding\\n\\nsummary judgment in favor of the defendants.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n During the 2014-2015 school year, Wood was an eleventh-grade student at La\\n\\nPlata High School, a public high school in Charles County, Maryland. Arnold was La\\n\\nPlataβs principal, and Morris was employed as one of the schoolβs vice-principals.\\n\\n As an eleventh-grade student, Wood was required to take a world history course,\\n\\nwhich was part of the schoolβs social studies curriculum. The year-long course covered\\n\\ntime periods from the year β1500 to the [p]resent.β Among the topics covered in the\\n\\ncourse were the Renaissance and Reformation, the Enlightenment period, the Industrial\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\fRevolution, and World Wars I and II. The topics were divided into separate units, with\\n\\neach unit generally being taught over a period of between ten and twenty days.\\n\\n The smallest unit of the world history course, encompassing five days, was\\n\\nentitled βThe Muslim World.β The unit was βdesigned to explore, among other things,\\n\\nformation of Middle Eastern empires including the basic concepts of the Islamic faith and\\n\\nhow it along with politics, culture, economics, and geography contributed to the\\n\\ndevelopment of those empires.β\\n\\n As part of the βMuslim Worldβ unit, Woodβs teacher presented the students with a\\n\\nPowerPoint slide entitled βIslam Today,β which contrasted βpeaceful Islamβ with βradical\\n\\nfundamental Islam.β The slide contained the statement that βMost Muslimβs [sic] faith is\\n\\nstronger than the average Christianβ (the comparative faith statement) (underlining in\\n\\noriginal). The schoolβs content specialist, Jack Tuttle, testified that use of the\\n\\ncomparative faith statement was inappropriate, and that he would have advised a teacher\\n\\nwho was considering teaching this statement β[n]ot to do that.β\\n\\n Wood also was required to complete a worksheet summarizing the lesson on\\n\\nIslam. The worksheet addressed topics such as the growth and expansion of Islam, the\\n\\nβbeliefs and practicesβ of Islam, and the links between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.\\n\\nPart of the worksheet required the students to βfill in the blanksβ to complete certain\\n\\ninformation comprising the βFive Pillarsβ of Islam. Included in that assignment was the\\n\\nstatement: βThere is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah[,]β a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fportion of a declaration known as the shahada (the shahada assignment). 1 For ease of\\n\\nreference, we collectively refer to the comparative faith statement and the shahada\\n\\nassignment as the βchallenged materials.β\\n\\n Woodβs father objected to the use of the challenged materials. He asserted to the\\n\\ndefendants that Islam should not be taught in the public school and demanded that his\\n\\ndaughter be given alternative assignments. He directed his daughter to refuse to complete\\n\\nany assignment associated with Islam on the ground that she was not required to βdo\\n\\nanything that violated [her] Christian beliefs.β Woodβs failure to complete the\\n\\nassignments that, in her view, βpromot[ed] Islam,β resulted in Wood receiving a lower\\n\\npercentage grade for the course but did not affect her final letter grade.\\n\\n Wood later sued the defendants, 2 alleging that they violated the Establishment\\n\\nClause by βimpermissibly endors[ing] and advanc[ing] the Islamic religion.β Wood\\n\\nfurther alleged that the defendants violated the Free Speech Clause of the First\\n\\nAmendment by requiring her to complete the shahada assignment, thereby βdepriv[ing]\\n\\n[her] of her right to be free from government compelled speech.β 3 The district court\\n\\ngranted the defendantsβ motion for summary judgment. Wood now appeals.\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The underlined words reflect the parts of the statement that the students were\\nrequired to complete.\\n 2\\n At the time the complaint was filed, Wood was a minor. Therefore, the suit was\\ninitially brought on Woodβs behalf by her parents. The complaint later was amended to\\nname Wood as a plaintiff once she reached the age of majority.\\n 3\\n Woodβs father also asserted separate claims for retaliation under the First\\nAmendment and due process violations related to Arnoldβs decision to ban him from the\\n(Continued)\\n 5\\n\\f II.\\n\\n We review the district courtβs award of summary judgment de novo. See Buxton\\n\\nv. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 2017). Wood contends that the district court\\n\\nerred in awarding summary judgment to the defendants on both her Establishment Clause\\n\\nclaim and her Free Speech Clause claim. We address each claim in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with Woodβs Establishment Clause claim. Wood contends that through\\n\\nthe comparative faith statement, βMost Muslimβs [sic] faith is stronger than the average\\n\\nChristian,β the defendants endorsed a view of Islam over Christianity in violation of the\\n\\nEstablishment Clause. Wood also argues that the assignment requiring students to write a\\n\\nportion of the shahada impermissibly advanced the Islamic religion and compelled Wood\\n\\nto βden[y] the very existence of her God.β According to Wood, the challenged materials\\n\\nlacked any secular purpose and had the βeffect of promoting and endorsing Islam.β We\\n\\ndisagree with Woodβs argument.\\n\\n The Establishment Clause provides that βCongress shall make no law respecting\\n\\nan establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.β U.S. Const.\\n\\namend. I, cl. 1. In evaluating an Establishment Clause claim, we apply the three-prong\\n\\ntest set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See Mellen v. Bunting, 327\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nLa Plata High School premises. Those claims were dismissed by the district court, and\\nhave not been pursued on appeal.\\n\\n 6\\n\\fF.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (β[W]e have emphasized that the Lemon test guides our\\n\\nanalysis of Establishment Clause challenges.β); Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th\\n\\nCir. 1999) (β[T]his Court must rely on Lemon in evaluating the constitutionality of\\n\\n[government action] under the Establishment Clause.β (internal quotation marks and\\n\\ncitation omitted)). Under this test, to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, βgovernment\\n\\nconduct (1) must be driven in part by a secular purpose; (2) must have a primary effect\\n\\nthat neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) must not excessively entangle church\\n\\nand State.β Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. 7, 683 F.3d 599, 608 (4th Cir. 2012)\\n\\n(citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). The government violates the Establishment Clause if\\n\\nthe challenged action fails any one of the Lemon factors. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 432\\n\\n(quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)).\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Before applying the Lemon test, we must determine the proper scope of our\\n\\ninquiry, namely, whether we should examine the challenged materials in isolation or in\\n\\nthe broader context of the world history curriculum. Wood asserts that we must analyze\\n\\neach statement on its own, apart from the subject matter of the class. We disagree with\\n\\nWoodβs contention.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has emphasized that for purposes of an Establishment Clause\\n\\nanalysis, context is crucial. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh\\n\\nChapter, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (β[T]he effect of the governmentβs use of religious\\n\\nsymbolism depends on its context.β), abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v.\\n\\nGalloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). To β[f]ocus exclusively on the religious component of\\n\\n 7\\n\\fany activity would inevitably lead to [the activityβs] invalidation under the Establishment\\n\\nClause.β Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1984). Thus, when determining the\\n\\npurpose or primary effect of challenged religious content, courts, including this Circuit,\\n\\nconsistently have examined the entire context surrounding the challenged practice, rather\\n\\nthan only reviewing the contested portion. See Lambeth v. Bd. of Commβrs of Davidson\\n\\nCty., 407 F.3d 266, 271 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v.\\n\\nCity of Warren, 707 F.3d 686, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2013); Croft v. Perry, 624 F.3d 157, 168\\n\\n(5th Cir. 2010); Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688-89 (7th Cir.\\n\\n1994); Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 787 (9th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Bd. of Sch.\\n\\nCommβrs of Mobile Cty., 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987).\\n\\n Indeed, common sense dictates a context-driven approach. Viewing the\\n\\nchallenged statements in isolation would violate the analysis mandated by the Supreme\\n\\nCourt in Lemon. As we have stated, Lemon first requires us to consider whether teaching\\n\\nthe challenged materials had some secular purpose. Moss, 683 F.3d at 608. Such a\\n\\ndetermination can only be made by considering the academic framework in which those\\n\\nmaterials were presented. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005);\\n\\nAdland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 481 (6th Cir. 2002) (β[C]ontext is critically important in\\n\\nevaluating a stateβs proffered secular purpose.β). And in requiring us to determine\\n\\nwhether the primary effect of the challenged materials was to advance or inhibit religion,\\n\\nMoss, 683 F.3d at 608, Lemon necessarily requires consideration of the contextual setting\\n\\nin which those materials were used, see Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 271 (explaining that the\\n\\nβproper analysisβ of Lemonβs second prong requires examining the effect of a religious\\n\\n 8\\n\\fdisplay βin its particular settingβ). Thus, any attempt on our part to strip statements from\\n\\ntheir context invariably would lead to confusion and misinterpretation when applying the\\n\\nLemon test.\\n\\n Manifestly, if courts were to find an Establishment Clause violation every time\\n\\nthat a student or parent thought that a single statement by a teacher either advanced or\\n\\ndisapproved of a religion, instruction in our public schools βwould be reduced to the\\n\\nlowest common denominator.β Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d\\n\\n1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1994). Such a focus on isolated statements effectively would\\n\\ntransform each student, parent, and by extension, the courts, into de facto βcurriculum\\n\\nreview committee[s],β monitoring every sentence for a constitutional violation. Id.\\n\\n School authorities, not the courts, are charged with the responsibility of deciding\\n\\nwhat speech is appropriate in the classroom. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484\\n\\nU.S. 260, 267 (1988) (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683\\n\\n(1986)). Although schools are not βimmune from the sweep of the First Amendment,β\\n\\nacademic freedom is itself a concern of that amendment. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,\\n\\n180-81 (1972); see also Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226\\n\\n(1985); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603\\n\\n(1967). Such academic freedom would not long survive in an environment in which\\n\\ncourts micromanage school curricula and parse singular statements made by teachers.\\n\\nBecause the challenged materials were presented as part of Woodβs world history\\n\\ncurriculum, it is in that context that we examine them.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n 9\\n\\f The first prong of the Lemon test asks whether the governmentβs conduct has an\\n\\nβadequate secular object.β McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 865. This directive requires an\\n\\nβinquiry into the subjective intentions of the government.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372\\n\\n(emphasis added). This part of the Lemon test imposes a βfairly low hurdle,β requiring\\n\\nthe government to show that it had a βplausible secular purposeβ for its action. Glassman\\n\\nv. Arlington County, 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). Notably, the governmentβs\\n\\npurpose need not be βexclusively secular.β Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2001) (citations omitted). Rather, it is only β[w]hen the government acts with the\\n\\nostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religionβ that it violates the\\n\\nEstablishment Clauseβs βtouchstoneβ principle of religious neutrality. McCreary County,\\n\\n545 U.S. at 860 (emphasis added). So long as the proffered secular purpose is βgenuine,\\n\\nnot a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective,β that purpose will satisfy\\n\\nLemonβs first prong. Id. at 864; see Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 270 (βA legitimate secular\\n\\npurpose is . . . sufficient to pass muster under the first prong of the Lemon test, unless the\\n\\nalleged secular purpose is in fact pretextual.β).\\n\\n The Supreme Court has recognized the secular value of studying religion on a\\n\\ncomparative basis. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 255\\n\\n(1963) (β[I]t might well be said that oneβs education is not complete without a study of\\n\\ncomparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of\\n\\ncivilization.β). In this case, the comparative faith statement was part of an academic unit\\n\\nin which students studied Middle Eastern empires and the role of Islam. The unit did not\\n\\nfocus exclusively on Islamβs core principles, but explored βamong other things, formation\\n\\n 10\\n\\fof Middle Eastern empires including the basic concepts of the Islamic faith and how it\\n\\nalong with politics, culture, economics, and geography contributed to the development of\\n\\nthose empires.β Nothing in the record indicates that the comparative faith statement was\\n\\nmade with a subjective purpose of advancing Islam over Christianity, or for any other\\n\\npredominately religious purpose. Nor does the record show that the proffered secular\\n\\npurpose of teaching about Muslim empires in the context of world history was pretextual.\\n\\nSee Lambeth, 407 F.3d at 270. Thus, on its face, the comparative faith statement was\\n\\nintroduced for a genuine secular purpose.\\n\\n Similarly, the shahada assignment was a tool designed to assess the studentsβ\\n\\nunderstanding of the lesson on Islam. In total, the worksheet included 17 questions with\\n\\n27 blank entries to be completed by the students on the history of Islam, βbeliefs and\\n\\npracticesβ of Muslims, and links between Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. The students\\n\\nwere not required to memorize the shahada, to recite it, or even to write the complete\\n\\nstatement of faith. Instead, the worksheet included a variety of factual information\\n\\nrelated to Islam and merely asked the students to demonstrate their understanding of the\\n\\nmaterial by completing the partial sentences. This is precisely the sort of academic\\n\\nexercise that the Supreme Court has indicated would not run afoul of the Establishment\\n\\nClause. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (βNothing we have said here indicates that such\\n\\nstudy . . . of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of\\n\\neducation, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.β (emphasis\\n\\nadded)). Because the school had a predominately secular purpose in teaching world\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\fhistory, we conclude that both the comparative faith statement and the shahada\\n\\nassignment satisfy the first prong of Lemon.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n To meet the second prong of Lemon, the challenged government action βmust\\n\\nhave a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.β Moss, 683 F.3d at 608.\\n\\nThis requirement sets an objective standard, which βmeasure[s] whether the principal\\n\\neffect of government action is to suggest government preference for a particular religious\\n\\nview or for religion in general.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). We have\\n\\nβrefine[d]β this analysis by incorporating the Supreme Courtβs βendorsement test,β which\\n\\nasks whether a reasonable, informed observer would conclude that government, by its\\n\\naction, has endorsed a particular religion or religion generally. See id.; see also County of\\n\\nAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-94 (adopting the endorsement test in the Establishment\\n\\nClause context). Thus, in this Circuit, the primary effect prong asks whether,\\n\\nβirrespective of governmentβs actual purpose,β a reasonable, informed observer would\\n\\nunderstand that βthe practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or\\n\\ndisapprovalβ of a religion. Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citation omitted). We presume that a\\n\\nβreasonable observer in the endorsement inquiryβ is βaware of the history and context of\\n\\nthe . . . forum in which the religious speech takes place.β Good News Club v. Milford\\n\\nCent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.\\n\\nPinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (OβConnor, J., concurring in part and concurring in\\n\\nthe judgment)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f The use of both the comparative faith statement and the shahada assignment in\\n\\nWoodβs world history class involved no more than having the class read, discuss, and\\n\\nthink about Islam. The comparative faith statement appeared on a slide under the\\n\\nheading βPeaceful Islam v. Radical Fundamental Islam.β The slide itself did not\\n\\nadvocate any belief system but instead focused on the development of Islamic\\n\\nfundamentalism as a political force. And the shahada assignment appeared on the\\n\\nstudent worksheet under the heading βBeliefs and Practices: The Five Pillars.β Thus, the\\n\\nassignment asked the students to identify the tenets of Islam, but did not suggest that a\\n\\nstudent should adopt those beliefs as her own.\\n\\n This is not a case in which students were being asked to participate in a daily\\n\\nreligious exercise, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992) (holding that\\n\\nrequiring students to stand for graduation prayer constituted compelled participation in\\n\\nreligious ritual); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (striking down state-\\n\\nsponsored prayer due to the inherently religious nature of prayer), or a case in which\\n\\nIslamic beliefs were posted on a classroom wall without explanation, see Stone v.\\n\\nGraham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (holding that posting the Ten Commandments on a\\n\\npublic school classroom wall violated the Establishment Clause). Rather, the challenged\\n\\nmaterials were βintegrated into the school curriculumβ and were directly relevant to the\\n\\nsecular lessons being taught. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42. These types of educational\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\fmaterials, which identify the views of a particular religion, 4 do not amount to an\\n\\nendorsement of religion. See id.; see also Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 106 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2008) (βPublic schools are not obliged to shield individual students from ideas which\\n\\npotentially are religiously offensive, particularly when the school imposes no requirement\\n\\nthat the student agree with or affirm those ideas.β). A reasonable observer, aware of the\\n\\nworld history curriculum being taught, would not view the challenged materials as\\n\\ncommunicating a message of endorsement.\\n\\n Additionally, we note that the challenged materials constituted only a very small\\n\\npart of the schoolβs world history curriculum. As we have explained, we must view the\\n\\neffect of the challenged materials within the context in which they were used. See\\n\\nLambeth, 407 F.3d at 271 (examining the primary effect of a religious display βin its\\n\\nparticular settingβ). Wood does not argue that the world history class itself advanced any\\n\\nreligion. Indeed, she readily admits that it is permissible to teach βhow the Islamic faith\\n\\ncontributed to the development of politics, culture, and geography.β As a matter of\\n\\ncommon sense, an objective observer would not perceive a singular statement such as the\\n\\n 4\\n Although scholars could debate endlessly the content of the comparative faith\\nstatement and its suitability for use in an educational context, the βprimary effectβ prong\\nof the Lemon test βmust be assessed objectively.β Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374. Thus,\\nWoodβs argument that the comparative faith statement is a βsubjective, biased statementβ\\nabout Islam is outside the bounds of our consideration whether use of the statement was\\nconstitutional. For the same reason, Woodβs contention that she viewed the comparative\\nfaith statement as offensive, and that some school officials thought the statement was\\ninappropriate, is unavailing. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (βWe do not hold that every state\\naction implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.β); Brown,\\n27 F.3d at 1383 (β[A] childβs subjective perception that a state action disapproves of or is\\nhostile toward his or her religion is not, by itself, sufficient to establish an Establishment\\nClause violation.β).\\n\\n 14\\n\\fcomparative faith statement, or a lone question about a religionβs core principle on a fill-\\n\\nin-the-blank assignment, as an endorsement or disapproval of religion. Therefore, we\\n\\nconclude that the primary effect of both the comparative faith statement and the shahada\\n\\nassignment was to teach comparative religion, not to endorse any religious belief.\\n\\nAccordingly, the use of the challenged materials satisfies Lemonβs second prong.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n The final prong of the Lemon test asks whether the governmentβs action created\\n\\nβan excessive entanglement between government and religion,β Lambeth, 407 F.3d at\\n\\n272-73 (internal quotation marks omitted), which βis a question of kind and degree,β\\n\\nLynch, 465 U.S. at 684. Excessive entanglement βtypicallyβ involves βthe governmentβs\\n\\nβinvasive monitoringβ of certain activities in order to prevent religious speech,β or the\\n\\nfunding of religious schools or instruction. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 433; Comm. for Pub. Ed.\\n\\n& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 (1973) (βPrimary among those evils\\n\\n[targeted by the Establishment Clause] have been sponsorship, financial support, and\\n\\nactive involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.β (citation omitted)). Excessive\\n\\nentanglement may also be shown when the governmentβs entanglement has βthe effect of\\n\\nadvancing or inhibiting religion.β See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997).\\n\\n We need not dwell long on the entanglement prong. As already discussed, neither\\n\\nthe comparative faith statement nor the shahada assignment advanced or inhibited any\\n\\nreligion. And there is no evidence in the record that these materials were obtained from a\\n\\nreligious institution or benefited any such institution. Finally, there is no evidence that\\n\\nuse of the challenged materials resulted in βinvasive monitoringβ of activities to prevent\\n\\n 15\\n\\for advance religious speech. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens,\\n\\n496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990). Under the world history curriculum, it appears that lessons on\\n\\nthe Muslim world constituted, at most, five days of a year-long course. Thus, we\\n\\nconclude that neither the comparative faith statement nor the shahada assignment\\n\\nresulted in an excessive entanglement with religion. Because the challenged materials\\n\\nsatisfy all three prongs of the Lemon test, we hold that the district court properly granted\\n\\nsummary judgment to the defendants on Woodβs Establishment Clause claim. 5\\n\\n B.\\n\\n We next consider Woodβs Free Speech Clause challenge. Wood argues that the\\n\\ndefendants violated her free speech rights by requiring her to complete in writing two\\n\\nmissing words of a portion of the shahada, namely, that β[t]here is no god but Allah and\\n\\nMuhammad is the messenger of Allah.β In her view, βthe curriculum implemented and\\n\\nsupervised by [d]efendants compelled [Wood] to confess by written word and deed her\\n\\nfaith in Allah.β We disagree with Woodβs position.\\n\\n Generally, when a governmental entity requires a person βto utter or distribute\\n\\nspeech bearing a particular message,β we subject that requirement to βrigorous scrutiny.β\\n\\nGreater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 879\\n\\n\\n 5\\n In Woodβs amended complaint, she objects to other portions of the world history\\ncurriculum, such as the fact that that Wood was βinstructed from the text of the Qurβan,β\\nthat Wood was βinstructed . . . that [r]ighteous women are . . . obedientβ to men, and that\\nthe course devoted only a single day to the study of Christianity while multiple days were\\nspent studying Islam. Wood waived these arguments by failing to raise them in her\\nopening brief. Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Intβl LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (βA\\nparty waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening brief.β).\\n\\n 16\\n\\fF.3d 101, 107 (4th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). In the public school setting, students do\\n\\nnot βshed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the\\n\\nschoolhouse gate,β but retain their First Amendment rights βapplied in light of the special\\n\\ncharacteristics of the school environment.β Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,\\n\\n393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). However, the Supreme Court has emphasized that studentsβ\\n\\nFirst Amendment rights in public schools βare not automatically coextensive with the\\n\\nrights of adults in other settings.β Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266.\\n\\n In considering the right against compelled speech in the public school context, the\\n\\nThird Circuit has explained:\\n\\n First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that the educational process\\n itself may sometimes require a state actor to force a student to speak when\\n the student would rather refrain. A student may also be forced to speak or\\n write on a particular topic even though the student might prefer a different\\n topic. And while a public educational institution may not demand that a\\n student profess beliefs or views with which the student does not agree, a\\n school may in some circumstances require a student to state the arguments\\n that could be made in support of such beliefs or views.\\n\\nC.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 187 (3d Cir. 2005). We agree with the\\n\\nThird Circuitβs reasoning. Although a studentβs right against compelled speech in a\\n\\npublic school may be asserted under various circumstances, that right has limited\\n\\napplication in a classroom setting in which a student is asked to study and discuss\\n\\nmaterials with which she disagrees.\\n\\n In the present case, the record is clear that the shahada assignment did not require\\n\\nWood to profess or accept the tenets of Islam. The students were not asked to recite the\\n\\nshahada, nor were they required to engage in any devotional practice related to Islam.\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\fCf. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1943) (distinguishing between\\n\\ncompelling students to declare a belief through mandatory recital of the pledge of\\n\\nallegiance, and βmerely . . . acquaint[ing students] with the flag salute so that they may be\\n\\ninformed as to what it is or even what it meansβ). Instead, the shahada assignment\\n\\nrequired Wood to write only two words of the shahada as an academic exercise to\\n\\ndemonstrate her understanding of the world history curriculum. On these facts, we\\n\\nconclude that Woodβs First Amendment right against compelled speech was not violated.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For these reasons, we affirm the district courtβs judgment.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":558,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4589849,"string":"4,589,849"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Eduardo Antonio RODRIGUEZ-ARIAS, Petitioner, v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Eduardo Rodriguez-Arias v. Matthew Whitaker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2211"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Donald C. COGGINS, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"FLOYD, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-2211\\n\\n\\nEDUARDO ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ-ARIAS,\\n\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General,\\n\\n Respondent.\\n\\n\\nOn Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 30, 2018 Decided: February 12, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Donald C. COGGINS, United States\\nDistrict Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.\\n\\n\\nPetition for review granted; vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Floyd\\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Harris and Judge Coggins joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: James Feroli, CATHOLIC CHARITIES IMMIGRATION LEGAL\\nSERVICES, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Margot Lynne Carter, UNITED STATES\\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Jennifer\\nBibby-Gerth, CATHOLIC CHARITIES IMMIGRATION LEGAL SERVICES,\\nWashington, D.C., for Petitioner. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General,\\nTerri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of\\nImmigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., for Respondent.\\n\\fFLOYD, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Eduardo Rodriguez-Arias (Rodriguez), a native of El Salvador, petitions for review\\n\\nof the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of his\\n\\nclaim for protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,\\n\\nInhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). We grant his petition for review\\n\\nof his CAT claim, vacate the BIAβs order with respect to that claim, and remand for further\\n\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Rodriguez fled El Salvadorβs rampant gang-related violence and crime in 2005,\\n\\nwhen he unlawfully entered the United States as a twelve-year-old. At that time, his\\n\\ngrandparents were being extorted by the gangs, he himself had been robbed twice by them,\\n\\nand his teenage cousin had been killed after refusing to join them. The cause of\\n\\nRodriguezβs flight now forms part of the basis for his claim for relief: Rodriguez fears\\n\\nbeing returned to El Salvador due to the countryβs continued high rate of gang-perpetrated\\n\\nviolence. But whatβs more, he now also fears violence at the hands of anti-gang vigilante\\n\\ngroups and the state police because today he bears the insignia of gang affiliation on his\\n\\nbodyβgang-related tattoos.\\n\\n After he arrived in the United States, Rodriguez moved to Maryland and joined\\n\\nSureΓ±os 13, a United States-based gang with no presence in El Salvador. Due to his\\n\\naffiliation with SureΓ±os 13, Rodriguez obtained multiple tattoos that identify him as a gang\\n\\nmember. These include the word βSureΓ±osβ on his chest, the phrase βBrown Prideβ on his\\n\\n 2\\n\\fstomach, βBPSβ and β13β on his left hand, the letter βSβ above each of his knees, and\\n\\nβBPSβ on his back. A.R. 951β56. Although Rodriguez left SureΓ±os 13 in 2011 or 2012,\\n\\nand has had a face tattoo removed, his other explicitly gang-related tattoos remain.\\n\\n After he was placed in removal proceedings, Rodriguez sought relief from removal\\n\\nunder the CAT. 1 He received an evidentiary hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) on\\n\\nMay 16, 2016. At the hearing, Rodriguez testified that he fears returning to El Salvador.\\n\\nBecause of his tattoos, he expects to be targeted by the violent gangs that plague the\\n\\ncountry, who will see him as a rival; by anti-gang vigilante groups, who engage in\\n\\nextrajudicial killings of gang members to protect their communities; and by the police, who\\n\\nuse extreme violence in their anti-gang efforts. Rodriguez explained in his testimony that\\n\\nin El Salvador, having tattoos is seen as an automatic sign of gang membership and people\\n\\ndo not bother investigating whether you are still an active gang member before harming\\n\\nyou. Confirming his fears, a friend of his who, like Rodriguez, had once belonged to\\n\\nSureΓ±os 13 was killed within a week after being deported to El Salvador.\\n\\n Indeed, Rodriguez testified that even after he left SureΓ±os 13, his tattoos have made\\n\\nhim a target of violence at the hands of Salvadoran gangs operating in the United States.\\n\\nOn one occasion, he was chased by ten to twenty men dressed in blue, the color worn by\\n\\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 gang. On another occasion he was walking near\\n\\nhis home when an MS-13 member struck him with a bat, and on still another occasion\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Rodriguez also applied for asylum and for withholding of removal but did not\\nappeal the denial of those forms of relief.\\n\\n 3\\n\\fsomeone hit him with a chair when he visited a restaurant frequented by MS-13 members.\\n\\nRodriguez has also been threatened by rival gangs while in immigration detention. An\\n\\nMS-13 member in detention told Rodriguez that as soon as he arrives in El Salvador, MS-\\n\\n13 will find him and kill him. Two members of the 18th Street gang told him that in El\\n\\nSalvador, 18th Street will look for him and will βhave fun withβ his body. A.R. 440.\\n\\n In addition to his own testimony, Rodriguez provided evidence from five expert\\n\\nwitnesses about how gang members or suspected gang members routinely experience\\n\\nextreme violence in El Salvador at the hands of other gangs, numerous vigilante groups,\\n\\nand police forces. He also produced the U.S. Department of State 2015 and 2014 Country\\n\\nReports on El Salvador, the asylum eligibility guidelines for El Salvador from the United\\n\\nNations High Commissioner for Refugees, and approximately thirty articles from various\\n\\nscholarly and news sources describing the appallingly violent conditions in El Salvador.\\n\\nIn all, he provided over 300 pages of documentation.\\n\\n The IJ denied Rodriguezβs application for relief. She devoted less than one page of\\n\\nher opinion to the CAT claim and limited her risk-of-torture analysis to the risks that\\n\\nRodriguez faced from gangs and the police. On appeal, the BIA remanded the case so that\\n\\nthe IJ could address Rodriguezβs risk of torture from vigilante groups as well. Nowhere in\\n\\nthe two-page remand order did the BIA state that the IJβs original opinion had been vacated\\n\\nor reversed.\\n\\n On remand, Rodriguez provided additional country-conditions evidence relating to\\n\\nhis risk of torture in El Salvador. The IJ then issued a supplemental opinion, which\\n\\nincorporated her first opinion by reference and provided new analysis on only those topics\\n\\n 4\\n\\fthat the BIA had ordered addressed. The IJ again denied CAT relief, this time devoting\\n\\nthree pages to the topic. On Rodriguezβs second appeal, the BIA reviewed the IJ opinions\\n\\ntogether, adopted both, and supplemented them with additional reasoning. In the BIAβs\\n\\ntwo pages of CAT analysis, it did not refer specifically to any of the evidence provided by\\n\\nRodriguez. This petition for review timely followed.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n When making a CAT claim, the alien seeking relief has the burden to show that βit\\n\\nis more likely than not that he or she would be torturedβ in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(2) (2012). Torture is defined as (1) βany act by which severe pain or\\n\\nsuffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a personβ in a manner\\n\\nthat is (2) βby or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official\\n\\nor other person acting in an official capacity.β 8 C.F.R. Β§ 1208.18(a)(1) (2012). Public\\n\\nofficials acquiesce to torture when, βprior to the activity constituting torture, [they] have\\n\\nawareness of such activity and thereafter breach [their] legal responsibility to intervene to\\n\\nprevent such activity.β 8 C.F.R. Β§ 1208.18(a)(7). Public officials breach their\\n\\nresponsibility to intervene when they engage in βwillful blindnessβ or βturn a blind eye to\\n\\ntorture.β Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting\\n\\nOntunezβTursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 2002)). Public officials need not\\n\\nhave actual knowledge of torture to have engaged in willful blindness. Id. When\\n\\ndetermining whether the willful-blindness standard has been met, βimmigration judges\\n\\nshould consider evidence of past torture, evidence of βgross, flagrant or mass violations of\\n\\n 5\\n\\fhuman rights,β the countryβs conditions, and whether the applicant could relocate to a part\\n\\nof the country where he or she is unlikely to be tortured.β Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(3) (2012)).\\n\\n In reviewing the denial of a CAT claim, we review the agencyβs finding of fact for\\n\\nsubstantial evidence. See Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010). In the\\n\\nimmigration context, this standard means that βadministrative findings of fact are\\n\\nconclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the\\n\\ncontrary.β 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 245. Legal\\n\\ndeterminations, however, are reviewed de novo. Hui Zheng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 647, 651\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2009). Although the BIA may be granted Chevron deference when it decides\\n\\nmatters of statutory interpretation, such deference is not granted where, as here, the BIA\\n\\nissued a nonprecedential opinion authored by a single member. Martinez v. Holder, 740\\n\\nF.3d 902, 909 (4th Cir. 2014); Turkson, 667 F.3d at 527; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.\\n\\nNatural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842β43 (1984).\\n\\n We may also overturn the BIAβs determinations if we conclude that the BIA abused\\n\\nits discretion. Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011). βThe BIA may be held\\n\\nto have abused its discretion if it failed to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or\\n\\nif it distorted or disregarded important aspects of the applicantβs claim.β Id. Finally,\\n\\nbecause the BIA here βadopted and supplemented an IJ decision, we are obliged to review\\n\\nboth rulings.β Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f In his petition for review, Rodriguez first argues that the BIA made a legal error\\n\\nwhen it denied him CAT relief because it failed to aggregate his risk of torture from all\\n\\nthree of the entities that he fears: gangs, vigilante groups, and the police. We agree.\\n\\n The CAT implementing regulations provide that when βassessing whether it is more\\n\\nlikely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all\\n\\nevidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered.β 8 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has read this requirement to\\n\\nmean that βCAT claims must be considered in terms of the aggregate risk of torture from\\n\\nall sources, and not as separate, divisible CAT claims.β Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799\\n\\nF.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 2015). The Third Circuit agrees. In a case where the CAT\\n\\napplicant feared torture from two different entities, the Third Circuit explained that β[a]\\n\\nproper application of the regulations . . . merely requires [the applicant] to establish that it\\n\\nis more likely than not that he faces torture . . . when the two entities are considered\\n\\ntogetherββin other words, when βthe cumulative probability of torture by the two entities\\n\\nexceeds 50%.β Kamara v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 213β14 (3d Cir. 2005)\\n\\n(demonstrating the aggregation analysis by adding a 27% likelihood of torture from one\\n\\nentity to a 28% of torture from another entity for a combined risk of torture of 55%, which\\n\\nmerited CAT relief); see also Matter of G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 366, 368 (BIA 2002)\\n\\n(en banc) (explaining in a case where the CAT applicant feared that he would be tortured\\n\\nbased on several factors, including βhis religion, his ethnicity, the duration of his residence\\n\\nin the United States, and his drug-related convictions,β that βthe evidence of record, when\\n\\nconsidered in the aggregate, supports the respondentβs contention that he would more\\n\\n 7\\n\\flikely than not be tortured upon his return to Iranβ (emphasis added)). No other U.S. Courts\\n\\nof Appeals have disagreed with this analysis.\\n\\n We now join our sister circuits and hold that the risks of torture from all sources\\n\\nshould be combined when determining whether a CAT applicant is more likely than not to\\n\\nbe tortured in a particular country. That interpretation is most consistent with both the\\n\\nimplementing regulations and our treaty obligations not to return individuals to a country\\n\\nwhere they face a substantial risk of torture. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783,\\n\\n806β07 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that βsettled rules of treaty interpretation require that\\n\\nwe construe the CAT generouslyβ); see also Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 114β16 (2d\\n\\nCir. 2007) (explaining that courts owe deference to the executive branchβs treaty\\n\\ninterpretation as expressed through implementing regulations). We therefore confirm that\\n\\nthe aggregation analysis described by the Ninth and Third Circuits is required when\\n\\nassessing an applicantβs risk of torture.\\n\\n While the government concedes that the BIA should have aggregated the risk of\\n\\ntorture that Rodriguez faces in El Salvador, it nevertheless argues that there was no error\\n\\nbelow because both the BIA and IJ did βconsider Rodriguezβs claim for relief\\n\\ncumulatively.β Appellee Br. at 26. We disagree. In her first order, the IJ addressed only\\n\\nthe risks that Rodriguez faced from gangs and the police, with no mention of vigilante\\n\\ngroups. In her second order, the IJ simply stated: βRespondent has failed to demonstrate\\n\\nthat it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by vigilante groups[.]β A.R. 124.\\n\\nAt no point did she consider the aggregated risk caused by all three entities in unison by\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\fadding the probability of torture from each entity and determining whether that sum\\n\\nexceeded 50%.\\n\\n The BIA, in turn, devoted no space in its final order to aggregating risk. Instead, it\\n\\nasserted the rule that β[a]n alienβs eligibility for [CAT] protection cannot be established by\\n\\nstringing together a series of suppositions to show that it is more likely than not that torture\\n\\nwill result,β unless the evidence βestablish[es] that each step in the hypothetical chain of\\n\\nevents is more likely than not to happen,β citing a BIA opinion as support. A.R. 007. Then,\\n\\nwithout citing to or describing any of Rodriguezβs evidence, the BIA simply stated:\\n\\nβ[Rodriguez] has not shown that his hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to\\n\\nhappen.β A.R. 008. But Rodriguez never attempted to prove a string of events. Instead,\\n\\nhe has consistently asserted that due to his tattoos, he fears torture from three separate\\n\\nentities: police, gangs, and vigilante groups. The proper response to Rodriguezβs fears is\\n\\nto add the amount of risk that each group poses to him and then determine whether that\\n\\nsum is greater than 50%. The BIA failed to do that analysis here, necessitating remand. 2\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The BIA also cited two cases to support its determination that Rodriguezβs tattoos\\nwould not put him at substantial risk of torture in El Salvador. The Court is not persuaded\\nby these cases for several reasons. First, CAT claims are highly fact specific, which means\\nthat one applicant may be able to show a substantial risk of torture in El Salvador due to\\nhis tattoos while another may not. Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004).\\nSecond, the cases cited by the BIA are readily distinguishable. In Castillo-Pena v. Holder,\\n482 F. Appβx 847 (4th Cir. 2012), the Court found that an unrepresented applicant had\\nfailed to show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by Salvadoran\\npolice because of his tattoos. The case did not address the combined risks posed by police,\\nvigilante groups, and gangs in El Salvador. Id. at 848. In the second, Andrade v. Lynch,\\n798 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIAβs denial of CAT relief\\nto a Salvadoran applicant who had two discreet non-gang-related tattoos. Id. at 1245.\\nHowever, those tattoosβwhich were merely his and his girlfriendβs initialsβdo not pose\\n(Continued)\\n 9\\n\\f IV.\\n\\n Rodriguez also argues that the BIA and IJ erred by (1) failing to meaningfully\\n\\nengage with the live testimony and over 300 pages of documentary evidence that he\\n\\noriginally produced in support of his claim, and (2) failing to meaningfully consider the\\n\\nadditional evidence that he submitted on remand about the risk of torture that he faces in\\n\\nEl Salvador. We agree.\\n\\n It is an abuse of discretion for the BIA or IJ to arbitrarily ignore relevant evidence.\\n\\nBaharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009); Tassi, 660 F.3d at 719. βThose who\\n\\nflee persecution and seek refuge under our laws have the right to know that the evidence\\n\\nthey present of mistreatment in their home country will be fairly considered and weighed\\n\\nby those who decide their fate.β Baharon, 588 F.3d at 233. Therefore, it is this Courtβs\\n\\nresponsibility to βensure that unrebutted, legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily\\n\\nignored by the factfinder.β Id. Moreover, the BIAβs or IJβs failure to engage with an\\n\\napplicantβs evidence hampers our ability to meaningfully review what was decided below.\\n\\nZelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 168 (4th Cir. 2012). Hence, a wholesale βfailure [by] the\\n\\n\\n\\nthe same level of risk as the plentiful and conspicuous gang tattoos on Rodriguez. Indeed,\\nthe case most similar to the one at bar was not even cited by the BIA and supports\\nRodriguezβs CAT claim here. In Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2011), a former\\ngang member with conspicuous gang tattoos on his face, calves, arms, and back sought\\nCAT relief because he feared that he would be tortured by the gangs, police forces, and\\nanti-gang death squads in his native Honduras. Id. at 765. The Ninth Circuit vacated and\\nremanded the BIAβs denial of CAT relief because it determined that the BIA had failed to\\naggregate the risk of torture that these three entities posed to an individual with multiple\\nand conspicuous gang tattoos. Id. at 775.\\n\\n 10\\n\\fIJ and BIA to consider evidence of country conditions constitutes reversible error.β\\n\\nAguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Ai Hua Chen v.\\n\\nHolder, 742 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the IJ and BIA must βoffer a\\n\\nspecific, cogent reason for rejecting evidenceβ).\\n\\n The IJ did not meaningfully address the evidence that Rodriguez provided about\\n\\ncountry conditions in El Salvador, especially the Salvadoran governmentβs behavior\\n\\ntowards gang members and suspected gang members. In her first opinion, she\\n\\nacknowledged that there are βsome instances of torture of gang members and former gang\\n\\nmembers by the police in El Salvador,β but then asserted that the βevidence does not\\n\\nsupportβ the likelihood that the harm inflicted on Rodriguez would be with the\\n\\ngovernmentβs acquiescence. A.R. 372. There was no other analysis. In her second\\n\\nopinion, the IJ admitted that β[t]he evidence does indicate that Salvadoran authorities have\\n\\nrecently failed to address many instances of vigilante violence.β A.R. 125. But she again\\n\\nfound that Rodriguezβs evidence was insufficient, this time because Salvadoran law\\n\\nβprohibits extrajudicial killings and violenceβ and there have been some efforts by the\\n\\ngovernment to investigate extrajudicial killings. A.R. 125. The IJ did not address\\n\\nRodriguezβs extensive evidence about the governmentβs willingness to use torture on\\n\\nsuspected gang members or its willingness to turn a blind eye to the extreme violence\\n\\nbetween rival gangs and between gangs and vigilante groups. This evidence included:\\n\\n 1) El Salvador passed a law in November 2013 that protects police officers who\\n kill in the line of duty, which resulted in a spike of extrajudicial killings, A.R.\\n 536;\\n 2) Salvadoran police officers routinely drop off suspected gang members in a rival\\n gangβs territory so that they will be tortured or killed by the rival gang, A.R. 536;\\n\\n 11\\n\\f 3) While El Salvador has announced investigations of several extrajudicial killings,\\n the 2015 Country Report stated that these investigations have not resulted in any\\n convictions, A.R. 605;\\n 4) In January 2016, there were 738 murders in El Salvador, of which 28.6% were\\n of alleged gang members, despite the fact that less than 2% of Salvadorans are\\n in gangs, A.R. 567.\\n\\n The IJβs failure to meaningfully engage with Rodriguezβs evidence was not\\n\\nremedied on appeal. In its review, both originally and after remand, the BIA did not engage\\n\\nwith Rodriguezβs evidence at all.\\n\\n This wholesale failure to fully consider Rodriguezβs country-conditions evidence\\n\\nconstitutes reversible error. Denying Rodriguezβs claim for CAT relief required moreβ\\n\\nmuch moreβfrom both the BIA and the IJ. On remand, the BIA must interact seriously\\n\\nwith the full panoply of the risk-of-torture evidence submitted by Rodriguez, recognizing\\n\\nthat βcountry conditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief under the [CAT].β\\n\\nKamalthus v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001); Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594\\n\\nF.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (β[A] CAT applicant may satisfy his burden with evidence\\n\\nof country conditions alone.β). When a manβs life is on the line, he is entitled to know that\\n\\nthe court deciding his claim reviewed all his evidence, understood it, and had a cogent,\\n\\narticulable basis for its determination that his evidence was insufficient. The BIA and IJ\\n\\nboth failed to provide such a cogent, articulable basis here.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f V.\\n\\n In conclusion, we grant Rodriguezβs petition for review of his CAT claim, vacate\\n\\nthe BIAβs decision with respect to that claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent\\n\\nwith this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4367102/\", \"author_raw\": \"FLOYD, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"FLOYD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HARRIS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DONALD C COGGINS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"FLOYD\": \", Circuit\", \"HARRIS\": \", Circuit\", \"C COGGINS\": \", United States District\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589849/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Eduardo Antonio RODRIGUEZ-ARIAS, Petitioner, v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-2211\n\n\nEDUARDO ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ-ARIAS,\n\n Petitioner,\n\n v.\n\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General,\n\n Respondent.\n\n\nOn Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\n\n\nArgued: October 30, 2018 Decided: February 12, 2019\n\n\nBefore FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Donald C. COGGINS, United States\nDistrict Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.\n\n\nPetition for review granted; vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Floyd\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Harris and Judge Coggins joined.\n\n\nARGUED: James Feroli, CATHOLIC CHARITIES IMMIGRATION LEGAL\nSERVICES, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Margot Lynne Carter, UNITED STATES\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Jennifer\nBibby-Gerth, CATHOLIC CHARITIES IMMIGRATION LEGAL SERVICES,\nWashington, D.C., for Petitioner. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General,\nTerri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of\nImmigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\nWashington, D.C., for Respondent.\n\fFLOYD, Circuit Judge:\n\n Eduardo Rodriguez-Arias (Rodriguez), a native of El Salvador, petitions for review\n\nof the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of his\n\nclaim for protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,\n\nInhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). We grant his petition for review\n\nof his CAT claim, vacate the BIAβs order with respect to that claim, and remand for further\n\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n Rodriguez fled El Salvadorβs rampant gang-related violence and crime in 2005,\n\nwhen he unlawfully entered the United States as a twelve-year-old. At that time, his\n\ngrandparents were being extorted by the gangs, he himself had been robbed twice by them,\n\nand his teenage cousin had been killed after refusing to join them. The cause of\n\nRodriguezβs flight now forms part of the basis for his claim for relief: Rodriguez fears\n\nbeing returned to El Salvador due to the countryβs continued high rate of gang-perpetrated\n\nviolence. But whatβs more, he now also fears violence at the hands of anti-gang vigilante\n\ngroups and the state police because today he bears the insignia of gang affiliation on his\n\nbodyβgang-related tattoos.\n\n After he arrived in the United States, Rodriguez moved to Maryland and joined\n\nSureΓ±os 13, a United States-based gang with no presence in El Salvador. Due to his\n\naffiliation with SureΓ±os 13, Rodriguez obtained multiple tattoos that identify him as a gang\n\nmember. These include the word βSureΓ±osβ on his chest, the phrase βBrown Prideβ on his\n\n 2\n\fstomach, βBPSβ and β13β on his left hand, the letter βSβ above each of his knees, and\n\nβBPSβ on his back. A.R. 951β56. Although Rodriguez left SureΓ±os 13 in 2011 or 2012,\n\nand has had a face tattoo removed, his other explicitly gang-related tattoos remain.\n\n After he was placed in removal proceedings, Rodriguez sought relief from removal\n\nunder the CAT. 1 He received an evidentiary hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) on\n\nMay 16, 2016. At the hearing, Rodriguez testified that he fears returning to El Salvador.\n\nBecause of his tattoos, he expects to be targeted by the violent gangs that plague the\n\ncountry, who will see him as a rival; by anti-gang vigilante groups, who engage in\n\nextrajudicial killings of gang members to protect their communities; and by the police, who\n\nuse extreme violence in their anti-gang efforts. Rodriguez explained in his testimony that\n\nin El Salvador, having tattoos is seen as an automatic sign of gang membership and people\n\ndo not bother investigating whether you are still an active gang member before harming\n\nyou. Confirming his fears, a friend of his who, like Rodriguez, had once belonged to\n\nSureΓ±os 13 was killed within a week after being deported to El Salvador.\n\n Indeed, Rodriguez testified that even after he left SureΓ±os 13, his tattoos have made\n\nhim a target of violence at the hands of Salvadoran gangs operating in the United States.\n\nOn one occasion, he was chased by ten to twenty men dressed in blue, the color worn by\n\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 gang. On another occasion he was walking near\n\nhis home when an MS-13 member struck him with a bat, and on still another occasion\n\n\n\n 1\n Rodriguez also applied for asylum and for withholding of removal but did not\nappeal the denial of those forms of relief.\n\n 3\n\fsomeone hit him with a chair when he visited a restaurant frequented by MS-13 members.\n\nRodriguez has also been threatened by rival gangs while in immigration detention. An\n\nMS-13 member in detention told Rodriguez that as soon as he arrives in El Salvador, MS-\n\n13 will find him and kill him. Two members of the 18th Street gang told him that in El\n\nSalvador, 18th Street will look for him and will βhave fun withβ his body. A.R. 440.\n\n In addition to his own testimony, Rodriguez provided evidence from five expert\n\nwitnesses about how gang members or suspected gang members routinely experience\n\nextreme violence in El Salvador at the hands of other gangs, numerous vigilante groups,\n\nand police forces. He also produced the U.S. Department of State 2015 and 2014 Country\n\nReports on El Salvador, the asylum eligibility guidelines for El Salvador from the United\n\nNations High Commissioner for Refugees, and approximately thirty articles from various\n\nscholarly and news sources describing the appallingly violent conditions in El Salvador.\n\nIn all, he provided over 300 pages of documentation.\n\n The IJ denied Rodriguezβs application for relief. She devoted less than one page of\n\nher opinion to the CAT claim and limited her risk-of-torture analysis to the risks that\n\nRodriguez faced from gangs and the police. On appeal, the BIA remanded the case so that\n\nthe IJ could address Rodriguezβs risk of torture from vigilante groups as well. Nowhere in\n\nthe two-page remand order did the BIA state that the IJβs original opinion had been vacated\n\nor reversed.\n\n On remand, Rodriguez provided additional country-conditions evidence relating to\n\nhis risk of torture in El Salvador. The IJ then issued a supplemental opinion, which\n\nincorporated her first opinion by reference and provided new analysis on only those topics\n\n 4\n\fthat the BIA had ordered addressed. The IJ again denied CAT relief, this time devoting\n\nthree pages to the topic. On Rodriguezβs second appeal, the BIA reviewed the IJ opinions\n\ntogether, adopted both, and supplemented them with additional reasoning. In the BIAβs\n\ntwo pages of CAT analysis, it did not refer specifically to any of the evidence provided by\n\nRodriguez. This petition for review timely followed.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n When making a CAT claim, the alien seeking relief has the burden to show that βit\n\nis more likely than not that he or she would be torturedβ in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R.\n\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(2) (2012). Torture is defined as (1) βany act by which severe pain or\n\nsuffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a personβ in a manner\n\nthat is (2) βby or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official\n\nor other person acting in an official capacity.β 8 C.F.R. Β§ 1208.18(a)(1) (2012). Public\n\nofficials acquiesce to torture when, βprior to the activity constituting torture, [they] have\n\nawareness of such activity and thereafter breach [their] legal responsibility to intervene to\n\nprevent such activity.β 8 C.F.R. Β§ 1208.18(a)(7). Public officials breach their\n\nresponsibility to intervene when they engage in βwillful blindnessβ or βturn a blind eye to\n\ntorture.β Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting\n\nOntunezβTursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 2002)). Public officials need not\n\nhave actual knowledge of torture to have engaged in willful blindness. Id. When\n\ndetermining whether the willful-blindness standard has been met, βimmigration judges\n\nshould consider evidence of past torture, evidence of βgross, flagrant or mass violations of\n\n 5\n\fhuman rights,β the countryβs conditions, and whether the applicant could relocate to a part\n\nof the country where he or she is unlikely to be tortured.β Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R.\n\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(3) (2012)).\n\n In reviewing the denial of a CAT claim, we review the agencyβs finding of fact for\n\nsubstantial evidence. See Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010). In the\n\nimmigration context, this standard means that βadministrative findings of fact are\n\nconclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the\n\ncontrary.β 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 245. Legal\n\ndeterminations, however, are reviewed de novo. Hui Zheng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 647, 651\n\n(4th Cir. 2009). Although the BIA may be granted Chevron deference when it decides\n\nmatters of statutory interpretation, such deference is not granted where, as here, the BIA\n\nissued a nonprecedential opinion authored by a single member. Martinez v. Holder, 740\n\nF.3d 902, 909 (4th Cir. 2014); Turkson, 667 F.3d at 527; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.\n\nNatural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842β43 (1984).\n\n We may also overturn the BIAβs determinations if we conclude that the BIA abused\n\nits discretion. Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011). βThe BIA may be held\n\nto have abused its discretion if it failed to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or\n\nif it distorted or disregarded important aspects of the applicantβs claim.β Id. Finally,\n\nbecause the BIA here βadopted and supplemented an IJ decision, we are obliged to review\n\nboth rulings.β Id.\n\n\n\n III.\n\n 6\n\f In his petition for review, Rodriguez first argues that the BIA made a legal error\n\nwhen it denied him CAT relief because it failed to aggregate his risk of torture from all\n\nthree of the entities that he fears: gangs, vigilante groups, and the police. We agree.\n\n The CAT implementing regulations provide that when βassessing whether it is more\n\nlikely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all\n\nevidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered.β 8 C.F.R.\n\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has read this requirement to\n\nmean that βCAT claims must be considered in terms of the aggregate risk of torture from\n\nall sources, and not as separate, divisible CAT claims.β Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799\n\nF.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 2015). The Third Circuit agrees. In a case where the CAT\n\napplicant feared torture from two different entities, the Third Circuit explained that β[a]\n\nproper application of the regulations . . . merely requires [the applicant] to establish that it\n\nis more likely than not that he faces torture . . . when the two entities are considered\n\ntogetherββin other words, when βthe cumulative probability of torture by the two entities\n\nexceeds 50%.β Kamara v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 213β14 (3d Cir. 2005)\n\n(demonstrating the aggregation analysis by adding a 27% likelihood of torture from one\n\nentity to a 28% of torture from another entity for a combined risk of torture of 55%, which\n\nmerited CAT relief); see also Matter of G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 366, 368 (BIA 2002)\n\n(en banc) (explaining in a case where the CAT applicant feared that he would be tortured\n\nbased on several factors, including βhis religion, his ethnicity, the duration of his residence\n\nin the United States, and his drug-related convictions,β that βthe evidence of record, when\n\nconsidered in the aggregate, supports the respondentβs contention that he would more\n\n 7\n\flikely than not be tortured upon his return to Iranβ (emphasis added)). No other U.S. Courts\n\nof Appeals have disagreed with this analysis.\n\n We now join our sister circuits and hold that the risks of torture from all sources\n\nshould be combined when determining whether a CAT applicant is more likely than not to\n\nbe tortured in a particular country. That interpretation is most consistent with both the\n\nimplementing regulations and our treaty obligations not to return individuals to a country\n\nwhere they face a substantial risk of torture. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783,\n\n806β07 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that βsettled rules of treaty interpretation require that\n\nwe construe the CAT generouslyβ); see also Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 114β16 (2d\n\nCir. 2007) (explaining that courts owe deference to the executive branchβs treaty\n\ninterpretation as expressed through implementing regulations). We therefore confirm that\n\nthe aggregation analysis described by the Ninth and Third Circuits is required when\n\nassessing an applicantβs risk of torture.\n\n While the government concedes that the BIA should have aggregated the risk of\n\ntorture that Rodriguez faces in El Salvador, it nevertheless argues that there was no error\n\nbelow because both the BIA and IJ did βconsider Rodriguezβs claim for relief\n\ncumulatively.β Appellee Br. at 26. We disagree. In her first order, the IJ addressed only\n\nthe risks that Rodriguez faced from gangs and the police, with no mention of vigilante\n\ngroups. In her second order, the IJ simply stated: βRespondent has failed to demonstrate\n\nthat it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by vigilante groups[.]β A.R. 124.\n\nAt no point did she consider the aggregated risk caused by all three entities in unison by\n\n\n\n 8\n\fadding the probability of torture from each entity and determining whether that sum\n\nexceeded 50%.\n\n The BIA, in turn, devoted no space in its final order to aggregating risk. Instead, it\n\nasserted the rule that β[a]n alienβs eligibility for [CAT] protection cannot be established by\n\nstringing together a series of suppositions to show that it is more likely than not that torture\n\nwill result,β unless the evidence βestablish[es] that each step in the hypothetical chain of\n\nevents is more likely than not to happen,β citing a BIA opinion as support. A.R. 007. Then,\n\nwithout citing to or describing any of Rodriguezβs evidence, the BIA simply stated:\n\nβ[Rodriguez] has not shown that his hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to\n\nhappen.β A.R. 008. But Rodriguez never attempted to prove a string of events. Instead,\n\nhe has consistently asserted that due to his tattoos, he fears torture from three separate\n\nentities: police, gangs, and vigilante groups. The proper response to Rodriguezβs fears is\n\nto add the amount of risk that each group poses to him and then determine whether that\n\nsum is greater than 50%. The BIA failed to do that analysis here, necessitating remand. 2\n\n\n 2\n The BIA also cited two cases to support its determination that Rodriguezβs tattoos\nwould not put him at substantial risk of torture in El Salvador. The Court is not persuaded\nby these cases for several reasons. First, CAT claims are highly fact specific, which means\nthat one applicant may be able to show a substantial risk of torture in El Salvador due to\nhis tattoos while another may not. Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004).\nSecond, the cases cited by the BIA are readily distinguishable. In Castillo-Pena v. Holder,\n482 F. Appβx 847 (4th Cir. 2012), the Court found that an unrepresented applicant had\nfailed to show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by Salvadoran\npolice because of his tattoos. The case did not address the combined risks posed by police,\nvigilante groups, and gangs in El Salvador. Id. at 848. In the second, Andrade v. Lynch,\n798 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIAβs denial of CAT relief\nto a Salvadoran applicant who had two discreet non-gang-related tattoos. Id. at 1245.\nHowever, those tattoosβwhich were merely his and his girlfriendβs initialsβdo not pose\n(Continued)\n 9\n\f IV.\n\n Rodriguez also argues that the BIA and IJ erred by (1) failing to meaningfully\n\nengage with the live testimony and over 300 pages of documentary evidence that he\n\noriginally produced in support of his claim, and (2) failing to meaningfully consider the\n\nadditional evidence that he submitted on remand about the risk of torture that he faces in\n\nEl Salvador. We agree.\n\n It is an abuse of discretion for the BIA or IJ to arbitrarily ignore relevant evidence.\n\nBaharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009); Tassi, 660 F.3d at 719. βThose who\n\nflee persecution and seek refuge under our laws have the right to know that the evidence\n\nthey present of mistreatment in their home country will be fairly considered and weighed\n\nby those who decide their fate.β Baharon, 588 F.3d at 233. Therefore, it is this Courtβs\n\nresponsibility to βensure that unrebutted, legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily\n\nignored by the factfinder.β Id. Moreover, the BIAβs or IJβs failure to engage with an\n\napplicantβs evidence hampers our ability to meaningfully review what was decided below.\n\nZelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 168 (4th Cir. 2012). Hence, a wholesale βfailure [by] the\n\n\n\nthe same level of risk as the plentiful and conspicuous gang tattoos on Rodriguez. Indeed,\nthe case most similar to the one at bar was not even cited by the BIA and supports\nRodriguezβs CAT claim here. In Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2011), a former\ngang member with conspicuous gang tattoos on his face, calves, arms, and back sought\nCAT relief because he feared that he would be tortured by the gangs, police forces, and\nanti-gang death squads in his native Honduras. Id. at 765. The Ninth Circuit vacated and\nremanded the BIAβs denial of CAT relief because it determined that the BIA had failed to\naggregate the risk of torture that these three entities posed to an individual with multiple\nand conspicuous gang tattoos. Id. at 775.\n\n 10\n\fIJ and BIA to consider evidence of country conditions constitutes reversible error.β\n\nAguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Ai Hua Chen v.\n\nHolder, 742 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the IJ and BIA must βoffer a\n\nspecific, cogent reason for rejecting evidenceβ).\n\n The IJ did not meaningfully address the evidence that Rodriguez provided about\n\ncountry conditions in El Salvador, especially the Salvadoran governmentβs behavior\n\ntowards gang members and suspected gang members. In her first opinion, she\n\nacknowledged that there are βsome instances of torture of gang members and former gang\n\nmembers by the police in El Salvador,β but then asserted that the βevidence does not\n\nsupportβ the likelihood that the harm inflicted on Rodriguez would be with the\n\ngovernmentβs acquiescence. A.R. 372. There was no other analysis. In her second\n\nopinion, the IJ admitted that β[t]he evidence does indicate that Salvadoran authorities have\n\nrecently failed to address many instances of vigilante violence.β A.R. 125. But she again\n\nfound that Rodriguezβs evidence was insufficient, this time because Salvadoran law\n\nβprohibits extrajudicial killings and violenceβ and there have been some efforts by the\n\ngovernment to investigate extrajudicial killings. A.R. 125. The IJ did not address\n\nRodriguezβs extensive evidence about the governmentβs willingness to use torture on\n\nsuspected gang members or its willingness to turn a blind eye to the extreme violence\n\nbetween rival gangs and between gangs and vigilante groups. This evidence included:\n\n 1) El Salvador passed a law in November 2013 that protects police officers who\n kill in the line of duty, which resulted in a spike of extrajudicial killings, A.R.\n 536;\n 2) Salvadoran police officers routinely drop off suspected gang members in a rival\n gangβs territory so that they will be tortured or killed by the rival gang, A.R. 536;\n\n 11\n\f 3) While El Salvador has announced investigations of several extrajudicial killings,\n the 2015 Country Report stated that these investigations have not resulted in any\n convictions, A.R. 605;\n 4) In January 2016, there were 738 murders in El Salvador, of which 28.6% were\n of alleged gang members, despite the fact that less than 2% of Salvadorans are\n in gangs, A.R. 567.\n\n The IJβs failure to meaningfully engage with Rodriguezβs evidence was not\n\nremedied on appeal. In its review, both originally and after remand, the BIA did not engage\n\nwith Rodriguezβs evidence at all.\n\n This wholesale failure to fully consider Rodriguezβs country-conditions evidence\n\nconstitutes reversible error. Denying Rodriguezβs claim for CAT relief required moreβ\n\nmuch moreβfrom both the BIA and the IJ. On remand, the BIA must interact seriously\n\nwith the full panoply of the risk-of-torture evidence submitted by Rodriguez, recognizing\n\nthat βcountry conditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief under the [CAT].β\n\nKamalthus v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001); Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594\n\nF.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (β[A] CAT applicant may satisfy his burden with evidence\n\nof country conditions alone.β). When a manβs life is on the line, he is entitled to know that\n\nthe court deciding his claim reviewed all his evidence, understood it, and had a cogent,\n\narticulable basis for its determination that his evidence was insufficient. The BIA and IJ\n\nboth failed to provide such a cogent, articulable basis here.\n\n\n\n\n 12\n\f V.\n\n In conclusion, we grant Rodriguezβs petition for review of his CAT claim, vacate\n\nthe BIAβs decision with respect to that claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent\n\nwith this opinion.\n\n\n\n PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED\n\n\n\n\n 13\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Eduardo Antonio RODRIGUEZ-ARIAS, Petitioner, v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-2211\\n\\n\\nEDUARDO ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ-ARIAS,\\n\\n Petitioner,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nMATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General,\\n\\n Respondent.\\n\\n\\nOn Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 30, 2018 Decided: February 12, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Donald C. COGGINS, United States\\nDistrict Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.\\n\\n\\nPetition for review granted; vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Floyd\\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Harris and Judge Coggins joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: James Feroli, CATHOLIC CHARITIES IMMIGRATION LEGAL\\nSERVICES, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Margot Lynne Carter, UNITED STATES\\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Jennifer\\nBibby-Gerth, CATHOLIC CHARITIES IMMIGRATION LEGAL SERVICES,\\nWashington, D.C., for Petitioner. Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General,\\nTerri J. Scadron, Assistant Director, Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of\\nImmigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., for Respondent.\\n\\fFLOYD, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Eduardo Rodriguez-Arias (Rodriguez), a native of El Salvador, petitions for review\\n\\nof the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of his\\n\\nclaim for protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,\\n\\nInhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). We grant his petition for review\\n\\nof his CAT claim, vacate the BIAβs order with respect to that claim, and remand for further\\n\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Rodriguez fled El Salvadorβs rampant gang-related violence and crime in 2005,\\n\\nwhen he unlawfully entered the United States as a twelve-year-old. At that time, his\\n\\ngrandparents were being extorted by the gangs, he himself had been robbed twice by them,\\n\\nand his teenage cousin had been killed after refusing to join them. The cause of\\n\\nRodriguezβs flight now forms part of the basis for his claim for relief: Rodriguez fears\\n\\nbeing returned to El Salvador due to the countryβs continued high rate of gang-perpetrated\\n\\nviolence. But whatβs more, he now also fears violence at the hands of anti-gang vigilante\\n\\ngroups and the state police because today he bears the insignia of gang affiliation on his\\n\\nbodyβgang-related tattoos.\\n\\n After he arrived in the United States, Rodriguez moved to Maryland and joined\\n\\nSureΓ±os 13, a United States-based gang with no presence in El Salvador. Due to his\\n\\naffiliation with SureΓ±os 13, Rodriguez obtained multiple tattoos that identify him as a gang\\n\\nmember. These include the word βSureΓ±osβ on his chest, the phrase βBrown Prideβ on his\\n\\n 2\\n\\fstomach, βBPSβ and β13β on his left hand, the letter βSβ above each of his knees, and\\n\\nβBPSβ on his back. A.R. 951β56. Although Rodriguez left SureΓ±os 13 in 2011 or 2012,\\n\\nand has had a face tattoo removed, his other explicitly gang-related tattoos remain.\\n\\n After he was placed in removal proceedings, Rodriguez sought relief from removal\\n\\nunder the CAT. 1 He received an evidentiary hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ) on\\n\\nMay 16, 2016. At the hearing, Rodriguez testified that he fears returning to El Salvador.\\n\\nBecause of his tattoos, he expects to be targeted by the violent gangs that plague the\\n\\ncountry, who will see him as a rival; by anti-gang vigilante groups, who engage in\\n\\nextrajudicial killings of gang members to protect their communities; and by the police, who\\n\\nuse extreme violence in their anti-gang efforts. Rodriguez explained in his testimony that\\n\\nin El Salvador, having tattoos is seen as an automatic sign of gang membership and people\\n\\ndo not bother investigating whether you are still an active gang member before harming\\n\\nyou. Confirming his fears, a friend of his who, like Rodriguez, had once belonged to\\n\\nSureΓ±os 13 was killed within a week after being deported to El Salvador.\\n\\n Indeed, Rodriguez testified that even after he left SureΓ±os 13, his tattoos have made\\n\\nhim a target of violence at the hands of Salvadoran gangs operating in the United States.\\n\\nOn one occasion, he was chased by ten to twenty men dressed in blue, the color worn by\\n\\nthe notorious Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 gang. On another occasion he was walking near\\n\\nhis home when an MS-13 member struck him with a bat, and on still another occasion\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Rodriguez also applied for asylum and for withholding of removal but did not\\nappeal the denial of those forms of relief.\\n\\n 3\\n\\fsomeone hit him with a chair when he visited a restaurant frequented by MS-13 members.\\n\\nRodriguez has also been threatened by rival gangs while in immigration detention. An\\n\\nMS-13 member in detention told Rodriguez that as soon as he arrives in El Salvador, MS-\\n\\n13 will find him and kill him. Two members of the 18th Street gang told him that in El\\n\\nSalvador, 18th Street will look for him and will βhave fun withβ his body. A.R. 440.\\n\\n In addition to his own testimony, Rodriguez provided evidence from five expert\\n\\nwitnesses about how gang members or suspected gang members routinely experience\\n\\nextreme violence in El Salvador at the hands of other gangs, numerous vigilante groups,\\n\\nand police forces. He also produced the U.S. Department of State 2015 and 2014 Country\\n\\nReports on El Salvador, the asylum eligibility guidelines for El Salvador from the United\\n\\nNations High Commissioner for Refugees, and approximately thirty articles from various\\n\\nscholarly and news sources describing the appallingly violent conditions in El Salvador.\\n\\nIn all, he provided over 300 pages of documentation.\\n\\n The IJ denied Rodriguezβs application for relief. She devoted less than one page of\\n\\nher opinion to the CAT claim and limited her risk-of-torture analysis to the risks that\\n\\nRodriguez faced from gangs and the police. On appeal, the BIA remanded the case so that\\n\\nthe IJ could address Rodriguezβs risk of torture from vigilante groups as well. Nowhere in\\n\\nthe two-page remand order did the BIA state that the IJβs original opinion had been vacated\\n\\nor reversed.\\n\\n On remand, Rodriguez provided additional country-conditions evidence relating to\\n\\nhis risk of torture in El Salvador. The IJ then issued a supplemental opinion, which\\n\\nincorporated her first opinion by reference and provided new analysis on only those topics\\n\\n 4\\n\\fthat the BIA had ordered addressed. The IJ again denied CAT relief, this time devoting\\n\\nthree pages to the topic. On Rodriguezβs second appeal, the BIA reviewed the IJ opinions\\n\\ntogether, adopted both, and supplemented them with additional reasoning. In the BIAβs\\n\\ntwo pages of CAT analysis, it did not refer specifically to any of the evidence provided by\\n\\nRodriguez. This petition for review timely followed.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n When making a CAT claim, the alien seeking relief has the burden to show that βit\\n\\nis more likely than not that he or she would be torturedβ in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(2) (2012). Torture is defined as (1) βany act by which severe pain or\\n\\nsuffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a personβ in a manner\\n\\nthat is (2) βby or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official\\n\\nor other person acting in an official capacity.β 8 C.F.R. Β§ 1208.18(a)(1) (2012). Public\\n\\nofficials acquiesce to torture when, βprior to the activity constituting torture, [they] have\\n\\nawareness of such activity and thereafter breach [their] legal responsibility to intervene to\\n\\nprevent such activity.β 8 C.F.R. Β§ 1208.18(a)(7). Public officials breach their\\n\\nresponsibility to intervene when they engage in βwillful blindnessβ or βturn a blind eye to\\n\\ntorture.β Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting\\n\\nOntunezβTursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 355 (5th Cir. 2002)). Public officials need not\\n\\nhave actual knowledge of torture to have engaged in willful blindness. Id. When\\n\\ndetermining whether the willful-blindness standard has been met, βimmigration judges\\n\\nshould consider evidence of past torture, evidence of βgross, flagrant or mass violations of\\n\\n 5\\n\\fhuman rights,β the countryβs conditions, and whether the applicant could relocate to a part\\n\\nof the country where he or she is unlikely to be tortured.β Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(3) (2012)).\\n\\n In reviewing the denial of a CAT claim, we review the agencyβs finding of fact for\\n\\nsubstantial evidence. See Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010). In the\\n\\nimmigration context, this standard means that βadministrative findings of fact are\\n\\nconclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the\\n\\ncontrary.β 8 U.S.C. Β§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 245. Legal\\n\\ndeterminations, however, are reviewed de novo. Hui Zheng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 647, 651\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2009). Although the BIA may be granted Chevron deference when it decides\\n\\nmatters of statutory interpretation, such deference is not granted where, as here, the BIA\\n\\nissued a nonprecedential opinion authored by a single member. Martinez v. Holder, 740\\n\\nF.3d 902, 909 (4th Cir. 2014); Turkson, 667 F.3d at 527; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.\\n\\nNatural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842β43 (1984).\\n\\n We may also overturn the BIAβs determinations if we conclude that the BIA abused\\n\\nits discretion. Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011). βThe BIA may be held\\n\\nto have abused its discretion if it failed to offer a reasoned explanation for its decision, or\\n\\nif it distorted or disregarded important aspects of the applicantβs claim.β Id. Finally,\\n\\nbecause the BIA here βadopted and supplemented an IJ decision, we are obliged to review\\n\\nboth rulings.β Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f In his petition for review, Rodriguez first argues that the BIA made a legal error\\n\\nwhen it denied him CAT relief because it failed to aggregate his risk of torture from all\\n\\nthree of the entities that he fears: gangs, vigilante groups, and the police. We agree.\\n\\n The CAT implementing regulations provide that when βassessing whether it is more\\n\\nlikely than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of removal, all\\n\\nevidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be considered.β 8 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 1208.16(c)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has read this requirement to\\n\\nmean that βCAT claims must be considered in terms of the aggregate risk of torture from\\n\\nall sources, and not as separate, divisible CAT claims.β Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 799\\n\\nF.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 2015). The Third Circuit agrees. In a case where the CAT\\n\\napplicant feared torture from two different entities, the Third Circuit explained that β[a]\\n\\nproper application of the regulations . . . merely requires [the applicant] to establish that it\\n\\nis more likely than not that he faces torture . . . when the two entities are considered\\n\\ntogetherββin other words, when βthe cumulative probability of torture by the two entities\\n\\nexceeds 50%.β Kamara v. Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 213β14 (3d Cir. 2005)\\n\\n(demonstrating the aggregation analysis by adding a 27% likelihood of torture from one\\n\\nentity to a 28% of torture from another entity for a combined risk of torture of 55%, which\\n\\nmerited CAT relief); see also Matter of G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 366, 368 (BIA 2002)\\n\\n(en banc) (explaining in a case where the CAT applicant feared that he would be tortured\\n\\nbased on several factors, including βhis religion, his ethnicity, the duration of his residence\\n\\nin the United States, and his drug-related convictions,β that βthe evidence of record, when\\n\\nconsidered in the aggregate, supports the respondentβs contention that he would more\\n\\n 7\\n\\flikely than not be tortured upon his return to Iranβ (emphasis added)). No other U.S. Courts\\n\\nof Appeals have disagreed with this analysis.\\n\\n We now join our sister circuits and hold that the risks of torture from all sources\\n\\nshould be combined when determining whether a CAT applicant is more likely than not to\\n\\nbe tortured in a particular country. That interpretation is most consistent with both the\\n\\nimplementing regulations and our treaty obligations not to return individuals to a country\\n\\nwhere they face a substantial risk of torture. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783,\\n\\n806β07 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that βsettled rules of treaty interpretation require that\\n\\nwe construe the CAT generouslyβ); see also Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 114β16 (2d\\n\\nCir. 2007) (explaining that courts owe deference to the executive branchβs treaty\\n\\ninterpretation as expressed through implementing regulations). We therefore confirm that\\n\\nthe aggregation analysis described by the Ninth and Third Circuits is required when\\n\\nassessing an applicantβs risk of torture.\\n\\n While the government concedes that the BIA should have aggregated the risk of\\n\\ntorture that Rodriguez faces in El Salvador, it nevertheless argues that there was no error\\n\\nbelow because both the BIA and IJ did βconsider Rodriguezβs claim for relief\\n\\ncumulatively.β Appellee Br. at 26. We disagree. In her first order, the IJ addressed only\\n\\nthe risks that Rodriguez faced from gangs and the police, with no mention of vigilante\\n\\ngroups. In her second order, the IJ simply stated: βRespondent has failed to demonstrate\\n\\nthat it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by vigilante groups[.]β A.R. 124.\\n\\nAt no point did she consider the aggregated risk caused by all three entities in unison by\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\fadding the probability of torture from each entity and determining whether that sum\\n\\nexceeded 50%.\\n\\n The BIA, in turn, devoted no space in its final order to aggregating risk. Instead, it\\n\\nasserted the rule that β[a]n alienβs eligibility for [CAT] protection cannot be established by\\n\\nstringing together a series of suppositions to show that it is more likely than not that torture\\n\\nwill result,β unless the evidence βestablish[es] that each step in the hypothetical chain of\\n\\nevents is more likely than not to happen,β citing a BIA opinion as support. A.R. 007. Then,\\n\\nwithout citing to or describing any of Rodriguezβs evidence, the BIA simply stated:\\n\\nβ[Rodriguez] has not shown that his hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to\\n\\nhappen.β A.R. 008. But Rodriguez never attempted to prove a string of events. Instead,\\n\\nhe has consistently asserted that due to his tattoos, he fears torture from three separate\\n\\nentities: police, gangs, and vigilante groups. The proper response to Rodriguezβs fears is\\n\\nto add the amount of risk that each group poses to him and then determine whether that\\n\\nsum is greater than 50%. The BIA failed to do that analysis here, necessitating remand. 2\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The BIA also cited two cases to support its determination that Rodriguezβs tattoos\\nwould not put him at substantial risk of torture in El Salvador. The Court is not persuaded\\nby these cases for several reasons. First, CAT claims are highly fact specific, which means\\nthat one applicant may be able to show a substantial risk of torture in El Salvador due to\\nhis tattoos while another may not. Huang v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004).\\nSecond, the cases cited by the BIA are readily distinguishable. In Castillo-Pena v. Holder,\\n482 F. Appβx 847 (4th Cir. 2012), the Court found that an unrepresented applicant had\\nfailed to show that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured by Salvadoran\\npolice because of his tattoos. The case did not address the combined risks posed by police,\\nvigilante groups, and gangs in El Salvador. Id. at 848. In the second, Andrade v. Lynch,\\n798 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIAβs denial of CAT relief\\nto a Salvadoran applicant who had two discreet non-gang-related tattoos. Id. at 1245.\\nHowever, those tattoosβwhich were merely his and his girlfriendβs initialsβdo not pose\\n(Continued)\\n 9\\n\\f IV.\\n\\n Rodriguez also argues that the BIA and IJ erred by (1) failing to meaningfully\\n\\nengage with the live testimony and over 300 pages of documentary evidence that he\\n\\noriginally produced in support of his claim, and (2) failing to meaningfully consider the\\n\\nadditional evidence that he submitted on remand about the risk of torture that he faces in\\n\\nEl Salvador. We agree.\\n\\n It is an abuse of discretion for the BIA or IJ to arbitrarily ignore relevant evidence.\\n\\nBaharon v. Holder, 588 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2009); Tassi, 660 F.3d at 719. βThose who\\n\\nflee persecution and seek refuge under our laws have the right to know that the evidence\\n\\nthey present of mistreatment in their home country will be fairly considered and weighed\\n\\nby those who decide their fate.β Baharon, 588 F.3d at 233. Therefore, it is this Courtβs\\n\\nresponsibility to βensure that unrebutted, legally significant evidence is not arbitrarily\\n\\nignored by the factfinder.β Id. Moreover, the BIAβs or IJβs failure to engage with an\\n\\napplicantβs evidence hampers our ability to meaningfully review what was decided below.\\n\\nZelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 168 (4th Cir. 2012). Hence, a wholesale βfailure [by] the\\n\\n\\n\\nthe same level of risk as the plentiful and conspicuous gang tattoos on Rodriguez. Indeed,\\nthe case most similar to the one at bar was not even cited by the BIA and supports\\nRodriguezβs CAT claim here. In Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2011), a former\\ngang member with conspicuous gang tattoos on his face, calves, arms, and back sought\\nCAT relief because he feared that he would be tortured by the gangs, police forces, and\\nanti-gang death squads in his native Honduras. Id. at 765. The Ninth Circuit vacated and\\nremanded the BIAβs denial of CAT relief because it determined that the BIA had failed to\\naggregate the risk of torture that these three entities posed to an individual with multiple\\nand conspicuous gang tattoos. Id. at 775.\\n\\n 10\\n\\fIJ and BIA to consider evidence of country conditions constitutes reversible error.β\\n\\nAguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Ai Hua Chen v.\\n\\nHolder, 742 F.3d 171, 179 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the IJ and BIA must βoffer a\\n\\nspecific, cogent reason for rejecting evidenceβ).\\n\\n The IJ did not meaningfully address the evidence that Rodriguez provided about\\n\\ncountry conditions in El Salvador, especially the Salvadoran governmentβs behavior\\n\\ntowards gang members and suspected gang members. In her first opinion, she\\n\\nacknowledged that there are βsome instances of torture of gang members and former gang\\n\\nmembers by the police in El Salvador,β but then asserted that the βevidence does not\\n\\nsupportβ the likelihood that the harm inflicted on Rodriguez would be with the\\n\\ngovernmentβs acquiescence. A.R. 372. There was no other analysis. In her second\\n\\nopinion, the IJ admitted that β[t]he evidence does indicate that Salvadoran authorities have\\n\\nrecently failed to address many instances of vigilante violence.β A.R. 125. But she again\\n\\nfound that Rodriguezβs evidence was insufficient, this time because Salvadoran law\\n\\nβprohibits extrajudicial killings and violenceβ and there have been some efforts by the\\n\\ngovernment to investigate extrajudicial killings. A.R. 125. The IJ did not address\\n\\nRodriguezβs extensive evidence about the governmentβs willingness to use torture on\\n\\nsuspected gang members or its willingness to turn a blind eye to the extreme violence\\n\\nbetween rival gangs and between gangs and vigilante groups. This evidence included:\\n\\n 1) El Salvador passed a law in November 2013 that protects police officers who\\n kill in the line of duty, which resulted in a spike of extrajudicial killings, A.R.\\n 536;\\n 2) Salvadoran police officers routinely drop off suspected gang members in a rival\\n gangβs territory so that they will be tortured or killed by the rival gang, A.R. 536;\\n\\n 11\\n\\f 3) While El Salvador has announced investigations of several extrajudicial killings,\\n the 2015 Country Report stated that these investigations have not resulted in any\\n convictions, A.R. 605;\\n 4) In January 2016, there were 738 murders in El Salvador, of which 28.6% were\\n of alleged gang members, despite the fact that less than 2% of Salvadorans are\\n in gangs, A.R. 567.\\n\\n The IJβs failure to meaningfully engage with Rodriguezβs evidence was not\\n\\nremedied on appeal. In its review, both originally and after remand, the BIA did not engage\\n\\nwith Rodriguezβs evidence at all.\\n\\n This wholesale failure to fully consider Rodriguezβs country-conditions evidence\\n\\nconstitutes reversible error. Denying Rodriguezβs claim for CAT relief required moreβ\\n\\nmuch moreβfrom both the BIA and the IJ. On remand, the BIA must interact seriously\\n\\nwith the full panoply of the risk-of-torture evidence submitted by Rodriguez, recognizing\\n\\nthat βcountry conditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief under the [CAT].β\\n\\nKamalthus v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001); Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594\\n\\nF.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (β[A] CAT applicant may satisfy his burden with evidence\\n\\nof country conditions alone.β). When a manβs life is on the line, he is entitled to know that\\n\\nthe court deciding his claim reviewed all his evidence, understood it, and had a cogent,\\n\\narticulable basis for its determination that his evidence was insufficient. The BIA and IJ\\n\\nboth failed to provide such a cogent, articulable basis here.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f V.\\n\\n In conclusion, we grant Rodriguezβs petition for review of his CAT claim, vacate\\n\\nthe BIAβs decision with respect to that claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent\\n\\nwith this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":559,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4591332,"string":"4,591,332"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF ROANOKE, a Virginia Municipality, Defendant - Appellee, and Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Intervenor/Defendant - Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Norfolk Southern Railway v. City of Roanoke"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1060"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wilkinson, Wynn, Diaz\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888025/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888026/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888027/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1060\\n\\n\\nNORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF ROANOKE, a Virginia Municipality,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee,\\n\\n and\\n\\nCHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION,\\n\\n Intervenor/Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at\\nRoanoke. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge. (7:16-cv-00176-GEC)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 15, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson\\nand Judge Wynn joined. Judge Wilkinson and Judge Wynn wrote separate concurring\\nopinions.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Gary A. Bryant, WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for\\nAppellant. Monica Taylor Monday, GENTRY LOCKE, Roanoke, Virginia; Jon Alan\\n\\nMueller, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellees.\\nON BRIEF: Gregory J. Haley, Scott A. Stephenson, GENTRY LOCKE, Roanoke,\\nVirginia; Daniel J. Callaghan, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY FOR THE CITY\\nOF ROANOKE, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee City of Roanoke. Alayna Chuney,\\nBrittany Wright, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, INC., Annapolis, Maryland, for\\nAppellee Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\nDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Plaintiff Norfolk Southern Railway appeals the district courtβs order granting\\n\\nsummary judgment for Defendant City of Roanoke, Virginia and Defendant-Intervenor\\n\\nChesapeake Bay Foundation in this lawsuit alleging discriminatory taxation in violation\\n\\nof the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. The district court\\n\\nconcluded that the Cityβs stormwater management charge is a fee, rather than a tax. This\\n\\ndistinction matters because only taxes are subject to challenge under the Act. For the\\n\\nreasons that follow, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The City of Roanoke operates a stormwater management system that includes\\n\\ngutters, storm drains, channels, retention basins, and other infrastructure. The system\\n\\ncollects stormwater and diverts it into the Roanoke River or one of its thirteen tributaries\\n\\nin the City.\\n\\n To operate its system, the City must hold a permit issued by Virginiaβs\\n\\nDepartment of Environmental Quality pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act and\\n\\nEnvironmental Protection Agency regulations. Such permits βrequire controls to reduce\\n\\nthe discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable, including management\\n\\npractices, control techniques and system, design and engineering methods, and such other\\n\\nprovisions as the [EPA] or the State determines appropriate for the control of such\\n\\npollutants.β 33 U.S.C. Β§ 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii). The Cityβs permit requires it to implement\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\nsix βminimum control measuresβ and meet Total Maximum Daily Load (βTMDLβ)\\n\\nlimits, among other requirements. 1\\n\\n To facilitate compliance with applicable state and federal stormwater regulations,\\n\\nVirginia law authorizes municipalities to establish stormwater utilities and enact\\n\\nstormwater management charges. Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2.2114. These charges must be\\n\\nenacted βby ordinance,β and must βbe based upon an analysis that demonstrates the\\n\\nrational relationship between the amount charged and the services provided.β Id.\\n\\nΒ§ 15.2.2144(A), (B). Localities must also provide for full or partial waivers of charges to\\n\\nproperty owners who engage in certain stormwater management practices. Id. Β§ 15.2-\\n\\n2114(D). Income from the charges βshall be dedicated special revenue . . . and may be\\n\\nused only to pay or recover costs forβ seven purposes related to stormwater management.\\n\\nId. Β§ 15.2-2114(A).\\n\\n In 2013, the Roanoke City Council enacted an ordinance establishing a\\n\\nStormwater Management Utility and a stormwater utility charge. The City Council found\\n\\nthat βan adequate, sustainable source of revenue for stormwater management activities is\\n\\nnecessary to protect the general health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the city.β\\n\\nRoanoke, Va., Code Β§ 11.5-2. The Council also found that βparcels . . . with higher\\n\\namounts of impervious surfaces contribute greater amounts of stormwater and pollutants\\n\\n 1\\n Minimum control measures include various means of reducing pollutants to\\ncomply with the Clean Water Act, from public outreach and participation to system\\noperation and maintenance. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systemβ\\nRegulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm\\nWater Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,752 (Dec. 8, 1999). TMDLs limit total\\ndischarges of specified pollutants based on water quality criteria. 33 U.S.C. Β§ 1313(d).\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\nto the cityβs stormwater management system and that the owners of such parcels should\\n\\ncarry a proportionate burden of the cost of such system.β Id. Therefore, the Council\\n\\nchose to base the charge on βa parcelβs impervious surface cover.β Id.\\n\\n The ordinance imposes the stormwater management charge on all βimproved\\n\\nparcels,β id. Β§ 11.5-3(a), meaning all parcels with 250 square feet or more of impervious\\n\\nsurface, id. Β§ 11.5-10(e). An impervious surface is one that significantly impedes or\\n\\nprevents βthe natural infiltration of water into the soil.β Id. Β§ 11.5-10(d). Approximately\\n\\n86% of the parcels in the City are considered improved parcels subject to the charge.\\n\\nJ.A. 57.\\n\\n Owners of improved parcels may apply for credits against the charge imposed\\n\\nupon them. Roanoke, Va., Code Β§ 11.5-7. Credits are available for various stormwater\\n\\nmanagement activities that reduce, control, or treat stormwater runoff from improved\\n\\nparcels, such as installing rain gardens or pervious asphalt. Id.; see J.A. 135β36. The\\n\\nmaximum credit allowed for a given parcel is 50% of the total charge. Id. Β§ 11.5-7(b)(1).\\n\\n All revenue from the charge is deposited into a stormwater utility enterprise fund,\\n\\nwhich is separate from the Cityβs general fund. The enterprise fund may only be used for\\n\\nsix stormwater management-related purposes listed in Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2-2114(A).\\n\\nSince it was established, the Utility has used all revenue from the charge for stormwater\\n\\nmanagement.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Norfolk Southern is one of the Cityβs largest property owners, and it holds one of\\n\\nthe Cityβs largest improved parcels. In 2017, it was assessed a stormwater charge of\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\n$416,748.28 for that parcel. Much of Norfolk Southernβs property is covered by railroad\\n\\ntrack and ballast. Ballast is the crushed stone surface beneath railroad tracks that\\n\\nstabilizes the tracks and drains stormwater away from them.\\n\\n Norfolk Southern claims that its ballasted property should be exempt from the\\n\\ncharge. It contends that ballast is at least as pervious to stormwater runoff as lawns,\\n\\nwhich are not considered impervious surfaces and are not subject to the charge.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Following unsuccessful attempts to exempt the ballasted property from the charge,\\n\\nNorfolk Southern sued the City, alleging that the stormwater management charge is a\\n\\ndiscriminatory tax in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act\\n\\nof 1976 (the β4-R Actβ), 49 U.S.C. Β§ 11501. Under the 4-R Act, states and localities may\\n\\nnot impose any βtax that discriminates against a rail carrier.β Id. Β§ 11501(b)(4). Norfolk\\n\\nSouthern alleges that the Cityβs stormwater management charge does just that because it\\n\\ntreats ballasted property differently from lawns, even though the two are, in the railroadβs\\n\\nview, equally pervious to stormwater.\\n\\n Following a period of discovery, the district court granted Defendantsβ motion for\\n\\nsummary judgment, concluding that although it is βadmittedly a close question,β the\\n\\ncharge is not subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements because it is a fee rather than a tax.\\n\\nNorfolk S. Railway Co. v. City of Roanoke, No. 7:16 CV 00176, 2017 WL 6599008, at\\n\\n*8β9 (W.D. Va. Dec. 26, 2017). We review the district courtβs decision de novo. Valero\\n\\nTerrestrial Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Because the 4-R Act applies only to taxes, not fees, we must determine whether\\n\\nthe charge in this case is closer to (1) a paradigmatic tax, which βis imposed by a\\n\\nlegislature upon many, or all, citizensβ and βraises money, contributed to a general fund,\\n\\nand spent for the benefit of the entire community,β or (2) a paradigmatic regulatory fee,\\n\\nwhich βis imposed by an agency upon those subject to its regulation,β and serves\\n\\nregulatory purposes by disincentivizing conduct or raising money to defray regulatory\\n\\nexpenses. San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commβn, 967 F.2d 683, 685 (1st Cir.\\n\\n1992). In answering this question, we are aided by the three-part framework suggested in\\n\\nSan Juan Cellular and adopted by this court in Valero, 205 F.3d at 134. 2 This framework\\n\\nfocuses on β(1) what entity imposes the charge; (2) what population is subject to the\\n\\ncharge; and (3) what purposes are served by the use of the monies obtained by the\\n\\ncharge.β Id. If the charge falls βsomewhere in the middleβ between a classic tax and a\\n\\nclassic fee, the most important of these considerations is the chargeβs purpose. Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Defendants urge us not to apply the San Juan Cellular framework to this 4-R Act\\ncase because it was developed in cases that concerned different statutes. Nothing about\\nthe framework, however, is statute-specific. As Judge Wynn aptly notes in his\\nconcurring opinion, it merely provides flexible and versatile guidance in assessing where\\na particular charge sits on the tax-fee continuum. Indeed, San Juan Cellular aimed to\\nsynthesize the general approach that courts had taken to distinguish taxes from fees βin a\\nvariety of statutory contexts.β 967 F.2d at 685.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We first consider who sets the charge. A charge is more likely to be a tax if itβs\\n\\nimposed by the legislature, rather than an administrative agency. Valero, 205 F.3d at\\n\\n134. Here, this factor suggests that the charge is a tax because itβs imposed by Roanokeβs\\n\\nlegislative body, the City Council. 3\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Under the second San Juan Cellular factor, a charge is more likely to be a tax if it\\n\\nis imposed on a broad segment of the public. GenOn Mid-Atl., LLC v. Montgomery\\n\\nCounty, 650 F.3d 1021, 1024 (4th Cir. 2011). And assessment of a tax is often based\\n\\nβsolely on ability to pay,β as measured by a payorβs property or income, rather than tied\\n\\nto the receipt of a particular benefit or the imposition of a regulatory burden. Natβl Cable\\n\\nTelevision Assβn, Inc v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974); see DIRECTV, Inc. v.\\n\\nTolson, 513 F.3d 119, 126 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing the significance of whether an\\n\\nassessment is tied to income). By contrast, the classic fee is imposed only upon persons\\n\\nsubject to regulation by a particular agency. Valero, 205 F.3d at 134.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n As Defendants point out, the Virginia statute authorizing the charge requires that\\nit be passed through ordinance by the City Council. This makes the Council somewhat\\nless like an autonomous legislature and somewhat more like an administrative agency\\nimplementing the state statute, which itself forms a part of the Clean Water Actβs\\ncomprehensive regulatory scheme. But the authorizing statute still requires legislative\\ndecision-making through passage of an ordinance. The Councilβs decision acts as a\\ncheck on the regulatory program, in much the same way that legislaturesβ appropriations\\ndecisions can check agenciesβ regulatory programs. Thus, we consider the Council to\\nhave acted in a predominantly legislative capacity for purposes of the first factor.\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\n This factor suggested that the charge was a tax in Valero, where it was imposed\\n\\nupon persons disposing waste at landfills, who in turn passed the cost on to their\\n\\ncustomers, thereby spreading it βto a significantly wider portion of the population.β Id.;\\n\\naccord DIRECTV, 513 F.3d at 125β26. In GenOn, however, we concluded that a carbon\\n\\nemission charge was a fee rather than a tax primarily because the charge applied to only\\n\\none entity. 650 F.3d at 1024. 4\\n\\n Here, the second factor is largely inconclusive. On the one hand, the stormwater\\n\\nmanagement charge applies to a broad class of property owners, suggesting that it is a\\n\\ntax. But on the other hand, it isnβt assessed solely on the basis of property ownership.\\n\\nRather, the amount assessed is proportional to the amount of impervious surface on an\\n\\nownerβs property. And property owners may receive credits against the assessment if\\n\\nthey engage in certain stormwater management practices. These features suggest that the\\n\\ncharge is a measure of the stormwater management obligations that each parcel imposes\\n\\nupon the City, rather than a measure of ability to pay. And this makes the charge more\\n\\nlike a fee. These features also distinguish the stormwater management charge from the\\n\\ncharge in Valero, which applied to all waste disposers regardless of their contribution to\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Courts have differed as to how the second factor applies to stormwater\\nmanagement charges. Compare DeKalb County v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 681, 700β\\n01 (2013) (concluding that the second factor suggested a stormwater management charge\\nwas a tax), and McLeod v. Columbia County, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346 (S.D. Ga.\\n2003) (same), with Homewood Vill., LLC v. Unified Govβt of Athens-Clarke County, 132\\nF. Supp. 3d 1376, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (reaching the opposite conclusion).\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\nthe burden that the charge was designed to addressβclosing underfunded landfills. On\\n\\nbalance then, this second factor is effectively a wash as to the nature of the charge.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Under the third San Juan Cellular factorβwhich is the most important one in\\n\\nclose casesβa charge is more likely to be a tax if its primary purpose is to raise revenue\\n\\nfor general government activity that benefits the entire community. 967 F.2d at 685β86.\\n\\nThis is true even if the revenue is placed into a special fund and segregated from general\\n\\nrevenue, as long as βthe special fund is used to benefit the population at large.β Valero,\\n\\n205 F.3d at 135. Conversely, a charge is more likely to be a fee if itβs used to provide\\n\\nindividualized benefits or to defray an agencyβs costs of regulating. San Juan Cellular,\\n\\n967 F.2d at 685β86. A charge will also be considered a fee if its primary purpose is to\\n\\nregulate conduct by making it more expensive (even if the charge also raises revenue).\\n\\nS.C. ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983).\\n\\n The third factor pointed to the charge being a tax in Valero, where the funds\\n\\ncollected were used to support the closure of underfunded landfills in an environmentally\\n\\nsound manner that complied with EPA regulations. 205 F.3d at 134β35. The chargeβs\\n\\npurpose was to protect the stateβs groundwater, which benefitted the general public. Id.\\n\\nAnd in United States v. City of Huntington, the chargeβs purpose suggested it was a tax\\n\\nwhere the charge paid for βcore government servicesβ including fire and flood protection\\n\\nand street maintenance. 999 F.2d 71, 73 (4th Cir. 1993).\\n\\n On the other hand, the chargeβs purpose suggested it was a fee in San Juan\\n\\nCellular, where the funds were used to regulate cell phone providers. 967 F.2d at 686.\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\nThe court noted that there need not be an exact match between the charge assessed and\\n\\nthe agencyβs expenditures on a particular regulated firm. Id. at 686β87. In GenOn, we\\n\\nfound that a carbon emission charge was βplainly regulatory,β just like a classic fee,\\n\\nbecause it βcreate[d] disincentives for GenOn to continue polluting and provide[d] funds\\n\\nfor others to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions.β 650 F.3d at 1025.\\n\\n Courts have reached different results in applying the third factor to stormwater\\n\\nmanagement charges. In DeKalb County, the court concluded that the third factor\\n\\nsuggested the charge was a tax because the benefits of stormwater managementβflood\\n\\nprevention and abatement of water pollutionβwere shared broadly by the general public.\\n\\n108 Fed. Cl. at 701. The court also noted that the assessment of a stormwater charge is\\n\\nbased βnot on the benefits derived by the payor, but by the anticipated burden that its\\n\\nproperty imposes on the stormwater system.β Id. at 703. And the charge couldnβt be\\n\\nconsidered a voluntary user fee because property owners couldnβt decline stormwater\\n\\nservices. Id. at 704β06. The McLeod court reached a similar result, noting that β[s]torm\\n\\nwater management was and is the type of service that is often funded through general tax\\n\\nrevenue.β 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1347β48. The Homewood Village court, however, reached\\n\\nthe opposite conclusion, noting that although all residents receive a benefit from\\n\\nstormwater management, βthose paying the charge receive a special benefitβ because the\\n\\ncounty treats polluted water on their properties, facilitating compliance with state and\\n\\nfederal requirements. 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1381 (citing Homewood Vill., LLC v. Unified\\n\\nGovβt of Athens-Clarke County, 739 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ga. 2013)).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\n Norfolk Southern argues that Roanokeβs stormwater management charge serves\\n\\ntwo purposes that both benefit the general public: reducing water pollution and improving\\n\\nflood control. It analogizes these purposes to maintaining the safety of the stateβs\\n\\ngroundwater, which we held to be a public benefit in Valero. Defendants respond that\\n\\nthey are obligated by law to operate a stormwater management system and to use all\\n\\nrevenue generated from the charge for specific stormwater management activities. Thus,\\n\\nalthough the charge may benefit the public, its primary purpose is to satisfy regulatory\\n\\nrequirements. 5 Norfolk Southernβs rejoinder is that the charge isnβt regulatory in the\\n\\nsense recognized by San Juan Cellular because the City is a regulated entity, rather than\\n\\na regulator. The railroad notes that the stormwater Utility doesnβt directly regulate its\\n\\nactivity or issue any permit for its stormwater discharges.\\n\\n We think the chargeβs purpose is more consistent with that of a fee than a tax,\\n\\nbecause the charge forms part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Although\\n\\nmunicipalities may have traditionally provided stormwater management as a public\\n\\nbenefit at the discretion of their legislatures, the Clean Water Actβs regulatory scheme\\n\\nnow requires the City to take myriad concrete actions to reduce discharges and pollutant\\n\\nconcentrationsβmany of them relating directly to runoff from Norfolk Southernβs\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Defendants also note that all revenue from the charge is placed into a segregated\\nenterprise fund, rather than the Cityβs general fund. But standing alone, the fact that\\nrevenue from the charge is placed in a special fund is βimmaterial.β Valero, 205 F.3d at\\n135.\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\nproperty and the waters that receive it. See, e.g., J.A. 140β44, 169β80, 262, 284β86,\\n\\n554β58.\\n\\n Whatβs more, if the City elects to assess a charge to offset the costs of complying\\n\\nwith these regulatory obligations, it must do so consistent with the state authorizing\\n\\nstatute, Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2-2114. This statute restricts the funds to specific uses\\n\\nrelated to stormwater management, and it requires that the charge incentivize stormwater\\n\\nmanagement practices by crediting property owners who adopt them. Id. Β§ 15.2-2114(D).\\n\\nThese requirements have removed much of the legislative discretion that was\\n\\ntraditionally associated with stormwater management. The City is now a participant in a\\n\\ncomprehensive scheme regulating stormwater management and the assessment of charges\\n\\nto pay for it.\\n\\n Of course, the City doesnβt directly regulate Norfolk Southern or other stormwater\\n\\ndischargers, nor does it issue permits for their discharges. Thus, rather than defraying the\\n\\nCityβs costs of regulating, the charge primarily defrays the Cityβs costs of complying with\\n\\nregulations imposed upon it. At bottom, however, a classic regulatory fee is designed to\\n\\naddress harmful impacts of otherwise permissible activities, and to ensure that the actors\\n\\nresponsible for those impacts bear the costs of addressing them. That is exactly the\\n\\nfunction served by Roanokeβs stormwater management charge, which ensures that\\n\\nowners of impervious surfaces bear the cost of managing stormwater runoff.\\n\\n In sum, the charge is part of a regulatory scheme, rooted in the Clean Water Act,\\n\\nwhose purpose is to remedy the environmental harms associated with stormwater runoff\\n\\nand to hold stormwater dischargers responsible for footing the bill. EPAβs regulations\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\nensure that the harms of stormwater discharge are addressed, and the City levies a charge\\n\\n(as directed by the state) upon those whose activity creates the need for regulation. The\\n\\ncharge also serves the regulatory function of incentivizing property owners to reduce the\\n\\namount of impervious surface on their land and engage in stormwater management\\n\\npractices that qualify them for credits.\\n\\n As a result, the third San Juan Cellular factor suggests that the charge is a fee.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Finally, we consider the three San Juan Cellular factors collectively, in light of all\\n\\nthe relevant circumstances, to decide whether the Cityβs stormwater management charge\\n\\nis a tax subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements, or a fee beyond the reach of those\\n\\nrequirements. As the district court acknowledged, this is a βclose question.β Norfolk S.,\\n\\n2017 WL 6599008, at *8. The first factor suggests that the charge is a tax because itβs\\n\\nimposed by the legislature. The second factor is largely inconclusive because the charge\\n\\nis levied upon most properties but based on contributions to stormwater runoff rather than\\n\\nability to pay. The third factor suggests that the charge is a fee because it forms part of a\\n\\ncomprehensive regulatory scheme.\\n\\n Applying the principle we articulated in Valero, 205 F.3d at 134, we give the third\\n\\nfactor controlling weight here because the chargeβs regulatory purpose provides a better\\n\\nindication of its overall nature than the body that implemented it or the class of persons it\\n\\nis levied upon. See also Club Assβn of W. Va., Inc. v. Wise, 293 F.3d 723, 726 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2002) (applying this principle). Accordingly, we conclude that the charge is a fee, rather\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\nthan a tax subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements. The district court correctly granted\\n\\nDefendantsβ motion for summary judgment.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4368585/\", \"author_raw\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:\\n\\n I am happy to concur in Judge Diazβs fine opinion. For the reasons given in that\\n\\nopinion, I agree that the charge levied on Norfolk Southern by the City of Roanoke is a\\n\\nfee and not a tax. I write separately to describe how this case fits into the larger story of\\n\\nenvironmental restoration.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Captain John Smithβs party could hardly convey to readers the βabundance of fish\\n\\nlying so thickeβ that exceeded any river in Europe: βNeither better fish, more plenty, or\\n\\nvariety, had any of us ever seene, in any place swimming in the water, then in the Bay of\\n\\nChesapeack β¦.β Walter Russell & Anas Todkill et al., The Accidents That Happened in\\n\\nthe Discoverie of the Bay, in 1 The Complete Works of Captain John Smith (1580-1631)\\n\\n224, 228 (Philip L. Barbour ed., 1986). Before the arrival of Captain Smith, the\\n\\nAlgonquin Indians recognized the extraordinary productivity of the Bay, terming it\\n\\nβChesepioc,β meaning βgreat shellfish bay.β Christopher P. White, The Chesapeake Bay\\n\\nField Guide, 3 (1989). More than a century later, in 1728, William Byrd II wrote that\\n\\nβone might believe, when he sees such terrible amounts of them, that there was as great a\\n\\nsupply of herring as there is water. In a word, it is unbelievable, indeed, indescribable,\\n\\nand also incomprehensible, what quantity is found there. One must behold oneself.β\\n\\nWilliam Byrd, The Newly Discovered Eden 78 (Richmond C. Beatty & William J.\\n\\nMulloy eds., trans., 1940).\\n\\n Today, one no longer can. Instead of fish, we quantify phosphorus, nitrogen,\\n\\nsediment, and other pollutants. Clouds of sediment and algal blooms blot out the sun,\\n\\n 16\\n\\nleaving the subaqueous flora starved for photosynthetic fuel. U.S. Environmental\\n\\nProtection Agency, Chesapeake Bay: Introduction to an Ecosystem, 4 (Kathryn\\n\\nReshetiloff ed., 1995). As the underwater grasses die for lack of sun, the fauna that rely\\n\\non them begin to die as well. Id. Microscopic zooplankton and small invertebrates that\\n\\nfeed on the grasses are deprived of their food. Alice Jane Lippson and Robert L. Lippson,\\n\\nLife in the Chesapeake Bay, 175, 192 (2006). In turn, species of fish and fowl that feed\\n\\non these creatures lose their food as well. Id. Blue crabs lose a safe place to hide after\\n\\nthey shed their hard shells during their seasonal molting. Christopher P. White,\\n\\nChesapeake Bay: A Field Guide, 84 (1989). And fish like menhaden and croakers, which\\n\\nuse the grasses as protective nurseries, are deprived of a safe place to nurture their young.\\n\\nAlice Jane Lippson and Robert L. Lippson, Life in the Chesapeake Bay, 190 (2006).\\n\\nThose fish that remain suffer from contamination by metals like chromium and mercury\\n\\nor organic contaminants like PCBs and pesticides. Karl Blankenship, βReport finds\\n\\nevidence of toxic contaminants impacting fish,β Bay Journal (January 1, 2013).\\n\\n But all that has happened, and is happening, need not always happen. And therein\\n\\nlies the future of Virginiaβs waters and the Bay.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Restoring damaged waters like the Chesapeake Bay requires sustained effort,\\n\\nentailing cooperation and coordination among the federal government, β[s]tate and local\\n\\ngovernments, the enterprise of the private sector, and . . . all the people who make this\\n\\nregion their home.β Exec. Order No. 13508, 74 Fed. Reg. 23099, 23100 (May 12, 2009).\\n\\nChesapeake Bay restoration would be impossible without stitching together the efforts of\\n\\n 17\\n\\na vast number of people from diverse walks of life: cattle farmers in West Virginia, lawn\\n\\ncare specialists in New York, and golf course operators in Pennsylvania, to name a few,\\n\\nnot to mention countless public servantsβtown managers, environmental experts,\\n\\nCooperative Extension agents. All share a common goal and corresponding common\\n\\nburdens.\\n\\n The response to the problem of stormwater runoff demonstrates the necessity of\\n\\ncooperation between all levels of government and private actors. Stormwater is of\\n\\nparticular concern to environmental restoration: when it falls on impervious surfaces like\\n\\nstreets or parking lots, it picks up pollutants like motor oil, animal waste, or just plain\\n\\ndirt, and washes them into the local streams. These pollutants contain chemical\\n\\ncontaminants and the nutrients that feed algal blooms. They make their way through\\n\\nstreams and tributaries, causing harm along the way, until they collect in the estuary\\n\\nwhere the rivers meet the ocean. William H. Funk, βVirginia Artificial Wetland a Game-\\n\\nChanger for Stormwater Pollution,β Chesapeake Bay Magazine (June 13, 2017).\\n\\n The scheme that regulates stormwater runoff begins with the federal government\\n\\nwhich, through the Clean Water Act, mandates that states set water quality standards that\\n\\nany given river must meet. 33 U.S.C. Β§ 1313. If the river does not meet the water quality\\n\\nstandards, the state government steps in and works with the EPA to put the river on a\\n\\nβpollution dietβ or Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL). Id. The TMDL establishes the\\n\\ntotal amount of each pollutant that is allowed to drain into the river, and slowly reduces\\n\\nthat amount to a level consistent with federally mandated water quality standards. Id. One\\n\\nof the ways the state then implements the TMDL is by adjusting the permits it gives to\\n\\n 18\\n\\nentities within the riverβs watershed so that the total amount of pollution these entities are\\n\\nallowed to drain into the river is below the overall limit. Local governments must obtain\\n\\none of these permits to manage the flow of stormwater from their sewer system into local\\n\\nwaterways.\\n\\n The City of Roanokeβs stormwater clean-up scheme, which is governed by its\\n\\npermit, is whatβs at issue here. While not in the Bayβs watershed, the Roanoke River is\\n\\nitself worthy of protection, and the City of Roanokeβs program is a prime example of the\\n\\ntype of stormwater remediation efforts that localities in the Bayβs watershed must enact.\\n\\nA ruling for Norfolk Southern here would have deleterious implications for comparable\\n\\nmunicipal stormwater programs that are within the Bayβs watershed like Richmond,\\n\\nCharlottesville, and Lynchburg. Richmond, Va., Code art. V., Β§ 14-336 (2017);\\n\\nLynchburg, Va., Code art. V., Β§ 16.2-56 (2018); Charlottesville, Va. Code art. VI., Β§ 10-\\n\\n104 (2018). And so while this case does not deal directly with the Chesapeakeβs waters,\\n\\nits health is very much at stake here.\\n\\n Under its permit, the City of Roanoke has the burden of reducing stormwater\\n\\npollution, but it can only do this with the cooperation of its residents. In addition to\\n\\nmaintaining its sewer infrastructure, the City coordinates with local βwatershed\\n\\nassociations, environmental advisory committees, and other environmental\\n\\norganizations.β J.A. 156. The City also helps its residents install features like rain gardens\\n\\nand detention ponds that soak up the stormwater rather than allowing it to drain\\n\\nimmediately into the river. And, importantly, the City relies on its residents to help fund\\n\\nits stormwater clean-up efforts through the fee at issue here.\\n\\n 19\\n\\n III.\\n\\n In seeking to avoid paying a fee that the City uses to fund its stormwater clean-up\\n\\nscheme, Norfolk Southern, one of the largest property owners in Roanoke, is seeking to\\n\\nabsolve itself of responsibility. Stormwater runs off the railroadβs property into the Cityβs\\n\\nsewer system. The City must then treat and manage this water to comply with its permit.\\n\\nThis costs money. If the City could not charge a fee to Norfolk Southern, Roanoke\\n\\nwould bear the burden of managing the railroadβs runoff alone. Erroneously deeming this\\n\\nfee a tax under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act would, as the\\n\\nrailroad knows, run the decided risk of limiting its contribution to the broader project of\\n\\nstormwater management. The City would thus lose important revenue needed to offset\\n\\nthe costs of building and maintaining municipal gutters and drains, monitoring pollution\\n\\nlevels, policing illegal discharges of polluted water, and educating the public on proper\\n\\nenvironmental practices. Norfolk Southern would, in effect, be shifting its burden to the\\n\\nCity. What we have here is the irony of a railroad seeking a free ride.\\n\\n This is unacceptable. As Judge Diaz aptly notes, βthe charge is part of a regulatory\\n\\nscheme, rooted in the Clean Water Act, whose purpose is to remedy the environmental\\n\\nharms associated with stormwater runoff and to hold stormwater dischargers responsible\\n\\nfor footing the bill.β Maj. Op. at 13. The arteries of the Chesapeake Bay wend through\\n\\nsix states, including three in the Fourth Circuit (Maryland, West Virginia, and Virginia).\\n\\nNumerous localities in the Bayβs watershed have clean-up schemes with fees comparable\\n\\nto Roanokeβs. Norfolk Southernβs position would put these projects at risk.\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\n Our rivers and estuaries are complex, interconnected ecosystems. It follows,\\n\\ntherefore, that efforts to restore them are correspondingly complex and interconnected.\\n\\nWithout the cooperation of all levels of government, as well as of private companies and\\n\\ncitizens, our waters will continue to be compromised by pollution. The restoration effort\\n\\nimposes burdens on many people; happily, the benefits of clean waters (economic;\\n\\nhealth; scenic; recreational) accrue to just as many if not more. Everyone, including the\\n\\nowners and employees of Norfolk Southern, are better off when our streams run clear and\\n\\nestuarine flora and fauna are flourishing. It is only fair to ask those who benefit to\\n\\nshoulder some of the burden.\\n\\n No one is so naΓ―ve as to believe that the Chesapeake Bay can be restored to the\\n\\npristine condition viewed by John Smith and William Byrd, or that the Roanoke River\\n\\nand its tributaries such as Peters Creek and Tinker Creek can be restored to the condition\\n\\nin which this countryβs earliest inhabitants found them. We would be fortunate to\\n\\npreserve a wholesome fraction of what once there was. This case is but a tiny chapter in\\n\\nthe story of our nationβs effort to reconcile the just demands of development with the\\n\\nimperative of preserving an environment that can help make productive enterprise worth\\n\\nhaving. A reversal here might seem just a small setback. But a series of such setbacks\\n\\naccelerates rather than retards the degradation of the natural world. We happily accepted\\n\\nthe abundance that came down from our forebears. How then can we impoverish the\\n\\nenvironment for those who come after?\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 21\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4368585/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring:\\n\\n I concur in the majority opinionβs determination that the City of Roanokeβs\\n\\nstormwater assessment constitutes a βfee,β rather than a βtax,β and therefore is not subject\\n\\nto the provision in the Railroad Revitalization and Reform Act (the β4-R Actβ)\\n\\nprohibiting state and municipal βtax[es]β that discriminate against rail carriers. 49 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 11501(b)(4). The assessment is connected to a federal regulatory program, is designed\\n\\nto defray the costs of that program, and encourages property owners to take steps to\\n\\nadvance the programβs regulatory objectives, and therefore serves βprimarily . . .\\n\\nregulatory or punitive purposes, making it a βfee.ββ GenOn Mid-Atlantic, LLC v.\\n\\nMontgomery Cty., Md., 650 F.3d 1021, 1023 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted).\\n\\n The analytical framework used in this matter derives from the First Circuitβs\\n\\ndecision in San Juan Cellular Telephone Co. v. Public Svc. Commβn, 967 F.2d 683, 685\\n\\n(1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, J.). The framework in that case has been used to distinguish\\n\\nβtaxesβ from βfeesβ for purposes of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1341. See\\n\\nValero Terrestrial Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 134 (4th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n Here, we apply that Tax Injunction Act precedent to interpret whether an\\n\\nassessment is a βtaxβ or βfeeβ under the 4-R Act. In doing so, we recognize that this\\n\\nCourt has held that βwe must examine the explicit factual circumstances that transcend\\n\\nthe literal meaning of the terminology and ask whether the charge is levied primarily for\\n\\nrevenue raising purposes, making it a βtax,β or whether it is assessed primary for\\n\\nregulatory or punitive purposes, making it a βfee.ββ GenOn, 650 F.3d at 1023 (internal\\n\\n 22\\n\\nquotation marks omitted). β[B]roader-based taxes . . . sustain the essential flow of\\n\\nrevenue to the state (or local) government [whereas] fees . . . are connected to some\\n\\nregulatory scheme.β Collins Holding Corp. v. Jasper Cty., S.C., 123 F.3d 797, 800 (4th\\n\\nCir. 1997). And this Courtβs long-standing precedent makes clear that β[t]he proper\\n\\nanalysis to arrive at the real nature of the assessment is to examine all the facts and\\n\\ncircumstances and assess them on the basis of economic realities.β United States v. City\\n\\nof Huntington, W. Va., 999 F.2d 71, 73 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and\\n\\nalterations omitted).\\n\\n Thus, determining whether an assessment amounts to a tax or fee turns on βall the\\n\\nfacts and circumstances.β Id. Nonetheless, this Court, and other courts, have\\n\\ncharacterized San Juan Cellular as identifying three βfactorsβ that bear on the resolution\\n\\nof that question: β(1) what entity imposes the charge; (2) what population is subject to the\\n\\ncharge; and (3) what purposes are served by the use of the monies obtained by the\\n\\ncharge.β Valero, 205 F.3d at 134. But San Juan Cellular did not enumerate a βthree-\\n\\nfactorβ testβwhich instead came from a Ninth Circuit opinion purporting to distill the\\n\\nanalysis in San Juan Cellular. See Bidart Bros. v. Cal. Apple Commβn, 73 F.3d 925, 931\\n\\n(9th Cir. 1996). Rather, San Juan Cellular highlighted three βfacts of th[e] caseββwhich\\n\\nβfactsβ the Ninth Circuit later denominated as βfactorsββbecause those facts indicated\\n\\nthat the assessment at issue was βclose to the βfeeβ end of the spectrum,β βwith a\\n\\nparadigmatic tax at one end and a paradigmatic fee at the other.β 967 F.2d at 686. The\\n\\ncourt had no reason to address other βcircumstancesβ that might be relevant in\\n\\ndistinguishing a tax from a fee because they were not present in the case. Id.\\n\\n 23\\n\\n Significantly, our Tax Injunction Act decisions distinguishing between taxes and\\n\\nfees have not always rigorously adhered to the three-factor analytical framework. See,\\n\\ne.g., GenOn, 650 F.3d at 1023β24 (placing little weight on first factor, and characterizing\\n\\nthree factor framework as an βaidβ in resolving governing question of whether\\n\\nassessment is for revenue raising purposes or regulatory purposes); Collins, 123 F.3d at\\n\\n797 (citing San Juan Cellular, but only addressing two of the three factors, and\\n\\ncharacterizing the third factorβthe βpurpose and ultimate use of the assessmentββas\\n\\nβthe heart of the inquiryβ).\\n\\n I write separately to point out that reducing a βtotality-of-the-circumstancesβ\\n\\ninquiry into a βthree-factor testβ poses substantial risks. It elevates the significance of\\n\\nenumerated factors, relative to non-enumerated factors. It suggests that the enumerated\\n\\nfactors warrant equal significance in the ultimate weighing, notwithstanding that some\\n\\nfacts may be more important than others. It also discourages courts from considering\\n\\nfactors that are not enumerated in the test, but may be highly relevant in a particular case.\\n\\nAnd it serves as an invitation to lower courts to simply tick through the enumerated\\n\\nfactors and determine whether more factors favor treating an assessment as a tax or a fee.\\n\\nBut βa score of [2] to [1] decides a baseball game,β Remington Hybrid Seed Co., 495 F.3d\\n\\n403, 407 (7th Cir. 2007), not a multi-factorial balancing test, let alone a totality-of-the-\\n\\nfacts-and-circumstances test, like that used to determine whether an assessment\\n\\nconstitutes a tax or fee, cf. Hexom v. Or. Depβt of Transp., 177 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir.\\n\\n1999) (explaining that cases applying the San Juan Cellular test βtake a practical and\\n\\n\\n\\n 24\\n\\nsensible approach. They do not apply a set of rigid rules or elements and then reach a\\n\\nmechanical conclusionβ).\\n\\n In this case, we conclude that the first two factors have little or no bearing on our\\n\\nultimate determination that the assessment at issue constitutes a fee. Additionally, the\\n\\ndecisive third factorβwhich appears to be coextensive with the purpose of the entire\\n\\nthree-factor inquiryβencompasses numerous considerations that bear significant weight\\n\\nin the ultimate determinationβsuch as whether the funds are kept in a segregated fund\\n\\nand whether the assessment incentivizes decisions that advance the programβs regulatory\\n\\nobjectivesβbut which are not elevated to separate βfactorsβ in the three-factor\\n\\nframework. Thus, though we characterize our analytical framework as a βthree factor\\n\\ntest,β the analysis adheres moreso to the governing βtotality-of-the-circumstancesβ\\n\\ninquiry.\\n\\n In sum, the three βfactorsβ from San Juan Cellular provide helpful guidance in\\n\\nanalyzing the fundamental question of whether an assessment serves revenue raising\\n\\npurposes, and therefore is a tax, or serves a regulatory purpose, and therefore is a fee.\\n\\nBut the βheart of the inquiryβ remains βthe purpose and ultimate use of the assessment.β\\n\\nCollins, 123 F.3d at 797. The majority opinion engages in a thorough and persuasive\\n\\nanalysis of numerous facts and circumstances bearing on that question and concludes the\\n\\nassessment is a fee. Accordingly, I concur.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4368585/\", \"author_raw\": \"WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILKINSON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WYNN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DIAZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":6,"string":"6"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591332/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF ROANOKE, a Virginia Municipality, Defendant - Appellee, and Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Intervenor/Defendant - Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1060\n\n\nNORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nCITY OF ROANOKE, a Virginia Municipality,\n\n Defendant β Appellee,\n\n and\n\nCHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION,\n\n Intervenor/Defendant β Appellee.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at\nRoanoke. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge. (7:16-cv-00176-GEC)\n\n\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 15, 2019\n\n\nBefore WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson\nand Judge Wynn joined. Judge Wilkinson and Judge Wynn wrote separate concurring\nopinions.\n\n\nARGUED: Gary A. Bryant, WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for\nAppellant. Monica Taylor Monday, GENTRY LOCKE, Roanoke, Virginia; Jon Alan\n\nMueller, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellees.\nON BRIEF: Gregory J. Haley, Scott A. Stephenson, GENTRY LOCKE, Roanoke,\nVirginia; Daniel J. Callaghan, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY FOR THE CITY\nOF ROANOKE, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee City of Roanoke. Alayna Chuney,\nBrittany Wright, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, INC., Annapolis, Maryland, for\nAppellee Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\nDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\n\n Plaintiff Norfolk Southern Railway appeals the district courtβs order granting\n\nsummary judgment for Defendant City of Roanoke, Virginia and Defendant-Intervenor\n\nChesapeake Bay Foundation in this lawsuit alleging discriminatory taxation in violation\n\nof the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. The district court\n\nconcluded that the Cityβs stormwater management charge is a fee, rather than a tax. This\n\ndistinction matters because only taxes are subject to challenge under the Act. For the\n\nreasons that follow, we affirm.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n A.\n\n The City of Roanoke operates a stormwater management system that includes\n\ngutters, storm drains, channels, retention basins, and other infrastructure. The system\n\ncollects stormwater and diverts it into the Roanoke River or one of its thirteen tributaries\n\nin the City.\n\n To operate its system, the City must hold a permit issued by Virginiaβs\n\nDepartment of Environmental Quality pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act and\n\nEnvironmental Protection Agency regulations. Such permits βrequire controls to reduce\n\nthe discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable, including management\n\npractices, control techniques and system, design and engineering methods, and such other\n\nprovisions as the [EPA] or the State determines appropriate for the control of such\n\npollutants.β 33 U.S.C. Β§ 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii). The Cityβs permit requires it to implement\n\n\n 3\n\nsix βminimum control measuresβ and meet Total Maximum Daily Load (βTMDLβ)\n\nlimits, among other requirements. 1\n\n To facilitate compliance with applicable state and federal stormwater regulations,\n\nVirginia law authorizes municipalities to establish stormwater utilities and enact\n\nstormwater management charges. Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2.2114. These charges must be\n\nenacted βby ordinance,β and must βbe based upon an analysis that demonstrates the\n\nrational relationship between the amount charged and the services provided.β Id.\n\nΒ§ 15.2.2144(A), (B). Localities must also provide for full or partial waivers of charges to\n\nproperty owners who engage in certain stormwater management practices. Id. Β§ 15.2-\n\n2114(D). Income from the charges βshall be dedicated special revenue . . . and may be\n\nused only to pay or recover costs forβ seven purposes related to stormwater management.\n\nId. Β§ 15.2-2114(A).\n\n In 2013, the Roanoke City Council enacted an ordinance establishing a\n\nStormwater Management Utility and a stormwater utility charge. The City Council found\n\nthat βan adequate, sustainable source of revenue for stormwater management activities is\n\nnecessary to protect the general health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the city.β\n\nRoanoke, Va., Code Β§ 11.5-2. The Council also found that βparcels . . . with higher\n\namounts of impervious surfaces contribute greater amounts of stormwater and pollutants\n\n 1\n Minimum control measures include various means of reducing pollutants to\ncomply with the Clean Water Act, from public outreach and participation to system\noperation and maintenance. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systemβ\nRegulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm\nWater Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,752 (Dec. 8, 1999). TMDLs limit total\ndischarges of specified pollutants based on water quality criteria. 33 U.S.C. Β§ 1313(d).\n\n\n 4\n\nto the cityβs stormwater management system and that the owners of such parcels should\n\ncarry a proportionate burden of the cost of such system.β Id. Therefore, the Council\n\nchose to base the charge on βa parcelβs impervious surface cover.β Id.\n\n The ordinance imposes the stormwater management charge on all βimproved\n\nparcels,β id. Β§ 11.5-3(a), meaning all parcels with 250 square feet or more of impervious\n\nsurface, id. Β§ 11.5-10(e). An impervious surface is one that significantly impedes or\n\nprevents βthe natural infiltration of water into the soil.β Id. Β§ 11.5-10(d). Approximately\n\n86% of the parcels in the City are considered improved parcels subject to the charge.\n\nJ.A. 57.\n\n Owners of improved parcels may apply for credits against the charge imposed\n\nupon them. Roanoke, Va., Code Β§ 11.5-7. Credits are available for various stormwater\n\nmanagement activities that reduce, control, or treat stormwater runoff from improved\n\nparcels, such as installing rain gardens or pervious asphalt. Id.; see J.A. 135β36. The\n\nmaximum credit allowed for a given parcel is 50% of the total charge. Id. Β§ 11.5-7(b)(1).\n\n All revenue from the charge is deposited into a stormwater utility enterprise fund,\n\nwhich is separate from the Cityβs general fund. The enterprise fund may only be used for\n\nsix stormwater management-related purposes listed in Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2-2114(A).\n\nSince it was established, the Utility has used all revenue from the charge for stormwater\n\nmanagement.\n\n B.\n\n Norfolk Southern is one of the Cityβs largest property owners, and it holds one of\n\nthe Cityβs largest improved parcels. In 2017, it was assessed a stormwater charge of\n\n\n 5\n\n$416,748.28 for that parcel. Much of Norfolk Southernβs property is covered by railroad\n\ntrack and ballast. Ballast is the crushed stone surface beneath railroad tracks that\n\nstabilizes the tracks and drains stormwater away from them.\n\n Norfolk Southern claims that its ballasted property should be exempt from the\n\ncharge. It contends that ballast is at least as pervious to stormwater runoff as lawns,\n\nwhich are not considered impervious surfaces and are not subject to the charge.\n\n C.\n\n Following unsuccessful attempts to exempt the ballasted property from the charge,\n\nNorfolk Southern sued the City, alleging that the stormwater management charge is a\n\ndiscriminatory tax in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act\n\nof 1976 (the β4-R Actβ), 49 U.S.C. Β§ 11501. Under the 4-R Act, states and localities may\n\nnot impose any βtax that discriminates against a rail carrier.β Id. Β§ 11501(b)(4). Norfolk\n\nSouthern alleges that the Cityβs stormwater management charge does just that because it\n\ntreats ballasted property differently from lawns, even though the two are, in the railroadβs\n\nview, equally pervious to stormwater.\n\n Following a period of discovery, the district court granted Defendantsβ motion for\n\nsummary judgment, concluding that although it is βadmittedly a close question,β the\n\ncharge is not subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements because it is a fee rather than a tax.\n\nNorfolk S. Railway Co. v. City of Roanoke, No. 7:16 CV 00176, 2017 WL 6599008, at\n\n*8β9 (W.D. Va. Dec. 26, 2017). We review the district courtβs decision de novo. Valero\n\nTerrestrial Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 2000).\n\n\n\n\n 6\n\n II.\n\n Because the 4-R Act applies only to taxes, not fees, we must determine whether\n\nthe charge in this case is closer to (1) a paradigmatic tax, which βis imposed by a\n\nlegislature upon many, or all, citizensβ and βraises money, contributed to a general fund,\n\nand spent for the benefit of the entire community,β or (2) a paradigmatic regulatory fee,\n\nwhich βis imposed by an agency upon those subject to its regulation,β and serves\n\nregulatory purposes by disincentivizing conduct or raising money to defray regulatory\n\nexpenses. San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commβn, 967 F.2d 683, 685 (1st Cir.\n\n1992). In answering this question, we are aided by the three-part framework suggested in\n\nSan Juan Cellular and adopted by this court in Valero, 205 F.3d at 134. 2 This framework\n\nfocuses on β(1) what entity imposes the charge; (2) what population is subject to the\n\ncharge; and (3) what purposes are served by the use of the monies obtained by the\n\ncharge.β Id. If the charge falls βsomewhere in the middleβ between a classic tax and a\n\nclassic fee, the most important of these considerations is the chargeβs purpose. Id.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Defendants urge us not to apply the San Juan Cellular framework to this 4-R Act\ncase because it was developed in cases that concerned different statutes. Nothing about\nthe framework, however, is statute-specific. As Judge Wynn aptly notes in his\nconcurring opinion, it merely provides flexible and versatile guidance in assessing where\na particular charge sits on the tax-fee continuum. Indeed, San Juan Cellular aimed to\nsynthesize the general approach that courts had taken to distinguish taxes from fees βin a\nvariety of statutory contexts.β 967 F.2d at 685.\n\n\n\n 7\n\n A.\n\n We first consider who sets the charge. A charge is more likely to be a tax if itβs\n\nimposed by the legislature, rather than an administrative agency. Valero, 205 F.3d at\n\n134. Here, this factor suggests that the charge is a tax because itβs imposed by Roanokeβs\n\nlegislative body, the City Council. 3\n\n B.\n\n Under the second San Juan Cellular factor, a charge is more likely to be a tax if it\n\nis imposed on a broad segment of the public. GenOn Mid-Atl., LLC v. Montgomery\n\nCounty, 650 F.3d 1021, 1024 (4th Cir. 2011). And assessment of a tax is often based\n\nβsolely on ability to pay,β as measured by a payorβs property or income, rather than tied\n\nto the receipt of a particular benefit or the imposition of a regulatory burden. Natβl Cable\n\nTelevision Assβn, Inc v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974); see DIRECTV, Inc. v.\n\nTolson, 513 F.3d 119, 126 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing the significance of whether an\n\nassessment is tied to income). By contrast, the classic fee is imposed only upon persons\n\nsubject to regulation by a particular agency. Valero, 205 F.3d at 134.\n\n\n\n 3\n As Defendants point out, the Virginia statute authorizing the charge requires that\nit be passed through ordinance by the City Council. This makes the Council somewhat\nless like an autonomous legislature and somewhat more like an administrative agency\nimplementing the state statute, which itself forms a part of the Clean Water Actβs\ncomprehensive regulatory scheme. But the authorizing statute still requires legislative\ndecision-making through passage of an ordinance. The Councilβs decision acts as a\ncheck on the regulatory program, in much the same way that legislaturesβ appropriations\ndecisions can check agenciesβ regulatory programs. Thus, we consider the Council to\nhave acted in a predominantly legislative capacity for purposes of the first factor.\n\n\n\n 8\n\n This factor suggested that the charge was a tax in Valero, where it was imposed\n\nupon persons disposing waste at landfills, who in turn passed the cost on to their\n\ncustomers, thereby spreading it βto a significantly wider portion of the population.β Id.;\n\naccord DIRECTV, 513 F.3d at 125β26. In GenOn, however, we concluded that a carbon\n\nemission charge was a fee rather than a tax primarily because the charge applied to only\n\none entity. 650 F.3d at 1024. 4\n\n Here, the second factor is largely inconclusive. On the one hand, the stormwater\n\nmanagement charge applies to a broad class of property owners, suggesting that it is a\n\ntax. But on the other hand, it isnβt assessed solely on the basis of property ownership.\n\nRather, the amount assessed is proportional to the amount of impervious surface on an\n\nownerβs property. And property owners may receive credits against the assessment if\n\nthey engage in certain stormwater management practices. These features suggest that the\n\ncharge is a measure of the stormwater management obligations that each parcel imposes\n\nupon the City, rather than a measure of ability to pay. And this makes the charge more\n\nlike a fee. These features also distinguish the stormwater management charge from the\n\ncharge in Valero, which applied to all waste disposers regardless of their contribution to\n\n\n\n\n 4\n Courts have differed as to how the second factor applies to stormwater\nmanagement charges. Compare DeKalb County v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 681, 700β\n01 (2013) (concluding that the second factor suggested a stormwater management charge\nwas a tax), and McLeod v. Columbia County, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346 (S.D. Ga.\n2003) (same), with Homewood Vill., LLC v. Unified Govβt of Athens-Clarke County, 132\nF. Supp. 3d 1376, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (reaching the opposite conclusion).\n\n\n\n 9\n\nthe burden that the charge was designed to addressβclosing underfunded landfills. On\n\nbalance then, this second factor is effectively a wash as to the nature of the charge.\n\n C.\n\n Under the third San Juan Cellular factorβwhich is the most important one in\n\nclose casesβa charge is more likely to be a tax if its primary purpose is to raise revenue\n\nfor general government activity that benefits the entire community. 967 F.2d at 685β86.\n\nThis is true even if the revenue is placed into a special fund and segregated from general\n\nrevenue, as long as βthe special fund is used to benefit the population at large.β Valero,\n\n205 F.3d at 135. Conversely, a charge is more likely to be a fee if itβs used to provide\n\nindividualized benefits or to defray an agencyβs costs of regulating. San Juan Cellular,\n\n967 F.2d at 685β86. A charge will also be considered a fee if its primary purpose is to\n\nregulate conduct by making it more expensive (even if the charge also raises revenue).\n\nS.C. ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983).\n\n The third factor pointed to the charge being a tax in Valero, where the funds\n\ncollected were used to support the closure of underfunded landfills in an environmentally\n\nsound manner that complied with EPA regulations. 205 F.3d at 134β35. The chargeβs\n\npurpose was to protect the stateβs groundwater, which benefitted the general public. Id.\n\nAnd in United States v. City of Huntington, the chargeβs purpose suggested it was a tax\n\nwhere the charge paid for βcore government servicesβ including fire and flood protection\n\nand street maintenance. 999 F.2d 71, 73 (4th Cir. 1993).\n\n On the other hand, the chargeβs purpose suggested it was a fee in San Juan\n\nCellular, where the funds were used to regulate cell phone providers. 967 F.2d at 686.\n\n\n 10\n\nThe court noted that there need not be an exact match between the charge assessed and\n\nthe agencyβs expenditures on a particular regulated firm. Id. at 686β87. In GenOn, we\n\nfound that a carbon emission charge was βplainly regulatory,β just like a classic fee,\n\nbecause it βcreate[d] disincentives for GenOn to continue polluting and provide[d] funds\n\nfor others to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions.β 650 F.3d at 1025.\n\n Courts have reached different results in applying the third factor to stormwater\n\nmanagement charges. In DeKalb County, the court concluded that the third factor\n\nsuggested the charge was a tax because the benefits of stormwater managementβflood\n\nprevention and abatement of water pollutionβwere shared broadly by the general public.\n\n108 Fed. Cl. at 701. The court also noted that the assessment of a stormwater charge is\n\nbased βnot on the benefits derived by the payor, but by the anticipated burden that its\n\nproperty imposes on the stormwater system.β Id. at 703. And the charge couldnβt be\n\nconsidered a voluntary user fee because property owners couldnβt decline stormwater\n\nservices. Id. at 704β06. The McLeod court reached a similar result, noting that β[s]torm\n\nwater management was and is the type of service that is often funded through general tax\n\nrevenue.β 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1347β48. The Homewood Village court, however, reached\n\nthe opposite conclusion, noting that although all residents receive a benefit from\n\nstormwater management, βthose paying the charge receive a special benefitβ because the\n\ncounty treats polluted water on their properties, facilitating compliance with state and\n\nfederal requirements. 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1381 (citing Homewood Vill., LLC v. Unified\n\nGovβt of Athens-Clarke County, 739 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ga. 2013)).\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\n Norfolk Southern argues that Roanokeβs stormwater management charge serves\n\ntwo purposes that both benefit the general public: reducing water pollution and improving\n\nflood control. It analogizes these purposes to maintaining the safety of the stateβs\n\ngroundwater, which we held to be a public benefit in Valero. Defendants respond that\n\nthey are obligated by law to operate a stormwater management system and to use all\n\nrevenue generated from the charge for specific stormwater management activities. Thus,\n\nalthough the charge may benefit the public, its primary purpose is to satisfy regulatory\n\nrequirements. 5 Norfolk Southernβs rejoinder is that the charge isnβt regulatory in the\n\nsense recognized by San Juan Cellular because the City is a regulated entity, rather than\n\na regulator. The railroad notes that the stormwater Utility doesnβt directly regulate its\n\nactivity or issue any permit for its stormwater discharges.\n\n We think the chargeβs purpose is more consistent with that of a fee than a tax,\n\nbecause the charge forms part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Although\n\nmunicipalities may have traditionally provided stormwater management as a public\n\nbenefit at the discretion of their legislatures, the Clean Water Actβs regulatory scheme\n\nnow requires the City to take myriad concrete actions to reduce discharges and pollutant\n\nconcentrationsβmany of them relating directly to runoff from Norfolk Southernβs\n\n\n\n\n 5\n Defendants also note that all revenue from the charge is placed into a segregated\nenterprise fund, rather than the Cityβs general fund. But standing alone, the fact that\nrevenue from the charge is placed in a special fund is βimmaterial.β Valero, 205 F.3d at\n135.\n\n\n\n 12\n\nproperty and the waters that receive it. See, e.g., J.A. 140β44, 169β80, 262, 284β86,\n\n554β58.\n\n Whatβs more, if the City elects to assess a charge to offset the costs of complying\n\nwith these regulatory obligations, it must do so consistent with the state authorizing\n\nstatute, Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2-2114. This statute restricts the funds to specific uses\n\nrelated to stormwater management, and it requires that the charge incentivize stormwater\n\nmanagement practices by crediting property owners who adopt them. Id. Β§ 15.2-2114(D).\n\nThese requirements have removed much of the legislative discretion that was\n\ntraditionally associated with stormwater management. The City is now a participant in a\n\ncomprehensive scheme regulating stormwater management and the assessment of charges\n\nto pay for it.\n\n Of course, the City doesnβt directly regulate Norfolk Southern or other stormwater\n\ndischargers, nor does it issue permits for their discharges. Thus, rather than defraying the\n\nCityβs costs of regulating, the charge primarily defrays the Cityβs costs of complying with\n\nregulations imposed upon it. At bottom, however, a classic regulatory fee is designed to\n\naddress harmful impacts of otherwise permissible activities, and to ensure that the actors\n\nresponsible for those impacts bear the costs of addressing them. That is exactly the\n\nfunction served by Roanokeβs stormwater management charge, which ensures that\n\nowners of impervious surfaces bear the cost of managing stormwater runoff.\n\n In sum, the charge is part of a regulatory scheme, rooted in the Clean Water Act,\n\nwhose purpose is to remedy the environmental harms associated with stormwater runoff\n\nand to hold stormwater dischargers responsible for footing the bill. EPAβs regulations\n\n\n 13\n\nensure that the harms of stormwater discharge are addressed, and the City levies a charge\n\n(as directed by the state) upon those whose activity creates the need for regulation. The\n\ncharge also serves the regulatory function of incentivizing property owners to reduce the\n\namount of impervious surface on their land and engage in stormwater management\n\npractices that qualify them for credits.\n\n As a result, the third San Juan Cellular factor suggests that the charge is a fee.\n\n D.\n\n Finally, we consider the three San Juan Cellular factors collectively, in light of all\n\nthe relevant circumstances, to decide whether the Cityβs stormwater management charge\n\nis a tax subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements, or a fee beyond the reach of those\n\nrequirements. As the district court acknowledged, this is a βclose question.β Norfolk S.,\n\n2017 WL 6599008, at *8. The first factor suggests that the charge is a tax because itβs\n\nimposed by the legislature. The second factor is largely inconclusive because the charge\n\nis levied upon most properties but based on contributions to stormwater runoff rather than\n\nability to pay. The third factor suggests that the charge is a fee because it forms part of a\n\ncomprehensive regulatory scheme.\n\n Applying the principle we articulated in Valero, 205 F.3d at 134, we give the third\n\nfactor controlling weight here because the chargeβs regulatory purpose provides a better\n\nindication of its overall nature than the body that implemented it or the class of persons it\n\nis levied upon. See also Club Assβn of W. Va., Inc. v. Wise, 293 F.3d 723, 726 (4th Cir.\n\n2002) (applying this principle). Accordingly, we conclude that the charge is a fee, rather\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\nthan a tax subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements. The district court correctly granted\n\nDefendantsβ motion for summary judgment.\n\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\n 15\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF ROANOKE, a Virginia Municipality, Defendant - Appellee, and Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Intervenor/Defendant - Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1060\\n\\n\\nNORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF ROANOKE, a Virginia Municipality,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee,\\n\\n and\\n\\nCHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION,\\n\\n Intervenor/Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at\\nRoanoke. Glen E. Conrad, District Judge. (7:16-cv-00176-GEC)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 15, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson\\nand Judge Wynn joined. Judge Wilkinson and Judge Wynn wrote separate concurring\\nopinions.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Gary A. Bryant, WILLCOX & SAVAGE, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for\\nAppellant. Monica Taylor Monday, GENTRY LOCKE, Roanoke, Virginia; Jon Alan\\n\\nMueller, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellees.\\nON BRIEF: Gregory J. Haley, Scott A. Stephenson, GENTRY LOCKE, Roanoke,\\nVirginia; Daniel J. Callaghan, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY FOR THE CITY\\nOF ROANOKE, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee City of Roanoke. Alayna Chuney,\\nBrittany Wright, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, INC., Annapolis, Maryland, for\\nAppellee Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\nDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Plaintiff Norfolk Southern Railway appeals the district courtβs order granting\\n\\nsummary judgment for Defendant City of Roanoke, Virginia and Defendant-Intervenor\\n\\nChesapeake Bay Foundation in this lawsuit alleging discriminatory taxation in violation\\n\\nof the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. The district court\\n\\nconcluded that the Cityβs stormwater management charge is a fee, rather than a tax. This\\n\\ndistinction matters because only taxes are subject to challenge under the Act. For the\\n\\nreasons that follow, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The City of Roanoke operates a stormwater management system that includes\\n\\ngutters, storm drains, channels, retention basins, and other infrastructure. The system\\n\\ncollects stormwater and diverts it into the Roanoke River or one of its thirteen tributaries\\n\\nin the City.\\n\\n To operate its system, the City must hold a permit issued by Virginiaβs\\n\\nDepartment of Environmental Quality pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act and\\n\\nEnvironmental Protection Agency regulations. Such permits βrequire controls to reduce\\n\\nthe discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable, including management\\n\\npractices, control techniques and system, design and engineering methods, and such other\\n\\nprovisions as the [EPA] or the State determines appropriate for the control of such\\n\\npollutants.β 33 U.S.C. Β§ 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii). The Cityβs permit requires it to implement\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\nsix βminimum control measuresβ and meet Total Maximum Daily Load (βTMDLβ)\\n\\nlimits, among other requirements. 1\\n\\n To facilitate compliance with applicable state and federal stormwater regulations,\\n\\nVirginia law authorizes municipalities to establish stormwater utilities and enact\\n\\nstormwater management charges. Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2.2114. These charges must be\\n\\nenacted βby ordinance,β and must βbe based upon an analysis that demonstrates the\\n\\nrational relationship between the amount charged and the services provided.β Id.\\n\\nΒ§ 15.2.2144(A), (B). Localities must also provide for full or partial waivers of charges to\\n\\nproperty owners who engage in certain stormwater management practices. Id. Β§ 15.2-\\n\\n2114(D). Income from the charges βshall be dedicated special revenue . . . and may be\\n\\nused only to pay or recover costs forβ seven purposes related to stormwater management.\\n\\nId. Β§ 15.2-2114(A).\\n\\n In 2013, the Roanoke City Council enacted an ordinance establishing a\\n\\nStormwater Management Utility and a stormwater utility charge. The City Council found\\n\\nthat βan adequate, sustainable source of revenue for stormwater management activities is\\n\\nnecessary to protect the general health, safety, and welfare of the residents of the city.β\\n\\nRoanoke, Va., Code Β§ 11.5-2. The Council also found that βparcels . . . with higher\\n\\namounts of impervious surfaces contribute greater amounts of stormwater and pollutants\\n\\n 1\\n Minimum control measures include various means of reducing pollutants to\\ncomply with the Clean Water Act, from public outreach and participation to system\\noperation and maintenance. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Systemβ\\nRegulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm\\nWater Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,752 (Dec. 8, 1999). TMDLs limit total\\ndischarges of specified pollutants based on water quality criteria. 33 U.S.C. Β§ 1313(d).\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\nto the cityβs stormwater management system and that the owners of such parcels should\\n\\ncarry a proportionate burden of the cost of such system.β Id. Therefore, the Council\\n\\nchose to base the charge on βa parcelβs impervious surface cover.β Id.\\n\\n The ordinance imposes the stormwater management charge on all βimproved\\n\\nparcels,β id. Β§ 11.5-3(a), meaning all parcels with 250 square feet or more of impervious\\n\\nsurface, id. Β§ 11.5-10(e). An impervious surface is one that significantly impedes or\\n\\nprevents βthe natural infiltration of water into the soil.β Id. Β§ 11.5-10(d). Approximately\\n\\n86% of the parcels in the City are considered improved parcels subject to the charge.\\n\\nJ.A. 57.\\n\\n Owners of improved parcels may apply for credits against the charge imposed\\n\\nupon them. Roanoke, Va., Code Β§ 11.5-7. Credits are available for various stormwater\\n\\nmanagement activities that reduce, control, or treat stormwater runoff from improved\\n\\nparcels, such as installing rain gardens or pervious asphalt. Id.; see J.A. 135β36. The\\n\\nmaximum credit allowed for a given parcel is 50% of the total charge. Id. Β§ 11.5-7(b)(1).\\n\\n All revenue from the charge is deposited into a stormwater utility enterprise fund,\\n\\nwhich is separate from the Cityβs general fund. The enterprise fund may only be used for\\n\\nsix stormwater management-related purposes listed in Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2-2114(A).\\n\\nSince it was established, the Utility has used all revenue from the charge for stormwater\\n\\nmanagement.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Norfolk Southern is one of the Cityβs largest property owners, and it holds one of\\n\\nthe Cityβs largest improved parcels. In 2017, it was assessed a stormwater charge of\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\n$416,748.28 for that parcel. Much of Norfolk Southernβs property is covered by railroad\\n\\ntrack and ballast. Ballast is the crushed stone surface beneath railroad tracks that\\n\\nstabilizes the tracks and drains stormwater away from them.\\n\\n Norfolk Southern claims that its ballasted property should be exempt from the\\n\\ncharge. It contends that ballast is at least as pervious to stormwater runoff as lawns,\\n\\nwhich are not considered impervious surfaces and are not subject to the charge.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Following unsuccessful attempts to exempt the ballasted property from the charge,\\n\\nNorfolk Southern sued the City, alleging that the stormwater management charge is a\\n\\ndiscriminatory tax in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act\\n\\nof 1976 (the β4-R Actβ), 49 U.S.C. Β§ 11501. Under the 4-R Act, states and localities may\\n\\nnot impose any βtax that discriminates against a rail carrier.β Id. Β§ 11501(b)(4). Norfolk\\n\\nSouthern alleges that the Cityβs stormwater management charge does just that because it\\n\\ntreats ballasted property differently from lawns, even though the two are, in the railroadβs\\n\\nview, equally pervious to stormwater.\\n\\n Following a period of discovery, the district court granted Defendantsβ motion for\\n\\nsummary judgment, concluding that although it is βadmittedly a close question,β the\\n\\ncharge is not subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements because it is a fee rather than a tax.\\n\\nNorfolk S. Railway Co. v. City of Roanoke, No. 7:16 CV 00176, 2017 WL 6599008, at\\n\\n*8β9 (W.D. Va. Dec. 26, 2017). We review the district courtβs decision de novo. Valero\\n\\nTerrestrial Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 2000).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Because the 4-R Act applies only to taxes, not fees, we must determine whether\\n\\nthe charge in this case is closer to (1) a paradigmatic tax, which βis imposed by a\\n\\nlegislature upon many, or all, citizensβ and βraises money, contributed to a general fund,\\n\\nand spent for the benefit of the entire community,β or (2) a paradigmatic regulatory fee,\\n\\nwhich βis imposed by an agency upon those subject to its regulation,β and serves\\n\\nregulatory purposes by disincentivizing conduct or raising money to defray regulatory\\n\\nexpenses. San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commβn, 967 F.2d 683, 685 (1st Cir.\\n\\n1992). In answering this question, we are aided by the three-part framework suggested in\\n\\nSan Juan Cellular and adopted by this court in Valero, 205 F.3d at 134. 2 This framework\\n\\nfocuses on β(1) what entity imposes the charge; (2) what population is subject to the\\n\\ncharge; and (3) what purposes are served by the use of the monies obtained by the\\n\\ncharge.β Id. If the charge falls βsomewhere in the middleβ between a classic tax and a\\n\\nclassic fee, the most important of these considerations is the chargeβs purpose. Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Defendants urge us not to apply the San Juan Cellular framework to this 4-R Act\\ncase because it was developed in cases that concerned different statutes. Nothing about\\nthe framework, however, is statute-specific. As Judge Wynn aptly notes in his\\nconcurring opinion, it merely provides flexible and versatile guidance in assessing where\\na particular charge sits on the tax-fee continuum. Indeed, San Juan Cellular aimed to\\nsynthesize the general approach that courts had taken to distinguish taxes from fees βin a\\nvariety of statutory contexts.β 967 F.2d at 685.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We first consider who sets the charge. A charge is more likely to be a tax if itβs\\n\\nimposed by the legislature, rather than an administrative agency. Valero, 205 F.3d at\\n\\n134. Here, this factor suggests that the charge is a tax because itβs imposed by Roanokeβs\\n\\nlegislative body, the City Council. 3\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Under the second San Juan Cellular factor, a charge is more likely to be a tax if it\\n\\nis imposed on a broad segment of the public. GenOn Mid-Atl., LLC v. Montgomery\\n\\nCounty, 650 F.3d 1021, 1024 (4th Cir. 2011). And assessment of a tax is often based\\n\\nβsolely on ability to pay,β as measured by a payorβs property or income, rather than tied\\n\\nto the receipt of a particular benefit or the imposition of a regulatory burden. Natβl Cable\\n\\nTelevision Assβn, Inc v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974); see DIRECTV, Inc. v.\\n\\nTolson, 513 F.3d 119, 126 n.3 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing the significance of whether an\\n\\nassessment is tied to income). By contrast, the classic fee is imposed only upon persons\\n\\nsubject to regulation by a particular agency. Valero, 205 F.3d at 134.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n As Defendants point out, the Virginia statute authorizing the charge requires that\\nit be passed through ordinance by the City Council. This makes the Council somewhat\\nless like an autonomous legislature and somewhat more like an administrative agency\\nimplementing the state statute, which itself forms a part of the Clean Water Actβs\\ncomprehensive regulatory scheme. But the authorizing statute still requires legislative\\ndecision-making through passage of an ordinance. The Councilβs decision acts as a\\ncheck on the regulatory program, in much the same way that legislaturesβ appropriations\\ndecisions can check agenciesβ regulatory programs. Thus, we consider the Council to\\nhave acted in a predominantly legislative capacity for purposes of the first factor.\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\n This factor suggested that the charge was a tax in Valero, where it was imposed\\n\\nupon persons disposing waste at landfills, who in turn passed the cost on to their\\n\\ncustomers, thereby spreading it βto a significantly wider portion of the population.β Id.;\\n\\naccord DIRECTV, 513 F.3d at 125β26. In GenOn, however, we concluded that a carbon\\n\\nemission charge was a fee rather than a tax primarily because the charge applied to only\\n\\none entity. 650 F.3d at 1024. 4\\n\\n Here, the second factor is largely inconclusive. On the one hand, the stormwater\\n\\nmanagement charge applies to a broad class of property owners, suggesting that it is a\\n\\ntax. But on the other hand, it isnβt assessed solely on the basis of property ownership.\\n\\nRather, the amount assessed is proportional to the amount of impervious surface on an\\n\\nownerβs property. And property owners may receive credits against the assessment if\\n\\nthey engage in certain stormwater management practices. These features suggest that the\\n\\ncharge is a measure of the stormwater management obligations that each parcel imposes\\n\\nupon the City, rather than a measure of ability to pay. And this makes the charge more\\n\\nlike a fee. These features also distinguish the stormwater management charge from the\\n\\ncharge in Valero, which applied to all waste disposers regardless of their contribution to\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Courts have differed as to how the second factor applies to stormwater\\nmanagement charges. Compare DeKalb County v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 681, 700β\\n01 (2013) (concluding that the second factor suggested a stormwater management charge\\nwas a tax), and McLeod v. Columbia County, 254 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1346 (S.D. Ga.\\n2003) (same), with Homewood Vill., LLC v. Unified Govβt of Athens-Clarke County, 132\\nF. Supp. 3d 1376, 1381 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (reaching the opposite conclusion).\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\nthe burden that the charge was designed to addressβclosing underfunded landfills. On\\n\\nbalance then, this second factor is effectively a wash as to the nature of the charge.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Under the third San Juan Cellular factorβwhich is the most important one in\\n\\nclose casesβa charge is more likely to be a tax if its primary purpose is to raise revenue\\n\\nfor general government activity that benefits the entire community. 967 F.2d at 685β86.\\n\\nThis is true even if the revenue is placed into a special fund and segregated from general\\n\\nrevenue, as long as βthe special fund is used to benefit the population at large.β Valero,\\n\\n205 F.3d at 135. Conversely, a charge is more likely to be a fee if itβs used to provide\\n\\nindividualized benefits or to defray an agencyβs costs of regulating. San Juan Cellular,\\n\\n967 F.2d at 685β86. A charge will also be considered a fee if its primary purpose is to\\n\\nregulate conduct by making it more expensive (even if the charge also raises revenue).\\n\\nS.C. ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983).\\n\\n The third factor pointed to the charge being a tax in Valero, where the funds\\n\\ncollected were used to support the closure of underfunded landfills in an environmentally\\n\\nsound manner that complied with EPA regulations. 205 F.3d at 134β35. The chargeβs\\n\\npurpose was to protect the stateβs groundwater, which benefitted the general public. Id.\\n\\nAnd in United States v. City of Huntington, the chargeβs purpose suggested it was a tax\\n\\nwhere the charge paid for βcore government servicesβ including fire and flood protection\\n\\nand street maintenance. 999 F.2d 71, 73 (4th Cir. 1993).\\n\\n On the other hand, the chargeβs purpose suggested it was a fee in San Juan\\n\\nCellular, where the funds were used to regulate cell phone providers. 967 F.2d at 686.\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\nThe court noted that there need not be an exact match between the charge assessed and\\n\\nthe agencyβs expenditures on a particular regulated firm. Id. at 686β87. In GenOn, we\\n\\nfound that a carbon emission charge was βplainly regulatory,β just like a classic fee,\\n\\nbecause it βcreate[d] disincentives for GenOn to continue polluting and provide[d] funds\\n\\nfor others to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions.β 650 F.3d at 1025.\\n\\n Courts have reached different results in applying the third factor to stormwater\\n\\nmanagement charges. In DeKalb County, the court concluded that the third factor\\n\\nsuggested the charge was a tax because the benefits of stormwater managementβflood\\n\\nprevention and abatement of water pollutionβwere shared broadly by the general public.\\n\\n108 Fed. Cl. at 701. The court also noted that the assessment of a stormwater charge is\\n\\nbased βnot on the benefits derived by the payor, but by the anticipated burden that its\\n\\nproperty imposes on the stormwater system.β Id. at 703. And the charge couldnβt be\\n\\nconsidered a voluntary user fee because property owners couldnβt decline stormwater\\n\\nservices. Id. at 704β06. The McLeod court reached a similar result, noting that β[s]torm\\n\\nwater management was and is the type of service that is often funded through general tax\\n\\nrevenue.β 254 F. Supp. 2d at 1347β48. The Homewood Village court, however, reached\\n\\nthe opposite conclusion, noting that although all residents receive a benefit from\\n\\nstormwater management, βthose paying the charge receive a special benefitβ because the\\n\\ncounty treats polluted water on their properties, facilitating compliance with state and\\n\\nfederal requirements. 132 F. Supp. 3d at 1381 (citing Homewood Vill., LLC v. Unified\\n\\nGovβt of Athens-Clarke County, 739 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ga. 2013)).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\n Norfolk Southern argues that Roanokeβs stormwater management charge serves\\n\\ntwo purposes that both benefit the general public: reducing water pollution and improving\\n\\nflood control. It analogizes these purposes to maintaining the safety of the stateβs\\n\\ngroundwater, which we held to be a public benefit in Valero. Defendants respond that\\n\\nthey are obligated by law to operate a stormwater management system and to use all\\n\\nrevenue generated from the charge for specific stormwater management activities. Thus,\\n\\nalthough the charge may benefit the public, its primary purpose is to satisfy regulatory\\n\\nrequirements. 5 Norfolk Southernβs rejoinder is that the charge isnβt regulatory in the\\n\\nsense recognized by San Juan Cellular because the City is a regulated entity, rather than\\n\\na regulator. The railroad notes that the stormwater Utility doesnβt directly regulate its\\n\\nactivity or issue any permit for its stormwater discharges.\\n\\n We think the chargeβs purpose is more consistent with that of a fee than a tax,\\n\\nbecause the charge forms part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Although\\n\\nmunicipalities may have traditionally provided stormwater management as a public\\n\\nbenefit at the discretion of their legislatures, the Clean Water Actβs regulatory scheme\\n\\nnow requires the City to take myriad concrete actions to reduce discharges and pollutant\\n\\nconcentrationsβmany of them relating directly to runoff from Norfolk Southernβs\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Defendants also note that all revenue from the charge is placed into a segregated\\nenterprise fund, rather than the Cityβs general fund. But standing alone, the fact that\\nrevenue from the charge is placed in a special fund is βimmaterial.β Valero, 205 F.3d at\\n135.\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\nproperty and the waters that receive it. See, e.g., J.A. 140β44, 169β80, 262, 284β86,\\n\\n554β58.\\n\\n Whatβs more, if the City elects to assess a charge to offset the costs of complying\\n\\nwith these regulatory obligations, it must do so consistent with the state authorizing\\n\\nstatute, Va. Code Ann. Β§ 15.2-2114. This statute restricts the funds to specific uses\\n\\nrelated to stormwater management, and it requires that the charge incentivize stormwater\\n\\nmanagement practices by crediting property owners who adopt them. Id. Β§ 15.2-2114(D).\\n\\nThese requirements have removed much of the legislative discretion that was\\n\\ntraditionally associated with stormwater management. The City is now a participant in a\\n\\ncomprehensive scheme regulating stormwater management and the assessment of charges\\n\\nto pay for it.\\n\\n Of course, the City doesnβt directly regulate Norfolk Southern or other stormwater\\n\\ndischargers, nor does it issue permits for their discharges. Thus, rather than defraying the\\n\\nCityβs costs of regulating, the charge primarily defrays the Cityβs costs of complying with\\n\\nregulations imposed upon it. At bottom, however, a classic regulatory fee is designed to\\n\\naddress harmful impacts of otherwise permissible activities, and to ensure that the actors\\n\\nresponsible for those impacts bear the costs of addressing them. That is exactly the\\n\\nfunction served by Roanokeβs stormwater management charge, which ensures that\\n\\nowners of impervious surfaces bear the cost of managing stormwater runoff.\\n\\n In sum, the charge is part of a regulatory scheme, rooted in the Clean Water Act,\\n\\nwhose purpose is to remedy the environmental harms associated with stormwater runoff\\n\\nand to hold stormwater dischargers responsible for footing the bill. EPAβs regulations\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\nensure that the harms of stormwater discharge are addressed, and the City levies a charge\\n\\n(as directed by the state) upon those whose activity creates the need for regulation. The\\n\\ncharge also serves the regulatory function of incentivizing property owners to reduce the\\n\\namount of impervious surface on their land and engage in stormwater management\\n\\npractices that qualify them for credits.\\n\\n As a result, the third San Juan Cellular factor suggests that the charge is a fee.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Finally, we consider the three San Juan Cellular factors collectively, in light of all\\n\\nthe relevant circumstances, to decide whether the Cityβs stormwater management charge\\n\\nis a tax subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements, or a fee beyond the reach of those\\n\\nrequirements. As the district court acknowledged, this is a βclose question.β Norfolk S.,\\n\\n2017 WL 6599008, at *8. The first factor suggests that the charge is a tax because itβs\\n\\nimposed by the legislature. The second factor is largely inconclusive because the charge\\n\\nis levied upon most properties but based on contributions to stormwater runoff rather than\\n\\nability to pay. The third factor suggests that the charge is a fee because it forms part of a\\n\\ncomprehensive regulatory scheme.\\n\\n Applying the principle we articulated in Valero, 205 F.3d at 134, we give the third\\n\\nfactor controlling weight here because the chargeβs regulatory purpose provides a better\\n\\nindication of its overall nature than the body that implemented it or the class of persons it\\n\\nis levied upon. See also Club Assβn of W. Va., Inc. v. Wise, 293 F.3d 723, 726 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2002) (applying this principle). Accordingly, we conclude that the charge is a fee, rather\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\nthan a tax subject to the 4-R Actβs requirements. The district court correctly granted\\n\\nDefendantsβ motion for summary judgment.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":560,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4591792,"string":"4,591,792"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"HANNAH P., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel COATS, Director of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence McLean, VA, Defendant-Appellee, and Mark Ewing, in His Personal Capacity McLean, VA, Defendant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Hannah P. v. Daniel Coats"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1943"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gregory, Thacker, Quattlebaum\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888034/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"035concurrenceinpart\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888035/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"THACKER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-1943\\n\\n\\nHANNAH P.,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDANIEL COATS, Director of the Office of The Director of National Intelligence\\nMcLean, VA,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee,\\n\\n and\\n\\nMARK EWING, in his personal capacity McLean, VA,\\n\\n Defendant.\\n\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nAlexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:16-cv-01030-CMH-IDD)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 19, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Thacker\\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Quattlebaum joined. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a\\nseparate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\\n\\nARGUED: Timothy Bosson, BOSSON LEGAL GROUP, Fairfax, Virginia, for\\nAppellant. Caroline D. Lopez, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy\\nAssistant Attorney General, Marleigh D. Dover, Civil Division, UNITED STATES\\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Dana J. Boente, United States\\nAttorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for\\nAppellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\nTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Appellant Hannah P. 1 (βHannahβ), a former employee of the Office of the Director\\n\\nof National Intelligence (βAppelleeβ), asserts that Appellee discriminated against her\\n\\npursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (βRehabilitation Actβ), 29 U.S.C. Β§ 701, et\\n\\nseq., and violated the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (βFMLAβ), 29 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 2601, et seq., by not hiring her for a permanent position. The district court granted\\n\\nsummary judgment in Appelleeβs favor as to all claims.\\n\\n For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district courtβs judgment as to the\\n\\nRehabilitation Act and FMLA retaliation claims. However, because a genuine issue of\\n\\nmaterial fact remains as to whether Hannah provided notice of her disability and interest\\n\\nin FMLA leave sufficient to trigger Appelleeβs duty to inquire, we hold that summary\\n\\njudgment as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim was not warranted. Accordingly, we\\n\\nvacate that part of the district courtβs judgment and remand Hannahβs FMLA interference\\n\\nclaim for further proceedings.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n In March 2011, Appellee hired Hannah for a five-year term as an operations\\n\\nanalyst. In that position, Hannah participated in βlong-term, in-depth studies into issues\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Pursuant to a protective order, Hannah is identified by her first name and last\\ninitial.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\nthat had particular budgetary importance for the [c]ommunity.β J.A. 18. 2 Hannah\\n\\ngenerally received glowing reviews from her supervisors. See, e.g., id. at 412 (describing\\n\\nHannahβs performance prior to 2015 as βoutstandingβ and noting her βenergy/drive,\\n\\ntechnical competence, superb communication and networking skills, and superior\\n\\nanalytic tradecraftβ); id. at 350 (describing Hannah as βa high-performing employeeβ); id.\\n\\nat 391β410 (describing, repeatedly, various elements of Hannahβs performance as\\n\\nβexcellentβ and βoutstandingβ).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n A few months after she was hired, Hannah was diagnosed with depression.\\n\\nHannah immediately informed at least two of her supervisors of her diagnosis, but she\\n\\ndid not request any accommodations at that time. Hannah treated her depression by\\n\\nseeing a counselor and a psychiatrist and by taking prescribed medication.\\n\\n In November 2013, Hannah was assigned to coordinate the responses of the\\n\\nNational Intelligence Director and Principal Deputy Director to Edward Snowdenβs\\n\\nunauthorized disclosures. 3 This role was βhigh stressβ and required βfrequent long hours\\n\\nand weekend work coupled with meeting tight deadlines and dealing with a demanding\\n\\n 2\\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\\nappeal.\\n 3\\n In 2013, National Security Agency subcontractor Edward Snowden leaked βthe\\nbiggest cache of top-secret documents in history,β which revealed numerous global\\nsurveillance programs run by the United States government. Ewen MacAskill & Alex\\nHern, Edward Snowden: βThe People Are Still Powerless, but Now Theyβre Aware,β\\nGuardian (June 4, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/04/edward-\\nsnowden-people-still-powerless-but-aware.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\n[National Security Council] customer.β J.A. 412. In fact, to accommodate the schedule\\n\\nchange that this role required, Appellee moved Hannah to a βmaxi flexβ schedule. Id. at\\n\\n350β51. A βmaxi flexβ schedule requires an analyst to work a certain number of hours --\\n\\n80 hours over a two-week period -- but does not dictate the exact hours that the analyst\\n\\nmust work per day. For Hannah, that meant starting and ending work later than\\n\\ntraditional business hours.\\n\\n The Snowden assignment lasted 18 months and completed in January 2015.\\n\\nHowever, Hannah continued her atypical working hours beyond the completion of the\\n\\nSnowden assignment. Hannahβs supervisor βwas expectingβ that when the Snowden\\n\\nassignment ended, Hannahβs hours βmight become more normal.β J.A. 353. However,\\n\\nfor the first few months, he did not communicate with Hannah about returning to normal\\n\\nbusiness hours. Rather, he explained, he was βprimarily concerned about establishing\\n\\nwhat [Hannahβs] next task was going to be.β Id.\\n\\n By March 2015, Hannahβs co-workers perceived her schedule to be βerratic.β J.A.\\n\\n413. Hannah arrived to work well after normal business hours and racked up numerous\\n\\nunplanned absences. On some occasions Hannah was βextremely late,β sometimes\\n\\narriving after 2 PM. Id. On other occasions Hannah was unreachable for hours, often\\n\\nmissing and failing to return βrepeated phone calls to her cell and home phone.β Id.\\n\\nWhen Hannahβs supervisors were able to reach her, they noted that she seemed βeither\\n\\nlethargic or almost unconcernedβ about her lateness and absences. Id. They also noted\\n\\nthat her demeanor was βsad, very flat, and almost trance like.β Id. Around that time,\\n\\nHannah informed her supervisors that she βhad a recent change in medication.β Id.\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\n C.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Appellee made some accommodations for Hannah following the Snowden\\n\\nassignment. First, after consulting with Hannah in January 2015, Appellee lightened\\n\\nHannahβs workload βto give her a chance to decompressβ from the stress of the Snowden\\n\\nassignment. J.A. 413 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, multiple of Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors had βinformal counseling sessionsβ with her βto discuss any issues that she\\n\\nmight be havingβ and to βurge herβ to notify them if she was going to be late or absent.\\n\\nId.\\n\\n On March 19, 2015, one of Hannahβs supervisors met with Hannah directly to\\n\\naddress her attendance issues. Together, Hannah and her supervisors developed a plan to\\n\\nreconcile Hannahβs depression with Appelleeβs staffing needs. According to that plan,\\n\\nHannah was to arrive to work by 10 AM. If she was going to be absent or later than 10\\n\\nAM, Hannah was to contact one of her supervisors in advance. If Hannah had not arrived\\n\\nat work or contacted a supervisor by 11 AM, a supervisor would call her to determine\\n\\nwhen she would arrive.\\n\\n But, Hannah did not follow the plan. For example, the very next day after she and\\n\\nher supervisors developed the plan, Hannah emailed her supervisors at 11:05 AM to\\n\\ninform them that she would be arriving after 12 PM. Similarly, on March 31, Hannah\\n\\nemailed her supervisors at 11:56 AM to inform them that she would not be coming into\\n\\nwork at all that day. On April 1, after Hannah had not arrived to work or contacted her\\n\\nsupervisors, Hannahβs second-level supervisor called her at 12:30 PM, at which time\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\nHannah reported βbeing unable to just get going.β J.A. 413. Later that day, when\\n\\nHannah finally arrived to work, her supervisor informed her that the plan they created\\n\\nwas not working.\\n\\n At that same time, her supervisor revised the plan to require Hannah to arrive at\\n\\nwork by 10 AM or report to her supervisors in advance if she was going to be late or\\n\\nabsent. This βput the onusβ on Hannah to contact her supervisors, rather than asking her\\n\\nsupervisors to contact her if she had not arrived at work by 11 AM. J.A. 90. Hannah\\n\\nfailed to follow this modified plan as well. In fact, she failed to comply on April 2 and\\n\\nApril 3, the two days following the meeting where the plan was modified.\\n\\n According to Appellee, Hannahβs timeliness and attendance issues impacted her\\n\\nperformance, the performance of her peers, and the performance of her supervisors. Per\\n\\nAppellee, Hannahβs βerraticβ schedule was βnoted by her teammatesβ and affected βunit\\n\\ncohesion.β J.A. 413. Hannahβs failure to report her tardiness and absences as well as her\\n\\nunresponsiveness required her management team to spend βsignificant time and energyβ\\n\\ntracking her down. Id. Additionally, because of Hannahβs absences, Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors were often forced to assign work that might have been assigned to Hannah to\\n\\nother analysts.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n On April 9, 2015, just three weeks after the initial work plan was developed to\\n\\nattempt to accommodate Hannahβs needs, Hannah again met with her supervisors. At\\n\\nthis meeting, Hannahβs supervisors informed her that they were referring her to the\\n\\nEmployee Assistance Program (βEAPβ). EAP is a voluntary counseling service for\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\nemployees and their family members that provides βfree, confidential, short-term mental\\n\\nhealth[,] financial, and addictions counseling and referral to cleared community\\n\\nproviders.β J.A. 132. Hannahβs supervisors made an EAP appointment for her for the\\n\\nfollowing day, Friday, April 10. At that time, Hannah explained to her supervisors that\\n\\nher psychiatrist recommended she take four weeks of medical leave. But, Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors insisted that she would need to meet with EAP before they could approve her\\n\\nrequest for medical leave.\\n\\n On the next business day following Hannahβs EAP session -- Monday, April 13 --\\n\\nHannahβs supervisor told Hannah he was willing to authorize her to take medical leave.\\n\\nHowever, at that point, Hannah informed her supervisor that her leave request was βon\\n\\nhold,β without further explanation. J.A. 170, 178.\\n\\n On April 16, Hannahβs supervisor noted in an email that he had an βextendedβ 40-\\n\\nminute discussion with Hannahβs EAP psychologist. J.A. 604. Hannah alleges that the\\n\\nEAP psychologist βshared with [Hannahβs supervisor] details of what Hannah had\\n\\nrevealed in confidence at the EAP sessions.β Appellantβs Br. 17. Specifically, Hannah\\n\\nalleges that the EAP psychologist told her supervisor that Hannah was concerned about\\n\\nAppelleeβs records retention policies, and that Hannahβs βdifficulties in getting to work\\n\\nwere the result of a lack of motivation, not related to depression.β J.A. 540.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Despite Hannahβs participation in EAP, her attendance problems persisted. For\\n\\nexample, on April 13, 2015, Hannah emailed her supervisors at 10:58 AM to inform them\\n\\nthat she would arrive to work by 11:30 AM. Similarly, on April 14, Hannah emailed her\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\nsupervisors at 11:08 AM to inform them that she would arrive to work by 12 PM. That\\n\\nday, Hannahβs supervisors were not able to confirm her arrival to work until after 1:50\\n\\nPM.\\n\\n A week after advising her supervisors that her leave request was βon hold,β on\\n\\nApril 21, Hannah renewed her request for four weeks of medical leave. Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors approved that request on May 5. They required her to use her annual leave to\\n\\naccount for four-fifths of the four week leave period, and allowed her one day of sick\\n\\nleave per week to make up the rest. Hannah began her leave the day it was approved.\\n\\n On May 4, the day before Hannah began her leave of absence, Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors gave her a letter of expectations. That letter confirmed the revised attendance\\n\\nand reporting plan. This plan required Hannah to arrive to work by 10 AM or report to\\n\\nher supervisors by 9:30 AM if she was going to be late or absent.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n During this time, Hannah applied for three permanent positions within the Office\\n\\nof the Director of National Intelligence. In February 2015, Hannah interviewed for two\\n\\npermanent positions for which she was not selected. Shortly before taking her leave of\\n\\nabsence in May 2015, Hannah applied for a third full-time position, the Program Mission\\n\\nManager Cyber Position (βCyber positionβ). She was interviewed for the Cyber position\\n\\non June 9, eight days after she returned from leave, and the interview panel recommended\\n\\nher for the position. Her application was then forwarded to Appelleeβs Chief\\n\\nManagement Officer, Mark Ewing, who recommended that Hannah not be selected for\\n\\nthe position βat this time,β stating that Hannahβs βrecent performance is not consistent\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\nwith a potentially good employee.β J.A. 232. Hannah was informed that her application\\n\\nhad been rejected in early July 2015, and she did not apply for any other positions.\\n\\nHannah completed her five-year term with Appellee in March 2016.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Hannah exhausted her administrative remedies and filed this lawsuit on August 12,\\n\\n2016. She alleged that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation Act in five ways: (1) failing\\n\\nto accommodate her mental illness; (2) creating a hostile work environment; (3) requiring\\n\\nher to undergo a medical examination; (4) disclosing her confidential medical\\n\\ninformation; and (5) refusing to hire her for the Cyber position. Additionally, Hannah\\n\\nalleged that Appellee violated the FMLA in two ways: (1) by interfering with her ability\\n\\nto take medical leave; and (2) by retaliating against her when she took medical leave.\\n\\nAfter the close of discovery, Appellee moved for summary judgment on all counts. The\\n\\ndistrict court granted that motion on July 27, 2017. Hannah filed this timely notice of\\n\\nappeal challenging the district courtβs decisions on all but the hostile work environment\\n\\nclaim.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review a district courtβs decision to grant summary judgment de novo. See\\n\\nVannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2016). In doing\\n\\nso, this court applies the same standard as the district court. See id. That standard\\n\\nrequires the court to grant summary judgment where βthere is no genuine dispute as to\\n\\nany material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.β Fed. R. Civ.\\n\\nP. 56(a); see also Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 300. We construe the evidence in the light most\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\nfavorable to Hannah, the nonmovant, and we draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.\\n\\nSee Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 300.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Hannah asserts that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to\\n\\naccommodate her depression, wrongfully requiring her to undergo a medical\\n\\nexamination, unlawfully disclosing her confidential medical information, and refusing to\\n\\nhire her for the Cyber position. Additionally, Hannah asserts that Appellee interfered\\n\\nwith and retaliated against her for using leave under the FMLA. We will address each of\\n\\nthese claims in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Rehabilitation Act Claims\\n\\n The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from discriminating against its\\n\\nemployees on the basis of disability. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 794. For the reasons explained\\n\\nbelow, Hannah failed to satisfy her burden on each of her claims under the Rehabilitation\\n\\nAct. Specifically, Hannah failed to: (1) demonstrate that Appellee failed to accommodate\\n\\nher depression; (2) demonstrate that Appelleeβs EAP amounted to a required medical\\n\\nexamination; (3) demonstrate that Appellee disclosed or misused confidential medical\\n\\ninformation; and (4) rebut Appelleeβs legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting\\n\\nher application for a permanent position.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Reasonable Accommodation\\n\\n Turning first to Hannahβs claim that Appellee failed to accommodate her\\n\\ndepression, the district court correctly concluded that Hannah did not establish a prima\\n\\nfacie case because Hannah failed to demonstrate that Appellee refused to make a\\n\\nreasonable accommodation.\\n\\n To establish a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate under the\\n\\nRehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was a qualified person with a\\n\\ndisability; (2) the employer had notice of the disability; (3) the plaintiff could perform the\\n\\nessential functions of the position with a reasonable accommodation; and (4) the\\n\\nemployer nonetheless refused to make the accommodation. See Reyazuddin v.\\n\\nMontgomery Cty., 789 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2015). The district court concluded that\\n\\nHannah could not establish the fourth element -- specifically, the district court\\n\\ndetermined that Appellee provided Hannah with at least two reasonable accommodations.\\n\\nAnd, on appeal, the parties dispute only the fourth element.\\n\\n Here, as detailed above, Appellee provided Hannah with a reasonable\\n\\naccommodation. When Hannah failed to follow that plan, Hannahβs supervisors\\n\\nattempted a new accommodation -- referring Hannah to EAP. Yet, despite Hannahβs\\n\\nparticipation in EAP, her attendance problems persisted.\\n\\n Hannah argues that Appelleeβs accommodations were not reasonable for two\\n\\nreasons. First, she claims that the accommodation was improperly rescinded when her\\n\\nsupervisors concluded that the first plan was not working. Hannah asserts that the\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\nRehabilitation Act requires a collaborative process. Hannah argues that rather than\\n\\ncollaborating with her to identify a workable accommodation, Appellee unilaterally\\n\\ndecided that the first plan was not working, then unilaterally decided that Hannah should\\n\\nparticipate in EAP counseling instead. Although employers have a duty to engage with\\n\\ntheir employees in an βinteractive process to identify a reasonable accommodation,β\\n\\nWilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir. 2013), the employer βhas the\\n\\nultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations.β Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d\\n\\nat 415β16 (citing Hankins v. Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996)). Nonetheless,\\n\\neven under Hannahβs view of the record, Appellee did, in fact, collaborate with Hannah\\n\\nin establishing the first accommodation and only acted unilaterally when that\\n\\naccommodation did not work.\\n\\n Second, Hannah claims that a reasonable accommodation that she requested -- a\\n\\nleave of absence -- was improperly delayed. Hannah posits that she βsuffered immense\\n\\nemotional stress during this one month lapse of [Appelleeβs] compliance with the law.β\\n\\nAppellantβs Br. 37. This argument is without merit and is not supported by the record,\\n\\neven when viewed in the light most favorable to Hannah. Hannah first requested the\\n\\nleave of absence on April 9, 2015. Then, on April 13 -- just two business days later --\\n\\nHannah withdrew her request without explanation, telling her supervisor that her leave\\n\\nrequest was βon hold.β J.A. 170, 178. Hannah then renewed her request for leave on\\n\\nApril 21, and her request was approved on May 5. Thus, there was no βone month\\n\\nlapse,β since Hannahβs request was βon holdβ for nine days of that time.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\n During the remaining gap between Hannahβs request for leave and Appelleeβs\\n\\napproval of that request, Appellee referred Hannah to its counseling service. The\\n\\nRehabilitation Act does not require an employer to provide the exact accommodation that\\n\\nan employee requests. See Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 415 (βAn employer may reasonably\\n\\naccommodate an employee without providing the exact accommodation that the\\n\\nemployee requested.β). Further, the record demonstrates that Hannahβs supervisors were\\n\\nactively considering her request for leave during that time, and they did ultimately\\n\\napprove it less than a month after she first requested leave.\\n\\n For these reasons, granting summary judgment to Appellee on Hannahβs\\n\\nreasonable accommodation claim was proper.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Required Medical Examination\\n\\n Under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer βshall not require a medical\\n\\nexamination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is\\n\\nan individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such\\n\\nexamination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.β\\n\\n42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(A).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\n a.\\n\\n Examination of a Job Applicant\\n\\n As an initial matter, Hannahβs arguments related to pre-employment medical\\n\\nexaminations under the Rehabilitation Act 4 miss the mark because Hannah was a current\\n\\nemployee, not a job applicant. Although Appellee knew Hannah was considering\\n\\napplying for permanent positions with Appellee at the time she was referred to EAP, she\\n\\nhad not yet done so. The evidence is clear that Appellee referred Hannah to EAP in lieu\\n\\nof disciplining her for her attendance issues in her then-current position, rather than as a\\n\\npre-employment medical examination. Moreover, the fact that Hannahβs attendance\\n\\nissues may have been related to her stress and frustration surrounding obtaining\\n\\npermanent employment with Appellee does not transform her EAP referral into a pre-\\n\\nemployment medical examination.\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Examination of a Current Employee\\n\\n Further, Hannah failed to demonstrate, much less create a genuine issue of\\n\\nmaterial fact, that EAP constituted a prohibited medical examination of a current\\n\\nemployee. We note that EAPβs policies make clear that EAP is intended to be used as a\\n\\nvoluntary counseling service, and not as a mandatory medical examination that would\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Subject to certain exceptions, an employer βshall not conduct a medical\\nexamination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an\\nindividual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 12112(d)(2)(A).\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\nviolate the Rehabilitation Act. See J.A. 130 (β[U]tilizing EAP is always voluntary and\\n\\ntherefore the employee has the right to decline to attend treatment, even if management-\\n\\nreferred.β). Additionally, Hannahβs EAP counselor repeatedly stated that she did not\\n\\nconduct a medical examination:\\n\\n I did not conduct a medical examination of [Hannah], and I\\n did not conduct a mental health evaluation or diagnostic\\n assessment because a) [Hannah] informed me she was already\\n in treatment and b) . . . it is not in EAPβs purview to conduct a\\n medical evaluation. I did not administer any medical or\\n mental health tests or diagnostic assessment tools for the\\n same reason. I was [n]ot tasked to diagnose or provide a\\n second opinion; my role was to facilitate communication\\n between [Hannah] and Management to resolve the problem\\n presented in the Management Referral -- namely, improving\\n attendance and notifying management when not attending\\n work.\\n\\nId. at 188 (emphasis omitted).\\n\\n However, even if EAP constituted a mandatory medical examination under the\\n\\nfacts of this case, summary judgment to Appellee was still appropriate on this claim\\n\\nbecause Hannahβs referral to EAP was βjob-related and consistent with business\\n\\nnecessity.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(A). As we have stated, βwhether a mental\\n\\nexamination was βjob-related and consistent with business necessityβ is an objective\\n\\ninquiry.β Pence v. Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., 169 F. Appβx 808, 812 (4th Cir. 2006).\\n\\nβWe therefore do not resolve any dispute about what [Appelleeβs] subjective motivations\\n\\nwere for having [Hannah] examined by the EAP.β Id. An employerβs request for a\\n\\nmedical examination is job-related and consistent with business necessity when: β(1) the\\n\\nemployee requests an accommodation; (2) the employeeβs ability to perform the essential\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\nfunctions of the job is impaired; or (3) the employee poses a direct threat to himself or\\n\\nothers.β Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth., 763 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Here, the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Hannah,\\n\\nsupports granting summary judgment because Appellee had a reasonable belief that\\n\\nHannahβs ability to perform the essential functions of her job was impaired by her\\n\\nrepeated issues with attendance and timely reporting. Hannah attempts to refute this by\\n\\nasserting that her job performance was excellent, but job performance alone does not\\n\\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact. Attendance was also an essential function of\\n\\nHannahβs job, one the record amply demonstrates she was unable to fulfill when Appellee\\n\\nreferred her to EAP. As we have stated:\\n\\n In addition to possessing the skills necessary to perform the\\n job in question, an employee must be willing and able to\\n demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.\\n Except in the unusual case where an employee can effectively\\n perform all work-related duties at home, an employee βwho\\n does not come to work cannot perform any of his job\\n functions, essential or otherwise.β Therefore, a regular and\\n reliable level of attendance is a necessary element of most\\n jobs.\\n\\nTyndall v. Natβl Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting\\n\\nWimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affβd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th\\n\\nCir. 1987)) (emphasis in original); see also Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 266 F.\\n\\nAppβx 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2007) (βJob performance is separate from the ability to show up\\n\\nfor work, an essential function of [Hannahβs] position.β).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\n Accordingly, Appellee did not violate the Rehabilitation Act by referring Hannah\\n\\nto EAP, and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on this\\n\\nclaim.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Confidential Medical Information\\n\\n Under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer may βconduct voluntary medical\\n\\nexaminations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee\\n\\nhealth programβ and may βmake inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job-\\n\\nrelated functions.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(B). Any βinformation obtained regarding\\n\\nthe medical condition or history of the applicantβ -- that is, medical information -- must\\n\\nbe βcollected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and [must\\n\\nbe] treated as a confidential medical record.β Id. Β§ 12112(d)(3)(B); see also id.\\n\\nΒ§ 12112(d)(4)(C).\\n\\n Hannah alleges two separate Rehabilitation Act violations regarding her medical\\n\\ninformation: first, that Hannahβs supervisors wrongfully sought and disclosed\\n\\nconfidential medical information elicited from Hannah, and second, that the EAP\\n\\npsychologist wrongfully disclosed confidential medical information gathered from the\\n\\nEAP session to Hannahβs supervisors. In both instances, the district court correctly\\n\\ndetermined that Hannah failed to demonstrate that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation\\n\\nAct.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\n a.\\n\\n Disclosures by Supervisors\\n\\n Hannah asserts that her supervisors disclosed her confidential medical information\\n\\nby writing in her EAP referral memo, β[e]arly in her tenure . . . and reaffirmed recently,\\n\\n[Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a psychiatrist and counselor and taking\\n\\nmedication for depression.β J.A. 413. Notably, Hannah voluntarily disclosed her\\n\\ndepression diagnosis to her supervisors. The Rehabilitation Act does not protect\\n\\ninformation shared voluntarily. See Reynolds v. Am. Natβl Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2012) (finding the district court properly granted summary judgment on a\\n\\nconfidentiality claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act because the record βclearly\\n\\nshow[ed]β that the appellant βdisclosed his medical condition voluntarilyβ). Indeed,\\n\\nHannah voluntarily told at least four of her supervisors that she had been diagnosed with\\n\\ndepression. See J.A. 179 (Hannahβs interrogatory responses) (βI disclosed my diagnosis\\n\\nof depression to my supervisors Kelly G. in summer 2011, Ann W. in fall 2014; Art Z. in\\n\\nMarch 2015, and Roy P. in March 2015.β).\\n\\n Hannah argues that these disclosures were not voluntary because they were made\\n\\nin response to inquiries about her disability. But the evidence does not support or create\\n\\na genuine issue of fact about that argument. The record indicates that only the March\\n\\n2015 disclosure was made in response to an inquiry, and that inquiry was not medical -- it\\n\\nwas about her attendance. See J.A. 23 (Hannahβs deposition testimony) (β[H]e was\\n\\nconcerned about unpredictability in my schedule. . . . I told him at that time I had\\n\\ndepression.β).\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\n Hannah asserts that this inquiry about her attendance was de facto an inquiry into\\n\\nher depression because (according to Hannah) the inquiring supervisor knew she was\\n\\ndepressed and knew her attendance issues were linked to her depression. Hannah cites\\n\\nonly out-of-circuit cases for the proposition that asking a question βlikely to elicitβ\\n\\ninformation about a disability amounts to a medical inquiry. See Harrison v. Benchmark\\n\\nElecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that whether an\\n\\ninquiry following a failed drug test was likely to elicit information about a disability in\\n\\nviolation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (βADAβ) 5 presented a question of fact\\n\\nfor a jury to resolve); Fleming v. State Univ. of N.Y., 502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 338 (E.D.N.Y.\\n\\n2007) (concluding the plaintiff pled facts sufficient to state a claim for failure to\\n\\nconfidentially maintain medical information under the ADA where the plaintiff alleged\\n\\nthat his disclosure of his sickle cell anemia was not voluntary because his supervisor\\n\\ncalled him while he was in the hospital and asked him why he was there).\\n\\n First, the record does not support Hannahβs argument that the supervisor in\\n\\nquestion knew about Hannahβs depression before she disclosed it to him. Hannah points\\n\\nto the supervisorβs statement that when he spoke to Hannah on the phone before\\n\\nconfronting her about her attendance, βshe didnβt sound well on the other end of the\\n\\nphone.β J.A. 466. Hannah also points to her supervisorβs statement that Hannahβs\\n\\nβdemeanor [wa]s sad, very flat, and almost trance like.β Id. at 413. This is not enough to\\n\\n 5\\n βTo the extent possible, we construe the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to impose\\nsimilar requirements.β Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461\\n(4th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inquiring supervisor knew\\n\\nHannah had been medically diagnosed with clinical depression, or whether by asking\\n\\nabout her attendance, the supervisor was fishing for medical information about Hannahβs\\n\\nillness.\\n\\n Second, even if Hannahβs supervisor had an inkling that Hannah may have had\\n\\ndepression, this is not evidence that he knew asking about her repeated absences and\\n\\ntardiness -- indisputably bad work behavior -- would elicit medical information related to\\n\\nher depression. Indeed, Hannahβs absences could have been the result of a world of\\n\\nother, nonmedical possibilities, such as transportation issues or oversleeping. Adopting\\n\\nHannahβs argument would require us to find that where an employer might know that a\\n\\nparticular bad work behavior is connected to a medical condition, the employer cannot\\n\\ninquire into the behavior without running afoul of the ADA and Rehabilitation Actβs\\n\\nprohibition on medical inquiries. We have held expressly the opposite: β[T]he ADA does\\n\\nnot require an employer to simply ignore an employeeβs blatant and persistent\\n\\nmisconduct, even where that behavior is potentially tied to a medical condition.β Vannoy\\n\\nv. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Jones v. Am.\\n\\nPostal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding the ADA does not\\n\\nβrequire an employer to ignore such egregious misconduct by one of its employees, even\\n\\nif the misconduct was caused by the employeeβs disabilityβ)).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 21\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Disclosures by EAP Psychologist\\n\\n Hannah also argues that, in addition to her supervisors disclosing her depression\\n\\ndiagnosis internally, the EAP psychologist disclosed βadditional, unique information\\n\\nfrom what Hannah had already told her supervisors.β Appellantβs Br. 51. Specifically,\\n\\nHannah alleges that the EAP psychologist told her supervisor that Hannah was concerned\\n\\nabout Appelleeβs records retention policies, and that Hannahβs βdifficulties in getting to\\n\\nwork were the result of a lack of motivation, not related to depression.β J.A. 540.\\n\\n Perhaps that is true. The record does indicate that the EAP psychologist shared\\n\\nsome information with Hannahβs supervisors and maybe it was unique information. See\\n\\nJ.A. 192 (EAP psychologist statement) (noting that the psychologist provided Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors updates regarding Hannahβs βEAP attendanceβ and βcooperation and\\n\\nprogress toward resolving the referral issuesβ). But there is no evidence that the EAP\\n\\npsychologist shared medical information. To the contrary, the EAP psychologist insisted,\\n\\nagain and again, that she did not share any confidential medical information. See id. at\\n\\n190 (noting that the psychologist, who is not a doctor, βdid not disclose any confidential\\n\\nmedical informationβ to anyone). Of note, Hannah did not point to any evidence in the\\n\\nrecord contradicting the psychologistβs assertions.\\n\\n Therefore, the information shared by the EAP psychologist did not trigger the\\n\\nRehabilitation Actβs confidentiality protections because the record indicates that the EAP\\n\\npsychologist shared only nonmedical information.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22\\n\\n c.\\n\\n Non-Reliance on Medical Information\\n\\n Finally, even if either Hannahβs supervisors or the EAP psychologist disclosed\\n\\nHannahβs medical information, Appellee still did not violate the Rehabilitation Act\\n\\nbecause Appellee did not rely on Hannahβs depression diagnosis or any other medical\\n\\ninformation in deciding not to hire Hannah for the Cyber position. Rather, the record\\n\\noverwhelmingly indicates that Appelleeβs decision was based on Hannahβs attendance\\n\\nissues. Accordingly, Hannah has not demonstrated that Appellee violated the\\n\\nRehabilitation Act by disclosing or misusing confidential medical information.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n Discrimination\\n\\n Rehabilitation Act claims for discrimination are reviewed under the McDonnell\\n\\nDouglas burden-shifting framework. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 430 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)); Perry v.\\n\\nComput. Scis. Corp., 429 F. Appβx 218, 219β20 (4th Cir. 2011). Under that framework,\\n\\nHannah has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See\\n\\nPerry, 429 F. Appβx at 220. To establish this prima facie case, Hannah must show that:\\n\\n(1) she is disabled; (2) she was otherwise qualified for the position; and (3) she suffered\\n\\nan adverse employment action solely on the basis of her disability. See id. (citing\\n\\nConstantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2005)).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\n If Hannah establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Appellee to provide a\\n\\nlegitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. See Perry, 429 F. Appβx at 220. If\\n\\nAppellee provides such a reason, Hannah βbears the ultimate burden of persuasionβ and\\n\\nβmust show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was a pretext\\n\\nfor discrimination.β Id.\\n\\n a.\\n\\n Establishing Pretext\\n\\n Even assuming that Hannah established a prima facie case of discrimination\\n\\n(which Appellee disputes), she cannot succeed on her claim that Appellee discriminated\\n\\nagainst her by not hiring her for a permanent position because she did not sufficiently\\n\\nrebut Appelleeβs proffered reason for rejecting her application, as required under the final\\n\\nstep of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Perry, 429 F. Appβx at\\n\\n220.\\n\\n Appellee presented evidence demonstrating that Hannahβs perpetual issues with\\n\\nattendance, timeliness, and reporting absences to her superiors were the bases of its\\n\\ndecision not to hire her for the permanent position. Attempting to expose that\\n\\nexplanation as a ruse, Hannah pointed to a purported inconsistency between the sworn\\n\\nstatement that Mark Ewing provided during the Equal Employment Opportunity\\n\\nCommission (βEEOCβ) investigation of Hannahβs case and an email he sent more than a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24\\n\\nyear earlier. In the sworn statement, signed on April 26, 2016, 6 Ewing asserts he βhad no\\n\\nknowledge of [Hannahβs] disability.β J.A. 650. But in the email, sent on June 30, 2015,\\n\\nEwing references two memos that he received from Hannahβs supervisors, both of which\\n\\nnote Hannahβs depression. See id. at 413 (April 9, 2015 memo) (βEarly in her tenure . . .\\n\\nand reaffirmed recently, [Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a psychiatrist\\n\\nand counselor and taking medication for depression.β); id. at 606 (April 23, 2015 memo)\\n\\n(βWhile . . . medical considerations (i.e., depression and/or ADD) do make this situation\\n\\nworse, these factors are under her control based upon treatment plans with her\\n\\npsychologist and psychiatric care providers.β). Underscoring the significance of this\\n\\ninconsistency, Hannah argues, is the fact that Ewing did not provide the June 30, 2015\\n\\nemail to the EEOC. Hannah argues that the inconsistency, coupled with Ewingβs failure\\n\\nto disclose the email evidencing the inconsistency, illustrates βclear pretext.β Appellantβs\\n\\nBr. 27.\\n\\n Despite Hannahβs arguments to the contrary, this apparent discrepancy does not\\n\\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact that Appelleeβs proffered reason for rejecting\\n\\nHannahβs application is pretextual. First, nothing in the record indicates that Ewing had\\n\\nfirst-hand knowledge of Hannahβs disability. Although the memos mention that Hannah\\n\\nself-reported that she had depression, the second memo also describes Hannahβs\\n\\ndepression as βunder her control.β J.A. 606. Indeed, Ewingβs email suggests that he did\\n\\n\\n 6\\n The excerpt of the statement that is included in the J.A. does not include the date.\\nThis date comes from Hannahβs brief. See Appellantβs Br. 26.\\n\\n\\n\\n 25\\n\\nnot know that Hannah had an ongoing disability. See J.A. 635 (βI am informed that EAP\\n\\nconcluded that [Hannah] does not have a medical problem, rather she is a disciplinary\\n\\nproblem.β).\\n\\n More significantly, Hannahβs asserted contradiction between Ewingβs EEOC\\n\\nstatements and his June 30, 2015 email do not create a genuine issue of material fact\\n\\nabout pretext because Ewingβs email and the memos written by Hannahβs supervisors\\n\\nfocus on Hannahβs attendance problems, not on her disability. See J.A. 413 (April 9,\\n\\n2015 memo) (noting that β[Hannahβs] schedule has become increasingly erraticβ and that\\n\\nβfrequent absences and late arrivals [have begun] to affect her assigned unit and\\n\\nindividual performanceβ); id. at 606 (April 23, 2015 memo) (describing Hannahβs history\\n\\nof attendance issues and Appelleeβs attempts to accommodate Hannah and noting that,\\n\\ndespite those attempts, β[Hannahβs] late attendance has continuedβ); id. at 635β36\\n\\n(Ewingβs June 30, 2015 email) (detailing Hannahβs problem with βattendance at work,β\\n\\nnoting that Hannahβs βabsences and late arrivals were affecting her assigned staff element\\n\\nand her individual performance,β and concluding that Hannahβs βrecent performance is\\n\\nnot consistent with a potentially good employee.β).\\n\\n Accordingly, Hannah did not point to any genuine issue of material fact that\\n\\nAppelleeβs purported basis for not hiring her was merely a pretext for discriminating\\n\\nagainst her on the basis of her depression.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Appelleeβs Nondiscriminatory Explanation\\n\\n i.\\n\\n Moreover, the record indicates that Appelleeβs proffered explanation for not hiring\\n\\nHannah for the Cyber position is genuine, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory.\\n\\n As the district court concluded, a continuous attendance issue is a legitimate\\n\\nreason for withholding an employment benefit. See Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213 (finding an\\n\\nemployee who cannot satisfy their employerβs attendance policy cannot be considered\\n\\nβqualifiedβ for the purposes of the ADA). Hannah might have been exceptionally\\n\\ntalented and substantively good at her job, but as noted above, β[i]n addition to\\n\\npossessing the skills necessary to perform the job in question, an employee must be\\n\\nwilling and able to demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.β Id.\\n\\n Hannah asserts that βserious questions of fact exist as to whether Hannah even had\\n\\nβsignificant attendance and reporting problems.ββ Appellantβs Br. 28. But the record\\n\\nevidences no less than 13 attendance issues that occurred in the 46 days between\\n\\nAppelleeβs first attempt to accommodate Hannah on March 19, 2015, and the revised\\n\\nplan made on May 4, 2015. Compare J.A. 114, 174 (noting Appelleeβs March 19, 2015\\n\\nmeeting with her supervisor and original accommodation asking her to arrive at work by\\n\\n10 AM or report to a supervisor), with id. at 556 (indicating four unexcused absences and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 27\\n\\nnine late arrivals between March 19 and April 29 that Appellee failed to timely report). 7\\n\\nIn light of Hannahβs failure to arrive or call in before 10 AM 13 times in 46 days, there is\\n\\nno genuine issue of material fact about Hannahβs significant attendance and reporting\\n\\nproblem.\\n\\n ii.\\n\\n Hannah also argues that because her disability was the cause of her attendance\\n\\nissues, Appellee could not withhold an employment benefit from her on that basis. We\\n\\nhave no doubt that Hannahβs struggle with depression was the cause of her attendance\\n\\nissues, and we are sympathetic to the toll this condition took on a highly talented\\n\\n\\n 7\\n The record reflects the following late arrivals and absences for Hannah between\\nMarch 19, 2015, and May 4, 2015: (1) April 2: Hannah emailed at 11:02 AM indicating\\nshe would arrive to work by 12 PM; (2) April 8: Hannah emailed at 11:05 AM indicating\\nshe would arrive to work by 12 PM; Hannah emailed again at 1:55 PM indicating she\\nwould not be coming in that day; (3) April 9: Hannah emailed at 11:11 AM indicating her\\ncar was towed and she would arrive at work by 1 PM; (4) April 13: Hannah emailed at\\n10:58 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 11:30 AM; (5) April 14: Hannah\\nemailed at 11:08 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 12 PM; (6) April 16:\\nHannahβs supervisor emailed Hannah at 10:18 AM looking for her; when Hannah was\\nreached at 11 AM, she indicated she would arrive to work by 12 PM; (7) April 20:\\nHannah emailed at 10:45 AM indicating she would arrive to work by 11:30 AM;\\nHannahβs supervisor confirmed her arrival at 12:50 PM; (8) April 22: Hannah emailed at\\n11:01 AM indicating she would arrive at work after 12 PM; Hannah emailed again at\\n12:41 PM indicating she would arrive at 1 PM due to traffic; (9) April 23: Hannah\\nemailed at 10:59 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 12 PM; Hannah emailed\\nagain at 12:56 PM indicating she would not be coming in that day due to a migraine; (10)\\nApril 24: Hannah emailed at 11:02 AM indicating she would arrive at work in the\\nafternoon; Hannah later called at 3:24 PM indicating she would not be coming in that\\nday; (11) April 27: Hannahβs supervisor emailed indicating Hannah arrived at work by 11\\nAM; (12) April 28: Hannah emailed at 10:52 AM indicating she would arrive at work by\\n11:30 AM; (13) April 29: Hannah emailed at 11:49 AM indicating she would not come in\\nto work that day. See J.A. 556.\\n\\n\\n\\n 28\\n\\nemployee. However, Appellee was nevertheless permitted to take Hannahβs attendance\\n\\nissues into account in its decision whether to hire her for the Cyber position. To reiterate,\\n\\nthe Rehabilitation Act βdoes not require an employer to simply ignore an employeeβs\\n\\nblatant and persistent misconduct, even where that behavior is potentially tied to a\\n\\nmedical condition.β Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 305; cf. Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104\\n\\nF.3d 683, 686 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (βMisconduct -- even misconduct related to a disability\\n\\n-- is not itself a disability, and an employer is free to fire an employee on that basis.β).\\n\\n iii.\\n\\n Finally, Hannah argues that by the time Appellee made the decision not to hire\\n\\nher, her attendance had improved. She asserts that between returning from her leave of\\n\\nabsence on June 1, 2015, and learning that she was not selected for the permanent\\n\\nposition on June 17, 2015, she βhad shown she was able to perform the essential\\n\\nfunctions of the job and had no current attendance issues.β Appellantβs Br. 32.\\n\\n Hannah is correct that in a failure to hire case, the relevant inquiry is the\\n\\ncandidateβs performance βat the time of the employment decision or in the immediate\\n\\nfuture.β Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 F. Appβx 49, 57 (4th Cir. 2002). However, Appellee\\n\\nwas not required to consider the two weeks before the decision was made in a vacuum.\\n\\nMoreover, it is not the job of this court to decide whether Appellee made the right choice\\n\\nby not hiring Hannah for the Cyber position. Rather, our job is simply to decide whether\\n\\nAppellee made an illegal choice. See Feldman v. Law Enfβt Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339,\\n\\n350 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that we do not βsit as a kind of super-personnel\\n\\ndepartment weighing the prudence of employment decisionsβ).\\n\\n\\n 29\\n\\n Because Hannah not did demonstrate that Appelleeβs purported basis for not hiring\\n\\nher was merely a pretext for discriminating against her on the basis of her depression, and\\n\\nbecause Hannahβs attendance problem was a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason to\\n\\nnot hire her, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate on her Rehabilitation\\n\\nAct discrimination claim.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n FMLA Claims\\n\\n The FMLA gives employees with qualifying medical conditions the right to take\\n\\nup to 12 weeks of leave during a 12-month period β[b]ecause of a serious health\\n\\ncondition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions ofβ her job. 29\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 2612(a)(1)(D). βThe employee has an accompanying right to return to the same\\n\\nor an equivalent position at the conclusion of the leave period.β Reed v. Buckeye Fire\\n\\nEquip., 241 F. Appβx 917, 923 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2614(a)(1)).\\n\\n As discussed below, as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim, Hannah illustrates\\n\\na genuine issue of material fact regarding the notice of her depression and her desire to\\n\\ntake a leave of absence. But, for the same reasons Hannahβs Rehabilitation Act\\n\\ndiscrimination claim fails, Hannahβs FMLA retaliation claim fails as well.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Interference\\n\\n a.\\n\\n The district court incorrectly concluded that Hannahβs disclosure of her depression\\n\\nwas not sufficient to put Appellee on notice that Hannah could have qualified for FMLA\\n\\n\\n 30\\n\\nprotections. Accordingly, summary judgment was not warranted as to Hannahβs FMLA\\n\\ninterference claim.\\n\\n βAn employee is mandated to provide notice to her employer when she requires\\n\\nFMLA leave.β Brushwood v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 520 F. Appβx 154, 157 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2013) (quoting Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 382 (4th Cir. 2001)). That said, an\\n\\nemployee need not specifically invoke the FMLA to benefit from its protections. See\\n\\nDotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 295 (4th Cir. 2009). Proper notice does not require\\n\\nβany magic words.β Id. Indeed, β[w]hen an employee seeks leave for the first time for\\n\\na[n] FMLA-qualifying reason, the employee need not expressly assert rights under the\\n\\nFMLA or even mention the FMLA.β 29 C.F.R. Β§ 825.302. Proper notice merely βmakes\\n\\nthe employer awareβ that the employee needs potentially FMLA-qualifying leave.\\n\\nBrushwood, 520 F. Appβx at 157. And once the employer is on notice of the employeeβs\\n\\nneed to take potentially FMLA-qualifying leave, βthe responsibility falls on the employer\\n\\nto inquire further about whether the employee is seeking FMLA leave.β Dotson, 558\\n\\nF.3d at 295.\\n\\n A reasonable jury could find that Hannahβs disclosure of her depression and her\\n\\nApril 9, 2015 request for psychiatrist-recommended leave was sufficient to trigger\\n\\nAppelleeβs responsibility to inquire further about whether Hannah was seeking FMLA\\n\\nleave. We have held that disclosure of a potentially FMLA-qualifying circumstance and\\n\\nan inquiry into leave options is sufficient to create a material question of fact regarding\\n\\nwhether an employee triggered her employerβs FMLA obligations. See Dotson, 558 F.3d\\n\\nat 291, 295 (finding that an employee informing his employer that he was adopting a\\n\\n\\n 31\\n\\nchild and speaking to a human resources representative about βtaking leave during the\\n\\nadoption processβ was sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether the employerβs\\n\\nFMLA-inquiry duties had been triggered).\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Here, Hannah informed her supervisors of her depression on multiple occasions.\\n\\nSee, e.g., J.A. 413 (April 9, 2015 memo from Hannahβs supervisors) (βEarly in her tenure\\n\\n. . . and reaffirmed recently, [Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a\\n\\npsychiatrist and counselor and taking medication for depression.β). 8 And on April 9,\\n\\n2015, Hannah explained to her supervisors that her psychiatrist recommended that she\\n\\ntake four weeks of medical leave. Hannahβs disclosures about her depression and her\\n\\npsychiatristβs recommendation could lead a reasonable jury to find that Appellee was on\\n\\nnotice that Hannah was inquiring about potentially FMLA-qualifying leave, triggering\\n\\nAppelleeβs responsibility to inquire further about whether Hannah was seeking FMLA\\n\\nleave. 9\\n\\n c.\\n\\n Appellee argues that Hannahβs interference claim fails because Hannah cannot\\n\\ndemonstrate that her depression was βa serious health condition.β Appelleeβs Resp. 40β\\n\\n41; see also 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2612(a)(1)(D). But that argument is premature. Appellee has\\n\\n 8\\n Indeed, Hannahβs supervisors had βgrown increasingly alarmed at the overall\\nchange in [Hannahβs] demeanor.β J.A. 413.\\n 9\\n It is undisputed that Appellee did not inquire about whether the leave should be\\nclassified as FMLA-protected.\\n\\n\\n\\n 32\\n\\nnot shown that it made any inquiry into whether Hannahβs depression was an FMLA-\\n\\nqualifying serious health condition. Appelleeβs argument βwould allow it to use its own\\n\\nfailure to determine whether leave should be designated as FMLA-protected to block\\n\\nliability.β Dotson, 558 F.3d at 295. We have refused βto allow an employer to take\\n\\nadvantage of its own lapse in such a way.β Id.\\n\\n d.\\n\\n Additionally, Appelleeβs failure to provide notice of the availability of FMLA\\n\\nleave prejudiced Hannah because if she had been aware of the availability of FMLA\\n\\nleave, she could have structured her leave differently. The FMLA βprovides no relief\\n\\nunless the employee has been prejudiced by the violation.β Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 302\\n\\n(citing Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)). βPrejudice may\\n\\nbe gleaned from evidence that had the plaintiff received the required (but omitted)\\n\\ninformation regarding his FMLA rights, he would have structured his leave differently.β\\n\\nId.\\n\\n Here, the record contains evidence that if Hannah had known that the FMLA\\n\\nprotected her position, she would have used only sick leave for her leave of absence. See\\n\\nJ.A. 664 (Hannahβs declaration) (βHad I known I could have chosen to take sick leave for\\n\\nthe entire period, I would have elected to do so.β). Instead, she used a combination of\\n\\nsick leave and annual time to take four weeks off. According to Hannah, β[u]nlike\\n\\nannual leave, sick leave is not paid out at the end of an employeeβs service, resulting in a\\n\\nloss of a benefit worth at least $20,000.β Id. Based on Hannahβs testimony, a jury could\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 33\\n\\nfind that Hannah was prejudiced by Appelleeβs failure to inquire into the availability of\\n\\nFMLA leave and thus interfered with her FMLA rights.\\n\\n For these reasons, Hannah has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that\\n\\nshould have precluded summary judgment on her FMLA interference claim.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Retaliation\\n\\n As for Hannahβs FMLA retaliation claim, however, the district court correctly\\n\\nconcluded that like her discrimination claim brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act,\\n\\nHannah did not sufficiently rebut Appelleeβs legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for not\\n\\nhiring Hannah for the Cyber position.\\n\\n The FMLA prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee for\\n\\nexercising her FMLA rights. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2615(a)(2). As relevant here, βemployers\\n\\ncannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions.β 29\\n\\nC.F.R. Β§ 825.220(c). Courts analyze FMLA retaliation claims, like discrimination claims\\n\\nbrought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting\\n\\nframework. See Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013). To\\n\\nestablish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that β(1)\\n\\nshe engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action\\n\\nagainst her; and (3) there was a causal link between the two events.β Adams v. Anne\\n\\nArundel Cty. Pub. Schs., 789 F.3d 422, 429 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant\\n\\nto provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for taking the employment action at issue.\\n\\n\\n 34\\n\\nId. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the\\n\\ndefendantβs proffered reason is pretextual. Id.\\n\\n Even assuming Hannah demonstrated a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation,\\n\\nsummary judgment was proper because she failed to rebut Appelleeβs legitimate,\\n\\nnonretaliatory reason for not hiring her for the Cyber position. Appellee asserts that it\\n\\nrelied on Hannahβs attendance issues in deciding not to hire her for the position, and the\\n\\nevidence in the record supports that assertion. See J.A. 635β36 (Ewingβs June 30, 2015\\n\\nemail expressing concerns about Hannahβs application for the Cyber position) (noting,\\n\\nβdespite some apparently solid performance while on the Snowden project,β Appellee\\n\\nhad βa consistent history of issues with [Hannah] over many monthsβ regarding Hannahβs\\n\\nβattendance at work and attitudeβ); id. at 219 (Ewingβs deposition testimony) (βThe\\n\\nprimary reason that I was concerned [about Hannahβs application] was the fact that her\\n\\nconduct was extremely negative at the point of time we were making a hiring decision for\\n\\npermanent employment status.β). Hannah points to no evidence that adequately\\n\\nundermines Appelleeβs proffered nonretaliatory reason for not hiring her. 10\\n\\n Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Hannahβs\\n\\nFMLA retaliation claim.\\n\\n\\n 10\\n Hannah again argues, as she did in the context of her claim of discrimination\\nunder the Rehabilitation Act, that the βinconsistencyβ between the sworn statement\\nEwing provided during the EEOC investigation of Hannahβs case and an email he sent\\nmore than a year earlier exposes Appelleeβs proffered reason for not hiring her for the\\npermanent position as pretextual. For the same reasons explained above, that argument\\nfails.\\n\\n\\n\\n 35\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court as to Hannahβs\\n\\nRehabilitation Act claims and FMLA retaliation claim. We vacate the grant of summary\\n\\njudgment as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim because there is a genuine issue of\\n\\nfact as to whether Hannahβs disclosure of her depression was sufficient to put Appellee\\n\\non notice that Hannah could have qualified for FMLA protections. Accordingly, we\\n\\nremand for further proceedings as to that claim.\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 36\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4369045/\", \"author_raw\": \"THACKER, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:\\n\\n Hannah P. was undisputedly an excellent intelligence officer. The Office of the\\n\\nDirector of National Intelligence (βODNIβ) entrusted her with the high-stress, high-\\n\\nprofile Edward Snowden case. She worked tirelessly and impeccably on that assignment,\\n\\nand ODNI praised her performance. For the duration of that assignment, Hannah kept\\n\\nnonconventional work hours with the knowledge and consent of her supervisors, and her\\n\\nattendance was not considered a problem.\\n\\n It was only after the Snowden project ended, and Hannahβs depression worsened,\\n\\nthat her supervisors found fault with her work hours, though she remained formally on a\\n\\nflexible schedule. When Hannah requested an accommodation for her depressionβa\\n\\nleave of absence recommended by both of her medical professionalsβHannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors refused to timely grant the request. This was despite the fact that her\\n\\nsupervisors had offered to grant her leave just a few months earlierβbefore her\\n\\ndepression was triggered.\\n\\n The result of this was tragic. Hannah was denied a permanent position for which\\n\\nit is undisputed that she was exceptionally qualified and for which the interview panel\\n\\nunanimously selected her. ODNI concedes that Hannahβs depression qualifies as a\\n\\ndisability protected by the Rehabilitation Act. Yet, the employer denied Hannah, a\\n\\ndedicated and valuable employee, the protection that the law requires.\\n\\n The majority mistakenly fails to see the force of Hannahβs claims. Though the\\n\\nmajority cites repeatedly to our decision in Vannoy v. Federal Reserve Bank of\\n\\nRichmond, it fails to grapple with the stark distinctions between the βblatant and\\n\\n 37\\n\\npersistent misconductβ by the employee in that case and Hannahβs cooperative attempts\\n\\nto satisfy her supervisorsβ expectations, despite the increasingly severe symptoms of her\\n\\ndisability. 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n While I concur in Parts III.A.2.a, III.A.3, and III.B.1 of the Courtβs opinion, I\\n\\ncannot agree that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Hannahβs claims\\n\\nthat ODNI violated the Rehabilitation Act and Family and Medical Leave Act (βFMLAβ)\\n\\nwhen it discriminated against her on the basis of her disability, failed to reasonably\\n\\naccommodate her depression, wrongfully required a medical examination of her as a\\n\\ncurrent employee, and chose not to hire her for permanent employment in retaliation for\\n\\nher FMLA-qualifying leave. I believe that several disputes of fact exist and that Hannah\\n\\nis entitled to her day in court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent with respect to those\\n\\nclaims.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Hannahβs supervisors were informed early in her employment that she suffered\\n\\nfrom depression. She was under the treatment of a psychiatrist and a licensed clinical\\n\\nsocial worker and did not initially request any work accommodations because she βwas\\n\\nadequately handling [her] depression at the time with medication and counseling.β J.A.\\n\\n19β20.\\n\\n Despite her depression, Hannah excelled at her job. In her position as the\\n\\ndisclosures coordinator for the Edward Snowden project, her βleadership, poise, and\\n\\nperformance were impeccable.β J.A. 412. She was described by her supervisors as βan\\n\\n 38\\n\\noutstanding employee combining energy/drive, technical competence, superb\\n\\ncommunication and networking skills, and superior analytic tradecraft.β Id. In short,\\n\\nHannah was considered βan invaluable intelligence officer and a future [Intelligence\\n\\nCommunity] leader.β Id.\\n\\n The high-profile Snowden project required long work hours, and Hannah was not\\n\\nrequired to maintain an established βcoreβ hours schedule. Instead, she worked a βmaxi\\n\\nflexβ schedule, which permitted her to vary her schedule so long as she put in 80 hours of\\n\\nwork in each two-week period. J.A. 492β93. She often came in later than other ODNI\\n\\nemployees (around noon), but stayed later as well. J.A. 494.\\n\\n In November or December 2014, as the Snowden project was coming to a close,\\n\\nHannahβs supervisors encouraged her to take leave, a common practice for ODNI\\n\\nemployees βafter finishing a burn-out job.β J.A. 173. Hannah did not take her\\n\\nsupervisors up on the offer, however, not only because she was interviewing for\\n\\npermanent employment, but also because βthere was still ambiguity over whether the\\n\\n[Snowden] disclosures responsibilities had truly finished.β Id.\\n\\n During this time, Hannahβs depression became more serious. She had trouble\\n\\narriving at work before noon and had unscheduled absences. Hannah remained on a maxi\\n\\nflex schedule, however, and it was not until March 19, 2015, that she was informed that\\n\\nher attendance and arrival time were problematic. J.A. 461, 495. In fact, her first-line\\n\\nsupervisor had no concerns about her attendance or work hours in early 2015 and asked\\n\\nHannah to fill in as acting chief of their division while he was out of the office in late\\n\\nFebruary. J.A. 494β95, 498.\\n\\n 39\\n\\n When Hannahβs supervisor spoke with her about her work hours on March 19,\\n\\n2015, Hannah was not told that she was required to return to a βcoreβ schedule. Rather,\\n\\nHannah and her first-line supervisor agreed that Hannah would either arrive at work by\\n\\n10:00 a.m. or contact her supervisors if she was unable to arrive by that time; if she\\n\\nneither arrived at work nor contacted the office by 11:00 a.m., her supervisor would reach\\n\\nout to her by phone. J.A. 114. Hannahβs second-line supervisor had no objection to the\\n\\narrangement; he βwanted to see what would happen.β J.A. 345.\\n\\n The day after making this arrangement, Hannah did not report for work by 10:00\\n\\na.m. When she did not arrive by 11:00 a.m., her supervisors did not call her. Instead, she\\n\\nemailed them at 11:05 a.m., advising she would be in around 12:30 p.m. J.A. 118.\\n\\n After that work day, Hannah began a pre-scheduled week-long leave during which\\n\\nshe was preoccupied with home renovations. J.A. 114. At the end of the week, she\\n\\nemailed her supervisors to inform them she would not be in Monday, the next business\\n\\nday, because of the renovations. J.A. 120. On Tuesday, Hannah emailed her supervisors\\n\\nnotifying them that she would not be in that day either. J.A. 122.\\n\\n On Wednesday, when Hannah did not come in by 10:00 a.m., Hannahβs second-\\n\\nline supervisor called her. J.A. 174. According to Hannah, her supervisor was βangryβ\\n\\nand demanded to know why Hannah had not arrived. Id. Hannah apologized, explained\\n\\nshe was having trouble getting out of bed, and indicated that she would be in as soon as\\n\\npossible. Id. When she arrived at work, her supervisor told her that the arrangement they\\n\\nhad made βwas not working.β J.A. 175. She was told that she was solely responsible for\\n\\ncontacting the office in the event she would be late or absent, and that her supervisors\\n\\n 40\\n\\nwould not be contacting her. J.A. 90. The arrangement had been in place for a total of\\n\\nfour days on which Hannah was scheduled to work.\\n\\n Hannah asked that her supervisors βgive the current accommodation more time to\\n\\nwork.β J.A. 175. Her supervisor, who was aware of Hannahβs depression, insisted that\\n\\nHannah propose an alternative plan βright then.β Id. She was ultimately given βa day or\\n\\ntwoβ to propose an alternative. Id.\\n\\n The next day, on April 2, 2015, Hannah emailed her supervisors at 11:02 a.m.,\\n\\nnotifying them that she would be in by noon. J.A. 124. That day, Hannahβs supervisors\\n\\nmet with ODNIβs Employee Management Relations Officer, the head of ODNIβs Equal\\n\\nEmployment Opportunity and Diversity Office, and the head of ODNIβs Human\\n\\nResources Division to discuss how to best address Hannahβs attendance and reporting.\\n\\nJ.A. 66, 128, 149. They collectively decided to refer Hannah to the Central Intelligence\\n\\nAgencyβs Employee Assistance Program (βEAPβ). 1 J.A. 326β29. Although Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors were well aware of her depression, she was referred to the EAP to βhelp\\n\\nidentify what her challenges were and provide her any support she needed,β such as\\n\\nβaccommodation with work hours, . . . counseling or any other type of support.β J.A.\\n\\n139β40.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Hannah was referred to the CIAβs EAP program because ODNI did not have one\\nof its own. The EAP provides employees with βfree, confidential, short-term mental\\nhealth[,] financial, and addictions counseling and referral to cleared community\\nproviders.β J.A. 132.\\n\\n\\n 41\\n\\n Hannahβs supervisors drafted a memorandum, which they dated April 9, 2015,\\n\\nreferring Hannah to the EAP. The memo outlined Hannahβs βimpressive capabilitiesβ\\n\\nand her work with ODNI, commented on her recent attendance, and explained that\\n\\nHannah had disclosed to her supervisors that she was meeting with a psychiatrist and\\n\\ncounselor and taking medication for depression. J.A. 412β13. The memo also noted:\\n\\n Hannah has indicated that she is struggling to get out of bed\\n in the morning and admits to feeling almost paralyzed. She\\n has also indicated that she had a recent change in medication\\n and that the upheaval in her living arrangements negatively\\n impacted some of her physical coping mechanisms.\\n\\nJ.A. 413. The memo explained that βas senior intelligence officials,β Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors βha[d] a duty to identify and if possible help vulnerable employees.β J.A.\\n\\n414.\\n\\n Meanwhile, Hannah met with her psychiatrist and counselor. Both professionals\\n\\nagreed that Hannah should take four weeks of leave. J.A. 175. Accordingly, Hannah met\\n\\nwith her supervisors on April 9, 2015 and requested a four-week leave of absence. J.A.\\n\\n424, 449, 468. Her supervisors did not ask her for any medical documentation to support\\n\\nthe leave request because they expected to receive a βquick answerβ from EAP. J.A. 95.\\n\\nThey also believed that Hannahβs medical providers did not have βthe expertise to\\n\\nprovideβ an opinion on βall of the itemsβ that they were planning to submit to EPA. Id.\\n\\n Hannahβs supervisors denied her leave request; they had already determined\\n\\nbefore meeting with Hannah that if Hannah asked for leave, they would βdefer that\\n\\ndecision until after meeting with EAP.β J.A. 422. One of Hannahβs supervisors\\n\\nexplained in her deposition that she βwanted to get a sense [Hannah] was in a good\\n\\n 42\\n\\nplace.β J.A. 431. According to that supervisor, the βrationaleβ of the group that decided\\n\\nto refer Hannah to EAP first was:\\n\\n If this were . . . a bad behavior problem, there would\\n be no need to grant immediate leave.\\n\\n If it were a medical mental health problem, the thought\\n was, granting leave and isolating [Hannah] from day-to-day\\n contact with her coworkers and her managers when we didnβt\\n know her state of mind and how much medical care she was\\n receiving could, potentially, be dangerous.\\n\\nJ.A. 422β23. Hannahβs second-line supervisor told her that the decision was made\\n\\nbecause of concern that βsince [Hannah] was a single woman if [she] took leave [she]\\n\\nwould be home by [herself] and that could make [her] depression worse.β J.A. 176. It\\n\\nwas made clear that Hannah was required to attend EAP counseling; if she refused, her\\n\\ntemporary position would be deemed βas excessβ and she would lose her job\\n\\nβimmediately.β Id.\\n\\n Hannahβs first-line supervisor disagreed with the othersβ proposed course of\\n\\naction; he believed that the supervisors should not βsubstitute [their] judgment for\\n\\n[Hannahβs] doctorβs.β J.A. 504. Nonetheless, Hannah signed the memo to EAP and\\n\\nattended an appointment with an EAP counselor the next day, April 10, 2015.\\n\\n On Monday, April 13, 2015, Hannah met again with one of her supervisors to\\n\\ndiscuss her leave request. Her supervisor told her that her leave request was approved but\\n\\nβwas pushingβ her to take only two weeks off, not the four she had requested. J.A. 524,\\n\\n528. He explained that Hannah would have to submit to a medical evaluation if she\\n\\nwished to take leave beyond the two weeks. J.A. 524. Hannah felt uncomfortable with\\n\\n\\n 43\\n\\nher supervisorβs pushiness and confused about the status of her leave request so she\\n\\nresponded that her request was βon hold.β Id. She wanted to figure out what the EAP\\n\\ncounselor had told her supervisor and to confirm her legal options. Id.\\n\\n Hannah continued to arrive at work later than 10:00 a.m. during April 2015.\\n\\nDuring that month, Hannah also continued attending the EAP sessions. In those sessions,\\n\\nHannah testified, she was questioned about her medical history, her familyβs medical\\n\\nhistory, and the medication she was taking and its dosage. J.A. 531β32. In the third\\n\\nsession, Hannah was given a diagnostic questionnaire βto assess depression or severity of\\n\\nthose sorts of things.β J.A. 534.\\n\\n On April 16, 2015, the EAP counselor had an extended forty-minute discussion\\n\\nwith Hannahβs second-line supervisor. During that discussion, the counselor disclosed\\n\\nthat Hannahβs βlack of motivation/inability to come to workβ was primarily influenced by\\n\\nfeelings of frustration over not securing a permanent position at ODNI. J.A. 604. At\\n\\nsome point, the counselor also indicated that Hannah was not cooperating with the EAP\\n\\nprocess because she was spending βmore than half the session at timesβ expressing\\n\\nconcerns over the record retention policy. J.A. 192.\\n\\n A week later, Hannahβs second-line supervisor circulated a status update via email\\n\\nto ODNI leadership outlining the information shared by the EAP counselor. That\\n\\ninformation included Hannahβs explained reasons for her inability to arrive punctually for\\n\\nwork, as well as Hannahβs concerns that the EAP process would βcreate a paper trail that\\n\\n[would] adversely impact her future employment and career.β J.A. 606. The email also\\n\\n\\n\\n 44\\n\\nindicated that the EAP counselor had identified βnon-medicalβ factors as the primary\\n\\ncause of Hannahβs attendance problems. J.A. 607.\\n\\n On April 28, 2015, Hannah met with one of her supervisors and reiterated her\\n\\nrequest for four weeks of leave. J.A. 41. She was told that her leave request would be\\n\\napproved if she met with the EAP counselor once more on May 1, 2015 and signed a\\n\\nLetter of Expectations. J.A. 42. Hannah attended the May 1 appointment and signed the\\n\\nLetter of Expectations on May 4, 2015. J.A. 43. The Letter of Expectations provided\\n\\nthat, β[e]ffective immediately,β Hannah would begin work by 10:00 a.m. and would\\n\\ncontact her office no later than 9:30 a.m. in the event she would be late. J.A. 614.\\n\\n Beginning on May 5, 2015, Hannah took a four-week leave of absence. She\\n\\nreturned to work on June 1, 2015 and was immediately tasked with leading a significant\\n\\nstudy. J.A. 44β45. Her attendance problem βlargely disappeared as Hannah responded to\\n\\nthe need for daily meetings all over the community.β J.A. 612.\\n\\n On June 9, 2015, Hannah interviewed for a permanent position with ODNIβ\\n\\nProgram Mission Manager Cyber (βCyberβ), a job she had applied for at the end of April\\n\\nor beginning of May 2015. J.A. 620β21. She was unanimously selected by the interview\\n\\npanel as the most qualified candidate for the position. J.A. 206, 625. A week later, the\\n\\ninterview panel forwarded its recommendation to ODNIβs Chief Management Officer,\\n\\nMark Ewing. J.A. 206β07. Ewing was already aware of the decision to refer Hannah to\\n\\nthe EAP and had been consulted in that decision-making process. J.A. 216. As Ewing\\n\\ntestified, the EAP referral was intended not only to address Hannahβs issues with the\\n\\n\\n\\n 45\\n\\ntemporary job she had at the time; Ewingβs βconcern was her conduct in relationship to\\n\\nbeing selected for a permanent government position.β J.A. 217, 585.\\n\\n Hannahβs application for the Cyber position stalled for several weeks, despite the\\n\\nfact that the approval process typically only took a few days. J.A. 443, 630. On June 25,\\n\\n2015, members of the interview panel began questioning the holdup. J.A. 633. In\\n\\nresponse, Ewing sent an email to the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence\\n\\n(βPDDNIβ) recommending that Hannah not be approved for the Cyber position based on\\n\\nher recent attendance history. J.A. 635β36. Ewing also represented that the EAP\\n\\ncounselor had concluded that Hannah did not have a medical problem, βrather she is a\\n\\ndisciplinary problem.β J.A. 635.\\n\\n The PDDNI shared that email with the Director of National Intelligence (βDNIβ).\\n\\nNeither the PDDNI nor the DNI approved Hannah for the permanent position. J.A. 722.\\n\\nOn July 7, 2015, Hannah was notified that she was not selected for the position. J.A.\\n\\n638. Hannah completed her temporary term at ODNI on March 27, 2016 as a high\\n\\nperformer, yet did not secure a permanent position with the department.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n I first take issue with the Courtβs treatment of Hannahβs discrimination claim\\n\\nunder the Rehabilitation Act. The majority concludes that Hannahβs 13 βattendance\\n\\nissuesβ between March 19, 2015 and May 4, 2015 constituted a βsignificant attendance\\n\\nand reporting problem.β Maj. Op. at 27β28. Accordingly, the majority credits this\\n\\n 46\\n\\nproffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for ODNIβs failure to hire Hannah for the\\n\\npermanent Cyber position. 2 The majority also concludes that Hannah has failed to satisfy\\n\\nher burden at this stage of presenting sufficient evidence that ODNIβs explanation for\\n\\nrejecting her application is pretext for disability discrimination. Maj. Op. 24β26.\\n\\n I disagree with the majorityβs conclusions for several reasons. Fundamentally,\\n\\nODNIβs proffered reason for not hiring Hannah reflects a misunderstanding of Hannahβs\\n\\ndisability. Among the most typical symptoms of depression are a loss of interest in\\n\\nnearly all activities, decreased energy, disturbed or irregular sleep, and an impaired\\n\\nability to function in oneβs daily activities, including communicating with others. Jerry\\n\\nVon Talge, Ph. D., Major Depressive DisorderβEssential Features, 26 Am.\\n\\nJurisprudence Proof of Facts 1, Β§ 12 (3d ed. 1994); Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of\\n\\nDes Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 2002) (βA jury could consider the difficulty one\\n\\nsuffering from depression has with communications . . . .β). βEven the smallest tasks\\n\\nseem to require substantial effort.β VonTalge, Major Depressive DisorderβEssential\\n\\nFeatures, 26 Am. Jurisprudence Proof of Facts 1, Β§ 12. In Hannahβs case, although she\\n\\nwas taking medication to treat her depression, she was βunable to just get going.β J.A.\\n\\n413. She was βlethargic or almost unconcerned.β Id. Her demeanor was βsad, very flat,\\n\\nand almost trance like.β Id. Yet, Hannah came to work, and her job performance\\n\\nremained βexcellent.β J.A. 408.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n ODNI does not dispute that Hannahβs depression qualifies as a disability under\\nthe Rehabilitation Act.\\n\\n\\n 47\\n\\n In light of the nature of Hannahβs disability and the record evidence, I am baffled\\n\\nby the majorityβs conclusion that her conduct amounted to a βsignificant attendance and\\n\\nreporting problemβ as a matter of law. Maj. Op. at 28; see Vannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank\\n\\nof Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2016) (βSummary judgment is appropriate if\\n\\nthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment\\n\\nas a matter of law.β (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Hannahβs behavior\\n\\nis far from the βblatant and persistent misconductβ that we have found to be lawful\\n\\ngrounds for adverse employment actions in this context. Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 305. In\\n\\nVannoy, for example, the employee, like Hannah, suffered from depression. Id. at 299.\\n\\nWe found that Vannoyβs employer had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to\\n\\nterminate his employment, despite his disability, when Vannoy had several unscheduled\\n\\nabsences from work; drove an employer vehicle for a three-day, out-of-state work\\n\\nassignment and stayed at a hotel paid for by his employer, yet did not once report for\\n\\nduty; refused to complete his portion of a performance improvement plan; and left work\\n\\nwithout authorization. Id. at 299β300, 305. It was in that context that we explained that\\n\\nthe Americans with Disabilities Act (βADAβ) βdoes not require an employer to simply\\n\\nignore an employeeβs blatant and persistent misconduct, even where that behavior is\\n\\npotentially tied to a medical condition.β Id. at 305 (emphasis added); see also 29 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 791(f) (incorporating ADA employment standards into section 501 of the\\n\\nRehabilitation Act).\\n\\n Unlike in Vannoy, the record here does not paint a picture of Hannah as an\\n\\ninsubordinate employee who refused to cooperate with her employer and blatantly\\n\\n 48\\n\\nmisused department resources. To the contrary, Hannah openly communicated with her\\n\\nsupervisors, even if she did so later in the day than they had expected. She informed her\\n\\nsupervisors of her depression and cooperated by attending the sessions with the EAP\\n\\ncounselor. During the 46-day period between the first accommodation and Hannahβs\\n\\nwritten agreement to begin work at a specified time, she had four unscheduled absences\\n\\nand came into work after 10:00 a.m. nine times. J.A. 556. On all but two occasions she\\n\\ncommunicated her anticipated schedule to ODNI. And on one of those two occasions,\\n\\nHannah arrived by 11:00 a.m., the time after which her supervisors were to contact her.\\n\\nId. During this time she actively worked with her medical professionals to design an\\n\\nalternative solution, and she requested, on more than one occasion, that ODNI grant the\\n\\nrecommended leave of absence. In fact, Hannah was absent only once and arrived after\\n\\n10:00 a.m. only twice before her initial leave request was denied. See id. Had her\\n\\nsupervisors granted her leave of absence on April 9 when she first requested it, many of\\n\\nher attendance issues would have been avoided. A jury could reasonably conclude that\\n\\nHannahβs late arrivals to work continued only because her depression was not effectively\\n\\naccommodated. See J.A. 175 (both medical professionals recommended four-week\\n\\nleave); J.A. 612 (noting Hannahβs attendance problem βlargely disappearedβ upon her\\n\\nreturn from leave). On this record, I find unfounded the characterization of Hannahβs\\n\\nconduct as blatant and persistent as a matter of law.\\n\\n Furthermore, Hannah has sufficiently shown that ODNIβs proffered reason for not\\n\\nhiring herβher attendance problemsβmay be pretext for disability discrimination. At\\n\\nthe summary judgment stage, Hannah need not conclusively prove discrimination. But\\n\\n 49\\n\\nshe must proffer sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that\\n\\nshe was in fact the victim of intentional discrimination by ODNI. Reyazuddin v.\\n\\nMontgomery Cty., Md., 789 F.3d 407, 419 (4th Cir. 2015). I would find that she has met\\n\\nthis burden for two reasons.\\n\\n First, as Hannah argues, questions of fact exist as to whether her attendance was a\\n\\nserious problem, or whether her attendance even violated any work-hours policy. The\\n\\nrecord suggests that it was not until May 4, 2015 that Hannah was given a formal time by\\n\\nwhich to arrive at work. See, e.g., J.A. 108 (β[D]ifferent people had different schedules\\n\\n. . . .β); id. (explaining that while most employees arrived at work around 9:00 a.m., there\\n\\nwas no βexplicitβ requirement to do so); J.A. 518 (denying that a βcore hours\\n\\nexpectationβ existed before September or October 2015). Although her supervisors told\\n\\nher on March 19, 2015 that she was to report by 10:00 a.m., they also initially agreed to\\n\\ncontact her if she did not report by 11:00 a.m. Had the 10:00 a.m. start time been deemed\\n\\na requirement, it would make little sense to have made any further arrangements. When\\n\\none of her supervisors attempted to unilaterally change that arrangement, he acceded to\\n\\nHannahβs request for time to propose an alternative. Hannah requested the doctor-\\n\\nrecommended leave of absence as an alternative, but she was never told that she was\\n\\nrequired to work specific hours; she remained formally on a maxi flex schedule. It was\\n\\nnot until the Letter of Expectation on May 4, 2015 that a formal start time was imposed.\\n\\nThe department itself did not move to βcoreβ hours until October 2015. J.A. 518.\\n\\nTherefore, Hannahβs work schedule during the relevant time may have been βerratic,β\\n\\n\\n\\n 50\\n\\nMaj. Op. 26, but a reasonable jury could conclude that it did not violate any established\\n\\nwork-hours requirement. 3\\n\\n Second, I would find that Mark Ewingβs inconsistent statements regarding his\\n\\nknowledge of Hannahβs disability, coupled with the above evidence, are sufficient\\n\\nevidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. The majority emphasizes that Ewing\\n\\ndid not have first-hand knowledge of her condition and that he was informed that her\\n\\ndepression was under control. Maj. Op. 25. But depression is not like physical illnesses;\\n\\nit does not simply dissipate overnight. Its symptoms may be under control one day yet\\n\\ntriggered the very next. See Sidney H. Kennedy, M.D., A Review of Antidepressant\\n\\nTherapy in Primary Care: Current Practices and Future Directions, Primary Care\\n\\nCompanion for CNS Disorders, vol. 15(2), PCC.12r01420 (Apr. 11, 2013) (noting that\\n\\nmajor depressive disorder, the disease with which Hannah was diagnosed, is βchronic and\\n\\nepisodicβ in nature). Indeed, Hannah was able to control her symptoms for years while\\n\\nworking at ODNI. Ewing was consulted by Hannahβs supervisors in connection with\\n\\ntheir decision to refer Hannah to EAP. J.A. 216. The EAP memo, a copy of which\\n\\nEwing possessed, explicitly stated: β[Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a\\n\\npsychiatrist and counselor and taking medication for depression.β J.A. 413. And the\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Hannahβs supervisors testified that, because she arrived later than other\\nemployees, they were forced to reassign work that would have fallen to her. There is\\nevidence that the work assignments were made around 9:00 or 9:30 a.m. J.A. 108β09.\\nHad Hannahβs supervisors truly been concerned about being able to assign her work, one\\nwould expect the accommodation they offered to Hannah to have required her to come\\ninto the office by 9:00. No such requirement was ever made of her.\\n\\n\\n 51\\n\\nmemo implicitly made the connection between Hannahβs βstruggling to get out of bed in\\n\\nthe morningβ and recent upheavals in her life that βnegatively impacted some of her\\n\\nphysical coping mechanisms.β Id. In fact, it noted that Hannah βappear[ed] to gain more\\n\\nenergy and become aware as the day progress[ed] into early evening.β Id. On this\\n\\nevidence, a reasonable jury could determine that Ewing was aware that Hannahβs\\n\\ndepression affected her ability to get to work by 10:00 a.m. and required medical\\n\\nintervention and that Ewingβs initial statement that he was unaware of her condition was\\n\\nintended to cover up the true reason for his desire not to hire her: her disability.\\n\\n In sum, because a reasonable jury could conclude on this record that Hannahβs\\n\\nattendance issues were far from βblatant and persistent misconduct,β Vannoy, 827 F.3d at\\n\\n305, and that ODNIβs proffered reason for failing to hire Hannah for the Cyber position\\n\\nwas pretext for discrimination on the basis of her disability, I would reverse the district\\n\\ncourtβs grant of summary judgment on the discrimination claim.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n I also take issue with the Courtβs conclusion that no question exists as to the\\n\\nreasonableness of the accommodations made by ODNI. The reasonableness of an\\n\\naccommodation depends βon a good-faith effort to assess the employeeβs needs and to\\n\\nrespond to them.β Feliberty v. Kemper Corp., 98 F.3d 274, 280 (7th Cir. 1996).\\n\\nImportantly, βa βreasonable accommodationβ is one that βeffectively accommodates the\\n\\ndisabled employeeβs limitations.ββ Bellino v. Peters, 530 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2008)\\n\\n(emphasis added) (citation omitted). In identifying a reasonable accommodation,\\n\\nemployers are required to engage in an interactive process with the disabled employee.\\n\\n 52\\n\\nSee 29 C.F.R. Β§ 1630.2(o)(3); Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 780\\n\\nF.3d 562, 581 (4th Cir. 2015) (βThe ADA imposes upon employers a good-faith duty βto\\n\\nengage [with their employees] in an interactive process to identify a reasonable\\n\\naccommodation.ββ (quoting Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2013))); Bellino, 530 F.3d at 548β50 (discussing ADAβs interactive-process requirement\\n\\nin the context of claim brought under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act). It is only if\\n\\nan employer provides a reasonable accommodation that the employerβs failure to engage\\n\\nin an interactive process will not sustain a failure-to-accommodate claim. Jacobs, 780\\n\\nF.3d at 581.\\n\\n The majority finds that ODNI provided Hannah with two accommodations: (1)\\n\\nthe March 19, 2015 agreement that Hannah would report for work by 10:00 a.m., and (2)\\n\\nthe referral to EAP. Maj. Op. 12. I submit that questions of fact exist with respect to\\n\\nwhether ODNI made a good-faith effort to respond to Hannahβs needs and whether either\\n\\nof these accommodations was effective, i.e., whether the accommodations were\\n\\nreasonable. And because a question of fact exists as to that issue, I agree with Hannah\\n\\nthat a question also exists as to whether her employer engaged in the required interactive\\n\\nprocess.\\n\\n Hannah argues that her supervisorsβ initial commitment to contact her if she did\\n\\nnot contact them or arrive by 11:00 a.m. was the sine qua non of the first\\n\\naccommodation. But Hannahβs supervisors allowed that accommodation to remain in\\n\\nplace for only four working days before unilaterally modifying it and, according to\\n\\nHannah, angrily pressuring her to propose an alternative accommodation on the spot.\\n\\n 53\\n\\nWhen Hannah did propose an alternativeβfour weeks of leave, as recommended by both\\n\\nof her treating medical professionalsβher supervisors denied the request because they\\n\\nhad already decided that EAP counseling was more appropriate. Speculating that they\\n\\nknew better than both of Hannahβs medical professionals, her supervisors believed that\\n\\nher medical providers lacked βthe expertise to provideβ an opinion on βall of the itemsβ\\n\\nthey wanted to submit to the EAP. J.A. 95. And while Hannahβs supervisors had\\n\\nsuggested that she take leave a few months earlier, prior to any signs that Hannahβs\\n\\ndisability would affect her ability to get into work in the morning, J.A. 173, they\\n\\nthreatened to terminate her employment if she did not first attend EAP sessions after she\\n\\nrequested medically recommended leave to cope with her depression, J.A. 176. On this\\n\\nevidence, the question of whether the first accommodation and the decision to require\\n\\nEAP counseling before granting medically recommended leave were made in good faith\\n\\nand were effective to address Hannahβs disability should be submitted to the jury, as\\n\\nreasonable minds could conclude that they were not.\\n\\n Likewise, the reasonableness of ODNIβs delay in granting Hannah leave should be\\n\\ndecided by a jury. Concededly, the short duration of the delay (from April 9, 2015 to\\n\\nMay 4, 2015) undercuts Hannahβs argument of unreasonableness. See Terrell v. USAir,\\n\\n132 F.3d 621, 628 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that delay of three months in providing\\n\\naccommodation was reasonable). However, Hannahβs attendanceβand the manifestation\\n\\nof her depressionβwas negatively impacted during the delay period; ODNI purposefully\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 54\\n\\ndelayed her leave while she attended required EAP sessions 4; ODNI would have\\n\\nterminated Hannahβs temporary position if she failed to attend the EAP counseling 5; and\\n\\nMark Ewing intended to use the EAP sessions to gather information regarding Hannahβs\\n\\nsuitability for future employment. 6 Presented with this evidence, a reasonable jury could\\n\\nconclude that the delay was the result of ODNIβs bad faith. Feliberty, 98 F.3d at 280.\\n\\nThus, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment on Hannahβs reasonable\\n\\naccommodation claim.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n I would also reverse summary judgment on Hannahβs claim that she was subjected\\n\\nto an unlawful medical examination as a current employee.\\n\\n Under the Rehabilitation Act, β[a] covered entity shall not require a medical\\n\\nexamination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is\\n\\nan individual with a disability or as to the nature and severity of the disability, unless\\n\\nsuch examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business\\n\\nnecessity.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(A); 29 U.S.C. Β§ 791(f).\\n\\n\\n 4\\n See J.A. 422 (βThe recommendation of the group was if Hannah were to ask for\\nleave, we should defer that decision until after meeting with EAP.β); J.A. 176 (βEAP was\\nconcerned that since I was a single woman if I took leave I would be home by myself and\\nthat could make my depression worse.β).\\n 5\\n See J.A. 176 (Hannahβs statement that she was told she had βno choiceβ but to\\nattend the EAP sessions or her job would be terminated immediately).\\n 6\\n See J.A. 584β85 (Mark Ewingβs deposition testimony that EAP referral βwasnβt\\ninitially just aboutβ Hannahβs temporary position but also because Ewing βknew she was\\nlooking for permanent employmentβ).\\n\\n\\n 55\\n\\n First, a clear dispute exists as to whether the EAP sessions constituted a required\\n\\nmedical examination under the Rehabilitation Act. Despite the voluntary nature of EAP\\n\\ncounseling highlighted by the majority, Maj. Op. 15, two of Hannahβs supervisors\\n\\ntestified that the sessions were in fact βmandatory.β J.A. 448, 474. As Hannah\\n\\nexplained, she was told by her supervisor that she had βno choiceβ in the matter and that\\n\\nif she did not participate in the EAP counseling, her temporary position with ODNI\\n\\nwould be declared βas excessβ and she βwould be out of a job immediately.β J.A. 176.\\n\\n The majority emphasizes the EAP counselorβs testimony that she did not conduct a\\n\\nmedical examination. Yet, the Courtβs opinion says nothing about Hannahβs testimony\\n\\nregarding the substance of her sessions with the counselor. According to Hannah, she\\n\\nwas asked for a family medical history, questioned about her medication and dosage, and\\n\\neven administered a diagnostic tool used to assess depression. J.A. 531β32, 534.\\n\\n In light of this testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that the EAP sessions\\n\\nwere in fact required and that the diagnostic tool constituted a βprocedure or test that\\n\\nseeks information about an individualβs physical or mental impairments or health.β\\n\\nE.E.O.C., Enforcement Guidance: DisabilityβRelated Inquiries and Medical\\n\\nExaminations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (EEOC\\n\\nNotice 915.002) (July 27, 2000). Likewise, a jury could determine that the questions\\n\\nasked during the sessions amounted to a βseries of questions . . . likely to elicit\\n\\ninformation about a disabilityβ and the scope of Hannahβs disability. Id.; Grenier v.\\n\\nCyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 677 (1st Cir. 1995). As Hannahβs supervisors\\n\\nexplained, the decision to refer her to EAP was to determine whether her attendance was\\n\\n 56\\n\\ndue to βa medical mental health problem.β J.A. 422. Their decision was predicated on a\\n\\nconcern that granting Hannah the doctor-recommended leave could βmake [her]\\n\\ndepression worseβ and could even βbe dangerous.β J.A. 176, 422β23. After meeting\\n\\nwith Hannah, the EAP counselor even suggested that Hannah could have bipolar\\n\\ndisorder. J.A. 601β02. If faced with this evidence, a reasonable jury could easily find\\n\\nthat the EAP sessions were in fact required medical examinations or disability-related\\n\\ninquiries.\\n\\n With respect to the second prong of our inquiryβwhether the EAP sessions were\\n\\njob-related and consistent with business necessityβquestions of fact also preclude\\n\\nsummary judgment. β[W]hether a mental examination was βjob-related and consistent\\n\\nwith business necessityβ is an objective inquiry.β Pence v. Tenneco Auto. Operating Co.,\\n\\nInc., 169 F. Appβx 808, 812 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth.,\\n\\n247 F.3d 506, 518 (3d Cir. 2001)). It is the employer who bears the burden of proving\\n\\nthis prong. Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth., 763 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2014). βA\\n\\nbusiness necessity must be based on more than βmere expediency,β and will be found to\\n\\nexist where the employer can βidentify legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to doubt\\n\\nthe employeeβs capacity to perform his or her duties.ββ Coursey v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore,\\n\\n577 F. Appβx 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Conroy v. N.Y. State Depβt of Corr. Servs.,\\n\\n333 F.3d 88, 97β98 (2d Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527 (8th Cir.\\n\\n2007)). A business necessity may also exist if a medical examination is necessary to\\n\\ndetermine βwhether an employeeβs absence or request for an absence is due to legitimate\\n\\n\\n\\n 57\\n\\nmedical reasons, when the employer has reason to suspect abuse of an attendance\\n\\npolicy.β Thomas, 483 F.3d at 527 (citing Conroy, 333 F.3d at 98).\\n\\n I would find that ODNI is not entitled to summary judgment because a reasonable\\n\\njury could conclude that the employer lacked a βreasonable belief based on objective\\n\\nevidence that [Hannah] was unable to perform the essential functions of her job or that\\n\\nshe posed a threat to herself or to others based on a medical condition.β Wright v. Ill.\\n\\nDepβt of Children and Family Servs., 798 F.3d 513, 524 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Kroll,\\n\\n763 F.3d at 623 (β[T]he individual who decides to require a medical examination must\\n\\nhave a reasonable belief based on objective evidence that the employeeβs behavior\\n\\nthreatens a vital function of the business.β (citing Pence, 69 F. Appβx at 812) (other\\n\\ncitation omitted)). It is undisputed that Hannahβs supervisors, as well as Mark Ewing,\\n\\nwere involved in the decision to refer Hannah to the EAP. Therefore, the question is\\n\\nwhether those supervisors had objective evidence that Hannah was unable to perform an\\n\\nessential function of her job. For the period including Hannahβs βegregiousβ attendance\\n\\nissues, she received an overall performance rating of 4.53 out of 5.00βa rating of\\n\\nβExcellent.β J.A. 406β10. Yet the majority concludes that her poor attendance precluded\\n\\nher from performing an essential function of her job.\\n\\n I submit that this conclusion cannot be reached as a matter of law on this record, a\\n\\nrecord that seriously calls into question ODNIβs sincerity in its assertion that Hannah was\\n\\nunable to perform an essential function of her job. For the entirety of Hannahβs time as\\n\\nthe disclosures coordinator on the Snowden project, she started work and left work later\\n\\nthan other ODNI employees. J.A. 25, 494. Although she came in later, she got the job\\n\\n 58\\n\\ndone, and she did it βimpeccabl[y].β J.A. 412. She was able to manage her depression\\n\\nand worked long hours in a stressful environment while excelling. J.A. 19β20, 412. Her\\n\\nsupervisors had no qualm with her attendance, and aside from the maxi flex schedule,\\n\\nthere was no formal work-hours requirement in place. J.A. 492β94, 518. When that\\n\\nproject winded down in late 2014 and early 2015, Hannahβs supervisors did not institute\\n\\nβcoreβ hours or otherwise formally remove Hannah from the maxi flex schedule. J.A.\\n\\n461, 518. In light of Hannahβs ODNI-sanctioned history of beginning her work day later\\n\\nthan others (a practice which simply continued into April 2015), the apparent lack of any\\n\\nformal policy requiring that her schedule be otherwise, and her consistent βexcellentβ\\n\\nperformance reviews, there is at the very least a question of fact regarding ODNIβs\\n\\nβreasonable belief based on objective evidence that [Hannah] was unable to perform the\\n\\nessential functions of her job.β Wright, 798 F.3d at 524.\\n\\n This is not to say that the essential functions of Hannahβs job did not include\\n\\nregular attendance. See Tyndall v. Natβl Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th\\n\\nCir. 1994). However, as discussed above, a jury could reasonably conclude that ODNI\\n\\nhad no βreason to suspect abuse of an attendance policy,β Thomas, 483 F.3d at 527\\n\\n(citation omitted), when no such policy formally existed and when Hannah had been\\n\\nallowed for over a year to begin work later than other department employees. And\\n\\nalthough Hannah requested leave, her supervisors had decided before Hannahβs request\\n\\nthat they would defer a decision on any leave request until after the EAP referral because\\n\\nthey expected a βquick answerβ from EAP. J.A. 95. But βmere expediencyβ is\\n\\ninsufficient to establish business necessity. Coursey, 577 F. Appβx at 173.\\n\\n 59\\n\\n In light of these considerations, I would submit the issue of whether the EAP\\n\\nsessions were job-related and consistent with business necessity to the jury for resolution.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Finally, I would reverse the district courtβs grant of summary judgment on\\n\\nHannahβs FMLA retaliation claim. ODNI argues that Hannah cannot prove this claim\\n\\nbecause her non-selection for the Cyber position was due to βher significant attendance\\n\\nand reporting problems prior to her first leave request.β Resp. Br. 48. For largely the\\n\\nsame reasons that I would reverse with respect to Hannahβs discrimination-in-hiring\\n\\nclaim, I would find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to create a material issue\\n\\nof fact for the jury to decide on this claim.\\n\\n Hannah suffered from a disability, one that could effectively be accommodated\\n\\nwith leave. Unfortunately, her leave was granted only after she struggled to manage her\\n\\ndisabilityβa struggle which a reasonable jury could readily conclude did not violate any\\n\\nattendance policy. Despite Hannahβs rebound upon her return, ODNI used her late\\n\\narrivals during the time for which she requested but was denied leave as grounds for\\n\\ndenying her a permanent position, a position for which it is undisputed that she was\\n\\nexceptionally qualified. J.A. 623β25, 635β36. In essence, ODNI assigned Hannah to a\\n\\nhigh-stress position after which her depression worsened; delayed her request for FMLA-\\n\\nqualifying leave to accommodate her depression, thereby intensifying her symptoms;\\n\\nthen refused to hire her for a permanent role when she returned from leave. Because of\\n\\nthis, and for the reasons I articulate above, a jury could reasonably conclude that ODNIβs\\n\\nrejection of Hannahβs application for permanent employment was based on the exercise\\n\\n 60\\n\\nof her FMLA rights in requesting and taking a qualifying leave of absence to\\n\\naccommodate her disability.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 61\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4369045/\", \"author_raw\": \"GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GREGORY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THACKER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"QUATTLEBAUM"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591792/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: HANNAH P., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel COATS, Director of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence McLean, VA, Defendant-Appellee, and Mark Ewing, in His Personal Capacity McLean, VA, Defendant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n\n No. 17-1943\n\n\nHANNAH P.,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nDANIEL COATS, Director of the Office of The Director of National Intelligence\nMcLean, VA,\n\n Defendant - Appellee,\n\n and\n\nMARK EWING, in his personal capacity McLean, VA,\n\n Defendant.\n\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\nAlexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:16-cv-01030-CMH-IDD)\n\n\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 19, 2019\n\n\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Thacker\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Quattlebaum joined. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a\nseparate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\n\nARGUED: Timothy Bosson, BOSSON LEGAL GROUP, Fairfax, Virginia, for\nAppellant. Caroline D. Lopez, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy\nAssistant Attorney General, Marleigh D. Dover, Civil Division, UNITED STATES\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Dana J. Boente, United States\nAttorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for\nAppellee.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\nTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\n\n Appellant Hannah P. 1 (βHannahβ), a former employee of the Office of the Director\n\nof National Intelligence (βAppelleeβ), asserts that Appellee discriminated against her\n\npursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (βRehabilitation Actβ), 29 U.S.C. Β§ 701, et\n\nseq., and violated the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (βFMLAβ), 29 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 2601, et seq., by not hiring her for a permanent position. The district court granted\n\nsummary judgment in Appelleeβs favor as to all claims.\n\n For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district courtβs judgment as to the\n\nRehabilitation Act and FMLA retaliation claims. However, because a genuine issue of\n\nmaterial fact remains as to whether Hannah provided notice of her disability and interest\n\nin FMLA leave sufficient to trigger Appelleeβs duty to inquire, we hold that summary\n\njudgment as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim was not warranted. Accordingly, we\n\nvacate that part of the district courtβs judgment and remand Hannahβs FMLA interference\n\nclaim for further proceedings.\n\n I.\n\n A.\n\n In March 2011, Appellee hired Hannah for a five-year term as an operations\n\nanalyst. In that position, Hannah participated in βlong-term, in-depth studies into issues\n\n\n\n\n 1\n Pursuant to a protective order, Hannah is identified by her first name and last\ninitial.\n\n\n\n 3\n\nthat had particular budgetary importance for the [c]ommunity.β J.A. 18. 2 Hannah\n\ngenerally received glowing reviews from her supervisors. See, e.g., id. at 412 (describing\n\nHannahβs performance prior to 2015 as βoutstandingβ and noting her βenergy/drive,\n\ntechnical competence, superb communication and networking skills, and superior\n\nanalytic tradecraftβ); id. at 350 (describing Hannah as βa high-performing employeeβ); id.\n\nat 391β410 (describing, repeatedly, various elements of Hannahβs performance as\n\nβexcellentβ and βoutstandingβ).\n\n B.\n\n A few months after she was hired, Hannah was diagnosed with depression.\n\nHannah immediately informed at least two of her supervisors of her diagnosis, but she\n\ndid not request any accommodations at that time. Hannah treated her depression by\n\nseeing a counselor and a psychiatrist and by taking prescribed medication.\n\n In November 2013, Hannah was assigned to coordinate the responses of the\n\nNational Intelligence Director and Principal Deputy Director to Edward Snowdenβs\n\nunauthorized disclosures. 3 This role was βhigh stressβ and required βfrequent long hours\n\nand weekend work coupled with meeting tight deadlines and dealing with a demanding\n\n 2\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\nappeal.\n 3\n In 2013, National Security Agency subcontractor Edward Snowden leaked βthe\nbiggest cache of top-secret documents in history,β which revealed numerous global\nsurveillance programs run by the United States government. Ewen MacAskill & Alex\nHern, Edward Snowden: βThe People Are Still Powerless, but Now Theyβre Aware,β\nGuardian (June 4, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/04/edward-\nsnowden-people-still-powerless-but-aware.\n\n\n\n 4\n\n[National Security Council] customer.β J.A. 412. In fact, to accommodate the schedule\n\nchange that this role required, Appellee moved Hannah to a βmaxi flexβ schedule. Id. at\n\n350β51. A βmaxi flexβ schedule requires an analyst to work a certain number of hours --\n\n80 hours over a two-week period -- but does not dictate the exact hours that the analyst\n\nmust work per day. For Hannah, that meant starting and ending work later than\n\ntraditional business hours.\n\n The Snowden assignment lasted 18 months and completed in January 2015.\n\nHowever, Hannah continued her atypical working hours beyond the completion of the\n\nSnowden assignment. Hannahβs supervisor βwas expectingβ that when the Snowden\n\nassignment ended, Hannahβs hours βmight become more normal.β J.A. 353. However,\n\nfor the first few months, he did not communicate with Hannah about returning to normal\n\nbusiness hours. Rather, he explained, he was βprimarily concerned about establishing\n\nwhat [Hannahβs] next task was going to be.β Id.\n\n By March 2015, Hannahβs co-workers perceived her schedule to be βerratic.β J.A.\n\n413. Hannah arrived to work well after normal business hours and racked up numerous\n\nunplanned absences. On some occasions Hannah was βextremely late,β sometimes\n\narriving after 2 PM. Id. On other occasions Hannah was unreachable for hours, often\n\nmissing and failing to return βrepeated phone calls to her cell and home phone.β Id.\n\nWhen Hannahβs supervisors were able to reach her, they noted that she seemed βeither\n\nlethargic or almost unconcernedβ about her lateness and absences. Id. They also noted\n\nthat her demeanor was βsad, very flat, and almost trance like.β Id. Around that time,\n\nHannah informed her supervisors that she βhad a recent change in medication.β Id.\n\n\n 5\n\n C.\n\n 1.\n\n Appellee made some accommodations for Hannah following the Snowden\n\nassignment. First, after consulting with Hannah in January 2015, Appellee lightened\n\nHannahβs workload βto give her a chance to decompressβ from the stress of the Snowden\n\nassignment. J.A. 413 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, multiple of Hannahβs\n\nsupervisors had βinformal counseling sessionsβ with her βto discuss any issues that she\n\nmight be havingβ and to βurge herβ to notify them if she was going to be late or absent.\n\nId.\n\n On March 19, 2015, one of Hannahβs supervisors met with Hannah directly to\n\naddress her attendance issues. Together, Hannah and her supervisors developed a plan to\n\nreconcile Hannahβs depression with Appelleeβs staffing needs. According to that plan,\n\nHannah was to arrive to work by 10 AM. If she was going to be absent or later than 10\n\nAM, Hannah was to contact one of her supervisors in advance. If Hannah had not arrived\n\nat work or contacted a supervisor by 11 AM, a supervisor would call her to determine\n\nwhen she would arrive.\n\n But, Hannah did not follow the plan. For example, the very next day after she and\n\nher supervisors developed the plan, Hannah emailed her supervisors at 11:05 AM to\n\ninform them that she would be arriving after 12 PM. Similarly, on March 31, Hannah\n\nemailed her supervisors at 11:56 AM to inform them that she would not be coming into\n\nwork at all that day. On April 1, after Hannah had not arrived to work or contacted her\n\nsupervisors, Hannahβs second-level supervisor called her at 12:30 PM, at which time\n\n\n 6\n\nHannah reported βbeing unable to just get going.β J.A. 413. Later that day, when\n\nHannah finally arrived to work, her supervisor informed her that the plan they created\n\nwas not working.\n\n At that same time, her supervisor revised the plan to require Hannah to arrive at\n\nwork by 10 AM or report to her supervisors in advance if she was going to be late or\n\nabsent. This βput the onusβ on Hannah to contact her supervisors, rather than asking her\n\nsupervisors to contact her if she had not arrived at work by 11 AM. J.A. 90. Hannah\n\nfailed to follow this modified plan as well. In fact, she failed to comply on April 2 and\n\nApril 3, the two days following the meeting where the plan was modified.\n\n According to Appellee, Hannahβs timeliness and attendance issues impacted her\n\nperformance, the performance of her peers, and the performance of her supervisors. Per\n\nAppellee, Hannahβs βerraticβ schedule was βnoted by her teammatesβ and affected βunit\n\ncohesion.β J.A. 413. Hannahβs failure to report her tardiness and absences as well as her\n\nunresponsiveness required her management team to spend βsignificant time and energyβ\n\ntracking her down. Id. Additionally, because of Hannahβs absences, Hannahβs\n\nsupervisors were often forced to assign work that might have been assigned to Hannah to\n\nother analysts.\n\n 2.\n\n On April 9, 2015, just three weeks after the initial work plan was developed to\n\nattempt to accommodate Hannahβs needs, Hannah again met with her supervisors. At\n\nthis meeting, Hannahβs supervisors informed her that they were referring her to the\n\nEmployee Assistance Program (βEAPβ). EAP is a voluntary counseling service for\n\n\n 7\n\nemployees and their family members that provides βfree, confidential, short-term mental\n\nhealth[,] financial, and addictions counseling and referral to cleared community\n\nproviders.β J.A. 132. Hannahβs supervisors made an EAP appointment for her for the\n\nfollowing day, Friday, April 10. At that time, Hannah explained to her supervisors that\n\nher psychiatrist recommended she take four weeks of medical leave. But, Hannahβs\n\nsupervisors insisted that she would need to meet with EAP before they could approve her\n\nrequest for medical leave.\n\n On the next business day following Hannahβs EAP session -- Monday, April 13 --\n\nHannahβs supervisor told Hannah he was willing to authorize her to take medical leave.\n\nHowever, at that point, Hannah informed her supervisor that her leave request was βon\n\nhold,β without further explanation. J.A. 170, 178.\n\n On April 16, Hannahβs supervisor noted in an email that he had an βextendedβ 40-\n\nminute discussion with Hannahβs EAP psychologist. J.A. 604. Hannah alleges that the\n\nEAP psychologist βshared with [Hannahβs supervisor] details of what Hannah had\n\nrevealed in confidence at the EAP sessions.β Appellantβs Br. 17. Specifically, Hannah\n\nalleges that the EAP psychologist told her supervisor that Hannah was concerned about\n\nAppelleeβs records retention policies, and that Hannahβs βdifficulties in getting to work\n\nwere the result of a lack of motivation, not related to depression.β J.A. 540.\n\n 3.\n\n Despite Hannahβs participation in EAP, her attendance problems persisted. For\n\nexample, on April 13, 2015, Hannah emailed her supervisors at 10:58 AM to inform them\n\nthat she would arrive to work by 11:30 AM. Similarly, on April 14, Hannah emailed her\n\n\n 8\n\nsupervisors at 11:08 AM to inform them that she would arrive to work by 12 PM. That\n\nday, Hannahβs supervisors were not able to confirm her arrival to work until after 1:50\n\nPM.\n\n A week after advising her supervisors that her leave request was βon hold,β on\n\nApril 21, Hannah renewed her request for four weeks of medical leave. Hannahβs\n\nsupervisors approved that request on May 5. They required her to use her annual leave to\n\naccount for four-fifths of the four week leave period, and allowed her one day of sick\n\nleave per week to make up the rest. Hannah began her leave the day it was approved.\n\n On May 4, the day before Hannah began her leave of absence, Hannahβs\n\nsupervisors gave her a letter of expectations. That letter confirmed the revised attendance\n\nand reporting plan. This plan required Hannah to arrive to work by 10 AM or report to\n\nher supervisors by 9:30 AM if she was going to be late or absent.\n\n 4.\n\n During this time, Hannah applied for three permanent positions within the Office\n\nof the Director of National Intelligence. In February 2015, Hannah interviewed for two\n\npermanent positions for which she was not selected. Shortly before taking her leave of\n\nabsence in May 2015, Hannah applied for a third full-time position, the Program Mission\n\nManager Cyber Position (βCyber positionβ). She was interviewed for the Cyber position\n\non June 9, eight days after she returned from leave, and the interview panel recommended\n\nher for the position. Her application was then forwarded to Appelleeβs Chief\n\nManagement Officer, Mark Ewing, who recommended that Hannah not be selected for\n\nthe position βat this time,β stating that Hannahβs βrecent performance is not consistent\n\n\n 9\n\nwith a potentially good employee.β J.A. 232. Hannah was informed that her application\n\nhad been rejected in early July 2015, and she did not apply for any other positions.\n\nHannah completed her five-year term with Appellee in March 2016.\n\n D.\n\n Hannah exhausted her administrative remedies and filed this lawsuit on August 12,\n\n2016. She alleged that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation Act in five ways: (1) failing\n\nto accommodate her mental illness; (2) creating a hostile work environment; (3) requiring\n\nher to undergo a medical examination; (4) disclosing her confidential medical\n\ninformation; and (5) refusing to hire her for the Cyber position. Additionally, Hannah\n\nalleged that Appellee violated the FMLA in two ways: (1) by interfering with her ability\n\nto take medical leave; and (2) by retaliating against her when she took medical leave.\n\nAfter the close of discovery, Appellee moved for summary judgment on all counts. The\n\ndistrict court granted that motion on July 27, 2017. Hannah filed this timely notice of\n\nappeal challenging the district courtβs decisions on all but the hostile work environment\n\nclaim.\n\n II.\n\n We review a district courtβs decision to grant summary judgment de novo. See\n\nVannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2016). In doing\n\nso, this court applies the same standard as the district court. See id. That standard\n\nrequires the court to grant summary judgment where βthere is no genuine dispute as to\n\nany material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.β Fed. R. Civ.\n\nP. 56(a); see also Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 300. We construe the evidence in the light most\n\n\n 10\n\nfavorable to Hannah, the nonmovant, and we draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.\n\nSee Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 300.\n\n III.\n\n Hannah asserts that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to\n\naccommodate her depression, wrongfully requiring her to undergo a medical\n\nexamination, unlawfully disclosing her confidential medical information, and refusing to\n\nhire her for the Cyber position. Additionally, Hannah asserts that Appellee interfered\n\nwith and retaliated against her for using leave under the FMLA. We will address each of\n\nthese claims in turn.\n\n A.\n\n Rehabilitation Act Claims\n\n The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from discriminating against its\n\nemployees on the basis of disability. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 794. For the reasons explained\n\nbelow, Hannah failed to satisfy her burden on each of her claims under the Rehabilitation\n\nAct. Specifically, Hannah failed to: (1) demonstrate that Appellee failed to accommodate\n\nher depression; (2) demonstrate that Appelleeβs EAP amounted to a required medical\n\nexamination; (3) demonstrate that Appellee disclosed or misused confidential medical\n\ninformation; and (4) rebut Appelleeβs legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting\n\nher application for a permanent position.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\n 1.\n\n Reasonable Accommodation\n\n Turning first to Hannahβs claim that Appellee failed to accommodate her\n\ndepression, the district court correctly concluded that Hannah did not establish a prima\n\nfacie case because Hannah failed to demonstrate that Appellee refused to make a\n\nreasonable accommodation.\n\n To establish a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate under the\n\nRehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was a qualified person with a\n\ndisability; (2) the employer had notice of the disability; (3) the plaintiff could perform the\n\nessential functions of the position with a reasonable accommodation; and (4) the\n\nemployer nonetheless refused to make the accommodation. See Reyazuddin v.\n\nMontgomery Cty., 789 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2015). The district court concluded that\n\nHannah could not establish the fourth element -- specifically, the district court\n\ndetermined that Appellee provided Hannah with at least two reasonable accommodations.\n\nAnd, on appeal, the parties dispute only the fourth element.\n\n Here, as detailed above, Appellee provided Hannah with a reasonable\n\naccommodation. When Hannah failed to follow that plan, Hannahβs supervisors\n\nattempted a new accommodation -- referring Hannah to EAP. Yet, despite Hannahβs\n\nparticipation in EAP, her attendance problems persisted.\n\n Hannah argues that Appelleeβs accommodations were not reasonable for two\n\nreasons. First, she claims that the accommodation was improperly rescinded when her\n\nsupervisors concluded that the first plan was not working. Hannah asserts that the\n\n\n 12\n\nRehabilitation Act requires a collaborative process. Hannah argues that rather than\n\ncollaborating with her to identify a workable accommodation, Appellee unilaterally\n\ndecided that the first plan was not working, then unilaterally decided that Hannah should\n\nparticipate in EAP counseling instead. Although employers have a duty to engage with\n\ntheir employees in an βinteractive process to identify a reasonable accommodation,β\n\nWilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir. 2013), the employer βhas the\n\nultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations.β Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d\n\nat 415β16 (citing Hankins v. Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996)). Nonetheless,\n\neven under Hannahβs view of the record, Appellee did, in fact, collaborate with Hannah\n\nin establishing the first accommodation and only acted unilaterally when that\n\naccommodation did not work.\n\n Second, Hannah claims that a reasonable accommodation that she requested -- a\n\nleave of absence -- was improperly delayed. Hannah posits that she βsuffered immense\n\nemotional stress during this one month lapse of [Appelleeβs] compliance with the law.β\n\nAppellantβs Br. 37. This argument is without merit and is not supported by the record,\n\neven when viewed in the light most favorable to Hannah. Hannah first requested the\n\nleave of absence on April 9, 2015. Then, on April 13 -- just two business days later --\n\nHannah withdrew her request without explanation, telling her supervisor that her leave\n\nrequest was βon hold.β J.A. 170, 178. Hannah then renewed her request for leave on\n\nApril 21, and her request was approved on May 5. Thus, there was no βone month\n\nlapse,β since Hannahβs request was βon holdβ for nine days of that time.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\n During the remaining gap between Hannahβs request for leave and Appelleeβs\n\napproval of that request, Appellee referred Hannah to its counseling service. The\n\nRehabilitation Act does not require an employer to provide the exact accommodation that\n\nan employee requests. See Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 415 (βAn employer may reasonably\n\naccommodate an employee without providing the exact accommodation that the\n\nemployee requested.β). Further, the record demonstrates that Hannahβs supervisors were\n\nactively considering her request for leave during that time, and they did ultimately\n\napprove it less than a month after she first requested leave.\n\n For these reasons, granting summary judgment to Appellee on Hannahβs\n\nreasonable accommodation claim was proper.\n\n 2.\n\n Required Medical Examination\n\n Under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer βshall not require a medical\n\nexamination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is\n\nan individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such\n\nexamination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.β\n\n42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(A).\n\n\n\n\n 14\n\n a.\n\n Examination of a Job Applicant\n\n As an initial matter, Hannahβs arguments related to pre-employment medical\n\nexaminations under the Rehabilitation Act 4 miss the mark because Hannah was a current\n\nemployee, not a job applicant. Although Appellee knew Hannah was considering\n\napplying for permanent positions with Appellee at the time she was referred to EAP, she\n\nhad not yet done so. The evidence is clear that Appellee referred Hannah to EAP in lieu\n\nof disciplining her for her attendance issues in her then-current position, rather than as a\n\npre-employment medical examination. Moreover, the fact that Hannahβs attendance\n\nissues may have been related to her stress and frustration surrounding obtaining\n\npermanent employment with Appellee does not transform her EAP referral into a pre-\n\nemployment medical examination.\n\n b.\n\n Examination of a Current Employee\n\n Further, Hannah failed to demonstrate, much less create a genuine issue of\n\nmaterial fact, that EAP constituted a prohibited medical examination of a current\n\nemployee. We note that EAPβs policies make clear that EAP is intended to be used as a\n\nvoluntary counseling service, and not as a mandatory medical examination that would\n\n\n 4\n Subject to certain exceptions, an employer βshall not conduct a medical\nexamination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an\nindividual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.β 42 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 12112(d)(2)(A).\n\n\n\n 15\n\nviolate the Rehabilitation Act. See J.A. 130 (β[U]tilizing EAP is always voluntary and\n\ntherefore the employee has the right to decline to attend treatment, even if management-\n\nreferred.β). Additionally, Hannahβs EAP counselor repeatedly stated that she did not\n\nconduct a medical examination:\n\n I did not conduct a medical examination of [Hannah], and I\n did not conduct a mental health evaluation or diagnostic\n assessment because a) [Hannah] informed me she was already\n in treatment and b) . . . it is not in EAPβs purview to conduct a\n medical evaluation. I did not administer any medical or\n mental health tests or diagnostic assessment tools for the\n same reason. I was [n]ot tasked to diagnose or provide a\n second opinion; my role was to facilitate communication\n between [Hannah] and Management to resolve the problem\n presented in the Management Referral -- namely, improving\n attendance and notifying management when not attending\n work.\n\nId. at 188 (emphasis omitted).\n\n However, even if EAP constituted a mandatory medical examination under the\n\nfacts of this case, summary judgment to Appellee was still appropriate on this claim\n\nbecause Hannahβs referral to EAP was βjob-related and consistent with business\n\nnecessity.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(A). As we have stated, βwhether a mental\n\nexamination was βjob-related and consistent with business necessityβ is an objective\n\ninquiry.β Pence v. Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., 169 F. Appβx 808, 812 (4th Cir. 2006).\n\nβWe therefore do not resolve any dispute about what [Appelleeβs] subjective motivations\n\nwere for having [Hannah] examined by the EAP.β Id. An employerβs request for a\n\nmedical examination is job-related and consistent with business necessity when: β(1) the\n\nemployee requests an accommodation; (2) the employeeβs ability to perform the essential\n\n\n\n 16\n\nfunctions of the job is impaired; or (3) the employee poses a direct threat to himself or\n\nothers.β Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth., 763 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2014).\n\n Here, the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Hannah,\n\nsupports granting summary judgment because Appellee had a reasonable belief that\n\nHannahβs ability to perform the essential functions of her job was impaired by her\n\nrepeated issues with attendance and timely reporting. Hannah attempts to refute this by\n\nasserting that her job performance was excellent, but job performance alone does not\n\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact. Attendance was also an essential function of\n\nHannahβs job, one the record amply demonstrates she was unable to fulfill when Appellee\n\nreferred her to EAP. As we have stated:\n\n In addition to possessing the skills necessary to perform the\n job in question, an employee must be willing and able to\n demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.\n Except in the unusual case where an employee can effectively\n perform all work-related duties at home, an employee βwho\n does not come to work cannot perform any of his job\n functions, essential or otherwise.β Therefore, a regular and\n reliable level of attendance is a necessary element of most\n jobs.\n\nTyndall v. Natβl Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting\n\nWimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affβd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th\n\nCir. 1987)) (emphasis in original); see also Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 266 F.\n\nAppβx 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2007) (βJob performance is separate from the ability to show up\n\nfor work, an essential function of [Hannahβs] position.β).\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\n Accordingly, Appellee did not violate the Rehabilitation Act by referring Hannah\n\nto EAP, and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on this\n\nclaim.\n\n 3.\n\n Confidential Medical Information\n\n Under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer may βconduct voluntary medical\n\nexaminations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee\n\nhealth programβ and may βmake inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job-\n\nrelated functions.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(B). Any βinformation obtained regarding\n\nthe medical condition or history of the applicantβ -- that is, medical information -- must\n\nbe βcollected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and [must\n\nbe] treated as a confidential medical record.β Id. Β§ 12112(d)(3)(B); see also id.\n\nΒ§ 12112(d)(4)(C).\n\n Hannah alleges two separate Rehabilitation Act violations regarding her medical\n\ninformation: first, that Hannahβs supervisors wrongfully sought and disclosed\n\nconfidential medical information elicited from Hannah, and second, that the EAP\n\npsychologist wrongfully disclosed confidential medical information gathered from the\n\nEAP session to Hannahβs supervisors. In both instances, the district court correctly\n\ndetermined that Hannah failed to demonstrate that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation\n\nAct.\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\n a.\n\n Disclosures by Supervisors\n\n Hannah asserts that her supervisors disclosed her confidential medical information\n\nby writing in her EAP referral memo, β[e]arly in her tenure . . . and reaffirmed recently,\n\n[Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a psychiatrist and counselor and taking\n\nmedication for depression.β J.A. 413. Notably, Hannah voluntarily disclosed her\n\ndepression diagnosis to her supervisors. The Rehabilitation Act does not protect\n\ninformation shared voluntarily. See Reynolds v. Am. Natβl Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155\n\n(4th Cir. 2012) (finding the district court properly granted summary judgment on a\n\nconfidentiality claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act because the record βclearly\n\nshow[ed]β that the appellant βdisclosed his medical condition voluntarilyβ). Indeed,\n\nHannah voluntarily told at least four of her supervisors that she had been diagnosed with\n\ndepression. See J.A. 179 (Hannahβs interrogatory responses) (βI disclosed my diagnosis\n\nof depression to my supervisors Kelly G. in summer 2011, Ann W. in fall 2014; Art Z. in\n\nMarch 2015, and Roy P. in March 2015.β).\n\n Hannah argues that these disclosures were not voluntary because they were made\n\nin response to inquiries about her disability. But the evidence does not support or create\n\na genuine issue of fact about that argument. The record indicates that only the March\n\n2015 disclosure was made in response to an inquiry, and that inquiry was not medical -- it\n\nwas about her attendance. See J.A. 23 (Hannahβs deposition testimony) (β[H]e was\n\nconcerned about unpredictability in my schedule. . . . I told him at that time I had\n\ndepression.β).\n\n\n 19\n\n Hannah asserts that this inquiry about her attendance was de facto an inquiry into\n\nher depression because (according to Hannah) the inquiring supervisor knew she was\n\ndepressed and knew her attendance issues were linked to her depression. Hannah cites\n\nonly out-of-circuit cases for the proposition that asking a question βlikely to elicitβ\n\ninformation about a disability amounts to a medical inquiry. See Harrison v. Benchmark\n\nElecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that whether an\n\ninquiry following a failed drug test was likely to elicit information about a disability in\n\nviolation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (βADAβ) 5 presented a question of fact\n\nfor a jury to resolve); Fleming v. State Univ. of N.Y., 502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 338 (E.D.N.Y.\n\n2007) (concluding the plaintiff pled facts sufficient to state a claim for failure to\n\nconfidentially maintain medical information under the ADA where the plaintiff alleged\n\nthat his disclosure of his sickle cell anemia was not voluntary because his supervisor\n\ncalled him while he was in the hospital and asked him why he was there).\n\n First, the record does not support Hannahβs argument that the supervisor in\n\nquestion knew about Hannahβs depression before she disclosed it to him. Hannah points\n\nto the supervisorβs statement that when he spoke to Hannah on the phone before\n\nconfronting her about her attendance, βshe didnβt sound well on the other end of the\n\nphone.β J.A. 466. Hannah also points to her supervisorβs statement that Hannahβs\n\nβdemeanor [wa]s sad, very flat, and almost trance like.β Id. at 413. This is not enough to\n\n 5\n βTo the extent possible, we construe the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to impose\nsimilar requirements.β Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461\n(4th Cir. 2012).\n\n\n\n 20\n\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inquiring supervisor knew\n\nHannah had been medically diagnosed with clinical depression, or whether by asking\n\nabout her attendance, the supervisor was fishing for medical information about Hannahβs\n\nillness.\n\n Second, even if Hannahβs supervisor had an inkling that Hannah may have had\n\ndepression, this is not evidence that he knew asking about her repeated absences and\n\ntardiness -- indisputably bad work behavior -- would elicit medical information related to\n\nher depression. Indeed, Hannahβs absences could have been the result of a world of\n\nother, nonmedical possibilities, such as transportation issues or oversleeping. Adopting\n\nHannahβs argument would require us to find that where an employer might know that a\n\nparticular bad work behavior is connected to a medical condition, the employer cannot\n\ninquire into the behavior without running afoul of the ADA and Rehabilitation Actβs\n\nprohibition on medical inquiries. We have held expressly the opposite: β[T]he ADA does\n\nnot require an employer to simply ignore an employeeβs blatant and persistent\n\nmisconduct, even where that behavior is potentially tied to a medical condition.β Vannoy\n\nv. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Jones v. Am.\n\nPostal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding the ADA does not\n\nβrequire an employer to ignore such egregious misconduct by one of its employees, even\n\nif the misconduct was caused by the employeeβs disabilityβ)).\n\n\n\n\n 21\n\n b.\n\n Disclosures by EAP Psychologist\n\n Hannah also argues that, in addition to her supervisors disclosing her depression\n\ndiagnosis internally, the EAP psychologist disclosed βadditional, unique information\n\nfrom what Hannah had already told her supervisors.β Appellantβs Br. 51. Specifically,\n\nHannah alleges that the EAP psychologist told her supervisor that Hannah was concerned\n\nabout Appelleeβs records retention policies, and that Hannahβs βdifficulties in getting to\n\nwork were the result of a lack of motivation, not related to depression.β J.A. 540.\n\n Perhaps that is true. The record does indicate that the EAP psychologist shared\n\nsome information with Hannahβs supervisors and maybe it was unique information. See\n\nJ.A. 192 (EAP psychologist statement) (noting that the psychologist provided Hannahβs\n\nsupervisors updates regarding Hannahβs βEAP attendanceβ and βcooperation and\n\nprogress toward resolving the referral issuesβ). But there is no evidence that the EAP\n\npsychologist shared medical information. To the contrary, the EAP psychologist insisted,\n\nagain and again, that she did not share any confidential medical information. See id. at\n\n190 (noting that the psychologist, who is not a doctor, βdid not disclose any confidential\n\nmedical informationβ to anyone). Of note, Hannah did not point to any evidence in the\n\nrecord contradicting the psychologistβs assertions.\n\n Therefore, the information shared by the EAP psychologist did not trigger the\n\nRehabilitation Actβs confidentiality protections because the record indicates that the EAP\n\npsychologist shared only nonmedical information.\n\n\n\n\n 22\n\n c.\n\n Non-Reliance on Medical Information\n\n Finally, even if either Hannahβs supervisors or the EAP psychologist disclosed\n\nHannahβs medical information, Appellee still did not violate the Rehabilitation Act\n\nbecause Appellee did not rely on Hannahβs depression diagnosis or any other medical\n\ninformation in deciding not to hire Hannah for the Cyber position. Rather, the record\n\noverwhelmingly indicates that Appelleeβs decision was based on Hannahβs attendance\n\nissues. Accordingly, Hannah has not demonstrated that Appellee violated the\n\nRehabilitation Act by disclosing or misusing confidential medical information.\n\n 4.\n\n Discrimination\n\n Rehabilitation Act claims for discrimination are reviewed under the McDonnell\n\nDouglas burden-shifting framework. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 430 (4th Cir.\n\n2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)); Perry v.\n\nComput. Scis. Corp., 429 F. Appβx 218, 219β20 (4th Cir. 2011). Under that framework,\n\nHannah has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See\n\nPerry, 429 F. Appβx at 220. To establish this prima facie case, Hannah must show that:\n\n(1) she is disabled; (2) she was otherwise qualified for the position; and (3) she suffered\n\nan adverse employment action solely on the basis of her disability. See id. (citing\n\nConstantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir.\n\n2005)).\n\n\n\n\n 23\n\n If Hannah establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Appellee to provide a\n\nlegitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. See Perry, 429 F. Appβx at 220. If\n\nAppellee provides such a reason, Hannah βbears the ultimate burden of persuasionβ and\n\nβmust show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was a pretext\n\nfor discrimination.β Id.\n\n a.\n\n Establishing Pretext\n\n Even assuming that Hannah established a prima facie case of discrimination\n\n(which Appellee disputes), she cannot succeed on her claim that Appellee discriminated\n\nagainst her by not hiring her for a permanent position because she did not sufficiently\n\nrebut Appelleeβs proffered reason for rejecting her application, as required under the final\n\nstep of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Perry, 429 F. Appβx at\n\n220.\n\n Appellee presented evidence demonstrating that Hannahβs perpetual issues with\n\nattendance, timeliness, and reporting absences to her superiors were the bases of its\n\ndecision not to hire her for the permanent position. Attempting to expose that\n\nexplanation as a ruse, Hannah pointed to a purported inconsistency between the sworn\n\nstatement that Mark Ewing provided during the Equal Employment Opportunity\n\nCommission (βEEOCβ) investigation of Hannahβs case and an email he sent more than a\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\nyear earlier. In the sworn statement, signed on April 26, 2016, 6 Ewing asserts he βhad no\n\nknowledge of [Hannahβs] disability.β J.A. 650. But in the email, sent on June 30, 2015,\n\nEwing references two memos that he received from Hannahβs supervisors, both of which\n\nnote Hannahβs depression. See id. at 413 (April 9, 2015 memo) (βEarly in her tenure . . .\n\nand reaffirmed recently, [Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a psychiatrist\n\nand counselor and taking medication for depression.β); id. at 606 (April 23, 2015 memo)\n\n(βWhile . . . medical considerations (i.e., depression and/or ADD) do make this situation\n\nworse, these factors are under her control based upon treatment plans with her\n\npsychologist and psychiatric care providers.β). Underscoring the significance of this\n\ninconsistency, Hannah argues, is the fact that Ewing did not provide the June 30, 2015\n\nemail to the EEOC. Hannah argues that the inconsistency, coupled with Ewingβs failure\n\nto disclose the email evidencing the inconsistency, illustrates βclear pretext.β Appellantβs\n\nBr. 27.\n\n Despite Hannahβs arguments to the contrary, this apparent discrepancy does not\n\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact that Appelleeβs proffered reason for rejecting\n\nHannahβs application is pretextual. First, nothing in the record indicates that Ewing had\n\nfirst-hand knowledge of Hannahβs disability. Although the memos mention that Hannah\n\nself-reported that she had depression, the second memo also describes Hannahβs\n\ndepression as βunder her control.β J.A. 606. Indeed, Ewingβs email suggests that he did\n\n\n 6\n The excerpt of the statement that is included in the J.A. does not include the date.\nThis date comes from Hannahβs brief. See Appellantβs Br. 26.\n\n\n\n 25\n\nnot know that Hannah had an ongoing disability. See J.A. 635 (βI am informed that EAP\n\nconcluded that [Hannah] does not have a medical problem, rather she is a disciplinary\n\nproblem.β).\n\n More significantly, Hannahβs asserted contradiction between Ewingβs EEOC\n\nstatements and his June 30, 2015 email do not create a genuine issue of material fact\n\nabout pretext because Ewingβs email and the memos written by Hannahβs supervisors\n\nfocus on Hannahβs attendance problems, not on her disability. See J.A. 413 (April 9,\n\n2015 memo) (noting that β[Hannahβs] schedule has become increasingly erraticβ and that\n\nβfrequent absences and late arrivals [have begun] to affect her assigned unit and\n\nindividual performanceβ); id. at 606 (April 23, 2015 memo) (describing Hannahβs history\n\nof attendance issues and Appelleeβs attempts to accommodate Hannah and noting that,\n\ndespite those attempts, β[Hannahβs] late attendance has continuedβ); id. at 635β36\n\n(Ewingβs June 30, 2015 email) (detailing Hannahβs problem with βattendance at work,β\n\nnoting that Hannahβs βabsences and late arrivals were affecting her assigned staff element\n\nand her individual performance,β and concluding that Hannahβs βrecent performance is\n\nnot consistent with a potentially good employee.β).\n\n Accordingly, Hannah did not point to any genuine issue of material fact that\n\nAppelleeβs purported basis for not hiring her was merely a pretext for discriminating\n\nagainst her on the basis of her depression.\n\n\n\n\n 26\n\n b.\n\n Appelleeβs Nondiscriminatory Explanation\n\n i.\n\n Moreover, the record indicates that Appelleeβs proffered explanation for not hiring\n\nHannah for the Cyber position is genuine, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory.\n\n As the district court concluded, a continuous attendance issue is a legitimate\n\nreason for withholding an employment benefit. See Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213 (finding an\n\nemployee who cannot satisfy their employerβs attendance policy cannot be considered\n\nβqualifiedβ for the purposes of the ADA). Hannah might have been exceptionally\n\ntalented and substantively good at her job, but as noted above, β[i]n addition to\n\npossessing the skills necessary to perform the job in question, an employee must be\n\nwilling and able to demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.β Id.\n\n Hannah asserts that βserious questions of fact exist as to whether Hannah even had\n\nβsignificant attendance and reporting problems.ββ Appellantβs Br. 28. But the record\n\nevidences no less than 13 attendance issues that occurred in the 46 days between\n\nAppelleeβs first attempt to accommodate Hannah on March 19, 2015, and the revised\n\nplan made on May 4, 2015. Compare J.A. 114, 174 (noting Appelleeβs March 19, 2015\n\nmeeting with her supervisor and original accommodation asking her to arrive at work by\n\n10 AM or report to a supervisor), with id. at 556 (indicating four unexcused absences and\n\n\n\n\n 27\n\nnine late arrivals between March 19 and April 29 that Appellee failed to timely report). 7\n\nIn light of Hannahβs failure to arrive or call in before 10 AM 13 times in 46 days, there is\n\nno genuine issue of material fact about Hannahβs significant attendance and reporting\n\nproblem.\n\n ii.\n\n Hannah also argues that because her disability was the cause of her attendance\n\nissues, Appellee could not withhold an employment benefit from her on that basis. We\n\nhave no doubt that Hannahβs struggle with depression was the cause of her attendance\n\nissues, and we are sympathetic to the toll this condition took on a highly talented\n\n\n 7\n The record reflects the following late arrivals and absences for Hannah between\nMarch 19, 2015, and May 4, 2015: (1) April 2: Hannah emailed at 11:02 AM indicating\nshe would arrive to work by 12 PM; (2) April 8: Hannah emailed at 11:05 AM indicating\nshe would arrive to work by 12 PM; Hannah emailed again at 1:55 PM indicating she\nwould not be coming in that day; (3) April 9: Hannah emailed at 11:11 AM indicating her\ncar was towed and she would arrive at work by 1 PM; (4) April 13: Hannah emailed at\n10:58 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 11:30 AM; (5) April 14: Hannah\nemailed at 11:08 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 12 PM; (6) April 16:\nHannahβs supervisor emailed Hannah at 10:18 AM looking for her; when Hannah was\nreached at 11 AM, she indicated she would arrive to work by 12 PM; (7) April 20:\nHannah emailed at 10:45 AM indicating she would arrive to work by 11:30 AM;\nHannahβs supervisor confirmed her arrival at 12:50 PM; (8) April 22: Hannah emailed at\n11:01 AM indicating she would arrive at work after 12 PM; Hannah emailed again at\n12:41 PM indicating she would arrive at 1 PM due to traffic; (9) April 23: Hannah\nemailed at 10:59 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 12 PM; Hannah emailed\nagain at 12:56 PM indicating she would not be coming in that day due to a migraine; (10)\nApril 24: Hannah emailed at 11:02 AM indicating she would arrive at work in the\nafternoon; Hannah later called at 3:24 PM indicating she would not be coming in that\nday; (11) April 27: Hannahβs supervisor emailed indicating Hannah arrived at work by 11\nAM; (12) April 28: Hannah emailed at 10:52 AM indicating she would arrive at work by\n11:30 AM; (13) April 29: Hannah emailed at 11:49 AM indicating she would not come in\nto work that day. See J.A. 556.\n\n\n\n 28\n\nemployee. However, Appellee was nevertheless permitted to take Hannahβs attendance\n\nissues into account in its decision whether to hire her for the Cyber position. To reiterate,\n\nthe Rehabilitation Act βdoes not require an employer to simply ignore an employeeβs\n\nblatant and persistent misconduct, even where that behavior is potentially tied to a\n\nmedical condition.β Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 305; cf. Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104\n\nF.3d 683, 686 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (βMisconduct -- even misconduct related to a disability\n\n-- is not itself a disability, and an employer is free to fire an employee on that basis.β).\n\n iii.\n\n Finally, Hannah argues that by the time Appellee made the decision not to hire\n\nher, her attendance had improved. She asserts that between returning from her leave of\n\nabsence on June 1, 2015, and learning that she was not selected for the permanent\n\nposition on June 17, 2015, she βhad shown she was able to perform the essential\n\nfunctions of the job and had no current attendance issues.β Appellantβs Br. 32.\n\n Hannah is correct that in a failure to hire case, the relevant inquiry is the\n\ncandidateβs performance βat the time of the employment decision or in the immediate\n\nfuture.β Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 F. Appβx 49, 57 (4th Cir. 2002). However, Appellee\n\nwas not required to consider the two weeks before the decision was made in a vacuum.\n\nMoreover, it is not the job of this court to decide whether Appellee made the right choice\n\nby not hiring Hannah for the Cyber position. Rather, our job is simply to decide whether\n\nAppellee made an illegal choice. See Feldman v. Law Enfβt Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339,\n\n350 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that we do not βsit as a kind of super-personnel\n\ndepartment weighing the prudence of employment decisionsβ).\n\n\n 29\n\n Because Hannah not did demonstrate that Appelleeβs purported basis for not hiring\n\nher was merely a pretext for discriminating against her on the basis of her depression, and\n\nbecause Hannahβs attendance problem was a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason to\n\nnot hire her, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate on her Rehabilitation\n\nAct discrimination claim.\n\n B.\n\n FMLA Claims\n\n The FMLA gives employees with qualifying medical conditions the right to take\n\nup to 12 weeks of leave during a 12-month period β[b]ecause of a serious health\n\ncondition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions ofβ her job. 29\n\nU.S.C. Β§ 2612(a)(1)(D). βThe employee has an accompanying right to return to the same\n\nor an equivalent position at the conclusion of the leave period.β Reed v. Buckeye Fire\n\nEquip., 241 F. Appβx 917, 923 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2614(a)(1)).\n\n As discussed below, as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim, Hannah illustrates\n\na genuine issue of material fact regarding the notice of her depression and her desire to\n\ntake a leave of absence. But, for the same reasons Hannahβs Rehabilitation Act\n\ndiscrimination claim fails, Hannahβs FMLA retaliation claim fails as well.\n\n 1.\n\n Interference\n\n a.\n\n The district court incorrectly concluded that Hannahβs disclosure of her depression\n\nwas not sufficient to put Appellee on notice that Hannah could have qualified for FMLA\n\n\n 30\n\nprotections. Accordingly, summary judgment was not warranted as to Hannahβs FMLA\n\ninterference claim.\n\n βAn employee is mandated to provide notice to her employer when she requires\n\nFMLA leave.β Brushwood v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 520 F. Appβx 154, 157 (4th Cir.\n\n2013) (quoting Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 382 (4th Cir. 2001)). That said, an\n\nemployee need not specifically invoke the FMLA to benefit from its protections. See\n\nDotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 295 (4th Cir. 2009). Proper notice does not require\n\nβany magic words.β Id. Indeed, β[w]hen an employee seeks leave for the first time for\n\na[n] FMLA-qualifying reason, the employee need not expressly assert rights under the\n\nFMLA or even mention the FMLA.β 29 C.F.R. Β§ 825.302. Proper notice merely βmakes\n\nthe employer awareβ that the employee needs potentially FMLA-qualifying leave.\n\nBrushwood, 520 F. Appβx at 157. And once the employer is on notice of the employeeβs\n\nneed to take potentially FMLA-qualifying leave, βthe responsibility falls on the employer\n\nto inquire further about whether the employee is seeking FMLA leave.β Dotson, 558\n\nF.3d at 295.\n\n A reasonable jury could find that Hannahβs disclosure of her depression and her\n\nApril 9, 2015 request for psychiatrist-recommended leave was sufficient to trigger\n\nAppelleeβs responsibility to inquire further about whether Hannah was seeking FMLA\n\nleave. We have held that disclosure of a potentially FMLA-qualifying circumstance and\n\nan inquiry into leave options is sufficient to create a material question of fact regarding\n\nwhether an employee triggered her employerβs FMLA obligations. See Dotson, 558 F.3d\n\nat 291, 295 (finding that an employee informing his employer that he was adopting a\n\n\n 31\n\nchild and speaking to a human resources representative about βtaking leave during the\n\nadoption processβ was sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether the employerβs\n\nFMLA-inquiry duties had been triggered).\n\n b.\n\n Here, Hannah informed her supervisors of her depression on multiple occasions.\n\nSee, e.g., J.A. 413 (April 9, 2015 memo from Hannahβs supervisors) (βEarly in her tenure\n\n. . . and reaffirmed recently, [Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a\n\npsychiatrist and counselor and taking medication for depression.β). 8 And on April 9,\n\n2015, Hannah explained to her supervisors that her psychiatrist recommended that she\n\ntake four weeks of medical leave. Hannahβs disclosures about her depression and her\n\npsychiatristβs recommendation could lead a reasonable jury to find that Appellee was on\n\nnotice that Hannah was inquiring about potentially FMLA-qualifying leave, triggering\n\nAppelleeβs responsibility to inquire further about whether Hannah was seeking FMLA\n\nleave. 9\n\n c.\n\n Appellee argues that Hannahβs interference claim fails because Hannah cannot\n\ndemonstrate that her depression was βa serious health condition.β Appelleeβs Resp. 40β\n\n41; see also 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2612(a)(1)(D). But that argument is premature. Appellee has\n\n 8\n Indeed, Hannahβs supervisors had βgrown increasingly alarmed at the overall\nchange in [Hannahβs] demeanor.β J.A. 413.\n 9\n It is undisputed that Appellee did not inquire about whether the leave should be\nclassified as FMLA-protected.\n\n\n\n 32\n\nnot shown that it made any inquiry into whether Hannahβs depression was an FMLA-\n\nqualifying serious health condition. Appelleeβs argument βwould allow it to use its own\n\nfailure to determine whether leave should be designated as FMLA-protected to block\n\nliability.β Dotson, 558 F.3d at 295. We have refused βto allow an employer to take\n\nadvantage of its own lapse in such a way.β Id.\n\n d.\n\n Additionally, Appelleeβs failure to provide notice of the availability of FMLA\n\nleave prejudiced Hannah because if she had been aware of the availability of FMLA\n\nleave, she could have structured her leave differently. The FMLA βprovides no relief\n\nunless the employee has been prejudiced by the violation.β Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 302\n\n(citing Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)). βPrejudice may\n\nbe gleaned from evidence that had the plaintiff received the required (but omitted)\n\ninformation regarding his FMLA rights, he would have structured his leave differently.β\n\nId.\n\n Here, the record contains evidence that if Hannah had known that the FMLA\n\nprotected her position, she would have used only sick leave for her leave of absence. See\n\nJ.A. 664 (Hannahβs declaration) (βHad I known I could have chosen to take sick leave for\n\nthe entire period, I would have elected to do so.β). Instead, she used a combination of\n\nsick leave and annual time to take four weeks off. According to Hannah, β[u]nlike\n\nannual leave, sick leave is not paid out at the end of an employeeβs service, resulting in a\n\nloss of a benefit worth at least $20,000.β Id. Based on Hannahβs testimony, a jury could\n\n\n\n\n 33\n\nfind that Hannah was prejudiced by Appelleeβs failure to inquire into the availability of\n\nFMLA leave and thus interfered with her FMLA rights.\n\n For these reasons, Hannah has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that\n\nshould have precluded summary judgment on her FMLA interference claim.\n\n 2.\n\n Retaliation\n\n As for Hannahβs FMLA retaliation claim, however, the district court correctly\n\nconcluded that like her discrimination claim brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act,\n\nHannah did not sufficiently rebut Appelleeβs legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for not\n\nhiring Hannah for the Cyber position.\n\n The FMLA prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee for\n\nexercising her FMLA rights. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2615(a)(2). As relevant here, βemployers\n\ncannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions.β 29\n\nC.F.R. Β§ 825.220(c). Courts analyze FMLA retaliation claims, like discrimination claims\n\nbrought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting\n\nframework. See Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013). To\n\nestablish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that β(1)\n\nshe engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action\n\nagainst her; and (3) there was a causal link between the two events.β Adams v. Anne\n\nArundel Cty. Pub. Schs., 789 F.3d 422, 429 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks\n\nomitted). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant\n\nto provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for taking the employment action at issue.\n\n\n 34\n\nId. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the\n\ndefendantβs proffered reason is pretextual. Id.\n\n Even assuming Hannah demonstrated a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation,\n\nsummary judgment was proper because she failed to rebut Appelleeβs legitimate,\n\nnonretaliatory reason for not hiring her for the Cyber position. Appellee asserts that it\n\nrelied on Hannahβs attendance issues in deciding not to hire her for the position, and the\n\nevidence in the record supports that assertion. See J.A. 635β36 (Ewingβs June 30, 2015\n\nemail expressing concerns about Hannahβs application for the Cyber position) (noting,\n\nβdespite some apparently solid performance while on the Snowden project,β Appellee\n\nhad βa consistent history of issues with [Hannah] over many monthsβ regarding Hannahβs\n\nβattendance at work and attitudeβ); id. at 219 (Ewingβs deposition testimony) (βThe\n\nprimary reason that I was concerned [about Hannahβs application] was the fact that her\n\nconduct was extremely negative at the point of time we were making a hiring decision for\n\npermanent employment status.β). Hannah points to no evidence that adequately\n\nundermines Appelleeβs proffered nonretaliatory reason for not hiring her. 10\n\n Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Hannahβs\n\nFMLA retaliation claim.\n\n\n 10\n Hannah again argues, as she did in the context of her claim of discrimination\nunder the Rehabilitation Act, that the βinconsistencyβ between the sworn statement\nEwing provided during the EEOC investigation of Hannahβs case and an email he sent\nmore than a year earlier exposes Appelleeβs proffered reason for not hiring her for the\npermanent position as pretextual. For the same reasons explained above, that argument\nfails.\n\n\n\n 35\n\n IV.\n\n For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court as to Hannahβs\n\nRehabilitation Act claims and FMLA retaliation claim. We vacate the grant of summary\n\njudgment as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim because there is a genuine issue of\n\nfact as to whether Hannahβs disclosure of her depression was sufficient to put Appellee\n\non notice that Hannah could have qualified for FMLA protections. Accordingly, we\n\nremand for further proceedings as to that claim.\n\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED\n\n\n\n\n 36\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: HANNAH P., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel COATS, Director of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence McLean, VA, Defendant-Appellee, and Mark Ewing, in His Personal Capacity McLean, VA, Defendant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-1943\\n\\n\\nHANNAH P.,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDANIEL COATS, Director of the Office of The Director of National Intelligence\\nMcLean, VA,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee,\\n\\n and\\n\\nMARK EWING, in his personal capacity McLean, VA,\\n\\n Defendant.\\n\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nAlexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:16-cv-01030-CMH-IDD)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 19, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Thacker\\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Quattlebaum joined. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a\\nseparate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\\n\\nARGUED: Timothy Bosson, BOSSON LEGAL GROUP, Fairfax, Virginia, for\\nAppellant. Caroline D. Lopez, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Chad A. Readler, Principal Deputy\\nAssistant Attorney General, Marleigh D. Dover, Civil Division, UNITED STATES\\nDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Dana J. Boente, United States\\nAttorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for\\nAppellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\nTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Appellant Hannah P. 1 (βHannahβ), a former employee of the Office of the Director\\n\\nof National Intelligence (βAppelleeβ), asserts that Appellee discriminated against her\\n\\npursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (βRehabilitation Actβ), 29 U.S.C. Β§ 701, et\\n\\nseq., and violated the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (βFMLAβ), 29 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 2601, et seq., by not hiring her for a permanent position. The district court granted\\n\\nsummary judgment in Appelleeβs favor as to all claims.\\n\\n For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district courtβs judgment as to the\\n\\nRehabilitation Act and FMLA retaliation claims. However, because a genuine issue of\\n\\nmaterial fact remains as to whether Hannah provided notice of her disability and interest\\n\\nin FMLA leave sufficient to trigger Appelleeβs duty to inquire, we hold that summary\\n\\njudgment as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim was not warranted. Accordingly, we\\n\\nvacate that part of the district courtβs judgment and remand Hannahβs FMLA interference\\n\\nclaim for further proceedings.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n In March 2011, Appellee hired Hannah for a five-year term as an operations\\n\\nanalyst. In that position, Hannah participated in βlong-term, in-depth studies into issues\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Pursuant to a protective order, Hannah is identified by her first name and last\\ninitial.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\nthat had particular budgetary importance for the [c]ommunity.β J.A. 18. 2 Hannah\\n\\ngenerally received glowing reviews from her supervisors. See, e.g., id. at 412 (describing\\n\\nHannahβs performance prior to 2015 as βoutstandingβ and noting her βenergy/drive,\\n\\ntechnical competence, superb communication and networking skills, and superior\\n\\nanalytic tradecraftβ); id. at 350 (describing Hannah as βa high-performing employeeβ); id.\\n\\nat 391β410 (describing, repeatedly, various elements of Hannahβs performance as\\n\\nβexcellentβ and βoutstandingβ).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n A few months after she was hired, Hannah was diagnosed with depression.\\n\\nHannah immediately informed at least two of her supervisors of her diagnosis, but she\\n\\ndid not request any accommodations at that time. Hannah treated her depression by\\n\\nseeing a counselor and a psychiatrist and by taking prescribed medication.\\n\\n In November 2013, Hannah was assigned to coordinate the responses of the\\n\\nNational Intelligence Director and Principal Deputy Director to Edward Snowdenβs\\n\\nunauthorized disclosures. 3 This role was βhigh stressβ and required βfrequent long hours\\n\\nand weekend work coupled with meeting tight deadlines and dealing with a demanding\\n\\n 2\\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\\nappeal.\\n 3\\n In 2013, National Security Agency subcontractor Edward Snowden leaked βthe\\nbiggest cache of top-secret documents in history,β which revealed numerous global\\nsurveillance programs run by the United States government. Ewen MacAskill & Alex\\nHern, Edward Snowden: βThe People Are Still Powerless, but Now Theyβre Aware,β\\nGuardian (June 4, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jun/04/edward-\\nsnowden-people-still-powerless-but-aware.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\n[National Security Council] customer.β J.A. 412. In fact, to accommodate the schedule\\n\\nchange that this role required, Appellee moved Hannah to a βmaxi flexβ schedule. Id. at\\n\\n350β51. A βmaxi flexβ schedule requires an analyst to work a certain number of hours --\\n\\n80 hours over a two-week period -- but does not dictate the exact hours that the analyst\\n\\nmust work per day. For Hannah, that meant starting and ending work later than\\n\\ntraditional business hours.\\n\\n The Snowden assignment lasted 18 months and completed in January 2015.\\n\\nHowever, Hannah continued her atypical working hours beyond the completion of the\\n\\nSnowden assignment. Hannahβs supervisor βwas expectingβ that when the Snowden\\n\\nassignment ended, Hannahβs hours βmight become more normal.β J.A. 353. However,\\n\\nfor the first few months, he did not communicate with Hannah about returning to normal\\n\\nbusiness hours. Rather, he explained, he was βprimarily concerned about establishing\\n\\nwhat [Hannahβs] next task was going to be.β Id.\\n\\n By March 2015, Hannahβs co-workers perceived her schedule to be βerratic.β J.A.\\n\\n413. Hannah arrived to work well after normal business hours and racked up numerous\\n\\nunplanned absences. On some occasions Hannah was βextremely late,β sometimes\\n\\narriving after 2 PM. Id. On other occasions Hannah was unreachable for hours, often\\n\\nmissing and failing to return βrepeated phone calls to her cell and home phone.β Id.\\n\\nWhen Hannahβs supervisors were able to reach her, they noted that she seemed βeither\\n\\nlethargic or almost unconcernedβ about her lateness and absences. Id. They also noted\\n\\nthat her demeanor was βsad, very flat, and almost trance like.β Id. Around that time,\\n\\nHannah informed her supervisors that she βhad a recent change in medication.β Id.\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\n C.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Appellee made some accommodations for Hannah following the Snowden\\n\\nassignment. First, after consulting with Hannah in January 2015, Appellee lightened\\n\\nHannahβs workload βto give her a chance to decompressβ from the stress of the Snowden\\n\\nassignment. J.A. 413 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, multiple of Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors had βinformal counseling sessionsβ with her βto discuss any issues that she\\n\\nmight be havingβ and to βurge herβ to notify them if she was going to be late or absent.\\n\\nId.\\n\\n On March 19, 2015, one of Hannahβs supervisors met with Hannah directly to\\n\\naddress her attendance issues. Together, Hannah and her supervisors developed a plan to\\n\\nreconcile Hannahβs depression with Appelleeβs staffing needs. According to that plan,\\n\\nHannah was to arrive to work by 10 AM. If she was going to be absent or later than 10\\n\\nAM, Hannah was to contact one of her supervisors in advance. If Hannah had not arrived\\n\\nat work or contacted a supervisor by 11 AM, a supervisor would call her to determine\\n\\nwhen she would arrive.\\n\\n But, Hannah did not follow the plan. For example, the very next day after she and\\n\\nher supervisors developed the plan, Hannah emailed her supervisors at 11:05 AM to\\n\\ninform them that she would be arriving after 12 PM. Similarly, on March 31, Hannah\\n\\nemailed her supervisors at 11:56 AM to inform them that she would not be coming into\\n\\nwork at all that day. On April 1, after Hannah had not arrived to work or contacted her\\n\\nsupervisors, Hannahβs second-level supervisor called her at 12:30 PM, at which time\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\nHannah reported βbeing unable to just get going.β J.A. 413. Later that day, when\\n\\nHannah finally arrived to work, her supervisor informed her that the plan they created\\n\\nwas not working.\\n\\n At that same time, her supervisor revised the plan to require Hannah to arrive at\\n\\nwork by 10 AM or report to her supervisors in advance if she was going to be late or\\n\\nabsent. This βput the onusβ on Hannah to contact her supervisors, rather than asking her\\n\\nsupervisors to contact her if she had not arrived at work by 11 AM. J.A. 90. Hannah\\n\\nfailed to follow this modified plan as well. In fact, she failed to comply on April 2 and\\n\\nApril 3, the two days following the meeting where the plan was modified.\\n\\n According to Appellee, Hannahβs timeliness and attendance issues impacted her\\n\\nperformance, the performance of her peers, and the performance of her supervisors. Per\\n\\nAppellee, Hannahβs βerraticβ schedule was βnoted by her teammatesβ and affected βunit\\n\\ncohesion.β J.A. 413. Hannahβs failure to report her tardiness and absences as well as her\\n\\nunresponsiveness required her management team to spend βsignificant time and energyβ\\n\\ntracking her down. Id. Additionally, because of Hannahβs absences, Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors were often forced to assign work that might have been assigned to Hannah to\\n\\nother analysts.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n On April 9, 2015, just three weeks after the initial work plan was developed to\\n\\nattempt to accommodate Hannahβs needs, Hannah again met with her supervisors. At\\n\\nthis meeting, Hannahβs supervisors informed her that they were referring her to the\\n\\nEmployee Assistance Program (βEAPβ). EAP is a voluntary counseling service for\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\nemployees and their family members that provides βfree, confidential, short-term mental\\n\\nhealth[,] financial, and addictions counseling and referral to cleared community\\n\\nproviders.β J.A. 132. Hannahβs supervisors made an EAP appointment for her for the\\n\\nfollowing day, Friday, April 10. At that time, Hannah explained to her supervisors that\\n\\nher psychiatrist recommended she take four weeks of medical leave. But, Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors insisted that she would need to meet with EAP before they could approve her\\n\\nrequest for medical leave.\\n\\n On the next business day following Hannahβs EAP session -- Monday, April 13 --\\n\\nHannahβs supervisor told Hannah he was willing to authorize her to take medical leave.\\n\\nHowever, at that point, Hannah informed her supervisor that her leave request was βon\\n\\nhold,β without further explanation. J.A. 170, 178.\\n\\n On April 16, Hannahβs supervisor noted in an email that he had an βextendedβ 40-\\n\\nminute discussion with Hannahβs EAP psychologist. J.A. 604. Hannah alleges that the\\n\\nEAP psychologist βshared with [Hannahβs supervisor] details of what Hannah had\\n\\nrevealed in confidence at the EAP sessions.β Appellantβs Br. 17. Specifically, Hannah\\n\\nalleges that the EAP psychologist told her supervisor that Hannah was concerned about\\n\\nAppelleeβs records retention policies, and that Hannahβs βdifficulties in getting to work\\n\\nwere the result of a lack of motivation, not related to depression.β J.A. 540.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Despite Hannahβs participation in EAP, her attendance problems persisted. For\\n\\nexample, on April 13, 2015, Hannah emailed her supervisors at 10:58 AM to inform them\\n\\nthat she would arrive to work by 11:30 AM. Similarly, on April 14, Hannah emailed her\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\nsupervisors at 11:08 AM to inform them that she would arrive to work by 12 PM. That\\n\\nday, Hannahβs supervisors were not able to confirm her arrival to work until after 1:50\\n\\nPM.\\n\\n A week after advising her supervisors that her leave request was βon hold,β on\\n\\nApril 21, Hannah renewed her request for four weeks of medical leave. Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors approved that request on May 5. They required her to use her annual leave to\\n\\naccount for four-fifths of the four week leave period, and allowed her one day of sick\\n\\nleave per week to make up the rest. Hannah began her leave the day it was approved.\\n\\n On May 4, the day before Hannah began her leave of absence, Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors gave her a letter of expectations. That letter confirmed the revised attendance\\n\\nand reporting plan. This plan required Hannah to arrive to work by 10 AM or report to\\n\\nher supervisors by 9:30 AM if she was going to be late or absent.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n During this time, Hannah applied for three permanent positions within the Office\\n\\nof the Director of National Intelligence. In February 2015, Hannah interviewed for two\\n\\npermanent positions for which she was not selected. Shortly before taking her leave of\\n\\nabsence in May 2015, Hannah applied for a third full-time position, the Program Mission\\n\\nManager Cyber Position (βCyber positionβ). She was interviewed for the Cyber position\\n\\non June 9, eight days after she returned from leave, and the interview panel recommended\\n\\nher for the position. Her application was then forwarded to Appelleeβs Chief\\n\\nManagement Officer, Mark Ewing, who recommended that Hannah not be selected for\\n\\nthe position βat this time,β stating that Hannahβs βrecent performance is not consistent\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\nwith a potentially good employee.β J.A. 232. Hannah was informed that her application\\n\\nhad been rejected in early July 2015, and she did not apply for any other positions.\\n\\nHannah completed her five-year term with Appellee in March 2016.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Hannah exhausted her administrative remedies and filed this lawsuit on August 12,\\n\\n2016. She alleged that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation Act in five ways: (1) failing\\n\\nto accommodate her mental illness; (2) creating a hostile work environment; (3) requiring\\n\\nher to undergo a medical examination; (4) disclosing her confidential medical\\n\\ninformation; and (5) refusing to hire her for the Cyber position. Additionally, Hannah\\n\\nalleged that Appellee violated the FMLA in two ways: (1) by interfering with her ability\\n\\nto take medical leave; and (2) by retaliating against her when she took medical leave.\\n\\nAfter the close of discovery, Appellee moved for summary judgment on all counts. The\\n\\ndistrict court granted that motion on July 27, 2017. Hannah filed this timely notice of\\n\\nappeal challenging the district courtβs decisions on all but the hostile work environment\\n\\nclaim.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review a district courtβs decision to grant summary judgment de novo. See\\n\\nVannoy v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2016). In doing\\n\\nso, this court applies the same standard as the district court. See id. That standard\\n\\nrequires the court to grant summary judgment where βthere is no genuine dispute as to\\n\\nany material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.β Fed. R. Civ.\\n\\nP. 56(a); see also Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 300. We construe the evidence in the light most\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\nfavorable to Hannah, the nonmovant, and we draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.\\n\\nSee Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 300.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Hannah asserts that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to\\n\\naccommodate her depression, wrongfully requiring her to undergo a medical\\n\\nexamination, unlawfully disclosing her confidential medical information, and refusing to\\n\\nhire her for the Cyber position. Additionally, Hannah asserts that Appellee interfered\\n\\nwith and retaliated against her for using leave under the FMLA. We will address each of\\n\\nthese claims in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Rehabilitation Act Claims\\n\\n The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from discriminating against its\\n\\nemployees on the basis of disability. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 794. For the reasons explained\\n\\nbelow, Hannah failed to satisfy her burden on each of her claims under the Rehabilitation\\n\\nAct. Specifically, Hannah failed to: (1) demonstrate that Appellee failed to accommodate\\n\\nher depression; (2) demonstrate that Appelleeβs EAP amounted to a required medical\\n\\nexamination; (3) demonstrate that Appellee disclosed or misused confidential medical\\n\\ninformation; and (4) rebut Appelleeβs legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting\\n\\nher application for a permanent position.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Reasonable Accommodation\\n\\n Turning first to Hannahβs claim that Appellee failed to accommodate her\\n\\ndepression, the district court correctly concluded that Hannah did not establish a prima\\n\\nfacie case because Hannah failed to demonstrate that Appellee refused to make a\\n\\nreasonable accommodation.\\n\\n To establish a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate under the\\n\\nRehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was a qualified person with a\\n\\ndisability; (2) the employer had notice of the disability; (3) the plaintiff could perform the\\n\\nessential functions of the position with a reasonable accommodation; and (4) the\\n\\nemployer nonetheless refused to make the accommodation. See Reyazuddin v.\\n\\nMontgomery Cty., 789 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2015). The district court concluded that\\n\\nHannah could not establish the fourth element -- specifically, the district court\\n\\ndetermined that Appellee provided Hannah with at least two reasonable accommodations.\\n\\nAnd, on appeal, the parties dispute only the fourth element.\\n\\n Here, as detailed above, Appellee provided Hannah with a reasonable\\n\\naccommodation. When Hannah failed to follow that plan, Hannahβs supervisors\\n\\nattempted a new accommodation -- referring Hannah to EAP. Yet, despite Hannahβs\\n\\nparticipation in EAP, her attendance problems persisted.\\n\\n Hannah argues that Appelleeβs accommodations were not reasonable for two\\n\\nreasons. First, she claims that the accommodation was improperly rescinded when her\\n\\nsupervisors concluded that the first plan was not working. Hannah asserts that the\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\nRehabilitation Act requires a collaborative process. Hannah argues that rather than\\n\\ncollaborating with her to identify a workable accommodation, Appellee unilaterally\\n\\ndecided that the first plan was not working, then unilaterally decided that Hannah should\\n\\nparticipate in EAP counseling instead. Although employers have a duty to engage with\\n\\ntheir employees in an βinteractive process to identify a reasonable accommodation,β\\n\\nWilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 346 (4th Cir. 2013), the employer βhas the\\n\\nultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations.β Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d\\n\\nat 415β16 (citing Hankins v. Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996)). Nonetheless,\\n\\neven under Hannahβs view of the record, Appellee did, in fact, collaborate with Hannah\\n\\nin establishing the first accommodation and only acted unilaterally when that\\n\\naccommodation did not work.\\n\\n Second, Hannah claims that a reasonable accommodation that she requested -- a\\n\\nleave of absence -- was improperly delayed. Hannah posits that she βsuffered immense\\n\\nemotional stress during this one month lapse of [Appelleeβs] compliance with the law.β\\n\\nAppellantβs Br. 37. This argument is without merit and is not supported by the record,\\n\\neven when viewed in the light most favorable to Hannah. Hannah first requested the\\n\\nleave of absence on April 9, 2015. Then, on April 13 -- just two business days later --\\n\\nHannah withdrew her request without explanation, telling her supervisor that her leave\\n\\nrequest was βon hold.β J.A. 170, 178. Hannah then renewed her request for leave on\\n\\nApril 21, and her request was approved on May 5. Thus, there was no βone month\\n\\nlapse,β since Hannahβs request was βon holdβ for nine days of that time.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\n During the remaining gap between Hannahβs request for leave and Appelleeβs\\n\\napproval of that request, Appellee referred Hannah to its counseling service. The\\n\\nRehabilitation Act does not require an employer to provide the exact accommodation that\\n\\nan employee requests. See Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 415 (βAn employer may reasonably\\n\\naccommodate an employee without providing the exact accommodation that the\\n\\nemployee requested.β). Further, the record demonstrates that Hannahβs supervisors were\\n\\nactively considering her request for leave during that time, and they did ultimately\\n\\napprove it less than a month after she first requested leave.\\n\\n For these reasons, granting summary judgment to Appellee on Hannahβs\\n\\nreasonable accommodation claim was proper.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Required Medical Examination\\n\\n Under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer βshall not require a medical\\n\\nexamination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is\\n\\nan individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such\\n\\nexamination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.β\\n\\n42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(A).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\n a.\\n\\n Examination of a Job Applicant\\n\\n As an initial matter, Hannahβs arguments related to pre-employment medical\\n\\nexaminations under the Rehabilitation Act 4 miss the mark because Hannah was a current\\n\\nemployee, not a job applicant. Although Appellee knew Hannah was considering\\n\\napplying for permanent positions with Appellee at the time she was referred to EAP, she\\n\\nhad not yet done so. The evidence is clear that Appellee referred Hannah to EAP in lieu\\n\\nof disciplining her for her attendance issues in her then-current position, rather than as a\\n\\npre-employment medical examination. Moreover, the fact that Hannahβs attendance\\n\\nissues may have been related to her stress and frustration surrounding obtaining\\n\\npermanent employment with Appellee does not transform her EAP referral into a pre-\\n\\nemployment medical examination.\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Examination of a Current Employee\\n\\n Further, Hannah failed to demonstrate, much less create a genuine issue of\\n\\nmaterial fact, that EAP constituted a prohibited medical examination of a current\\n\\nemployee. We note that EAPβs policies make clear that EAP is intended to be used as a\\n\\nvoluntary counseling service, and not as a mandatory medical examination that would\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Subject to certain exceptions, an employer βshall not conduct a medical\\nexamination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an\\nindividual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 12112(d)(2)(A).\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\nviolate the Rehabilitation Act. See J.A. 130 (β[U]tilizing EAP is always voluntary and\\n\\ntherefore the employee has the right to decline to attend treatment, even if management-\\n\\nreferred.β). Additionally, Hannahβs EAP counselor repeatedly stated that she did not\\n\\nconduct a medical examination:\\n\\n I did not conduct a medical examination of [Hannah], and I\\n did not conduct a mental health evaluation or diagnostic\\n assessment because a) [Hannah] informed me she was already\\n in treatment and b) . . . it is not in EAPβs purview to conduct a\\n medical evaluation. I did not administer any medical or\\n mental health tests or diagnostic assessment tools for the\\n same reason. I was [n]ot tasked to diagnose or provide a\\n second opinion; my role was to facilitate communication\\n between [Hannah] and Management to resolve the problem\\n presented in the Management Referral -- namely, improving\\n attendance and notifying management when not attending\\n work.\\n\\nId. at 188 (emphasis omitted).\\n\\n However, even if EAP constituted a mandatory medical examination under the\\n\\nfacts of this case, summary judgment to Appellee was still appropriate on this claim\\n\\nbecause Hannahβs referral to EAP was βjob-related and consistent with business\\n\\nnecessity.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(A). As we have stated, βwhether a mental\\n\\nexamination was βjob-related and consistent with business necessityβ is an objective\\n\\ninquiry.β Pence v. Tenneco Auto. Operating Co., 169 F. Appβx 808, 812 (4th Cir. 2006).\\n\\nβWe therefore do not resolve any dispute about what [Appelleeβs] subjective motivations\\n\\nwere for having [Hannah] examined by the EAP.β Id. An employerβs request for a\\n\\nmedical examination is job-related and consistent with business necessity when: β(1) the\\n\\nemployee requests an accommodation; (2) the employeeβs ability to perform the essential\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\nfunctions of the job is impaired; or (3) the employee poses a direct threat to himself or\\n\\nothers.β Kroll v. White Lake Ambulance Auth., 763 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Here, the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Hannah,\\n\\nsupports granting summary judgment because Appellee had a reasonable belief that\\n\\nHannahβs ability to perform the essential functions of her job was impaired by her\\n\\nrepeated issues with attendance and timely reporting. Hannah attempts to refute this by\\n\\nasserting that her job performance was excellent, but job performance alone does not\\n\\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact. Attendance was also an essential function of\\n\\nHannahβs job, one the record amply demonstrates she was unable to fulfill when Appellee\\n\\nreferred her to EAP. As we have stated:\\n\\n In addition to possessing the skills necessary to perform the\\n job in question, an employee must be willing and able to\\n demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.\\n Except in the unusual case where an employee can effectively\\n perform all work-related duties at home, an employee βwho\\n does not come to work cannot perform any of his job\\n functions, essential or otherwise.β Therefore, a regular and\\n reliable level of attendance is a necessary element of most\\n jobs.\\n\\nTyndall v. Natβl Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting\\n\\nWimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), affβd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th\\n\\nCir. 1987)) (emphasis in original); see also Denman v. Davey Tree Expert Co., 266 F.\\n\\nAppβx 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2007) (βJob performance is separate from the ability to show up\\n\\nfor work, an essential function of [Hannahβs] position.β).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\n Accordingly, Appellee did not violate the Rehabilitation Act by referring Hannah\\n\\nto EAP, and the district court properly granted summary judgment to Appellee on this\\n\\nclaim.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Confidential Medical Information\\n\\n Under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer may βconduct voluntary medical\\n\\nexaminations, including voluntary medical histories, which are part of an employee\\n\\nhealth programβ and may βmake inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job-\\n\\nrelated functions.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 12112(d)(4)(B). Any βinformation obtained regarding\\n\\nthe medical condition or history of the applicantβ -- that is, medical information -- must\\n\\nbe βcollected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and [must\\n\\nbe] treated as a confidential medical record.β Id. Β§ 12112(d)(3)(B); see also id.\\n\\nΒ§ 12112(d)(4)(C).\\n\\n Hannah alleges two separate Rehabilitation Act violations regarding her medical\\n\\ninformation: first, that Hannahβs supervisors wrongfully sought and disclosed\\n\\nconfidential medical information elicited from Hannah, and second, that the EAP\\n\\npsychologist wrongfully disclosed confidential medical information gathered from the\\n\\nEAP session to Hannahβs supervisors. In both instances, the district court correctly\\n\\ndetermined that Hannah failed to demonstrate that Appellee violated the Rehabilitation\\n\\nAct.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\n a.\\n\\n Disclosures by Supervisors\\n\\n Hannah asserts that her supervisors disclosed her confidential medical information\\n\\nby writing in her EAP referral memo, β[e]arly in her tenure . . . and reaffirmed recently,\\n\\n[Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a psychiatrist and counselor and taking\\n\\nmedication for depression.β J.A. 413. Notably, Hannah voluntarily disclosed her\\n\\ndepression diagnosis to her supervisors. The Rehabilitation Act does not protect\\n\\ninformation shared voluntarily. See Reynolds v. Am. Natβl Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2012) (finding the district court properly granted summary judgment on a\\n\\nconfidentiality claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act because the record βclearly\\n\\nshow[ed]β that the appellant βdisclosed his medical condition voluntarilyβ). Indeed,\\n\\nHannah voluntarily told at least four of her supervisors that she had been diagnosed with\\n\\ndepression. See J.A. 179 (Hannahβs interrogatory responses) (βI disclosed my diagnosis\\n\\nof depression to my supervisors Kelly G. in summer 2011, Ann W. in fall 2014; Art Z. in\\n\\nMarch 2015, and Roy P. in March 2015.β).\\n\\n Hannah argues that these disclosures were not voluntary because they were made\\n\\nin response to inquiries about her disability. But the evidence does not support or create\\n\\na genuine issue of fact about that argument. The record indicates that only the March\\n\\n2015 disclosure was made in response to an inquiry, and that inquiry was not medical -- it\\n\\nwas about her attendance. See J.A. 23 (Hannahβs deposition testimony) (β[H]e was\\n\\nconcerned about unpredictability in my schedule. . . . I told him at that time I had\\n\\ndepression.β).\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\n Hannah asserts that this inquiry about her attendance was de facto an inquiry into\\n\\nher depression because (according to Hannah) the inquiring supervisor knew she was\\n\\ndepressed and knew her attendance issues were linked to her depression. Hannah cites\\n\\nonly out-of-circuit cases for the proposition that asking a question βlikely to elicitβ\\n\\ninformation about a disability amounts to a medical inquiry. See Harrison v. Benchmark\\n\\nElecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1216 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that whether an\\n\\ninquiry following a failed drug test was likely to elicit information about a disability in\\n\\nviolation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (βADAβ) 5 presented a question of fact\\n\\nfor a jury to resolve); Fleming v. State Univ. of N.Y., 502 F. Supp. 2d 324, 338 (E.D.N.Y.\\n\\n2007) (concluding the plaintiff pled facts sufficient to state a claim for failure to\\n\\nconfidentially maintain medical information under the ADA where the plaintiff alleged\\n\\nthat his disclosure of his sickle cell anemia was not voluntary because his supervisor\\n\\ncalled him while he was in the hospital and asked him why he was there).\\n\\n First, the record does not support Hannahβs argument that the supervisor in\\n\\nquestion knew about Hannahβs depression before she disclosed it to him. Hannah points\\n\\nto the supervisorβs statement that when he spoke to Hannah on the phone before\\n\\nconfronting her about her attendance, βshe didnβt sound well on the other end of the\\n\\nphone.β J.A. 466. Hannah also points to her supervisorβs statement that Hannahβs\\n\\nβdemeanor [wa]s sad, very flat, and almost trance like.β Id. at 413. This is not enough to\\n\\n 5\\n βTo the extent possible, we construe the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to impose\\nsimilar requirements.β Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 461\\n(4th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inquiring supervisor knew\\n\\nHannah had been medically diagnosed with clinical depression, or whether by asking\\n\\nabout her attendance, the supervisor was fishing for medical information about Hannahβs\\n\\nillness.\\n\\n Second, even if Hannahβs supervisor had an inkling that Hannah may have had\\n\\ndepression, this is not evidence that he knew asking about her repeated absences and\\n\\ntardiness -- indisputably bad work behavior -- would elicit medical information related to\\n\\nher depression. Indeed, Hannahβs absences could have been the result of a world of\\n\\nother, nonmedical possibilities, such as transportation issues or oversleeping. Adopting\\n\\nHannahβs argument would require us to find that where an employer might know that a\\n\\nparticular bad work behavior is connected to a medical condition, the employer cannot\\n\\ninquire into the behavior without running afoul of the ADA and Rehabilitation Actβs\\n\\nprohibition on medical inquiries. We have held expressly the opposite: β[T]he ADA does\\n\\nnot require an employer to simply ignore an employeeβs blatant and persistent\\n\\nmisconduct, even where that behavior is potentially tied to a medical condition.β Vannoy\\n\\nv. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Jones v. Am.\\n\\nPostal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding the ADA does not\\n\\nβrequire an employer to ignore such egregious misconduct by one of its employees, even\\n\\nif the misconduct was caused by the employeeβs disabilityβ)).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 21\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Disclosures by EAP Psychologist\\n\\n Hannah also argues that, in addition to her supervisors disclosing her depression\\n\\ndiagnosis internally, the EAP psychologist disclosed βadditional, unique information\\n\\nfrom what Hannah had already told her supervisors.β Appellantβs Br. 51. Specifically,\\n\\nHannah alleges that the EAP psychologist told her supervisor that Hannah was concerned\\n\\nabout Appelleeβs records retention policies, and that Hannahβs βdifficulties in getting to\\n\\nwork were the result of a lack of motivation, not related to depression.β J.A. 540.\\n\\n Perhaps that is true. The record does indicate that the EAP psychologist shared\\n\\nsome information with Hannahβs supervisors and maybe it was unique information. See\\n\\nJ.A. 192 (EAP psychologist statement) (noting that the psychologist provided Hannahβs\\n\\nsupervisors updates regarding Hannahβs βEAP attendanceβ and βcooperation and\\n\\nprogress toward resolving the referral issuesβ). But there is no evidence that the EAP\\n\\npsychologist shared medical information. To the contrary, the EAP psychologist insisted,\\n\\nagain and again, that she did not share any confidential medical information. See id. at\\n\\n190 (noting that the psychologist, who is not a doctor, βdid not disclose any confidential\\n\\nmedical informationβ to anyone). Of note, Hannah did not point to any evidence in the\\n\\nrecord contradicting the psychologistβs assertions.\\n\\n Therefore, the information shared by the EAP psychologist did not trigger the\\n\\nRehabilitation Actβs confidentiality protections because the record indicates that the EAP\\n\\npsychologist shared only nonmedical information.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22\\n\\n c.\\n\\n Non-Reliance on Medical Information\\n\\n Finally, even if either Hannahβs supervisors or the EAP psychologist disclosed\\n\\nHannahβs medical information, Appellee still did not violate the Rehabilitation Act\\n\\nbecause Appellee did not rely on Hannahβs depression diagnosis or any other medical\\n\\ninformation in deciding not to hire Hannah for the Cyber position. Rather, the record\\n\\noverwhelmingly indicates that Appelleeβs decision was based on Hannahβs attendance\\n\\nissues. Accordingly, Hannah has not demonstrated that Appellee violated the\\n\\nRehabilitation Act by disclosing or misusing confidential medical information.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n Discrimination\\n\\n Rehabilitation Act claims for discrimination are reviewed under the McDonnell\\n\\nDouglas burden-shifting framework. See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 430 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)); Perry v.\\n\\nComput. Scis. Corp., 429 F. Appβx 218, 219β20 (4th Cir. 2011). Under that framework,\\n\\nHannah has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See\\n\\nPerry, 429 F. Appβx at 220. To establish this prima facie case, Hannah must show that:\\n\\n(1) she is disabled; (2) she was otherwise qualified for the position; and (3) she suffered\\n\\nan adverse employment action solely on the basis of her disability. See id. (citing\\n\\nConstantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2005)).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\n If Hannah establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Appellee to provide a\\n\\nlegitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. See Perry, 429 F. Appβx at 220. If\\n\\nAppellee provides such a reason, Hannah βbears the ultimate burden of persuasionβ and\\n\\nβmust show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was a pretext\\n\\nfor discrimination.β Id.\\n\\n a.\\n\\n Establishing Pretext\\n\\n Even assuming that Hannah established a prima facie case of discrimination\\n\\n(which Appellee disputes), she cannot succeed on her claim that Appellee discriminated\\n\\nagainst her by not hiring her for a permanent position because she did not sufficiently\\n\\nrebut Appelleeβs proffered reason for rejecting her application, as required under the final\\n\\nstep of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Perry, 429 F. Appβx at\\n\\n220.\\n\\n Appellee presented evidence demonstrating that Hannahβs perpetual issues with\\n\\nattendance, timeliness, and reporting absences to her superiors were the bases of its\\n\\ndecision not to hire her for the permanent position. Attempting to expose that\\n\\nexplanation as a ruse, Hannah pointed to a purported inconsistency between the sworn\\n\\nstatement that Mark Ewing provided during the Equal Employment Opportunity\\n\\nCommission (βEEOCβ) investigation of Hannahβs case and an email he sent more than a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24\\n\\nyear earlier. In the sworn statement, signed on April 26, 2016, 6 Ewing asserts he βhad no\\n\\nknowledge of [Hannahβs] disability.β J.A. 650. But in the email, sent on June 30, 2015,\\n\\nEwing references two memos that he received from Hannahβs supervisors, both of which\\n\\nnote Hannahβs depression. See id. at 413 (April 9, 2015 memo) (βEarly in her tenure . . .\\n\\nand reaffirmed recently, [Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a psychiatrist\\n\\nand counselor and taking medication for depression.β); id. at 606 (April 23, 2015 memo)\\n\\n(βWhile . . . medical considerations (i.e., depression and/or ADD) do make this situation\\n\\nworse, these factors are under her control based upon treatment plans with her\\n\\npsychologist and psychiatric care providers.β). Underscoring the significance of this\\n\\ninconsistency, Hannah argues, is the fact that Ewing did not provide the June 30, 2015\\n\\nemail to the EEOC. Hannah argues that the inconsistency, coupled with Ewingβs failure\\n\\nto disclose the email evidencing the inconsistency, illustrates βclear pretext.β Appellantβs\\n\\nBr. 27.\\n\\n Despite Hannahβs arguments to the contrary, this apparent discrepancy does not\\n\\ncreate a genuine issue of material fact that Appelleeβs proffered reason for rejecting\\n\\nHannahβs application is pretextual. First, nothing in the record indicates that Ewing had\\n\\nfirst-hand knowledge of Hannahβs disability. Although the memos mention that Hannah\\n\\nself-reported that she had depression, the second memo also describes Hannahβs\\n\\ndepression as βunder her control.β J.A. 606. Indeed, Ewingβs email suggests that he did\\n\\n\\n 6\\n The excerpt of the statement that is included in the J.A. does not include the date.\\nThis date comes from Hannahβs brief. See Appellantβs Br. 26.\\n\\n\\n\\n 25\\n\\nnot know that Hannah had an ongoing disability. See J.A. 635 (βI am informed that EAP\\n\\nconcluded that [Hannah] does not have a medical problem, rather she is a disciplinary\\n\\nproblem.β).\\n\\n More significantly, Hannahβs asserted contradiction between Ewingβs EEOC\\n\\nstatements and his June 30, 2015 email do not create a genuine issue of material fact\\n\\nabout pretext because Ewingβs email and the memos written by Hannahβs supervisors\\n\\nfocus on Hannahβs attendance problems, not on her disability. See J.A. 413 (April 9,\\n\\n2015 memo) (noting that β[Hannahβs] schedule has become increasingly erraticβ and that\\n\\nβfrequent absences and late arrivals [have begun] to affect her assigned unit and\\n\\nindividual performanceβ); id. at 606 (April 23, 2015 memo) (describing Hannahβs history\\n\\nof attendance issues and Appelleeβs attempts to accommodate Hannah and noting that,\\n\\ndespite those attempts, β[Hannahβs] late attendance has continuedβ); id. at 635β36\\n\\n(Ewingβs June 30, 2015 email) (detailing Hannahβs problem with βattendance at work,β\\n\\nnoting that Hannahβs βabsences and late arrivals were affecting her assigned staff element\\n\\nand her individual performance,β and concluding that Hannahβs βrecent performance is\\n\\nnot consistent with a potentially good employee.β).\\n\\n Accordingly, Hannah did not point to any genuine issue of material fact that\\n\\nAppelleeβs purported basis for not hiring her was merely a pretext for discriminating\\n\\nagainst her on the basis of her depression.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Appelleeβs Nondiscriminatory Explanation\\n\\n i.\\n\\n Moreover, the record indicates that Appelleeβs proffered explanation for not hiring\\n\\nHannah for the Cyber position is genuine, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory.\\n\\n As the district court concluded, a continuous attendance issue is a legitimate\\n\\nreason for withholding an employment benefit. See Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213 (finding an\\n\\nemployee who cannot satisfy their employerβs attendance policy cannot be considered\\n\\nβqualifiedβ for the purposes of the ADA). Hannah might have been exceptionally\\n\\ntalented and substantively good at her job, but as noted above, β[i]n addition to\\n\\npossessing the skills necessary to perform the job in question, an employee must be\\n\\nwilling and able to demonstrate these skills by coming to work on a regular basis.β Id.\\n\\n Hannah asserts that βserious questions of fact exist as to whether Hannah even had\\n\\nβsignificant attendance and reporting problems.ββ Appellantβs Br. 28. But the record\\n\\nevidences no less than 13 attendance issues that occurred in the 46 days between\\n\\nAppelleeβs first attempt to accommodate Hannah on March 19, 2015, and the revised\\n\\nplan made on May 4, 2015. Compare J.A. 114, 174 (noting Appelleeβs March 19, 2015\\n\\nmeeting with her supervisor and original accommodation asking her to arrive at work by\\n\\n10 AM or report to a supervisor), with id. at 556 (indicating four unexcused absences and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 27\\n\\nnine late arrivals between March 19 and April 29 that Appellee failed to timely report). 7\\n\\nIn light of Hannahβs failure to arrive or call in before 10 AM 13 times in 46 days, there is\\n\\nno genuine issue of material fact about Hannahβs significant attendance and reporting\\n\\nproblem.\\n\\n ii.\\n\\n Hannah also argues that because her disability was the cause of her attendance\\n\\nissues, Appellee could not withhold an employment benefit from her on that basis. We\\n\\nhave no doubt that Hannahβs struggle with depression was the cause of her attendance\\n\\nissues, and we are sympathetic to the toll this condition took on a highly talented\\n\\n\\n 7\\n The record reflects the following late arrivals and absences for Hannah between\\nMarch 19, 2015, and May 4, 2015: (1) April 2: Hannah emailed at 11:02 AM indicating\\nshe would arrive to work by 12 PM; (2) April 8: Hannah emailed at 11:05 AM indicating\\nshe would arrive to work by 12 PM; Hannah emailed again at 1:55 PM indicating she\\nwould not be coming in that day; (3) April 9: Hannah emailed at 11:11 AM indicating her\\ncar was towed and she would arrive at work by 1 PM; (4) April 13: Hannah emailed at\\n10:58 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 11:30 AM; (5) April 14: Hannah\\nemailed at 11:08 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 12 PM; (6) April 16:\\nHannahβs supervisor emailed Hannah at 10:18 AM looking for her; when Hannah was\\nreached at 11 AM, she indicated she would arrive to work by 12 PM; (7) April 20:\\nHannah emailed at 10:45 AM indicating she would arrive to work by 11:30 AM;\\nHannahβs supervisor confirmed her arrival at 12:50 PM; (8) April 22: Hannah emailed at\\n11:01 AM indicating she would arrive at work after 12 PM; Hannah emailed again at\\n12:41 PM indicating she would arrive at 1 PM due to traffic; (9) April 23: Hannah\\nemailed at 10:59 AM indicating she would arrive at work by 12 PM; Hannah emailed\\nagain at 12:56 PM indicating she would not be coming in that day due to a migraine; (10)\\nApril 24: Hannah emailed at 11:02 AM indicating she would arrive at work in the\\nafternoon; Hannah later called at 3:24 PM indicating she would not be coming in that\\nday; (11) April 27: Hannahβs supervisor emailed indicating Hannah arrived at work by 11\\nAM; (12) April 28: Hannah emailed at 10:52 AM indicating she would arrive at work by\\n11:30 AM; (13) April 29: Hannah emailed at 11:49 AM indicating she would not come in\\nto work that day. See J.A. 556.\\n\\n\\n\\n 28\\n\\nemployee. However, Appellee was nevertheless permitted to take Hannahβs attendance\\n\\nissues into account in its decision whether to hire her for the Cyber position. To reiterate,\\n\\nthe Rehabilitation Act βdoes not require an employer to simply ignore an employeeβs\\n\\nblatant and persistent misconduct, even where that behavior is potentially tied to a\\n\\nmedical condition.β Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 305; cf. Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104\\n\\nF.3d 683, 686 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (βMisconduct -- even misconduct related to a disability\\n\\n-- is not itself a disability, and an employer is free to fire an employee on that basis.β).\\n\\n iii.\\n\\n Finally, Hannah argues that by the time Appellee made the decision not to hire\\n\\nher, her attendance had improved. She asserts that between returning from her leave of\\n\\nabsence on June 1, 2015, and learning that she was not selected for the permanent\\n\\nposition on June 17, 2015, she βhad shown she was able to perform the essential\\n\\nfunctions of the job and had no current attendance issues.β Appellantβs Br. 32.\\n\\n Hannah is correct that in a failure to hire case, the relevant inquiry is the\\n\\ncandidateβs performance βat the time of the employment decision or in the immediate\\n\\nfuture.β Lamb v. Qualex, Inc., 33 F. Appβx 49, 57 (4th Cir. 2002). However, Appellee\\n\\nwas not required to consider the two weeks before the decision was made in a vacuum.\\n\\nMoreover, it is not the job of this court to decide whether Appellee made the right choice\\n\\nby not hiring Hannah for the Cyber position. Rather, our job is simply to decide whether\\n\\nAppellee made an illegal choice. See Feldman v. Law Enfβt Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339,\\n\\n350 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that we do not βsit as a kind of super-personnel\\n\\ndepartment weighing the prudence of employment decisionsβ).\\n\\n\\n 29\\n\\n Because Hannah not did demonstrate that Appelleeβs purported basis for not hiring\\n\\nher was merely a pretext for discriminating against her on the basis of her depression, and\\n\\nbecause Hannahβs attendance problem was a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason to\\n\\nnot hire her, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriate on her Rehabilitation\\n\\nAct discrimination claim.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n FMLA Claims\\n\\n The FMLA gives employees with qualifying medical conditions the right to take\\n\\nup to 12 weeks of leave during a 12-month period β[b]ecause of a serious health\\n\\ncondition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions ofβ her job. 29\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 2612(a)(1)(D). βThe employee has an accompanying right to return to the same\\n\\nor an equivalent position at the conclusion of the leave period.β Reed v. Buckeye Fire\\n\\nEquip., 241 F. Appβx 917, 923 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2614(a)(1)).\\n\\n As discussed below, as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim, Hannah illustrates\\n\\na genuine issue of material fact regarding the notice of her depression and her desire to\\n\\ntake a leave of absence. But, for the same reasons Hannahβs Rehabilitation Act\\n\\ndiscrimination claim fails, Hannahβs FMLA retaliation claim fails as well.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Interference\\n\\n a.\\n\\n The district court incorrectly concluded that Hannahβs disclosure of her depression\\n\\nwas not sufficient to put Appellee on notice that Hannah could have qualified for FMLA\\n\\n\\n 30\\n\\nprotections. Accordingly, summary judgment was not warranted as to Hannahβs FMLA\\n\\ninterference claim.\\n\\n βAn employee is mandated to provide notice to her employer when she requires\\n\\nFMLA leave.β Brushwood v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 520 F. Appβx 154, 157 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2013) (quoting Rhoads v. FDIC, 257 F.3d 373, 382 (4th Cir. 2001)). That said, an\\n\\nemployee need not specifically invoke the FMLA to benefit from its protections. See\\n\\nDotson v. Pfizer, Inc., 558 F.3d 284, 295 (4th Cir. 2009). Proper notice does not require\\n\\nβany magic words.β Id. Indeed, β[w]hen an employee seeks leave for the first time for\\n\\na[n] FMLA-qualifying reason, the employee need not expressly assert rights under the\\n\\nFMLA or even mention the FMLA.β 29 C.F.R. Β§ 825.302. Proper notice merely βmakes\\n\\nthe employer awareβ that the employee needs potentially FMLA-qualifying leave.\\n\\nBrushwood, 520 F. Appβx at 157. And once the employer is on notice of the employeeβs\\n\\nneed to take potentially FMLA-qualifying leave, βthe responsibility falls on the employer\\n\\nto inquire further about whether the employee is seeking FMLA leave.β Dotson, 558\\n\\nF.3d at 295.\\n\\n A reasonable jury could find that Hannahβs disclosure of her depression and her\\n\\nApril 9, 2015 request for psychiatrist-recommended leave was sufficient to trigger\\n\\nAppelleeβs responsibility to inquire further about whether Hannah was seeking FMLA\\n\\nleave. We have held that disclosure of a potentially FMLA-qualifying circumstance and\\n\\nan inquiry into leave options is sufficient to create a material question of fact regarding\\n\\nwhether an employee triggered her employerβs FMLA obligations. See Dotson, 558 F.3d\\n\\nat 291, 295 (finding that an employee informing his employer that he was adopting a\\n\\n\\n 31\\n\\nchild and speaking to a human resources representative about βtaking leave during the\\n\\nadoption processβ was sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether the employerβs\\n\\nFMLA-inquiry duties had been triggered).\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Here, Hannah informed her supervisors of her depression on multiple occasions.\\n\\nSee, e.g., J.A. 413 (April 9, 2015 memo from Hannahβs supervisors) (βEarly in her tenure\\n\\n. . . and reaffirmed recently, [Hannah] informed us that she was meeting with a\\n\\npsychiatrist and counselor and taking medication for depression.β). 8 And on April 9,\\n\\n2015, Hannah explained to her supervisors that her psychiatrist recommended that she\\n\\ntake four weeks of medical leave. Hannahβs disclosures about her depression and her\\n\\npsychiatristβs recommendation could lead a reasonable jury to find that Appellee was on\\n\\nnotice that Hannah was inquiring about potentially FMLA-qualifying leave, triggering\\n\\nAppelleeβs responsibility to inquire further about whether Hannah was seeking FMLA\\n\\nleave. 9\\n\\n c.\\n\\n Appellee argues that Hannahβs interference claim fails because Hannah cannot\\n\\ndemonstrate that her depression was βa serious health condition.β Appelleeβs Resp. 40β\\n\\n41; see also 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2612(a)(1)(D). But that argument is premature. Appellee has\\n\\n 8\\n Indeed, Hannahβs supervisors had βgrown increasingly alarmed at the overall\\nchange in [Hannahβs] demeanor.β J.A. 413.\\n 9\\n It is undisputed that Appellee did not inquire about whether the leave should be\\nclassified as FMLA-protected.\\n\\n\\n\\n 32\\n\\nnot shown that it made any inquiry into whether Hannahβs depression was an FMLA-\\n\\nqualifying serious health condition. Appelleeβs argument βwould allow it to use its own\\n\\nfailure to determine whether leave should be designated as FMLA-protected to block\\n\\nliability.β Dotson, 558 F.3d at 295. We have refused βto allow an employer to take\\n\\nadvantage of its own lapse in such a way.β Id.\\n\\n d.\\n\\n Additionally, Appelleeβs failure to provide notice of the availability of FMLA\\n\\nleave prejudiced Hannah because if she had been aware of the availability of FMLA\\n\\nleave, she could have structured her leave differently. The FMLA βprovides no relief\\n\\nunless the employee has been prejudiced by the violation.β Vannoy, 827 F.3d at 302\\n\\n(citing Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002)). βPrejudice may\\n\\nbe gleaned from evidence that had the plaintiff received the required (but omitted)\\n\\ninformation regarding his FMLA rights, he would have structured his leave differently.β\\n\\nId.\\n\\n Here, the record contains evidence that if Hannah had known that the FMLA\\n\\nprotected her position, she would have used only sick leave for her leave of absence. See\\n\\nJ.A. 664 (Hannahβs declaration) (βHad I known I could have chosen to take sick leave for\\n\\nthe entire period, I would have elected to do so.β). Instead, she used a combination of\\n\\nsick leave and annual time to take four weeks off. According to Hannah, β[u]nlike\\n\\nannual leave, sick leave is not paid out at the end of an employeeβs service, resulting in a\\n\\nloss of a benefit worth at least $20,000.β Id. Based on Hannahβs testimony, a jury could\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 33\\n\\nfind that Hannah was prejudiced by Appelleeβs failure to inquire into the availability of\\n\\nFMLA leave and thus interfered with her FMLA rights.\\n\\n For these reasons, Hannah has demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact that\\n\\nshould have precluded summary judgment on her FMLA interference claim.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Retaliation\\n\\n As for Hannahβs FMLA retaliation claim, however, the district court correctly\\n\\nconcluded that like her discrimination claim brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act,\\n\\nHannah did not sufficiently rebut Appelleeβs legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for not\\n\\nhiring Hannah for the Cyber position.\\n\\n The FMLA prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee for\\n\\nexercising her FMLA rights. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 2615(a)(2). As relevant here, βemployers\\n\\ncannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions.β 29\\n\\nC.F.R. Β§ 825.220(c). Courts analyze FMLA retaliation claims, like discrimination claims\\n\\nbrought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting\\n\\nframework. See Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 2013). To\\n\\nestablish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that β(1)\\n\\nshe engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action\\n\\nagainst her; and (3) there was a causal link between the two events.β Adams v. Anne\\n\\nArundel Cty. Pub. Schs., 789 F.3d 422, 429 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant\\n\\nto provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for taking the employment action at issue.\\n\\n\\n 34\\n\\nId. If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the\\n\\ndefendantβs proffered reason is pretextual. Id.\\n\\n Even assuming Hannah demonstrated a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation,\\n\\nsummary judgment was proper because she failed to rebut Appelleeβs legitimate,\\n\\nnonretaliatory reason for not hiring her for the Cyber position. Appellee asserts that it\\n\\nrelied on Hannahβs attendance issues in deciding not to hire her for the position, and the\\n\\nevidence in the record supports that assertion. See J.A. 635β36 (Ewingβs June 30, 2015\\n\\nemail expressing concerns about Hannahβs application for the Cyber position) (noting,\\n\\nβdespite some apparently solid performance while on the Snowden project,β Appellee\\n\\nhad βa consistent history of issues with [Hannah] over many monthsβ regarding Hannahβs\\n\\nβattendance at work and attitudeβ); id. at 219 (Ewingβs deposition testimony) (βThe\\n\\nprimary reason that I was concerned [about Hannahβs application] was the fact that her\\n\\nconduct was extremely negative at the point of time we were making a hiring decision for\\n\\npermanent employment status.β). Hannah points to no evidence that adequately\\n\\nundermines Appelleeβs proffered nonretaliatory reason for not hiring her. 10\\n\\n Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on Hannahβs\\n\\nFMLA retaliation claim.\\n\\n\\n 10\\n Hannah again argues, as she did in the context of her claim of discrimination\\nunder the Rehabilitation Act, that the βinconsistencyβ between the sworn statement\\nEwing provided during the EEOC investigation of Hannahβs case and an email he sent\\nmore than a year earlier exposes Appelleeβs proffered reason for not hiring her for the\\npermanent position as pretextual. For the same reasons explained above, that argument\\nfails.\\n\\n\\n\\n 35\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court as to Hannahβs\\n\\nRehabilitation Act claims and FMLA retaliation claim. We vacate the grant of summary\\n\\njudgment as to Hannahβs FMLA interference claim because there is a genuine issue of\\n\\nfact as to whether Hannahβs disclosure of her depression was sufficient to put Appellee\\n\\non notice that Hannah could have qualified for FMLA protections. Accordingly, we\\n\\nremand for further proceedings as to that claim.\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 36\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":561,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4592127,"string":"4,592,127"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Gregory Kyle SEERDEN, Defendant - Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Gregory Seerden"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-20"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-4124"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wilkinson, Agee, Thacker\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"THACKER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-4124\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nGREGORY KYLE SEERDEN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nNorfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:17-cr-00067-RAJ-DEM-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 20, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\\nWilkinson and Judge Agee joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Andrew William Grindrod, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\\nDEFENDER, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\\nGeremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\\nDEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\\nAttorney, Alexandria, Virginia, David A. Layne, Special Assistant United States\\nAttorney, Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.\\n\\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In January 2017 investigators with the Naval Criminal Investigation Service\\n\\n(βNCISβ) obtained a military warrant to search the cell phone of Gregory Kyle Seerden\\n\\n(βAppellantβ) for evidence of sexual assault. During the search of Appellantβs phone, the\\n\\ninvestigators found child pornography. On that basis, the investigators then obtained a\\n\\nfederal warrant to search Appellantβs phone a second time and again found child\\n\\npornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the first search\\n\\nwas unlawful because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence and that evidence\\n\\nobtained during the second search was fruit of the poisonous tree.\\n\\n Although the district court agreed that evidence obtained during the military\\n\\nsearch was inadmissible because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence, it nonetheless\\n\\nfound that the good faith exception allowed the government to admit evidence discovered\\n\\nvia the second search.\\n\\n On September 20, 2017, Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to production\\n\\nof child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). He subsequently filed\\n\\nthis appeal. As explained below, we affirm on different grounds.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Appellant was a member of the United States Navyβs Sea, Air, and Land Team.\\n\\nAt all times relevant to this appeal, he was stationed in San Diego, California. But for\\n\\none week in January 2017, Appellant attended a training at the Little Creek base in\\n\\nVirginia Beach, Virginia. During that week, Appellant was accused of sexual assault and\\n\\nsuspected of possession of child pornography.\\n\\n 2\\n\\f On his next to last night of training in Virginia, Appellant met a woman. The\\n\\nwoman recalled that, during her night out with Appellant, the pair went to a few bars and\\n\\nhad more than a few drinks. The woman came in and out of consciousness throughout\\n\\nthe night, but she remembered returning to Appellantβs room in the Navy Gateway Inns\\n\\nand Suites at Little Creek. At around 4:00 a.m., the woman woke up lying naked next to\\n\\nAppellant. She learned from Appellant that, at some point during the night, they had sex.\\n\\nShe then left. While she was waiting for a cab at the gate of the base, she began to cry.\\n\\nA service member on guard duty (a βsentryβ) approached her, and she told him that\\n\\nAppellant sexually assaulted her. Appellant then attempted to call her. She didnβt\\n\\nanswer. Meanwhile, the sentry reported the allegations to NCIS.\\n\\n Later that day, NCIS began investigating the allegations. In doing so, NCIS\\n\\norchestrated a βcontrolled text message conversationβ between the woman and Appellant.\\n\\nNCIS agents had the woman text Appellant and inquire about the night in question.\\n\\nDuring that conversation, Appellant admitted that the pair had sex and that the woman\\n\\nwas not sober. With that, NCIS agents began coordinating with Appellantβs commanding\\n\\nofficer in San Diego as well as the commanding officer of the Little Creek base to obtain\\n\\nauthorizations to search Appellantβs cell phone and hotel room. NCIS also consulted the\\n\\nJudge Advocate Generalβs (βJAGβ) authorities at both bases. NCIS and JAG officers\\n\\ndecided that the Little Creek commanding officer should authorize the search of\\n\\nAppellantβs hotel room while Appellantβs commanding officer in San Diego should\\n\\nauthorize the search of his phone. The officers reasoned that, while the Little Creek\\n\\ncommanding officer had control over the base, Appellantβs commanding officer in San\\n\\n 3\\n\\fDiego had control over Appellant. In line with that plan, Appellantβs commanding\\n\\nofficer in San Diego signed a Command Authorization for Search and Seizure (βCASSβ)\\n\\nsanctioning the search of Appellantβs phone.\\n\\n The CASS sought to collect messages, photographs, videos, and any other\\n\\ninformation related to the investigation from Appellantβs phone. In its statement of\\n\\nprobable cause, the affidavit supporting the CASS connected Appellantβs phone to the\\n\\nalleged criminal activity by noting that Appellant attempted to call his accuser after\\n\\ndropping her off at the gate. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a pretext\\n\\ncommunication between Appellant and the woman accusing him of sexual assault.\\n\\n A week later, a digital forensics examiner executed the search of Appellantβs\\n\\nphone. In doing so, the forensics examiner viewed thumbnail-size icons of photographs\\n\\non Appellantβs phone. The examiner, who was trained in and had experience with child\\n\\nexploitation investigations, believed some of those photographs were images of child\\n\\npornography.\\n\\n Based on the evidence discovered during the military search of Appellantβs phone,\\n\\nNCIS obtained a federal search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to search\\n\\nAppellantβs phone for further evidence of child pornography. Under the authority of this\\n\\nsecond warrant, the forensics examiner continued his analysis of Appellantβs cell phone\\n\\ndata. He found 78 images and four videos of child pornography. The images depicted\\n\\nknown victims of child sexual exploitation, while the videos depicted Appellant\\n\\nperforming a sexual act inches from the face of a sleeping child.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f On March 31, 2017, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging\\n\\nAppellant with possession and production of child pornography. And on April 20, 2017,\\n\\na grand jury indicted Appellant for possession, production, and transportation of child\\n\\npornography. On June 6, 2017, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from\\n\\nthe two searches of his phone. After holding a hearing on Appellantβs motion, the district\\n\\ncourt denied it.\\n\\n The district court first concluded that the evidence obtained during the first search\\n\\nwas inadmissible. Applying the Military Rules of Evidence in evaluating the lawfulness\\n\\nof that search, the district court reasoned that the CASS obtained by NCIS did not satisfy\\n\\nthe βauthorizationβ requirement of Military Rule of Evidence 315:\\n\\n Pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 315(d), a search\\n is valid only if it is issued by an impartial individual. An\\n impartial individual is a commander, military judge or\\n magistrate. Mil. R. Evid. 315(d)(1) and (2). A military\\n commander is defined as βa commander or other person\\n serving in a position designated by the Secretary concerned as\\n either a position analogous to an officer in charge or a\\n position of command, who has control over the place where\\n the property or person to be search is situated or found, or if\\n that place is not under military control, having control over\\n persons subject to military law or the law of war.β Mil. R.\\n Evid. 315(d)(1). A military judge or magistrate βis a person\\n who is authorized under regulations prescribed by the\\n Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned.β Mil. R.\\n Evid. 315(d)(2).\\n\\n Here, the person who authorized the CASS for the first\\n search of [Appellantβs] telephone was [Appellantβs] unit\\n commander in San Diego, CA. Pursuant to the definitions\\n provided in Military Rules of Evidence 315(d)(1),\\n [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have the authority to\\n authorize any search [conducted] on [the Little Creek base]\\n because [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have control\\n\\n 5\\n\\f over the place where the property or person to be searched was\\n situated.\\n\\nJ.A. 215. 1 The district court further reasoned that, because of the defect in the CASS\\n\\nauthorization, it could not apply the exclusionary ruleβs good faith exception to the\\n\\nevidence obtained as a result of the first search. Citing Military Rule of Evidence 311,\\n\\nthe district court noted, βPursuant to military law, evidence obtained as the result of an\\n\\nunlawful search may [only] be used if . . . βthe search or seizure resulted from an\\n\\nauthorization . . . issued by an individual competent to issue the authorization under Mil.\\n\\nR. Evid. 315(d).ββ J.A. 217β18. Because the district court found that Appellantβs\\n\\ncommander in San Diego was not competent to authorize the CASS, the court concluded\\n\\nthat βthe good faith exception does not cure the first search.β Id. at 218.\\n\\n Despite finding that evidence obtained during the first search was inadmissible,\\n\\nthe district court concluded that evidence obtained during the second search was\\n\\nadmissible. In doing so, the district court acknowledged that βthe second search relied\\n\\nupon evidence found during the first search,β J.A. 218, that the probable cause supporting\\n\\nthe search warrant authorizing the second search was βobtained through unlawful\\n\\nmeans,β id. at 220, and that β[a]s a result, the magistrate judgeβs subsequent issuance of a\\n\\nsearch warrant . . . was void ab initio.β Id. at 222. Nonetheless, the district court found\\n\\nthat the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the\\n\\nevidence obtained during the second search and denied Appellantβs motion to suppress.\\n\\n 1\\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Thereafter, on September 27, 2017, Appellant plead guilty to production of child\\n\\npornography. He stipulated to a written statement of facts but reserved his right to appeal\\n\\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion to suppress. On February 15, 2018, the district\\n\\ncourt sentenced Appellant to 324 months of imprisonment to be followed by 25 years of\\n\\nsupervised release. This appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Analyzing a district courtβs decision to deny a motion to suppress, we review legal\\n\\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890\\n\\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). In doing so, we consider the evidence in the light most\\n\\nfavorable to the Government. See id.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Appellant contends that the Military Rules of Evidence apply here and require\\n\\nsuppression. We hold, however, that the Fourth Amendment governs whether evidence\\n\\nis admissible in federal criminal proceedings. The Military Rules of Evidence cannot\\n\\nusurp the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that, even assuming the initial warrant\\n\\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule\\n\\nprecludes suppression of evidence obtained from the first search. And because the good\\n\\nfaith exception saves the evidence of the first search, it also saves the evidence obtained\\n\\nfrom the second search.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f A.\\n\\n At the outset, we recognize that federal courts treat searches conducted within the\\n\\nconfines of the military differently. As this court observed in United States v. Rendon,\\n\\nβ[T]he Fourth Amendment protects members of the armed services from unreasonable\\n\\nsearches and seizuresβ with βdifferent standards than those that apply in the civilian\\n\\ncontext.β 607 F.3d 982, 990 (4th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n That is not to say that military rules wholly displace the framework of the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment. To the contrary, military rules and procedures affect whether a military\\n\\nsearch satisfies the Fourth Amendmentβs reasonableness requirement. To determine\\n\\nwhether a search is reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to balance the\\n\\ndegree to which a search βintrudes upon an individualβs privacyβ against βthe degree to\\n\\nwhich it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.β Samson v.\\n\\nCalifornia, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (citations omitted). The privacy and governmental\\n\\ninterests implicated by military searches are different from those implicated by civilian\\n\\nsearches: In military settings, the government has a significant interest in maintaining\\n\\norder and control over its service members. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744\\n\\n(1974). Meanwhile, the rights of service members must bend to meet the demands of\\n\\ndiscipline and duty. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). For that reason,\\n\\nfederal courts consider the Military Rules of Evidence, which outline the rules and\\n\\nprocedures that govern how military officers conduct military searches, in evaluating the\\n\\nreasonableness of military searches. See, e.g., Rendon, 607 F.3d at 990β91. And when\\n\\nsuch a search violates those rules in a way that impedes a service memberβs specific\\n\\n 8\\n\\fexpectations of privacy, βa violation of the Fourth Amendment can result.β See id. at\\n\\n991.\\n\\n But it does not follow that the Military Rules of Evidence themselves tie the hands\\n\\nof the federal courts. βMilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists\\n\\nseparate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.β\\n\\nBurns, 346 U.S. at 140. Just as states βlack the power to impose on federal courts\\n\\nrequirements stricter than those mandated by the federal Constitution,β United States v.\\n\\nClyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1994), so too does the military. To hold otherwise\\n\\nwould βhamper the enforcement of valid federal laws by rendering relevant and reliable\\n\\nevidence unavailable.β Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368,\\n\\n1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (alteration omitted)). For that reason, the Fourth Amendment\\n\\nprovides the proper standard for determining whether evidence seized pursuant to a non-\\n\\nfederal warrant is admissible in federal court. Id. at 616β17; see also United States v.\\n\\nVan Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 346β47 (4th Cir. 1998) (β[T]he proper standard for evaluating\\n\\nillegal seizure claims in federal courts has uniformly been whether the actions of the state\\n\\nofficials in securing the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States\\n\\nConstitution.β (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Even assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation here, we hold that the\\n\\ngood faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression.\\n\\n Suppression is not itself a right explicitly bestowed by the Fourth Amendment.\\n\\nRather, suppression of evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth\\n\\n 9\\n\\fAmendment is a judicially created prescription for such a violation. See United States v.\\n\\nLeon, 486 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). Indeed, the exclusionary rule is primarily proscriptive:\\n\\nit is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Id. For\\n\\nthat reason, βevidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law\\n\\nenforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the\\n\\nsearch was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.β Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.\\n\\n340, 348β49 (1987) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (internal\\n\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n In line with that principle, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows\\n\\ncourts to introduce evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution but in reasonable\\n\\nreliance on a defective warrant. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Supreme Court has\\n\\nidentified only five limitations to the application of the good faith exception: (1) where a\\n\\nmagistrate issues a warrant based on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit, see\\n\\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155β56 (1978); (2) where a magistrate lacks\\n\\nneutrality and detachment, see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326β28\\n\\n(1979); (3) where a warrant is based on an affidavit βso lacking in indicia of probable\\n\\ncause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,β Leon, 468 U.S. at\\n\\n923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610β11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in\\n\\npart)); (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient that a reasonable officer could not\\n\\nbelieve it was valid, see id. at 923; and (5) where police recklessly maintain or knowingly\\n\\nenter false information into a warrant database to enable a future arrest, Herring v. United\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\fStates, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). Appellant argues that the CASS at issue here triggers\\n\\ntwo of those limitations. 2\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Appellant argues that, because the CASS was not authorized by the commanding\\n\\nofficer with βcontrol over the place where the property or person to be searched [was]\\n\\nsituated,β it was facially deficient to the point where βno reasonable person could have\\n\\nconcluded that this officer possessed authority to issue the CASS.β Appellantβs Br. 18.\\n\\nThat argument lacks both legal and logical support.\\n\\n First, we have applied the good faith exception to warrants authorized by\\n\\nmagistrate judges lacking jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685,\\n\\n691 (4th Cir. 2018). We have done so because βthe exclusionary rule is designed to deter\\n\\npolice misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.β Id.\\n\\n(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). And suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a\\n\\nwarrant issued by the wrong magistrate judge would not appreciably deter police\\n\\nmisconduct. Id. There is no reason to conclude that a case of the wrong commanding\\n\\nofficer should be treated any differently.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Appellant presents no independent basis for suppressing the evidence that\\nofficers obtained when they executed the federal warrant. Instead, Appellant argues that\\nevidence obtained through the federal warrant must be suppressed because the CASS was\\nillegal and the federal warrant was supported solely by evidence obtained through the\\nCASS. Accordingly, the question before us is whether evidence obtained through the\\nCASS is admissible. We need not scrutinize the federal warrant.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Second, we cannot say that no reasonable officer could review a CASS authorized\\n\\nby the subject of the searchβs commanding officer -- as opposed to the commanding\\n\\nofficer of the subjectβs current location -- and believe it to be valid. Military Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 315(d) is no bastion of clarity: it places the power to authorize searches on the\\n\\nofficer βwho has control over the place where the property or person to be searched is\\n\\nsituated.β One could reasonably conclude that a military service memberβs commanding\\n\\nofficer is the officer who has control over the place where he or she βis situated.β Indeed,\\n\\nin this case, several officers reached that conclusion. NCIS consulted Appellantβs\\n\\ncommanding officer in San Diego and the commanding officer of the Little Creek base.\\n\\nNCIS also consulted JAG attorneys at both bases. Only after taking these measures did\\n\\nNCIS reach the technically incorrect conclusion that Appellantβs commander in San\\n\\nDiego should authorize the search of Appellantβs phone, while the Little Creek\\n\\ncommanding officer should authorize the search of his hotel room. This court is not\\n\\nprepared to call that conclusion, and each of those officers, unreasonable.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Appellant also argues that the good faith exception cannot apply to the CASS\\n\\nbecause it was so lacking in indicia of probable cause. But βthe threshold for establishing\\n\\nthis exception is a high one.β Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012).\\n\\nOfficers executing warrants are not often expected to question the conclusions of an\\n\\nissuing authority. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921). For that reason, to preclude\\n\\napplication of the good faith exception, an officerβs reliance on an issuing authorityβs\\n\\nprobable cause determination must have been βentirely unreasonable.β Id. at 549. That\\n\\n 12\\n\\fwas not the case here. The affidavit supporting the CASS detailed the allegations of\\n\\nAppellantβs accuser. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a controlled text\\n\\nmessage conversation between Appellant and his accuser and described the admissions\\n\\nthat Appellant made during that conversation. Those admissions were consistent with the\\n\\nallegations of Appellantβs accuser. Presented with such information, it would not be\\n\\nentirely unreasonable for an officer to believe that the CASS was supported by probable\\n\\ncause.\\n\\n Accordingly, we hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies\\n\\nto the evidence obtained through the CASS. Evidence subsequently obtained through the\\n\\nfederal warrant, which was supported by the CASS evidence, is likewise admissible.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the forgoing reasons, the judgement of the district court is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4369380/\", \"author_raw\": \"THACKER, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILKINSON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"AGEE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"THACKER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592127/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Gregory Kyle SEERDEN, Defendant - Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-20\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-4124\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nGREGORY KYLE SEERDEN,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\nNorfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:17-cr-00067-RAJ-DEM-1)\n\n\nArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 20, 2019\n\n\nBefore WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\nWilkinson and Judge Agee joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Andrew William Grindrod, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\nDEFENDER, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\nGeremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\nDEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\nAttorney, Alexandria, Virginia, David A. Layne, Special Assistant United States\nAttorney, Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.\n\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\n\n In January 2017 investigators with the Naval Criminal Investigation Service\n\n(βNCISβ) obtained a military warrant to search the cell phone of Gregory Kyle Seerden\n\n(βAppellantβ) for evidence of sexual assault. During the search of Appellantβs phone, the\n\ninvestigators found child pornography. On that basis, the investigators then obtained a\n\nfederal warrant to search Appellantβs phone a second time and again found child\n\npornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the first search\n\nwas unlawful because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence and that evidence\n\nobtained during the second search was fruit of the poisonous tree.\n\n Although the district court agreed that evidence obtained during the military\n\nsearch was inadmissible because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence, it nonetheless\n\nfound that the good faith exception allowed the government to admit evidence discovered\n\nvia the second search.\n\n On September 20, 2017, Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to production\n\nof child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). He subsequently filed\n\nthis appeal. As explained below, we affirm on different grounds.\n\n I.\n\n Appellant was a member of the United States Navyβs Sea, Air, and Land Team.\n\nAt all times relevant to this appeal, he was stationed in San Diego, California. But for\n\none week in January 2017, Appellant attended a training at the Little Creek base in\n\nVirginia Beach, Virginia. During that week, Appellant was accused of sexual assault and\n\nsuspected of possession of child pornography.\n\n 2\n\f On his next to last night of training in Virginia, Appellant met a woman. The\n\nwoman recalled that, during her night out with Appellant, the pair went to a few bars and\n\nhad more than a few drinks. The woman came in and out of consciousness throughout\n\nthe night, but she remembered returning to Appellantβs room in the Navy Gateway Inns\n\nand Suites at Little Creek. At around 4:00 a.m., the woman woke up lying naked next to\n\nAppellant. She learned from Appellant that, at some point during the night, they had sex.\n\nShe then left. While she was waiting for a cab at the gate of the base, she began to cry.\n\nA service member on guard duty (a βsentryβ) approached her, and she told him that\n\nAppellant sexually assaulted her. Appellant then attempted to call her. She didnβt\n\nanswer. Meanwhile, the sentry reported the allegations to NCIS.\n\n Later that day, NCIS began investigating the allegations. In doing so, NCIS\n\norchestrated a βcontrolled text message conversationβ between the woman and Appellant.\n\nNCIS agents had the woman text Appellant and inquire about the night in question.\n\nDuring that conversation, Appellant admitted that the pair had sex and that the woman\n\nwas not sober. With that, NCIS agents began coordinating with Appellantβs commanding\n\nofficer in San Diego as well as the commanding officer of the Little Creek base to obtain\n\nauthorizations to search Appellantβs cell phone and hotel room. NCIS also consulted the\n\nJudge Advocate Generalβs (βJAGβ) authorities at both bases. NCIS and JAG officers\n\ndecided that the Little Creek commanding officer should authorize the search of\n\nAppellantβs hotel room while Appellantβs commanding officer in San Diego should\n\nauthorize the search of his phone. The officers reasoned that, while the Little Creek\n\ncommanding officer had control over the base, Appellantβs commanding officer in San\n\n 3\n\fDiego had control over Appellant. In line with that plan, Appellantβs commanding\n\nofficer in San Diego signed a Command Authorization for Search and Seizure (βCASSβ)\n\nsanctioning the search of Appellantβs phone.\n\n The CASS sought to collect messages, photographs, videos, and any other\n\ninformation related to the investigation from Appellantβs phone. In its statement of\n\nprobable cause, the affidavit supporting the CASS connected Appellantβs phone to the\n\nalleged criminal activity by noting that Appellant attempted to call his accuser after\n\ndropping her off at the gate. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a pretext\n\ncommunication between Appellant and the woman accusing him of sexual assault.\n\n A week later, a digital forensics examiner executed the search of Appellantβs\n\nphone. In doing so, the forensics examiner viewed thumbnail-size icons of photographs\n\non Appellantβs phone. The examiner, who was trained in and had experience with child\n\nexploitation investigations, believed some of those photographs were images of child\n\npornography.\n\n Based on the evidence discovered during the military search of Appellantβs phone,\n\nNCIS obtained a federal search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to search\n\nAppellantβs phone for further evidence of child pornography. Under the authority of this\n\nsecond warrant, the forensics examiner continued his analysis of Appellantβs cell phone\n\ndata. He found 78 images and four videos of child pornography. The images depicted\n\nknown victims of child sexual exploitation, while the videos depicted Appellant\n\nperforming a sexual act inches from the face of a sleeping child.\n\n\n\n 4\n\f On March 31, 2017, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging\n\nAppellant with possession and production of child pornography. And on April 20, 2017,\n\na grand jury indicted Appellant for possession, production, and transportation of child\n\npornography. On June 6, 2017, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from\n\nthe two searches of his phone. After holding a hearing on Appellantβs motion, the district\n\ncourt denied it.\n\n The district court first concluded that the evidence obtained during the first search\n\nwas inadmissible. Applying the Military Rules of Evidence in evaluating the lawfulness\n\nof that search, the district court reasoned that the CASS obtained by NCIS did not satisfy\n\nthe βauthorizationβ requirement of Military Rule of Evidence 315:\n\n Pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 315(d), a search\n is valid only if it is issued by an impartial individual. An\n impartial individual is a commander, military judge or\n magistrate. Mil. R. Evid. 315(d)(1) and (2). A military\n commander is defined as βa commander or other person\n serving in a position designated by the Secretary concerned as\n either a position analogous to an officer in charge or a\n position of command, who has control over the place where\n the property or person to be search is situated or found, or if\n that place is not under military control, having control over\n persons subject to military law or the law of war.β Mil. R.\n Evid. 315(d)(1). A military judge or magistrate βis a person\n who is authorized under regulations prescribed by the\n Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned.β Mil. R.\n Evid. 315(d)(2).\n\n Here, the person who authorized the CASS for the first\n search of [Appellantβs] telephone was [Appellantβs] unit\n commander in San Diego, CA. Pursuant to the definitions\n provided in Military Rules of Evidence 315(d)(1),\n [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have the authority to\n authorize any search [conducted] on [the Little Creek base]\n because [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have control\n\n 5\n\f over the place where the property or person to be searched was\n situated.\n\nJ.A. 215. 1 The district court further reasoned that, because of the defect in the CASS\n\nauthorization, it could not apply the exclusionary ruleβs good faith exception to the\n\nevidence obtained as a result of the first search. Citing Military Rule of Evidence 311,\n\nthe district court noted, βPursuant to military law, evidence obtained as the result of an\n\nunlawful search may [only] be used if . . . βthe search or seizure resulted from an\n\nauthorization . . . issued by an individual competent to issue the authorization under Mil.\n\nR. Evid. 315(d).ββ J.A. 217β18. Because the district court found that Appellantβs\n\ncommander in San Diego was not competent to authorize the CASS, the court concluded\n\nthat βthe good faith exception does not cure the first search.β Id. at 218.\n\n Despite finding that evidence obtained during the first search was inadmissible,\n\nthe district court concluded that evidence obtained during the second search was\n\nadmissible. In doing so, the district court acknowledged that βthe second search relied\n\nupon evidence found during the first search,β J.A. 218, that the probable cause supporting\n\nthe search warrant authorizing the second search was βobtained through unlawful\n\nmeans,β id. at 220, and that β[a]s a result, the magistrate judgeβs subsequent issuance of a\n\nsearch warrant . . . was void ab initio.β Id. at 222. Nonetheless, the district court found\n\nthat the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the\n\nevidence obtained during the second search and denied Appellantβs motion to suppress.\n\n 1\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\nappeal.\n\n\n 6\n\f Thereafter, on September 27, 2017, Appellant plead guilty to production of child\n\npornography. He stipulated to a written statement of facts but reserved his right to appeal\n\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion to suppress. On February 15, 2018, the district\n\ncourt sentenced Appellant to 324 months of imprisonment to be followed by 25 years of\n\nsupervised release. This appeal followed.\n\n II.\n\n Analyzing a district courtβs decision to deny a motion to suppress, we review legal\n\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890\n\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). In doing so, we consider the evidence in the light most\n\nfavorable to the Government. See id.\n\n III.\n\n Appellant contends that the Military Rules of Evidence apply here and require\n\nsuppression. We hold, however, that the Fourth Amendment governs whether evidence\n\nis admissible in federal criminal proceedings. The Military Rules of Evidence cannot\n\nusurp the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that, even assuming the initial warrant\n\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule\n\nprecludes suppression of evidence obtained from the first search. And because the good\n\nfaith exception saves the evidence of the first search, it also saves the evidence obtained\n\nfrom the second search.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f A.\n\n At the outset, we recognize that federal courts treat searches conducted within the\n\nconfines of the military differently. As this court observed in United States v. Rendon,\n\nβ[T]he Fourth Amendment protects members of the armed services from unreasonable\n\nsearches and seizuresβ with βdifferent standards than those that apply in the civilian\n\ncontext.β 607 F.3d 982, 990 (4th Cir. 2010).\n\n That is not to say that military rules wholly displace the framework of the Fourth\n\nAmendment. To the contrary, military rules and procedures affect whether a military\n\nsearch satisfies the Fourth Amendmentβs reasonableness requirement. To determine\n\nwhether a search is reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to balance the\n\ndegree to which a search βintrudes upon an individualβs privacyβ against βthe degree to\n\nwhich it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.β Samson v.\n\nCalifornia, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (citations omitted). The privacy and governmental\n\ninterests implicated by military searches are different from those implicated by civilian\n\nsearches: In military settings, the government has a significant interest in maintaining\n\norder and control over its service members. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744\n\n(1974). Meanwhile, the rights of service members must bend to meet the demands of\n\ndiscipline and duty. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). For that reason,\n\nfederal courts consider the Military Rules of Evidence, which outline the rules and\n\nprocedures that govern how military officers conduct military searches, in evaluating the\n\nreasonableness of military searches. See, e.g., Rendon, 607 F.3d at 990β91. And when\n\nsuch a search violates those rules in a way that impedes a service memberβs specific\n\n 8\n\fexpectations of privacy, βa violation of the Fourth Amendment can result.β See id. at\n\n991.\n\n But it does not follow that the Military Rules of Evidence themselves tie the hands\n\nof the federal courts. βMilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists\n\nseparate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.β\n\nBurns, 346 U.S. at 140. Just as states βlack the power to impose on federal courts\n\nrequirements stricter than those mandated by the federal Constitution,β United States v.\n\nClyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1994), so too does the military. To hold otherwise\n\nwould βhamper the enforcement of valid federal laws by rendering relevant and reliable\n\nevidence unavailable.β Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368,\n\n1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (alteration omitted)). For that reason, the Fourth Amendment\n\nprovides the proper standard for determining whether evidence seized pursuant to a non-\n\nfederal warrant is admissible in federal court. Id. at 616β17; see also United States v.\n\nVan Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 346β47 (4th Cir. 1998) (β[T]he proper standard for evaluating\n\nillegal seizure claims in federal courts has uniformly been whether the actions of the state\n\nofficials in securing the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States\n\nConstitution.β (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\n B.\n\n Even assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation here, we hold that the\n\ngood faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression.\n\n Suppression is not itself a right explicitly bestowed by the Fourth Amendment.\n\nRather, suppression of evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth\n\n 9\n\fAmendment is a judicially created prescription for such a violation. See United States v.\n\nLeon, 486 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). Indeed, the exclusionary rule is primarily proscriptive:\n\nit is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Id. For\n\nthat reason, βevidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law\n\nenforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the\n\nsearch was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.β Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.\n\n340, 348β49 (1987) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (internal\n\nquotation marks omitted)).\n\n In line with that principle, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows\n\ncourts to introduce evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution but in reasonable\n\nreliance on a defective warrant. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Supreme Court has\n\nidentified only five limitations to the application of the good faith exception: (1) where a\n\nmagistrate issues a warrant based on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit, see\n\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155β56 (1978); (2) where a magistrate lacks\n\nneutrality and detachment, see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326β28\n\n(1979); (3) where a warrant is based on an affidavit βso lacking in indicia of probable\n\ncause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,β Leon, 468 U.S. at\n\n923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610β11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in\n\npart)); (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient that a reasonable officer could not\n\nbelieve it was valid, see id. at 923; and (5) where police recklessly maintain or knowingly\n\nenter false information into a warrant database to enable a future arrest, Herring v. United\n\n\n\n 10\n\fStates, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). Appellant argues that the CASS at issue here triggers\n\ntwo of those limitations. 2\n\n 1.\n\n Appellant argues that, because the CASS was not authorized by the commanding\n\nofficer with βcontrol over the place where the property or person to be searched [was]\n\nsituated,β it was facially deficient to the point where βno reasonable person could have\n\nconcluded that this officer possessed authority to issue the CASS.β Appellantβs Br. 18.\n\nThat argument lacks both legal and logical support.\n\n First, we have applied the good faith exception to warrants authorized by\n\nmagistrate judges lacking jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685,\n\n691 (4th Cir. 2018). We have done so because βthe exclusionary rule is designed to deter\n\npolice misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.β Id.\n\n(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). And suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a\n\nwarrant issued by the wrong magistrate judge would not appreciably deter police\n\nmisconduct. Id. There is no reason to conclude that a case of the wrong commanding\n\nofficer should be treated any differently.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Appellant presents no independent basis for suppressing the evidence that\nofficers obtained when they executed the federal warrant. Instead, Appellant argues that\nevidence obtained through the federal warrant must be suppressed because the CASS was\nillegal and the federal warrant was supported solely by evidence obtained through the\nCASS. Accordingly, the question before us is whether evidence obtained through the\nCASS is admissible. We need not scrutinize the federal warrant.\n\n\n 11\n\f Second, we cannot say that no reasonable officer could review a CASS authorized\n\nby the subject of the searchβs commanding officer -- as opposed to the commanding\n\nofficer of the subjectβs current location -- and believe it to be valid. Military Rule of\n\nEvidence 315(d) is no bastion of clarity: it places the power to authorize searches on the\n\nofficer βwho has control over the place where the property or person to be searched is\n\nsituated.β One could reasonably conclude that a military service memberβs commanding\n\nofficer is the officer who has control over the place where he or she βis situated.β Indeed,\n\nin this case, several officers reached that conclusion. NCIS consulted Appellantβs\n\ncommanding officer in San Diego and the commanding officer of the Little Creek base.\n\nNCIS also consulted JAG attorneys at both bases. Only after taking these measures did\n\nNCIS reach the technically incorrect conclusion that Appellantβs commander in San\n\nDiego should authorize the search of Appellantβs phone, while the Little Creek\n\ncommanding officer should authorize the search of his hotel room. This court is not\n\nprepared to call that conclusion, and each of those officers, unreasonable.\n\n 2.\n\n Appellant also argues that the good faith exception cannot apply to the CASS\n\nbecause it was so lacking in indicia of probable cause. But βthe threshold for establishing\n\nthis exception is a high one.β Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012).\n\nOfficers executing warrants are not often expected to question the conclusions of an\n\nissuing authority. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921). For that reason, to preclude\n\napplication of the good faith exception, an officerβs reliance on an issuing authorityβs\n\nprobable cause determination must have been βentirely unreasonable.β Id. at 549. That\n\n 12\n\fwas not the case here. The affidavit supporting the CASS detailed the allegations of\n\nAppellantβs accuser. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a controlled text\n\nmessage conversation between Appellant and his accuser and described the admissions\n\nthat Appellant made during that conversation. Those admissions were consistent with the\n\nallegations of Appellantβs accuser. Presented with such information, it would not be\n\nentirely unreasonable for an officer to believe that the CASS was supported by probable\n\ncause.\n\n Accordingly, we hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies\n\nto the evidence obtained through the CASS. Evidence subsequently obtained through the\n\nfederal warrant, which was supported by the CASS evidence, is likewise admissible.\n\n IV.\n\n For the forgoing reasons, the judgement of the district court is\n\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Gregory Kyle SEERDEN, Defendant - Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-20\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-4124\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nGREGORY KYLE SEERDEN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nNorfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:17-cr-00067-RAJ-DEM-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 20, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\\nWilkinson and Judge Agee joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Andrew William Grindrod, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\\nDEFENDER, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\\nGeremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\\nDEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\\nAttorney, Alexandria, Virginia, David A. Layne, Special Assistant United States\\nAttorney, Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.\\n\\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In January 2017 investigators with the Naval Criminal Investigation Service\\n\\n(βNCISβ) obtained a military warrant to search the cell phone of Gregory Kyle Seerden\\n\\n(βAppellantβ) for evidence of sexual assault. During the search of Appellantβs phone, the\\n\\ninvestigators found child pornography. On that basis, the investigators then obtained a\\n\\nfederal warrant to search Appellantβs phone a second time and again found child\\n\\npornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the first search\\n\\nwas unlawful because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence and that evidence\\n\\nobtained during the second search was fruit of the poisonous tree.\\n\\n Although the district court agreed that evidence obtained during the military\\n\\nsearch was inadmissible because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence, it nonetheless\\n\\nfound that the good faith exception allowed the government to admit evidence discovered\\n\\nvia the second search.\\n\\n On September 20, 2017, Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to production\\n\\nof child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). He subsequently filed\\n\\nthis appeal. As explained below, we affirm on different grounds.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Appellant was a member of the United States Navyβs Sea, Air, and Land Team.\\n\\nAt all times relevant to this appeal, he was stationed in San Diego, California. But for\\n\\none week in January 2017, Appellant attended a training at the Little Creek base in\\n\\nVirginia Beach, Virginia. During that week, Appellant was accused of sexual assault and\\n\\nsuspected of possession of child pornography.\\n\\n 2\\n\\f On his next to last night of training in Virginia, Appellant met a woman. The\\n\\nwoman recalled that, during her night out with Appellant, the pair went to a few bars and\\n\\nhad more than a few drinks. The woman came in and out of consciousness throughout\\n\\nthe night, but she remembered returning to Appellantβs room in the Navy Gateway Inns\\n\\nand Suites at Little Creek. At around 4:00 a.m., the woman woke up lying naked next to\\n\\nAppellant. She learned from Appellant that, at some point during the night, they had sex.\\n\\nShe then left. While she was waiting for a cab at the gate of the base, she began to cry.\\n\\nA service member on guard duty (a βsentryβ) approached her, and she told him that\\n\\nAppellant sexually assaulted her. Appellant then attempted to call her. She didnβt\\n\\nanswer. Meanwhile, the sentry reported the allegations to NCIS.\\n\\n Later that day, NCIS began investigating the allegations. In doing so, NCIS\\n\\norchestrated a βcontrolled text message conversationβ between the woman and Appellant.\\n\\nNCIS agents had the woman text Appellant and inquire about the night in question.\\n\\nDuring that conversation, Appellant admitted that the pair had sex and that the woman\\n\\nwas not sober. With that, NCIS agents began coordinating with Appellantβs commanding\\n\\nofficer in San Diego as well as the commanding officer of the Little Creek base to obtain\\n\\nauthorizations to search Appellantβs cell phone and hotel room. NCIS also consulted the\\n\\nJudge Advocate Generalβs (βJAGβ) authorities at both bases. NCIS and JAG officers\\n\\ndecided that the Little Creek commanding officer should authorize the search of\\n\\nAppellantβs hotel room while Appellantβs commanding officer in San Diego should\\n\\nauthorize the search of his phone. The officers reasoned that, while the Little Creek\\n\\ncommanding officer had control over the base, Appellantβs commanding officer in San\\n\\n 3\\n\\fDiego had control over Appellant. In line with that plan, Appellantβs commanding\\n\\nofficer in San Diego signed a Command Authorization for Search and Seizure (βCASSβ)\\n\\nsanctioning the search of Appellantβs phone.\\n\\n The CASS sought to collect messages, photographs, videos, and any other\\n\\ninformation related to the investigation from Appellantβs phone. In its statement of\\n\\nprobable cause, the affidavit supporting the CASS connected Appellantβs phone to the\\n\\nalleged criminal activity by noting that Appellant attempted to call his accuser after\\n\\ndropping her off at the gate. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a pretext\\n\\ncommunication between Appellant and the woman accusing him of sexual assault.\\n\\n A week later, a digital forensics examiner executed the search of Appellantβs\\n\\nphone. In doing so, the forensics examiner viewed thumbnail-size icons of photographs\\n\\non Appellantβs phone. The examiner, who was trained in and had experience with child\\n\\nexploitation investigations, believed some of those photographs were images of child\\n\\npornography.\\n\\n Based on the evidence discovered during the military search of Appellantβs phone,\\n\\nNCIS obtained a federal search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to search\\n\\nAppellantβs phone for further evidence of child pornography. Under the authority of this\\n\\nsecond warrant, the forensics examiner continued his analysis of Appellantβs cell phone\\n\\ndata. He found 78 images and four videos of child pornography. The images depicted\\n\\nknown victims of child sexual exploitation, while the videos depicted Appellant\\n\\nperforming a sexual act inches from the face of a sleeping child.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f On March 31, 2017, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging\\n\\nAppellant with possession and production of child pornography. And on April 20, 2017,\\n\\na grand jury indicted Appellant for possession, production, and transportation of child\\n\\npornography. On June 6, 2017, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from\\n\\nthe two searches of his phone. After holding a hearing on Appellantβs motion, the district\\n\\ncourt denied it.\\n\\n The district court first concluded that the evidence obtained during the first search\\n\\nwas inadmissible. Applying the Military Rules of Evidence in evaluating the lawfulness\\n\\nof that search, the district court reasoned that the CASS obtained by NCIS did not satisfy\\n\\nthe βauthorizationβ requirement of Military Rule of Evidence 315:\\n\\n Pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 315(d), a search\\n is valid only if it is issued by an impartial individual. An\\n impartial individual is a commander, military judge or\\n magistrate. Mil. R. Evid. 315(d)(1) and (2). A military\\n commander is defined as βa commander or other person\\n serving in a position designated by the Secretary concerned as\\n either a position analogous to an officer in charge or a\\n position of command, who has control over the place where\\n the property or person to be search is situated or found, or if\\n that place is not under military control, having control over\\n persons subject to military law or the law of war.β Mil. R.\\n Evid. 315(d)(1). A military judge or magistrate βis a person\\n who is authorized under regulations prescribed by the\\n Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned.β Mil. R.\\n Evid. 315(d)(2).\\n\\n Here, the person who authorized the CASS for the first\\n search of [Appellantβs] telephone was [Appellantβs] unit\\n commander in San Diego, CA. Pursuant to the definitions\\n provided in Military Rules of Evidence 315(d)(1),\\n [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have the authority to\\n authorize any search [conducted] on [the Little Creek base]\\n because [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have control\\n\\n 5\\n\\f over the place where the property or person to be searched was\\n situated.\\n\\nJ.A. 215. 1 The district court further reasoned that, because of the defect in the CASS\\n\\nauthorization, it could not apply the exclusionary ruleβs good faith exception to the\\n\\nevidence obtained as a result of the first search. Citing Military Rule of Evidence 311,\\n\\nthe district court noted, βPursuant to military law, evidence obtained as the result of an\\n\\nunlawful search may [only] be used if . . . βthe search or seizure resulted from an\\n\\nauthorization . . . issued by an individual competent to issue the authorization under Mil.\\n\\nR. Evid. 315(d).ββ J.A. 217β18. Because the district court found that Appellantβs\\n\\ncommander in San Diego was not competent to authorize the CASS, the court concluded\\n\\nthat βthe good faith exception does not cure the first search.β Id. at 218.\\n\\n Despite finding that evidence obtained during the first search was inadmissible,\\n\\nthe district court concluded that evidence obtained during the second search was\\n\\nadmissible. In doing so, the district court acknowledged that βthe second search relied\\n\\nupon evidence found during the first search,β J.A. 218, that the probable cause supporting\\n\\nthe search warrant authorizing the second search was βobtained through unlawful\\n\\nmeans,β id. at 220, and that β[a]s a result, the magistrate judgeβs subsequent issuance of a\\n\\nsearch warrant . . . was void ab initio.β Id. at 222. Nonetheless, the district court found\\n\\nthat the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the\\n\\nevidence obtained during the second search and denied Appellantβs motion to suppress.\\n\\n 1\\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Thereafter, on September 27, 2017, Appellant plead guilty to production of child\\n\\npornography. He stipulated to a written statement of facts but reserved his right to appeal\\n\\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion to suppress. On February 15, 2018, the district\\n\\ncourt sentenced Appellant to 324 months of imprisonment to be followed by 25 years of\\n\\nsupervised release. This appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Analyzing a district courtβs decision to deny a motion to suppress, we review legal\\n\\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890\\n\\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). In doing so, we consider the evidence in the light most\\n\\nfavorable to the Government. See id.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Appellant contends that the Military Rules of Evidence apply here and require\\n\\nsuppression. We hold, however, that the Fourth Amendment governs whether evidence\\n\\nis admissible in federal criminal proceedings. The Military Rules of Evidence cannot\\n\\nusurp the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that, even assuming the initial warrant\\n\\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule\\n\\nprecludes suppression of evidence obtained from the first search. And because the good\\n\\nfaith exception saves the evidence of the first search, it also saves the evidence obtained\\n\\nfrom the second search.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f A.\\n\\n At the outset, we recognize that federal courts treat searches conducted within the\\n\\nconfines of the military differently. As this court observed in United States v. Rendon,\\n\\nβ[T]he Fourth Amendment protects members of the armed services from unreasonable\\n\\nsearches and seizuresβ with βdifferent standards than those that apply in the civilian\\n\\ncontext.β 607 F.3d 982, 990 (4th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n That is not to say that military rules wholly displace the framework of the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment. To the contrary, military rules and procedures affect whether a military\\n\\nsearch satisfies the Fourth Amendmentβs reasonableness requirement. To determine\\n\\nwhether a search is reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to balance the\\n\\ndegree to which a search βintrudes upon an individualβs privacyβ against βthe degree to\\n\\nwhich it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.β Samson v.\\n\\nCalifornia, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (citations omitted). The privacy and governmental\\n\\ninterests implicated by military searches are different from those implicated by civilian\\n\\nsearches: In military settings, the government has a significant interest in maintaining\\n\\norder and control over its service members. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744\\n\\n(1974). Meanwhile, the rights of service members must bend to meet the demands of\\n\\ndiscipline and duty. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). For that reason,\\n\\nfederal courts consider the Military Rules of Evidence, which outline the rules and\\n\\nprocedures that govern how military officers conduct military searches, in evaluating the\\n\\nreasonableness of military searches. See, e.g., Rendon, 607 F.3d at 990β91. And when\\n\\nsuch a search violates those rules in a way that impedes a service memberβs specific\\n\\n 8\\n\\fexpectations of privacy, βa violation of the Fourth Amendment can result.β See id. at\\n\\n991.\\n\\n But it does not follow that the Military Rules of Evidence themselves tie the hands\\n\\nof the federal courts. βMilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists\\n\\nseparate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.β\\n\\nBurns, 346 U.S. at 140. Just as states βlack the power to impose on federal courts\\n\\nrequirements stricter than those mandated by the federal Constitution,β United States v.\\n\\nClyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1994), so too does the military. To hold otherwise\\n\\nwould βhamper the enforcement of valid federal laws by rendering relevant and reliable\\n\\nevidence unavailable.β Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368,\\n\\n1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (alteration omitted)). For that reason, the Fourth Amendment\\n\\nprovides the proper standard for determining whether evidence seized pursuant to a non-\\n\\nfederal warrant is admissible in federal court. Id. at 616β17; see also United States v.\\n\\nVan Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 346β47 (4th Cir. 1998) (β[T]he proper standard for evaluating\\n\\nillegal seizure claims in federal courts has uniformly been whether the actions of the state\\n\\nofficials in securing the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States\\n\\nConstitution.β (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Even assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation here, we hold that the\\n\\ngood faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression.\\n\\n Suppression is not itself a right explicitly bestowed by the Fourth Amendment.\\n\\nRather, suppression of evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth\\n\\n 9\\n\\fAmendment is a judicially created prescription for such a violation. See United States v.\\n\\nLeon, 486 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). Indeed, the exclusionary rule is primarily proscriptive:\\n\\nit is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Id. For\\n\\nthat reason, βevidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law\\n\\nenforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the\\n\\nsearch was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.β Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.\\n\\n340, 348β49 (1987) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (internal\\n\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n In line with that principle, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows\\n\\ncourts to introduce evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution but in reasonable\\n\\nreliance on a defective warrant. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Supreme Court has\\n\\nidentified only five limitations to the application of the good faith exception: (1) where a\\n\\nmagistrate issues a warrant based on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit, see\\n\\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155β56 (1978); (2) where a magistrate lacks\\n\\nneutrality and detachment, see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326β28\\n\\n(1979); (3) where a warrant is based on an affidavit βso lacking in indicia of probable\\n\\ncause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,β Leon, 468 U.S. at\\n\\n923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610β11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in\\n\\npart)); (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient that a reasonable officer could not\\n\\nbelieve it was valid, see id. at 923; and (5) where police recklessly maintain or knowingly\\n\\nenter false information into a warrant database to enable a future arrest, Herring v. United\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\fStates, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). Appellant argues that the CASS at issue here triggers\\n\\ntwo of those limitations. 2\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Appellant argues that, because the CASS was not authorized by the commanding\\n\\nofficer with βcontrol over the place where the property or person to be searched [was]\\n\\nsituated,β it was facially deficient to the point where βno reasonable person could have\\n\\nconcluded that this officer possessed authority to issue the CASS.β Appellantβs Br. 18.\\n\\nThat argument lacks both legal and logical support.\\n\\n First, we have applied the good faith exception to warrants authorized by\\n\\nmagistrate judges lacking jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685,\\n\\n691 (4th Cir. 2018). We have done so because βthe exclusionary rule is designed to deter\\n\\npolice misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.β Id.\\n\\n(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). And suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a\\n\\nwarrant issued by the wrong magistrate judge would not appreciably deter police\\n\\nmisconduct. Id. There is no reason to conclude that a case of the wrong commanding\\n\\nofficer should be treated any differently.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Appellant presents no independent basis for suppressing the evidence that\\nofficers obtained when they executed the federal warrant. Instead, Appellant argues that\\nevidence obtained through the federal warrant must be suppressed because the CASS was\\nillegal and the federal warrant was supported solely by evidence obtained through the\\nCASS. Accordingly, the question before us is whether evidence obtained through the\\nCASS is admissible. We need not scrutinize the federal warrant.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Second, we cannot say that no reasonable officer could review a CASS authorized\\n\\nby the subject of the searchβs commanding officer -- as opposed to the commanding\\n\\nofficer of the subjectβs current location -- and believe it to be valid. Military Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 315(d) is no bastion of clarity: it places the power to authorize searches on the\\n\\nofficer βwho has control over the place where the property or person to be searched is\\n\\nsituated.β One could reasonably conclude that a military service memberβs commanding\\n\\nofficer is the officer who has control over the place where he or she βis situated.β Indeed,\\n\\nin this case, several officers reached that conclusion. NCIS consulted Appellantβs\\n\\ncommanding officer in San Diego and the commanding officer of the Little Creek base.\\n\\nNCIS also consulted JAG attorneys at both bases. Only after taking these measures did\\n\\nNCIS reach the technically incorrect conclusion that Appellantβs commander in San\\n\\nDiego should authorize the search of Appellantβs phone, while the Little Creek\\n\\ncommanding officer should authorize the search of his hotel room. This court is not\\n\\nprepared to call that conclusion, and each of those officers, unreasonable.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Appellant also argues that the good faith exception cannot apply to the CASS\\n\\nbecause it was so lacking in indicia of probable cause. But βthe threshold for establishing\\n\\nthis exception is a high one.β Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012).\\n\\nOfficers executing warrants are not often expected to question the conclusions of an\\n\\nissuing authority. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921). For that reason, to preclude\\n\\napplication of the good faith exception, an officerβs reliance on an issuing authorityβs\\n\\nprobable cause determination must have been βentirely unreasonable.β Id. at 549. That\\n\\n 12\\n\\fwas not the case here. The affidavit supporting the CASS detailed the allegations of\\n\\nAppellantβs accuser. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a controlled text\\n\\nmessage conversation between Appellant and his accuser and described the admissions\\n\\nthat Appellant made during that conversation. Those admissions were consistent with the\\n\\nallegations of Appellantβs accuser. Presented with such information, it would not be\\n\\nentirely unreasonable for an officer to believe that the CASS was supported by probable\\n\\ncause.\\n\\n Accordingly, we hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies\\n\\nto the evidence obtained through the CASS. Evidence subsequently obtained through the\\n\\nfederal warrant, which was supported by the CASS evidence, is likewise admissible.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the forgoing reasons, the judgement of the district court is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":562,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4592596,"string":"4,592,596"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Nicholas YOUNG, Defendant - Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Nicholas Young"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-4138"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Agee, Keenan, Richardson\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"AGEE, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-4138\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nNICHOLAS YOUNG,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nAlexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00265-LMB-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 21, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore AGEE, KEENAN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote\\nthe opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Richardson joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Nicholas David Smith, DAVID B. SMITH, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for\\nAppellant. Gordon D. Kromberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,\\nAlexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\\nAttorney, John T. Gibbs, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.\\n\\fAGEE, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n A jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia\\n\\nconvicted Nicholas Young of one count of attempting to provide material support to the\\n\\nIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (βISILβ), a designated foreign terrorist organization\\n\\n(βFTOβ), in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B, as well as two counts of attempting to\\n\\nobstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(c)(2). Asserting a host of district court\\n\\nerrors, Young challenges his convictions and sentence. For the following reasons, we\\n\\naffirm the material support conviction, vacate the obstruction convictions, and remand for\\n\\nresentencing.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (βFBIβ) opened a counterterrorism\\n\\ninvestigation into Young, a police officer with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit\\n\\nAuthority, prompted in part by his connections to an acquaintance who had been arrested\\n\\non 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B charges. That December, βKhalil,β an undercover FBI agent,\\n\\nbegan maintaining contact with Young, who would discuss with Khalil his wariness of\\n\\nFBI surveillance, the measures he had taken to thwart such surveillance, and the skills\\n\\nneededβwhich he purported to possessβto attack an FBI or a federal office. During this\\n\\nperiod, law enforcement also observed Young traveling to and from Libya, though law\\n\\nenforcement was unable to determine the purpose of his trips. Khalilβs contact with\\n\\nYoung eventually concluded in April 2012.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f In May 2014, the FBI again began observing Young more actively after an FBI\\n\\ninformant, βMo,β met Young through Youngβs acquaintances, whom Mo was monitoring.\\n\\nOver the next several months, Mo and Young met approximately 20 times. During their\\n\\nmeetings, Mo indicated that he was interested in traveling to Syria to join ISIL. Young in\\n\\nturn offered advice on how to travel overseas without being flagged by government\\n\\nauthorities. Specifically, Young suggested that Mo devise a cover story for his trip, such\\n\\nas pretending that he was taking a guided tour of Turkey (or that he actually take such a\\n\\ntour). Young also advised Mo to book a roundtrip ticket and volunteered to send a text to\\n\\nMo a few days after Moβs βreturn dateβ to assist Mo in evading law enforcement\\n\\nsuspicion, explaining that the text would make it look like Young was expecting Moβs\\n\\nreturn (rather than staying on in the region to travel to ISIL-controlled territory). Finally,\\n\\nYoung and Mo set up covert email accounts to communicate.\\n\\n That October, Mo traveled to Turkey with his FBI handler, Special Agent John\\n\\nMinichello. While there, Mo emailed Young that he was planning to travel to ISIL-\\n\\ncontrolled territory in Syria. Mo then returned to the U.S. In November 2014, Young\\n\\nsent Mo the pre-arranged text message: βHope you had a good vacation. If you want to\\n\\ngrab lunch . . . hit me up.β J.A. 566:3β5. After forwarding that message to Agent\\n\\nMinichello, Moβs involvement in the investigation concluded; from that point on, Agent\\n\\nMinichello and another agent impersonated Mo to Young through the email account.\\n\\n In subsequent emails to Mo, Young made it clear that he believed Mo had joined\\n\\nISIL. In 2015, Young asked Mo to mention him to any Libyan ISIL members Mo might\\n\\nencounter and to tell them that Young had been in Libya with the Abu Salem Martyrsβ\\n\\n 3\\n\\fBrigade, a militia group with connections to al Qaeda that had been fighting Muammar al\\n\\nQaddafiβs regime. Young also emailed his contacts in the Brigade on Moβs behalf.\\n\\n On December 3 and 5, 2015, two FBI agents interviewed Young. Although the\\n\\nagents purported to be questioning Young about Moβs whereabouts, they were attempting\\n\\nto determine whether Young himself was in contact with any terrorists. During the\\n\\ninterviews, Young denied having current contact information for Mo. He informed the\\n\\nagents that he believed Mo had gone on vacation but that he had not been in touch with\\n\\nMo since October 2014. He also denied knowing anyone who had given Mo travel\\n\\nguidance. Young later emailed Mo to inform him about the FBIβs inquiry.\\n\\n In April 2016, Mo suggested to Young that they should communicate through an\\n\\nencrypted messaging app, Threema. In July, Young created a Threema account and\\n\\nreceived a message from Mo noting that ISIL needed more fighters. Mo explained that\\n\\nGoogle gift cards could be used to buy Threema accounts to help fighters communicate\\n\\nwith ISIL, thereby facilitating their travel to ISIL-controlled territory. At the end of the\\n\\nmonth, Young used Threema to transmit $245 in Google gift cards to Mo. After\\n\\nconfirming that Mo had received the cards, Young responded that he was βgladβ and\\n\\nwould be disposing of the device used to communicate with Mo. J.A. 868:13.\\n\\n In August 2016, Young was arrested for attempted material support of ISIL, an\\n\\nFTO. On the day of his arrest, agents executed a search warrant and seized militant\\n\\nIslamist, Nazi, and white supremacist paraphernalia as well as weapons from his home.\\n\\nAn indictment subsequently charged Young with attempting to provide material\\n\\nsupportβthe gift cardsβto a designated FTO, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B (Count\\n\\n 4\\n\\fOne), and attempting to obstructβduring the 2015 interviews (Count Two) and with the\\n\\nNovember 2014 text (Count Four)βan official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2). 1 Young proceeded to a trial on these counts. The jury convicted Young of\\n\\nall three counts and the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 180\\n\\nmonths as to each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.\\n\\n Young timely appealed, asserting five sets of errors by the district court. The first\\n\\nthree concern Count One, to which Young had asserted an entrapment defense during\\n\\ntrial. To establish Youngβs predisposition to commit the offense conduct, the\\n\\nGovernment had introduced evidence of the seized items over Youngβs objections. On\\n\\nappeal, Young asserts in Ground One that the district court erred by admitting into\\n\\nevidence the white supremacist and Nazi paraphernalia. Ground Two contends that the\\n\\ndistrict court erroneously certified an expert witness on militant Islamist and Nazi\\n\\nβconvergence.β Ground Three asserts that a number of the district courtβs evidentiary\\n\\nrulings deprived Young of his due process right to a fair trial. Ground Four posits that\\n\\nthe Government failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove the two attempted obstruction\\n\\nof justice charges. Finally, Ground Five asserts that his sentence was both procedurally\\n\\nerroneous and substantively unreasonable.\\n\\n This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\\n\\n\\n\\n II. Grounds One to Three: Entrapment-Centered Challenges\\n\\n 1\\n Count Three, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(b)(3), was dismissed as\\nduplicative.\\n\\n 5\\n\\f At trial, Young presented an entrapment defense to Count One, which charged\\n\\nYoung with attempting to provide material support to a designated FTO. To establish\\n\\nentrapment, a defendant must first demonstrate the government induced him to engage in\\n\\nthe criminal activity. United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 380 (4th Cir. 2014).\\n\\nOnce the defendant has shown government inducement, the burden shifts to the\\n\\ngovernment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendantβs predisposition to have\\n\\nengaged in the criminal conduct. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir.\\n\\n1992). Predisposition βfocuses upon whether the defendant was an unwary innocent or,\\n\\ninstead, an unwary criminal who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate\\n\\nthe crime.β Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). 2 To establish Youngβs\\n\\npredisposition to commit the offense conduct, the Government introduced evidence of\\n\\nYoungβs interest in radical, anti-Semitic terrorist causes both before and after his first\\n\\ncontact with Khalil in 2010. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548β50 (1992)\\n\\n(holding that predisposition must be established prior to the defendantβs first contact with\\n\\na government agent). This evidence included Nazi and white supremacist paraphernalia\\n\\nseized from Youngβs home, expert testimony regarding the βconvergenceβ of Nazism and\\n\\nmilitant Islamism, and testimony about Youngβs prior support for such causes. Young\\n\\ncontests the admission of that evidence as well as the exclusion of other purportedly\\n\\nexculpatory evidence.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n We have omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations here and\\nthroughout this opinion, unless otherwise noted.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f In reviewing evidentiary rulings, this Court reviews the district courtβs legal\\n\\nconclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Kolsuz, 890\\n\\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). Such rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and\\n\\noverturned only if the error was not harmless. United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 401\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 81 (4th Cir. 2005) (concerning\\n\\nexpert testimony).\\n\\n A. Ground One: Nazi and White Supremacist Paraphernalia\\n\\n To prove Youngβs predisposition to assist an FTO, the Government introduced\\n\\nNazi and white supremacist paraphernalia seized from Youngβs home pursuant to a\\n\\nsearch warrant. The warrant had authorized the seizure of β[a]ll records, documents, and\\n\\nparaphernalia . . . relating to ISIL/ISIS,β as well as βother designated terrorist groups, or\\n\\nany individual or group engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity, or communications with\\n\\nor involving such groups and/or individuals.β J.A. 56; 66. After finding the items in\\n\\nYoungβs home and consulting with a Government attorney, law enforcement seized the\\n\\nmaterials.\\n\\n The Government then moved to admit this evidence (1) to corroborate testimony\\n\\nfrom Youngβs college friends and former housemates concerning his pre-2010 interest in\\n\\nthese causes 3 and (2) to further illustrate his interest in a historical and modern-day\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Specifically, Youngβs college friend testified that after they had attended a 2001\\ngathering of neo-Nazis for a school project, Young told him not to discount an alliance\\nbetween Nazis and Muslims to combat Jews. And Youngβs former housemates testified\\nthat Young had listened to racially inflammatory music and used an Israeli flag as a\\ndoormat to make an anti-Semitic statement. To corroborate this testimony, the\\n(Continued)\\n 7\\n\\fconnection between Nazis and militant Islamists. To this latter point, the Government\\n\\nintroduced, among other items, a poster Young had downloaded in 2007 depicting a Nazi\\n\\nshaking hands with the Mufti of Jerusalemβwho had allied himself with Adolf Hitler\\n\\nand recruited Muslim troops to serve in the SSβtitled βThe Alliance: Worldwide\\n\\nAssociation of Nazis and Islamists 1939β2004,β Response Br. 35; photos of the Mufti\\n\\nand Hitler as well as the Mufti and Muslim SS troops; Youngβs prayer list, which\\n\\nincluded Hitler and the Mufti; a 2007 photo on his computer of Muslim women with a\\n\\nsign saying, βGod Bless Hitler,β J.A. 1636; a copy of Youngβs Facebook page from 2011,\\n\\nin which Young linked to a story about the arrest of neo-Nazi turned jihadist Emerson\\n\\nBegolly; and a 2014 graphic on his phone with the words, βTogether, we can finish what\\n\\nHitler started,β J.A. 1633.\\n\\n Young moved prior to trial to suppress the admission of the Nazi and white\\n\\nsupremacist paraphernalia based on two asserted errors: first, the seizure of the items\\n\\nexceeded the warrantβs scope and second, their admission violated Federal Rules of\\n\\nEvidence 401 and 403. The district court denied the motion, and Young challenges the\\n\\ndistrict courtβs holding based on these two alleged errors. We consider each in turn and\\n\\naffirm the district courtβs rulings.\\n\\n 1. Scope of the Search Warrant\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nGovernment introduced, among other items, a copy of a neo-Nazi book that Young had\\ngifted to his college friend; a flyer for a βwhite powerβ music company; and an anti-\\nSemitic graphic that Young had downloaded to his computer in 2007.\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Young contends the items should have been suppressed because they were outside\\n\\nthe scope of the warrant. He argues the warrantβwhich permitted the seizure of items\\n\\nrelated to ISIL as well as βother designated terrorist groups,β J.A. 56; 66βdid not\\n\\nauthorize the seizure of the Nazi and white supremacist items, both because they were not\\n\\nincluded within the warrantβs language and because he was not being investigated for a\\n\\nhate crime. The district court rejected Youngβs arguments, concluding that the items fell\\n\\nwithin the scope of the search warrantβs expansive language.\\n\\n βWhen a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, it is limited in scope by the\\n\\nterms of the warrantβs authorization,β but these terms βare not to be interpreted in a\\n\\nhypertechnical manner.β United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010).\\n\\nInstead, a warrant should be read in a βcommonsense and realisticβ manner. United\\n\\nStates v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2009). Agents may seize an item pursuant\\n\\nto a warrant even if it βdoes not expressly mention and painstakingly describe it,β id. at\\n\\n225, because the specificity required may βvary according to the circumstances and type\\n\\nof items involved.β In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1990).\\n\\n We conclude the seizure of the items here did not exceed the scope of the warrant.\\n\\nFirst, as the district court correctly recognized, even if Nazi organizations are not\\n\\ndesignated FTOs, a reasonable officer would be able to draw on common knowledge to\\n\\nconclude that the Nazisβ threats and use of violence as a means of achieving their\\n\\npolitical ends meant that Nazis engaged in terroristic activity as defined by the U.S. Code\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\fand Blackβs Law Dictionary. 4 See also United States v. Young, 260 F. Supp. 3d 530,\\n\\n554β55 (E.D. Va. 2017). Second, some of the items illustrated a historical and present-\\n\\nday connection between Nazism and radical Islamism. Third, the Criminal Complaint\\n\\nAffidavit provided examples of Youngβs affiliation with both Nazism and radical\\n\\nIslamism: the Affidavit described how Young had told law enforcement he had dressed\\n\\nup both as a βJihadi Johnβ and a Nazi, had collected Nazi memorabilia, and had a tattoo\\n\\nof a German eagle on his neck. J.A. 43. Given this information, agents reasonably\\n\\nconcluded both that Nazis qualified as a terrorist organization and that as to this particular\\n\\ncase, the Nazi paraphernalia was relevant to or probative of material support for a\\n\\nterrorist organization. For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in\\n\\ndeclining to suppress these items.\\n\\n 2. Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403\\n\\n Even if the items were properly seized, Young argues that they nonetheless should\\n\\nhave been excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. He contends that\\n\\nunder Rule 401, the materials were irrelevant because Nazism and militant Islamism are\\n\\nmutually exclusive belief systems. And under Rule 403, he asserts that the items were\\n\\nunfairly prejudicial because they did not tend to prove Youngβs predisposition. But the\\n\\n\\n 4\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2331(1) and (5) define βterrorismβ as activities that: (1) involve\\nviolent acts violative of federal or state criminal laws; and (2) appear to be intended to\\nintimidate a civilian population, influence government policy by intimidation or coercion,\\nor affect government conduct through mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.\\nSimilarly, Blackβs Law Dictionary defines terrorism as β[t]he use or threat of violence to\\nintimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of achieving a political end.β Terrorism,\\nBLACKβS LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).\\n\\n 10\\n\\fdistrict court determined that the evidence was neither unfairly irrelevant nor prejudicial\\n\\nbecause for this particular defendant, predisposition encompassed βthe convergence\\n\\nbetween Nazis and Islamist terrorists.β J.A. 136.\\n\\n With respect to relevance, we conclude the district court did not abuse its\\n\\ndiscretion in rejecting Youngβs argument because Youngβs advancement of the\\n\\nentrapment defense increased the scope of the relevant evidence. Under Rule 401,\\n\\nevidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it\\n\\nwould be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.\\n\\nSpecifically as to this case, βa broad swath of evidence, including aspects of the\\n\\ndefendantβs character and criminal past, [was] relevant to proving predisposition.β\\n\\nMcLaurin, 764 F.3d at 381. This is because predisposition βrefers to the defendantβs\\n\\nstate of mind before government agents make any suggestion that he shall commit a\\n\\ncrime,β and so is a βbroad conceptβ that requires distinguishing the βunwary innocentβ\\n\\nfrom the βunwary criminal.β Id. (finding that certain bad act evidence may be admissible\\n\\nunder Rule 404(b) in entrapment cases). In this vein, β[p]redisposition is not limited only\\n\\nto the crimes specifically contemplated by the defendant prior to government\\n\\nsuggestion[.]β United States v. Ramos, 462 F.3d 329, 334β35 (4th Cir. 2006); see also\\n\\nUnited States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 207 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding in a terrorism\\n\\ncase that, to show predisposition, a defendantβs relevant prior design to commit the crime\\n\\ncould include a generalized intent to inflict harm on the U.S.).\\n\\n Here, the district court correctly recognized that Nazism and militant Islamism\\n\\nshare common groundβspecifically, radical, anti-Semitic viewpoints. Given that the\\n\\n 11\\n\\fitems seized were probative of (1) Youngβs predisposition to support such viewpoints,\\n\\nand (2) the length of such a predisposition, the items were relevant to meeting the\\n\\nGovernmentβs burden to prove Youngβs predisposition to support terrorist activity. See,\\n\\ne.g., United States v. Mostafa, 16 F. Supp. 3d 236, 266β67 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding a\\n\\ndefendantβs statement that βeverybody wants to kill [Jews, including Hitler]β was\\n\\nβrelevant to the defendantβs motive and intent regarding violent jihadβ).\\n\\n Second, even if, as Young contends, Nazism and militant Islamism are mutually\\n\\nexclusive belief systems, absolute consistency of belief is not a prerequisite to proving\\n\\npredisposition. Other circuits have recognized that seemingly inconsistent belief in a\\n\\nterrorist groupβs ideology does not preclude a finding by a court that a defendant either\\n\\nsupported that group in a criminal fashion or was predisposed to do so. See United States\\n\\nv. Van Haften, 881 F.3d 543, 544 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming the application of a terrorism\\n\\nenhancement at a sentencing for material support of ISIL despite defendantβs support for\\n\\na variety of ideologies and evidence suggesting he had at times disclaimed his support for\\n\\nISIL); see also Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 215 (finding that moments of wavering did not\\n\\npreclude a finding of predisposition in a terrorism case).\\n\\n This does not end the analysis, however, because under Rule 403 a court βmay\\n\\nexclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of\\n\\none or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,\\n\\nundue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.β Here, as\\n\\ndiscussed, the district court properly concluded the evidence was highly probative of\\n\\nYoungβs particular predisposition to support ISIL. See United States v. Siraj, No. 07-\\n\\n 12\\n\\f0224-cr, 2008 WL 2675826, at *2 (2d Cir. July 9, 2008) (affirming the admission of\\n\\nallegedly prejudicial radical Islamist books from the bookstore at which the defendant\\n\\nhad worked because to the extent the defendant recommended the books, βthey were\\n\\nrelevant to show predisposition,β and to the extent that they were for sale, they βtended to\\n\\nrebut [the defendantβs] assertion that the cooperating witness first exposed him to radical\\n\\nIslam and violent jihadβ). This highly probative value meant that any prejudicial effect\\n\\nwas not unfair. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932) (noting that if a\\n\\ndefendant presents an entrapment defense and suffers a disadvantage, βhe has brought it\\n\\nupon himself by reason of the nature of the defenseβ).\\n\\n Furthermore, any prejudicial effect was blunted by the district courtβs limiting\\n\\ninstructions to the jury, which specifically cautioned:\\n\\n So I want you to understand that he is not being charged and you cannot\\n find him guilty for possessing Nazi or anti-Semitic literature. Heβs not\\n being charged with that, he cannot be convicted for that, but the evidence is\\n being allowed in [to consider] . . . whether or not it helps or doesnβt help to\\n establish the predisposition issue, all right?\\n\\nJ.A. 980. See also United States v. Crowden, 882 F.3d 464, 473 (4th Cir. 2018) (β[A]ny\\n\\nprejudicial effect was reduced by the district courtβs issuance of two sets of limiting\\n\\ninstructions[.]β). For these reasons, we conclude the district courtβs admission of the\\n\\nNazi and white supremacist paraphernalia did not constitute an abuse of discretion and\\n\\ntherefore affirm the district courtβs denial of the motion to suppress.\\n\\n B. Ground Two: Expert Certification\\n\\n At trial, the Government called Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross as an expert witness\\n\\nregarding (1) violent extremist movements claiming inspiration from Islam; (2) white\\n\\n 13\\n\\fseparatists and the neo-Nazi movement; (3) the radicalization processes for such groups;\\n\\nand (4) the Libyan Civil War. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross also explained points of overlap\\n\\nbetween Nazism and radical Islamism with examples of individuals who had subscribed\\n\\nto both philosophies. Expert testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702\\n\\nif it involves specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the\\n\\nevidence or determining a fact in issue, and is both reliable and relevant. Daubert v.\\n\\nMerrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589β92 (1993). In admitting Dr. Gartenstein-\\n\\nRossβ testimony, the district court found that βhis background,β βhis extensive academic\\n\\ncredentials,β βthe fact that the United States government uses him for training in these\\n\\nareas,β and his prior work as an expert in other contexts sufficiently qualified him as an\\n\\nexpert witness. J.A. 212β13. The district court also concluded his testimony was\\n\\nrelevant. Although Young contends that the testimony of Dr. Gartenstein-Ross was\\n\\nneither reliable nor relevant, we agree with the district courtβs conclusions.\\n\\n With respect to reliability, Young contends that Dr. Gartenstein-Ross had never\\n\\ntestified in a civil or criminal proceeding on these issues; had not published his thesis on\\n\\nthe βconvergenceβ of white supremacism and militant Islamism in peer-reviewed\\n\\njournals; had not authored any studies on far-right radicalization; and had yet to perform\\n\\nany empirical analysis on this matter in the field. See United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d\\n\\n104, 131 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming the admission of expert testimony on homegrown\\n\\nterrorism in a material support case where the court had βpreviously approved of [the\\n\\nexpertβs] expertise in terrorism mattersβ and the expertβs methods had been subjected to\\n\\npeer review). But under the highly deferential standard afforded to the district court in\\n\\n 14\\n\\fdetermining an expert witnessβs reliability, the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\n\\ndetermining that Dr. Gartenstein-Ross was reliable. 5 Even when an expert has never\\n\\npreviously been qualified, βit is the qualityβ of the expertβs qualifications that a district\\n\\ncourt must focus on. United States v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 391 (4th Cir. 2014). Here,\\n\\nthe district court considered Youngβs concerns yet reached a reasonable decision in\\n\\nqualifying Dr. Gartenstein-Ross based on his extensive credentials and areas of\\n\\nexpertise. 6 And although publishing in a peer-reviewed publication is often a hallmark of\\n\\nexpert witness reliability, that hallmark is a guidepost, not a mandatory prerequisite to\\n\\nqualification as an expert. See Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 229 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2017) (noting Daubertβs βlist of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively\\n\\napplies to all expertsβ).\\n\\n In turn, the district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Dr. Gartenstein-\\n\\nRossβ social sciences-based methodology. At trial, Dr. Gartenstein-Ross explained that\\n\\nhe conducted his research βthrough a comparative method,β focusing on primary sources,\\n\\nthen comparing his conclusions against secondary sources and βevents on the ground.β\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Furthermore, contrary to Youngβs assertion, a Daubert hearing was not required.\\nA district court need not hold a hearing if, after being presented with a proposed expertβs\\nβsubstantialβ credentials and training, it concludes β[t]his training and experience amply\\n[qualifies the expert] to give testimony [on the topic for which he or she is being\\nqualified].β United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 150 (4th Cir. 2007). Here, as\\ndiscussed below, the district court reviewed Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ credentials and\\nconcluded he was qualified to give expert testimony.\\n 6\\n These credentials included: training on radical groups for federal agencies;\\nteaching university courses on violent non-state actors; consultation on the Libyan Civil\\nWar for the U.S. government; field research on jihadist recruiting in the Middle East; and\\ntestimony in immigration cases on the Taliban and al Qaeda.\\n\\n 15\\n\\fJ.A. 1124β25. This methodology appears to be indistinguishable from that which we\\n\\napproved in United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), revβd on other\\n\\ngrounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). There, we affirmed the admission of expert testimony on\\n\\nthe structure of terrorist groups after β[the expert] identified his methodology as one\\n\\ngenerally employed in the social sciencesββthat is, βcollect[ing] as much information as\\n\\npossible,β then balancing βeach new incoming piece of information against the body of\\n\\ninformation youβve built to that point.β Id. at 337. Accordingly, the district court did not\\n\\nabuse its discretion when it deemed Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ explanation of his\\n\\nmethodology, when combined with his credentials, βsufficient.β J.A. 1126.\\n\\n As to relevance, we conclude the testimony was relevant and met Rule 702βs\\n\\nrequirement that the expertβs specialized knowledge βhelp the trier of fact . . . understand\\n\\nthe evidence or to determine a fact in issue.β Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ testimony assisted\\n\\nthe jury by providing context for the historical backgrounds of and connection between\\n\\nNazism and militant Islamism. As the βevidence in this case was complicated, touching\\n\\nby necessity on a wide variety of ideas, terms, people, and organizations connected to\\n\\nradical Islam,β as well as white supremacism, the district court fairly concluded that the\\n\\ntestimony would assist the jury in understanding evidence regarding predisposition.\\n\\nUnited States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 309 (4th Cir. 2008). For these reasons, we\\n\\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ\\n\\ntestimony.\\n\\n C. Ground Three: Evidentiary Rulings\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Young argues that three of the district courtβs evidentiary rulings, considered\\n\\nindividually or cumulatively, violated his due process right to a fair trial.\\n\\n 1. Admission of Weapons and Youngβs Comments\\n\\n Young argues that the district court denied Young a fair trial when it reversed\\n\\npretrial rulings excluding evidence of (1) Youngβs lawfully-owned weapons and (2)\\n\\nremarks Young had made to Khalil about attacking federal buildings. The contention by\\n\\nYoung is that the district court violated his claimed entitlement to rely on several pretrial\\n\\nrulings as the settled law of the case. But βthe district judge is free, in the exercise of\\n\\nsound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling,β especially in light of issues\\n\\nthat arise during a trial. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41β42 (1984). In particular,\\n\\nit is well within the district courtβs discretion to deem previously-excluded evidence\\n\\nadmissible after the party seeking exclusion βopen[s] the door.β United States v. Blake,\\n\\n571 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in later deeming certain\\n\\nevidence admissible. First, the district court provided notice to Young multiple times that\\n\\nit could change its in limine rulings depending on what occurred during trial. For\\n\\nexample, the district court warned, β[N]ormally my rulings on a motion in limine are\\n\\nalways with a caveat that if something changes during the course of the trial, the decision\\n\\nmay be reversed[.]β J.A. 127β28. Second, with respect to Khalilβs testimony, the district\\n\\ncourt properly admitted this evidence after Young decided to focus his entrapment\\n\\ndefense on whether there was predisposition prior to his first contact with Khalil. At a\\n\\npretrial hearing, the district court warned Young that by framing his entrapment defense\\n\\n 17\\n\\fin this manner, some of Khalilβs testimony about Youngβs statements might be admitted\\n\\nbecause such testimony would be probative of whether Young was already predisposed to\\n\\nsupport militant, radical ideas or whether Khalil implanted such ideas. (Specifically, the\\n\\ndistrict court advised, β[I]f you start the predisposition at a later date, then some of that\\n\\nKhalil business might not come in.β J.A. 261.) Nonetheless, Young continued to pursue\\n\\nthis line of argument utilizing an earlier chronological starting point. As a result, the\\n\\ndistrict court allowed Khalil to describe his relationship with Young, including\\n\\nrecounting Youngβs statements about attacking the FBI, his ability to smuggle guns into a\\n\\nfederal building, and the usefulness of ballistic vests if the FBI were to come to his home.\\n\\nThird, at that point, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming Youngβs\\n\\npossession of firearms and weapons admissible. Such possession was corroborative of\\n\\nKhalilβs testimony, and therefore properly admissible because Khalilβs credibility was\\n\\nfundamental in establishing Youngβs predisposition before 2010. For these reasons, we\\n\\naffirm the district courtβs admission of this evidence.\\n\\n 2. Exclusion of Youngβs and Agentsβ Comments\\n\\n Young argues the district court erred by excluding purportedly exculpatory\\n\\nevidence demonstrating that he lacked the predisposition to support ISIL. First, the\\n\\ndistrict court excluded, among other claimed exculpatory remarks, online comments\\n\\nYoung had made from his LiveLeak 7 account denouncing ISIL because the Government\\n\\nhad previously been barred from introducing other comments from this same account,\\n\\n\\n 7\\n LiveLeak is a video-sharing website.\\n\\n 18\\n\\fwhich the district court had deemed unfairly prejudicial and cumulative. We discern no\\n\\nreversible error because in excluding these and similar comments, the district court acted\\n\\nwithin its discretion to determine whether introducing such comments would permit the\\n\\nadmission of other previously-excluded evidence. See McLaurin, 764 F.3d at 384.\\n\\n Second, the district court barred the introduction of June 2016 messages between\\n\\nFBI agents reflecting their frustration with the slow pace of the investigation, which\\n\\nYoung argued went to their motives and consequently the issue of entrapment. The\\n\\ndistrict court properly concluded that the agentsβ motives were βirrelevantβ to entrapment\\n\\nbecause whether or not Young was induced had to be assessed by βwhat specifically was\\n\\npresented to [Young]β by the agents rather than what the agents discussed amongst\\n\\nthemselves. J.A. 443. See also United States v. Daniel, 3 F.3d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1993)\\n\\n(βInducement . . . involves elements of governmental . . . conduct sufficiently excessive\\n\\nto implant a criminal design in the mind of an otherwise innocent third party.β). We thus\\n\\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these materials.\\n\\n 3. Jencks Act and Brady Materials\\n\\n Finally, Young asserts Jencks 8 and Brady 9 errors. In the week prior to trial, the\\n\\nGovernment made two last-minute classified Jencks productions of communications\\n\\n\\n 8\\n βUnder the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3500(b), on a motion by the defendant, the\\ngovernment is required to produce any βstatementβ of the witness related to the witnessβ[]\\ntestimony that is in the governmentβs possession.β United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d\\n212, 220 (4th Cir. 2018).\\n 9\\n Brady v. Maryland held that βsuppression by the prosecution of evidence\\nfavorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material\\neither to guilt or to punishment[.]β 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).\\n\\n 19\\n\\famongst FBI agents about (1) the number of audio recordings made of Moβs meetings\\n\\nwith Young and (2) their frustration with the pace of their investigation of Young.\\n\\nYoung moved to strike the witnesses as to whom the Jencks material applied or to\\n\\ncontinue trial. Rather than striking the witnesses, the district court permitted defense\\n\\ncounsel a five-day continuance to which Young did not object. Young now argues that\\n\\nthe district court erred in doing so, contending these materials suggested spoliation of\\n\\nexculpatory evidence and therefore a Brady violation.\\n\\n We discern no reversible error by the district court. First, when the government\\n\\nfails to timely provide discovery materials that are not exculpatory, such as Jencks\\n\\nmaterials, the district courtβs determination of whether to impose a sanction, and what\\n\\nsanction to impose, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sterling, 724\\n\\nF.3d 482, 512 (4th Cir. 2013). βA continuance is the preferred sanction.β Id. In\\n\\nfashioning a remedy, the district court must consider the reason for the governmentβs\\n\\ndelay, whether the government acted intentionally or in bad faith, the degree of prejudice\\n\\n(if any) suffered by the defendant, and whether any less severe sanction will remedy the\\n\\nprejudice. Id. We have recognized that it is the rare case that would, absent bad faith,\\n\\nresult in an exclusion of evidence (such as striking witnesses). Id. Here, the district court\\n\\ncorrectly recognized that the government did not act in bad faith, given that the vast\\n\\nmajority of discovery was produced well in advance of trial, and that Young was not\\n\\nprejudiced because the materials at issue were not βrelevant, let alone exculpatory.β J.A.\\n\\n278. Nonetheless, given the last-minute production, the district court permitted defense\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\fcounsel an ample continuance to review the material. Under these circumstances, the\\n\\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion.\\n\\n Second, to establish a Brady violation, the evidence at issue must have been (1)\\n\\nfavorable to the defendant (either because it was exculpatory or impeaching), (2) material\\n\\nto the defense (that is, prejudice must have ensued), and (3) suppressed (that is, within the\\n\\nprosecutionβs possession but not disclosed to defendant). United States v. Sarihifard, 155\\n\\nF.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 1998). But here, no issue implicating Brady arose. Young\\n\\ncontends that some of the Jencks material suggested Government spoliation of some\\n\\naudio recordings of Moβs meetings with Young. Specifically, he notes that FBI records\\n\\nindicate that Young and Mo discussed ISIL for the first time during a June 29, 2014\\n\\nmeeting, but that no recording of this meeting was produced to him. Young argues that\\n\\nbecause (1) most of Moβs other meetings with Young were recorded and (2) such an early\\n\\nconversation regarding ISIL may have been probative of Youngβs predisposition, the\\n\\nGovernment withheld potentially exculpatory evidence and thereby committed a Brady\\n\\nviolation. But a review of the recordβparticularly the very FBI communications at\\n\\nissueβindicates that a recording of the meeting, unlike recordings of most of Moβs other\\n\\nmeetings with Young, was never made and that any information purportedly within the\\n\\nrecordings was not material. 10 There is no record evidence to the contrary. Given this,\\n\\n\\n 10\\n Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that it would have\\nproduced a different outcome. United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 936 (4th Cir. 1994).\\nYoung suggests the purported missing conversation would have gone to Youngβs lack of\\npredisposition because it could have included statements by Young criticizing ISIL or\\nsupporters of ISIL. However, by Youngβs own count, at least thirteen similar comments\\n(Continued)\\n 21\\n\\fYoung has offered nothing but rank speculation as to the nature of the allegedly\\n\\nsuppressed materials, which cannot establish a Brady violation. See United States v.\\n\\nStokes, 261 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that to prove a Brady violation, the\\n\\ndefendant must show that βthe prosecution had the [purportedly withheld materials] and\\n\\nfailed to disclose themβ); see also United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 619 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2010) (βBecause [the defendant] can only speculate as to what the requested information\\n\\nmight reveal, he cannot satisfy Bradyβs requirement of showing that the requested\\n\\nevidence would be favorable to the accused.β). We therefore affirm the district courtβs\\n\\nruling on this issue.\\n\\n\\n\\n III. Ground Four: Obstruction Convictions\\n\\n Young argues that the Government failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove\\n\\nthe attempted obstruction of justice counts and that the district court erroneously denied\\n\\nhis motion for judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). We\\n\\nreview the denial of such a Rule 29 motion de novo. United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d\\n\\n519, 525 (4th Cir. 2014). βIn its assessment of a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence,\\n\\na reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and\\n\\ndecides whether βsubstantial evidenceβββthat is, βevidence that a reasonable finder of\\n\\n\\nwere admitted during Moβs testimony. Therefore, the recordings would not have been\\nmaterial because the jury nonetheless foundβdespite the admission of similar\\ncommentsβthat Young was predisposed to support terrorism. These reasons also\\nsupport the holding that the district court did not err in declining to find a Brady\\nviolation.\\n\\n 22\\n\\ffact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendantβs guilt\\n\\nbeyond a reasonable doubtββsupports the verdict. Id. Under that standard, we\\n\\nconclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove the nexus and foreseeability\\n\\nrequirements of the obstruction statute and consequently vacate the convictions under\\n\\nCounts Two and Four.\\n\\n A. Elements of the Offense\\n\\n To convict Young of attempted obstruction, the Government was required to prove\\n\\nhe (1) βcorruptlyβ attempted to (2) βobstruct[], influence[], or impede[]β (3) βan official\\n\\nproceedingβ during the December 3 and 5, 2015 interviews with FBI agents (Count Two)\\n\\nand when he sent the November 2014 text message (Count Four). 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2).\\n\\n An βofficial proceedingβ includes a grand jury investigation, but not an FBI\\n\\ninvestigation. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1515(a)(1) provides that βofficial proceedingβ encompasses:\\n\\nβ(A) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States . . . or a Federal grand\\n\\njuryβ or β(C) a proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by\\n\\nlaw[.]β Here, only a proceeding before a βFederal grand jury,β as found at\\n\\nΒ§ 1515(a)(1)(A), could apply to Young. Other circuits considering whether an FBI\\n\\ninvestigation would fall under Β§ 1515(a)(1)(C) have concluded that it does not because\\n\\nthe use of the preposition βbeforeβ in conjunction with βFederal Government agencyβ\\n\\nimplies βsome formal convocation of the agency in which parties are directed to appear,\\n\\ninstead of any informal investigation conducted by any member of the agency.β United\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\fStates v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Ramos,\\n\\n537 F.3d 439, 462β63 (5th Cir. 2008)). We agree with our sister circuits.\\n\\n Young argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of an\\n\\nβofficial proceedingβ that he could have obstructed. First, Young asserts there was no\\n\\nβofficial proceedingβ concerning Mo for Young to obstruct: Mo was the FBIβs own\\n\\ninformant and therefore the FBI never investigated Mo. Second, Young contends there\\n\\nwas no evidence that Young attempted to obstruct a proceeding concerning himself: the\\n\\nagents never informed Young that he was under investigation; the gift card crime was\\n\\ncommitted after the allegedly obstructive conduct, so there was no crime whose\\n\\ninvestigation Young could knowingly have attempted to obstruct; and an agent testified\\n\\nthat Young was not aware of any investigation until his arrest in August 2016. And even\\n\\nif he had been aware of an FBI investigation of himself, Young asserts, such an\\n\\ninvestigation would not have constituted an βofficial proceedingβ under Β§ 1515(a)(1).\\n\\n Youngβs view misses the mark but points to a much more fundamental flaw in the\\n\\nGovernmentβs evidence. As 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(f)(1) provides, βan official proceeding\\n\\nneed not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.β Therefore, it\\n\\nwas immaterial whether an official proceeding actually existed at the time of the\\n\\nobstructive conduct. 11 Nonetheless, Β§ 1512(c) does require that (1) the obstructive\\n\\nconduct be connected to a specific official proceeding (the βnexusβ requirement) that was\\n\\n\\n 11\\n Although the FBI began βrequest[ing] federal grand jury subpoenas related to\\n[Young]β as early as 2011, the existence of such a grand jury investigation is irrelevant to\\nour determination of this matter for the reasons we describe. J.A. 1376.\\n\\n 24\\n\\f(2) either pending or was reasonably foreseeable to Young when he engaged in the\\n\\nconduct (the βreasonable foreseeabilityβ requirement). These requirements, while not\\n\\nexplicitly laid out in Β§ 1512(c), arise from two Supreme Court casesβUnited States v.\\n\\nAguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995), and Arthur Anderson, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696\\n\\n(2005)βin which the Supreme Court identified these elements from related obstruction\\n\\nstatutes. 12 See also Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018).\\n\\n Aguilar considered the catchall provision of a statute criminalizing attempted\\n\\ngrand jury tampering. 515 U.S. at 599. The defendant had lied to the FBI during the\\n\\ncourse of an investigation and was convicted of βcorruptly endeavoring to influence,\\n\\nobstruct, and impede [a] grand jury investigationβ in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1503. Id.\\n\\nAll the government had shown in support of the conviction was that the defendant had\\n\\nuttered false statements to an investigating agent βwho might or might not testify before a\\n\\ngrand jury.β Id. at 600. The Supreme Court held that Β§ 1503 required a greater\\n\\nconnection between the obstructive act and an official proceeding than what the\\n\\ngovernment had shownβspecifically, a βnexusβ showing βthat the act [had] a\\n\\nrelationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceeding.β Id. at 599. In\\n\\nconsidering the evidence, the Court in Aguilar concluded: βWe do not believe that\\n\\nuttering false statements to an investigating agentβand that seems to be all that was\\n\\n\\n 12\\n Our sister circuits have noted that β[t]he nexus limitation is best understood as\\nan articulation of the proof of wrongful intent that will satisfy the mens rea requirement\\nof βcorruptlyβ obstructing or endeavoring to obstructββthat is, the first element of\\nproving a Β§ 1512(c)(2) charge. United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.\\n2009) (quoting United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 170 (2d Cir. 2006)).\\n\\n 25\\n\\fproved hereβwho might or might not testify before a grand jury is sufficient toβ satisfy\\n\\nthe nexus requirement. Id. at 600.\\n\\n Arthur Andersen applied the nexus requirement to Β§ 1512(b)(2)(A) offenses,\\n\\nwhich criminalize βknowinglyβ and βcorruptly persuad[ing]β another person βwith intent\\n\\nto causeβ that person to tamper with documents that would be used in an official\\n\\nproceeding. 544 U.S. at 703. There, the Supreme Court considered whether the\\n\\ngovernment was required to prove a nexus between the tampering and a particular (rather\\n\\nthan abstract) proceeding. Id. at 707β08. Although the government pointed to Β§ 1512(f)\\n\\nto argue that the statute did not require contemplation of a particular proceeding, the\\n\\nSupreme Court concluded that an official proceeding must, at a minimum, be reasonably\\n\\nforeseeable to the defendant who commits the obstructive act: βIt is . . . one thing to say\\n\\nthat a proceeding need not be pending or instituted at the time of the offense, and quite\\n\\nanother to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen.β Id. A knowingly corrupt\\n\\npersuader cannot be convicted βwhen he does not have in contemplation any particular\\n\\nofficial proceeding in which those documents might be material.β Id. at 708.\\n\\n Though we have not specifically done so, 13 other circuits have applied Aguilar and\\n\\nArthur Andersen to the similarly-structured statute, Β§ 1512(c), to conclude that, in\\n\\n\\n 13\\n We have previously considered in an unpublished per curiam opinion a\\ndefendantβs nexus argument. In affirming his Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction, we concluded the\\nevidence was sufficient to uphold his conviction because βthere [was] a clear, logical\\nrelationship between his [obstructive] conduct and the judicial proceeding.β United\\nStates v. Wein, 521 F. Appβx 138 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). But we have not further\\naddressed the nexus or reasonable foreseeability requirements to prove such a charge.\\nSee id.\\n\\n 26\\n\\fdemonstrating a Β§ 1512(c)(2) offense, βthe government must prove that such a\\n\\nproceeding was reasonably foreseeable to the defendantβ and βthat there was a βnexusβ\\n\\nbetween the defendantβs conduct and the pending, or foreseeable, official proceeding.β\\n\\nUnited States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2017); see, e.g., United States v.\\n\\nPetruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 249β50\\n\\n(3d Cir. 2013) (applying the nexus and foreseeability requirements to βany prosecution\\n\\nbrought under a Β§ 1512 provision charging obstruction of justice involving an βofficial\\n\\nproceedingββ); United States v. Bennett, 664 F.3d 997, 1013 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying the\\n\\nnexus requirement to Β§ 1512(c)(2)), vacated on other grounds by 567 U.S. 950 (2012);\\n\\nUnited States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v.\\n\\nPhillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1263β64 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Carson, 560\\n\\nF.3d 566, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (assuming arguendo that the nexus requirement applies to\\n\\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2)). And as the Eighth Circuit noted in Petruk, β[W]e are aware of no circuit\\n\\nthat has considered and rejected application of the nexus requirement to Β§ 1512(c)(2),β\\n\\ngiven the βsimilarity of statutory language between Β§ 1512(c)(2) and the catchall\\n\\nprovision at issue in Aguilar, the application of the nexus requirement in Arthur Andersen\\n\\nto another provision of Β§ 1512, and other circuitsβ application of the nexus requirement to\\n\\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2).β 781 F.3d at 445. We agree and hold that Β§ 1512(c)(2) incorporates the\\n\\nnexus and reasonable foreseeability requirements set forth in Aguilar and Arthur\\n\\nAndersen. That is, it is a requirement βthat a successful prosecution under Β§ 1512(c)(2)\\n\\n[provide] proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant contemplated a particular,\\n\\nforeseeable proceeding, and that the contemplated proceeding constituted an βofficial\\n\\n 27\\n\\fproceeding,β which is defined under Β§ 1515(a)(1)(A) to include a proceeding before a\\n\\nfederal judge, court, or grand jury[.]β Id. at 445. Youngβs convictions do not meet this\\n\\nrequirement.\\n\\n B. Youngβs Obstruction Convictions\\n\\n Upon considering the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the evidence\\n\\nwas insufficient to convict Young of Counts Two and Four for attempting to obstruct\\n\\njustice under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(c)(2). In November 2014 and December 2015, Young did\\n\\ndesign his conduct to mislead FBI agents, including those he believed were investigating\\n\\nhis relationship with Mo. With respect to Count Four, prior to Moβs βtrip,β Young told\\n\\nMo the FBI would investigate Young after becoming aware Mo had joined ISIL and that\\n\\nthey knew one another. Young said he would send the text because the text would be\\n\\nβgood for [Young],β helping Young avoid suspicion from law enforcement that he knew\\n\\nof Moβs plans to join ISIL. J.A. 656. And with respect to Count Two, when Young\\n\\nthought in December 2015 that the FBI had learned that Mo had joined ISIL, Young\\n\\nattempted to deceive the FBI by providing statements consistent with the cover story,\\n\\ndisclaiming any knowledge of Moβs whereabouts or plans. Young would only have\\n\\nundertaken these actions had an FBI investigationβwhether in November 2014 or\\n\\nDecember 2015βbeen at least foreseeable to him.\\n\\n But this is not enough for purposes of Β§ 1512(c)(2). In neither situation\\n\\n(November 2014 or December 2015) was this conduct connected to a specific official\\n\\nproceeding, nor was such a specific official proceeding reasonably foreseeable to Young.\\n\\nSimply because an FBI investigation was reasonably foreseeable to Young does not mean\\n\\n 28\\n\\fthat a grand jury investigation was reasonably foreseeable to him or that his conduct was\\n\\ndesigned to obstruct a grand juryβs proceedings. Specifically as to Count Two, the\\n\\nevidence is insufficient largely for the same reason that it was insufficient in Aguilar:\\n\\nβAll the Government ha[s] shown was that [the defendant] had uttered false statements to\\n\\nan investigating agent who might or might not testify before a grand jury.β Arthur\\n\\nAndersen, 544 U.S. at 708. Even if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that\\n\\nYoung obstructed an FBI investigation, there is simply no evidence to demonstrate he\\n\\nwas aware either that his conduct would affect a grand jury proceeding or that a grand\\n\\njury or similar proceeding was impending. And with respect to Count Four, the\\n\\nGovernment has similarly failed to provide evidence demonstrating that Young foresaw a\\n\\nspecific grand jury investigation or that he designed his conduct to thwart such an\\n\\ninvestigation, rather than designing his conduct to obstruct an FBI inquiryβwhich he did\\n\\nforesee.\\n\\n Rather, Youngβs case is more analogous to that of Friske, in which the Eleventh\\n\\nCircuit reversed a defendantβs Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction for attempting to obstruct a\\n\\nforfeiture proceeding. There, the defendant had, at the behest of an incarcerated friend,\\n\\ngone to the latterβs home to retrieve certain unspecified items which turned out to be\\n\\nsubject to forfeiture. 640 F.3d at 1289β90. In overturning the defendantβs conviction, the\\n\\nEleventh Circuit concluded that the government had failed to prove that the defendant\\n\\nβknew that the natural and probable result of his actions would be the obstruction of [the\\n\\nfriendβs] forfeiture proceeding.β Id. at 1292β93. Even though the defendant βwas\\n\\ncertainly acting suspiciously,β βmore is required to prove a violation of Β§ 1512(c)(2).β\\n\\n 29\\n\\fId. at 1292. But because the only way for the jury to conclude that the defendant βknew\\n\\nof or foresaw the forfeiture proceedingβ βwould be through speculation,β the evidence\\n\\nwas insufficient to convict him. Id. at 1293. Similarly, although Youngβs actions were\\n\\ncertainly designed to thwart an FBI inquiry, the only way the jury could have concluded\\n\\nhe foresaw a particular grand jury investigation would be through speculation.\\n\\n The insufficiency of the evidence here is highlighted by cases in which courts\\n\\nhave found that a grand jury proceeding into criminal activity was reasonably foreseeable\\n\\nbecause of a defendantβs actual awareness of an ongoing or impending investigation into\\n\\nclosely related activity and specific criminal actions in relation to such awareness. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 590 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding a grand jury\\n\\nproceeding was foreseeable because the defendant was aware that he was the target of a\\n\\nseparate regulatory investigation into an insurance fraud scheme and had destroyed\\n\\nincriminating documents related to the scheme); United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539,\\n\\n552 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding a grand jury proceeding was reasonably foreseeable to a\\n\\nbusiness owner who had learned about the execution of search warrants for his company\\n\\nand had ordered the deletion of emails after learning of the warrants). By contrast, based\\n\\non the record before us in this case, we would be stretching the foreseeability requirement\\n\\nbeyond its limits in concluding that Youngβs anticipation of an FBI investigation into an\\n\\nacquaintanceβs future trip would also reasonably herald a grand jury proceeding. To do\\n\\nso would be pure speculation.\\n\\n Nonetheless, in an effort to bolster the evidence presented, the Government points\\n\\nto Youngβs (1) awareness of his acquaintancesβ arrests; (2) status as a law enforcement\\n\\n 30\\n\\fofficer; and (3) heightened suspicion of FBI surveillance of him, contending that these\\n\\nthree factors should support the inference that a grand jury investigation was reasonably\\n\\nforeseeable to him and that he designed his conduct to obstruct such an investigation.\\n\\nBut this case is entirely distinguishable from those in which a court has inferred the nexus\\n\\nand foreseeability requirements from similar factors. For example, in Martinez, the\\n\\nSecond Circuit affirmed a Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction of a defendant police officer who was\\n\\npart of a conspiracy in which at least two dozen co-conspirators committed more than\\n\\n200 robberies of drug traffickers. In upholding the sufficiency of the evidence, the\\n\\nSecond Circuit concluded that βit was easily inferable that the 2008 arrests of many of his\\n\\ncoconspirators made it foreseeable to [the defendant]βwho estimated that as an NYPD\\n\\nofficer, he had testified 15-20 times in grand jury proceedings . . . βthat there would be a\\n\\ngrand jury proceeding leading to numerous indictments.β 862 F.3d at 238. Furthermore,\\n\\nβit could easily be inferred that [the defendantβs] persistent searches of NYPD databases,\\n\\nand his reports back to coconspirators who had not been arrested, were intended to make\\n\\nit possible for them to avoid arrest by absconding before any outstanding warrants could\\n\\nbe executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury proceeding.β Id.\\n\\n By contrast, the indictment of Youngβs acquaintances was too attenuated from\\n\\nYoungβs relationship with Mo to have made a grand jury investigation of Young, Mo, or\\n\\ntheir relationship foreseeable to Young. And neither Young nor Mo was involved in an\\n\\nongoing criminal conspiracy with those acquaintances. Furthermore, although Young\\n\\nworked in law enforcement, the Governmentβs evidence failed to establish that he was\\n\\nroutinely involved in grand jury proceedingsβor, for that matter, had ever testified in\\n\\n 31\\n\\fsuch a proceeding. And finally, Youngβs awareness about FBI surveillance was also\\n\\ninadequate to create a sufficient nexus. Although the Government established at trial that\\n\\nYoung was constantly aware of the fact that the FBI could be investigating him, the\\n\\nGovernment failed to connect this general awarenessβwhether in combination with any\\n\\nof the issues discussed above or individuallyβwith a specific and reasonably foreseeable\\n\\nofficial proceeding.\\n\\n Thus, βbased on our review of the record, we have uncovered no evidence to\\n\\nsatisfy Arthur Andersenβs requirement that the Government prove a nexus between [the\\n\\nobstructive] conduct and a foreseeable particular federal proceeding to establish a\\n\\nconviction underβ Β§ 1512(c). Tyler, 732 F.3d at 250β51. Because the evidence was\\n\\ninsufficient to meet this essential requirement, we vacate Youngβs convictions as to\\n\\nCounts Two and Four.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Youngβs conviction as to Count One, vacate\\n\\nYoungβs convictions as to Counts Two and Four, and remand for resentencing. 14\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,\\n AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n Because Counts One, Two, and Four were grouped under United States\\nSentencing Guidelines Β§ 3D1.2(c) for sentencing purposes, we do not address Youngβs\\nchallenges to his sentence which, if relevant, can be addressed by the district court in the\\nfirst instance upon remand.\\n\\n 32\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4369849/\", \"author_raw\": \"AGEE, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"AGEE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KEENAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RICHARDSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592596/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Nicholas YOUNG, Defendant - Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-4138\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nNICHOLAS YOUNG,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\nAlexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00265-LMB-1)\n\n\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 21, 2019\n\n\nBefore AGEE, KEENAN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote\nthe opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Richardson joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Nicholas David Smith, DAVID B. SMITH, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for\nAppellant. Gordon D. Kromberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,\nAlexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\nAttorney, John T. Gibbs, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.\n\fAGEE, Circuit Judge:\n\n A jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia\n\nconvicted Nicholas Young of one count of attempting to provide material support to the\n\nIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (βISILβ), a designated foreign terrorist organization\n\n(βFTOβ), in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B, as well as two counts of attempting to\n\nobstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(c)(2). Asserting a host of district court\n\nerrors, Young challenges his convictions and sentence. For the following reasons, we\n\naffirm the material support conviction, vacate the obstruction convictions, and remand for\n\nresentencing.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (βFBIβ) opened a counterterrorism\n\ninvestigation into Young, a police officer with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit\n\nAuthority, prompted in part by his connections to an acquaintance who had been arrested\n\non 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B charges. That December, βKhalil,β an undercover FBI agent,\n\nbegan maintaining contact with Young, who would discuss with Khalil his wariness of\n\nFBI surveillance, the measures he had taken to thwart such surveillance, and the skills\n\nneededβwhich he purported to possessβto attack an FBI or a federal office. During this\n\nperiod, law enforcement also observed Young traveling to and from Libya, though law\n\nenforcement was unable to determine the purpose of his trips. Khalilβs contact with\n\nYoung eventually concluded in April 2012.\n\n\n\n 2\n\f In May 2014, the FBI again began observing Young more actively after an FBI\n\ninformant, βMo,β met Young through Youngβs acquaintances, whom Mo was monitoring.\n\nOver the next several months, Mo and Young met approximately 20 times. During their\n\nmeetings, Mo indicated that he was interested in traveling to Syria to join ISIL. Young in\n\nturn offered advice on how to travel overseas without being flagged by government\n\nauthorities. Specifically, Young suggested that Mo devise a cover story for his trip, such\n\nas pretending that he was taking a guided tour of Turkey (or that he actually take such a\n\ntour). Young also advised Mo to book a roundtrip ticket and volunteered to send a text to\n\nMo a few days after Moβs βreturn dateβ to assist Mo in evading law enforcement\n\nsuspicion, explaining that the text would make it look like Young was expecting Moβs\n\nreturn (rather than staying on in the region to travel to ISIL-controlled territory). Finally,\n\nYoung and Mo set up covert email accounts to communicate.\n\n That October, Mo traveled to Turkey with his FBI handler, Special Agent John\n\nMinichello. While there, Mo emailed Young that he was planning to travel to ISIL-\n\ncontrolled territory in Syria. Mo then returned to the U.S. In November 2014, Young\n\nsent Mo the pre-arranged text message: βHope you had a good vacation. If you want to\n\ngrab lunch . . . hit me up.β J.A. 566:3β5. After forwarding that message to Agent\n\nMinichello, Moβs involvement in the investigation concluded; from that point on, Agent\n\nMinichello and another agent impersonated Mo to Young through the email account.\n\n In subsequent emails to Mo, Young made it clear that he believed Mo had joined\n\nISIL. In 2015, Young asked Mo to mention him to any Libyan ISIL members Mo might\n\nencounter and to tell them that Young had been in Libya with the Abu Salem Martyrsβ\n\n 3\n\fBrigade, a militia group with connections to al Qaeda that had been fighting Muammar al\n\nQaddafiβs regime. Young also emailed his contacts in the Brigade on Moβs behalf.\n\n On December 3 and 5, 2015, two FBI agents interviewed Young. Although the\n\nagents purported to be questioning Young about Moβs whereabouts, they were attempting\n\nto determine whether Young himself was in contact with any terrorists. During the\n\ninterviews, Young denied having current contact information for Mo. He informed the\n\nagents that he believed Mo had gone on vacation but that he had not been in touch with\n\nMo since October 2014. He also denied knowing anyone who had given Mo travel\n\nguidance. Young later emailed Mo to inform him about the FBIβs inquiry.\n\n In April 2016, Mo suggested to Young that they should communicate through an\n\nencrypted messaging app, Threema. In July, Young created a Threema account and\n\nreceived a message from Mo noting that ISIL needed more fighters. Mo explained that\n\nGoogle gift cards could be used to buy Threema accounts to help fighters communicate\n\nwith ISIL, thereby facilitating their travel to ISIL-controlled territory. At the end of the\n\nmonth, Young used Threema to transmit $245 in Google gift cards to Mo. After\n\nconfirming that Mo had received the cards, Young responded that he was βgladβ and\n\nwould be disposing of the device used to communicate with Mo. J.A. 868:13.\n\n In August 2016, Young was arrested for attempted material support of ISIL, an\n\nFTO. On the day of his arrest, agents executed a search warrant and seized militant\n\nIslamist, Nazi, and white supremacist paraphernalia as well as weapons from his home.\n\nAn indictment subsequently charged Young with attempting to provide material\n\nsupportβthe gift cardsβto a designated FTO, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B (Count\n\n 4\n\fOne), and attempting to obstructβduring the 2015 interviews (Count Two) and with the\n\nNovember 2014 text (Count Four)βan official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2). 1 Young proceeded to a trial on these counts. The jury convicted Young of\n\nall three counts and the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 180\n\nmonths as to each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.\n\n Young timely appealed, asserting five sets of errors by the district court. The first\n\nthree concern Count One, to which Young had asserted an entrapment defense during\n\ntrial. To establish Youngβs predisposition to commit the offense conduct, the\n\nGovernment had introduced evidence of the seized items over Youngβs objections. On\n\nappeal, Young asserts in Ground One that the district court erred by admitting into\n\nevidence the white supremacist and Nazi paraphernalia. Ground Two contends that the\n\ndistrict court erroneously certified an expert witness on militant Islamist and Nazi\n\nβconvergence.β Ground Three asserts that a number of the district courtβs evidentiary\n\nrulings deprived Young of his due process right to a fair trial. Ground Four posits that\n\nthe Government failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove the two attempted obstruction\n\nof justice charges. Finally, Ground Five asserts that his sentence was both procedurally\n\nerroneous and substantively unreasonable.\n\n This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\n\n\n\n II. Grounds One to Three: Entrapment-Centered Challenges\n\n 1\n Count Three, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(b)(3), was dismissed as\nduplicative.\n\n 5\n\f At trial, Young presented an entrapment defense to Count One, which charged\n\nYoung with attempting to provide material support to a designated FTO. To establish\n\nentrapment, a defendant must first demonstrate the government induced him to engage in\n\nthe criminal activity. United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 380 (4th Cir. 2014).\n\nOnce the defendant has shown government inducement, the burden shifts to the\n\ngovernment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendantβs predisposition to have\n\nengaged in the criminal conduct. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir.\n\n1992). Predisposition βfocuses upon whether the defendant was an unwary innocent or,\n\ninstead, an unwary criminal who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate\n\nthe crime.β Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). 2 To establish Youngβs\n\npredisposition to commit the offense conduct, the Government introduced evidence of\n\nYoungβs interest in radical, anti-Semitic terrorist causes both before and after his first\n\ncontact with Khalil in 2010. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548β50 (1992)\n\n(holding that predisposition must be established prior to the defendantβs first contact with\n\na government agent). This evidence included Nazi and white supremacist paraphernalia\n\nseized from Youngβs home, expert testimony regarding the βconvergenceβ of Nazism and\n\nmilitant Islamism, and testimony about Youngβs prior support for such causes. Young\n\ncontests the admission of that evidence as well as the exclusion of other purportedly\n\nexculpatory evidence.\n\n\n\n 2\n We have omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations here and\nthroughout this opinion, unless otherwise noted.\n\n 6\n\f In reviewing evidentiary rulings, this Court reviews the district courtβs legal\n\nconclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Kolsuz, 890\n\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). Such rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and\n\noverturned only if the error was not harmless. United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 401\n\n(4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 81 (4th Cir. 2005) (concerning\n\nexpert testimony).\n\n A. Ground One: Nazi and White Supremacist Paraphernalia\n\n To prove Youngβs predisposition to assist an FTO, the Government introduced\n\nNazi and white supremacist paraphernalia seized from Youngβs home pursuant to a\n\nsearch warrant. The warrant had authorized the seizure of β[a]ll records, documents, and\n\nparaphernalia . . . relating to ISIL/ISIS,β as well as βother designated terrorist groups, or\n\nany individual or group engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity, or communications with\n\nor involving such groups and/or individuals.β J.A. 56; 66. After finding the items in\n\nYoungβs home and consulting with a Government attorney, law enforcement seized the\n\nmaterials.\n\n The Government then moved to admit this evidence (1) to corroborate testimony\n\nfrom Youngβs college friends and former housemates concerning his pre-2010 interest in\n\nthese causes 3 and (2) to further illustrate his interest in a historical and modern-day\n\n\n 3\n Specifically, Youngβs college friend testified that after they had attended a 2001\ngathering of neo-Nazis for a school project, Young told him not to discount an alliance\nbetween Nazis and Muslims to combat Jews. And Youngβs former housemates testified\nthat Young had listened to racially inflammatory music and used an Israeli flag as a\ndoormat to make an anti-Semitic statement. To corroborate this testimony, the\n(Continued)\n 7\n\fconnection between Nazis and militant Islamists. To this latter point, the Government\n\nintroduced, among other items, a poster Young had downloaded in 2007 depicting a Nazi\n\nshaking hands with the Mufti of Jerusalemβwho had allied himself with Adolf Hitler\n\nand recruited Muslim troops to serve in the SSβtitled βThe Alliance: Worldwide\n\nAssociation of Nazis and Islamists 1939β2004,β Response Br. 35; photos of the Mufti\n\nand Hitler as well as the Mufti and Muslim SS troops; Youngβs prayer list, which\n\nincluded Hitler and the Mufti; a 2007 photo on his computer of Muslim women with a\n\nsign saying, βGod Bless Hitler,β J.A. 1636; a copy of Youngβs Facebook page from 2011,\n\nin which Young linked to a story about the arrest of neo-Nazi turned jihadist Emerson\n\nBegolly; and a 2014 graphic on his phone with the words, βTogether, we can finish what\n\nHitler started,β J.A. 1633.\n\n Young moved prior to trial to suppress the admission of the Nazi and white\n\nsupremacist paraphernalia based on two asserted errors: first, the seizure of the items\n\nexceeded the warrantβs scope and second, their admission violated Federal Rules of\n\nEvidence 401 and 403. The district court denied the motion, and Young challenges the\n\ndistrict courtβs holding based on these two alleged errors. We consider each in turn and\n\naffirm the district courtβs rulings.\n\n 1. Scope of the Search Warrant\n\n\n\n\nGovernment introduced, among other items, a copy of a neo-Nazi book that Young had\ngifted to his college friend; a flyer for a βwhite powerβ music company; and an anti-\nSemitic graphic that Young had downloaded to his computer in 2007.\n\n 8\n\f Young contends the items should have been suppressed because they were outside\n\nthe scope of the warrant. He argues the warrantβwhich permitted the seizure of items\n\nrelated to ISIL as well as βother designated terrorist groups,β J.A. 56; 66βdid not\n\nauthorize the seizure of the Nazi and white supremacist items, both because they were not\n\nincluded within the warrantβs language and because he was not being investigated for a\n\nhate crime. The district court rejected Youngβs arguments, concluding that the items fell\n\nwithin the scope of the search warrantβs expansive language.\n\n βWhen a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, it is limited in scope by the\n\nterms of the warrantβs authorization,β but these terms βare not to be interpreted in a\n\nhypertechnical manner.β United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010).\n\nInstead, a warrant should be read in a βcommonsense and realisticβ manner. United\n\nStates v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2009). Agents may seize an item pursuant\n\nto a warrant even if it βdoes not expressly mention and painstakingly describe it,β id. at\n\n225, because the specificity required may βvary according to the circumstances and type\n\nof items involved.β In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1990).\n\n We conclude the seizure of the items here did not exceed the scope of the warrant.\n\nFirst, as the district court correctly recognized, even if Nazi organizations are not\n\ndesignated FTOs, a reasonable officer would be able to draw on common knowledge to\n\nconclude that the Nazisβ threats and use of violence as a means of achieving their\n\npolitical ends meant that Nazis engaged in terroristic activity as defined by the U.S. Code\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\fand Blackβs Law Dictionary. 4 See also United States v. Young, 260 F. Supp. 3d 530,\n\n554β55 (E.D. Va. 2017). Second, some of the items illustrated a historical and present-\n\nday connection between Nazism and radical Islamism. Third, the Criminal Complaint\n\nAffidavit provided examples of Youngβs affiliation with both Nazism and radical\n\nIslamism: the Affidavit described how Young had told law enforcement he had dressed\n\nup both as a βJihadi Johnβ and a Nazi, had collected Nazi memorabilia, and had a tattoo\n\nof a German eagle on his neck. J.A. 43. Given this information, agents reasonably\n\nconcluded both that Nazis qualified as a terrorist organization and that as to this particular\n\ncase, the Nazi paraphernalia was relevant to or probative of material support for a\n\nterrorist organization. For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in\n\ndeclining to suppress these items.\n\n 2. Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403\n\n Even if the items were properly seized, Young argues that they nonetheless should\n\nhave been excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. He contends that\n\nunder Rule 401, the materials were irrelevant because Nazism and militant Islamism are\n\nmutually exclusive belief systems. And under Rule 403, he asserts that the items were\n\nunfairly prejudicial because they did not tend to prove Youngβs predisposition. But the\n\n\n 4\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2331(1) and (5) define βterrorismβ as activities that: (1) involve\nviolent acts violative of federal or state criminal laws; and (2) appear to be intended to\nintimidate a civilian population, influence government policy by intimidation or coercion,\nor affect government conduct through mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.\nSimilarly, Blackβs Law Dictionary defines terrorism as β[t]he use or threat of violence to\nintimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of achieving a political end.β Terrorism,\nBLACKβS LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).\n\n 10\n\fdistrict court determined that the evidence was neither unfairly irrelevant nor prejudicial\n\nbecause for this particular defendant, predisposition encompassed βthe convergence\n\nbetween Nazis and Islamist terrorists.β J.A. 136.\n\n With respect to relevance, we conclude the district court did not abuse its\n\ndiscretion in rejecting Youngβs argument because Youngβs advancement of the\n\nentrapment defense increased the scope of the relevant evidence. Under Rule 401,\n\nevidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it\n\nwould be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.\n\nSpecifically as to this case, βa broad swath of evidence, including aspects of the\n\ndefendantβs character and criminal past, [was] relevant to proving predisposition.β\n\nMcLaurin, 764 F.3d at 381. This is because predisposition βrefers to the defendantβs\n\nstate of mind before government agents make any suggestion that he shall commit a\n\ncrime,β and so is a βbroad conceptβ that requires distinguishing the βunwary innocentβ\n\nfrom the βunwary criminal.β Id. (finding that certain bad act evidence may be admissible\n\nunder Rule 404(b) in entrapment cases). In this vein, β[p]redisposition is not limited only\n\nto the crimes specifically contemplated by the defendant prior to government\n\nsuggestion[.]β United States v. Ramos, 462 F.3d 329, 334β35 (4th Cir. 2006); see also\n\nUnited States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 207 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding in a terrorism\n\ncase that, to show predisposition, a defendantβs relevant prior design to commit the crime\n\ncould include a generalized intent to inflict harm on the U.S.).\n\n Here, the district court correctly recognized that Nazism and militant Islamism\n\nshare common groundβspecifically, radical, anti-Semitic viewpoints. Given that the\n\n 11\n\fitems seized were probative of (1) Youngβs predisposition to support such viewpoints,\n\nand (2) the length of such a predisposition, the items were relevant to meeting the\n\nGovernmentβs burden to prove Youngβs predisposition to support terrorist activity. See,\n\ne.g., United States v. Mostafa, 16 F. Supp. 3d 236, 266β67 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding a\n\ndefendantβs statement that βeverybody wants to kill [Jews, including Hitler]β was\n\nβrelevant to the defendantβs motive and intent regarding violent jihadβ).\n\n Second, even if, as Young contends, Nazism and militant Islamism are mutually\n\nexclusive belief systems, absolute consistency of belief is not a prerequisite to proving\n\npredisposition. Other circuits have recognized that seemingly inconsistent belief in a\n\nterrorist groupβs ideology does not preclude a finding by a court that a defendant either\n\nsupported that group in a criminal fashion or was predisposed to do so. See United States\n\nv. Van Haften, 881 F.3d 543, 544 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming the application of a terrorism\n\nenhancement at a sentencing for material support of ISIL despite defendantβs support for\n\na variety of ideologies and evidence suggesting he had at times disclaimed his support for\n\nISIL); see also Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 215 (finding that moments of wavering did not\n\npreclude a finding of predisposition in a terrorism case).\n\n This does not end the analysis, however, because under Rule 403 a court βmay\n\nexclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of\n\none or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,\n\nundue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.β Here, as\n\ndiscussed, the district court properly concluded the evidence was highly probative of\n\nYoungβs particular predisposition to support ISIL. See United States v. Siraj, No. 07-\n\n 12\n\f0224-cr, 2008 WL 2675826, at *2 (2d Cir. July 9, 2008) (affirming the admission of\n\nallegedly prejudicial radical Islamist books from the bookstore at which the defendant\n\nhad worked because to the extent the defendant recommended the books, βthey were\n\nrelevant to show predisposition,β and to the extent that they were for sale, they βtended to\n\nrebut [the defendantβs] assertion that the cooperating witness first exposed him to radical\n\nIslam and violent jihadβ). This highly probative value meant that any prejudicial effect\n\nwas not unfair. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932) (noting that if a\n\ndefendant presents an entrapment defense and suffers a disadvantage, βhe has brought it\n\nupon himself by reason of the nature of the defenseβ).\n\n Furthermore, any prejudicial effect was blunted by the district courtβs limiting\n\ninstructions to the jury, which specifically cautioned:\n\n So I want you to understand that he is not being charged and you cannot\n find him guilty for possessing Nazi or anti-Semitic literature. Heβs not\n being charged with that, he cannot be convicted for that, but the evidence is\n being allowed in [to consider] . . . whether or not it helps or doesnβt help to\n establish the predisposition issue, all right?\n\nJ.A. 980. See also United States v. Crowden, 882 F.3d 464, 473 (4th Cir. 2018) (β[A]ny\n\nprejudicial effect was reduced by the district courtβs issuance of two sets of limiting\n\ninstructions[.]β). For these reasons, we conclude the district courtβs admission of the\n\nNazi and white supremacist paraphernalia did not constitute an abuse of discretion and\n\ntherefore affirm the district courtβs denial of the motion to suppress.\n\n B. Ground Two: Expert Certification\n\n At trial, the Government called Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross as an expert witness\n\nregarding (1) violent extremist movements claiming inspiration from Islam; (2) white\n\n 13\n\fseparatists and the neo-Nazi movement; (3) the radicalization processes for such groups;\n\nand (4) the Libyan Civil War. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross also explained points of overlap\n\nbetween Nazism and radical Islamism with examples of individuals who had subscribed\n\nto both philosophies. Expert testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702\n\nif it involves specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the\n\nevidence or determining a fact in issue, and is both reliable and relevant. Daubert v.\n\nMerrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589β92 (1993). In admitting Dr. Gartenstein-\n\nRossβ testimony, the district court found that βhis background,β βhis extensive academic\n\ncredentials,β βthe fact that the United States government uses him for training in these\n\nareas,β and his prior work as an expert in other contexts sufficiently qualified him as an\n\nexpert witness. J.A. 212β13. The district court also concluded his testimony was\n\nrelevant. Although Young contends that the testimony of Dr. Gartenstein-Ross was\n\nneither reliable nor relevant, we agree with the district courtβs conclusions.\n\n With respect to reliability, Young contends that Dr. Gartenstein-Ross had never\n\ntestified in a civil or criminal proceeding on these issues; had not published his thesis on\n\nthe βconvergenceβ of white supremacism and militant Islamism in peer-reviewed\n\njournals; had not authored any studies on far-right radicalization; and had yet to perform\n\nany empirical analysis on this matter in the field. See United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d\n\n104, 131 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming the admission of expert testimony on homegrown\n\nterrorism in a material support case where the court had βpreviously approved of [the\n\nexpertβs] expertise in terrorism mattersβ and the expertβs methods had been subjected to\n\npeer review). But under the highly deferential standard afforded to the district court in\n\n 14\n\fdetermining an expert witnessβs reliability, the district court did not abuse its discretion in\n\ndetermining that Dr. Gartenstein-Ross was reliable. 5 Even when an expert has never\n\npreviously been qualified, βit is the qualityβ of the expertβs qualifications that a district\n\ncourt must focus on. United States v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 391 (4th Cir. 2014). Here,\n\nthe district court considered Youngβs concerns yet reached a reasonable decision in\n\nqualifying Dr. Gartenstein-Ross based on his extensive credentials and areas of\n\nexpertise. 6 And although publishing in a peer-reviewed publication is often a hallmark of\n\nexpert witness reliability, that hallmark is a guidepost, not a mandatory prerequisite to\n\nqualification as an expert. See Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 229 (4th Cir.\n\n2017) (noting Daubertβs βlist of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively\n\napplies to all expertsβ).\n\n In turn, the district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Dr. Gartenstein-\n\nRossβ social sciences-based methodology. At trial, Dr. Gartenstein-Ross explained that\n\nhe conducted his research βthrough a comparative method,β focusing on primary sources,\n\nthen comparing his conclusions against secondary sources and βevents on the ground.β\n\n\n 5\n Furthermore, contrary to Youngβs assertion, a Daubert hearing was not required.\nA district court need not hold a hearing if, after being presented with a proposed expertβs\nβsubstantialβ credentials and training, it concludes β[t]his training and experience amply\n[qualifies the expert] to give testimony [on the topic for which he or she is being\nqualified].β United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 150 (4th Cir. 2007). Here, as\ndiscussed below, the district court reviewed Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ credentials and\nconcluded he was qualified to give expert testimony.\n 6\n These credentials included: training on radical groups for federal agencies;\nteaching university courses on violent non-state actors; consultation on the Libyan Civil\nWar for the U.S. government; field research on jihadist recruiting in the Middle East; and\ntestimony in immigration cases on the Taliban and al Qaeda.\n\n 15\n\fJ.A. 1124β25. This methodology appears to be indistinguishable from that which we\n\napproved in United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), revβd on other\n\ngrounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). There, we affirmed the admission of expert testimony on\n\nthe structure of terrorist groups after β[the expert] identified his methodology as one\n\ngenerally employed in the social sciencesββthat is, βcollect[ing] as much information as\n\npossible,β then balancing βeach new incoming piece of information against the body of\n\ninformation youβve built to that point.β Id. at 337. Accordingly, the district court did not\n\nabuse its discretion when it deemed Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ explanation of his\n\nmethodology, when combined with his credentials, βsufficient.β J.A. 1126.\n\n As to relevance, we conclude the testimony was relevant and met Rule 702βs\n\nrequirement that the expertβs specialized knowledge βhelp the trier of fact . . . understand\n\nthe evidence or to determine a fact in issue.β Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ testimony assisted\n\nthe jury by providing context for the historical backgrounds of and connection between\n\nNazism and militant Islamism. As the βevidence in this case was complicated, touching\n\nby necessity on a wide variety of ideas, terms, people, and organizations connected to\n\nradical Islam,β as well as white supremacism, the district court fairly concluded that the\n\ntestimony would assist the jury in understanding evidence regarding predisposition.\n\nUnited States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 309 (4th Cir. 2008). For these reasons, we\n\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ\n\ntestimony.\n\n C. Ground Three: Evidentiary Rulings\n\n\n\n 16\n\f Young argues that three of the district courtβs evidentiary rulings, considered\n\nindividually or cumulatively, violated his due process right to a fair trial.\n\n 1. Admission of Weapons and Youngβs Comments\n\n Young argues that the district court denied Young a fair trial when it reversed\n\npretrial rulings excluding evidence of (1) Youngβs lawfully-owned weapons and (2)\n\nremarks Young had made to Khalil about attacking federal buildings. The contention by\n\nYoung is that the district court violated his claimed entitlement to rely on several pretrial\n\nrulings as the settled law of the case. But βthe district judge is free, in the exercise of\n\nsound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling,β especially in light of issues\n\nthat arise during a trial. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41β42 (1984). In particular,\n\nit is well within the district courtβs discretion to deem previously-excluded evidence\n\nadmissible after the party seeking exclusion βopen[s] the door.β United States v. Blake,\n\n571 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).\n\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in later deeming certain\n\nevidence admissible. First, the district court provided notice to Young multiple times that\n\nit could change its in limine rulings depending on what occurred during trial. For\n\nexample, the district court warned, β[N]ormally my rulings on a motion in limine are\n\nalways with a caveat that if something changes during the course of the trial, the decision\n\nmay be reversed[.]β J.A. 127β28. Second, with respect to Khalilβs testimony, the district\n\ncourt properly admitted this evidence after Young decided to focus his entrapment\n\ndefense on whether there was predisposition prior to his first contact with Khalil. At a\n\npretrial hearing, the district court warned Young that by framing his entrapment defense\n\n 17\n\fin this manner, some of Khalilβs testimony about Youngβs statements might be admitted\n\nbecause such testimony would be probative of whether Young was already predisposed to\n\nsupport militant, radical ideas or whether Khalil implanted such ideas. (Specifically, the\n\ndistrict court advised, β[I]f you start the predisposition at a later date, then some of that\n\nKhalil business might not come in.β J.A. 261.) Nonetheless, Young continued to pursue\n\nthis line of argument utilizing an earlier chronological starting point. As a result, the\n\ndistrict court allowed Khalil to describe his relationship with Young, including\n\nrecounting Youngβs statements about attacking the FBI, his ability to smuggle guns into a\n\nfederal building, and the usefulness of ballistic vests if the FBI were to come to his home.\n\nThird, at that point, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming Youngβs\n\npossession of firearms and weapons admissible. Such possession was corroborative of\n\nKhalilβs testimony, and therefore properly admissible because Khalilβs credibility was\n\nfundamental in establishing Youngβs predisposition before 2010. For these reasons, we\n\naffirm the district courtβs admission of this evidence.\n\n 2. Exclusion of Youngβs and Agentsβ Comments\n\n Young argues the district court erred by excluding purportedly exculpatory\n\nevidence demonstrating that he lacked the predisposition to support ISIL. First, the\n\ndistrict court excluded, among other claimed exculpatory remarks, online comments\n\nYoung had made from his LiveLeak 7 account denouncing ISIL because the Government\n\nhad previously been barred from introducing other comments from this same account,\n\n\n 7\n LiveLeak is a video-sharing website.\n\n 18\n\fwhich the district court had deemed unfairly prejudicial and cumulative. We discern no\n\nreversible error because in excluding these and similar comments, the district court acted\n\nwithin its discretion to determine whether introducing such comments would permit the\n\nadmission of other previously-excluded evidence. See McLaurin, 764 F.3d at 384.\n\n Second, the district court barred the introduction of June 2016 messages between\n\nFBI agents reflecting their frustration with the slow pace of the investigation, which\n\nYoung argued went to their motives and consequently the issue of entrapment. The\n\ndistrict court properly concluded that the agentsβ motives were βirrelevantβ to entrapment\n\nbecause whether or not Young was induced had to be assessed by βwhat specifically was\n\npresented to [Young]β by the agents rather than what the agents discussed amongst\n\nthemselves. J.A. 443. See also United States v. Daniel, 3 F.3d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1993)\n\n(βInducement . . . involves elements of governmental . . . conduct sufficiently excessive\n\nto implant a criminal design in the mind of an otherwise innocent third party.β). We thus\n\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these materials.\n\n 3. Jencks Act and Brady Materials\n\n Finally, Young asserts Jencks 8 and Brady 9 errors. In the week prior to trial, the\n\nGovernment made two last-minute classified Jencks productions of communications\n\n\n 8\n βUnder the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3500(b), on a motion by the defendant, the\ngovernment is required to produce any βstatementβ of the witness related to the witnessβ[]\ntestimony that is in the governmentβs possession.β United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d\n212, 220 (4th Cir. 2018).\n 9\n Brady v. Maryland held that βsuppression by the prosecution of evidence\nfavorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material\neither to guilt or to punishment[.]β 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).\n\n 19\n\famongst FBI agents about (1) the number of audio recordings made of Moβs meetings\n\nwith Young and (2) their frustration with the pace of their investigation of Young.\n\nYoung moved to strike the witnesses as to whom the Jencks material applied or to\n\ncontinue trial. Rather than striking the witnesses, the district court permitted defense\n\ncounsel a five-day continuance to which Young did not object. Young now argues that\n\nthe district court erred in doing so, contending these materials suggested spoliation of\n\nexculpatory evidence and therefore a Brady violation.\n\n We discern no reversible error by the district court. First, when the government\n\nfails to timely provide discovery materials that are not exculpatory, such as Jencks\n\nmaterials, the district courtβs determination of whether to impose a sanction, and what\n\nsanction to impose, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sterling, 724\n\nF.3d 482, 512 (4th Cir. 2013). βA continuance is the preferred sanction.β Id. In\n\nfashioning a remedy, the district court must consider the reason for the governmentβs\n\ndelay, whether the government acted intentionally or in bad faith, the degree of prejudice\n\n(if any) suffered by the defendant, and whether any less severe sanction will remedy the\n\nprejudice. Id. We have recognized that it is the rare case that would, absent bad faith,\n\nresult in an exclusion of evidence (such as striking witnesses). Id. Here, the district court\n\ncorrectly recognized that the government did not act in bad faith, given that the vast\n\nmajority of discovery was produced well in advance of trial, and that Young was not\n\nprejudiced because the materials at issue were not βrelevant, let alone exculpatory.β J.A.\n\n278. Nonetheless, given the last-minute production, the district court permitted defense\n\n\n\n 20\n\fcounsel an ample continuance to review the material. Under these circumstances, the\n\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion.\n\n Second, to establish a Brady violation, the evidence at issue must have been (1)\n\nfavorable to the defendant (either because it was exculpatory or impeaching), (2) material\n\nto the defense (that is, prejudice must have ensued), and (3) suppressed (that is, within the\n\nprosecutionβs possession but not disclosed to defendant). United States v. Sarihifard, 155\n\nF.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 1998). But here, no issue implicating Brady arose. Young\n\ncontends that some of the Jencks material suggested Government spoliation of some\n\naudio recordings of Moβs meetings with Young. Specifically, he notes that FBI records\n\nindicate that Young and Mo discussed ISIL for the first time during a June 29, 2014\n\nmeeting, but that no recording of this meeting was produced to him. Young argues that\n\nbecause (1) most of Moβs other meetings with Young were recorded and (2) such an early\n\nconversation regarding ISIL may have been probative of Youngβs predisposition, the\n\nGovernment withheld potentially exculpatory evidence and thereby committed a Brady\n\nviolation. But a review of the recordβparticularly the very FBI communications at\n\nissueβindicates that a recording of the meeting, unlike recordings of most of Moβs other\n\nmeetings with Young, was never made and that any information purportedly within the\n\nrecordings was not material. 10 There is no record evidence to the contrary. Given this,\n\n\n 10\n Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that it would have\nproduced a different outcome. United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 936 (4th Cir. 1994).\nYoung suggests the purported missing conversation would have gone to Youngβs lack of\npredisposition because it could have included statements by Young criticizing ISIL or\nsupporters of ISIL. However, by Youngβs own count, at least thirteen similar comments\n(Continued)\n 21\n\fYoung has offered nothing but rank speculation as to the nature of the allegedly\n\nsuppressed materials, which cannot establish a Brady violation. See United States v.\n\nStokes, 261 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that to prove a Brady violation, the\n\ndefendant must show that βthe prosecution had the [purportedly withheld materials] and\n\nfailed to disclose themβ); see also United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 619 (4th Cir.\n\n2010) (βBecause [the defendant] can only speculate as to what the requested information\n\nmight reveal, he cannot satisfy Bradyβs requirement of showing that the requested\n\nevidence would be favorable to the accused.β). We therefore affirm the district courtβs\n\nruling on this issue.\n\n\n\n III. Ground Four: Obstruction Convictions\n\n Young argues that the Government failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove\n\nthe attempted obstruction of justice counts and that the district court erroneously denied\n\nhis motion for judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). We\n\nreview the denial of such a Rule 29 motion de novo. United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d\n\n519, 525 (4th Cir. 2014). βIn its assessment of a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence,\n\na reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and\n\ndecides whether βsubstantial evidenceβββthat is, βevidence that a reasonable finder of\n\n\nwere admitted during Moβs testimony. Therefore, the recordings would not have been\nmaterial because the jury nonetheless foundβdespite the admission of similar\ncommentsβthat Young was predisposed to support terrorism. These reasons also\nsupport the holding that the district court did not err in declining to find a Brady\nviolation.\n\n 22\n\ffact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendantβs guilt\n\nbeyond a reasonable doubtββsupports the verdict. Id. Under that standard, we\n\nconclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove the nexus and foreseeability\n\nrequirements of the obstruction statute and consequently vacate the convictions under\n\nCounts Two and Four.\n\n A. Elements of the Offense\n\n To convict Young of attempted obstruction, the Government was required to prove\n\nhe (1) βcorruptlyβ attempted to (2) βobstruct[], influence[], or impede[]β (3) βan official\n\nproceedingβ during the December 3 and 5, 2015 interviews with FBI agents (Count Two)\n\nand when he sent the November 2014 text message (Count Four). 18 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2).\n\n An βofficial proceedingβ includes a grand jury investigation, but not an FBI\n\ninvestigation. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1515(a)(1) provides that βofficial proceedingβ encompasses:\n\nβ(A) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States . . . or a Federal grand\n\njuryβ or β(C) a proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by\n\nlaw[.]β Here, only a proceeding before a βFederal grand jury,β as found at\n\nΒ§ 1515(a)(1)(A), could apply to Young. Other circuits considering whether an FBI\n\ninvestigation would fall under Β§ 1515(a)(1)(C) have concluded that it does not because\n\nthe use of the preposition βbeforeβ in conjunction with βFederal Government agencyβ\n\nimplies βsome formal convocation of the agency in which parties are directed to appear,\n\ninstead of any informal investigation conducted by any member of the agency.β United\n\n\n\n 23\n\fStates v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Ramos,\n\n537 F.3d 439, 462β63 (5th Cir. 2008)). We agree with our sister circuits.\n\n Young argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of an\n\nβofficial proceedingβ that he could have obstructed. First, Young asserts there was no\n\nβofficial proceedingβ concerning Mo for Young to obstruct: Mo was the FBIβs own\n\ninformant and therefore the FBI never investigated Mo. Second, Young contends there\n\nwas no evidence that Young attempted to obstruct a proceeding concerning himself: the\n\nagents never informed Young that he was under investigation; the gift card crime was\n\ncommitted after the allegedly obstructive conduct, so there was no crime whose\n\ninvestigation Young could knowingly have attempted to obstruct; and an agent testified\n\nthat Young was not aware of any investigation until his arrest in August 2016. And even\n\nif he had been aware of an FBI investigation of himself, Young asserts, such an\n\ninvestigation would not have constituted an βofficial proceedingβ under Β§ 1515(a)(1).\n\n Youngβs view misses the mark but points to a much more fundamental flaw in the\n\nGovernmentβs evidence. As 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(f)(1) provides, βan official proceeding\n\nneed not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.β Therefore, it\n\nwas immaterial whether an official proceeding actually existed at the time of the\n\nobstructive conduct. 11 Nonetheless, Β§ 1512(c) does require that (1) the obstructive\n\nconduct be connected to a specific official proceeding (the βnexusβ requirement) that was\n\n\n 11\n Although the FBI began βrequest[ing] federal grand jury subpoenas related to\n[Young]β as early as 2011, the existence of such a grand jury investigation is irrelevant to\nour determination of this matter for the reasons we describe. J.A. 1376.\n\n 24\n\f(2) either pending or was reasonably foreseeable to Young when he engaged in the\n\nconduct (the βreasonable foreseeabilityβ requirement). These requirements, while not\n\nexplicitly laid out in Β§ 1512(c), arise from two Supreme Court casesβUnited States v.\n\nAguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995), and Arthur Anderson, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696\n\n(2005)βin which the Supreme Court identified these elements from related obstruction\n\nstatutes. 12 See also Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018).\n\n Aguilar considered the catchall provision of a statute criminalizing attempted\n\ngrand jury tampering. 515 U.S. at 599. The defendant had lied to the FBI during the\n\ncourse of an investigation and was convicted of βcorruptly endeavoring to influence,\n\nobstruct, and impede [a] grand jury investigationβ in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1503. Id.\n\nAll the government had shown in support of the conviction was that the defendant had\n\nuttered false statements to an investigating agent βwho might or might not testify before a\n\ngrand jury.β Id. at 600. The Supreme Court held that Β§ 1503 required a greater\n\nconnection between the obstructive act and an official proceeding than what the\n\ngovernment had shownβspecifically, a βnexusβ showing βthat the act [had] a\n\nrelationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceeding.β Id. at 599. In\n\nconsidering the evidence, the Court in Aguilar concluded: βWe do not believe that\n\nuttering false statements to an investigating agentβand that seems to be all that was\n\n\n 12\n Our sister circuits have noted that β[t]he nexus limitation is best understood as\nan articulation of the proof of wrongful intent that will satisfy the mens rea requirement\nof βcorruptlyβ obstructing or endeavoring to obstructββthat is, the first element of\nproving a Β§ 1512(c)(2) charge. United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.\n2009) (quoting United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 170 (2d Cir. 2006)).\n\n 25\n\fproved hereβwho might or might not testify before a grand jury is sufficient toβ satisfy\n\nthe nexus requirement. Id. at 600.\n\n Arthur Andersen applied the nexus requirement to Β§ 1512(b)(2)(A) offenses,\n\nwhich criminalize βknowinglyβ and βcorruptly persuad[ing]β another person βwith intent\n\nto causeβ that person to tamper with documents that would be used in an official\n\nproceeding. 544 U.S. at 703. There, the Supreme Court considered whether the\n\ngovernment was required to prove a nexus between the tampering and a particular (rather\n\nthan abstract) proceeding. Id. at 707β08. Although the government pointed to Β§ 1512(f)\n\nto argue that the statute did not require contemplation of a particular proceeding, the\n\nSupreme Court concluded that an official proceeding must, at a minimum, be reasonably\n\nforeseeable to the defendant who commits the obstructive act: βIt is . . . one thing to say\n\nthat a proceeding need not be pending or instituted at the time of the offense, and quite\n\nanother to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen.β Id. A knowingly corrupt\n\npersuader cannot be convicted βwhen he does not have in contemplation any particular\n\nofficial proceeding in which those documents might be material.β Id. at 708.\n\n Though we have not specifically done so, 13 other circuits have applied Aguilar and\n\nArthur Andersen to the similarly-structured statute, Β§ 1512(c), to conclude that, in\n\n\n 13\n We have previously considered in an unpublished per curiam opinion a\ndefendantβs nexus argument. In affirming his Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction, we concluded the\nevidence was sufficient to uphold his conviction because βthere [was] a clear, logical\nrelationship between his [obstructive] conduct and the judicial proceeding.β United\nStates v. Wein, 521 F. Appβx 138 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). But we have not further\naddressed the nexus or reasonable foreseeability requirements to prove such a charge.\nSee id.\n\n 26\n\fdemonstrating a Β§ 1512(c)(2) offense, βthe government must prove that such a\n\nproceeding was reasonably foreseeable to the defendantβ and βthat there was a βnexusβ\n\nbetween the defendantβs conduct and the pending, or foreseeable, official proceeding.β\n\nUnited States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2017); see, e.g., United States v.\n\nPetruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 249β50\n\n(3d Cir. 2013) (applying the nexus and foreseeability requirements to βany prosecution\n\nbrought under a Β§ 1512 provision charging obstruction of justice involving an βofficial\n\nproceedingββ); United States v. Bennett, 664 F.3d 997, 1013 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying the\n\nnexus requirement to Β§ 1512(c)(2)), vacated on other grounds by 567 U.S. 950 (2012);\n\nUnited States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v.\n\nPhillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1263β64 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Carson, 560\n\nF.3d 566, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (assuming arguendo that the nexus requirement applies to\n\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2)). And as the Eighth Circuit noted in Petruk, β[W]e are aware of no circuit\n\nthat has considered and rejected application of the nexus requirement to Β§ 1512(c)(2),β\n\ngiven the βsimilarity of statutory language between Β§ 1512(c)(2) and the catchall\n\nprovision at issue in Aguilar, the application of the nexus requirement in Arthur Andersen\n\nto another provision of Β§ 1512, and other circuitsβ application of the nexus requirement to\n\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2).β 781 F.3d at 445. We agree and hold that Β§ 1512(c)(2) incorporates the\n\nnexus and reasonable foreseeability requirements set forth in Aguilar and Arthur\n\nAndersen. That is, it is a requirement βthat a successful prosecution under Β§ 1512(c)(2)\n\n[provide] proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant contemplated a particular,\n\nforeseeable proceeding, and that the contemplated proceeding constituted an βofficial\n\n 27\n\fproceeding,β which is defined under Β§ 1515(a)(1)(A) to include a proceeding before a\n\nfederal judge, court, or grand jury[.]β Id. at 445. Youngβs convictions do not meet this\n\nrequirement.\n\n B. Youngβs Obstruction Convictions\n\n Upon considering the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the evidence\n\nwas insufficient to convict Young of Counts Two and Four for attempting to obstruct\n\njustice under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(c)(2). In November 2014 and December 2015, Young did\n\ndesign his conduct to mislead FBI agents, including those he believed were investigating\n\nhis relationship with Mo. With respect to Count Four, prior to Moβs βtrip,β Young told\n\nMo the FBI would investigate Young after becoming aware Mo had joined ISIL and that\n\nthey knew one another. Young said he would send the text because the text would be\n\nβgood for [Young],β helping Young avoid suspicion from law enforcement that he knew\n\nof Moβs plans to join ISIL. J.A. 656. And with respect to Count Two, when Young\n\nthought in December 2015 that the FBI had learned that Mo had joined ISIL, Young\n\nattempted to deceive the FBI by providing statements consistent with the cover story,\n\ndisclaiming any knowledge of Moβs whereabouts or plans. Young would only have\n\nundertaken these actions had an FBI investigationβwhether in November 2014 or\n\nDecember 2015βbeen at least foreseeable to him.\n\n But this is not enough for purposes of Β§ 1512(c)(2). In neither situation\n\n(November 2014 or December 2015) was this conduct connected to a specific official\n\nproceeding, nor was such a specific official proceeding reasonably foreseeable to Young.\n\nSimply because an FBI investigation was reasonably foreseeable to Young does not mean\n\n 28\n\fthat a grand jury investigation was reasonably foreseeable to him or that his conduct was\n\ndesigned to obstruct a grand juryβs proceedings. Specifically as to Count Two, the\n\nevidence is insufficient largely for the same reason that it was insufficient in Aguilar:\n\nβAll the Government ha[s] shown was that [the defendant] had uttered false statements to\n\nan investigating agent who might or might not testify before a grand jury.β Arthur\n\nAndersen, 544 U.S. at 708. Even if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that\n\nYoung obstructed an FBI investigation, there is simply no evidence to demonstrate he\n\nwas aware either that his conduct would affect a grand jury proceeding or that a grand\n\njury or similar proceeding was impending. And with respect to Count Four, the\n\nGovernment has similarly failed to provide evidence demonstrating that Young foresaw a\n\nspecific grand jury investigation or that he designed his conduct to thwart such an\n\ninvestigation, rather than designing his conduct to obstruct an FBI inquiryβwhich he did\n\nforesee.\n\n Rather, Youngβs case is more analogous to that of Friske, in which the Eleventh\n\nCircuit reversed a defendantβs Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction for attempting to obstruct a\n\nforfeiture proceeding. There, the defendant had, at the behest of an incarcerated friend,\n\ngone to the latterβs home to retrieve certain unspecified items which turned out to be\n\nsubject to forfeiture. 640 F.3d at 1289β90. In overturning the defendantβs conviction, the\n\nEleventh Circuit concluded that the government had failed to prove that the defendant\n\nβknew that the natural and probable result of his actions would be the obstruction of [the\n\nfriendβs] forfeiture proceeding.β Id. at 1292β93. Even though the defendant βwas\n\ncertainly acting suspiciously,β βmore is required to prove a violation of Β§ 1512(c)(2).β\n\n 29\n\fId. at 1292. But because the only way for the jury to conclude that the defendant βknew\n\nof or foresaw the forfeiture proceedingβ βwould be through speculation,β the evidence\n\nwas insufficient to convict him. Id. at 1293. Similarly, although Youngβs actions were\n\ncertainly designed to thwart an FBI inquiry, the only way the jury could have concluded\n\nhe foresaw a particular grand jury investigation would be through speculation.\n\n The insufficiency of the evidence here is highlighted by cases in which courts\n\nhave found that a grand jury proceeding into criminal activity was reasonably foreseeable\n\nbecause of a defendantβs actual awareness of an ongoing or impending investigation into\n\nclosely related activity and specific criminal actions in relation to such awareness. See\n\nUnited States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 590 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding a grand jury\n\nproceeding was foreseeable because the defendant was aware that he was the target of a\n\nseparate regulatory investigation into an insurance fraud scheme and had destroyed\n\nincriminating documents related to the scheme); United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539,\n\n552 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding a grand jury proceeding was reasonably foreseeable to a\n\nbusiness owner who had learned about the execution of search warrants for his company\n\nand had ordered the deletion of emails after learning of the warrants). By contrast, based\n\non the record before us in this case, we would be stretching the foreseeability requirement\n\nbeyond its limits in concluding that Youngβs anticipation of an FBI investigation into an\n\nacquaintanceβs future trip would also reasonably herald a grand jury proceeding. To do\n\nso would be pure speculation.\n\n Nonetheless, in an effort to bolster the evidence presented, the Government points\n\nto Youngβs (1) awareness of his acquaintancesβ arrests; (2) status as a law enforcement\n\n 30\n\fofficer; and (3) heightened suspicion of FBI surveillance of him, contending that these\n\nthree factors should support the inference that a grand jury investigation was reasonably\n\nforeseeable to him and that he designed his conduct to obstruct such an investigation.\n\nBut this case is entirely distinguishable from those in which a court has inferred the nexus\n\nand foreseeability requirements from similar factors. For example, in Martinez, the\n\nSecond Circuit affirmed a Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction of a defendant police officer who was\n\npart of a conspiracy in which at least two dozen co-conspirators committed more than\n\n200 robberies of drug traffickers. In upholding the sufficiency of the evidence, the\n\nSecond Circuit concluded that βit was easily inferable that the 2008 arrests of many of his\n\ncoconspirators made it foreseeable to [the defendant]βwho estimated that as an NYPD\n\nofficer, he had testified 15-20 times in grand jury proceedings . . . βthat there would be a\n\ngrand jury proceeding leading to numerous indictments.β 862 F.3d at 238. Furthermore,\n\nβit could easily be inferred that [the defendantβs] persistent searches of NYPD databases,\n\nand his reports back to coconspirators who had not been arrested, were intended to make\n\nit possible for them to avoid arrest by absconding before any outstanding warrants could\n\nbe executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury proceeding.β Id.\n\n By contrast, the indictment of Youngβs acquaintances was too attenuated from\n\nYoungβs relationship with Mo to have made a grand jury investigation of Young, Mo, or\n\ntheir relationship foreseeable to Young. And neither Young nor Mo was involved in an\n\nongoing criminal conspiracy with those acquaintances. Furthermore, although Young\n\nworked in law enforcement, the Governmentβs evidence failed to establish that he was\n\nroutinely involved in grand jury proceedingsβor, for that matter, had ever testified in\n\n 31\n\fsuch a proceeding. And finally, Youngβs awareness about FBI surveillance was also\n\ninadequate to create a sufficient nexus. Although the Government established at trial that\n\nYoung was constantly aware of the fact that the FBI could be investigating him, the\n\nGovernment failed to connect this general awarenessβwhether in combination with any\n\nof the issues discussed above or individuallyβwith a specific and reasonably foreseeable\n\nofficial proceeding.\n\n Thus, βbased on our review of the record, we have uncovered no evidence to\n\nsatisfy Arthur Andersenβs requirement that the Government prove a nexus between [the\n\nobstructive] conduct and a foreseeable particular federal proceeding to establish a\n\nconviction underβ Β§ 1512(c). Tyler, 732 F.3d at 250β51. Because the evidence was\n\ninsufficient to meet this essential requirement, we vacate Youngβs convictions as to\n\nCounts Two and Four.\n\n\n\n IV.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Youngβs conviction as to Count One, vacate\n\nYoungβs convictions as to Counts Two and Four, and remand for resentencing. 14\n\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,\n AND REMANDED\n\n\n\n\n 14\n Because Counts One, Two, and Four were grouped under United States\nSentencing Guidelines Β§ 3D1.2(c) for sentencing purposes, we do not address Youngβs\nchallenges to his sentence which, if relevant, can be addressed by the district court in the\nfirst instance upon remand.\n\n 32\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Nicholas YOUNG, Defendant - Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-4138\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nNICHOLAS YOUNG,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nAlexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:16-cr-00265-LMB-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 21, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore AGEE, KEENAN, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote\\nthe opinion, in which Judge Keenan and Judge Richardson joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Nicholas David Smith, DAVID B. SMITH, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for\\nAppellant. Gordon D. Kromberg, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,\\nAlexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\\nAttorney, John T. Gibbs, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.\\n\\fAGEE, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n A jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia\\n\\nconvicted Nicholas Young of one count of attempting to provide material support to the\\n\\nIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (βISILβ), a designated foreign terrorist organization\\n\\n(βFTOβ), in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B, as well as two counts of attempting to\\n\\nobstruct justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(c)(2). Asserting a host of district court\\n\\nerrors, Young challenges his convictions and sentence. For the following reasons, we\\n\\naffirm the material support conviction, vacate the obstruction convictions, and remand for\\n\\nresentencing.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In 2010, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (βFBIβ) opened a counterterrorism\\n\\ninvestigation into Young, a police officer with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit\\n\\nAuthority, prompted in part by his connections to an acquaintance who had been arrested\\n\\non 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B charges. That December, βKhalil,β an undercover FBI agent,\\n\\nbegan maintaining contact with Young, who would discuss with Khalil his wariness of\\n\\nFBI surveillance, the measures he had taken to thwart such surveillance, and the skills\\n\\nneededβwhich he purported to possessβto attack an FBI or a federal office. During this\\n\\nperiod, law enforcement also observed Young traveling to and from Libya, though law\\n\\nenforcement was unable to determine the purpose of his trips. Khalilβs contact with\\n\\nYoung eventually concluded in April 2012.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f In May 2014, the FBI again began observing Young more actively after an FBI\\n\\ninformant, βMo,β met Young through Youngβs acquaintances, whom Mo was monitoring.\\n\\nOver the next several months, Mo and Young met approximately 20 times. During their\\n\\nmeetings, Mo indicated that he was interested in traveling to Syria to join ISIL. Young in\\n\\nturn offered advice on how to travel overseas without being flagged by government\\n\\nauthorities. Specifically, Young suggested that Mo devise a cover story for his trip, such\\n\\nas pretending that he was taking a guided tour of Turkey (or that he actually take such a\\n\\ntour). Young also advised Mo to book a roundtrip ticket and volunteered to send a text to\\n\\nMo a few days after Moβs βreturn dateβ to assist Mo in evading law enforcement\\n\\nsuspicion, explaining that the text would make it look like Young was expecting Moβs\\n\\nreturn (rather than staying on in the region to travel to ISIL-controlled territory). Finally,\\n\\nYoung and Mo set up covert email accounts to communicate.\\n\\n That October, Mo traveled to Turkey with his FBI handler, Special Agent John\\n\\nMinichello. While there, Mo emailed Young that he was planning to travel to ISIL-\\n\\ncontrolled territory in Syria. Mo then returned to the U.S. In November 2014, Young\\n\\nsent Mo the pre-arranged text message: βHope you had a good vacation. If you want to\\n\\ngrab lunch . . . hit me up.β J.A. 566:3β5. After forwarding that message to Agent\\n\\nMinichello, Moβs involvement in the investigation concluded; from that point on, Agent\\n\\nMinichello and another agent impersonated Mo to Young through the email account.\\n\\n In subsequent emails to Mo, Young made it clear that he believed Mo had joined\\n\\nISIL. In 2015, Young asked Mo to mention him to any Libyan ISIL members Mo might\\n\\nencounter and to tell them that Young had been in Libya with the Abu Salem Martyrsβ\\n\\n 3\\n\\fBrigade, a militia group with connections to al Qaeda that had been fighting Muammar al\\n\\nQaddafiβs regime. Young also emailed his contacts in the Brigade on Moβs behalf.\\n\\n On December 3 and 5, 2015, two FBI agents interviewed Young. Although the\\n\\nagents purported to be questioning Young about Moβs whereabouts, they were attempting\\n\\nto determine whether Young himself was in contact with any terrorists. During the\\n\\ninterviews, Young denied having current contact information for Mo. He informed the\\n\\nagents that he believed Mo had gone on vacation but that he had not been in touch with\\n\\nMo since October 2014. He also denied knowing anyone who had given Mo travel\\n\\nguidance. Young later emailed Mo to inform him about the FBIβs inquiry.\\n\\n In April 2016, Mo suggested to Young that they should communicate through an\\n\\nencrypted messaging app, Threema. In July, Young created a Threema account and\\n\\nreceived a message from Mo noting that ISIL needed more fighters. Mo explained that\\n\\nGoogle gift cards could be used to buy Threema accounts to help fighters communicate\\n\\nwith ISIL, thereby facilitating their travel to ISIL-controlled territory. At the end of the\\n\\nmonth, Young used Threema to transmit $245 in Google gift cards to Mo. After\\n\\nconfirming that Mo had received the cards, Young responded that he was βgladβ and\\n\\nwould be disposing of the device used to communicate with Mo. J.A. 868:13.\\n\\n In August 2016, Young was arrested for attempted material support of ISIL, an\\n\\nFTO. On the day of his arrest, agents executed a search warrant and seized militant\\n\\nIslamist, Nazi, and white supremacist paraphernalia as well as weapons from his home.\\n\\nAn indictment subsequently charged Young with attempting to provide material\\n\\nsupportβthe gift cardsβto a designated FTO, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2339B (Count\\n\\n 4\\n\\fOne), and attempting to obstructβduring the 2015 interviews (Count Two) and with the\\n\\nNovember 2014 text (Count Four)βan official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2). 1 Young proceeded to a trial on these counts. The jury convicted Young of\\n\\nall three counts and the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 180\\n\\nmonths as to each count, with the sentences to run concurrently.\\n\\n Young timely appealed, asserting five sets of errors by the district court. The first\\n\\nthree concern Count One, to which Young had asserted an entrapment defense during\\n\\ntrial. To establish Youngβs predisposition to commit the offense conduct, the\\n\\nGovernment had introduced evidence of the seized items over Youngβs objections. On\\n\\nappeal, Young asserts in Ground One that the district court erred by admitting into\\n\\nevidence the white supremacist and Nazi paraphernalia. Ground Two contends that the\\n\\ndistrict court erroneously certified an expert witness on militant Islamist and Nazi\\n\\nβconvergence.β Ground Three asserts that a number of the district courtβs evidentiary\\n\\nrulings deprived Young of his due process right to a fair trial. Ground Four posits that\\n\\nthe Government failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove the two attempted obstruction\\n\\nof justice charges. Finally, Ground Five asserts that his sentence was both procedurally\\n\\nerroneous and substantively unreasonable.\\n\\n This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\\n\\n\\n\\n II. Grounds One to Three: Entrapment-Centered Challenges\\n\\n 1\\n Count Three, charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(b)(3), was dismissed as\\nduplicative.\\n\\n 5\\n\\f At trial, Young presented an entrapment defense to Count One, which charged\\n\\nYoung with attempting to provide material support to a designated FTO. To establish\\n\\nentrapment, a defendant must first demonstrate the government induced him to engage in\\n\\nthe criminal activity. United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 380 (4th Cir. 2014).\\n\\nOnce the defendant has shown government inducement, the burden shifts to the\\n\\ngovernment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendantβs predisposition to have\\n\\nengaged in the criminal conduct. United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir.\\n\\n1992). Predisposition βfocuses upon whether the defendant was an unwary innocent or,\\n\\ninstead, an unwary criminal who readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate\\n\\nthe crime.β Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988). 2 To establish Youngβs\\n\\npredisposition to commit the offense conduct, the Government introduced evidence of\\n\\nYoungβs interest in radical, anti-Semitic terrorist causes both before and after his first\\n\\ncontact with Khalil in 2010. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548β50 (1992)\\n\\n(holding that predisposition must be established prior to the defendantβs first contact with\\n\\na government agent). This evidence included Nazi and white supremacist paraphernalia\\n\\nseized from Youngβs home, expert testimony regarding the βconvergenceβ of Nazism and\\n\\nmilitant Islamism, and testimony about Youngβs prior support for such causes. Young\\n\\ncontests the admission of that evidence as well as the exclusion of other purportedly\\n\\nexculpatory evidence.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n We have omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations here and\\nthroughout this opinion, unless otherwise noted.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f In reviewing evidentiary rulings, this Court reviews the district courtβs legal\\n\\nconclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Kolsuz, 890\\n\\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). Such rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion and\\n\\noverturned only if the error was not harmless. United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 401\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 81 (4th Cir. 2005) (concerning\\n\\nexpert testimony).\\n\\n A. Ground One: Nazi and White Supremacist Paraphernalia\\n\\n To prove Youngβs predisposition to assist an FTO, the Government introduced\\n\\nNazi and white supremacist paraphernalia seized from Youngβs home pursuant to a\\n\\nsearch warrant. The warrant had authorized the seizure of β[a]ll records, documents, and\\n\\nparaphernalia . . . relating to ISIL/ISIS,β as well as βother designated terrorist groups, or\\n\\nany individual or group engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity, or communications with\\n\\nor involving such groups and/or individuals.β J.A. 56; 66. After finding the items in\\n\\nYoungβs home and consulting with a Government attorney, law enforcement seized the\\n\\nmaterials.\\n\\n The Government then moved to admit this evidence (1) to corroborate testimony\\n\\nfrom Youngβs college friends and former housemates concerning his pre-2010 interest in\\n\\nthese causes 3 and (2) to further illustrate his interest in a historical and modern-day\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Specifically, Youngβs college friend testified that after they had attended a 2001\\ngathering of neo-Nazis for a school project, Young told him not to discount an alliance\\nbetween Nazis and Muslims to combat Jews. And Youngβs former housemates testified\\nthat Young had listened to racially inflammatory music and used an Israeli flag as a\\ndoormat to make an anti-Semitic statement. To corroborate this testimony, the\\n(Continued)\\n 7\\n\\fconnection between Nazis and militant Islamists. To this latter point, the Government\\n\\nintroduced, among other items, a poster Young had downloaded in 2007 depicting a Nazi\\n\\nshaking hands with the Mufti of Jerusalemβwho had allied himself with Adolf Hitler\\n\\nand recruited Muslim troops to serve in the SSβtitled βThe Alliance: Worldwide\\n\\nAssociation of Nazis and Islamists 1939β2004,β Response Br. 35; photos of the Mufti\\n\\nand Hitler as well as the Mufti and Muslim SS troops; Youngβs prayer list, which\\n\\nincluded Hitler and the Mufti; a 2007 photo on his computer of Muslim women with a\\n\\nsign saying, βGod Bless Hitler,β J.A. 1636; a copy of Youngβs Facebook page from 2011,\\n\\nin which Young linked to a story about the arrest of neo-Nazi turned jihadist Emerson\\n\\nBegolly; and a 2014 graphic on his phone with the words, βTogether, we can finish what\\n\\nHitler started,β J.A. 1633.\\n\\n Young moved prior to trial to suppress the admission of the Nazi and white\\n\\nsupremacist paraphernalia based on two asserted errors: first, the seizure of the items\\n\\nexceeded the warrantβs scope and second, their admission violated Federal Rules of\\n\\nEvidence 401 and 403. The district court denied the motion, and Young challenges the\\n\\ndistrict courtβs holding based on these two alleged errors. We consider each in turn and\\n\\naffirm the district courtβs rulings.\\n\\n 1. Scope of the Search Warrant\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nGovernment introduced, among other items, a copy of a neo-Nazi book that Young had\\ngifted to his college friend; a flyer for a βwhite powerβ music company; and an anti-\\nSemitic graphic that Young had downloaded to his computer in 2007.\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Young contends the items should have been suppressed because they were outside\\n\\nthe scope of the warrant. He argues the warrantβwhich permitted the seizure of items\\n\\nrelated to ISIL as well as βother designated terrorist groups,β J.A. 56; 66βdid not\\n\\nauthorize the seizure of the Nazi and white supremacist items, both because they were not\\n\\nincluded within the warrantβs language and because he was not being investigated for a\\n\\nhate crime. The district court rejected Youngβs arguments, concluding that the items fell\\n\\nwithin the scope of the search warrantβs expansive language.\\n\\n βWhen a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, it is limited in scope by the\\n\\nterms of the warrantβs authorization,β but these terms βare not to be interpreted in a\\n\\nhypertechnical manner.β United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 519 (4th Cir. 2010).\\n\\nInstead, a warrant should be read in a βcommonsense and realisticβ manner. United\\n\\nStates v. Phillips, 588 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2009). Agents may seize an item pursuant\\n\\nto a warrant even if it βdoes not expressly mention and painstakingly describe it,β id. at\\n\\n225, because the specificity required may βvary according to the circumstances and type\\n\\nof items involved.β In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 920 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1990).\\n\\n We conclude the seizure of the items here did not exceed the scope of the warrant.\\n\\nFirst, as the district court correctly recognized, even if Nazi organizations are not\\n\\ndesignated FTOs, a reasonable officer would be able to draw on common knowledge to\\n\\nconclude that the Nazisβ threats and use of violence as a means of achieving their\\n\\npolitical ends meant that Nazis engaged in terroristic activity as defined by the U.S. Code\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\fand Blackβs Law Dictionary. 4 See also United States v. Young, 260 F. Supp. 3d 530,\\n\\n554β55 (E.D. Va. 2017). Second, some of the items illustrated a historical and present-\\n\\nday connection between Nazism and radical Islamism. Third, the Criminal Complaint\\n\\nAffidavit provided examples of Youngβs affiliation with both Nazism and radical\\n\\nIslamism: the Affidavit described how Young had told law enforcement he had dressed\\n\\nup both as a βJihadi Johnβ and a Nazi, had collected Nazi memorabilia, and had a tattoo\\n\\nof a German eagle on his neck. J.A. 43. Given this information, agents reasonably\\n\\nconcluded both that Nazis qualified as a terrorist organization and that as to this particular\\n\\ncase, the Nazi paraphernalia was relevant to or probative of material support for a\\n\\nterrorist organization. For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in\\n\\ndeclining to suppress these items.\\n\\n 2. Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403\\n\\n Even if the items were properly seized, Young argues that they nonetheless should\\n\\nhave been excluded under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. He contends that\\n\\nunder Rule 401, the materials were irrelevant because Nazism and militant Islamism are\\n\\nmutually exclusive belief systems. And under Rule 403, he asserts that the items were\\n\\nunfairly prejudicial because they did not tend to prove Youngβs predisposition. But the\\n\\n\\n 4\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2331(1) and (5) define βterrorismβ as activities that: (1) involve\\nviolent acts violative of federal or state criminal laws; and (2) appear to be intended to\\nintimidate a civilian population, influence government policy by intimidation or coercion,\\nor affect government conduct through mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.\\nSimilarly, Blackβs Law Dictionary defines terrorism as β[t]he use or threat of violence to\\nintimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of achieving a political end.β Terrorism,\\nBLACKβS LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).\\n\\n 10\\n\\fdistrict court determined that the evidence was neither unfairly irrelevant nor prejudicial\\n\\nbecause for this particular defendant, predisposition encompassed βthe convergence\\n\\nbetween Nazis and Islamist terrorists.β J.A. 136.\\n\\n With respect to relevance, we conclude the district court did not abuse its\\n\\ndiscretion in rejecting Youngβs argument because Youngβs advancement of the\\n\\nentrapment defense increased the scope of the relevant evidence. Under Rule 401,\\n\\nevidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it\\n\\nwould be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.\\n\\nSpecifically as to this case, βa broad swath of evidence, including aspects of the\\n\\ndefendantβs character and criminal past, [was] relevant to proving predisposition.β\\n\\nMcLaurin, 764 F.3d at 381. This is because predisposition βrefers to the defendantβs\\n\\nstate of mind before government agents make any suggestion that he shall commit a\\n\\ncrime,β and so is a βbroad conceptβ that requires distinguishing the βunwary innocentβ\\n\\nfrom the βunwary criminal.β Id. (finding that certain bad act evidence may be admissible\\n\\nunder Rule 404(b) in entrapment cases). In this vein, β[p]redisposition is not limited only\\n\\nto the crimes specifically contemplated by the defendant prior to government\\n\\nsuggestion[.]β United States v. Ramos, 462 F.3d 329, 334β35 (4th Cir. 2006); see also\\n\\nUnited States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 207 (2d Cir. 2013) (concluding in a terrorism\\n\\ncase that, to show predisposition, a defendantβs relevant prior design to commit the crime\\n\\ncould include a generalized intent to inflict harm on the U.S.).\\n\\n Here, the district court correctly recognized that Nazism and militant Islamism\\n\\nshare common groundβspecifically, radical, anti-Semitic viewpoints. Given that the\\n\\n 11\\n\\fitems seized were probative of (1) Youngβs predisposition to support such viewpoints,\\n\\nand (2) the length of such a predisposition, the items were relevant to meeting the\\n\\nGovernmentβs burden to prove Youngβs predisposition to support terrorist activity. See,\\n\\ne.g., United States v. Mostafa, 16 F. Supp. 3d 236, 266β67 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding a\\n\\ndefendantβs statement that βeverybody wants to kill [Jews, including Hitler]β was\\n\\nβrelevant to the defendantβs motive and intent regarding violent jihadβ).\\n\\n Second, even if, as Young contends, Nazism and militant Islamism are mutually\\n\\nexclusive belief systems, absolute consistency of belief is not a prerequisite to proving\\n\\npredisposition. Other circuits have recognized that seemingly inconsistent belief in a\\n\\nterrorist groupβs ideology does not preclude a finding by a court that a defendant either\\n\\nsupported that group in a criminal fashion or was predisposed to do so. See United States\\n\\nv. Van Haften, 881 F.3d 543, 544 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming the application of a terrorism\\n\\nenhancement at a sentencing for material support of ISIL despite defendantβs support for\\n\\na variety of ideologies and evidence suggesting he had at times disclaimed his support for\\n\\nISIL); see also Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 215 (finding that moments of wavering did not\\n\\npreclude a finding of predisposition in a terrorism case).\\n\\n This does not end the analysis, however, because under Rule 403 a court βmay\\n\\nexclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of\\n\\none or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,\\n\\nundue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.β Here, as\\n\\ndiscussed, the district court properly concluded the evidence was highly probative of\\n\\nYoungβs particular predisposition to support ISIL. See United States v. Siraj, No. 07-\\n\\n 12\\n\\f0224-cr, 2008 WL 2675826, at *2 (2d Cir. July 9, 2008) (affirming the admission of\\n\\nallegedly prejudicial radical Islamist books from the bookstore at which the defendant\\n\\nhad worked because to the extent the defendant recommended the books, βthey were\\n\\nrelevant to show predisposition,β and to the extent that they were for sale, they βtended to\\n\\nrebut [the defendantβs] assertion that the cooperating witness first exposed him to radical\\n\\nIslam and violent jihadβ). This highly probative value meant that any prejudicial effect\\n\\nwas not unfair. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932) (noting that if a\\n\\ndefendant presents an entrapment defense and suffers a disadvantage, βhe has brought it\\n\\nupon himself by reason of the nature of the defenseβ).\\n\\n Furthermore, any prejudicial effect was blunted by the district courtβs limiting\\n\\ninstructions to the jury, which specifically cautioned:\\n\\n So I want you to understand that he is not being charged and you cannot\\n find him guilty for possessing Nazi or anti-Semitic literature. Heβs not\\n being charged with that, he cannot be convicted for that, but the evidence is\\n being allowed in [to consider] . . . whether or not it helps or doesnβt help to\\n establish the predisposition issue, all right?\\n\\nJ.A. 980. See also United States v. Crowden, 882 F.3d 464, 473 (4th Cir. 2018) (β[A]ny\\n\\nprejudicial effect was reduced by the district courtβs issuance of two sets of limiting\\n\\ninstructions[.]β). For these reasons, we conclude the district courtβs admission of the\\n\\nNazi and white supremacist paraphernalia did not constitute an abuse of discretion and\\n\\ntherefore affirm the district courtβs denial of the motion to suppress.\\n\\n B. Ground Two: Expert Certification\\n\\n At trial, the Government called Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross as an expert witness\\n\\nregarding (1) violent extremist movements claiming inspiration from Islam; (2) white\\n\\n 13\\n\\fseparatists and the neo-Nazi movement; (3) the radicalization processes for such groups;\\n\\nand (4) the Libyan Civil War. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross also explained points of overlap\\n\\nbetween Nazism and radical Islamism with examples of individuals who had subscribed\\n\\nto both philosophies. Expert testimony is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702\\n\\nif it involves specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in understanding the\\n\\nevidence or determining a fact in issue, and is both reliable and relevant. Daubert v.\\n\\nMerrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589β92 (1993). In admitting Dr. Gartenstein-\\n\\nRossβ testimony, the district court found that βhis background,β βhis extensive academic\\n\\ncredentials,β βthe fact that the United States government uses him for training in these\\n\\nareas,β and his prior work as an expert in other contexts sufficiently qualified him as an\\n\\nexpert witness. J.A. 212β13. The district court also concluded his testimony was\\n\\nrelevant. Although Young contends that the testimony of Dr. Gartenstein-Ross was\\n\\nneither reliable nor relevant, we agree with the district courtβs conclusions.\\n\\n With respect to reliability, Young contends that Dr. Gartenstein-Ross had never\\n\\ntestified in a civil or criminal proceeding on these issues; had not published his thesis on\\n\\nthe βconvergenceβ of white supremacism and militant Islamism in peer-reviewed\\n\\njournals; had not authored any studies on far-right radicalization; and had yet to perform\\n\\nany empirical analysis on this matter in the field. See United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d\\n\\n104, 131 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming the admission of expert testimony on homegrown\\n\\nterrorism in a material support case where the court had βpreviously approved of [the\\n\\nexpertβs] expertise in terrorism mattersβ and the expertβs methods had been subjected to\\n\\npeer review). But under the highly deferential standard afforded to the district court in\\n\\n 14\\n\\fdetermining an expert witnessβs reliability, the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\n\\ndetermining that Dr. Gartenstein-Ross was reliable. 5 Even when an expert has never\\n\\npreviously been qualified, βit is the qualityβ of the expertβs qualifications that a district\\n\\ncourt must focus on. United States v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 391 (4th Cir. 2014). Here,\\n\\nthe district court considered Youngβs concerns yet reached a reasonable decision in\\n\\nqualifying Dr. Gartenstein-Ross based on his extensive credentials and areas of\\n\\nexpertise. 6 And although publishing in a peer-reviewed publication is often a hallmark of\\n\\nexpert witness reliability, that hallmark is a guidepost, not a mandatory prerequisite to\\n\\nqualification as an expert. See Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 229 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2017) (noting Daubertβs βlist of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively\\n\\napplies to all expertsβ).\\n\\n In turn, the district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting Dr. Gartenstein-\\n\\nRossβ social sciences-based methodology. At trial, Dr. Gartenstein-Ross explained that\\n\\nhe conducted his research βthrough a comparative method,β focusing on primary sources,\\n\\nthen comparing his conclusions against secondary sources and βevents on the ground.β\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Furthermore, contrary to Youngβs assertion, a Daubert hearing was not required.\\nA district court need not hold a hearing if, after being presented with a proposed expertβs\\nβsubstantialβ credentials and training, it concludes β[t]his training and experience amply\\n[qualifies the expert] to give testimony [on the topic for which he or she is being\\nqualified].β United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 150 (4th Cir. 2007). Here, as\\ndiscussed below, the district court reviewed Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ credentials and\\nconcluded he was qualified to give expert testimony.\\n 6\\n These credentials included: training on radical groups for federal agencies;\\nteaching university courses on violent non-state actors; consultation on the Libyan Civil\\nWar for the U.S. government; field research on jihadist recruiting in the Middle East; and\\ntestimony in immigration cases on the Taliban and al Qaeda.\\n\\n 15\\n\\fJ.A. 1124β25. This methodology appears to be indistinguishable from that which we\\n\\napproved in United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), revβd on other\\n\\ngrounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). There, we affirmed the admission of expert testimony on\\n\\nthe structure of terrorist groups after β[the expert] identified his methodology as one\\n\\ngenerally employed in the social sciencesββthat is, βcollect[ing] as much information as\\n\\npossible,β then balancing βeach new incoming piece of information against the body of\\n\\ninformation youβve built to that point.β Id. at 337. Accordingly, the district court did not\\n\\nabuse its discretion when it deemed Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ explanation of his\\n\\nmethodology, when combined with his credentials, βsufficient.β J.A. 1126.\\n\\n As to relevance, we conclude the testimony was relevant and met Rule 702βs\\n\\nrequirement that the expertβs specialized knowledge βhelp the trier of fact . . . understand\\n\\nthe evidence or to determine a fact in issue.β Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ testimony assisted\\n\\nthe jury by providing context for the historical backgrounds of and connection between\\n\\nNazism and militant Islamism. As the βevidence in this case was complicated, touching\\n\\nby necessity on a wide variety of ideas, terms, people, and organizations connected to\\n\\nradical Islam,β as well as white supremacism, the district court fairly concluded that the\\n\\ntestimony would assist the jury in understanding evidence regarding predisposition.\\n\\nUnited States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 309 (4th Cir. 2008). For these reasons, we\\n\\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Gartenstein-Rossβ\\n\\ntestimony.\\n\\n C. Ground Three: Evidentiary Rulings\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Young argues that three of the district courtβs evidentiary rulings, considered\\n\\nindividually or cumulatively, violated his due process right to a fair trial.\\n\\n 1. Admission of Weapons and Youngβs Comments\\n\\n Young argues that the district court denied Young a fair trial when it reversed\\n\\npretrial rulings excluding evidence of (1) Youngβs lawfully-owned weapons and (2)\\n\\nremarks Young had made to Khalil about attacking federal buildings. The contention by\\n\\nYoung is that the district court violated his claimed entitlement to rely on several pretrial\\n\\nrulings as the settled law of the case. But βthe district judge is free, in the exercise of\\n\\nsound judicial discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling,β especially in light of issues\\n\\nthat arise during a trial. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41β42 (1984). In particular,\\n\\nit is well within the district courtβs discretion to deem previously-excluded evidence\\n\\nadmissible after the party seeking exclusion βopen[s] the door.β United States v. Blake,\\n\\n571 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in later deeming certain\\n\\nevidence admissible. First, the district court provided notice to Young multiple times that\\n\\nit could change its in limine rulings depending on what occurred during trial. For\\n\\nexample, the district court warned, β[N]ormally my rulings on a motion in limine are\\n\\nalways with a caveat that if something changes during the course of the trial, the decision\\n\\nmay be reversed[.]β J.A. 127β28. Second, with respect to Khalilβs testimony, the district\\n\\ncourt properly admitted this evidence after Young decided to focus his entrapment\\n\\ndefense on whether there was predisposition prior to his first contact with Khalil. At a\\n\\npretrial hearing, the district court warned Young that by framing his entrapment defense\\n\\n 17\\n\\fin this manner, some of Khalilβs testimony about Youngβs statements might be admitted\\n\\nbecause such testimony would be probative of whether Young was already predisposed to\\n\\nsupport militant, radical ideas or whether Khalil implanted such ideas. (Specifically, the\\n\\ndistrict court advised, β[I]f you start the predisposition at a later date, then some of that\\n\\nKhalil business might not come in.β J.A. 261.) Nonetheless, Young continued to pursue\\n\\nthis line of argument utilizing an earlier chronological starting point. As a result, the\\n\\ndistrict court allowed Khalil to describe his relationship with Young, including\\n\\nrecounting Youngβs statements about attacking the FBI, his ability to smuggle guns into a\\n\\nfederal building, and the usefulness of ballistic vests if the FBI were to come to his home.\\n\\nThird, at that point, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming Youngβs\\n\\npossession of firearms and weapons admissible. Such possession was corroborative of\\n\\nKhalilβs testimony, and therefore properly admissible because Khalilβs credibility was\\n\\nfundamental in establishing Youngβs predisposition before 2010. For these reasons, we\\n\\naffirm the district courtβs admission of this evidence.\\n\\n 2. Exclusion of Youngβs and Agentsβ Comments\\n\\n Young argues the district court erred by excluding purportedly exculpatory\\n\\nevidence demonstrating that he lacked the predisposition to support ISIL. First, the\\n\\ndistrict court excluded, among other claimed exculpatory remarks, online comments\\n\\nYoung had made from his LiveLeak 7 account denouncing ISIL because the Government\\n\\nhad previously been barred from introducing other comments from this same account,\\n\\n\\n 7\\n LiveLeak is a video-sharing website.\\n\\n 18\\n\\fwhich the district court had deemed unfairly prejudicial and cumulative. We discern no\\n\\nreversible error because in excluding these and similar comments, the district court acted\\n\\nwithin its discretion to determine whether introducing such comments would permit the\\n\\nadmission of other previously-excluded evidence. See McLaurin, 764 F.3d at 384.\\n\\n Second, the district court barred the introduction of June 2016 messages between\\n\\nFBI agents reflecting their frustration with the slow pace of the investigation, which\\n\\nYoung argued went to their motives and consequently the issue of entrapment. The\\n\\ndistrict court properly concluded that the agentsβ motives were βirrelevantβ to entrapment\\n\\nbecause whether or not Young was induced had to be assessed by βwhat specifically was\\n\\npresented to [Young]β by the agents rather than what the agents discussed amongst\\n\\nthemselves. J.A. 443. See also United States v. Daniel, 3 F.3d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1993)\\n\\n(βInducement . . . involves elements of governmental . . . conduct sufficiently excessive\\n\\nto implant a criminal design in the mind of an otherwise innocent third party.β). We thus\\n\\nconclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these materials.\\n\\n 3. Jencks Act and Brady Materials\\n\\n Finally, Young asserts Jencks 8 and Brady 9 errors. In the week prior to trial, the\\n\\nGovernment made two last-minute classified Jencks productions of communications\\n\\n\\n 8\\n βUnder the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3500(b), on a motion by the defendant, the\\ngovernment is required to produce any βstatementβ of the witness related to the witnessβ[]\\ntestimony that is in the governmentβs possession.β United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d\\n212, 220 (4th Cir. 2018).\\n 9\\n Brady v. Maryland held that βsuppression by the prosecution of evidence\\nfavorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material\\neither to guilt or to punishment[.]β 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).\\n\\n 19\\n\\famongst FBI agents about (1) the number of audio recordings made of Moβs meetings\\n\\nwith Young and (2) their frustration with the pace of their investigation of Young.\\n\\nYoung moved to strike the witnesses as to whom the Jencks material applied or to\\n\\ncontinue trial. Rather than striking the witnesses, the district court permitted defense\\n\\ncounsel a five-day continuance to which Young did not object. Young now argues that\\n\\nthe district court erred in doing so, contending these materials suggested spoliation of\\n\\nexculpatory evidence and therefore a Brady violation.\\n\\n We discern no reversible error by the district court. First, when the government\\n\\nfails to timely provide discovery materials that are not exculpatory, such as Jencks\\n\\nmaterials, the district courtβs determination of whether to impose a sanction, and what\\n\\nsanction to impose, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sterling, 724\\n\\nF.3d 482, 512 (4th Cir. 2013). βA continuance is the preferred sanction.β Id. In\\n\\nfashioning a remedy, the district court must consider the reason for the governmentβs\\n\\ndelay, whether the government acted intentionally or in bad faith, the degree of prejudice\\n\\n(if any) suffered by the defendant, and whether any less severe sanction will remedy the\\n\\nprejudice. Id. We have recognized that it is the rare case that would, absent bad faith,\\n\\nresult in an exclusion of evidence (such as striking witnesses). Id. Here, the district court\\n\\ncorrectly recognized that the government did not act in bad faith, given that the vast\\n\\nmajority of discovery was produced well in advance of trial, and that Young was not\\n\\nprejudiced because the materials at issue were not βrelevant, let alone exculpatory.β J.A.\\n\\n278. Nonetheless, given the last-minute production, the district court permitted defense\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\fcounsel an ample continuance to review the material. Under these circumstances, the\\n\\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion.\\n\\n Second, to establish a Brady violation, the evidence at issue must have been (1)\\n\\nfavorable to the defendant (either because it was exculpatory or impeaching), (2) material\\n\\nto the defense (that is, prejudice must have ensued), and (3) suppressed (that is, within the\\n\\nprosecutionβs possession but not disclosed to defendant). United States v. Sarihifard, 155\\n\\nF.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 1998). But here, no issue implicating Brady arose. Young\\n\\ncontends that some of the Jencks material suggested Government spoliation of some\\n\\naudio recordings of Moβs meetings with Young. Specifically, he notes that FBI records\\n\\nindicate that Young and Mo discussed ISIL for the first time during a June 29, 2014\\n\\nmeeting, but that no recording of this meeting was produced to him. Young argues that\\n\\nbecause (1) most of Moβs other meetings with Young were recorded and (2) such an early\\n\\nconversation regarding ISIL may have been probative of Youngβs predisposition, the\\n\\nGovernment withheld potentially exculpatory evidence and thereby committed a Brady\\n\\nviolation. But a review of the recordβparticularly the very FBI communications at\\n\\nissueβindicates that a recording of the meeting, unlike recordings of most of Moβs other\\n\\nmeetings with Young, was never made and that any information purportedly within the\\n\\nrecordings was not material. 10 There is no record evidence to the contrary. Given this,\\n\\n\\n 10\\n Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that it would have\\nproduced a different outcome. United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 936 (4th Cir. 1994).\\nYoung suggests the purported missing conversation would have gone to Youngβs lack of\\npredisposition because it could have included statements by Young criticizing ISIL or\\nsupporters of ISIL. However, by Youngβs own count, at least thirteen similar comments\\n(Continued)\\n 21\\n\\fYoung has offered nothing but rank speculation as to the nature of the allegedly\\n\\nsuppressed materials, which cannot establish a Brady violation. See United States v.\\n\\nStokes, 261 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that to prove a Brady violation, the\\n\\ndefendant must show that βthe prosecution had the [purportedly withheld materials] and\\n\\nfailed to disclose themβ); see also United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 619 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2010) (βBecause [the defendant] can only speculate as to what the requested information\\n\\nmight reveal, he cannot satisfy Bradyβs requirement of showing that the requested\\n\\nevidence would be favorable to the accused.β). We therefore affirm the district courtβs\\n\\nruling on this issue.\\n\\n\\n\\n III. Ground Four: Obstruction Convictions\\n\\n Young argues that the Government failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove\\n\\nthe attempted obstruction of justice counts and that the district court erroneously denied\\n\\nhis motion for judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). We\\n\\nreview the denial of such a Rule 29 motion de novo. United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d\\n\\n519, 525 (4th Cir. 2014). βIn its assessment of a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence,\\n\\na reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and\\n\\ndecides whether βsubstantial evidenceβββthat is, βevidence that a reasonable finder of\\n\\n\\nwere admitted during Moβs testimony. Therefore, the recordings would not have been\\nmaterial because the jury nonetheless foundβdespite the admission of similar\\ncommentsβthat Young was predisposed to support terrorism. These reasons also\\nsupport the holding that the district court did not err in declining to find a Brady\\nviolation.\\n\\n 22\\n\\ffact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendantβs guilt\\n\\nbeyond a reasonable doubtββsupports the verdict. Id. Under that standard, we\\n\\nconclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove the nexus and foreseeability\\n\\nrequirements of the obstruction statute and consequently vacate the convictions under\\n\\nCounts Two and Four.\\n\\n A. Elements of the Offense\\n\\n To convict Young of attempted obstruction, the Government was required to prove\\n\\nhe (1) βcorruptlyβ attempted to (2) βobstruct[], influence[], or impede[]β (3) βan official\\n\\nproceedingβ during the December 3 and 5, 2015 interviews with FBI agents (Count Two)\\n\\nand when he sent the November 2014 text message (Count Four). 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2).\\n\\n An βofficial proceedingβ includes a grand jury investigation, but not an FBI\\n\\ninvestigation. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1515(a)(1) provides that βofficial proceedingβ encompasses:\\n\\nβ(A) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States . . . or a Federal grand\\n\\njuryβ or β(C) a proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by\\n\\nlaw[.]β Here, only a proceeding before a βFederal grand jury,β as found at\\n\\nΒ§ 1515(a)(1)(A), could apply to Young. Other circuits considering whether an FBI\\n\\ninvestigation would fall under Β§ 1515(a)(1)(C) have concluded that it does not because\\n\\nthe use of the preposition βbeforeβ in conjunction with βFederal Government agencyβ\\n\\nimplies βsome formal convocation of the agency in which parties are directed to appear,\\n\\ninstead of any informal investigation conducted by any member of the agency.β United\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\fStates v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Ramos,\\n\\n537 F.3d 439, 462β63 (5th Cir. 2008)). We agree with our sister circuits.\\n\\n Young argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of an\\n\\nβofficial proceedingβ that he could have obstructed. First, Young asserts there was no\\n\\nβofficial proceedingβ concerning Mo for Young to obstruct: Mo was the FBIβs own\\n\\ninformant and therefore the FBI never investigated Mo. Second, Young contends there\\n\\nwas no evidence that Young attempted to obstruct a proceeding concerning himself: the\\n\\nagents never informed Young that he was under investigation; the gift card crime was\\n\\ncommitted after the allegedly obstructive conduct, so there was no crime whose\\n\\ninvestigation Young could knowingly have attempted to obstruct; and an agent testified\\n\\nthat Young was not aware of any investigation until his arrest in August 2016. And even\\n\\nif he had been aware of an FBI investigation of himself, Young asserts, such an\\n\\ninvestigation would not have constituted an βofficial proceedingβ under Β§ 1515(a)(1).\\n\\n Youngβs view misses the mark but points to a much more fundamental flaw in the\\n\\nGovernmentβs evidence. As 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(f)(1) provides, βan official proceeding\\n\\nneed not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.β Therefore, it\\n\\nwas immaterial whether an official proceeding actually existed at the time of the\\n\\nobstructive conduct. 11 Nonetheless, Β§ 1512(c) does require that (1) the obstructive\\n\\nconduct be connected to a specific official proceeding (the βnexusβ requirement) that was\\n\\n\\n 11\\n Although the FBI began βrequest[ing] federal grand jury subpoenas related to\\n[Young]β as early as 2011, the existence of such a grand jury investigation is irrelevant to\\nour determination of this matter for the reasons we describe. J.A. 1376.\\n\\n 24\\n\\f(2) either pending or was reasonably foreseeable to Young when he engaged in the\\n\\nconduct (the βreasonable foreseeabilityβ requirement). These requirements, while not\\n\\nexplicitly laid out in Β§ 1512(c), arise from two Supreme Court casesβUnited States v.\\n\\nAguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995), and Arthur Anderson, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696\\n\\n(2005)βin which the Supreme Court identified these elements from related obstruction\\n\\nstatutes. 12 See also Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018).\\n\\n Aguilar considered the catchall provision of a statute criminalizing attempted\\n\\ngrand jury tampering. 515 U.S. at 599. The defendant had lied to the FBI during the\\n\\ncourse of an investigation and was convicted of βcorruptly endeavoring to influence,\\n\\nobstruct, and impede [a] grand jury investigationβ in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1503. Id.\\n\\nAll the government had shown in support of the conviction was that the defendant had\\n\\nuttered false statements to an investigating agent βwho might or might not testify before a\\n\\ngrand jury.β Id. at 600. The Supreme Court held that Β§ 1503 required a greater\\n\\nconnection between the obstructive act and an official proceeding than what the\\n\\ngovernment had shownβspecifically, a βnexusβ showing βthat the act [had] a\\n\\nrelationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceeding.β Id. at 599. In\\n\\nconsidering the evidence, the Court in Aguilar concluded: βWe do not believe that\\n\\nuttering false statements to an investigating agentβand that seems to be all that was\\n\\n\\n 12\\n Our sister circuits have noted that β[t]he nexus limitation is best understood as\\nan articulation of the proof of wrongful intent that will satisfy the mens rea requirement\\nof βcorruptlyβ obstructing or endeavoring to obstructββthat is, the first element of\\nproving a Β§ 1512(c)(2) charge. United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.\\n2009) (quoting United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 170 (2d Cir. 2006)).\\n\\n 25\\n\\fproved hereβwho might or might not testify before a grand jury is sufficient toβ satisfy\\n\\nthe nexus requirement. Id. at 600.\\n\\n Arthur Andersen applied the nexus requirement to Β§ 1512(b)(2)(A) offenses,\\n\\nwhich criminalize βknowinglyβ and βcorruptly persuad[ing]β another person βwith intent\\n\\nto causeβ that person to tamper with documents that would be used in an official\\n\\nproceeding. 544 U.S. at 703. There, the Supreme Court considered whether the\\n\\ngovernment was required to prove a nexus between the tampering and a particular (rather\\n\\nthan abstract) proceeding. Id. at 707β08. Although the government pointed to Β§ 1512(f)\\n\\nto argue that the statute did not require contemplation of a particular proceeding, the\\n\\nSupreme Court concluded that an official proceeding must, at a minimum, be reasonably\\n\\nforeseeable to the defendant who commits the obstructive act: βIt is . . . one thing to say\\n\\nthat a proceeding need not be pending or instituted at the time of the offense, and quite\\n\\nanother to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen.β Id. A knowingly corrupt\\n\\npersuader cannot be convicted βwhen he does not have in contemplation any particular\\n\\nofficial proceeding in which those documents might be material.β Id. at 708.\\n\\n Though we have not specifically done so, 13 other circuits have applied Aguilar and\\n\\nArthur Andersen to the similarly-structured statute, Β§ 1512(c), to conclude that, in\\n\\n\\n 13\\n We have previously considered in an unpublished per curiam opinion a\\ndefendantβs nexus argument. In affirming his Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction, we concluded the\\nevidence was sufficient to uphold his conviction because βthere [was] a clear, logical\\nrelationship between his [obstructive] conduct and the judicial proceeding.β United\\nStates v. Wein, 521 F. Appβx 138 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). But we have not further\\naddressed the nexus or reasonable foreseeability requirements to prove such a charge.\\nSee id.\\n\\n 26\\n\\fdemonstrating a Β§ 1512(c)(2) offense, βthe government must prove that such a\\n\\nproceeding was reasonably foreseeable to the defendantβ and βthat there was a βnexusβ\\n\\nbetween the defendantβs conduct and the pending, or foreseeable, official proceeding.β\\n\\nUnited States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2017); see, e.g., United States v.\\n\\nPetruk, 781 F.3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 249β50\\n\\n(3d Cir. 2013) (applying the nexus and foreseeability requirements to βany prosecution\\n\\nbrought under a Β§ 1512 provision charging obstruction of justice involving an βofficial\\n\\nproceedingββ); United States v. Bennett, 664 F.3d 997, 1013 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying the\\n\\nnexus requirement to Β§ 1512(c)(2)), vacated on other grounds by 567 U.S. 950 (2012);\\n\\nUnited States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v.\\n\\nPhillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1263β64 (10th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Carson, 560\\n\\nF.3d 566, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (assuming arguendo that the nexus requirement applies to\\n\\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2)). And as the Eighth Circuit noted in Petruk, β[W]e are aware of no circuit\\n\\nthat has considered and rejected application of the nexus requirement to Β§ 1512(c)(2),β\\n\\ngiven the βsimilarity of statutory language between Β§ 1512(c)(2) and the catchall\\n\\nprovision at issue in Aguilar, the application of the nexus requirement in Arthur Andersen\\n\\nto another provision of Β§ 1512, and other circuitsβ application of the nexus requirement to\\n\\nΒ§ 1512(c)(2).β 781 F.3d at 445. We agree and hold that Β§ 1512(c)(2) incorporates the\\n\\nnexus and reasonable foreseeability requirements set forth in Aguilar and Arthur\\n\\nAndersen. That is, it is a requirement βthat a successful prosecution under Β§ 1512(c)(2)\\n\\n[provide] proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant contemplated a particular,\\n\\nforeseeable proceeding, and that the contemplated proceeding constituted an βofficial\\n\\n 27\\n\\fproceeding,β which is defined under Β§ 1515(a)(1)(A) to include a proceeding before a\\n\\nfederal judge, court, or grand jury[.]β Id. at 445. Youngβs convictions do not meet this\\n\\nrequirement.\\n\\n B. Youngβs Obstruction Convictions\\n\\n Upon considering the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the evidence\\n\\nwas insufficient to convict Young of Counts Two and Four for attempting to obstruct\\n\\njustice under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1512(c)(2). In November 2014 and December 2015, Young did\\n\\ndesign his conduct to mislead FBI agents, including those he believed were investigating\\n\\nhis relationship with Mo. With respect to Count Four, prior to Moβs βtrip,β Young told\\n\\nMo the FBI would investigate Young after becoming aware Mo had joined ISIL and that\\n\\nthey knew one another. Young said he would send the text because the text would be\\n\\nβgood for [Young],β helping Young avoid suspicion from law enforcement that he knew\\n\\nof Moβs plans to join ISIL. J.A. 656. And with respect to Count Two, when Young\\n\\nthought in December 2015 that the FBI had learned that Mo had joined ISIL, Young\\n\\nattempted to deceive the FBI by providing statements consistent with the cover story,\\n\\ndisclaiming any knowledge of Moβs whereabouts or plans. Young would only have\\n\\nundertaken these actions had an FBI investigationβwhether in November 2014 or\\n\\nDecember 2015βbeen at least foreseeable to him.\\n\\n But this is not enough for purposes of Β§ 1512(c)(2). In neither situation\\n\\n(November 2014 or December 2015) was this conduct connected to a specific official\\n\\nproceeding, nor was such a specific official proceeding reasonably foreseeable to Young.\\n\\nSimply because an FBI investigation was reasonably foreseeable to Young does not mean\\n\\n 28\\n\\fthat a grand jury investigation was reasonably foreseeable to him or that his conduct was\\n\\ndesigned to obstruct a grand juryβs proceedings. Specifically as to Count Two, the\\n\\nevidence is insufficient largely for the same reason that it was insufficient in Aguilar:\\n\\nβAll the Government ha[s] shown was that [the defendant] had uttered false statements to\\n\\nan investigating agent who might or might not testify before a grand jury.β Arthur\\n\\nAndersen, 544 U.S. at 708. Even if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that\\n\\nYoung obstructed an FBI investigation, there is simply no evidence to demonstrate he\\n\\nwas aware either that his conduct would affect a grand jury proceeding or that a grand\\n\\njury or similar proceeding was impending. And with respect to Count Four, the\\n\\nGovernment has similarly failed to provide evidence demonstrating that Young foresaw a\\n\\nspecific grand jury investigation or that he designed his conduct to thwart such an\\n\\ninvestigation, rather than designing his conduct to obstruct an FBI inquiryβwhich he did\\n\\nforesee.\\n\\n Rather, Youngβs case is more analogous to that of Friske, in which the Eleventh\\n\\nCircuit reversed a defendantβs Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction for attempting to obstruct a\\n\\nforfeiture proceeding. There, the defendant had, at the behest of an incarcerated friend,\\n\\ngone to the latterβs home to retrieve certain unspecified items which turned out to be\\n\\nsubject to forfeiture. 640 F.3d at 1289β90. In overturning the defendantβs conviction, the\\n\\nEleventh Circuit concluded that the government had failed to prove that the defendant\\n\\nβknew that the natural and probable result of his actions would be the obstruction of [the\\n\\nfriendβs] forfeiture proceeding.β Id. at 1292β93. Even though the defendant βwas\\n\\ncertainly acting suspiciously,β βmore is required to prove a violation of Β§ 1512(c)(2).β\\n\\n 29\\n\\fId. at 1292. But because the only way for the jury to conclude that the defendant βknew\\n\\nof or foresaw the forfeiture proceedingβ βwould be through speculation,β the evidence\\n\\nwas insufficient to convict him. Id. at 1293. Similarly, although Youngβs actions were\\n\\ncertainly designed to thwart an FBI inquiry, the only way the jury could have concluded\\n\\nhe foresaw a particular grand jury investigation would be through speculation.\\n\\n The insufficiency of the evidence here is highlighted by cases in which courts\\n\\nhave found that a grand jury proceeding into criminal activity was reasonably foreseeable\\n\\nbecause of a defendantβs actual awareness of an ongoing or impending investigation into\\n\\nclosely related activity and specific criminal actions in relation to such awareness. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Binday, 804 F.3d 558, 590 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding a grand jury\\n\\nproceeding was foreseeable because the defendant was aware that he was the target of a\\n\\nseparate regulatory investigation into an insurance fraud scheme and had destroyed\\n\\nincriminating documents related to the scheme); United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539,\\n\\n552 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding a grand jury proceeding was reasonably foreseeable to a\\n\\nbusiness owner who had learned about the execution of search warrants for his company\\n\\nand had ordered the deletion of emails after learning of the warrants). By contrast, based\\n\\non the record before us in this case, we would be stretching the foreseeability requirement\\n\\nbeyond its limits in concluding that Youngβs anticipation of an FBI investigation into an\\n\\nacquaintanceβs future trip would also reasonably herald a grand jury proceeding. To do\\n\\nso would be pure speculation.\\n\\n Nonetheless, in an effort to bolster the evidence presented, the Government points\\n\\nto Youngβs (1) awareness of his acquaintancesβ arrests; (2) status as a law enforcement\\n\\n 30\\n\\fofficer; and (3) heightened suspicion of FBI surveillance of him, contending that these\\n\\nthree factors should support the inference that a grand jury investigation was reasonably\\n\\nforeseeable to him and that he designed his conduct to obstruct such an investigation.\\n\\nBut this case is entirely distinguishable from those in which a court has inferred the nexus\\n\\nand foreseeability requirements from similar factors. For example, in Martinez, the\\n\\nSecond Circuit affirmed a Β§ 1512(c)(2) conviction of a defendant police officer who was\\n\\npart of a conspiracy in which at least two dozen co-conspirators committed more than\\n\\n200 robberies of drug traffickers. In upholding the sufficiency of the evidence, the\\n\\nSecond Circuit concluded that βit was easily inferable that the 2008 arrests of many of his\\n\\ncoconspirators made it foreseeable to [the defendant]βwho estimated that as an NYPD\\n\\nofficer, he had testified 15-20 times in grand jury proceedings . . . βthat there would be a\\n\\ngrand jury proceeding leading to numerous indictments.β 862 F.3d at 238. Furthermore,\\n\\nβit could easily be inferred that [the defendantβs] persistent searches of NYPD databases,\\n\\nand his reports back to coconspirators who had not been arrested, were intended to make\\n\\nit possible for them to avoid arrest by absconding before any outstanding warrants could\\n\\nbe executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury proceeding.β Id.\\n\\n By contrast, the indictment of Youngβs acquaintances was too attenuated from\\n\\nYoungβs relationship with Mo to have made a grand jury investigation of Young, Mo, or\\n\\ntheir relationship foreseeable to Young. And neither Young nor Mo was involved in an\\n\\nongoing criminal conspiracy with those acquaintances. Furthermore, although Young\\n\\nworked in law enforcement, the Governmentβs evidence failed to establish that he was\\n\\nroutinely involved in grand jury proceedingsβor, for that matter, had ever testified in\\n\\n 31\\n\\fsuch a proceeding. And finally, Youngβs awareness about FBI surveillance was also\\n\\ninadequate to create a sufficient nexus. Although the Government established at trial that\\n\\nYoung was constantly aware of the fact that the FBI could be investigating him, the\\n\\nGovernment failed to connect this general awarenessβwhether in combination with any\\n\\nof the issues discussed above or individuallyβwith a specific and reasonably foreseeable\\n\\nofficial proceeding.\\n\\n Thus, βbased on our review of the record, we have uncovered no evidence to\\n\\nsatisfy Arthur Andersenβs requirement that the Government prove a nexus between [the\\n\\nobstructive] conduct and a foreseeable particular federal proceeding to establish a\\n\\nconviction underβ Β§ 1512(c). Tyler, 732 F.3d at 250β51. Because the evidence was\\n\\ninsufficient to meet this essential requirement, we vacate Youngβs convictions as to\\n\\nCounts Two and Four.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Youngβs conviction as to Count One, vacate\\n\\nYoungβs convictions as to Counts Two and Four, and remand for resentencing. 14\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,\\n AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n Because Counts One, Two, and Four were grouped under United States\\nSentencing Guidelines Β§ 3D1.2(c) for sentencing purposes, we do not address Youngβs\\nchallenges to his sentence which, if relevant, can be addressed by the district court in the\\nfirst instance upon remand.\\n\\n 32\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":563,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4592600,"string":"4,592,600"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Gregory Seerden"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-4124"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"THACKER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-4124\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nGREGORY KYLE SEERDEN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nNorfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:17-cr-00067-RAJ-DEM-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 20, 2019\\n Amended: February 21, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\\nWilkinson and Judge Agee joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Andrew William Grindrod, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\\nDEFENDER, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\\nGeremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\\nDEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\\nAttorney, Alexandria, Virginia, David A. Layne, Special Assistant United States\\nAttorney, Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.\\n\\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In January 2017 investigators with the Naval Criminal Investigation Service\\n\\n(βNCISβ) obtained a military warrant to search the cell phone of Gregory Kyle Seerden\\n\\n(βAppellantβ) for evidence of sexual assault. During the search of Appellantβs phone, the\\n\\ninvestigators found child pornography. On that basis, the investigators then obtained a\\n\\nfederal warrant to search Appellantβs phone a second time and again found child\\n\\npornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the first search\\n\\nwas unlawful because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence and that evidence\\n\\nobtained during the second search was fruit of the poisonous tree.\\n\\n Although the district court agreed that evidence obtained during the military\\n\\nsearch was inadmissible because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence, it nonetheless\\n\\nfound that the good faith exception allowed the government to admit evidence discovered\\n\\nvia the second search.\\n\\n On September 20, 2017, Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to production\\n\\nof child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). He subsequently filed\\n\\nthis appeal. As explained below, we affirm on different grounds.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Appellant was a member of the United States Navyβs Sea, Air, and Land Team.\\n\\nAt all times relevant to this appeal, he was stationed in San Diego, California. But for\\n\\none week in January 2017, Appellant attended a training at the Little Creek base in\\n\\nVirginia Beach, Virginia. During that week, Appellant was accused of sexual assault and\\n\\nsuspected of possession of child pornography.\\n\\n 2\\n\\f On his next to last night of training in Virginia, Appellant met a woman. The\\n\\nwoman recalled that, during her night out with Appellant, the pair went to a few bars and\\n\\nhad more than a few drinks. The woman came in and out of consciousness throughout\\n\\nthe night, but she remembered returning to Appellantβs room in the Navy Gateway Inns\\n\\nand Suites at Little Creek. At around 4:00 a.m., the woman woke up lying naked next to\\n\\nAppellant. She learned from Appellant that, at some point during the night, they had sex.\\n\\nShe then left. While she was waiting for a cab at the gate of the base, she began to cry.\\n\\nA service member on guard duty (a βsentryβ) approached her, and she told him that\\n\\nAppellant sexually assaulted her. Appellant then attempted to call her. She didnβt\\n\\nanswer. Meanwhile, the sentry reported the allegations to NCIS.\\n\\n Later that day, NCIS began investigating the allegations. In doing so, NCIS\\n\\norchestrated a βcontrolled text message conversationβ between the woman and Appellant.\\n\\nNCIS agents had the woman text Appellant and inquire about the night in question.\\n\\nDuring that conversation, Appellant admitted that the pair had sex and that the woman\\n\\nwas not sober. With that, NCIS agents began coordinating with Appellantβs commanding\\n\\nofficer in San Diego as well as the commanding officer of the Little Creek base to obtain\\n\\nauthorizations to search Appellantβs cell phone and hotel room. NCIS also consulted the\\n\\nJudge Advocate Generalβs (βJAGβ) authorities at both bases. NCIS and JAG officers\\n\\ndecided that the Little Creek commanding officer should authorize the search of\\n\\nAppellantβs hotel room while Appellantβs commanding officer in San Diego should\\n\\nauthorize the search of his phone. The officers reasoned that, while the Little Creek\\n\\ncommanding officer had control over the base, Appellantβs commanding officer in San\\n\\n 3\\n\\fDiego had control over Appellant. In line with that plan, Appellantβs commanding\\n\\nofficer in San Diego signed a Command Authorization for Search and Seizure (βCASSβ)\\n\\nsanctioning the search of Appellantβs phone.\\n\\n The CASS sought to collect messages, photographs, videos, and any other\\n\\ninformation related to the investigation from Appellantβs phone. In its statement of\\n\\nprobable cause, the affidavit supporting the CASS connected Appellantβs phone to the\\n\\nalleged criminal activity by noting that Appellant attempted to call his accuser after\\n\\ndropping her off at the gate. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a pretext\\n\\ncommunication between Appellant and the woman accusing him of sexual assault.\\n\\n A week later, a digital forensics examiner executed the search of Appellantβs\\n\\nphone. In doing so, the forensics examiner viewed thumbnail-size icons of photographs\\n\\non Appellantβs phone. The examiner, who was trained in and had experience with child\\n\\nexploitation investigations, believed some of those photographs were images of child\\n\\npornography.\\n\\n Based on the evidence discovered during the military search of Appellantβs phone,\\n\\nNCIS obtained a federal search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to search\\n\\nAppellantβs phone for further evidence of child pornography. Under the authority of this\\n\\nsecond warrant, the forensics examiner continued his analysis of Appellantβs cell phone\\n\\ndata. He found 78 images and four videos of child pornography. The images depicted\\n\\nknown victims of child sexual exploitation, while the videos depicted Appellant\\n\\nperforming a sexual act inches from the face of a sleeping child.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f On March 31, 2017, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging\\n\\nAppellant with possession and production of child pornography. And on April 20, 2017,\\n\\na grand jury indicted Appellant for possession, production, and transportation of child\\n\\npornography. On June 6, 2017, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from\\n\\nthe two searches of his phone. After holding a hearing on Appellantβs motion, the district\\n\\ncourt denied it.\\n\\n The district court first concluded that the evidence obtained during the first search\\n\\nwas inadmissible. Applying the Military Rules of Evidence in evaluating the lawfulness\\n\\nof that search, the district court reasoned that the CASS obtained by NCIS did not satisfy\\n\\nthe βauthorizationβ requirement of Military Rule of Evidence 315:\\n\\n Pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 315(d), a search\\n is valid only if it is issued by an impartial individual. An\\n impartial individual is a commander, military judge or\\n magistrate. Mil. R. Evid. 315(d)(1) and (2). A military\\n commander is defined as βa commander or other person\\n serving in a position designated by the Secretary concerned as\\n either a position analogous to an officer in charge or a\\n position of command, who has control over the place where\\n the property or person to be search is situated or found, or if\\n that place is not under military control, having control over\\n persons subject to military law or the law of war.β Mil. R.\\n Evid. 315(d)(1). A military judge or magistrate βis a person\\n who is authorized under regulations prescribed by the\\n Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned.β Mil. R.\\n Evid. 315(d)(2).\\n\\n Here, the person who authorized the CASS for the first\\n search of [Appellantβs] telephone was [Appellantβs] unit\\n commander in San Diego, CA. Pursuant to the definitions\\n provided in Military Rules of Evidence 315(d)(1),\\n [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have the authority to\\n authorize any search [conducted] on [the Little Creek base]\\n because [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have control\\n\\n 5\\n\\f over the place where the property or person to be searched was\\n situated.\\n\\nJ.A. 215. 1 The district court further reasoned that, because of the defect in the CASS\\n\\nauthorization, it could not apply the exclusionary ruleβs good faith exception to the\\n\\nevidence obtained as a result of the first search. Citing Military Rule of Evidence 311,\\n\\nthe district court noted, βPursuant to military law, evidence obtained as the result of an\\n\\nunlawful search may [only] be used if . . . βthe search or seizure resulted from an\\n\\nauthorization . . . issued by an individual competent to issue the authorization under Mil.\\n\\nR. Evid. 315(d).ββ J.A. 217β18. Because the district court found that Appellantβs\\n\\ncommander in San Diego was not competent to authorize the CASS, the court concluded\\n\\nthat βthe good faith exception does not cure the first search.β Id. at 218.\\n\\n Despite finding that evidence obtained during the first search was inadmissible,\\n\\nthe district court concluded that evidence obtained during the second search was\\n\\nadmissible. In doing so, the district court acknowledged that βthe second search relied\\n\\nupon evidence found during the first search,β J.A. 218, that the probable cause supporting\\n\\nthe search warrant authorizing the second search was βobtained through unlawful\\n\\nmeans,β id. at 220, and that β[a]s a result, the magistrate judgeβs subsequent issuance of a\\n\\nsearch warrant . . . was void ab initio.β Id. at 222. Nonetheless, the district court found\\n\\nthat the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the\\n\\nevidence obtained during the second search and denied Appellantβs motion to suppress.\\n\\n 1\\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Thereafter, on September 27, 2017, Appellant plead guilty to production of child\\n\\npornography. He stipulated to a written statement of facts but reserved his right to appeal\\n\\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion to suppress. On February 15, 2018, the district\\n\\ncourt sentenced Appellant to 324 months of imprisonment to be followed by 25 years of\\n\\nsupervised release. This appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Analyzing a district courtβs decision to deny a motion to suppress, we review legal\\n\\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890\\n\\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). In doing so, we consider the evidence in the light most\\n\\nfavorable to the Government. See id.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Appellant contends that the Military Rules of Evidence apply here and require\\n\\nsuppression. We hold, however, that the Fourth Amendment governs whether evidence\\n\\nis admissible in federal criminal proceedings. The Military Rules of Evidence cannot\\n\\nusurp the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that, even assuming the initial warrant\\n\\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule\\n\\nprecludes suppression of evidence obtained from the first search. And because the good\\n\\nfaith exception saves the evidence of the first search, it also saves the evidence obtained\\n\\nfrom the second search.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f A.\\n\\n At the outset, we recognize that federal courts treat searches conducted within the\\n\\nconfines of the military differently. As this court observed in United States v. Rendon,\\n\\nβ[T]he Fourth Amendment protects members of the armed services from unreasonable\\n\\nsearches and seizuresβ with βdifferent standards than those that apply in the civilian\\n\\ncontext.β 607 F.3d 982, 990 (4th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n That is not to say that military rules wholly displace the framework of the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment. To the contrary, military rules and procedures affect whether a military\\n\\nsearch satisfies the Fourth Amendmentβs reasonableness requirement. To determine\\n\\nwhether a search is reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to balance the\\n\\ndegree to which a search βintrudes upon an individualβs privacyβ against βthe degree to\\n\\nwhich it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.β Samson v.\\n\\nCalifornia, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (citations omitted). The privacy and governmental\\n\\ninterests implicated by military searches are different from those implicated by civilian\\n\\nsearches: In military settings, the government has a significant interest in maintaining\\n\\norder and control over its service members. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744\\n\\n(1974). Meanwhile, the rights of service members must bend to meet the demands of\\n\\ndiscipline and duty. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). For that reason,\\n\\nfederal courts consider the Military Rules of Evidence, which outline the rules and\\n\\nprocedures that govern how military officers conduct military searches, in evaluating the\\n\\nreasonableness of military searches. See, e.g., Rendon, 607 F.3d at 990β91. And when\\n\\nsuch a search violates those rules in a way that impedes a service memberβs specific\\n\\n 8\\n\\fexpectations of privacy, βa violation of the Fourth Amendment can result.β See id. at\\n\\n991.\\n\\n But it does not follow that the Military Rules of Evidence themselves tie the hands\\n\\nof the federal courts. βMilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists\\n\\nseparate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.β\\n\\nBurns, 346 U.S. at 140. Just as states βlack the power to impose on federal courts\\n\\nrequirements stricter than those mandated by the federal Constitution,β United States v.\\n\\nClyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1994), so too does the military. To hold otherwise\\n\\nwould βhamper the enforcement of valid federal laws by rendering relevant and reliable\\n\\nevidence unavailable.β Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368,\\n\\n1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (alteration omitted)). For that reason, the Fourth Amendment\\n\\nprovides the proper standard for determining whether evidence seized pursuant to a non-\\n\\nfederal warrant is admissible in federal court. Id. at 616β17; see also United States v.\\n\\nVan Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 346β47 (4th Cir. 1998) (β[T]he proper standard for evaluating\\n\\nillegal seizure claims in federal courts has uniformly been whether the actions of the state\\n\\nofficials in securing the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States\\n\\nConstitution.β (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Even assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation here, we hold that the\\n\\ngood faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression.\\n\\n Suppression is not itself a right explicitly bestowed by the Fourth Amendment.\\n\\nRather, suppression of evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth\\n\\n 9\\n\\fAmendment is a judicially created prescription for such a violation. See United States v.\\n\\nLeon, 486 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). Indeed, the exclusionary rule is primarily proscriptive:\\n\\nit is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Id. For\\n\\nthat reason, βevidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law\\n\\nenforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the\\n\\nsearch was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.β Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.\\n\\n340, 348β49 (1987) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (internal\\n\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n In line with that principle, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows\\n\\ncourts to introduce evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution but in reasonable\\n\\nreliance on a defective warrant. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Supreme Court has\\n\\nidentified only five limitations to the application of the good faith exception: (1) where a\\n\\nmagistrate issues a warrant based on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit, see\\n\\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155β56 (1978); (2) where a magistrate lacks\\n\\nneutrality and detachment, see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326β28\\n\\n(1979); (3) where a warrant is based on an affidavit βso lacking in indicia of probable\\n\\ncause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,β Leon, 468 U.S. at\\n\\n923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610β11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in\\n\\npart)); (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient that a reasonable officer could not\\n\\nbelieve it was valid, see id. at 923; and (5) where police recklessly maintain or knowingly\\n\\nenter false information into a warrant database to enable a future arrest, Herring v. United\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\fStates, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). Appellant argues that the CASS at issue here triggers\\n\\ntwo of those limitations. 2\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Appellant argues that, because the CASS was not authorized by the commanding\\n\\nofficer with βcontrol over the place where the property or person to be searched [was]\\n\\nsituated,β it was facially deficient to the point where βno reasonable person could have\\n\\nconcluded that this officer possessed authority to issue the CASS.β Appellantβs Br. 18.\\n\\nThat argument lacks both legal and logical support.\\n\\n First, we have applied the good faith exception to warrants authorized by\\n\\nmagistrate judges lacking jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685,\\n\\n691 (4th Cir. 2018). We have done so because βthe exclusionary rule is designed to deter\\n\\npolice misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.β Id.\\n\\n(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). And suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a\\n\\nwarrant issued by the wrong magistrate judge would not appreciably deter police\\n\\nmisconduct. Id. There is no reason to conclude that a case of the wrong commanding\\n\\nofficer should be treated any differently.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Appellant presents no independent basis for suppressing the evidence that\\nofficers obtained when they executed the federal warrant. Instead, Appellant argues that\\nevidence obtained through the federal warrant must be suppressed because the CASS was\\nillegal and the federal warrant was supported solely by evidence obtained through the\\nCASS. Accordingly, the question before us is whether evidence obtained through the\\nCASS is admissible. We need not scrutinize the federal warrant.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Second, we cannot say that no reasonable officer could review a CASS authorized\\n\\nby the subject of the searchβs commanding officer -- as opposed to the commanding\\n\\nofficer of the subjectβs current location -- and believe it to be valid. Military Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 315(d) is no bastion of clarity: it places the power to authorize searches on the\\n\\nofficer βwho has control over the place where the property or person to be searched is\\n\\nsituated.β One could reasonably conclude that a military service memberβs commanding\\n\\nofficer is the officer who has control over the place where he or she βis situated.β Indeed,\\n\\nin this case, several officers reached that conclusion. NCIS consulted Appellantβs\\n\\ncommanding officer in San Diego and the commanding officer of the Little Creek base.\\n\\nNCIS also consulted JAG attorneys at both bases. Only after taking these measures did\\n\\nNCIS reach the technically incorrect conclusion that Appellantβs commander in San\\n\\nDiego should authorize the search of Appellantβs phone, while the Little Creek\\n\\ncommanding officer should authorize the search of his hotel room. This court is not\\n\\nprepared to call that conclusion, and each of those officers, unreasonable.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Appellant also argues that the good faith exception cannot apply to the CASS\\n\\nbecause it was so lacking in indicia of probable cause. But βthe threshold for establishing\\n\\nthis exception is a high one.β Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012).\\n\\nOfficers executing warrants are not often expected to question the conclusions of an\\n\\nissuing authority. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921). For that reason, to preclude\\n\\napplication of the good faith exception, an officerβs reliance on an issuing authorityβs\\n\\nprobable cause determination must have been βentirely unreasonable.β Id. at 549. That\\n\\n 12\\n\\fwas not the case here. The affidavit supporting the CASS detailed the allegations of\\n\\nAppellantβs accuser. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a controlled text\\n\\nmessage conversation between Appellant and his accuser and described the admissions\\n\\nthat Appellant made during that conversation. Those admissions were consistent with the\\n\\nallegations of Appellantβs accuser. Presented with such information, it would not be\\n\\nentirely unreasonable for an officer to believe that the CASS was supported by probable\\n\\ncause.\\n\\n Accordingly, we hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies\\n\\nto the evidence obtained through the CASS. Evidence subsequently obtained through the\\n\\nfederal warrant, which was supported by the CASS evidence, is likewise admissible.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4369853/\", \"author_raw\": \"THACKER, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILKINSON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"AGEE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"THACKER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILKINSON\": \", Circuit\", \"AGEE\": \", Circuit\", \"THACKER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592600/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Gregory Seerden\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-4124\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nGREGORY KYLE SEERDEN,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\nNorfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:17-cr-00067-RAJ-DEM-1)\n\n\nArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 20, 2019\n Amended: February 21, 2019\n\n\nBefore WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\nWilkinson and Judge Agee joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Andrew William Grindrod, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\nDEFENDER, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\nGeremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\nDEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\nAttorney, Alexandria, Virginia, David A. Layne, Special Assistant United States\nAttorney, Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.\n\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\n\n In January 2017 investigators with the Naval Criminal Investigation Service\n\n(βNCISβ) obtained a military warrant to search the cell phone of Gregory Kyle Seerden\n\n(βAppellantβ) for evidence of sexual assault. During the search of Appellantβs phone, the\n\ninvestigators found child pornography. On that basis, the investigators then obtained a\n\nfederal warrant to search Appellantβs phone a second time and again found child\n\npornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the first search\n\nwas unlawful because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence and that evidence\n\nobtained during the second search was fruit of the poisonous tree.\n\n Although the district court agreed that evidence obtained during the military\n\nsearch was inadmissible because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence, it nonetheless\n\nfound that the good faith exception allowed the government to admit evidence discovered\n\nvia the second search.\n\n On September 20, 2017, Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to production\n\nof child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). He subsequently filed\n\nthis appeal. As explained below, we affirm on different grounds.\n\n I.\n\n Appellant was a member of the United States Navyβs Sea, Air, and Land Team.\n\nAt all times relevant to this appeal, he was stationed in San Diego, California. But for\n\none week in January 2017, Appellant attended a training at the Little Creek base in\n\nVirginia Beach, Virginia. During that week, Appellant was accused of sexual assault and\n\nsuspected of possession of child pornography.\n\n 2\n\f On his next to last night of training in Virginia, Appellant met a woman. The\n\nwoman recalled that, during her night out with Appellant, the pair went to a few bars and\n\nhad more than a few drinks. The woman came in and out of consciousness throughout\n\nthe night, but she remembered returning to Appellantβs room in the Navy Gateway Inns\n\nand Suites at Little Creek. At around 4:00 a.m., the woman woke up lying naked next to\n\nAppellant. She learned from Appellant that, at some point during the night, they had sex.\n\nShe then left. While she was waiting for a cab at the gate of the base, she began to cry.\n\nA service member on guard duty (a βsentryβ) approached her, and she told him that\n\nAppellant sexually assaulted her. Appellant then attempted to call her. She didnβt\n\nanswer. Meanwhile, the sentry reported the allegations to NCIS.\n\n Later that day, NCIS began investigating the allegations. In doing so, NCIS\n\norchestrated a βcontrolled text message conversationβ between the woman and Appellant.\n\nNCIS agents had the woman text Appellant and inquire about the night in question.\n\nDuring that conversation, Appellant admitted that the pair had sex and that the woman\n\nwas not sober. With that, NCIS agents began coordinating with Appellantβs commanding\n\nofficer in San Diego as well as the commanding officer of the Little Creek base to obtain\n\nauthorizations to search Appellantβs cell phone and hotel room. NCIS also consulted the\n\nJudge Advocate Generalβs (βJAGβ) authorities at both bases. NCIS and JAG officers\n\ndecided that the Little Creek commanding officer should authorize the search of\n\nAppellantβs hotel room while Appellantβs commanding officer in San Diego should\n\nauthorize the search of his phone. The officers reasoned that, while the Little Creek\n\ncommanding officer had control over the base, Appellantβs commanding officer in San\n\n 3\n\fDiego had control over Appellant. In line with that plan, Appellantβs commanding\n\nofficer in San Diego signed a Command Authorization for Search and Seizure (βCASSβ)\n\nsanctioning the search of Appellantβs phone.\n\n The CASS sought to collect messages, photographs, videos, and any other\n\ninformation related to the investigation from Appellantβs phone. In its statement of\n\nprobable cause, the affidavit supporting the CASS connected Appellantβs phone to the\n\nalleged criminal activity by noting that Appellant attempted to call his accuser after\n\ndropping her off at the gate. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a pretext\n\ncommunication between Appellant and the woman accusing him of sexual assault.\n\n A week later, a digital forensics examiner executed the search of Appellantβs\n\nphone. In doing so, the forensics examiner viewed thumbnail-size icons of photographs\n\non Appellantβs phone. The examiner, who was trained in and had experience with child\n\nexploitation investigations, believed some of those photographs were images of child\n\npornography.\n\n Based on the evidence discovered during the military search of Appellantβs phone,\n\nNCIS obtained a federal search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to search\n\nAppellantβs phone for further evidence of child pornography. Under the authority of this\n\nsecond warrant, the forensics examiner continued his analysis of Appellantβs cell phone\n\ndata. He found 78 images and four videos of child pornography. The images depicted\n\nknown victims of child sexual exploitation, while the videos depicted Appellant\n\nperforming a sexual act inches from the face of a sleeping child.\n\n\n\n 4\n\f On March 31, 2017, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging\n\nAppellant with possession and production of child pornography. And on April 20, 2017,\n\na grand jury indicted Appellant for possession, production, and transportation of child\n\npornography. On June 6, 2017, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from\n\nthe two searches of his phone. After holding a hearing on Appellantβs motion, the district\n\ncourt denied it.\n\n The district court first concluded that the evidence obtained during the first search\n\nwas inadmissible. Applying the Military Rules of Evidence in evaluating the lawfulness\n\nof that search, the district court reasoned that the CASS obtained by NCIS did not satisfy\n\nthe βauthorizationβ requirement of Military Rule of Evidence 315:\n\n Pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 315(d), a search\n is valid only if it is issued by an impartial individual. An\n impartial individual is a commander, military judge or\n magistrate. Mil. R. Evid. 315(d)(1) and (2). A military\n commander is defined as βa commander or other person\n serving in a position designated by the Secretary concerned as\n either a position analogous to an officer in charge or a\n position of command, who has control over the place where\n the property or person to be search is situated or found, or if\n that place is not under military control, having control over\n persons subject to military law or the law of war.β Mil. R.\n Evid. 315(d)(1). A military judge or magistrate βis a person\n who is authorized under regulations prescribed by the\n Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned.β Mil. R.\n Evid. 315(d)(2).\n\n Here, the person who authorized the CASS for the first\n search of [Appellantβs] telephone was [Appellantβs] unit\n commander in San Diego, CA. Pursuant to the definitions\n provided in Military Rules of Evidence 315(d)(1),\n [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have the authority to\n authorize any search [conducted] on [the Little Creek base]\n because [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have control\n\n 5\n\f over the place where the property or person to be searched was\n situated.\n\nJ.A. 215. 1 The district court further reasoned that, because of the defect in the CASS\n\nauthorization, it could not apply the exclusionary ruleβs good faith exception to the\n\nevidence obtained as a result of the first search. Citing Military Rule of Evidence 311,\n\nthe district court noted, βPursuant to military law, evidence obtained as the result of an\n\nunlawful search may [only] be used if . . . βthe search or seizure resulted from an\n\nauthorization . . . issued by an individual competent to issue the authorization under Mil.\n\nR. Evid. 315(d).ββ J.A. 217β18. Because the district court found that Appellantβs\n\ncommander in San Diego was not competent to authorize the CASS, the court concluded\n\nthat βthe good faith exception does not cure the first search.β Id. at 218.\n\n Despite finding that evidence obtained during the first search was inadmissible,\n\nthe district court concluded that evidence obtained during the second search was\n\nadmissible. In doing so, the district court acknowledged that βthe second search relied\n\nupon evidence found during the first search,β J.A. 218, that the probable cause supporting\n\nthe search warrant authorizing the second search was βobtained through unlawful\n\nmeans,β id. at 220, and that β[a]s a result, the magistrate judgeβs subsequent issuance of a\n\nsearch warrant . . . was void ab initio.β Id. at 222. Nonetheless, the district court found\n\nthat the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the\n\nevidence obtained during the second search and denied Appellantβs motion to suppress.\n\n 1\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\nappeal.\n\n\n 6\n\f Thereafter, on September 27, 2017, Appellant plead guilty to production of child\n\npornography. He stipulated to a written statement of facts but reserved his right to appeal\n\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion to suppress. On February 15, 2018, the district\n\ncourt sentenced Appellant to 324 months of imprisonment to be followed by 25 years of\n\nsupervised release. This appeal followed.\n\n II.\n\n Analyzing a district courtβs decision to deny a motion to suppress, we review legal\n\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890\n\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). In doing so, we consider the evidence in the light most\n\nfavorable to the Government. See id.\n\n III.\n\n Appellant contends that the Military Rules of Evidence apply here and require\n\nsuppression. We hold, however, that the Fourth Amendment governs whether evidence\n\nis admissible in federal criminal proceedings. The Military Rules of Evidence cannot\n\nusurp the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that, even assuming the initial warrant\n\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule\n\nprecludes suppression of evidence obtained from the first search. And because the good\n\nfaith exception saves the evidence of the first search, it also saves the evidence obtained\n\nfrom the second search.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f A.\n\n At the outset, we recognize that federal courts treat searches conducted within the\n\nconfines of the military differently. As this court observed in United States v. Rendon,\n\nβ[T]he Fourth Amendment protects members of the armed services from unreasonable\n\nsearches and seizuresβ with βdifferent standards than those that apply in the civilian\n\ncontext.β 607 F.3d 982, 990 (4th Cir. 2010).\n\n That is not to say that military rules wholly displace the framework of the Fourth\n\nAmendment. To the contrary, military rules and procedures affect whether a military\n\nsearch satisfies the Fourth Amendmentβs reasonableness requirement. To determine\n\nwhether a search is reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to balance the\n\ndegree to which a search βintrudes upon an individualβs privacyβ against βthe degree to\n\nwhich it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.β Samson v.\n\nCalifornia, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (citations omitted). The privacy and governmental\n\ninterests implicated by military searches are different from those implicated by civilian\n\nsearches: In military settings, the government has a significant interest in maintaining\n\norder and control over its service members. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744\n\n(1974). Meanwhile, the rights of service members must bend to meet the demands of\n\ndiscipline and duty. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). For that reason,\n\nfederal courts consider the Military Rules of Evidence, which outline the rules and\n\nprocedures that govern how military officers conduct military searches, in evaluating the\n\nreasonableness of military searches. See, e.g., Rendon, 607 F.3d at 990β91. And when\n\nsuch a search violates those rules in a way that impedes a service memberβs specific\n\n 8\n\fexpectations of privacy, βa violation of the Fourth Amendment can result.β See id. at\n\n991.\n\n But it does not follow that the Military Rules of Evidence themselves tie the hands\n\nof the federal courts. βMilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists\n\nseparate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.β\n\nBurns, 346 U.S. at 140. Just as states βlack the power to impose on federal courts\n\nrequirements stricter than those mandated by the federal Constitution,β United States v.\n\nClyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1994), so too does the military. To hold otherwise\n\nwould βhamper the enforcement of valid federal laws by rendering relevant and reliable\n\nevidence unavailable.β Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368,\n\n1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (alteration omitted)). For that reason, the Fourth Amendment\n\nprovides the proper standard for determining whether evidence seized pursuant to a non-\n\nfederal warrant is admissible in federal court. Id. at 616β17; see also United States v.\n\nVan Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 346β47 (4th Cir. 1998) (β[T]he proper standard for evaluating\n\nillegal seizure claims in federal courts has uniformly been whether the actions of the state\n\nofficials in securing the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States\n\nConstitution.β (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).\n\n B.\n\n Even assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation here, we hold that the\n\ngood faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression.\n\n Suppression is not itself a right explicitly bestowed by the Fourth Amendment.\n\nRather, suppression of evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth\n\n 9\n\fAmendment is a judicially created prescription for such a violation. See United States v.\n\nLeon, 486 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). Indeed, the exclusionary rule is primarily proscriptive:\n\nit is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Id. For\n\nthat reason, βevidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law\n\nenforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the\n\nsearch was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.β Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.\n\n340, 348β49 (1987) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (internal\n\nquotation marks omitted)).\n\n In line with that principle, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows\n\ncourts to introduce evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution but in reasonable\n\nreliance on a defective warrant. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Supreme Court has\n\nidentified only five limitations to the application of the good faith exception: (1) where a\n\nmagistrate issues a warrant based on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit, see\n\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155β56 (1978); (2) where a magistrate lacks\n\nneutrality and detachment, see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326β28\n\n(1979); (3) where a warrant is based on an affidavit βso lacking in indicia of probable\n\ncause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,β Leon, 468 U.S. at\n\n923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610β11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in\n\npart)); (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient that a reasonable officer could not\n\nbelieve it was valid, see id. at 923; and (5) where police recklessly maintain or knowingly\n\nenter false information into a warrant database to enable a future arrest, Herring v. United\n\n\n\n 10\n\fStates, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). Appellant argues that the CASS at issue here triggers\n\ntwo of those limitations. 2\n\n 1.\n\n Appellant argues that, because the CASS was not authorized by the commanding\n\nofficer with βcontrol over the place where the property or person to be searched [was]\n\nsituated,β it was facially deficient to the point where βno reasonable person could have\n\nconcluded that this officer possessed authority to issue the CASS.β Appellantβs Br. 18.\n\nThat argument lacks both legal and logical support.\n\n First, we have applied the good faith exception to warrants authorized by\n\nmagistrate judges lacking jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685,\n\n691 (4th Cir. 2018). We have done so because βthe exclusionary rule is designed to deter\n\npolice misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.β Id.\n\n(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). And suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a\n\nwarrant issued by the wrong magistrate judge would not appreciably deter police\n\nmisconduct. Id. There is no reason to conclude that a case of the wrong commanding\n\nofficer should be treated any differently.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Appellant presents no independent basis for suppressing the evidence that\nofficers obtained when they executed the federal warrant. Instead, Appellant argues that\nevidence obtained through the federal warrant must be suppressed because the CASS was\nillegal and the federal warrant was supported solely by evidence obtained through the\nCASS. Accordingly, the question before us is whether evidence obtained through the\nCASS is admissible. We need not scrutinize the federal warrant.\n\n\n 11\n\f Second, we cannot say that no reasonable officer could review a CASS authorized\n\nby the subject of the searchβs commanding officer -- as opposed to the commanding\n\nofficer of the subjectβs current location -- and believe it to be valid. Military Rule of\n\nEvidence 315(d) is no bastion of clarity: it places the power to authorize searches on the\n\nofficer βwho has control over the place where the property or person to be searched is\n\nsituated.β One could reasonably conclude that a military service memberβs commanding\n\nofficer is the officer who has control over the place where he or she βis situated.β Indeed,\n\nin this case, several officers reached that conclusion. NCIS consulted Appellantβs\n\ncommanding officer in San Diego and the commanding officer of the Little Creek base.\n\nNCIS also consulted JAG attorneys at both bases. Only after taking these measures did\n\nNCIS reach the technically incorrect conclusion that Appellantβs commander in San\n\nDiego should authorize the search of Appellantβs phone, while the Little Creek\n\ncommanding officer should authorize the search of his hotel room. This court is not\n\nprepared to call that conclusion, and each of those officers, unreasonable.\n\n 2.\n\n Appellant also argues that the good faith exception cannot apply to the CASS\n\nbecause it was so lacking in indicia of probable cause. But βthe threshold for establishing\n\nthis exception is a high one.β Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012).\n\nOfficers executing warrants are not often expected to question the conclusions of an\n\nissuing authority. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921). For that reason, to preclude\n\napplication of the good faith exception, an officerβs reliance on an issuing authorityβs\n\nprobable cause determination must have been βentirely unreasonable.β Id. at 549. That\n\n 12\n\fwas not the case here. The affidavit supporting the CASS detailed the allegations of\n\nAppellantβs accuser. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a controlled text\n\nmessage conversation between Appellant and his accuser and described the admissions\n\nthat Appellant made during that conversation. Those admissions were consistent with the\n\nallegations of Appellantβs accuser. Presented with such information, it would not be\n\nentirely unreasonable for an officer to believe that the CASS was supported by probable\n\ncause.\n\n Accordingly, we hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies\n\nto the evidence obtained through the CASS. Evidence subsequently obtained through the\n\nfederal warrant, which was supported by the CASS evidence, is likewise admissible.\n\n IV.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is\n\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Gregory Seerden\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-4124\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nGREGORY KYLE SEERDEN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nNorfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:17-cr-00067-RAJ-DEM-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 20, 2019\\n Amended: February 21, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\\nWilkinson and Judge Agee joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Andrew William Grindrod, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\\nDEFENDER, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\\nGeremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC\\nDEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger, United States\\nAttorney, Alexandria, Virginia, David A. Layne, Special Assistant United States\\nAttorney, Elizabeth M. Yusi, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.\\n\\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In January 2017 investigators with the Naval Criminal Investigation Service\\n\\n(βNCISβ) obtained a military warrant to search the cell phone of Gregory Kyle Seerden\\n\\n(βAppellantβ) for evidence of sexual assault. During the search of Appellantβs phone, the\\n\\ninvestigators found child pornography. On that basis, the investigators then obtained a\\n\\nfederal warrant to search Appellantβs phone a second time and again found child\\n\\npornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the first search\\n\\nwas unlawful because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence and that evidence\\n\\nobtained during the second search was fruit of the poisonous tree.\\n\\n Although the district court agreed that evidence obtained during the military\\n\\nsearch was inadmissible because it violated the Military Rules of Evidence, it nonetheless\\n\\nfound that the good faith exception allowed the government to admit evidence discovered\\n\\nvia the second search.\\n\\n On September 20, 2017, Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to production\\n\\nof child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e). He subsequently filed\\n\\nthis appeal. As explained below, we affirm on different grounds.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Appellant was a member of the United States Navyβs Sea, Air, and Land Team.\\n\\nAt all times relevant to this appeal, he was stationed in San Diego, California. But for\\n\\none week in January 2017, Appellant attended a training at the Little Creek base in\\n\\nVirginia Beach, Virginia. During that week, Appellant was accused of sexual assault and\\n\\nsuspected of possession of child pornography.\\n\\n 2\\n\\f On his next to last night of training in Virginia, Appellant met a woman. The\\n\\nwoman recalled that, during her night out with Appellant, the pair went to a few bars and\\n\\nhad more than a few drinks. The woman came in and out of consciousness throughout\\n\\nthe night, but she remembered returning to Appellantβs room in the Navy Gateway Inns\\n\\nand Suites at Little Creek. At around 4:00 a.m., the woman woke up lying naked next to\\n\\nAppellant. She learned from Appellant that, at some point during the night, they had sex.\\n\\nShe then left. While she was waiting for a cab at the gate of the base, she began to cry.\\n\\nA service member on guard duty (a βsentryβ) approached her, and she told him that\\n\\nAppellant sexually assaulted her. Appellant then attempted to call her. She didnβt\\n\\nanswer. Meanwhile, the sentry reported the allegations to NCIS.\\n\\n Later that day, NCIS began investigating the allegations. In doing so, NCIS\\n\\norchestrated a βcontrolled text message conversationβ between the woman and Appellant.\\n\\nNCIS agents had the woman text Appellant and inquire about the night in question.\\n\\nDuring that conversation, Appellant admitted that the pair had sex and that the woman\\n\\nwas not sober. With that, NCIS agents began coordinating with Appellantβs commanding\\n\\nofficer in San Diego as well as the commanding officer of the Little Creek base to obtain\\n\\nauthorizations to search Appellantβs cell phone and hotel room. NCIS also consulted the\\n\\nJudge Advocate Generalβs (βJAGβ) authorities at both bases. NCIS and JAG officers\\n\\ndecided that the Little Creek commanding officer should authorize the search of\\n\\nAppellantβs hotel room while Appellantβs commanding officer in San Diego should\\n\\nauthorize the search of his phone. The officers reasoned that, while the Little Creek\\n\\ncommanding officer had control over the base, Appellantβs commanding officer in San\\n\\n 3\\n\\fDiego had control over Appellant. In line with that plan, Appellantβs commanding\\n\\nofficer in San Diego signed a Command Authorization for Search and Seizure (βCASSβ)\\n\\nsanctioning the search of Appellantβs phone.\\n\\n The CASS sought to collect messages, photographs, videos, and any other\\n\\ninformation related to the investigation from Appellantβs phone. In its statement of\\n\\nprobable cause, the affidavit supporting the CASS connected Appellantβs phone to the\\n\\nalleged criminal activity by noting that Appellant attempted to call his accuser after\\n\\ndropping her off at the gate. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a pretext\\n\\ncommunication between Appellant and the woman accusing him of sexual assault.\\n\\n A week later, a digital forensics examiner executed the search of Appellantβs\\n\\nphone. In doing so, the forensics examiner viewed thumbnail-size icons of photographs\\n\\non Appellantβs phone. The examiner, who was trained in and had experience with child\\n\\nexploitation investigations, believed some of those photographs were images of child\\n\\npornography.\\n\\n Based on the evidence discovered during the military search of Appellantβs phone,\\n\\nNCIS obtained a federal search warrant from the Eastern District of Virginia to search\\n\\nAppellantβs phone for further evidence of child pornography. Under the authority of this\\n\\nsecond warrant, the forensics examiner continued his analysis of Appellantβs cell phone\\n\\ndata. He found 78 images and four videos of child pornography. The images depicted\\n\\nknown victims of child sexual exploitation, while the videos depicted Appellant\\n\\nperforming a sexual act inches from the face of a sleeping child.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f On March 31, 2017, the Government filed a criminal complaint charging\\n\\nAppellant with possession and production of child pornography. And on April 20, 2017,\\n\\na grand jury indicted Appellant for possession, production, and transportation of child\\n\\npornography. On June 6, 2017, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from\\n\\nthe two searches of his phone. After holding a hearing on Appellantβs motion, the district\\n\\ncourt denied it.\\n\\n The district court first concluded that the evidence obtained during the first search\\n\\nwas inadmissible. Applying the Military Rules of Evidence in evaluating the lawfulness\\n\\nof that search, the district court reasoned that the CASS obtained by NCIS did not satisfy\\n\\nthe βauthorizationβ requirement of Military Rule of Evidence 315:\\n\\n Pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 315(d), a search\\n is valid only if it is issued by an impartial individual. An\\n impartial individual is a commander, military judge or\\n magistrate. Mil. R. Evid. 315(d)(1) and (2). A military\\n commander is defined as βa commander or other person\\n serving in a position designated by the Secretary concerned as\\n either a position analogous to an officer in charge or a\\n position of command, who has control over the place where\\n the property or person to be search is situated or found, or if\\n that place is not under military control, having control over\\n persons subject to military law or the law of war.β Mil. R.\\n Evid. 315(d)(1). A military judge or magistrate βis a person\\n who is authorized under regulations prescribed by the\\n Secretary of Defense or the Secretary concerned.β Mil. R.\\n Evid. 315(d)(2).\\n\\n Here, the person who authorized the CASS for the first\\n search of [Appellantβs] telephone was [Appellantβs] unit\\n commander in San Diego, CA. Pursuant to the definitions\\n provided in Military Rules of Evidence 315(d)(1),\\n [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have the authority to\\n authorize any search [conducted] on [the Little Creek base]\\n because [Appellantβs] unit commander did not have control\\n\\n 5\\n\\f over the place where the property or person to be searched was\\n situated.\\n\\nJ.A. 215. 1 The district court further reasoned that, because of the defect in the CASS\\n\\nauthorization, it could not apply the exclusionary ruleβs good faith exception to the\\n\\nevidence obtained as a result of the first search. Citing Military Rule of Evidence 311,\\n\\nthe district court noted, βPursuant to military law, evidence obtained as the result of an\\n\\nunlawful search may [only] be used if . . . βthe search or seizure resulted from an\\n\\nauthorization . . . issued by an individual competent to issue the authorization under Mil.\\n\\nR. Evid. 315(d).ββ J.A. 217β18. Because the district court found that Appellantβs\\n\\ncommander in San Diego was not competent to authorize the CASS, the court concluded\\n\\nthat βthe good faith exception does not cure the first search.β Id. at 218.\\n\\n Despite finding that evidence obtained during the first search was inadmissible,\\n\\nthe district court concluded that evidence obtained during the second search was\\n\\nadmissible. In doing so, the district court acknowledged that βthe second search relied\\n\\nupon evidence found during the first search,β J.A. 218, that the probable cause supporting\\n\\nthe search warrant authorizing the second search was βobtained through unlawful\\n\\nmeans,β id. at 220, and that β[a]s a result, the magistrate judgeβs subsequent issuance of a\\n\\nsearch warrant . . . was void ab initio.β Id. at 222. Nonetheless, the district court found\\n\\nthat the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the\\n\\nevidence obtained during the second search and denied Appellantβs motion to suppress.\\n\\n 1\\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Thereafter, on September 27, 2017, Appellant plead guilty to production of child\\n\\npornography. He stipulated to a written statement of facts but reserved his right to appeal\\n\\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion to suppress. On February 15, 2018, the district\\n\\ncourt sentenced Appellant to 324 months of imprisonment to be followed by 25 years of\\n\\nsupervised release. This appeal followed.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Analyzing a district courtβs decision to deny a motion to suppress, we review legal\\n\\nconclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Kolsuz, 890\\n\\nF.3d 133, 141β42 (4th Cir. 2018). In doing so, we consider the evidence in the light most\\n\\nfavorable to the Government. See id.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Appellant contends that the Military Rules of Evidence apply here and require\\n\\nsuppression. We hold, however, that the Fourth Amendment governs whether evidence\\n\\nis admissible in federal criminal proceedings. The Military Rules of Evidence cannot\\n\\nusurp the Fourth Amendment. We further hold that, even assuming the initial warrant\\n\\nviolated the Fourth Amendment, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule\\n\\nprecludes suppression of evidence obtained from the first search. And because the good\\n\\nfaith exception saves the evidence of the first search, it also saves the evidence obtained\\n\\nfrom the second search.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f A.\\n\\n At the outset, we recognize that federal courts treat searches conducted within the\\n\\nconfines of the military differently. As this court observed in United States v. Rendon,\\n\\nβ[T]he Fourth Amendment protects members of the armed services from unreasonable\\n\\nsearches and seizuresβ with βdifferent standards than those that apply in the civilian\\n\\ncontext.β 607 F.3d 982, 990 (4th Cir. 2010).\\n\\n That is not to say that military rules wholly displace the framework of the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment. To the contrary, military rules and procedures affect whether a military\\n\\nsearch satisfies the Fourth Amendmentβs reasonableness requirement. To determine\\n\\nwhether a search is reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to balance the\\n\\ndegree to which a search βintrudes upon an individualβs privacyβ against βthe degree to\\n\\nwhich it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.β Samson v.\\n\\nCalifornia, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (citations omitted). The privacy and governmental\\n\\ninterests implicated by military searches are different from those implicated by civilian\\n\\nsearches: In military settings, the government has a significant interest in maintaining\\n\\norder and control over its service members. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744\\n\\n(1974). Meanwhile, the rights of service members must bend to meet the demands of\\n\\ndiscipline and duty. See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). For that reason,\\n\\nfederal courts consider the Military Rules of Evidence, which outline the rules and\\n\\nprocedures that govern how military officers conduct military searches, in evaluating the\\n\\nreasonableness of military searches. See, e.g., Rendon, 607 F.3d at 990β91. And when\\n\\nsuch a search violates those rules in a way that impedes a service memberβs specific\\n\\n 8\\n\\fexpectations of privacy, βa violation of the Fourth Amendment can result.β See id. at\\n\\n991.\\n\\n But it does not follow that the Military Rules of Evidence themselves tie the hands\\n\\nof the federal courts. βMilitary law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists\\n\\nseparate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.β\\n\\nBurns, 346 U.S. at 140. Just as states βlack the power to impose on federal courts\\n\\nrequirements stricter than those mandated by the federal Constitution,β United States v.\\n\\nClyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1994), so too does the military. To hold otherwise\\n\\nwould βhamper the enforcement of valid federal laws by rendering relevant and reliable\\n\\nevidence unavailable.β Id. (quoting United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368,\\n\\n1374 (9th Cir. 1987) (alteration omitted)). For that reason, the Fourth Amendment\\n\\nprovides the proper standard for determining whether evidence seized pursuant to a non-\\n\\nfederal warrant is admissible in federal court. Id. at 616β17; see also United States v.\\n\\nVan Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 346β47 (4th Cir. 1998) (β[T]he proper standard for evaluating\\n\\nillegal seizure claims in federal courts has uniformly been whether the actions of the state\\n\\nofficials in securing the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States\\n\\nConstitution.β (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Even assuming there was a Fourth Amendment violation here, we hold that the\\n\\ngood faith exception to the exclusionary rule precludes suppression.\\n\\n Suppression is not itself a right explicitly bestowed by the Fourth Amendment.\\n\\nRather, suppression of evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth\\n\\n 9\\n\\fAmendment is a judicially created prescription for such a violation. See United States v.\\n\\nLeon, 486 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). Indeed, the exclusionary rule is primarily proscriptive:\\n\\nit is designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. Id. For\\n\\nthat reason, βevidence should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law\\n\\nenforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the\\n\\nsearch was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.β Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.\\n\\n340, 348β49 (1987) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975) (internal\\n\\nquotation marks omitted)).\\n\\n In line with that principle, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows\\n\\ncourts to introduce evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution but in reasonable\\n\\nreliance on a defective warrant. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 905. The Supreme Court has\\n\\nidentified only five limitations to the application of the good faith exception: (1) where a\\n\\nmagistrate issues a warrant based on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit, see\\n\\nFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155β56 (1978); (2) where a magistrate lacks\\n\\nneutrality and detachment, see Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326β28\\n\\n(1979); (3) where a warrant is based on an affidavit βso lacking in indicia of probable\\n\\ncause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,β Leon, 468 U.S. at\\n\\n923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610β11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in\\n\\npart)); (4) where a warrant is so facially deficient that a reasonable officer could not\\n\\nbelieve it was valid, see id. at 923; and (5) where police recklessly maintain or knowingly\\n\\nenter false information into a warrant database to enable a future arrest, Herring v. United\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\fStates, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009). Appellant argues that the CASS at issue here triggers\\n\\ntwo of those limitations. 2\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Appellant argues that, because the CASS was not authorized by the commanding\\n\\nofficer with βcontrol over the place where the property or person to be searched [was]\\n\\nsituated,β it was facially deficient to the point where βno reasonable person could have\\n\\nconcluded that this officer possessed authority to issue the CASS.β Appellantβs Br. 18.\\n\\nThat argument lacks both legal and logical support.\\n\\n First, we have applied the good faith exception to warrants authorized by\\n\\nmagistrate judges lacking jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685,\\n\\n691 (4th Cir. 2018). We have done so because βthe exclusionary rule is designed to deter\\n\\npolice misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.β Id.\\n\\n(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). And suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to a\\n\\nwarrant issued by the wrong magistrate judge would not appreciably deter police\\n\\nmisconduct. Id. There is no reason to conclude that a case of the wrong commanding\\n\\nofficer should be treated any differently.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Appellant presents no independent basis for suppressing the evidence that\\nofficers obtained when they executed the federal warrant. Instead, Appellant argues that\\nevidence obtained through the federal warrant must be suppressed because the CASS was\\nillegal and the federal warrant was supported solely by evidence obtained through the\\nCASS. Accordingly, the question before us is whether evidence obtained through the\\nCASS is admissible. We need not scrutinize the federal warrant.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Second, we cannot say that no reasonable officer could review a CASS authorized\\n\\nby the subject of the searchβs commanding officer -- as opposed to the commanding\\n\\nofficer of the subjectβs current location -- and believe it to be valid. Military Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 315(d) is no bastion of clarity: it places the power to authorize searches on the\\n\\nofficer βwho has control over the place where the property or person to be searched is\\n\\nsituated.β One could reasonably conclude that a military service memberβs commanding\\n\\nofficer is the officer who has control over the place where he or she βis situated.β Indeed,\\n\\nin this case, several officers reached that conclusion. NCIS consulted Appellantβs\\n\\ncommanding officer in San Diego and the commanding officer of the Little Creek base.\\n\\nNCIS also consulted JAG attorneys at both bases. Only after taking these measures did\\n\\nNCIS reach the technically incorrect conclusion that Appellantβs commander in San\\n\\nDiego should authorize the search of Appellantβs phone, while the Little Creek\\n\\ncommanding officer should authorize the search of his hotel room. This court is not\\n\\nprepared to call that conclusion, and each of those officers, unreasonable.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Appellant also argues that the good faith exception cannot apply to the CASS\\n\\nbecause it was so lacking in indicia of probable cause. But βthe threshold for establishing\\n\\nthis exception is a high one.β Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012).\\n\\nOfficers executing warrants are not often expected to question the conclusions of an\\n\\nissuing authority. Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 921). For that reason, to preclude\\n\\napplication of the good faith exception, an officerβs reliance on an issuing authorityβs\\n\\nprobable cause determination must have been βentirely unreasonable.β Id. at 549. That\\n\\n 12\\n\\fwas not the case here. The affidavit supporting the CASS detailed the allegations of\\n\\nAppellantβs accuser. It also noted that NCIS agents orchestrated a controlled text\\n\\nmessage conversation between Appellant and his accuser and described the admissions\\n\\nthat Appellant made during that conversation. Those admissions were consistent with the\\n\\nallegations of Appellantβs accuser. Presented with such information, it would not be\\n\\nentirely unreasonable for an officer to believe that the CASS was supported by probable\\n\\ncause.\\n\\n Accordingly, we hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies\\n\\nto the evidence obtained through the CASS. Evidence subsequently obtained through the\\n\\nfederal warrant, which was supported by the CASS evidence, is likewise admissible.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":564,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4592605,"string":"4,592,605"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"ACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORPORATION; UMB Bank, NA, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. CITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA ; Public Recreational Facilities Authority of the City of Buena Vista, Virginia, Defendants - Appellees, and Russell J. Singer and Douglas L. Sbertoli, SR., Trustees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"ACA Financial Guaranty v. City of Buena Vista, Virginia"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-21"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1268"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gregory, Thacker, Quattlebaum\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1268\\n\\n\\nACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORPORATION; UMB BANK, NA,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA; PUBLIC RECREATIONAL\\nFACILITIES AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees,\\n\\nand\\n\\nRUSSELL J. SINGER and DOUGLAS L. SBERTOLI, SR.,\\n\\n Trustees.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at\\nLynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior District Judge. (6:17-cv-00013-NKM-RSB)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 21, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Chief\\nJudge Gregory and Judge Thacker joined.\\n\\fARGUED: Scott Carlton Ford, Brian Aaron Richardson, FORD RICHARDSON, PC,\\nRichmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Kevin M. Rose, BOTKINROSE PLC,\\nHarrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael W. Sharp, BOTKINROSE\\nPLC, Harrisonburg, Virginia; Brian J. Kearney, W. Wayne Heslep, HESLEP &\\nKEARNEY PC, Lexington, Virginia, for Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fQUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In this appeal, we review an order dismissing a complaint that arose from a\\n\\ntroubled bond transaction involving a municipal golf course in the City of Buena Vista,\\n\\nVirginia (the βCityβ). Bonds were issued to refinance debt on the golf course and the\\n\\nrepayment of the bonds depended on the City making payments on the lease of the golf\\n\\ncourse. When it failed to do so, this litigation ensued. The primary question on appeal is\\n\\nwhether the Cityβs obligation to make rent payments is legally enforceable when the\\n\\nobligation is expressly subject to the Cityβs annual decision to appropriate funds. Finding\\n\\nthat the answer is no, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of the complaint.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Plans for a golf course in the City date back to 2002. In that year, the\\n\\nCommonwealth of Virginia created the Public Recreational Facilities Authority (the\\n\\nβAuthorityβ) to construct, operate and maintain public recreational facilities for the\\n\\nbenefit of the City. In 2003, the Authority, at the request of the City, took out a loan to\\n\\nfinance the construction of a municipal golf course called the Vista Links Golf Club (the\\n\\nβGolf Courseβ). 1\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The facts that led to the Cityβs interest in a golf course and the subsequent\\nproblems with this course are not in the record nor material to this Courtβs decision.\\nHowever, the events that are described in this case generally follow trends in the golf\\nindustry. In the early 2000s, there was a noticeable rise in the popularity of golf. See\\nSteven J. Wernick, Diamonds in the Rough: Judicial Reaction to Golf Course\\nConversations, 2017 WL 1098131, 30 No. 4 ZONING & PLANNING LAW REPORT 1 (April\\n2007). Tiger Woodsβ dramatic entry and domination in the golf world brought a wave of\\nnew golfers to the sport. Id. What is known as the βTiger Woods Effectβ led to increased\\ntelevision ratings and golf related sales. Id. However, monetization of the increased\\n(Continued)\\n 3\\n\\f In 2005, the City and the Authority sought to refinance the loan on the Golf\\n\\nCourse. To accomplish this, the Authority issued over $9 million in bonds. The Authority\\n\\nand SunTrust Bank (the βBankβ) entered into a Trust Agreement which described how\\n\\nthe bonds would be issued, how they would be repaid and the rights of the parties in the\\n\\nevent the bonds were not repaid. 2 The Authority used the bond proceeds to pay off the\\n\\nexisting loan on the Golf Course.\\n\\n To have a source of revenue to repay the bonds, the Authority leased the Golf\\n\\nCourse to the City. Under the Lease Agreement, the City agreed to make rent payments\\n\\nas well as maintain and operate the Golf Course. The Authority agreed that the rent\\n\\npayments would be used to repay the bonds. The rent payments from the City, therefore,\\n\\nwere the financial linchpin of the transaction. Critically, however, the City never made an\\n\\nabsolute commitment to make the rent payments. Under the Lease Agreement and the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\npopularity of golf did not always extend to golf courses. Id. While the number of golf\\ncourses increased, the number of rounds of golf played per year roughly stayed the same.\\nThus, some golf courses became the victim of too much supply and not enough demand.\\nAccording to the National Golf Foundation, a trend began in 2006 where each year\\nsignificantly more golf courses closed than opened. National Golf Foundation, NGF\\nIssues 2018 Golf Industry Report: Consolidated State-of-the-Industry Report Features\\nParticipation and Course Supply Dada, NGF Quarterly, May 2018,\\nhttps://www.thengfq.com/2018/05/ngf-issues-2018-golf-industry-report/.\\n 2\\n UMB Bank, N.A. is the successor-in-interest to SunTrust Bank.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fother financing documents, the Cityβs obligation was subject to its decision to appropriate\\n\\nfunds each year. 3\\n\\n Other documents in the bond transaction gave the Bank rights as a creditor in the\\n\\nevent the bonds were not repaid. The City issued a Deed of Trust to the Bank where the\\n\\nCity pledged its existing City Hall building and police station as security. Similarly, the\\n\\nAuthority issued a Deed of Trust to the Bank where the Authority pledged the Golf\\n\\nCourse as security. Both the City Deed of Trust and the Authority Deed of Trust\\n\\n(collectively βDeeds of Trustβ) along with the Trust Agreement contain provisions\\n\\noutlining the Bankβs creditor rights to this collateral.\\n\\n The Bank retained ACA Financial Guaranty Corporation (βACAβ) to provide\\n\\ninsurance on the bonds. Through this arrangement, ACA received insurance premiums,\\n\\nand, in return, agreed to pay off the bonds if there was a default in repayment. In such a\\n\\nsituation, ACA would front the costs of paying off the bonds and then assume the Bankβs\\n\\nrights to receive rent payments and to enforce other creditor rights.\\n\\n In 2010 and 2011, the City failed to appropriate enough money to fully pay the\\n\\nrent due on the Golf Course lease. As a result, the Authority could not repay the bonds.\\n\\nAfter discussions and negotiations, the parties entered into the Forbearance Agreement.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The reason for this arrangement is not clear from the record. However, because\\nthe Cityβs charter requires βany bonded indebtednessβ to be approved through a\\nreferendum βpassed by a majority of the qualified voters,β see City of Buena Vista (Va.)\\nCharter Β§ 2.214, the City could not simply enter into a long-term loan agreement with the\\nBank. An obligation subject to the Cityβs decision to make appropriations avoided the\\nrequirement of having the electorate vote on the debt.\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\fUnder the Forbearance Agreement, ACA agreed to make up any shortfall resulting from\\n\\nthe Cityβs failure to make rent payments. It also agreed to temporarily forego exercising\\n\\nits creditor rights and remedies. The City and the Authority agreed that ACA would be\\n\\nreimbursed for any payments it made and agreed that the bonds would still be repaid\\n\\nfrom rent payments, although the payment plan was extended over a longer period of\\n\\ntime. Significantly, the Forbearance Agreement also makes clear that the obligation to\\n\\nmake the rent payments is subject to annual appropriations by the City.\\n\\n In January 2015, the City voted not to appropriate funds for the rent payments and\\n\\nhas not made any payments since that time. As a result, the Authority once again failed to\\n\\nrepay the bonds.\\n\\n In response, ACA and the Bank filed a ten-count complaint in federal court against\\n\\nthe City and the Authority. The City and the Authority filed a motion to dismiss the\\n\\ncomplaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court\\n\\ngranted the motion to dismiss finding that all ten counts in the complaint failed to state\\n\\nclaims for which relief could be granted. ACA and the Bank appealed all but one of the\\n\\ncounts. We have jurisdiction for this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This Court reviews a motion to dismiss de novo. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.\\n\\nConsumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). In so doing, we follow the\\n\\nwell-settled standard for considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n\\n A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the claims\\n\\npled in a complaint. To sufficiently plead a claim, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\\n\\n 6\\n\\frequire that β[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain\\n\\nstatement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .β Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n8(a). This pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations. Ashcroft v.\\n\\nIqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, βit demands more than an unadorned, the-\\n\\ndefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.β Id. Labels, conclusions, recitation of a\\n\\nclaimβs elements, and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement will not\\n\\nsuffice to meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. Id.\\n\\n To meet the Rule 8 standard and survive a motion to dismiss, βa complaint must\\n\\ncontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to βstate a claim to relief that is\\n\\nplausible on its face.ββ Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557\\n\\n(2007)). To contain sufficient factual matter to make a claim plausible, the factual content\\n\\nmust βallow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the\\n\\nmisconduct alleged.β Id.\\n\\n While we must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we need not\\n\\naccept a complaintβs legal conclusions. Id. Thus, simply reciting the cause of actionsβ\\n\\nelements and supporting them by conclusory statements does not meet the required\\n\\nstandard. Id. The Supreme Court noted that while Rule 8 departed from the\\n\\nhypertechnical code-pleading requirement of a prior era, it did not βunlock the doors of\\n\\ndiscovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.β Id. at 678β679.\\n\\n Using this standard, we review ACA and the Bankβs claims on appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f III.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank appeal nine of the ten counts that the district court dismissed.\\n\\nFive of the nine counts at issue on appeal are primarily based on the Cityβs failure to\\n\\nmake the rent payments because it did not appropriate the funds for such payments.\\n\\nThese five counts all assert a breach of one of the financing documents. The remaining\\n\\nfour counts are implied, declaratory and equitable in nature. We will address the five\\n\\nbreach of contract counts and then the remaining implied, declaratory and equitable\\n\\ncounts.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n First, ACA and the Bank argue the district court erred in dismissing their claim\\n\\nfor breach of a third-party beneficiary contract. Although they are not parties to the Lease\\n\\nAgreement between the City and the Authority, ACA and the Bank claim they can bring\\n\\nan action under it because they are third-party beneficiaries to that Lease Agreement.\\n\\nThey contend this count states a plausible claim for relief because the City has a legally\\n\\nenforceable obligation to pay rent under the Lease Agreement. ACA and the Bank claim\\n\\nthat the City breached the Lease Agreement by not paying rent to the Bank.\\n\\n This argument gets to the crux of the lawsuitβwhether the City has an\\n\\nenforceable obligation to make rent payments. The language of the Lease Agreement is\\n\\ndispositive on this issue. Section 4.2 of the Lease Agreement states that the City shall pay\\n\\nthe rent to the Bank on behalf of the Authority. This provision is subject to Section 4.5\\n\\nwhich states:\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Notwithstanding anything in this Lease Agreement to the contrary, the\\n Cityβs obligations to pay the cost of performing its obligations under this\\n Lease Agreement and the Trust Agreement, including without limitation its\\n obligation to pay all Basic Rent and Additional Rent, shall be subject to\\n and dependent upon appropriations being made from time to time by\\n the City Council for such purpose . . . .\\n\\nJ.A. 54. (emphasis added).\\n\\n Consistently, Section 6.1(c) states:\\n\\n Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section to the contrary, failure\\n by the City to make when due any payment required to be made under\\n this Lease Agreement or failure by the City to observe and perform any\\n covenant, condition or agreement on its part to be observed or performed\\n under this Lease Agreement resulting from failure of the City to\\n appropriate moneys for such purposes, as described in Section 4.5,\\n shall not constitute an event of default.\\n\\nJ.A. 61β62. (emphasis added).\\n\\n This language unambiguously states that the City did not have an enforceable\\n\\nobligation to make the rent payments. Any obligation of the City to make rent payments\\n\\nwas and is subject to the City appropriating the funds for such payments. In other words,\\n\\nif the City did not appropriate funds, which it did not, the City had no obligation to make\\n\\nthe rent payments. A party cannot be sued for breaching an obligation it never had in the\\n\\nfirst place. To make this even more clear, the Lease Agreement provides that the Cityβs\\n\\nfailure to make rent payments when no appropriations are made does not constitute an\\n\\nevent of default. Therefore, the claim that the City breached its obligation to the\\n\\nAuthority under the Lease Agreement fails to state a claim for which relief can be\\n\\ngranted.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f The ACA and the Bank challenge the legal effect of the βsubject to appropriationβ\\n\\nlanguage. In considering this challenge, the Virginia Supreme Courtβs decision in Dykes\\n\\nv. Northern Virginia Transp. Dist. Commβn, 411 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1991) is instructive. In\\n\\nthat case, a county incurred a long-term debt obligation without holding a referendum on\\n\\nthe debt. Concerned citizens alleged that the obligation violated Virginiaβs constitutional\\n\\nrequirement that such obligations be approved by the citizens of the county. The court\\n\\nrejected the challenge because the countyβs obligation, like the obligation in this case,\\n\\nwas subject to the countyβs appropriation of funds for that purpose. The court held that\\n\\nβsubject to appropriationβ financing does not create constitutional cognizable debt\\n\\nβbecause it does not impose any enforceable duty or liability on the County.β Id. at 10.\\n\\nβ[N]either the County nor its general revenues is liable for repayment of the debt incurred\\n\\nby the bond issue.β Id.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank argue that Dykes is distinguishable from this case because it\\n\\ninvolved a constitutional challenge to a municipal bond transaction brought by concerned\\n\\ncitizens whereas this case is brought by parties to the financing arrangement. This\\n\\ndistinction, however, is immaterial. The court in Dykes looked to the nature of the debt,\\n\\nnot the nature of the parties, and found that βsubject to appropriationβ financing does not\\n\\nimpose any enforceable duty or liability on the county. Dykes confirms the complaint\\n\\nfails to state a claim that the City breached its obligation to the Authority under the Lease\\n\\nAgreement for which ACA and the Bank can recover as third-party beneficiaries.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\f B.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next argue the district court erred in dismissing their claim that\\n\\nthe Authority breached the Trust Agreement. In that count, ACA and the Bank claim the\\n\\nAuthority has not made bond payments since 2014. To address this ground, we look to\\n\\nthe language of the Trust Agreement. Under it, the Authorityβs obligation to make the\\n\\nbond payments was dependent on the City paying rent. For example, Section 1001(c) of\\n\\nthe Trust Agreement states:\\n\\n The Authority covenants to faithfully observe and perform all of its\\n covenants, conditions and agreements contained in this Trust Agreement\\n and to promptly pay the principal of and premium, if any, and interest on\\n the Bonds at the places, on the dates and in the manner specified in this\\n Trust Agreement and the Bonds; provided, however, that such\\n obligations are limited obligations of the Authority, payable solely from\\n the payments of Basic Rent and Additional Rent and the property\\n secured by the Deed of Trust.\\n\\nJ.A. 118. (emphasis added).\\n\\n Additionally, Section 1703 of the Trust Agreement states:\\n\\n Notwithstanding any provision of the Bonds or the Basic Agreements to the\\n contrary, the obligations of the Authority under the Bonds and the Basic\\n Agreements are not general obligations of the Authority, but are limited\\n obligations payable solely from payments of Basic Rent and Additional\\n Rent and the property pledged pursuant to the Deed of Trust.\\n\\nJ.A. 141. (emphasis added).\\n\\n As the language quoted above makes clear, the Authorityβs promise to make the\\n\\nbond payments was and is subject to the Cityβs payment of the rent. Aside from the rent\\n\\npayments from the City, the Authority had no independent contractual obligation to make\\n\\nthe bond payments. Thus, we find that ACA and the Bankβs claim for breach of the Trust\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\fAgreement is not plausible because it is contradicted by the clear and unambiguous terms\\n\\nof the Trust Agreement. See Foothill Capital Corp. v. E. Coast Bldg. Supply Corp., 259\\n\\nB.R. 844, 845 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that where an agreement is plain and\\n 4\\nunambiguous, the court is not at liberty to rewrite the contractual language).\\n\\n C.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next claim the district court erred in dismissing their claims for\\n\\nbreach of the City Deed of Trust and breach of the Authority Deed of Trust. They point to\\n\\nSection 1.2 of the Deeds of Trust, which states that the βGrantor shall perform and\\n\\nobserve all duties, obligations, and requirements and shall comply in all respects with the\\n\\nterms, covenants, conditions, representations and warranties of the Bonds, this Deed of\\n\\nTrust, the Lease Agreement and the Trust Agreement.β J.A. 176, 199. Specifically, they\\n\\nargue that by failing to make bond payments in the manner provided by the Trust\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n ACA and the Bank raise an additional issue regarding this count by asserting that\\nthe Authority also breached the Trust Agreement by not paying revenues derived from\\nthe secured property. However, they did not make this argument before the district court.\\nWe have held that β[w]hen a party in a civil case fails to raise an argument in the lower\\ncourt and instead raises it for the first time before us, we may reverse only if the newly\\nraised argument establishes βfundamental errorβ or a denial of fundamental justice.β In re\\nUnder Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267,\\n1271 (4th Cir. 1985)). We find neither fundamental error nor a denial of fundamental\\njustice here. ACA and the Bank do not even allege in this count that the Authority failed\\nto pay from the revenues of the property secured by the Deed of Trust. The complaint\\nsimply alleges that the Authority breached the Trust Agreement βin a number of material\\nwaysβ and does not give any further specificity. These conclusory allegations fail to meet\\npleading requirements prescribed in Twombly and Iqbal. They also defeat any argument\\nthat dismissing ACA and the Bankβs new and improperly late argument constitutes\\nfundamental error or denial of fundamental justice.\\n\\n 12\\n\\fAgreement, the City and the Authority breached their obligations under the Deeds of\\n\\nTrust.\\n\\n While the Deeds of Trust require the City and the Authority to adhere to the Trust\\n\\nAgreement, they do not alter or modify the language in Sections 1001(c) and 1703 of the\\n\\nTrust Agreement discussed above. By the express terms of the Trust Agreement, the\\n\\nAuthorityβs obligation to make bond payments is limited to the rent paid by the City. It\\n\\nmakes clear that the Cityβs obligation to make rent payments is subject to the Cityβs\\n\\ndecision to appropriate rent money. In the face of those clear contractual terms, the\\n\\ncounts alleging violations of the Deeds of Trust fail to state a claim for which relief can\\n\\nbe granted.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next claim the district court erred in dismissing their count for\\n\\nbreach of the Forbearance Agreement. They concede that the Cityβs rent payment\\n\\nobligation under the Forbearance Agreement is subject to appropriations by the City.\\n\\nHowever, they contend that language does not waive the Cityβs or the Authorityβs duty to\\n\\nmake rent payments under the Forbearance Agreement. We disagree. Section 5.4 of the\\n\\nForbearance Agreement provides:\\n\\n The obligations of the City to make adjusted Basic Rent payments pursuant\\n to Paragraph 5.1 and deferred payments of Basic Rent pursuant to\\n Paragraph 5.3 are subject to annual appropriation by the City Council\\n of amounts sufficient to make such payments. The City agrees that it is the\\n intention of the City to make annual appropriations in amounts sufficient to\\n make the payments required under this Agreement.\\n\\nJ.A. 227. (emphasis added).\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Like the language in the Trust Agreement and the Lease Agreement described\\n\\nabove, this language is unambiguous. Accordingly, the claim for breach of the\\n\\nForbearance Agreement fails to state a plausible claim.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank also claim on appeal the district court erred in dismissing this\\n\\ncount because the City and the Authority made misrepresentations which constituted a\\n\\nbreach of the Forbearance Agreement. However, neither this count nor any part of the\\n\\ncomplaint contains any allegations about misrepresentations. Instead, the complaint\\n\\nalleges that ACA and the Bank βhave been damaged as a result of Defendantsβ breaches\\n\\nof their contractual obligations contained in the Forbearance Agreement.β J.A. 32. ACA\\n\\nand the Bank argue that making a misrepresentation constitutes a breach of the City and\\n\\nthe Authorityβs obligations under the Forbearance Agreement. ACA and the Bank thus\\n\\ncontend that they have satisfied their pleading requirements by alleging the City and the\\n\\nAuthority breached their contractual obligations even though they have not specified the\\n\\nalleged misrepresentations. This position is in direct conflict with Twombly and Iqbal.\\n\\nConclusory allegations, such as those pointed to by ACA and the Bank, do not contain\\n\\nsufficient facts to properly state a claim. The allegations do not specify what contractual\\n\\nobligation was breached. Neither do they refer to any underlying facts to support the\\n\\npurported breach. Thus, the complaint is not pled with enough specificity to plausibly\\n\\nstate a claim for breach of the Forbearance Agreement.\\n\\n E.\\n\\n Having addressed the breach of contract counts, we turn to ACA and the Bankβs\\n\\ncount for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ACA and the\\n\\n 14\\n\\fBank argue that, even if they have no claim for breach of an express term, they have\\n\\nstated a plausible claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.\\n\\nSpecifically, ACA and the Bank argue that the βsubject to appropriationβ language is\\n\\nambiguous and created discretion on the part of the City. They then claim the City acted\\n\\narbitrarily and unfairly by failing to appropriate funds when the City could afford to\\n\\nappropriate the funds to repay the Golf Course debt. This argument fails for two reasons.\\n\\n First, the complaint does not allege that the City acted arbitrarily and unfairly by\\n\\nfailing to make appropriations when it could afford to appropriate. When a complaint\\n\\nfails to state a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to\\n\\nrelief, the claim fails. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). That is precisely the situation here.\\n\\nWithout factual allegations that support their legal conclusions, ACA and the Bank have\\n\\nfailed to plead a plausible claim for relief.\\n\\n Second, even if we put aside the deficiencies in the pleadings, the βsubject to\\n\\nappropriationβ language is not ambiguous. As stated above, ACA and the Bank are\\n\\nsophisticated commercial entities engaged in a multi-million dollar municipal finance\\n\\ntransaction. They are to be bound by the plain and unambiguous terms of their contracts.\\n\\nSee Quadros & Assocs., P.C. v. City of Hampton, 268 Va. 50, 54, 597 S.E.2d 90, 93\\n\\n(2004) (holding that the terms of the partiesβ contract were plain and unambiguous and\\n\\nthus the parties were bound by them). Under Virginia law, the implied covenant of good\\n\\nfaith and fair dealing βcannot be the vehicle for rewriting an unambiguous contract in\\n\\norder to create duties that do not otherwise exist.β Wardβs Equip., Inc. v. New Holland N.\\n\\nAm., Inc., 254 Va. 379, 385, 493 S.E.2d 516, 520 (1997).\\n\\n 15\\n\\f In essence, ACA and the Bank ask us to impose new terms to their deal that save\\n\\nthem from the consequences of the express terms of their agreements. We decline to do\\n\\nso. We find that ACA and the Bank fail to state a claim that the City and the Authority\\n\\nbreached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.\\n\\n F.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank challenge the district courtβs dismissal of their declaratory\\n\\njudgment count. In that count, ACA and the Bank sought a declaration that the financing\\n\\ndocuments were legal and enforceable and provide ACA and the Bank with the right to\\n\\npossess and foreclose on the secured property. The district court dismissed this count on\\n\\nthe basis that the request for declaratory judgment was not a proper standalone claim.\\n\\n We first consider the request for a declaration that the financing documents were\\n\\nlegal and enforceable. Despite its ruling that the declaratory judgment count was not a\\n\\nproper standalone claim, the district court proceeded to address the merits of this request\\n\\nin its consideration of the City Deed of Trust claim. The district court explained that the\\n\\nonly document whose legality was at issue was the City Deed of Trust. The district court\\n\\nthen evaluated that document and found it to be legally valid and enforceable. This\\n\\nfinding was not appealed to this Court, thus there is no longer a dispute regarding its\\n\\nlegality. Since the issue for which the declaration was sought is not in dispute, we decline\\n\\nto address this issue.\\n\\n Turning now to the request for a declaration that ACA and the Bank could possess\\n\\nand foreclose the secured property, counsel for the City and the Authority conceded at\\n\\noral argument that, subject to compliance with the terms of the documents, ACA and the\\n\\n 16\\n\\fBank have the right to foreclose the property secured by the Deeds of Trust. As there\\n\\nappears to be no dispute about whether ACA and the Bank have the right to pursue their\\n\\ncreditor rights under the financing documents, we decline to address this issue as well.\\n\\n G.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next argue that the district court erred in dismissing their count\\n\\nfor restitution/unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. They argue that this count properly\\n\\nstates a claim because the enforceability of the financing documents is in dispute. ACA\\n\\nand the Bank claim that if the City and the Authority are not forced to make bond\\n\\npayments under the financing documents, they can recover under equitable theories. In\\n\\nsupport of this argument, ACA and the Bank appear to assume that a finding that the City\\n\\nand the Authority were not required to make bond payments equates to a finding that the\\n\\nfinancing documents are unenforceable or void.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank are mistaken. The district court did not find that the financing\\n\\ndocuments were unenforceable, nor do we. We, as did the district court, simply recognize\\n\\nthat the express terms of the contract make repayment subject to appropriations by the\\n\\nCity. Virginia law makes clear that βwhere there is an express and enforceable contract in\\n\\nexistence which governs the rights of the parties, the law will not imply a contract in\\n\\ncontravention thereof.β Royer v. Bd. Of Cty. Supervisors of Albemarle Cty., 10 S.E. 2d\\n\\n876, 881 (Va. 1940). Thus, this count fails to state a claim. 5\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Additionally, the district court found that ACA and the Bank pled this count βin\\nthe alternativeβ in the event that the court found the City Deed of Trust void. The district\\njudge found that the City Deed of Trust was a valid document, and thus dismissed this\\n(Continued)\\n 17\\n\\f H.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next argue that the district court erred in dismissing their count\\n\\nfor constructive fraudulent inducement. They assert that the complaint states a plausible\\n\\nclaim because they pled that they detrimentally relied on misrepresentations by the City\\n\\nand the Authority concerning the validity of the financing documents. We find this count\\n\\nshould be dismissed because it was inadequately pled. In the complaint, ACA and the\\n\\nBank do not identify any specific misrepresentations of the Authority. Therefore, under\\n\\nIqbal and Twombly, any claim of misrepresentation by the Authority fails to assert facts\\n\\nwhich could plausibly provide relief. 6\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Having addressed the challenges to the district courtβs dismissal of the complaint,\\n\\nwe now turn to the challenge to the district courtβs rulings on ACA and the Bankβs\\n\\nrequests to amend. ACA and the Bank did not file a motion to amend. However, they\\n\\nrequested leave to amend five times in their response in opposition to the City and the\\n\\nAuthorityβs motion to dismiss. Three requests are mentioned in the body of their response\\n\\nand two in the footnotes. The district court addressed one of these requests, denying it on\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ncount. While the complaint did not state that this count was pled in the alternative,\\ncounsel for ACA and the Bank made representations at oral argument that the count was\\npled in the alternative. Therefore, we find no error in the district courtβs determination.\\n 6\\n The district court dismissed this claim because it found that, like the\\nrestitution/unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim, ACA and the Bank pled it in the\\nalternative. As stated in the preceding footnote, we find no error in this determination.\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\fthe basis that it was not a proper motion. The district court does not appear to have ruled\\n\\non the other requests. ACA and the Bank argue that the district court erred by summarily\\n\\ndenying one of their requests to amend and ignoring their other requests to amend.\\n\\n Generally, courts βshould freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.β\\n\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A motion to amend should only be denied when βthe amendment\\n\\nwould be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the\\n\\nmoving party, or the amendment would be futile.β Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178\\n\\nF.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a district\\n\\ncourt does not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a request to amend when it is not\\n\\nproperly made as a motion. See Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 630β31\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of leave to amend when the plaintiffsβ request for leave\\n\\nwas in a footnote of their response to a motion to dismiss and in their final sentence of\\n\\ntheir objection to the recommendation of the magistrate judge).\\n\\n ACA and the Bank concede that this Court has held that a district court does not\\n\\nabuse its discretion by denying contingent requests to amend in the legal memoranda\\n\\nmade in lieu of a motion to amend. They argue, however, that this Court should follow\\n\\nother circuits which, according to their interpretation, find that requests made in\\n\\nopposition memoranda constitute a proper motion to amend. We decline to do so.\\n\\n Even if we did find that ACA and the Bankβs βrequestsβ to amend constituted a\\n\\nmotion to amend, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying it. A review of\\n\\nthe record indicates that although they informally requested several times to amend, ACA\\n\\nand the Bank never indicated what amendments they were seeking. They never identified\\n\\n 19\\n\\fany facts they sought to include in an amendment. They never identified any cause of\\n\\naction they sought to add in an amendment. Without that information, there was no way\\n\\nfor a district court to evaluate whether the proposed amendments were futile or not. Thus,\\n\\nto the extent their requests for leave are considered motions to amend, and to the extent\\n\\nthey were denied, we affirm the district court.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n As the district court correctly concluded, the complaint fails to allege claims for\\n\\nwhich relief could be granted. For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district\\n\\ncourt is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4369858/\", \"author_raw\": \"QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GREGORY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THACKER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"QUATTLEBAUM"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592605/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: ACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORPORATION; UMB Bank, NA, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. CITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA ; Public Recreational Facilities Authority of the City of Buena Vista, Virginia, Defendants - Appellees, and Russell J. Singer and Douglas L. Sbertoli, SR., Trustees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-21\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1268\n\n\nACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORPORATION; UMB BANK, NA,\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nCITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA; PUBLIC RECREATIONAL\nFACILITIES AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA,\n\n Defendants - Appellees,\n\nand\n\nRUSSELL J. SINGER and DOUGLAS L. SBERTOLI, SR.,\n\n Trustees.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at\nLynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior District Judge. (6:17-cv-00013-NKM-RSB)\n\n\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 21, 2019\n\n\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit\nJudges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Chief\nJudge Gregory and Judge Thacker joined.\n\fARGUED: Scott Carlton Ford, Brian Aaron Richardson, FORD RICHARDSON, PC,\nRichmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Kevin M. Rose, BOTKINROSE PLC,\nHarrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael W. Sharp, BOTKINROSE\nPLC, Harrisonburg, Virginia; Brian J. Kearney, W. Wayne Heslep, HESLEP &\nKEARNEY PC, Lexington, Virginia, for Appellees.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\fQUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:\n\n In this appeal, we review an order dismissing a complaint that arose from a\n\ntroubled bond transaction involving a municipal golf course in the City of Buena Vista,\n\nVirginia (the βCityβ). Bonds were issued to refinance debt on the golf course and the\n\nrepayment of the bonds depended on the City making payments on the lease of the golf\n\ncourse. When it failed to do so, this litigation ensued. The primary question on appeal is\n\nwhether the Cityβs obligation to make rent payments is legally enforceable when the\n\nobligation is expressly subject to the Cityβs annual decision to appropriate funds. Finding\n\nthat the answer is no, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of the complaint.\n\n I.\n\n Plans for a golf course in the City date back to 2002. In that year, the\n\nCommonwealth of Virginia created the Public Recreational Facilities Authority (the\n\nβAuthorityβ) to construct, operate and maintain public recreational facilities for the\n\nbenefit of the City. In 2003, the Authority, at the request of the City, took out a loan to\n\nfinance the construction of a municipal golf course called the Vista Links Golf Club (the\n\nβGolf Courseβ). 1\n\n\n 1\n The facts that led to the Cityβs interest in a golf course and the subsequent\nproblems with this course are not in the record nor material to this Courtβs decision.\nHowever, the events that are described in this case generally follow trends in the golf\nindustry. In the early 2000s, there was a noticeable rise in the popularity of golf. See\nSteven J. Wernick, Diamonds in the Rough: Judicial Reaction to Golf Course\nConversations, 2017 WL 1098131, 30 No. 4 ZONING & PLANNING LAW REPORT 1 (April\n2007). Tiger Woodsβ dramatic entry and domination in the golf world brought a wave of\nnew golfers to the sport. Id. What is known as the βTiger Woods Effectβ led to increased\ntelevision ratings and golf related sales. Id. However, monetization of the increased\n(Continued)\n 3\n\f In 2005, the City and the Authority sought to refinance the loan on the Golf\n\nCourse. To accomplish this, the Authority issued over $9 million in bonds. The Authority\n\nand SunTrust Bank (the βBankβ) entered into a Trust Agreement which described how\n\nthe bonds would be issued, how they would be repaid and the rights of the parties in the\n\nevent the bonds were not repaid. 2 The Authority used the bond proceeds to pay off the\n\nexisting loan on the Golf Course.\n\n To have a source of revenue to repay the bonds, the Authority leased the Golf\n\nCourse to the City. Under the Lease Agreement, the City agreed to make rent payments\n\nas well as maintain and operate the Golf Course. The Authority agreed that the rent\n\npayments would be used to repay the bonds. The rent payments from the City, therefore,\n\nwere the financial linchpin of the transaction. Critically, however, the City never made an\n\nabsolute commitment to make the rent payments. Under the Lease Agreement and the\n\n\n\n\npopularity of golf did not always extend to golf courses. Id. While the number of golf\ncourses increased, the number of rounds of golf played per year roughly stayed the same.\nThus, some golf courses became the victim of too much supply and not enough demand.\nAccording to the National Golf Foundation, a trend began in 2006 where each year\nsignificantly more golf courses closed than opened. National Golf Foundation, NGF\nIssues 2018 Golf Industry Report: Consolidated State-of-the-Industry Report Features\nParticipation and Course Supply Dada, NGF Quarterly, May 2018,\nhttps://www.thengfq.com/2018/05/ngf-issues-2018-golf-industry-report/.\n 2\n UMB Bank, N.A. is the successor-in-interest to SunTrust Bank.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\fother financing documents, the Cityβs obligation was subject to its decision to appropriate\n\nfunds each year. 3\n\n Other documents in the bond transaction gave the Bank rights as a creditor in the\n\nevent the bonds were not repaid. The City issued a Deed of Trust to the Bank where the\n\nCity pledged its existing City Hall building and police station as security. Similarly, the\n\nAuthority issued a Deed of Trust to the Bank where the Authority pledged the Golf\n\nCourse as security. Both the City Deed of Trust and the Authority Deed of Trust\n\n(collectively βDeeds of Trustβ) along with the Trust Agreement contain provisions\n\noutlining the Bankβs creditor rights to this collateral.\n\n The Bank retained ACA Financial Guaranty Corporation (βACAβ) to provide\n\ninsurance on the bonds. Through this arrangement, ACA received insurance premiums,\n\nand, in return, agreed to pay off the bonds if there was a default in repayment. In such a\n\nsituation, ACA would front the costs of paying off the bonds and then assume the Bankβs\n\nrights to receive rent payments and to enforce other creditor rights.\n\n In 2010 and 2011, the City failed to appropriate enough money to fully pay the\n\nrent due on the Golf Course lease. As a result, the Authority could not repay the bonds.\n\nAfter discussions and negotiations, the parties entered into the Forbearance Agreement.\n\n\n 3\n The reason for this arrangement is not clear from the record. However, because\nthe Cityβs charter requires βany bonded indebtednessβ to be approved through a\nreferendum βpassed by a majority of the qualified voters,β see City of Buena Vista (Va.)\nCharter Β§ 2.214, the City could not simply enter into a long-term loan agreement with the\nBank. An obligation subject to the Cityβs decision to make appropriations avoided the\nrequirement of having the electorate vote on the debt.\n\n\n 5\n\fUnder the Forbearance Agreement, ACA agreed to make up any shortfall resulting from\n\nthe Cityβs failure to make rent payments. It also agreed to temporarily forego exercising\n\nits creditor rights and remedies. The City and the Authority agreed that ACA would be\n\nreimbursed for any payments it made and agreed that the bonds would still be repaid\n\nfrom rent payments, although the payment plan was extended over a longer period of\n\ntime. Significantly, the Forbearance Agreement also makes clear that the obligation to\n\nmake the rent payments is subject to annual appropriations by the City.\n\n In January 2015, the City voted not to appropriate funds for the rent payments and\n\nhas not made any payments since that time. As a result, the Authority once again failed to\n\nrepay the bonds.\n\n In response, ACA and the Bank filed a ten-count complaint in federal court against\n\nthe City and the Authority. The City and the Authority filed a motion to dismiss the\n\ncomplaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court\n\ngranted the motion to dismiss finding that all ten counts in the complaint failed to state\n\nclaims for which relief could be granted. ACA and the Bank appealed all but one of the\n\ncounts. We have jurisdiction for this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\n\n II.\n\n This Court reviews a motion to dismiss de novo. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.\n\nConsumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). In so doing, we follow the\n\nwell-settled standard for considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).\n\n A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the claims\n\npled in a complaint. To sufficiently plead a claim, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\n\n 6\n\frequire that β[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain\n\nstatement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .β Fed. R. Civ. P.\n\n8(a). This pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations. Ashcroft v.\n\nIqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, βit demands more than an unadorned, the-\n\ndefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.β Id. Labels, conclusions, recitation of a\n\nclaimβs elements, and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement will not\n\nsuffice to meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. Id.\n\n To meet the Rule 8 standard and survive a motion to dismiss, βa complaint must\n\ncontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to βstate a claim to relief that is\n\nplausible on its face.ββ Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557\n\n(2007)). To contain sufficient factual matter to make a claim plausible, the factual content\n\nmust βallow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the\n\nmisconduct alleged.β Id.\n\n While we must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we need not\n\naccept a complaintβs legal conclusions. Id. Thus, simply reciting the cause of actionsβ\n\nelements and supporting them by conclusory statements does not meet the required\n\nstandard. Id. The Supreme Court noted that while Rule 8 departed from the\n\nhypertechnical code-pleading requirement of a prior era, it did not βunlock the doors of\n\ndiscovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.β Id. at 678β679.\n\n Using this standard, we review ACA and the Bankβs claims on appeal.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\f III.\n\n ACA and the Bank appeal nine of the ten counts that the district court dismissed.\n\nFive of the nine counts at issue on appeal are primarily based on the Cityβs failure to\n\nmake the rent payments because it did not appropriate the funds for such payments.\n\nThese five counts all assert a breach of one of the financing documents. The remaining\n\nfour counts are implied, declaratory and equitable in nature. We will address the five\n\nbreach of contract counts and then the remaining implied, declaratory and equitable\n\ncounts.\n\n A.\n\n First, ACA and the Bank argue the district court erred in dismissing their claim\n\nfor breach of a third-party beneficiary contract. Although they are not parties to the Lease\n\nAgreement between the City and the Authority, ACA and the Bank claim they can bring\n\nan action under it because they are third-party beneficiaries to that Lease Agreement.\n\nThey contend this count states a plausible claim for relief because the City has a legally\n\nenforceable obligation to pay rent under the Lease Agreement. ACA and the Bank claim\n\nthat the City breached the Lease Agreement by not paying rent to the Bank.\n\n This argument gets to the crux of the lawsuitβwhether the City has an\n\nenforceable obligation to make rent payments. The language of the Lease Agreement is\n\ndispositive on this issue. Section 4.2 of the Lease Agreement states that the City shall pay\n\nthe rent to the Bank on behalf of the Authority. This provision is subject to Section 4.5\n\nwhich states:\n\n\n\n 8\n\f Notwithstanding anything in this Lease Agreement to the contrary, the\n Cityβs obligations to pay the cost of performing its obligations under this\n Lease Agreement and the Trust Agreement, including without limitation its\n obligation to pay all Basic Rent and Additional Rent, shall be subject to\n and dependent upon appropriations being made from time to time by\n the City Council for such purpose . . . .\n\nJ.A. 54. (emphasis added).\n\n Consistently, Section 6.1(c) states:\n\n Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section to the contrary, failure\n by the City to make when due any payment required to be made under\n this Lease Agreement or failure by the City to observe and perform any\n covenant, condition or agreement on its part to be observed or performed\n under this Lease Agreement resulting from failure of the City to\n appropriate moneys for such purposes, as described in Section 4.5,\n shall not constitute an event of default.\n\nJ.A. 61β62. (emphasis added).\n\n This language unambiguously states that the City did not have an enforceable\n\nobligation to make the rent payments. Any obligation of the City to make rent payments\n\nwas and is subject to the City appropriating the funds for such payments. In other words,\n\nif the City did not appropriate funds, which it did not, the City had no obligation to make\n\nthe rent payments. A party cannot be sued for breaching an obligation it never had in the\n\nfirst place. To make this even more clear, the Lease Agreement provides that the Cityβs\n\nfailure to make rent payments when no appropriations are made does not constitute an\n\nevent of default. Therefore, the claim that the City breached its obligation to the\n\nAuthority under the Lease Agreement fails to state a claim for which relief can be\n\ngranted.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f The ACA and the Bank challenge the legal effect of the βsubject to appropriationβ\n\nlanguage. In considering this challenge, the Virginia Supreme Courtβs decision in Dykes\n\nv. Northern Virginia Transp. Dist. Commβn, 411 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1991) is instructive. In\n\nthat case, a county incurred a long-term debt obligation without holding a referendum on\n\nthe debt. Concerned citizens alleged that the obligation violated Virginiaβs constitutional\n\nrequirement that such obligations be approved by the citizens of the county. The court\n\nrejected the challenge because the countyβs obligation, like the obligation in this case,\n\nwas subject to the countyβs appropriation of funds for that purpose. The court held that\n\nβsubject to appropriationβ financing does not create constitutional cognizable debt\n\nβbecause it does not impose any enforceable duty or liability on the County.β Id. at 10.\n\nβ[N]either the County nor its general revenues is liable for repayment of the debt incurred\n\nby the bond issue.β Id.\n\n ACA and the Bank argue that Dykes is distinguishable from this case because it\n\ninvolved a constitutional challenge to a municipal bond transaction brought by concerned\n\ncitizens whereas this case is brought by parties to the financing arrangement. This\n\ndistinction, however, is immaterial. The court in Dykes looked to the nature of the debt,\n\nnot the nature of the parties, and found that βsubject to appropriationβ financing does not\n\nimpose any enforceable duty or liability on the county. Dykes confirms the complaint\n\nfails to state a claim that the City breached its obligation to the Authority under the Lease\n\nAgreement for which ACA and the Bank can recover as third-party beneficiaries.\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\f B.\n\n ACA and the Bank next argue the district court erred in dismissing their claim that\n\nthe Authority breached the Trust Agreement. In that count, ACA and the Bank claim the\n\nAuthority has not made bond payments since 2014. To address this ground, we look to\n\nthe language of the Trust Agreement. Under it, the Authorityβs obligation to make the\n\nbond payments was dependent on the City paying rent. For example, Section 1001(c) of\n\nthe Trust Agreement states:\n\n The Authority covenants to faithfully observe and perform all of its\n covenants, conditions and agreements contained in this Trust Agreement\n and to promptly pay the principal of and premium, if any, and interest on\n the Bonds at the places, on the dates and in the manner specified in this\n Trust Agreement and the Bonds; provided, however, that such\n obligations are limited obligations of the Authority, payable solely from\n the payments of Basic Rent and Additional Rent and the property\n secured by the Deed of Trust.\n\nJ.A. 118. (emphasis added).\n\n Additionally, Section 1703 of the Trust Agreement states:\n\n Notwithstanding any provision of the Bonds or the Basic Agreements to the\n contrary, the obligations of the Authority under the Bonds and the Basic\n Agreements are not general obligations of the Authority, but are limited\n obligations payable solely from payments of Basic Rent and Additional\n Rent and the property pledged pursuant to the Deed of Trust.\n\nJ.A. 141. (emphasis added).\n\n As the language quoted above makes clear, the Authorityβs promise to make the\n\nbond payments was and is subject to the Cityβs payment of the rent. Aside from the rent\n\npayments from the City, the Authority had no independent contractual obligation to make\n\nthe bond payments. Thus, we find that ACA and the Bankβs claim for breach of the Trust\n\n\n 11\n\fAgreement is not plausible because it is contradicted by the clear and unambiguous terms\n\nof the Trust Agreement. See Foothill Capital Corp. v. E. Coast Bldg. Supply Corp., 259\n\nB.R. 844, 845 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that where an agreement is plain and\n 4\nunambiguous, the court is not at liberty to rewrite the contractual language).\n\n C.\n\n ACA and the Bank next claim the district court erred in dismissing their claims for\n\nbreach of the City Deed of Trust and breach of the Authority Deed of Trust. They point to\n\nSection 1.2 of the Deeds of Trust, which states that the βGrantor shall perform and\n\nobserve all duties, obligations, and requirements and shall comply in all respects with the\n\nterms, covenants, conditions, representations and warranties of the Bonds, this Deed of\n\nTrust, the Lease Agreement and the Trust Agreement.β J.A. 176, 199. Specifically, they\n\nargue that by failing to make bond payments in the manner provided by the Trust\n\n\n\n\n 4\n ACA and the Bank raise an additional issue regarding this count by asserting that\nthe Authority also breached the Trust Agreement by not paying revenues derived from\nthe secured property. However, they did not make this argument before the district court.\nWe have held that β[w]hen a party in a civil case fails to raise an argument in the lower\ncourt and instead raises it for the first time before us, we may reverse only if the newly\nraised argument establishes βfundamental errorβ or a denial of fundamental justice.β In re\nUnder Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267,\n1271 (4th Cir. 1985)). We find neither fundamental error nor a denial of fundamental\njustice here. ACA and the Bank do not even allege in this count that the Authority failed\nto pay from the revenues of the property secured by the Deed of Trust. The complaint\nsimply alleges that the Authority breached the Trust Agreement βin a number of material\nwaysβ and does not give any further specificity. These conclusory allegations fail to meet\npleading requirements prescribed in Twombly and Iqbal. They also defeat any argument\nthat dismissing ACA and the Bankβs new and improperly late argument constitutes\nfundamental error or denial of fundamental justice.\n\n 12\n\fAgreement, the City and the Authority breached their obligations under the Deeds of\n\nTrust.\n\n While the Deeds of Trust require the City and the Authority to adhere to the Trust\n\nAgreement, they do not alter or modify the language in Sections 1001(c) and 1703 of the\n\nTrust Agreement discussed above. By the express terms of the Trust Agreement, the\n\nAuthorityβs obligation to make bond payments is limited to the rent paid by the City. It\n\nmakes clear that the Cityβs obligation to make rent payments is subject to the Cityβs\n\ndecision to appropriate rent money. In the face of those clear contractual terms, the\n\ncounts alleging violations of the Deeds of Trust fail to state a claim for which relief can\n\nbe granted.\n\n D.\n\n ACA and the Bank next claim the district court erred in dismissing their count for\n\nbreach of the Forbearance Agreement. They concede that the Cityβs rent payment\n\nobligation under the Forbearance Agreement is subject to appropriations by the City.\n\nHowever, they contend that language does not waive the Cityβs or the Authorityβs duty to\n\nmake rent payments under the Forbearance Agreement. We disagree. Section 5.4 of the\n\nForbearance Agreement provides:\n\n The obligations of the City to make adjusted Basic Rent payments pursuant\n to Paragraph 5.1 and deferred payments of Basic Rent pursuant to\n Paragraph 5.3 are subject to annual appropriation by the City Council\n of amounts sufficient to make such payments. The City agrees that it is the\n intention of the City to make annual appropriations in amounts sufficient to\n make the payments required under this Agreement.\n\nJ.A. 227. (emphasis added).\n\n\n 13\n\f Like the language in the Trust Agreement and the Lease Agreement described\n\nabove, this language is unambiguous. Accordingly, the claim for breach of the\n\nForbearance Agreement fails to state a plausible claim.\n\n ACA and the Bank also claim on appeal the district court erred in dismissing this\n\ncount because the City and the Authority made misrepresentations which constituted a\n\nbreach of the Forbearance Agreement. However, neither this count nor any part of the\n\ncomplaint contains any allegations about misrepresentations. Instead, the complaint\n\nalleges that ACA and the Bank βhave been damaged as a result of Defendantsβ breaches\n\nof their contractual obligations contained in the Forbearance Agreement.β J.A. 32. ACA\n\nand the Bank argue that making a misrepresentation constitutes a breach of the City and\n\nthe Authorityβs obligations under the Forbearance Agreement. ACA and the Bank thus\n\ncontend that they have satisfied their pleading requirements by alleging the City and the\n\nAuthority breached their contractual obligations even though they have not specified the\n\nalleged misrepresentations. This position is in direct conflict with Twombly and Iqbal.\n\nConclusory allegations, such as those pointed to by ACA and the Bank, do not contain\n\nsufficient facts to properly state a claim. The allegations do not specify what contractual\n\nobligation was breached. Neither do they refer to any underlying facts to support the\n\npurported breach. Thus, the complaint is not pled with enough specificity to plausibly\n\nstate a claim for breach of the Forbearance Agreement.\n\n E.\n\n Having addressed the breach of contract counts, we turn to ACA and the Bankβs\n\ncount for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ACA and the\n\n 14\n\fBank argue that, even if they have no claim for breach of an express term, they have\n\nstated a plausible claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.\n\nSpecifically, ACA and the Bank argue that the βsubject to appropriationβ language is\n\nambiguous and created discretion on the part of the City. They then claim the City acted\n\narbitrarily and unfairly by failing to appropriate funds when the City could afford to\n\nappropriate the funds to repay the Golf Course debt. This argument fails for two reasons.\n\n First, the complaint does not allege that the City acted arbitrarily and unfairly by\n\nfailing to make appropriations when it could afford to appropriate. When a complaint\n\nfails to state a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to\n\nrelief, the claim fails. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). That is precisely the situation here.\n\nWithout factual allegations that support their legal conclusions, ACA and the Bank have\n\nfailed to plead a plausible claim for relief.\n\n Second, even if we put aside the deficiencies in the pleadings, the βsubject to\n\nappropriationβ language is not ambiguous. As stated above, ACA and the Bank are\n\nsophisticated commercial entities engaged in a multi-million dollar municipal finance\n\ntransaction. They are to be bound by the plain and unambiguous terms of their contracts.\n\nSee Quadros & Assocs., P.C. v. City of Hampton, 268 Va. 50, 54, 597 S.E.2d 90, 93\n\n(2004) (holding that the terms of the partiesβ contract were plain and unambiguous and\n\nthus the parties were bound by them). Under Virginia law, the implied covenant of good\n\nfaith and fair dealing βcannot be the vehicle for rewriting an unambiguous contract in\n\norder to create duties that do not otherwise exist.β Wardβs Equip., Inc. v. New Holland N.\n\nAm., Inc., 254 Va. 379, 385, 493 S.E.2d 516, 520 (1997).\n\n 15\n\f In essence, ACA and the Bank ask us to impose new terms to their deal that save\n\nthem from the consequences of the express terms of their agreements. We decline to do\n\nso. We find that ACA and the Bank fail to state a claim that the City and the Authority\n\nbreached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.\n\n F.\n\n ACA and the Bank challenge the district courtβs dismissal of their declaratory\n\njudgment count. In that count, ACA and the Bank sought a declaration that the financing\n\ndocuments were legal and enforceable and provide ACA and the Bank with the right to\n\npossess and foreclose on the secured property. The district court dismissed this count on\n\nthe basis that the request for declaratory judgment was not a proper standalone claim.\n\n We first consider the request for a declaration that the financing documents were\n\nlegal and enforceable. Despite its ruling that the declaratory judgment count was not a\n\nproper standalone claim, the district court proceeded to address the merits of this request\n\nin its consideration of the City Deed of Trust claim. The district court explained that the\n\nonly document whose legality was at issue was the City Deed of Trust. The district court\n\nthen evaluated that document and found it to be legally valid and enforceable. This\n\nfinding was not appealed to this Court, thus there is no longer a dispute regarding its\n\nlegality. Since the issue for which the declaration was sought is not in dispute, we decline\n\nto address this issue.\n\n Turning now to the request for a declaration that ACA and the Bank could possess\n\nand foreclose the secured property, counsel for the City and the Authority conceded at\n\noral argument that, subject to compliance with the terms of the documents, ACA and the\n\n 16\n\fBank have the right to foreclose the property secured by the Deeds of Trust. As there\n\nappears to be no dispute about whether ACA and the Bank have the right to pursue their\n\ncreditor rights under the financing documents, we decline to address this issue as well.\n\n G.\n\n ACA and the Bank next argue that the district court erred in dismissing their count\n\nfor restitution/unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. They argue that this count properly\n\nstates a claim because the enforceability of the financing documents is in dispute. ACA\n\nand the Bank claim that if the City and the Authority are not forced to make bond\n\npayments under the financing documents, they can recover under equitable theories. In\n\nsupport of this argument, ACA and the Bank appear to assume that a finding that the City\n\nand the Authority were not required to make bond payments equates to a finding that the\n\nfinancing documents are unenforceable or void.\n\n ACA and the Bank are mistaken. The district court did not find that the financing\n\ndocuments were unenforceable, nor do we. We, as did the district court, simply recognize\n\nthat the express terms of the contract make repayment subject to appropriations by the\n\nCity. Virginia law makes clear that βwhere there is an express and enforceable contract in\n\nexistence which governs the rights of the parties, the law will not imply a contract in\n\ncontravention thereof.β Royer v. Bd. Of Cty. Supervisors of Albemarle Cty., 10 S.E. 2d\n\n876, 881 (Va. 1940). Thus, this count fails to state a claim. 5\n\n\n 5\n Additionally, the district court found that ACA and the Bank pled this count βin\nthe alternativeβ in the event that the court found the City Deed of Trust void. The district\njudge found that the City Deed of Trust was a valid document, and thus dismissed this\n(Continued)\n 17\n\f H.\n\n ACA and the Bank next argue that the district court erred in dismissing their count\n\nfor constructive fraudulent inducement. They assert that the complaint states a plausible\n\nclaim because they pled that they detrimentally relied on misrepresentations by the City\n\nand the Authority concerning the validity of the financing documents. We find this count\n\nshould be dismissed because it was inadequately pled. In the complaint, ACA and the\n\nBank do not identify any specific misrepresentations of the Authority. Therefore, under\n\nIqbal and Twombly, any claim of misrepresentation by the Authority fails to assert facts\n\nwhich could plausibly provide relief. 6\n\n IV.\n\n Having addressed the challenges to the district courtβs dismissal of the complaint,\n\nwe now turn to the challenge to the district courtβs rulings on ACA and the Bankβs\n\nrequests to amend. ACA and the Bank did not file a motion to amend. However, they\n\nrequested leave to amend five times in their response in opposition to the City and the\n\nAuthorityβs motion to dismiss. Three requests are mentioned in the body of their response\n\nand two in the footnotes. The district court addressed one of these requests, denying it on\n\n\n\n\ncount. While the complaint did not state that this count was pled in the alternative,\ncounsel for ACA and the Bank made representations at oral argument that the count was\npled in the alternative. Therefore, we find no error in the district courtβs determination.\n 6\n The district court dismissed this claim because it found that, like the\nrestitution/unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim, ACA and the Bank pled it in the\nalternative. As stated in the preceding footnote, we find no error in this determination.\n\n\n 18\n\fthe basis that it was not a proper motion. The district court does not appear to have ruled\n\non the other requests. ACA and the Bank argue that the district court erred by summarily\n\ndenying one of their requests to amend and ignoring their other requests to amend.\n\n Generally, courts βshould freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.β\n\nFed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A motion to amend should only be denied when βthe amendment\n\nwould be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the\n\nmoving party, or the amendment would be futile.β Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178\n\nF.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a district\n\ncourt does not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a request to amend when it is not\n\nproperly made as a motion. See Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 630β31\n\n(4th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of leave to amend when the plaintiffsβ request for leave\n\nwas in a footnote of their response to a motion to dismiss and in their final sentence of\n\ntheir objection to the recommendation of the magistrate judge).\n\n ACA and the Bank concede that this Court has held that a district court does not\n\nabuse its discretion by denying contingent requests to amend in the legal memoranda\n\nmade in lieu of a motion to amend. They argue, however, that this Court should follow\n\nother circuits which, according to their interpretation, find that requests made in\n\nopposition memoranda constitute a proper motion to amend. We decline to do so.\n\n Even if we did find that ACA and the Bankβs βrequestsβ to amend constituted a\n\nmotion to amend, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying it. A review of\n\nthe record indicates that although they informally requested several times to amend, ACA\n\nand the Bank never indicated what amendments they were seeking. They never identified\n\n 19\n\fany facts they sought to include in an amendment. They never identified any cause of\n\naction they sought to add in an amendment. Without that information, there was no way\n\nfor a district court to evaluate whether the proposed amendments were futile or not. Thus,\n\nto the extent their requests for leave are considered motions to amend, and to the extent\n\nthey were denied, we affirm the district court.\n\n V.\n\n As the district court correctly concluded, the complaint fails to allege claims for\n\nwhich relief could be granted. For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district\n\ncourt is\n\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 20\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: ACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORPORATION; UMB Bank, NA, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. CITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA ; Public Recreational Facilities Authority of the City of Buena Vista, Virginia, Defendants - Appellees, and Russell J. Singer and Douglas L. Sbertoli, SR., Trustees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-21\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1268\\n\\n\\nACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORPORATION; UMB BANK, NA,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nCITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA; PUBLIC RECREATIONAL\\nFACILITIES AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees,\\n\\nand\\n\\nRUSSELL J. SINGER and DOUGLAS L. SBERTOLI, SR.,\\n\\n Trustees.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at\\nLynchburg. Norman K. Moon, Senior District Judge. (6:17-cv-00013-NKM-RSB)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 21, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit\\nJudges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in which Chief\\nJudge Gregory and Judge Thacker joined.\\n\\fARGUED: Scott Carlton Ford, Brian Aaron Richardson, FORD RICHARDSON, PC,\\nRichmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Kevin M. Rose, BOTKINROSE PLC,\\nHarrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Michael W. Sharp, BOTKINROSE\\nPLC, Harrisonburg, Virginia; Brian J. Kearney, W. Wayne Heslep, HESLEP &\\nKEARNEY PC, Lexington, Virginia, for Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fQUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In this appeal, we review an order dismissing a complaint that arose from a\\n\\ntroubled bond transaction involving a municipal golf course in the City of Buena Vista,\\n\\nVirginia (the βCityβ). Bonds were issued to refinance debt on the golf course and the\\n\\nrepayment of the bonds depended on the City making payments on the lease of the golf\\n\\ncourse. When it failed to do so, this litigation ensued. The primary question on appeal is\\n\\nwhether the Cityβs obligation to make rent payments is legally enforceable when the\\n\\nobligation is expressly subject to the Cityβs annual decision to appropriate funds. Finding\\n\\nthat the answer is no, we affirm the district courtβs dismissal of the complaint.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Plans for a golf course in the City date back to 2002. In that year, the\\n\\nCommonwealth of Virginia created the Public Recreational Facilities Authority (the\\n\\nβAuthorityβ) to construct, operate and maintain public recreational facilities for the\\n\\nbenefit of the City. In 2003, the Authority, at the request of the City, took out a loan to\\n\\nfinance the construction of a municipal golf course called the Vista Links Golf Club (the\\n\\nβGolf Courseβ). 1\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The facts that led to the Cityβs interest in a golf course and the subsequent\\nproblems with this course are not in the record nor material to this Courtβs decision.\\nHowever, the events that are described in this case generally follow trends in the golf\\nindustry. In the early 2000s, there was a noticeable rise in the popularity of golf. See\\nSteven J. Wernick, Diamonds in the Rough: Judicial Reaction to Golf Course\\nConversations, 2017 WL 1098131, 30 No. 4 ZONING & PLANNING LAW REPORT 1 (April\\n2007). Tiger Woodsβ dramatic entry and domination in the golf world brought a wave of\\nnew golfers to the sport. Id. What is known as the βTiger Woods Effectβ led to increased\\ntelevision ratings and golf related sales. Id. However, monetization of the increased\\n(Continued)\\n 3\\n\\f In 2005, the City and the Authority sought to refinance the loan on the Golf\\n\\nCourse. To accomplish this, the Authority issued over $9 million in bonds. The Authority\\n\\nand SunTrust Bank (the βBankβ) entered into a Trust Agreement which described how\\n\\nthe bonds would be issued, how they would be repaid and the rights of the parties in the\\n\\nevent the bonds were not repaid. 2 The Authority used the bond proceeds to pay off the\\n\\nexisting loan on the Golf Course.\\n\\n To have a source of revenue to repay the bonds, the Authority leased the Golf\\n\\nCourse to the City. Under the Lease Agreement, the City agreed to make rent payments\\n\\nas well as maintain and operate the Golf Course. The Authority agreed that the rent\\n\\npayments would be used to repay the bonds. The rent payments from the City, therefore,\\n\\nwere the financial linchpin of the transaction. Critically, however, the City never made an\\n\\nabsolute commitment to make the rent payments. Under the Lease Agreement and the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\npopularity of golf did not always extend to golf courses. Id. While the number of golf\\ncourses increased, the number of rounds of golf played per year roughly stayed the same.\\nThus, some golf courses became the victim of too much supply and not enough demand.\\nAccording to the National Golf Foundation, a trend began in 2006 where each year\\nsignificantly more golf courses closed than opened. National Golf Foundation, NGF\\nIssues 2018 Golf Industry Report: Consolidated State-of-the-Industry Report Features\\nParticipation and Course Supply Dada, NGF Quarterly, May 2018,\\nhttps://www.thengfq.com/2018/05/ngf-issues-2018-golf-industry-report/.\\n 2\\n UMB Bank, N.A. is the successor-in-interest to SunTrust Bank.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fother financing documents, the Cityβs obligation was subject to its decision to appropriate\\n\\nfunds each year. 3\\n\\n Other documents in the bond transaction gave the Bank rights as a creditor in the\\n\\nevent the bonds were not repaid. The City issued a Deed of Trust to the Bank where the\\n\\nCity pledged its existing City Hall building and police station as security. Similarly, the\\n\\nAuthority issued a Deed of Trust to the Bank where the Authority pledged the Golf\\n\\nCourse as security. Both the City Deed of Trust and the Authority Deed of Trust\\n\\n(collectively βDeeds of Trustβ) along with the Trust Agreement contain provisions\\n\\noutlining the Bankβs creditor rights to this collateral.\\n\\n The Bank retained ACA Financial Guaranty Corporation (βACAβ) to provide\\n\\ninsurance on the bonds. Through this arrangement, ACA received insurance premiums,\\n\\nand, in return, agreed to pay off the bonds if there was a default in repayment. In such a\\n\\nsituation, ACA would front the costs of paying off the bonds and then assume the Bankβs\\n\\nrights to receive rent payments and to enforce other creditor rights.\\n\\n In 2010 and 2011, the City failed to appropriate enough money to fully pay the\\n\\nrent due on the Golf Course lease. As a result, the Authority could not repay the bonds.\\n\\nAfter discussions and negotiations, the parties entered into the Forbearance Agreement.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The reason for this arrangement is not clear from the record. However, because\\nthe Cityβs charter requires βany bonded indebtednessβ to be approved through a\\nreferendum βpassed by a majority of the qualified voters,β see City of Buena Vista (Va.)\\nCharter Β§ 2.214, the City could not simply enter into a long-term loan agreement with the\\nBank. An obligation subject to the Cityβs decision to make appropriations avoided the\\nrequirement of having the electorate vote on the debt.\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\fUnder the Forbearance Agreement, ACA agreed to make up any shortfall resulting from\\n\\nthe Cityβs failure to make rent payments. It also agreed to temporarily forego exercising\\n\\nits creditor rights and remedies. The City and the Authority agreed that ACA would be\\n\\nreimbursed for any payments it made and agreed that the bonds would still be repaid\\n\\nfrom rent payments, although the payment plan was extended over a longer period of\\n\\ntime. Significantly, the Forbearance Agreement also makes clear that the obligation to\\n\\nmake the rent payments is subject to annual appropriations by the City.\\n\\n In January 2015, the City voted not to appropriate funds for the rent payments and\\n\\nhas not made any payments since that time. As a result, the Authority once again failed to\\n\\nrepay the bonds.\\n\\n In response, ACA and the Bank filed a ten-count complaint in federal court against\\n\\nthe City and the Authority. The City and the Authority filed a motion to dismiss the\\n\\ncomplaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court\\n\\ngranted the motion to dismiss finding that all ten counts in the complaint failed to state\\n\\nclaims for which relief could be granted. ACA and the Bank appealed all but one of the\\n\\ncounts. We have jurisdiction for this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n This Court reviews a motion to dismiss de novo. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v.\\n\\nConsumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). In so doing, we follow the\\n\\nwell-settled standard for considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).\\n\\n A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the claims\\n\\npled in a complaint. To sufficiently plead a claim, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\\n\\n 6\\n\\frequire that β[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain\\n\\nstatement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .β Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n8(a). This pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations. Ashcroft v.\\n\\nIqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, βit demands more than an unadorned, the-\\n\\ndefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.β Id. Labels, conclusions, recitation of a\\n\\nclaimβs elements, and naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement will not\\n\\nsuffice to meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. Id.\\n\\n To meet the Rule 8 standard and survive a motion to dismiss, βa complaint must\\n\\ncontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to βstate a claim to relief that is\\n\\nplausible on its face.ββ Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557\\n\\n(2007)). To contain sufficient factual matter to make a claim plausible, the factual content\\n\\nmust βallow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the\\n\\nmisconduct alleged.β Id.\\n\\n While we must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we need not\\n\\naccept a complaintβs legal conclusions. Id. Thus, simply reciting the cause of actionsβ\\n\\nelements and supporting them by conclusory statements does not meet the required\\n\\nstandard. Id. The Supreme Court noted that while Rule 8 departed from the\\n\\nhypertechnical code-pleading requirement of a prior era, it did not βunlock the doors of\\n\\ndiscovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.β Id. at 678β679.\\n\\n Using this standard, we review ACA and the Bankβs claims on appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f III.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank appeal nine of the ten counts that the district court dismissed.\\n\\nFive of the nine counts at issue on appeal are primarily based on the Cityβs failure to\\n\\nmake the rent payments because it did not appropriate the funds for such payments.\\n\\nThese five counts all assert a breach of one of the financing documents. The remaining\\n\\nfour counts are implied, declaratory and equitable in nature. We will address the five\\n\\nbreach of contract counts and then the remaining implied, declaratory and equitable\\n\\ncounts.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n First, ACA and the Bank argue the district court erred in dismissing their claim\\n\\nfor breach of a third-party beneficiary contract. Although they are not parties to the Lease\\n\\nAgreement between the City and the Authority, ACA and the Bank claim they can bring\\n\\nan action under it because they are third-party beneficiaries to that Lease Agreement.\\n\\nThey contend this count states a plausible claim for relief because the City has a legally\\n\\nenforceable obligation to pay rent under the Lease Agreement. ACA and the Bank claim\\n\\nthat the City breached the Lease Agreement by not paying rent to the Bank.\\n\\n This argument gets to the crux of the lawsuitβwhether the City has an\\n\\nenforceable obligation to make rent payments. The language of the Lease Agreement is\\n\\ndispositive on this issue. Section 4.2 of the Lease Agreement states that the City shall pay\\n\\nthe rent to the Bank on behalf of the Authority. This provision is subject to Section 4.5\\n\\nwhich states:\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Notwithstanding anything in this Lease Agreement to the contrary, the\\n Cityβs obligations to pay the cost of performing its obligations under this\\n Lease Agreement and the Trust Agreement, including without limitation its\\n obligation to pay all Basic Rent and Additional Rent, shall be subject to\\n and dependent upon appropriations being made from time to time by\\n the City Council for such purpose . . . .\\n\\nJ.A. 54. (emphasis added).\\n\\n Consistently, Section 6.1(c) states:\\n\\n Notwithstanding anything contained in this Section to the contrary, failure\\n by the City to make when due any payment required to be made under\\n this Lease Agreement or failure by the City to observe and perform any\\n covenant, condition or agreement on its part to be observed or performed\\n under this Lease Agreement resulting from failure of the City to\\n appropriate moneys for such purposes, as described in Section 4.5,\\n shall not constitute an event of default.\\n\\nJ.A. 61β62. (emphasis added).\\n\\n This language unambiguously states that the City did not have an enforceable\\n\\nobligation to make the rent payments. Any obligation of the City to make rent payments\\n\\nwas and is subject to the City appropriating the funds for such payments. In other words,\\n\\nif the City did not appropriate funds, which it did not, the City had no obligation to make\\n\\nthe rent payments. A party cannot be sued for breaching an obligation it never had in the\\n\\nfirst place. To make this even more clear, the Lease Agreement provides that the Cityβs\\n\\nfailure to make rent payments when no appropriations are made does not constitute an\\n\\nevent of default. Therefore, the claim that the City breached its obligation to the\\n\\nAuthority under the Lease Agreement fails to state a claim for which relief can be\\n\\ngranted.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f The ACA and the Bank challenge the legal effect of the βsubject to appropriationβ\\n\\nlanguage. In considering this challenge, the Virginia Supreme Courtβs decision in Dykes\\n\\nv. Northern Virginia Transp. Dist. Commβn, 411 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1991) is instructive. In\\n\\nthat case, a county incurred a long-term debt obligation without holding a referendum on\\n\\nthe debt. Concerned citizens alleged that the obligation violated Virginiaβs constitutional\\n\\nrequirement that such obligations be approved by the citizens of the county. The court\\n\\nrejected the challenge because the countyβs obligation, like the obligation in this case,\\n\\nwas subject to the countyβs appropriation of funds for that purpose. The court held that\\n\\nβsubject to appropriationβ financing does not create constitutional cognizable debt\\n\\nβbecause it does not impose any enforceable duty or liability on the County.β Id. at 10.\\n\\nβ[N]either the County nor its general revenues is liable for repayment of the debt incurred\\n\\nby the bond issue.β Id.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank argue that Dykes is distinguishable from this case because it\\n\\ninvolved a constitutional challenge to a municipal bond transaction brought by concerned\\n\\ncitizens whereas this case is brought by parties to the financing arrangement. This\\n\\ndistinction, however, is immaterial. The court in Dykes looked to the nature of the debt,\\n\\nnot the nature of the parties, and found that βsubject to appropriationβ financing does not\\n\\nimpose any enforceable duty or liability on the county. Dykes confirms the complaint\\n\\nfails to state a claim that the City breached its obligation to the Authority under the Lease\\n\\nAgreement for which ACA and the Bank can recover as third-party beneficiaries.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\f B.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next argue the district court erred in dismissing their claim that\\n\\nthe Authority breached the Trust Agreement. In that count, ACA and the Bank claim the\\n\\nAuthority has not made bond payments since 2014. To address this ground, we look to\\n\\nthe language of the Trust Agreement. Under it, the Authorityβs obligation to make the\\n\\nbond payments was dependent on the City paying rent. For example, Section 1001(c) of\\n\\nthe Trust Agreement states:\\n\\n The Authority covenants to faithfully observe and perform all of its\\n covenants, conditions and agreements contained in this Trust Agreement\\n and to promptly pay the principal of and premium, if any, and interest on\\n the Bonds at the places, on the dates and in the manner specified in this\\n Trust Agreement and the Bonds; provided, however, that such\\n obligations are limited obligations of the Authority, payable solely from\\n the payments of Basic Rent and Additional Rent and the property\\n secured by the Deed of Trust.\\n\\nJ.A. 118. (emphasis added).\\n\\n Additionally, Section 1703 of the Trust Agreement states:\\n\\n Notwithstanding any provision of the Bonds or the Basic Agreements to the\\n contrary, the obligations of the Authority under the Bonds and the Basic\\n Agreements are not general obligations of the Authority, but are limited\\n obligations payable solely from payments of Basic Rent and Additional\\n Rent and the property pledged pursuant to the Deed of Trust.\\n\\nJ.A. 141. (emphasis added).\\n\\n As the language quoted above makes clear, the Authorityβs promise to make the\\n\\nbond payments was and is subject to the Cityβs payment of the rent. Aside from the rent\\n\\npayments from the City, the Authority had no independent contractual obligation to make\\n\\nthe bond payments. Thus, we find that ACA and the Bankβs claim for breach of the Trust\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\fAgreement is not plausible because it is contradicted by the clear and unambiguous terms\\n\\nof the Trust Agreement. See Foothill Capital Corp. v. E. Coast Bldg. Supply Corp., 259\\n\\nB.R. 844, 845 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that where an agreement is plain and\\n 4\\nunambiguous, the court is not at liberty to rewrite the contractual language).\\n\\n C.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next claim the district court erred in dismissing their claims for\\n\\nbreach of the City Deed of Trust and breach of the Authority Deed of Trust. They point to\\n\\nSection 1.2 of the Deeds of Trust, which states that the βGrantor shall perform and\\n\\nobserve all duties, obligations, and requirements and shall comply in all respects with the\\n\\nterms, covenants, conditions, representations and warranties of the Bonds, this Deed of\\n\\nTrust, the Lease Agreement and the Trust Agreement.β J.A. 176, 199. Specifically, they\\n\\nargue that by failing to make bond payments in the manner provided by the Trust\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n ACA and the Bank raise an additional issue regarding this count by asserting that\\nthe Authority also breached the Trust Agreement by not paying revenues derived from\\nthe secured property. However, they did not make this argument before the district court.\\nWe have held that β[w]hen a party in a civil case fails to raise an argument in the lower\\ncourt and instead raises it for the first time before us, we may reverse only if the newly\\nraised argument establishes βfundamental errorβ or a denial of fundamental justice.β In re\\nUnder Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267,\\n1271 (4th Cir. 1985)). We find neither fundamental error nor a denial of fundamental\\njustice here. ACA and the Bank do not even allege in this count that the Authority failed\\nto pay from the revenues of the property secured by the Deed of Trust. The complaint\\nsimply alleges that the Authority breached the Trust Agreement βin a number of material\\nwaysβ and does not give any further specificity. These conclusory allegations fail to meet\\npleading requirements prescribed in Twombly and Iqbal. They also defeat any argument\\nthat dismissing ACA and the Bankβs new and improperly late argument constitutes\\nfundamental error or denial of fundamental justice.\\n\\n 12\\n\\fAgreement, the City and the Authority breached their obligations under the Deeds of\\n\\nTrust.\\n\\n While the Deeds of Trust require the City and the Authority to adhere to the Trust\\n\\nAgreement, they do not alter or modify the language in Sections 1001(c) and 1703 of the\\n\\nTrust Agreement discussed above. By the express terms of the Trust Agreement, the\\n\\nAuthorityβs obligation to make bond payments is limited to the rent paid by the City. It\\n\\nmakes clear that the Cityβs obligation to make rent payments is subject to the Cityβs\\n\\ndecision to appropriate rent money. In the face of those clear contractual terms, the\\n\\ncounts alleging violations of the Deeds of Trust fail to state a claim for which relief can\\n\\nbe granted.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next claim the district court erred in dismissing their count for\\n\\nbreach of the Forbearance Agreement. They concede that the Cityβs rent payment\\n\\nobligation under the Forbearance Agreement is subject to appropriations by the City.\\n\\nHowever, they contend that language does not waive the Cityβs or the Authorityβs duty to\\n\\nmake rent payments under the Forbearance Agreement. We disagree. Section 5.4 of the\\n\\nForbearance Agreement provides:\\n\\n The obligations of the City to make adjusted Basic Rent payments pursuant\\n to Paragraph 5.1 and deferred payments of Basic Rent pursuant to\\n Paragraph 5.3 are subject to annual appropriation by the City Council\\n of amounts sufficient to make such payments. The City agrees that it is the\\n intention of the City to make annual appropriations in amounts sufficient to\\n make the payments required under this Agreement.\\n\\nJ.A. 227. (emphasis added).\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Like the language in the Trust Agreement and the Lease Agreement described\\n\\nabove, this language is unambiguous. Accordingly, the claim for breach of the\\n\\nForbearance Agreement fails to state a plausible claim.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank also claim on appeal the district court erred in dismissing this\\n\\ncount because the City and the Authority made misrepresentations which constituted a\\n\\nbreach of the Forbearance Agreement. However, neither this count nor any part of the\\n\\ncomplaint contains any allegations about misrepresentations. Instead, the complaint\\n\\nalleges that ACA and the Bank βhave been damaged as a result of Defendantsβ breaches\\n\\nof their contractual obligations contained in the Forbearance Agreement.β J.A. 32. ACA\\n\\nand the Bank argue that making a misrepresentation constitutes a breach of the City and\\n\\nthe Authorityβs obligations under the Forbearance Agreement. ACA and the Bank thus\\n\\ncontend that they have satisfied their pleading requirements by alleging the City and the\\n\\nAuthority breached their contractual obligations even though they have not specified the\\n\\nalleged misrepresentations. This position is in direct conflict with Twombly and Iqbal.\\n\\nConclusory allegations, such as those pointed to by ACA and the Bank, do not contain\\n\\nsufficient facts to properly state a claim. The allegations do not specify what contractual\\n\\nobligation was breached. Neither do they refer to any underlying facts to support the\\n\\npurported breach. Thus, the complaint is not pled with enough specificity to plausibly\\n\\nstate a claim for breach of the Forbearance Agreement.\\n\\n E.\\n\\n Having addressed the breach of contract counts, we turn to ACA and the Bankβs\\n\\ncount for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ACA and the\\n\\n 14\\n\\fBank argue that, even if they have no claim for breach of an express term, they have\\n\\nstated a plausible claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.\\n\\nSpecifically, ACA and the Bank argue that the βsubject to appropriationβ language is\\n\\nambiguous and created discretion on the part of the City. They then claim the City acted\\n\\narbitrarily and unfairly by failing to appropriate funds when the City could afford to\\n\\nappropriate the funds to repay the Golf Course debt. This argument fails for two reasons.\\n\\n First, the complaint does not allege that the City acted arbitrarily and unfairly by\\n\\nfailing to make appropriations when it could afford to appropriate. When a complaint\\n\\nfails to state a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to\\n\\nrelief, the claim fails. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). That is precisely the situation here.\\n\\nWithout factual allegations that support their legal conclusions, ACA and the Bank have\\n\\nfailed to plead a plausible claim for relief.\\n\\n Second, even if we put aside the deficiencies in the pleadings, the βsubject to\\n\\nappropriationβ language is not ambiguous. As stated above, ACA and the Bank are\\n\\nsophisticated commercial entities engaged in a multi-million dollar municipal finance\\n\\ntransaction. They are to be bound by the plain and unambiguous terms of their contracts.\\n\\nSee Quadros & Assocs., P.C. v. City of Hampton, 268 Va. 50, 54, 597 S.E.2d 90, 93\\n\\n(2004) (holding that the terms of the partiesβ contract were plain and unambiguous and\\n\\nthus the parties were bound by them). Under Virginia law, the implied covenant of good\\n\\nfaith and fair dealing βcannot be the vehicle for rewriting an unambiguous contract in\\n\\norder to create duties that do not otherwise exist.β Wardβs Equip., Inc. v. New Holland N.\\n\\nAm., Inc., 254 Va. 379, 385, 493 S.E.2d 516, 520 (1997).\\n\\n 15\\n\\f In essence, ACA and the Bank ask us to impose new terms to their deal that save\\n\\nthem from the consequences of the express terms of their agreements. We decline to do\\n\\nso. We find that ACA and the Bank fail to state a claim that the City and the Authority\\n\\nbreached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.\\n\\n F.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank challenge the district courtβs dismissal of their declaratory\\n\\njudgment count. In that count, ACA and the Bank sought a declaration that the financing\\n\\ndocuments were legal and enforceable and provide ACA and the Bank with the right to\\n\\npossess and foreclose on the secured property. The district court dismissed this count on\\n\\nthe basis that the request for declaratory judgment was not a proper standalone claim.\\n\\n We first consider the request for a declaration that the financing documents were\\n\\nlegal and enforceable. Despite its ruling that the declaratory judgment count was not a\\n\\nproper standalone claim, the district court proceeded to address the merits of this request\\n\\nin its consideration of the City Deed of Trust claim. The district court explained that the\\n\\nonly document whose legality was at issue was the City Deed of Trust. The district court\\n\\nthen evaluated that document and found it to be legally valid and enforceable. This\\n\\nfinding was not appealed to this Court, thus there is no longer a dispute regarding its\\n\\nlegality. Since the issue for which the declaration was sought is not in dispute, we decline\\n\\nto address this issue.\\n\\n Turning now to the request for a declaration that ACA and the Bank could possess\\n\\nand foreclose the secured property, counsel for the City and the Authority conceded at\\n\\noral argument that, subject to compliance with the terms of the documents, ACA and the\\n\\n 16\\n\\fBank have the right to foreclose the property secured by the Deeds of Trust. As there\\n\\nappears to be no dispute about whether ACA and the Bank have the right to pursue their\\n\\ncreditor rights under the financing documents, we decline to address this issue as well.\\n\\n G.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next argue that the district court erred in dismissing their count\\n\\nfor restitution/unjust enrichment/quantum meruit. They argue that this count properly\\n\\nstates a claim because the enforceability of the financing documents is in dispute. ACA\\n\\nand the Bank claim that if the City and the Authority are not forced to make bond\\n\\npayments under the financing documents, they can recover under equitable theories. In\\n\\nsupport of this argument, ACA and the Bank appear to assume that a finding that the City\\n\\nand the Authority were not required to make bond payments equates to a finding that the\\n\\nfinancing documents are unenforceable or void.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank are mistaken. The district court did not find that the financing\\n\\ndocuments were unenforceable, nor do we. We, as did the district court, simply recognize\\n\\nthat the express terms of the contract make repayment subject to appropriations by the\\n\\nCity. Virginia law makes clear that βwhere there is an express and enforceable contract in\\n\\nexistence which governs the rights of the parties, the law will not imply a contract in\\n\\ncontravention thereof.β Royer v. Bd. Of Cty. Supervisors of Albemarle Cty., 10 S.E. 2d\\n\\n876, 881 (Va. 1940). Thus, this count fails to state a claim. 5\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Additionally, the district court found that ACA and the Bank pled this count βin\\nthe alternativeβ in the event that the court found the City Deed of Trust void. The district\\njudge found that the City Deed of Trust was a valid document, and thus dismissed this\\n(Continued)\\n 17\\n\\f H.\\n\\n ACA and the Bank next argue that the district court erred in dismissing their count\\n\\nfor constructive fraudulent inducement. They assert that the complaint states a plausible\\n\\nclaim because they pled that they detrimentally relied on misrepresentations by the City\\n\\nand the Authority concerning the validity of the financing documents. We find this count\\n\\nshould be dismissed because it was inadequately pled. In the complaint, ACA and the\\n\\nBank do not identify any specific misrepresentations of the Authority. Therefore, under\\n\\nIqbal and Twombly, any claim of misrepresentation by the Authority fails to assert facts\\n\\nwhich could plausibly provide relief. 6\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Having addressed the challenges to the district courtβs dismissal of the complaint,\\n\\nwe now turn to the challenge to the district courtβs rulings on ACA and the Bankβs\\n\\nrequests to amend. ACA and the Bank did not file a motion to amend. However, they\\n\\nrequested leave to amend five times in their response in opposition to the City and the\\n\\nAuthorityβs motion to dismiss. Three requests are mentioned in the body of their response\\n\\nand two in the footnotes. The district court addressed one of these requests, denying it on\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ncount. While the complaint did not state that this count was pled in the alternative,\\ncounsel for ACA and the Bank made representations at oral argument that the count was\\npled in the alternative. Therefore, we find no error in the district courtβs determination.\\n 6\\n The district court dismissed this claim because it found that, like the\\nrestitution/unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim, ACA and the Bank pled it in the\\nalternative. As stated in the preceding footnote, we find no error in this determination.\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\fthe basis that it was not a proper motion. The district court does not appear to have ruled\\n\\non the other requests. ACA and the Bank argue that the district court erred by summarily\\n\\ndenying one of their requests to amend and ignoring their other requests to amend.\\n\\n Generally, courts βshould freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.β\\n\\nFed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). A motion to amend should only be denied when βthe amendment\\n\\nwould be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the\\n\\nmoving party, or the amendment would be futile.β Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178\\n\\nF.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a district\\n\\ncourt does not abuse its discretion by declining to grant a request to amend when it is not\\n\\nproperly made as a motion. See Cozzarelli v. Inspire Pharm. Inc., 549 F.3d 618, 630β31\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of leave to amend when the plaintiffsβ request for leave\\n\\nwas in a footnote of their response to a motion to dismiss and in their final sentence of\\n\\ntheir objection to the recommendation of the magistrate judge).\\n\\n ACA and the Bank concede that this Court has held that a district court does not\\n\\nabuse its discretion by denying contingent requests to amend in the legal memoranda\\n\\nmade in lieu of a motion to amend. They argue, however, that this Court should follow\\n\\nother circuits which, according to their interpretation, find that requests made in\\n\\nopposition memoranda constitute a proper motion to amend. We decline to do so.\\n\\n Even if we did find that ACA and the Bankβs βrequestsβ to amend constituted a\\n\\nmotion to amend, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying it. A review of\\n\\nthe record indicates that although they informally requested several times to amend, ACA\\n\\nand the Bank never indicated what amendments they were seeking. They never identified\\n\\n 19\\n\\fany facts they sought to include in an amendment. They never identified any cause of\\n\\naction they sought to add in an amendment. Without that information, there was no way\\n\\nfor a district court to evaluate whether the proposed amendments were futile or not. Thus,\\n\\nto the extent their requests for leave are considered motions to amend, and to the extent\\n\\nthey were denied, we affirm the district court.\\n\\n V.\\n\\n As the district court correctly concluded, the complaint fails to allege claims for\\n\\nwhich relief could be granted. For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district\\n\\ncourt is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":565,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4593142,"string":"4,593,142"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Nikki Thomas v. Nancy Berryhill"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2215"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KING, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"FLOYD, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-2215\\n\\n\\nNIKKI T. THOMAS,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,\\nat Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:16-cv-00836-MOC)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: January 15, 2019\\n Amended: February 22, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the majority opinion, in\\nwhich Judge Thacker joined. Judge King wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgment.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Dana Wayne Duncan, DUNCAN DISABILITY LAW, SC, Nekoosa,\\nWisconsin, for Appellant. David Nathaniel Mervis, SOCIAL SECURITY\\nADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: R. Andrew\\nMurray, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Kaba-Kabi A. Kazadi,\\nSpecial Assistant United States Attorney, Gill B. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney,\\nOFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for\\nAppellee.\\n\\nFLOYD, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n The Acting Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denied Nikki T.\\n\\nThomasβs application for supplemental security income (SSI). Thomas sought review in\\n\\nthe district court, and the district court affirmed the denial of her application. This appeal\\n\\nfollowed. We now hold that the administrative law judge (ALJ) who effectuated the\\n\\ndenial of Thomasβs application made two legal errors. First, the ALJ did not sufficiently\\n\\nexplain the reasoning underlying her evaluation of Thomasβs residual functional capacity\\n\\n(RFC). Second, the ALJ neither identified nor resolved an apparent conflict between the\\n\\ntestimony of a vocational expert (VE) and the DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES\\n\\n(4th ed. 1991) (hereinafter βDOTβ). 1 Accordingly, we vacate and remand.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n On October 30, 2012, Thomas applied for SSI, alleging that a combination of\\n\\nphysical and mental impairments had left her unable to stay employed. The\\n\\nCommissioner denied Thomasβs application both initially and on reconsideration; at\\n\\nThomasβs request, her application then went to an ALJ for further review.\\n\\n An ALJ reviews an application for SSI using a five-step process established by the\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n The DOT is a βSocial Security Administration resource[] that list[s] occupations\\nexisting in the economy and explain[s] some of the physical and mental requirements of\\nthose occupations.β Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 205 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). The\\nSocial Security Administration also uses a companion resource to the DOT, entitled\\nSELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCUPATIONS DEFINED IN THE REVISED DICTIONARY\\nOF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (1993), that explains additional physical and environmental\\ndemands of the occupations listed in the DOT.\\n 2\\n\\nregulations of the Social Security Administration (Administration). See 20 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 416.920(a)(4) (2018); see also Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015)\\n\\n(summarizing the five-step process). Briefly: at step one, the ALJ determines whether\\n\\nthe claimant is unemployed. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs\\n\\nimpairments are severe enough, and have lasted long enough, to satisfy the regulationsβ\\n\\nthreshold requirements. At step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs\\n\\nimpairments matchβor are functionally equal toβan impairment listed in the\\n\\nregulations; if not, the ALJ makes a finding as to the claimantβs RFC, which is the\\n\\nmaximum work the claimant can do for a full workweek despite her impairments. At\\n\\nstep four, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs RFC enables her to do the work she\\n\\ndid in the past; if not, the ALJ moves on to step five. At step five, the ALJ determines\\n\\nwhether the claimantβgiven her RFC, her age, her education, and her prior work\\n\\nexperienceβcan do any other work that βexists in significant numbers in the national\\n\\neconomy.β 20 C.F.R. Β§ 416.960(c)(2). For the first four steps, the burden lies with the\\n\\nclaimant; at step five, it shifts to the Commissioner. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635.\\n\\n Here, at steps one through three, the ALJ determined that Thomas was not employed,\\n\\nthat she suffered from severe physical and mental impairments, and that her impairments\\n\\ndid not meet or equal any of the impairments listed in the Administrationβs regulations.\\n\\nTherefore, the ALJ examined the evidence of Thomasβs impairments and made a finding\\n\\nas to Thomasβs RFC. In relevant part, the ALJ found that Thomas\\n\\n has the residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . . [She] is able\\n to follow short, simple instructions and perform routine tasks, but no work\\n requiring a production rate or demand pace. She can have occasional\\n\\n 3\\n\\n public contact or interaction and frequent, but not continuous, contact or\\n interaction with coworkers and supervisors. [She] must avoid work\\n involving crisis situations, complex decision making, or constant changes\\n in a routine setting. 2\\n\\nA.R. 21. 3\\n\\n Having established Thomasβs RFC, the ALJ concluded that Thomas could not\\n\\nperform the work in which she had previously been employed. The ALJ therefore\\n\\nreached the fifth and final step of the process: determining whether, given the limitations\\n\\nembodied in her RFC, Thomas could perform any work that existed in significant\\n\\nnumbers in the national economy. To make that determination, the ALJ relied on a VEβs\\n\\ntestimony. The VE testified that Thomas could perform three jobs that existed in\\n\\nsignificant numbers in the national economy: βmarker,β βfinal inspector,β and βorder\\n\\ncaller.β A.R. 26. (According to the DOT, all three jobs require Level 2 reasoning,\\n\\nwhich, among other things, entails βcarry[ing] out detailed but uninvolved written or oral\\n\\ninstructions . . . .β DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802; DOT 727.687-054, 1991 WL\\n\\n679672; DOT 209.667-014, 1991 WL 671807.) The ALJ accepted the VEβs testimony\\n\\nand concluded that Thomasβs impairments did not prevent her from working;\\n\\nconsequently, Thomasβs application for SSI was denied.\\n\\n Thomas sought review of the ALJβs decision in district court. The district court\\n\\ngranted summary judgment to the Commissioner and affirmed the ALJβs decision.\\n\\n2\\n This is the portion of the RFC that deals with Thomasβs mental limitations. Other\\nportions of the RFC deal with Thomasβs physical limitations. We focus on the portion\\ndealing with Thomasβs mental limitations because that is the only portion Thomas\\nchallenges on appeal.\\n3\\n Citations to the administrative record are abbreviated βA.R.β\\n 4\\n\\nThomas now appeals. She argues, in relevant part, that the ALJ made legal errors at two\\n\\nstages of the review process: first, in her evaluation of Thomasβs RFC; second, in her\\n\\nreliance on the VEβs testimony.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo the district courtβs decision to grant or deny summary judgment.\\n\\nMartin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 2012). Like the district court, we will not\\n\\ndisturb an ALJβs decision on an application for SSI βwhen [the] ALJ has applied correct\\n\\nlegal standards and the ALJβs factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.β\\n\\nBird v. Commβr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We agree with Thomas that the ALJ who reviewed her application made two errors\\n\\nof law. First, when evaluating Thomasβs RFC, the ALJ did not sufficiently explain her\\n\\nconclusions regarding Thomasβs mental impairments. Second, the ALJ did not identify\\n\\nor resolve an apparent conflict between the DOT and the testimony of the VE. Each error\\n\\nrequires us to vacate and remand.\\n\\n\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with the ALJβs evaluation of Thomasβs RFC. According to Thomas, the\\n\\nALJ erred at this stage by failing to provide a logical explanation of how she weighed the\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\nrecord evidence and arrived at her RFC findings. We conclude that Thomas is correct,\\n\\ngiven our binding decisions in Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2018); Monroe\\n\\nv. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176 (2016); and Mascio, 780 F.3d at 632. 4\\n\\n The Administration has specified the manner in which an ALJ should assess a\\n\\nclaimantβs RFC. The ALJ must consider all of the claimantβs βphysical and mental\\n\\nimpairments, severe and otherwise, and determine, on a function-by-function basis, how\\n\\nthey affect [the claimantβs] ability to work.β Monroe, 826 F.3d at 188. In doing so, the\\n\\nALJ must provide βa narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each\\n\\nconclusion . . . .β SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (July 2, 1996). Once the ALJ has\\n\\ncompleted this function-by-function analysis, the ALJ can make a finding as to the\\n\\nclaimantβs RFC.\\n\\n Thus, a proper RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical\\n\\nexplanation, and (3) conclusion. The second component, the ALJβs logical explanation,\\n\\nis just as important as the other two. Indeed, our precedent makes clear that meaningful\\n\\nreview is frustrated when an ALJ goes straight from listing evidence to stating a\\n\\nconclusion. Woods, 888 F.3d at 694.\\n\\n In this case, the ALJβs analysis of Thomasβs RFC contains too little logical\\n\\nexplanation for us to conduct meaningful appellate review. We are particularly troubled\\n\\nby four flaws in the ALJβs analysis:\\n\\n First, the ALJ drew no explicit conclusions about how Thomasβs mental limitations\\n\\n\\n4\\n We note that Mascio was published only a month before the ALJ denied Thomasβs\\napplication, while Woods and Monroe were published well after.\\n 6\\n\\naffect her ability to perform job-related tasks for a full workdayβa benchmark\\n\\nestablished by the Administrationβs own regulations. SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at\\n\\n*2; see also Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637 (stating that ALJβs RFC analysis was βsorely\\n\\nlackingβ because, among other things, the ALJ βsaid nothing about [the claimantβs]\\n\\nability to perform [job-related functions] for a full workdayβ).\\n\\n Second, the ALJ did not sufficiently explain how she weighed significant evidence\\n\\nrelated to Thomasβs mental-health treatment. The ALJ accurately stated that βthe\\n\\nrecord . . . includes numerous findings of normal mood and affect or normal mental status\\n\\nexaminations,β but she omitted that those findingsβat least, those she citesβwere made\\n\\nby physicians treating Thomasβs chronic foot pain. A.R. 24. There is no way for us to\\n\\nknow whether, or why, the ALJ gave those findings the same weight as inconsistent\\n\\nfindings made by Dr. Ida Richmond, a licensed psychologist who evaluated Thomas.\\n\\nSimilarly, the ALJ did not say why she declined to discuss Thomasβs record of mental-\\n\\nhealth evaluations at Bridge Builders Family and Youth Services. To be sure, βthere is\\n\\nno rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her]\\n\\ndecision.β Reid v. Commβr of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal\\n\\ncitation and quotation marks omitted). But here, the ALJ chose not to discuss what\\n\\nappears to be a substantial portion of the record relating to Thomasβs treatment by\\n\\nmental-health specialists, even while citing curt mental-health notes made by doctors\\n\\ntreating Thomasβs foot ailment. Right or wrong, that decision warrants some\\n\\nexplanation.\\n\\n Third, the ALJ βexpress[ed] [Thomasβs] RFC first and only then conclud[ed] that the\\n\\n 7\\n\\nlimitations caused by [her] impairments were consistent with that RFC . . . .β Monroe,\\n\\n826 F.3d at 188 (emphasis in original). Stating a claimantβs RFC before conducting a\\n\\nfunction-by-function analysis is an errorβeven though, on its own, it does not\\n\\nnecessarily require remand. Id.\\n\\n Fourth, while the ALJ stated that Thomas could not perform work βrequiring a\\n\\nproduction rate or demand pace,β she did not give us enough information to understand\\n\\nwhat those terms mean. A.R. 21. That makes it difficult, if not impossible, for us to\\n\\nassess whether their inclusion in Thomasβs RFC is supported by substantial evidence.\\n\\nThe Commissioner contends that βproduction rateβ and βdemand paceβ are βcommon\\n\\nvocationally relevant functional limitations.β Resp. Br. at 21. But those terms appear in\\n\\na vanishingly small number of Social Security cases involving RFC evaluations. Of the\\n\\ncases in which the terms do appear, several originated with the same ALJ as the one who\\n\\ndenied Thomasβs application. See, e.g., Dyrda v. Colvin, 47 F. Supp. 3d 318, 321\\n\\n(M.D.N.C. 2014). We therefore disagree with the Commissioner: the terms do not seem\\n\\nto be especially commonβcertainly not common enough for us to know what they mean\\n\\nwithout elaboration.\\n\\n Combined, the above-listed missteps in the ALJβs RFC evaluation frustrate our\\n\\nability to conduct meaningful appellate review, requiring us to vacate and remand. 5 In so\\n\\n\\n\\n5\\n Thomas argues that her RFC, as stated by the ALJ, does not account for her moderate\\nlimitations in concentration, persistence, and paceβeven though the RFC limits her to\\njobs that do not require a βproduction rateβ or βdemand pace.β We decline to resolve that\\nquestion. As discussed above, the ALJβs evaluation of Thomasβs mental impairments for\\npurposes of the RFC contains too little explanation for us to meaningfully review it.\\n 8\\n\\ndoing, we express no opinion on whether the ALJβs RFC findings were correct. We\\n\\nsimply ask the ALJ to give us a clearer window into her reasoning.\\n\\n\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Since it is likely to come up again below, we address another issue raised by\\n\\nThomasβs appeal: whether the ALJ should have identified and resolved a conflict\\n\\nbetween the DOT and the testimony of the VE. This requires us to decide whether there\\n\\nis an βapparent conflictβ between a limitation to βshort, simple instructionsβ (as found in\\n\\nThomasβs RFC) and a need to carry out βdetailed but uninvolved . . . instructionsβ (as\\n\\nfound in jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning). We hold that there is.\\n\\n Some background explanation is in order. When, as in this case, an ALJ determines\\n\\nthat a claimantβs RFC prevents the claimant from performing her past work, the ALJ\\n\\nreaches step five of the review process. Recall that at this step, the burden shifts to the\\n\\nCommissioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant is capable\\n\\nof doing other work that exists in significant supply in the national economy. Mascio,\\n\\n780 F.3d at 635. The Commissioner often seeks to meet this burden through the\\n\\ntestimony of a VE. Specifically, as in this case, the Commissioner calls a VE to testify to\\n\\n\\nWithout further explanation, we simply cannot tell whether the RFC findingβ\\nparticularly the portion restricting Thomas to jobs that do not require a βproduction rateβ\\nor βdemand paceββproperly accounts for Thomasβs moderate limitations in\\nconcentration, persistence, and pace. On remand, the ALJ will need to establish for how\\nlong, and under what conditions, Thomas is able βto focus [her] attention on work\\nactivities and stay on task at a sustained rate.β 20 C.F.R. Β§ Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 Β§\\n12.00E(3). Only then will we or any court be able to meaningfully review the ALJβs\\nRFC finding.\\n 9\\n\\nwhether a hypothetical person with the same limitations as the claimant would be able to\\n\\nperform any of the jobs listed in the DOT. Id.; see also SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at\\n\\n*2 (Dec. 4, 2000).\\n\\n An ALJ cannot rely unquestioningly on a VEβs testimony. Rather, an ALJ must\\n\\nensure that any βapparentβ conflicts between the Dictionary and the VEβs testimony are\\n\\nreasonably resolved. SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2. To that end, the ALJ must\\n\\nask the VE whether his or her testimony conflicts with the DOT. If the answer is βyes,β\\n\\nthe ALJ βmust elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying onβ the\\n\\ntestimony. Id. But even if the VE answers βno,β the ALJ has an affirmative βduty to\\n\\nmake an independent identification of apparent conflicts.β Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d\\n\\n204, 210 (4th Cir. 2015). This means that the ALJ must recognize and resolve ways in\\n\\nwhich a VEβs testimony βseems to, but does not necessarily,β conflict with the βexpress\\n\\nlanguageβ of the DOTβeven if the conflict is not βobvious.β Id. at 209.\\n\\n Our opinion in Pearson furnishes us with a useful example of what makes a conflict\\n\\napparent. 6 In Pearson, an ALJ evaluated an SSI claimantβs RFC and determined that the\\n\\nclaimant βcould only occasionally reach upwardβ with his βnondominant arm.β Id. at\\n\\n210. At step five of the review process, a VE testified that in spite of the claimantβs\\n\\nphysical limitation, the claimant could perform several jobs that existed in significant\\n\\nnumbers in the national economy. Id. Yet according to the DOT, all the jobs identified\\n\\nby the VE required βfrequent reaching.β Id. at 210β11 (emphasis in original). We held\\n\\n\\n\\n6\\n We note that Pearson was decided after the ALJ denied Thomasβs application.\\n 10\\n\\nthat there was an apparent conflict between the DOT and the VEβs testimonyβeven\\n\\nthough, based on the DOT, it was not clear whether the jobs identified by the VE would\\n\\never require the claimant to reach overhead with his nondominant arm. Because the ALJ\\n\\nhad failed to identify or resolve this conflict, we remanded. Id. at 211.\\n\\n The VEβs testimony in this case contains a comparable conflict with the DOT. After\\n\\nbeing informed of Thomasβs RFC, the VE testified that Thomas was capable of holding\\n\\nthree jobs: marker, final inspector, and order caller. As noted above, the DOT states that\\n\\nall three of the jobs identified by the VE require employees to βcarry out detailed but\\n\\nuninvolved written or oral instructions . . . .β DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802; DOT\\n\\n727.687-054, 1991 WL 679672; DOT 209.667-014, 1991 WL 671807. By comparison,\\n\\nThomasβs RFC limits her to jobs that involve only βshort, simple instructions.β\\n\\n We believe that Thomas, being limited to short, simple instructions, may not be able\\n\\nto carry out detailed but uninvolved instructions. This is not a categorical ruleβsome\\n\\ninstructions, particularly if they are well-drafted, may be simultaneously short, simple,\\n\\ndetailed, and uninvolved. Even so, the conflict between Thomasβs limitation to short,\\n\\nsimple instructions and the VEβs testimony that Thomas could perform jobs that include\\n\\ndetailed but uninvolved instructions is as apparent as the conflict we identified in\\n\\nPearson. Since we held that an apparent conflict existed in Pearson, we are satisfied that\\n\\none exists in this case, too. 7 We remand so that the ALJ can resolve the conflict in\\n\\n\\n\\n7\\n The Commissioner did not argue that this conflict, if apparent, would be harmless;\\ntherefore, we decline to reach that question now. See United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254,\\n280 n.8 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that government may waive harmless error\\n 11\\n\\naccordance with the Administrationβs regulations.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n We hereby vacate the district courtβs order granting summary judgment to the\\n\\nCommissioner. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to\\n\\nthe Commissioner for such further administrative proceedings as may be appropriate.\\n\\n VACATED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nargument).\\n 12\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4370395/\", \"author_raw\": \"FLOYD, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"KING, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"KING, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:\\n\\n I am pleased to concur in all of the majority opinion except Part III.A. With great\\n\\nrespect for the views of my good colleagues, I am unable to join that part of the\\n\\nmajorityβs analysis because it is in tension with our recent decision in Keller v. Berryhill,\\n\\nNo. 17-2248, where we properly affirmed a very similar mental RFC explanation from\\n\\nthe same ALJ. I ultimately agree, however, that we should vacate the district courtβs\\n\\njudgment and return this case to the Commissioner of Social Security for such further\\n\\nadministrative proceedings as may be appropriate.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4370395/\", \"author_raw\": \"KING, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"FLOYD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"THACKER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KING\": \", Circuit\", \"FLOYD\": \", Circuit\", \"THACKER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593142/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Nikki Thomas v. Nancy Berryhill\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-2215\n\n\nNIKKI T. THOMAS,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\n v.\n\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,\n\n Defendant - Appellee.\n\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,\nat Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:16-cv-00836-MOC)\n\n\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: January 15, 2019\n Amended: February 22, 2019\n\n\nBefore KING, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the majority opinion, in\nwhich Judge Thacker joined. Judge King wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and\nconcurring in the judgment.\n\n\nARGUED: Dana Wayne Duncan, DUNCAN DISABILITY LAW, SC, Nekoosa,\nWisconsin, for Appellant. David Nathaniel Mervis, SOCIAL SECURITY\nADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: R. Andrew\nMurray, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Kaba-Kabi A. Kazadi,\nSpecial Assistant United States Attorney, Gill B. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney,\nOFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for\nAppellee.\n\nFLOYD, Circuit Judge:\n\n The Acting Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denied Nikki T.\n\nThomasβs application for supplemental security income (SSI). Thomas sought review in\n\nthe district court, and the district court affirmed the denial of her application. This appeal\n\nfollowed. We now hold that the administrative law judge (ALJ) who effectuated the\n\ndenial of Thomasβs application made two legal errors. First, the ALJ did not sufficiently\n\nexplain the reasoning underlying her evaluation of Thomasβs residual functional capacity\n\n(RFC). Second, the ALJ neither identified nor resolved an apparent conflict between the\n\ntestimony of a vocational expert (VE) and the DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES\n\n(4th ed. 1991) (hereinafter βDOTβ). 1 Accordingly, we vacate and remand.\n\n\n\n\n I.\n\n On October 30, 2012, Thomas applied for SSI, alleging that a combination of\n\nphysical and mental impairments had left her unable to stay employed. The\n\nCommissioner denied Thomasβs application both initially and on reconsideration; at\n\nThomasβs request, her application then went to an ALJ for further review.\n\n An ALJ reviews an application for SSI using a five-step process established by the\n\n\n\n1\n The DOT is a βSocial Security Administration resource[] that list[s] occupations\nexisting in the economy and explain[s] some of the physical and mental requirements of\nthose occupations.β Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 205 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). The\nSocial Security Administration also uses a companion resource to the DOT, entitled\nSELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCUPATIONS DEFINED IN THE REVISED DICTIONARY\nOF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (1993), that explains additional physical and environmental\ndemands of the occupations listed in the DOT.\n 2\n\nregulations of the Social Security Administration (Administration). See 20 C.F.R.\n\nΒ§ 416.920(a)(4) (2018); see also Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015)\n\n(summarizing the five-step process). Briefly: at step one, the ALJ determines whether\n\nthe claimant is unemployed. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs\n\nimpairments are severe enough, and have lasted long enough, to satisfy the regulationsβ\n\nthreshold requirements. At step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs\n\nimpairments matchβor are functionally equal toβan impairment listed in the\n\nregulations; if not, the ALJ makes a finding as to the claimantβs RFC, which is the\n\nmaximum work the claimant can do for a full workweek despite her impairments. At\n\nstep four, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs RFC enables her to do the work she\n\ndid in the past; if not, the ALJ moves on to step five. At step five, the ALJ determines\n\nwhether the claimantβgiven her RFC, her age, her education, and her prior work\n\nexperienceβcan do any other work that βexists in significant numbers in the national\n\neconomy.β 20 C.F.R. Β§ 416.960(c)(2). For the first four steps, the burden lies with the\n\nclaimant; at step five, it shifts to the Commissioner. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635.\n\n Here, at steps one through three, the ALJ determined that Thomas was not employed,\n\nthat she suffered from severe physical and mental impairments, and that her impairments\n\ndid not meet or equal any of the impairments listed in the Administrationβs regulations.\n\nTherefore, the ALJ examined the evidence of Thomasβs impairments and made a finding\n\nas to Thomasβs RFC. In relevant part, the ALJ found that Thomas\n\n has the residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . . [She] is able\n to follow short, simple instructions and perform routine tasks, but no work\n requiring a production rate or demand pace. She can have occasional\n\n 3\n\n public contact or interaction and frequent, but not continuous, contact or\n interaction with coworkers and supervisors. [She] must avoid work\n involving crisis situations, complex decision making, or constant changes\n in a routine setting. 2\n\nA.R. 21. 3\n\n Having established Thomasβs RFC, the ALJ concluded that Thomas could not\n\nperform the work in which she had previously been employed. The ALJ therefore\n\nreached the fifth and final step of the process: determining whether, given the limitations\n\nembodied in her RFC, Thomas could perform any work that existed in significant\n\nnumbers in the national economy. To make that determination, the ALJ relied on a VEβs\n\ntestimony. The VE testified that Thomas could perform three jobs that existed in\n\nsignificant numbers in the national economy: βmarker,β βfinal inspector,β and βorder\n\ncaller.β A.R. 26. (According to the DOT, all three jobs require Level 2 reasoning,\n\nwhich, among other things, entails βcarry[ing] out detailed but uninvolved written or oral\n\ninstructions . . . .β DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802; DOT 727.687-054, 1991 WL\n\n679672; DOT 209.667-014, 1991 WL 671807.) The ALJ accepted the VEβs testimony\n\nand concluded that Thomasβs impairments did not prevent her from working;\n\nconsequently, Thomasβs application for SSI was denied.\n\n Thomas sought review of the ALJβs decision in district court. The district court\n\ngranted summary judgment to the Commissioner and affirmed the ALJβs decision.\n\n2\n This is the portion of the RFC that deals with Thomasβs mental limitations. Other\nportions of the RFC deal with Thomasβs physical limitations. We focus on the portion\ndealing with Thomasβs mental limitations because that is the only portion Thomas\nchallenges on appeal.\n3\n Citations to the administrative record are abbreviated βA.R.β\n 4\n\nThomas now appeals. She argues, in relevant part, that the ALJ made legal errors at two\n\nstages of the review process: first, in her evaluation of Thomasβs RFC; second, in her\n\nreliance on the VEβs testimony.\n\n\n\n\n II.\n\n We review de novo the district courtβs decision to grant or deny summary judgment.\n\nMartin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 2012). Like the district court, we will not\n\ndisturb an ALJβs decision on an application for SSI βwhen [the] ALJ has applied correct\n\nlegal standards and the ALJβs factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.β\n\nBird v. Commβr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012).\n\n\n\n\n III.\n\n We agree with Thomas that the ALJ who reviewed her application made two errors\n\nof law. First, when evaluating Thomasβs RFC, the ALJ did not sufficiently explain her\n\nconclusions regarding Thomasβs mental impairments. Second, the ALJ did not identify\n\nor resolve an apparent conflict between the DOT and the testimony of the VE. Each error\n\nrequires us to vacate and remand.\n\n\n\n A.\n\n We begin with the ALJβs evaluation of Thomasβs RFC. According to Thomas, the\n\nALJ erred at this stage by failing to provide a logical explanation of how she weighed the\n\n\n 5\n\nrecord evidence and arrived at her RFC findings. We conclude that Thomas is correct,\n\ngiven our binding decisions in Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2018); Monroe\n\nv. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176 (2016); and Mascio, 780 F.3d at 632. 4\n\n The Administration has specified the manner in which an ALJ should assess a\n\nclaimantβs RFC. The ALJ must consider all of the claimantβs βphysical and mental\n\nimpairments, severe and otherwise, and determine, on a function-by-function basis, how\n\nthey affect [the claimantβs] ability to work.β Monroe, 826 F.3d at 188. In doing so, the\n\nALJ must provide βa narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each\n\nconclusion . . . .β SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (July 2, 1996). Once the ALJ has\n\ncompleted this function-by-function analysis, the ALJ can make a finding as to the\n\nclaimantβs RFC.\n\n Thus, a proper RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical\n\nexplanation, and (3) conclusion. The second component, the ALJβs logical explanation,\n\nis just as important as the other two. Indeed, our precedent makes clear that meaningful\n\nreview is frustrated when an ALJ goes straight from listing evidence to stating a\n\nconclusion. Woods, 888 F.3d at 694.\n\n In this case, the ALJβs analysis of Thomasβs RFC contains too little logical\n\nexplanation for us to conduct meaningful appellate review. We are particularly troubled\n\nby four flaws in the ALJβs analysis:\n\n First, the ALJ drew no explicit conclusions about how Thomasβs mental limitations\n\n\n4\n We note that Mascio was published only a month before the ALJ denied Thomasβs\napplication, while Woods and Monroe were published well after.\n 6\n\naffect her ability to perform job-related tasks for a full workdayβa benchmark\n\nestablished by the Administrationβs own regulations. SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at\n\n*2; see also Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637 (stating that ALJβs RFC analysis was βsorely\n\nlackingβ because, among other things, the ALJ βsaid nothing about [the claimantβs]\n\nability to perform [job-related functions] for a full workdayβ).\n\n Second, the ALJ did not sufficiently explain how she weighed significant evidence\n\nrelated to Thomasβs mental-health treatment. The ALJ accurately stated that βthe\n\nrecord . . . includes numerous findings of normal mood and affect or normal mental status\n\nexaminations,β but she omitted that those findingsβat least, those she citesβwere made\n\nby physicians treating Thomasβs chronic foot pain. A.R. 24. There is no way for us to\n\nknow whether, or why, the ALJ gave those findings the same weight as inconsistent\n\nfindings made by Dr. Ida Richmond, a licensed psychologist who evaluated Thomas.\n\nSimilarly, the ALJ did not say why she declined to discuss Thomasβs record of mental-\n\nhealth evaluations at Bridge Builders Family and Youth Services. To be sure, βthere is\n\nno rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her]\n\ndecision.β Reid v. Commβr of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal\n\ncitation and quotation marks omitted). But here, the ALJ chose not to discuss what\n\nappears to be a substantial portion of the record relating to Thomasβs treatment by\n\nmental-health specialists, even while citing curt mental-health notes made by doctors\n\ntreating Thomasβs foot ailment. Right or wrong, that decision warrants some\n\nexplanation.\n\n Third, the ALJ βexpress[ed] [Thomasβs] RFC first and only then conclud[ed] that the\n\n 7\n\nlimitations caused by [her] impairments were consistent with that RFC . . . .β Monroe,\n\n826 F.3d at 188 (emphasis in original). Stating a claimantβs RFC before conducting a\n\nfunction-by-function analysis is an errorβeven though, on its own, it does not\n\nnecessarily require remand. Id.\n\n Fourth, while the ALJ stated that Thomas could not perform work βrequiring a\n\nproduction rate or demand pace,β she did not give us enough information to understand\n\nwhat those terms mean. A.R. 21. That makes it difficult, if not impossible, for us to\n\nassess whether their inclusion in Thomasβs RFC is supported by substantial evidence.\n\nThe Commissioner contends that βproduction rateβ and βdemand paceβ are βcommon\n\nvocationally relevant functional limitations.β Resp. Br. at 21. But those terms appear in\n\na vanishingly small number of Social Security cases involving RFC evaluations. Of the\n\ncases in which the terms do appear, several originated with the same ALJ as the one who\n\ndenied Thomasβs application. See, e.g., Dyrda v. Colvin, 47 F. Supp. 3d 318, 321\n\n(M.D.N.C. 2014). We therefore disagree with the Commissioner: the terms do not seem\n\nto be especially commonβcertainly not common enough for us to know what they mean\n\nwithout elaboration.\n\n Combined, the above-listed missteps in the ALJβs RFC evaluation frustrate our\n\nability to conduct meaningful appellate review, requiring us to vacate and remand. 5 In so\n\n\n\n5\n Thomas argues that her RFC, as stated by the ALJ, does not account for her moderate\nlimitations in concentration, persistence, and paceβeven though the RFC limits her to\njobs that do not require a βproduction rateβ or βdemand pace.β We decline to resolve that\nquestion. As discussed above, the ALJβs evaluation of Thomasβs mental impairments for\npurposes of the RFC contains too little explanation for us to meaningfully review it.\n 8\n\ndoing, we express no opinion on whether the ALJβs RFC findings were correct. We\n\nsimply ask the ALJ to give us a clearer window into her reasoning.\n\n\n\n B.\n\n Since it is likely to come up again below, we address another issue raised by\n\nThomasβs appeal: whether the ALJ should have identified and resolved a conflict\n\nbetween the DOT and the testimony of the VE. This requires us to decide whether there\n\nis an βapparent conflictβ between a limitation to βshort, simple instructionsβ (as found in\n\nThomasβs RFC) and a need to carry out βdetailed but uninvolved . . . instructionsβ (as\n\nfound in jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning). We hold that there is.\n\n Some background explanation is in order. When, as in this case, an ALJ determines\n\nthat a claimantβs RFC prevents the claimant from performing her past work, the ALJ\n\nreaches step five of the review process. Recall that at this step, the burden shifts to the\n\nCommissioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant is capable\n\nof doing other work that exists in significant supply in the national economy. Mascio,\n\n780 F.3d at 635. The Commissioner often seeks to meet this burden through the\n\ntestimony of a VE. Specifically, as in this case, the Commissioner calls a VE to testify to\n\n\nWithout further explanation, we simply cannot tell whether the RFC findingβ\nparticularly the portion restricting Thomas to jobs that do not require a βproduction rateβ\nor βdemand paceββproperly accounts for Thomasβs moderate limitations in\nconcentration, persistence, and pace. On remand, the ALJ will need to establish for how\nlong, and under what conditions, Thomas is able βto focus [her] attention on work\nactivities and stay on task at a sustained rate.β 20 C.F.R. Β§ Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 Β§\n12.00E(3). Only then will we or any court be able to meaningfully review the ALJβs\nRFC finding.\n 9\n\nwhether a hypothetical person with the same limitations as the claimant would be able to\n\nperform any of the jobs listed in the DOT. Id.; see also SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at\n\n*2 (Dec. 4, 2000).\n\n An ALJ cannot rely unquestioningly on a VEβs testimony. Rather, an ALJ must\n\nensure that any βapparentβ conflicts between the Dictionary and the VEβs testimony are\n\nreasonably resolved. SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2. To that end, the ALJ must\n\nask the VE whether his or her testimony conflicts with the DOT. If the answer is βyes,β\n\nthe ALJ βmust elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying onβ the\n\ntestimony. Id. But even if the VE answers βno,β the ALJ has an affirmative βduty to\n\nmake an independent identification of apparent conflicts.β Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d\n\n204, 210 (4th Cir. 2015). This means that the ALJ must recognize and resolve ways in\n\nwhich a VEβs testimony βseems to, but does not necessarily,β conflict with the βexpress\n\nlanguageβ of the DOTβeven if the conflict is not βobvious.β Id. at 209.\n\n Our opinion in Pearson furnishes us with a useful example of what makes a conflict\n\napparent. 6 In Pearson, an ALJ evaluated an SSI claimantβs RFC and determined that the\n\nclaimant βcould only occasionally reach upwardβ with his βnondominant arm.β Id. at\n\n210. At step five of the review process, a VE testified that in spite of the claimantβs\n\nphysical limitation, the claimant could perform several jobs that existed in significant\n\nnumbers in the national economy. Id. Yet according to the DOT, all the jobs identified\n\nby the VE required βfrequent reaching.β Id. at 210β11 (emphasis in original). We held\n\n\n\n6\n We note that Pearson was decided after the ALJ denied Thomasβs application.\n 10\n\nthat there was an apparent conflict between the DOT and the VEβs testimonyβeven\n\nthough, based on the DOT, it was not clear whether the jobs identified by the VE would\n\never require the claimant to reach overhead with his nondominant arm. Because the ALJ\n\nhad failed to identify or resolve this conflict, we remanded. Id. at 211.\n\n The VEβs testimony in this case contains a comparable conflict with the DOT. After\n\nbeing informed of Thomasβs RFC, the VE testified that Thomas was capable of holding\n\nthree jobs: marker, final inspector, and order caller. As noted above, the DOT states that\n\nall three of the jobs identified by the VE require employees to βcarry out detailed but\n\nuninvolved written or oral instructions . . . .β DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802; DOT\n\n727.687-054, 1991 WL 679672; DOT 209.667-014, 1991 WL 671807. By comparison,\n\nThomasβs RFC limits her to jobs that involve only βshort, simple instructions.β\n\n We believe that Thomas, being limited to short, simple instructions, may not be able\n\nto carry out detailed but uninvolved instructions. This is not a categorical ruleβsome\n\ninstructions, particularly if they are well-drafted, may be simultaneously short, simple,\n\ndetailed, and uninvolved. Even so, the conflict between Thomasβs limitation to short,\n\nsimple instructions and the VEβs testimony that Thomas could perform jobs that include\n\ndetailed but uninvolved instructions is as apparent as the conflict we identified in\n\nPearson. Since we held that an apparent conflict existed in Pearson, we are satisfied that\n\none exists in this case, too. 7 We remand so that the ALJ can resolve the conflict in\n\n\n\n7\n The Commissioner did not argue that this conflict, if apparent, would be harmless;\ntherefore, we decline to reach that question now. See United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254,\n280 n.8 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that government may waive harmless error\n 11\n\naccordance with the Administrationβs regulations.\n\n\n\n\n IV.\n\n We hereby vacate the district courtβs order granting summary judgment to the\n\nCommissioner. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to\n\nthe Commissioner for such further administrative proceedings as may be appropriate.\n\n VACATED AND REMANDED\n\n\n\n\nargument).\n 12\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Nikki Thomas v. Nancy Berryhill\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-2215\\n\\n\\nNIKKI T. THOMAS,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n v.\\n\\nNANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,\\nat Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:16-cv-00836-MOC)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: January 15, 2019\\n Amended: February 22, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the majority opinion, in\\nwhich Judge Thacker joined. Judge King wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgment.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Dana Wayne Duncan, DUNCAN DISABILITY LAW, SC, Nekoosa,\\nWisconsin, for Appellant. David Nathaniel Mervis, SOCIAL SECURITY\\nADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: R. Andrew\\nMurray, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Kaba-Kabi A. Kazadi,\\nSpecial Assistant United States Attorney, Gill B. Beck, Assistant United States Attorney,\\nOFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for\\nAppellee.\\n\\nFLOYD, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n The Acting Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denied Nikki T.\\n\\nThomasβs application for supplemental security income (SSI). Thomas sought review in\\n\\nthe district court, and the district court affirmed the denial of her application. This appeal\\n\\nfollowed. We now hold that the administrative law judge (ALJ) who effectuated the\\n\\ndenial of Thomasβs application made two legal errors. First, the ALJ did not sufficiently\\n\\nexplain the reasoning underlying her evaluation of Thomasβs residual functional capacity\\n\\n(RFC). Second, the ALJ neither identified nor resolved an apparent conflict between the\\n\\ntestimony of a vocational expert (VE) and the DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES\\n\\n(4th ed. 1991) (hereinafter βDOTβ). 1 Accordingly, we vacate and remand.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n On October 30, 2012, Thomas applied for SSI, alleging that a combination of\\n\\nphysical and mental impairments had left her unable to stay employed. The\\n\\nCommissioner denied Thomasβs application both initially and on reconsideration; at\\n\\nThomasβs request, her application then went to an ALJ for further review.\\n\\n An ALJ reviews an application for SSI using a five-step process established by the\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n The DOT is a βSocial Security Administration resource[] that list[s] occupations\\nexisting in the economy and explain[s] some of the physical and mental requirements of\\nthose occupations.β Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 205 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). The\\nSocial Security Administration also uses a companion resource to the DOT, entitled\\nSELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCUPATIONS DEFINED IN THE REVISED DICTIONARY\\nOF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (1993), that explains additional physical and environmental\\ndemands of the occupations listed in the DOT.\\n 2\\n\\nregulations of the Social Security Administration (Administration). See 20 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 416.920(a)(4) (2018); see also Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2015)\\n\\n(summarizing the five-step process). Briefly: at step one, the ALJ determines whether\\n\\nthe claimant is unemployed. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs\\n\\nimpairments are severe enough, and have lasted long enough, to satisfy the regulationsβ\\n\\nthreshold requirements. At step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs\\n\\nimpairments matchβor are functionally equal toβan impairment listed in the\\n\\nregulations; if not, the ALJ makes a finding as to the claimantβs RFC, which is the\\n\\nmaximum work the claimant can do for a full workweek despite her impairments. At\\n\\nstep four, the ALJ determines whether the claimantβs RFC enables her to do the work she\\n\\ndid in the past; if not, the ALJ moves on to step five. At step five, the ALJ determines\\n\\nwhether the claimantβgiven her RFC, her age, her education, and her prior work\\n\\nexperienceβcan do any other work that βexists in significant numbers in the national\\n\\neconomy.β 20 C.F.R. Β§ 416.960(c)(2). For the first four steps, the burden lies with the\\n\\nclaimant; at step five, it shifts to the Commissioner. Mascio, 780 F.3d at 635.\\n\\n Here, at steps one through three, the ALJ determined that Thomas was not employed,\\n\\nthat she suffered from severe physical and mental impairments, and that her impairments\\n\\ndid not meet or equal any of the impairments listed in the Administrationβs regulations.\\n\\nTherefore, the ALJ examined the evidence of Thomasβs impairments and made a finding\\n\\nas to Thomasβs RFC. In relevant part, the ALJ found that Thomas\\n\\n has the residual functional capacity to perform light work . . . . [She] is able\\n to follow short, simple instructions and perform routine tasks, but no work\\n requiring a production rate or demand pace. She can have occasional\\n\\n 3\\n\\n public contact or interaction and frequent, but not continuous, contact or\\n interaction with coworkers and supervisors. [She] must avoid work\\n involving crisis situations, complex decision making, or constant changes\\n in a routine setting. 2\\n\\nA.R. 21. 3\\n\\n Having established Thomasβs RFC, the ALJ concluded that Thomas could not\\n\\nperform the work in which she had previously been employed. The ALJ therefore\\n\\nreached the fifth and final step of the process: determining whether, given the limitations\\n\\nembodied in her RFC, Thomas could perform any work that existed in significant\\n\\nnumbers in the national economy. To make that determination, the ALJ relied on a VEβs\\n\\ntestimony. The VE testified that Thomas could perform three jobs that existed in\\n\\nsignificant numbers in the national economy: βmarker,β βfinal inspector,β and βorder\\n\\ncaller.β A.R. 26. (According to the DOT, all three jobs require Level 2 reasoning,\\n\\nwhich, among other things, entails βcarry[ing] out detailed but uninvolved written or oral\\n\\ninstructions . . . .β DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802; DOT 727.687-054, 1991 WL\\n\\n679672; DOT 209.667-014, 1991 WL 671807.) The ALJ accepted the VEβs testimony\\n\\nand concluded that Thomasβs impairments did not prevent her from working;\\n\\nconsequently, Thomasβs application for SSI was denied.\\n\\n Thomas sought review of the ALJβs decision in district court. The district court\\n\\ngranted summary judgment to the Commissioner and affirmed the ALJβs decision.\\n\\n2\\n This is the portion of the RFC that deals with Thomasβs mental limitations. Other\\nportions of the RFC deal with Thomasβs physical limitations. We focus on the portion\\ndealing with Thomasβs mental limitations because that is the only portion Thomas\\nchallenges on appeal.\\n3\\n Citations to the administrative record are abbreviated βA.R.β\\n 4\\n\\nThomas now appeals. She argues, in relevant part, that the ALJ made legal errors at two\\n\\nstages of the review process: first, in her evaluation of Thomasβs RFC; second, in her\\n\\nreliance on the VEβs testimony.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo the district courtβs decision to grant or deny summary judgment.\\n\\nMartin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 2012). Like the district court, we will not\\n\\ndisturb an ALJβs decision on an application for SSI βwhen [the] ALJ has applied correct\\n\\nlegal standards and the ALJβs factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.β\\n\\nBird v. Commβr of Soc. Sec. Admin., 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We agree with Thomas that the ALJ who reviewed her application made two errors\\n\\nof law. First, when evaluating Thomasβs RFC, the ALJ did not sufficiently explain her\\n\\nconclusions regarding Thomasβs mental impairments. Second, the ALJ did not identify\\n\\nor resolve an apparent conflict between the DOT and the testimony of the VE. Each error\\n\\nrequires us to vacate and remand.\\n\\n\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with the ALJβs evaluation of Thomasβs RFC. According to Thomas, the\\n\\nALJ erred at this stage by failing to provide a logical explanation of how she weighed the\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\nrecord evidence and arrived at her RFC findings. We conclude that Thomas is correct,\\n\\ngiven our binding decisions in Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2018); Monroe\\n\\nv. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176 (2016); and Mascio, 780 F.3d at 632. 4\\n\\n The Administration has specified the manner in which an ALJ should assess a\\n\\nclaimantβs RFC. The ALJ must consider all of the claimantβs βphysical and mental\\n\\nimpairments, severe and otherwise, and determine, on a function-by-function basis, how\\n\\nthey affect [the claimantβs] ability to work.β Monroe, 826 F.3d at 188. In doing so, the\\n\\nALJ must provide βa narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each\\n\\nconclusion . . . .β SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (July 2, 1996). Once the ALJ has\\n\\ncompleted this function-by-function analysis, the ALJ can make a finding as to the\\n\\nclaimantβs RFC.\\n\\n Thus, a proper RFC analysis has three components: (1) evidence, (2) logical\\n\\nexplanation, and (3) conclusion. The second component, the ALJβs logical explanation,\\n\\nis just as important as the other two. Indeed, our precedent makes clear that meaningful\\n\\nreview is frustrated when an ALJ goes straight from listing evidence to stating a\\n\\nconclusion. Woods, 888 F.3d at 694.\\n\\n In this case, the ALJβs analysis of Thomasβs RFC contains too little logical\\n\\nexplanation for us to conduct meaningful appellate review. We are particularly troubled\\n\\nby four flaws in the ALJβs analysis:\\n\\n First, the ALJ drew no explicit conclusions about how Thomasβs mental limitations\\n\\n\\n4\\n We note that Mascio was published only a month before the ALJ denied Thomasβs\\napplication, while Woods and Monroe were published well after.\\n 6\\n\\naffect her ability to perform job-related tasks for a full workdayβa benchmark\\n\\nestablished by the Administrationβs own regulations. SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at\\n\\n*2; see also Mascio, 780 F.3d at 637 (stating that ALJβs RFC analysis was βsorely\\n\\nlackingβ because, among other things, the ALJ βsaid nothing about [the claimantβs]\\n\\nability to perform [job-related functions] for a full workdayβ).\\n\\n Second, the ALJ did not sufficiently explain how she weighed significant evidence\\n\\nrelated to Thomasβs mental-health treatment. The ALJ accurately stated that βthe\\n\\nrecord . . . includes numerous findings of normal mood and affect or normal mental status\\n\\nexaminations,β but she omitted that those findingsβat least, those she citesβwere made\\n\\nby physicians treating Thomasβs chronic foot pain. A.R. 24. There is no way for us to\\n\\nknow whether, or why, the ALJ gave those findings the same weight as inconsistent\\n\\nfindings made by Dr. Ida Richmond, a licensed psychologist who evaluated Thomas.\\n\\nSimilarly, the ALJ did not say why she declined to discuss Thomasβs record of mental-\\n\\nhealth evaluations at Bridge Builders Family and Youth Services. To be sure, βthere is\\n\\nno rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of evidence in [her]\\n\\ndecision.β Reid v. Commβr of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal\\n\\ncitation and quotation marks omitted). But here, the ALJ chose not to discuss what\\n\\nappears to be a substantial portion of the record relating to Thomasβs treatment by\\n\\nmental-health specialists, even while citing curt mental-health notes made by doctors\\n\\ntreating Thomasβs foot ailment. Right or wrong, that decision warrants some\\n\\nexplanation.\\n\\n Third, the ALJ βexpress[ed] [Thomasβs] RFC first and only then conclud[ed] that the\\n\\n 7\\n\\nlimitations caused by [her] impairments were consistent with that RFC . . . .β Monroe,\\n\\n826 F.3d at 188 (emphasis in original). Stating a claimantβs RFC before conducting a\\n\\nfunction-by-function analysis is an errorβeven though, on its own, it does not\\n\\nnecessarily require remand. Id.\\n\\n Fourth, while the ALJ stated that Thomas could not perform work βrequiring a\\n\\nproduction rate or demand pace,β she did not give us enough information to understand\\n\\nwhat those terms mean. A.R. 21. That makes it difficult, if not impossible, for us to\\n\\nassess whether their inclusion in Thomasβs RFC is supported by substantial evidence.\\n\\nThe Commissioner contends that βproduction rateβ and βdemand paceβ are βcommon\\n\\nvocationally relevant functional limitations.β Resp. Br. at 21. But those terms appear in\\n\\na vanishingly small number of Social Security cases involving RFC evaluations. Of the\\n\\ncases in which the terms do appear, several originated with the same ALJ as the one who\\n\\ndenied Thomasβs application. See, e.g., Dyrda v. Colvin, 47 F. Supp. 3d 318, 321\\n\\n(M.D.N.C. 2014). We therefore disagree with the Commissioner: the terms do not seem\\n\\nto be especially commonβcertainly not common enough for us to know what they mean\\n\\nwithout elaboration.\\n\\n Combined, the above-listed missteps in the ALJβs RFC evaluation frustrate our\\n\\nability to conduct meaningful appellate review, requiring us to vacate and remand. 5 In so\\n\\n\\n\\n5\\n Thomas argues that her RFC, as stated by the ALJ, does not account for her moderate\\nlimitations in concentration, persistence, and paceβeven though the RFC limits her to\\njobs that do not require a βproduction rateβ or βdemand pace.β We decline to resolve that\\nquestion. As discussed above, the ALJβs evaluation of Thomasβs mental impairments for\\npurposes of the RFC contains too little explanation for us to meaningfully review it.\\n 8\\n\\ndoing, we express no opinion on whether the ALJβs RFC findings were correct. We\\n\\nsimply ask the ALJ to give us a clearer window into her reasoning.\\n\\n\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Since it is likely to come up again below, we address another issue raised by\\n\\nThomasβs appeal: whether the ALJ should have identified and resolved a conflict\\n\\nbetween the DOT and the testimony of the VE. This requires us to decide whether there\\n\\nis an βapparent conflictβ between a limitation to βshort, simple instructionsβ (as found in\\n\\nThomasβs RFC) and a need to carry out βdetailed but uninvolved . . . instructionsβ (as\\n\\nfound in jobs requiring Level 2 reasoning). We hold that there is.\\n\\n Some background explanation is in order. When, as in this case, an ALJ determines\\n\\nthat a claimantβs RFC prevents the claimant from performing her past work, the ALJ\\n\\nreaches step five of the review process. Recall that at this step, the burden shifts to the\\n\\nCommissioner to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant is capable\\n\\nof doing other work that exists in significant supply in the national economy. Mascio,\\n\\n780 F.3d at 635. The Commissioner often seeks to meet this burden through the\\n\\ntestimony of a VE. Specifically, as in this case, the Commissioner calls a VE to testify to\\n\\n\\nWithout further explanation, we simply cannot tell whether the RFC findingβ\\nparticularly the portion restricting Thomas to jobs that do not require a βproduction rateβ\\nor βdemand paceββproperly accounts for Thomasβs moderate limitations in\\nconcentration, persistence, and pace. On remand, the ALJ will need to establish for how\\nlong, and under what conditions, Thomas is able βto focus [her] attention on work\\nactivities and stay on task at a sustained rate.β 20 C.F.R. Β§ Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 Β§\\n12.00E(3). Only then will we or any court be able to meaningfully review the ALJβs\\nRFC finding.\\n 9\\n\\nwhether a hypothetical person with the same limitations as the claimant would be able to\\n\\nperform any of the jobs listed in the DOT. Id.; see also SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at\\n\\n*2 (Dec. 4, 2000).\\n\\n An ALJ cannot rely unquestioningly on a VEβs testimony. Rather, an ALJ must\\n\\nensure that any βapparentβ conflicts between the Dictionary and the VEβs testimony are\\n\\nreasonably resolved. SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2. To that end, the ALJ must\\n\\nask the VE whether his or her testimony conflicts with the DOT. If the answer is βyes,β\\n\\nthe ALJ βmust elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying onβ the\\n\\ntestimony. Id. But even if the VE answers βno,β the ALJ has an affirmative βduty to\\n\\nmake an independent identification of apparent conflicts.β Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d\\n\\n204, 210 (4th Cir. 2015). This means that the ALJ must recognize and resolve ways in\\n\\nwhich a VEβs testimony βseems to, but does not necessarily,β conflict with the βexpress\\n\\nlanguageβ of the DOTβeven if the conflict is not βobvious.β Id. at 209.\\n\\n Our opinion in Pearson furnishes us with a useful example of what makes a conflict\\n\\napparent. 6 In Pearson, an ALJ evaluated an SSI claimantβs RFC and determined that the\\n\\nclaimant βcould only occasionally reach upwardβ with his βnondominant arm.β Id. at\\n\\n210. At step five of the review process, a VE testified that in spite of the claimantβs\\n\\nphysical limitation, the claimant could perform several jobs that existed in significant\\n\\nnumbers in the national economy. Id. Yet according to the DOT, all the jobs identified\\n\\nby the VE required βfrequent reaching.β Id. at 210β11 (emphasis in original). We held\\n\\n\\n\\n6\\n We note that Pearson was decided after the ALJ denied Thomasβs application.\\n 10\\n\\nthat there was an apparent conflict between the DOT and the VEβs testimonyβeven\\n\\nthough, based on the DOT, it was not clear whether the jobs identified by the VE would\\n\\never require the claimant to reach overhead with his nondominant arm. Because the ALJ\\n\\nhad failed to identify or resolve this conflict, we remanded. Id. at 211.\\n\\n The VEβs testimony in this case contains a comparable conflict with the DOT. After\\n\\nbeing informed of Thomasβs RFC, the VE testified that Thomas was capable of holding\\n\\nthree jobs: marker, final inspector, and order caller. As noted above, the DOT states that\\n\\nall three of the jobs identified by the VE require employees to βcarry out detailed but\\n\\nuninvolved written or oral instructions . . . .β DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802; DOT\\n\\n727.687-054, 1991 WL 679672; DOT 209.667-014, 1991 WL 671807. By comparison,\\n\\nThomasβs RFC limits her to jobs that involve only βshort, simple instructions.β\\n\\n We believe that Thomas, being limited to short, simple instructions, may not be able\\n\\nto carry out detailed but uninvolved instructions. This is not a categorical ruleβsome\\n\\ninstructions, particularly if they are well-drafted, may be simultaneously short, simple,\\n\\ndetailed, and uninvolved. Even so, the conflict between Thomasβs limitation to short,\\n\\nsimple instructions and the VEβs testimony that Thomas could perform jobs that include\\n\\ndetailed but uninvolved instructions is as apparent as the conflict we identified in\\n\\nPearson. Since we held that an apparent conflict existed in Pearson, we are satisfied that\\n\\none exists in this case, too. 7 We remand so that the ALJ can resolve the conflict in\\n\\n\\n\\n7\\n The Commissioner did not argue that this conflict, if apparent, would be harmless;\\ntherefore, we decline to reach that question now. See United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254,\\n280 n.8 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that government may waive harmless error\\n 11\\n\\naccordance with the Administrationβs regulations.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n We hereby vacate the district courtβs order granting summary judgment to the\\n\\nCommissioner. The case is remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to\\n\\nthe Commissioner for such further administrative proceedings as may be appropriate.\\n\\n VACATED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nargument).\\n 12\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":566,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4593143,"string":"4,593,143"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Mitra RANGARAJAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Defendant - Appellee. Mitra Rangarajan, United States of America, State of Maryland, Ex Rel., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation; Johns Hopkins Hospital, Incorporated, Trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; Anthony Kalloo, M.D.; Johns Hopkins University, Defendants - Appellees. Mitra Rangarajan, United States of America, State of Maryland, Ex Rel., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation and Johns Hopkins University, Trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; Johns Hopkins Hospital, Incorporated, Defendants - Appellees."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Mitra Rangarajan v. Johns Hopkins University"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-1834; 17-1835; 17-1836"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gregory, Niemeyer, Harris\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-1834\\n\\n\\nMITRA RANGARAJAN,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-1835\\n\\n\\nMITRA RANGARAJAN, United States of America, State of Maryland, ex rel.,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION; JOHNS HOPKINS\\nHOSPITAL, INCORPORATED, trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; ANTHONY\\nKALLOO, M.D.; JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,\\n\\n Defendants β Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-1836\\n\\n\\nMITRA RANGARAJAN, United States of America, State of Maryland, ex rel.,\\n\\f Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION AND JOHNS\\nHOPKINS UNIVERSITY, trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; JOHNS HOPKINS\\nHOSPITAL, INCORPORATED,\\n\\n Defendants β Appellees.\\n\\n\\nAppeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.\\nWilliam M. Nickerson, Senior District Judge. (1:12-cv-01953-WMN; 1:13-cv-03630-\\nWMN; 1:17-cv-00807-WMN)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 22, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Chief\\nJudge Gregory and Judge Harris joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Erienne A. Sutherell, HANSEL LAW, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for\\nAppellant. Robert Thomas Smith, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, Washington\\nD.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Cary J. Hansel, III, HANSEL LAW, P.C., Baltimore,\\nMaryland, for Appellant. Maria E. Rodriguez, Elizabeth Clark Rinehart, VENABLE,\\nLLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Daniel E. Lipton, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fNIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Mitra Rangarajan, who claims that she was constructively discharged as a nurse\\n\\npractitioner at the School of Medicine of Johns Hopkins University β whether because\\n\\nof discrimination and retaliation, as she contends, or because of her performance, as\\n\\nJohns Hopkins contends β commenced four separate actions against the University *\\n\\narising out of the same course of events and alleging state torts of defamation and\\n\\ninterference with prospective advantage, as well as violations of the False Claims Act, the\\n\\nMaryland False Health Claims Act, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1981. Over the long\\n\\ncourse of proceedings in these cases, the district court dismissed one action for failure to\\n\\nprosecute and the remaining three actions as the sanction for Rangarajanβs βflagrant and\\n\\nunremittingβ violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially with respect to\\n\\ndiscovery and summary judgment practice.\\n\\n On appeal, Rangarajan contends that the district court abused its discretion by\\n\\nfailing to give her adequate warning of the sanction and failing to show required restraint\\n\\nby imposing lesser sanctions. After careful review of the lengthy procedural history of\\n\\nthe cases, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Rangarajanβs\\n\\nconduct under the procedural rules was inept and abusive to the degree that, as the district\\n\\ncourt found in its thorough 44-page opinion, it rendered virtually useless five years of\\n\\n\\n *\\n Rangarajan sued not only Johns Hopkins University but also the Johns Hopkins\\nHealth System Corp., the Johns Hopkins Hospital Inc., and related personnel whom she\\nrefers to in her brief collectively as Johns Hopkins or JH. We are satisfied also to refer to\\nJohns Hopkins collectively, as the issues in this appeal are not implicated by which entity\\nmight have been involved in any given activity.\\n\\n 3\\n\\fproceedings before the district court, and such abuse would likely have continued in any\\n\\nfuture proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n I\\n\\n Rangarajanβs employment at Johns Hopkins as a nurse over the period from 2007\\n\\nto 2011 was volatile and unsatisfactory to both Rangarajan and Johns Hopkins. From\\n\\nRangarajanβs viewpoint, as the district court summarized, she was a stellar healthcare\\n\\nprovider who was treated unfairly by supervisors and coworkers in the following\\n\\nrespects:\\n\\n [S]he was denied the $95,000 salary that she was allegedly promised; she\\n was assigned unmanageable workloads; she was not provided the training\\n she needed to advance her career while Dr. [Anthony] Kalloo, [the director\\n of the GI Division in which Rangarajan worked] showed favoritism and\\n provided those opportunities to another Nurse Practitioner . . . ; [she]\\n applied for but was denied permission to participate in a Nurse Practitioner\\n Fellowship Program; while she was accepted into a Doctor of Nursing\\n Practice (DNP) program, once in the program she was treated unfairly by\\n the program director . . . ; she was given an undeserved failing grade by the\\n Capstone Professor in the DNP program . . . ; and, she was denied vacation\\n leave and reimbursement for attending professional conferences.\\n\\nBut from Johns Hopkinsβ point of view, again as the district court summarized, she failed\\n\\nas a professional nurse:\\n\\n [Rangarajan] had attendance and tardiness issues, she failed to timely check\\n for test results and follow-up with patients, and her notes in medical\\n histories were often disorganized and unreliable. In response to a round of\\n negative performance reviews, [Rangarajan] was placed on a performance\\n improvement plan in January of 2011. Before that plan could be fully\\n implemented, [she] demonstrated poor judgment in the care of a patient that\\n [Johns Hopkins] assert[s] could have had catastrophic results for that\\n patient. In response to those concerns, Dr. Anthony Kalloo, the director of\\n the GI Division, suspended [Rangarajanβs] clinical privileges.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fAfter Rangarajan was suspended, she resigned from Johns Hopkins in May 2011,\\n\\nclaiming that she was constructively discharged. She then began litigation against Johns\\n\\nHopkins, filing four separate actions based on its treatment of her.\\n\\n In the first action filed in October 2012 β No. 12-1953 β Rangarajan alleged that\\n\\nJohns Hopkins engaged in widespread fraudulent billing of the U.S. Government and\\n\\nthen retaliated against her for reporting it internally. Because her claims under the False\\n\\nClaims Act and the Maryland False Health Claims Act were qui tam actions, the U.S.\\n\\nDepartment of Justice and the Maryland Attorney General investigated them but then\\n\\ndeclined to intervene, as those statutes would allow. Rangarajan thereafter voluntarily\\n\\ndismissed the qui tam claims but continued her claim alleging that Johns Hopkins\\n\\nretaliated against her for reporting fraudulent billing practices. Later, however, she filed\\n\\na motion to amend her complaint to reallege the qui tam claims, but the district court\\n\\ndenied her motion as untimely and prejudicial.\\n\\n Several months after filing the first action, Rangarajan filed a second action\\n\\nagainst Johns Hopkins β No. 13-3630 β alleging that Johns Hopkins had discriminated\\n\\nagainst her on the basis of race, national origin, age, and sex, in violation of Title VII and\\n\\n42 U.S.C. Β§ 1981. This action was based on the same conduct that formed the basis for\\n\\nher claims in the first action.\\n\\n A month after the district court denied Rangarajanβs motion to amend the first\\n\\naction to re-allege her qui tam claims, Rangarajan filed a third action β No. 15-1394 β\\n\\nalleging those same qui tam action claims again. She did not, however, pursue this action\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\fin accordance with the rules of procedure, and, after it languished for over a year and a\\n\\nhalf, the district court dismissed it for failure to prosecute.\\n\\n Rather than appealing the district courtβs ruling in the third action, Rangarajan\\n\\nfiled a fourth action β No. 17-807 β which the district court concluded was βessentially\\n\\nidentical to the just-dismissed [third] action.β The court by then, however, had before it\\n\\nJohns Hopkinsβ motion for sanctions based on Rangarajanβs discovery and summary\\n\\njudgment practices in the first and second actions, and accordingly it stayed the fourth\\n\\naction pending its ruling on the sanctions motion.\\n\\n After the second action was filed, the district court consolidated the first and\\n\\nsecond actions, and the parties conducted discovery in the consolidated actions. During\\n\\ndiscovery, Johns Hopkins provided Rangarajan with nearly 50,000 pages of documents,\\n\\nincluding tens of thousands of emails. It also arranged for and participated in the\\n\\ndepositions of 14 former and current employees of Johns Hopkins. During this period,\\n\\nRangarajan also responded to Johns Hopkinsβ discovery requests. In response to Johns\\n\\nHopkinsβ request for all βjhmi.eduβ and βjhu.eduβ emails in her possession, Rangarajan\\n\\nmade no objection and produced 1,573 pages of documents. After the close of discovery,\\n\\nshe produced an additional 85 pages, stating that they also responded to Johns Hopkinsβ\\n\\nrequest for her βjhmi.eduβ and βjhu.eduβ emails. Rangarajan also gave a deposition,\\n\\nwhich lasted roughly seven hours.\\n\\n After discovery closed in September 2016 as directed in the district courtβs\\n\\nscheduling order, Johns Hopkins filed a motion for summary judgment in both\\n\\nconsolidated actions, based on the record that discovery had produced. Johns Hopkins\\n\\n 6\\n\\fcontended that summary judgment in its favor was justified by βoverwhelming evidence\\n\\nthat Ms. Rangarajan did not satisfy the basic requirements of her job[] and that there were\\n\\nlegitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for any adverse employment\\n\\naction that she allegedly suffered.β\\n\\n In response to Johns Hopkinsβ motion for summary judgment, Rangarajan took a\\n\\nnumber of steps to expand, embellish, alter, and recast her deposition testimony. First,\\n\\nshe submitted a 51-page errata sheet to her deposition, proposing hundreds of edits to her\\n\\ntestimony and justifying many of the changes by claiming that the court reporter had\\n\\nintentionally altered both the transcript and the audio and video recording of her\\n\\ndeposition. She stated:\\n\\n The Court Reportersβ Office has informed me that they edited my video,\\n audio and typed deposition transcripts. It is clear that key testimony is\\n deleted, altered, cloned from various sound bites etc., to accomplish two\\n things. 1. Change the testimony 2. To induce grammar mistakes thus\\n making me sound as if I am speaking broken English.\\n\\nShe also sent an ex parte letter to the district court for the district judgeβs βeyes only,β\\n\\nclaiming similarly that the court reporter improperly edited her deposition.\\n\\n Second, in support of her opposition to the summary judgment motion, Rangarajan\\n\\nfiled a 54-page Declaration in which she introduced new allegations, attached 19 exhibits\\n\\nthat had never before been produced during discovery, and revised testimony that\\n\\nallegedly contradicted her deposition testimony. While the district court did not find the\\n\\nDeclaration to be βdiametrically opposedβ to Rangarajanβs statements in the deposition, it\\n\\nnonetheless concluded that reliance on the Declaration βwould render the taking of\\n\\n[Rangarajanβs] deposition essentially useless.β Rangarajanβs opposition to Johns\\n\\n 7\\n\\fHopkinsβ motion for summary judgment was grounded mainly on her Declaration and not\\n\\nthe evidence produced during discovery. As the district court noted, while Rangarajan\\n\\ncited her deposition testimony only 3 times in her opposition, she cited her subsequently\\n\\nfiled Declaration βover 750 times.β\\n\\n In addition, the newly disclosed exhibits revealed major failures by Rangarajan to\\n\\nproduce documents requested of her during discovery. For instance, several exhibits β\\n\\nscreenshots of Rangarajanβs emails β revealed her computerβs entire display showing\\n\\nretained copies of emails in two inboxes labeled βJhmiβ and βJhmi 1,β and one of those\\n\\ninboxes contained 8,612 emails, most of which had never been produced during\\n\\ndiscovery; Rangarajan had only produced 1,658 documents during discovery.\\n\\n After receiving Rangarajanβs opposition to its motion for summary judgment,\\n\\nJohns Hopkins filed a motion to stay further briefing on the summary judgment motion,\\n\\nto strike Rangarajanβs opposition to its motion for summary judgment, and to dismiss\\n\\nRangarajanβs actions as the sanction for her improper conduct. In support of its motion,\\n\\nit claimed that Rangarajan had βattempted to fundamentally alter the record that existed\\n\\nwhen discovery closedβ by, among other things,\\n\\n (1) submitting her 51-page errata, which baselessly accused the court\\n reporter of altering hundreds of lines of key testimony; (2) including\\n a 54-page declaration that sought to fill critical holes in her story;\\n (3) attaching at least 19 documents to her opposition that had not\\n been produced during discovery; and (4) concealing thousands of e-\\n mails responsive to [Johns Hopkinsβ] requests after falsely certifying\\n that she would produce these documents.\\n\\nAfter receiving Johns Hopkinsβ motion, the district court issued an order staying further\\n\\nproceedings on the summary judgment motion and informing Rangarajan that Johns\\n\\n 8\\n\\fHopkinsβ motion for sanctions βraise[d] some serious issues regarding [Rangarajanβs]\\n\\nlack of compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, both throughout the\\n\\ndiscovery process and in the submission of her opposition to the summary judgment\\n\\nmotion.β\\n\\n The next day, the court unsealed Rangarajanβs third action, which was again a qui\\n\\ntam action, and dismissed it for nonprosecution. Nonetheless, Rangarajan then proceeded\\n\\nto file the fourth action repeating the qui tam allegations she had made in the first and\\n\\nthird actions. The district court stayed the fourth action, pending disposition of the\\n\\nmotion for sanctions.\\n\\n In response to the motion for sanctions, Rangarajan argued that her Declaration\\n\\ndid not contradict her deposition testimony and that her errata sheet properly clarified her\\n\\ndeposition testimony. As to her accusation that the court reporter altered the deposition\\n\\ntranscript, she stated:\\n\\n Ms. Rangarajan believes that her deposition transcript was changed and that\\n Defendants are attempting to divert attention to this discrepancy through its\\n Motion to Strike. However, Ms. Rangarajan does not know who changed\\n the transcript. She also believes that the exhibits provided by the Court\\n Reporter were different than those shown to her during her deposition. In\\n addition, she believes that she did not receive her original deposition video.\\n Ms. Rangarajan has provided a detailed chart with examples of the\\n testimony in the transcript to show the discrepancy in the written testimony\\n and video and the statement of an expert who viewed the video, which\\n confirm her position.\\n\\nAs to her nonproduction of emails, Rangarajan stated that she βbelieve[d] that she\\n\\nprovided all her emails to her counsel.β\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f After briefing on the motion for sanctions was completed, Rangarajan filed yet\\n\\nanother paper entitled βNotice of Plaintiffβs Analysis,β again purporting to demonstrate\\n\\nthat the Court Reporter had altered the videotape of her deposition, again asserting\\n\\nmalfeasance, and again embellishing her testimony.\\n\\n By order dated June 16, 2017, the district court granted Johns Hopkinsβ motion for\\n\\nsanctions, dismissing Rangarajanβs three pending actions β the first, the second, and the\\n\\nfourth. In its thorough written opinion, which recited Rangarajanβs misconduct chapter\\n\\nand verse, the court concluded that β[n]othing that [Rangarajan] submitted lends any\\n\\ncredence to her claims that the videotape or transcript of her deposition was purposely\\n\\naltered in any way. . . . The Court suspects that [Rangarajanβs] inexorable need to deflect\\n\\nresponsibility and to project it on others perhaps sheds more light on [her] difficulties in\\n\\nthe GI Division than any of the actual testimony in her deposition.β With respect to the\\n\\nDeclaration that Rangarajan had filed, the court concluded that it was an effort βto\\n\\nreplace [Rangarajanβs deposition testimony] with [a] more favorable narrative of events.β\\n\\nThe court noted that if it were to rely on the Declaration, the Declaration βwould render\\n\\nthe taking of [Rangarajanβs] deposition essentially useless.β And with respect to Johns\\n\\nHopkinsβ claims that Rangarajan withheld documents during discovery, the court\\n\\nconcluded that Rangarajan βfailed to fulfill her discovery obligations under Rule 26(e).β\\n\\nMoreover, the court found that Rangarajan βflagrantly and unremittingly violated the\\n\\nrules governing discovery and summary judgment motions practiceβ and that Rangarajan\\n\\nherself was clearly culpable. βThe responsibility for the lack of compliance with the\\n\\npertinent rules [lay] primarily with her and not with her counsel.β While the court\\n\\n 10\\n\\fcriticized Rangarajanβs counsel for his judgment, the court concluded that Rangarajan\\n\\nherself βhas been and continues to be the prime offender.β Finally, the court concluded\\n\\nthat Rangarajanβs conduct βrendered much of [the litigation] activity essentially\\n\\nmeaningless,β and her conduct βimpacted the dozen witnesses who could not care for\\n\\npatients while responding to her claims and has also depleted the resources of [the\\n\\nvarious agencies that were necessarily involved].β And to justify dismissal rather than a\\n\\nlesser sanction, the court concluded that βthere is not another remedy that would\\n\\neffectively address [Rangarajanβs] violations.β Even if it attempted a more limited\\n\\nsanction, it noted, βdiscovery would need to be reopened and it is likely that plaintiff\\n\\nwould need to be re-deposed and [Johns Hopkinsβ] motion for summary judgment\\n\\nre-briefed. Doing so would foist considerabl[y] more expense on [Johns Hopkins].\\n\\nGiven the history of this litigation, were discovery to be reopened, the Court has little\\n\\nconfidence that [Rangarajanβs] counsel would be able to ensure [Rangarajanβs]\\n\\ncompliance with the rules of discovery.β The court also recognized βthe futility of\\n\\nredoing discovery and motions practiceβ because βit [was] apparent from the current\\n\\nrecord that those claims would fail on the merits.β\\n\\n From the district courtβs order, Rangarajan filed this appeal.\\n\\n\\n II\\n\\n Rangarajan does not challenge the district courtβs factual findings. Indeed, she\\n\\nappears to acknowledge her βirregularitiesβ and βtransgressions,β blaming them on\\n\\nβdisagreements between [her] and her previous attorney.β Rather, she contends (1) that\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\fthe district court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction βwithout providing the\\n\\nrequired clear and explicit warning to [her] that her discovery transgressions could lead to\\n\\ndismissalβ and (2) that the court abused its discretion in βfail[ing] to use the restraint\\n\\nrequired in exercising this most extreme sanction without adequately addressing the\\n\\nrequired factors,β arguing that the βtransgressions . . . would have been rectifiable by\\n\\nlesser sanctions.β She also contends that the district court abused its discretion in\\n\\ndismissing the fourth action as part of the sanction. We address these points in order.\\n\\n\\n A\\n\\n Rangarajan first argues that prior warning of sanctions was required and that she\\n\\ndid not receive prior warning. We reject both arguments.\\n\\n First, as a factual matter, Rangarajan did receive notice that dismissal of her\\n\\nactions was a potential sanction when the district court, in response to Johns Hopkinsβ\\n\\nmotion for sanctions, alerted her that the motion βraised some serious issuesβ regarding\\n\\nher failure to comply with rules relating to discovery and summary judgment. Johns\\n\\nHopkinsβ motion itself detailed the alleged failures and sought dismissal of the first and\\n\\nsecond actions as a sanction. The gravity of the issues was also conveyed to Rangarajan\\n\\nby the district courtβs order staying proceedings in not only the first and second actions,\\n\\nbut also in the fourth action. Moreover, Rangarajan conceded in her response that she\\n\\nknew that the sanction of dismissal was on the table, as she fully addressed the sanction\\n\\nof dismissal, arguing that it was βnot warrantedβ and that Johns Hopkinsβ motion was\\n\\nonly an effort at distracting the court from the truth. She also argued that she had not\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\freceived clear notice of potential dismissal, yet, in making that argument itself before any\\n\\nsanction was imposed, she revealed that she had notice. It does not ring true, therefore,\\n\\nthat the district court failed to warn Rangarajan. The fact remains that she not only was\\n\\nwarned, she argued her position on both the sanction of dismissal and the lack of notice\\n\\nbefore any sanction was issued.\\n\\n Moreover, Rangarajanβs contention that a clear and explicit warning of dismissal\\n\\nmust always be given is not supported by any specific authority. To be sure, giving\\n\\nnotice is an aspect of fairness in procedure that might relate to the ultimate fairness of\\n\\nimposing any sanction. But it is not a rubric to be applied mechanically. Federal Rule of\\n\\nCivil Procedure 37, on which Rangarajan relies, imposes no such requirement, and\\n\\nHathcock v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 1995), on\\n\\nwhich she also relies, did not mandate it in every situation. In Hathcock, we recognized\\n\\nthe βsignificance of warning a defendant about the possibility of default before entering\\n\\nsuch a harsh sanctionβ in circumstances where the district court had entered a default\\n\\njudgment for the defendantβs failure to follow general scheduling orders. Id. at 40. But a\\n\\nwarning was not held to be a necessary element for imposing a Rule 37 sanction. Rather,\\n\\nthe lack of warning was a deficiency reflecting on the district courtβs exercise of\\n\\ndiscretion in selecting a particular sanction for violating the courtβs general scheduling\\n\\norders.\\n\\n As importantly, in this case, the district court did not impose its sanction under\\n\\nRule 37. While the court did recognize its authority under Rule 37 to dismiss actions, it\\n\\nrelied on its inherent power to do so because the circumstances presented a party who\\n\\n 13\\n\\fβabuse[d] the process at a level that [was] utterly inconsistent with the orderly\\n\\nadministration of justice or undermine[d] the integrity of the process,β quoting Projects\\n\\nManagement Co. v. Dyncorp International, LLC, 734 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. 2013)\\n\\n(quoting United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993)). In\\n\\nDyncorp, we affirmed dismissal of an action as a sanction where the plaintiff βwas on\\n\\nclear notice of the district courtβs consideration of the use of its inherent authority and\\n\\nhad a full opportunity to argue its position before the court.β Id. at 376. So it was here,\\n\\nas the court stated in response to Johns Hopkinsβ motion for dismissal, that Johns\\n\\nHopkins had presented the court with βserious issues,β and Rangarajan then had a full\\n\\nopportunity to respond β and did respond β before any decision on sanctions was\\n\\nmade.\\n\\n\\n B\\n\\n Rangarajanβs argument that the district court failed to exhibit restraint by declining\\n\\nto impose lesser sanctions challenges the courtβs exercise of discretion with respect to its\\n\\ninherent power to dismiss an action. We review that exercise of discretion for abuse. See\\n\\nShaffer, 11 F.3d at 462.\\n\\n In exercising its discretion, the district court relied on the six factors set forth in\\n\\nShaffer, 11 F.3d at 462β63. As we explained in Shaffer, when exercising its power to\\n\\ndismiss as a sanction, a court must consider:\\n\\n (1) the degree of the wrongdoerβs culpability; (2) the extent of the clientβs\\n blameworthiness if the wrongful conduct is committed by its attorney,\\n recognizing that we seldom dismiss claims against blameless clients; (3) the\\n prejudice to the judicial process and the administration of justice; (4) the\\n\\n 14\\n\\f prejudice to the victim; (5) the availability of other sanctions to rectify the\\n wrong by punishing culpable persons, compensating harmed persons, and\\n deterring similar conduct in the future; and (6) the public interest.\\n\\nId. In addressing the first two factors, the district court found that Rangarajan was\\n\\npersonally responsible for her actions. As to the third and fourth factors, the court noted\\n\\nthat βDefendants have been forced to expend a tremendous amount of time, effort, and\\n\\nexpense in the discovery process and motions practiceβ and that Rangarajanβs βconduct\\n\\nhas rendered much of that activity essentially meaningless.β As to the fifth factor, while\\n\\nrecognizing that striking Rangarajanβs Declaration and the exhibits not produced in\\n\\ndiscovery could have cured the prejudice resulting from those specific failures, the court\\n\\nconcluded that such a sanction βwould not address her failure to produce the thousands of\\n\\nemails contained on her home computer.β Moreover, the court expressed its lack of\\n\\nconfidence that counsel could ensure Rangarajanβs compliance given her previous\\n\\nfailures. The court also concluded that reopening discovery would be futile because\\n\\nRangarajanβs βdesperate attempt to disavow her deposition testimony and replace it with\\n\\nher Declaration [was] an implicit acknowledgement that her claims were unsupported\\n\\nunder the record produced through discovery.β Finally, as to the sixth factor, the court\\n\\nfound that the public interest supported dismissal because the βlitigation ha[d] interrupted\\n\\nthe provision of care of numerous health care providers and impacted the resources of\\n\\nthis Court and several administrative agenciesβ and Rangarajanβs actions βseriously\\n\\nundermined the truth-seeking function of the Court.β Finding that all of the six factors\\n\\nweighed against Rangarajan and in favor of dismissal, the court imposed the sanction of\\n\\ndismissal.\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Rangarajan argues nonetheless that the district court abused its discretion in\\n\\nbypassing βthe analysis set forth by the Fourth Circuit for determining whether sanction\\n\\nis even appropriate for [her] failures to update disclosure in discovery and proceed[ing]\\n\\ndirectly to selecting a penalty.β She also argues that, β[i]n seeking an appropriate\\n\\npenalty, the court also bypassed those penalties contemplated specifically for this failure\\n\\nto disclose, as set forth in Rule 37(c)(1), and proceed[ed] directly to [the] harshest of the\\n\\nother sanctions enumerated under Rule 37(b)(2).β She then concludes:\\n\\n The several irregularities of discovery cited by the lower court in the instant\\n matter either do not rise to the level of a violation worthy of sanction or, if\\n found to be sanctionable, were by no means permanent, surprising, or\\n fatally prejudicial. The lower court could have easily remedied these by\\n sanctions tailored to the transgression, even though it may not be exactly\\n commensurate, and still remain within its discretion.\\n\\nTo support that conclusion, Rangarajan then launches into a discussion of how each\\n\\nβirregularityβ or βtransgressionβ was justified, could have been rectified, or in any case\\n\\ndid not justify dismissal. For example, with respect to her failure to produce thousands of\\n\\nemails that she was required to produce during discovery, she argues that βthere has been\\n\\nno effort by the court and no agreement by the parties to provide for a finding of fact or\\n\\nagreeable method of determining which of those [8,612 emails] [was] discoverable,\\n\\nwhich may be personal or even privileged, or how they should be provided in discovery.β\\n\\nYet, during the discovery, Rangarajan made no objection to the request for documents β\\n\\nwhich called for the production of all emails in her βJhmiβ and βJhmi 1β inboxes, and\\n\\nmore β but rather confirmed that she was producing all of the documents covered by\\n\\nJohns Hopkinsβ requests. Her arguments typically turn a blind eye to the scope of her\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\fmisconduct as found by the district court and thus fail to address the specific misconduct\\n\\nfound.\\n\\n When reviewed it its totality, the record in this case reveals a totally dysfunctional\\n\\nperformance by Rangarajan and her counsel, but mostly by her, as she acknowledged in\\n\\nher brief that β[t]hough [I] was, in fact, represented by an attorney, the court was well\\n\\naware that [I] was in many ways acting without the benefit of counsel.β\\n\\n To begin, Rangarajan commenced four actions, when only one was proper and\\n\\nwould have sufficed, repeatedly reasserting claims that the district court had dismissed.\\n\\nAfter the district court denied her motion to replead qui tam claims in the first action, she\\n\\nnonetheless repleaded them in the third action, and when the district court dismissed the\\n\\nthird action, she refiled the same claims in the fourth action.\\n\\n In the course of discovery, Rangarajan flagrantly failed to produce thousands of\\n\\ndocuments, several of which were core documents relating to her claims. She later\\n\\nproduced some of those documents for the first time during the summary judgment\\n\\nprocess, because she thought she needed them to make her points. Also, after giving a\\n\\ndaylong deposition, she sought to undermine and recant her testimony in a long, 54-page\\n\\nDeclaration that, as the district court found, rendered her deposition essentially useless.\\n\\nFinally, she challenged the transcription of her deposition, claiming it was deliberately\\n\\naltered and recreated by the court reporter, a conclusion that the district court found to be\\n\\nconclusively false. In short, she rendered virtually useless the entire discovery process, in\\n\\nwhich the parties had invested substantial time and money.\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\f During summary judgment, which required additional expenditures of time and\\n\\nmoney, Rangarajan relied almost exclusively on her Declaration, which had not been\\n\\nmade part of the discovery record and which was often inconsistent with her deposition\\n\\ntestimony, placing the summary judgment practice on an untenable and virtually useless\\n\\nfooting.\\n\\n In addition to these specifics, it was also apparent throughout the entire\\n\\nproceedings that, while Rangarajan was represented by an attorney, she refused to follow\\n\\nhis advice and engaged in inappropriate actions, such as communicating arguments\\n\\ndirectly to the court ex parte and including substantive matters in her errata sheet. And\\n\\nthe district court attributed this dysfunction between attorney and client to Rangarajan\\n\\npersonally, a finding that Rangarajan has not disputed. As the court stated:\\n\\n It [was] [Rangarajan] who continue[d] the attempt to support the\\n unsupportable contention that the court reporting service made hundreds of\\n alterations to her deposition video and transcript. It is clear that it was\\n [Rangarajan] who authored the embellished narrative contained in her\\n Declaration. It was [Rangarajan] who failed to turn over to her counsel\\n documents that were clearly responsive to discovery requests and it [was]\\n [Rangarajan] who misrepresented the amount of emails from her work\\n email account that were stored on her home computer.\\n\\nThe court also pointed to the statement of Rangarajanβs counsel that β[Rangarajan] had\\n\\nadditions and revisions to her declaration which . . . result[ed] in changes to the\\n\\nopposition, and [Rangarajan] and her counsel [were] not in agreement with the final\\n\\ncontent of the opposition.β\\n\\n Any effort to have retrieved useful products of some five years of the litigation\\n\\nprocess would undoubtedly have failed to produce much of what was needed to\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\fadjudicate the case. The district court so concluded β βRangarajanβs conduct has\\n\\nrendered much of [the litigation] activity essentially meaningless.β It observed that any\\n\\nattempt to remedy this would require a do-over β βdiscovery would need to be reopened\\n\\nand it is likely that [Rangarajan] would need to be re-deposed and [Johns Hopkinsβ]\\n\\nmotion for summary judgment re-briefed.β And all of this would be at much additional\\n\\nexpense. Also important to the courtβs ultimate sanction decision was its additional\\n\\nfinding that, in light of Rangarajanβs conduct, the court had βlittle confidence that\\n\\n[Rangarajanβs] counsel would be able to ensure [Rangarajanβs] compliance with the rules\\n\\nof discovery,β a finding that the court made while expressing doubt about the merits of\\n\\nRangarajanβs claims.\\n\\n We are mindful of the strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on the merits\\n\\nand disfavoring dismissals without a merits decision. See Shaffer, 11 F.3d at 462. But\\n\\nwhen a party βabuses the process at a level that is utterly inconsistent with the orderly\\n\\nadministration of justice or undermines the integrity of the processβ β as we conclude\\n\\nRangarajan did here β she forfeits her right to use the process. Id. We hold that the\\n\\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the actions.\\n\\n\\n C\\n\\n Finally, Rangarajan contends that the sanction imposed by the district court should\\n\\nnot have included dismissal of the fourth action because the reasons that the district court\\n\\ngave for dismissal of the first and second actions were not applicable to the fourth action.\\n\\nThe district court, however, noted that the fourth action was essentially the same as the\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\fthird action, which it had dismissed earlier for nonprosecution. It also noted that the\\n\\nfourth action related to βtransactions that took place as long as nine years ago.β\\n\\nMoreover, we note that the claims in the fourth action were not only the same as the\\n\\nclaims in the third action, they were also the same as the claims that Rangarajan was\\n\\nbarred from repleading in the first action based on the courtβs finding that they were\\n\\nuntimely and prejudicial.\\n\\n All four actions that Rangarajan filed against Johns Hopkins were based on the\\n\\nsame term of employment and the same course of events, and the fact that two of the\\n\\nactions specifically suffered from Rangarajanβs misconduct does not spare the other two\\n\\nactions from being infected by the same misconduct. As the court found, Rangarajanβs\\n\\nmisconduct in litigating would not likely have abated in the future. We believe,\\n\\nmoreover, that the unnecessary multiplicity of actions was an abuse that colored\\n\\nRangarajanβs entire litigation efforts. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion\\n\\nin including the fourth action in the scope of its sanction.\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4370396/\", \"author_raw\": \"NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GREGORY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"NIEMEYER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HARRIS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593143/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Mitra RANGARAJAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Defendant - Appellee. Mitra Rangarajan, United States of America, State of Maryland, Ex Rel., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation; Johns Hopkins Hospital, Incorporated, Trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; Anthony Kalloo, M.D.; Johns Hopkins University, Defendants - Appellees. Mitra Rangarajan, United States of America, State of Maryland, Ex Rel., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation and Johns Hopkins University, Trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; Johns Hopkins Hospital, Incorporated, Defendants - Appellees.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-1834\n\n\nMITRA RANGARAJAN,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nJOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,\n\n Defendant β Appellee.\n\n\n\n No. 17-1835\n\n\nMITRA RANGARAJAN, United States of America, State of Maryland, ex rel.,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nJOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION; JOHNS HOPKINS\nHOSPITAL, INCORPORATED, trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; ANTHONY\nKALLOO, M.D.; JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,\n\n Defendants β Appellees.\n\n\n\n No. 17-1836\n\n\nMITRA RANGARAJAN, United States of America, State of Maryland, ex rel.,\n\f Plaintiff β Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nJOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION AND JOHNS\nHOPKINS UNIVERSITY, trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; JOHNS HOPKINS\nHOSPITAL, INCORPORATED,\n\n Defendants β Appellees.\n\n\nAppeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.\nWilliam M. Nickerson, Senior District Judge. (1:12-cv-01953-WMN; 1:13-cv-03630-\nWMN; 1:17-cv-00807-WMN)\n\n\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 22, 2019\n\n\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Chief\nJudge Gregory and Judge Harris joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Erienne A. Sutherell, HANSEL LAW, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for\nAppellant. Robert Thomas Smith, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, Washington\nD.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Cary J. Hansel, III, HANSEL LAW, P.C., Baltimore,\nMaryland, for Appellant. Maria E. Rodriguez, Elizabeth Clark Rinehart, VENABLE,\nLLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Daniel E. Lipton, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP,\nWashington, D.C., for Appellees.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\fNIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:\n\n Mitra Rangarajan, who claims that she was constructively discharged as a nurse\n\npractitioner at the School of Medicine of Johns Hopkins University β whether because\n\nof discrimination and retaliation, as she contends, or because of her performance, as\n\nJohns Hopkins contends β commenced four separate actions against the University *\n\narising out of the same course of events and alleging state torts of defamation and\n\ninterference with prospective advantage, as well as violations of the False Claims Act, the\n\nMaryland False Health Claims Act, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1981. Over the long\n\ncourse of proceedings in these cases, the district court dismissed one action for failure to\n\nprosecute and the remaining three actions as the sanction for Rangarajanβs βflagrant and\n\nunremittingβ violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially with respect to\n\ndiscovery and summary judgment practice.\n\n On appeal, Rangarajan contends that the district court abused its discretion by\n\nfailing to give her adequate warning of the sanction and failing to show required restraint\n\nby imposing lesser sanctions. After careful review of the lengthy procedural history of\n\nthe cases, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Rangarajanβs\n\nconduct under the procedural rules was inept and abusive to the degree that, as the district\n\ncourt found in its thorough 44-page opinion, it rendered virtually useless five years of\n\n\n *\n Rangarajan sued not only Johns Hopkins University but also the Johns Hopkins\nHealth System Corp., the Johns Hopkins Hospital Inc., and related personnel whom she\nrefers to in her brief collectively as Johns Hopkins or JH. We are satisfied also to refer to\nJohns Hopkins collectively, as the issues in this appeal are not implicated by which entity\nmight have been involved in any given activity.\n\n 3\n\fproceedings before the district court, and such abuse would likely have continued in any\n\nfuture proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm.\n\n\n I\n\n Rangarajanβs employment at Johns Hopkins as a nurse over the period from 2007\n\nto 2011 was volatile and unsatisfactory to both Rangarajan and Johns Hopkins. From\n\nRangarajanβs viewpoint, as the district court summarized, she was a stellar healthcare\n\nprovider who was treated unfairly by supervisors and coworkers in the following\n\nrespects:\n\n [S]he was denied the $95,000 salary that she was allegedly promised; she\n was assigned unmanageable workloads; she was not provided the training\n she needed to advance her career while Dr. [Anthony] Kalloo, [the director\n of the GI Division in which Rangarajan worked] showed favoritism and\n provided those opportunities to another Nurse Practitioner . . . ; [she]\n applied for but was denied permission to participate in a Nurse Practitioner\n Fellowship Program; while she was accepted into a Doctor of Nursing\n Practice (DNP) program, once in the program she was treated unfairly by\n the program director . . . ; she was given an undeserved failing grade by the\n Capstone Professor in the DNP program . . . ; and, she was denied vacation\n leave and reimbursement for attending professional conferences.\n\nBut from Johns Hopkinsβ point of view, again as the district court summarized, she failed\n\nas a professional nurse:\n\n [Rangarajan] had attendance and tardiness issues, she failed to timely check\n for test results and follow-up with patients, and her notes in medical\n histories were often disorganized and unreliable. In response to a round of\n negative performance reviews, [Rangarajan] was placed on a performance\n improvement plan in January of 2011. Before that plan could be fully\n implemented, [she] demonstrated poor judgment in the care of a patient that\n [Johns Hopkins] assert[s] could have had catastrophic results for that\n patient. In response to those concerns, Dr. Anthony Kalloo, the director of\n the GI Division, suspended [Rangarajanβs] clinical privileges.\n\n\n 4\n\fAfter Rangarajan was suspended, she resigned from Johns Hopkins in May 2011,\n\nclaiming that she was constructively discharged. She then began litigation against Johns\n\nHopkins, filing four separate actions based on its treatment of her.\n\n In the first action filed in October 2012 β No. 12-1953 β Rangarajan alleged that\n\nJohns Hopkins engaged in widespread fraudulent billing of the U.S. Government and\n\nthen retaliated against her for reporting it internally. Because her claims under the False\n\nClaims Act and the Maryland False Health Claims Act were qui tam actions, the U.S.\n\nDepartment of Justice and the Maryland Attorney General investigated them but then\n\ndeclined to intervene, as those statutes would allow. Rangarajan thereafter voluntarily\n\ndismissed the qui tam claims but continued her claim alleging that Johns Hopkins\n\nretaliated against her for reporting fraudulent billing practices. Later, however, she filed\n\na motion to amend her complaint to reallege the qui tam claims, but the district court\n\ndenied her motion as untimely and prejudicial.\n\n Several months after filing the first action, Rangarajan filed a second action\n\nagainst Johns Hopkins β No. 13-3630 β alleging that Johns Hopkins had discriminated\n\nagainst her on the basis of race, national origin, age, and sex, in violation of Title VII and\n\n42 U.S.C. Β§ 1981. This action was based on the same conduct that formed the basis for\n\nher claims in the first action.\n\n A month after the district court denied Rangarajanβs motion to amend the first\n\naction to re-allege her qui tam claims, Rangarajan filed a third action β No. 15-1394 β\n\nalleging those same qui tam action claims again. She did not, however, pursue this action\n\n\n\n 5\n\fin accordance with the rules of procedure, and, after it languished for over a year and a\n\nhalf, the district court dismissed it for failure to prosecute.\n\n Rather than appealing the district courtβs ruling in the third action, Rangarajan\n\nfiled a fourth action β No. 17-807 β which the district court concluded was βessentially\n\nidentical to the just-dismissed [third] action.β The court by then, however, had before it\n\nJohns Hopkinsβ motion for sanctions based on Rangarajanβs discovery and summary\n\njudgment practices in the first and second actions, and accordingly it stayed the fourth\n\naction pending its ruling on the sanctions motion.\n\n After the second action was filed, the district court consolidated the first and\n\nsecond actions, and the parties conducted discovery in the consolidated actions. During\n\ndiscovery, Johns Hopkins provided Rangarajan with nearly 50,000 pages of documents,\n\nincluding tens of thousands of emails. It also arranged for and participated in the\n\ndepositions of 14 former and current employees of Johns Hopkins. During this period,\n\nRangarajan also responded to Johns Hopkinsβ discovery requests. In response to Johns\n\nHopkinsβ request for all βjhmi.eduβ and βjhu.eduβ emails in her possession, Rangarajan\n\nmade no objection and produced 1,573 pages of documents. After the close of discovery,\n\nshe produced an additional 85 pages, stating that they also responded to Johns Hopkinsβ\n\nrequest for her βjhmi.eduβ and βjhu.eduβ emails. Rangarajan also gave a deposition,\n\nwhich lasted roughly seven hours.\n\n After discovery closed in September 2016 as directed in the district courtβs\n\nscheduling order, Johns Hopkins filed a motion for summary judgment in both\n\nconsolidated actions, based on the record that discovery had produced. Johns Hopkins\n\n 6\n\fcontended that summary judgment in its favor was justified by βoverwhelming evidence\n\nthat Ms. Rangarajan did not satisfy the basic requirements of her job[] and that there were\n\nlegitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for any adverse employment\n\naction that she allegedly suffered.β\n\n In response to Johns Hopkinsβ motion for summary judgment, Rangarajan took a\n\nnumber of steps to expand, embellish, alter, and recast her deposition testimony. First,\n\nshe submitted a 51-page errata sheet to her deposition, proposing hundreds of edits to her\n\ntestimony and justifying many of the changes by claiming that the court reporter had\n\nintentionally altered both the transcript and the audio and video recording of her\n\ndeposition. She stated:\n\n The Court Reportersβ Office has informed me that they edited my video,\n audio and typed deposition transcripts. It is clear that key testimony is\n deleted, altered, cloned from various sound bites etc., to accomplish two\n things. 1. Change the testimony 2. To induce grammar mistakes thus\n making me sound as if I am speaking broken English.\n\nShe also sent an ex parte letter to the district court for the district judgeβs βeyes only,β\n\nclaiming similarly that the court reporter improperly edited her deposition.\n\n Second, in support of her opposition to the summary judgment motion, Rangarajan\n\nfiled a 54-page Declaration in which she introduced new allegations, attached 19 exhibits\n\nthat had never before been produced during discovery, and revised testimony that\n\nallegedly contradicted her deposition testimony. While the district court did not find the\n\nDeclaration to be βdiametrically opposedβ to Rangarajanβs statements in the deposition, it\n\nnonetheless concluded that reliance on the Declaration βwould render the taking of\n\n[Rangarajanβs] deposition essentially useless.β Rangarajanβs opposition to Johns\n\n 7\n\fHopkinsβ motion for summary judgment was grounded mainly on her Declaration and not\n\nthe evidence produced during discovery. As the district court noted, while Rangarajan\n\ncited her deposition testimony only 3 times in her opposition, she cited her subsequently\n\nfiled Declaration βover 750 times.β\n\n In addition, the newly disclosed exhibits revealed major failures by Rangarajan to\n\nproduce documents requested of her during discovery. For instance, several exhibits β\n\nscreenshots of Rangarajanβs emails β revealed her computerβs entire display showing\n\nretained copies of emails in two inboxes labeled βJhmiβ and βJhmi 1,β and one of those\n\ninboxes contained 8,612 emails, most of which had never been produced during\n\ndiscovery; Rangarajan had only produced 1,658 documents during discovery.\n\n After receiving Rangarajanβs opposition to its motion for summary judgment,\n\nJohns Hopkins filed a motion to stay further briefing on the summary judgment motion,\n\nto strike Rangarajanβs opposition to its motion for summary judgment, and to dismiss\n\nRangarajanβs actions as the sanction for her improper conduct. In support of its motion,\n\nit claimed that Rangarajan had βattempted to fundamentally alter the record that existed\n\nwhen discovery closedβ by, among other things,\n\n (1) submitting her 51-page errata, which baselessly accused the court\n reporter of altering hundreds of lines of key testimony; (2) including\n a 54-page declaration that sought to fill critical holes in her story;\n (3) attaching at least 19 documents to her opposition that had not\n been produced during discovery; and (4) concealing thousands of e-\n mails responsive to [Johns Hopkinsβ] requests after falsely certifying\n that she would produce these documents.\n\nAfter receiving Johns Hopkinsβ motion, the district court issued an order staying further\n\nproceedings on the summary judgment motion and informing Rangarajan that Johns\n\n 8\n\fHopkinsβ motion for sanctions βraise[d] some serious issues regarding [Rangarajanβs]\n\nlack of compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, both throughout the\n\ndiscovery process and in the submission of her opposition to the summary judgment\n\nmotion.β\n\n The next day, the court unsealed Rangarajanβs third action, which was again a qui\n\ntam action, and dismissed it for nonprosecution. Nonetheless, Rangarajan then proceeded\n\nto file the fourth action repeating the qui tam allegations she had made in the first and\n\nthird actions. The district court stayed the fourth action, pending disposition of the\n\nmotion for sanctions.\n\n In response to the motion for sanctions, Rangarajan argued that her Declaration\n\ndid not contradict her deposition testimony and that her errata sheet properly clarified her\n\ndeposition testimony. As to her accusation that the court reporter altered the deposition\n\ntranscript, she stated:\n\n Ms. Rangarajan believes that her deposition transcript was changed and that\n Defendants are attempting to divert attention to this discrepancy through its\n Motion to Strike. However, Ms. Rangarajan does not know who changed\n the transcript. She also believes that the exhibits provided by the Court\n Reporter were different than those shown to her during her deposition. In\n addition, she believes that she did not receive her original deposition video.\n Ms. Rangarajan has provided a detailed chart with examples of the\n testimony in the transcript to show the discrepancy in the written testimony\n and video and the statement of an expert who viewed the video, which\n confirm her position.\n\nAs to her nonproduction of emails, Rangarajan stated that she βbelieve[d] that she\n\nprovided all her emails to her counsel.β\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f After briefing on the motion for sanctions was completed, Rangarajan filed yet\n\nanother paper entitled βNotice of Plaintiffβs Analysis,β again purporting to demonstrate\n\nthat the Court Reporter had altered the videotape of her deposition, again asserting\n\nmalfeasance, and again embellishing her testimony.\n\n By order dated June 16, 2017, the district court granted Johns Hopkinsβ motion for\n\nsanctions, dismissing Rangarajanβs three pending actions β the first, the second, and the\n\nfourth. In its thorough written opinion, which recited Rangarajanβs misconduct chapter\n\nand verse, the court concluded that β[n]othing that [Rangarajan] submitted lends any\n\ncredence to her claims that the videotape or transcript of her deposition was purposely\n\naltered in any way. . . . The Court suspects that [Rangarajanβs] inexorable need to deflect\n\nresponsibility and to project it on others perhaps sheds more light on [her] difficulties in\n\nthe GI Division than any of the actual testimony in her deposition.β With respect to the\n\nDeclaration that Rangarajan had filed, the court concluded that it was an effort βto\n\nreplace [Rangarajanβs deposition testimony] with [a] more favorable narrative of events.β\n\nThe court noted that if it were to rely on the Declaration, the Declaration βwould render\n\nthe taking of [Rangarajanβs] deposition essentially useless.β And with respect to Johns\n\nHopkinsβ claims that Rangarajan withheld documents during discovery, the court\n\nconcluded that Rangarajan βfailed to fulfill her discovery obligations under Rule 26(e).β\n\nMoreover, the court found that Rangarajan βflagrantly and unremittingly violated the\n\nrules governing discovery and summary judgment motions practiceβ and that Rangarajan\n\nherself was clearly culpable. βThe responsibility for the lack of compliance with the\n\npertinent rules [lay] primarily with her and not with her counsel.β While the court\n\n 10\n\fcriticized Rangarajanβs counsel for his judgment, the court concluded that Rangarajan\n\nherself βhas been and continues to be the prime offender.β Finally, the court concluded\n\nthat Rangarajanβs conduct βrendered much of [the litigation] activity essentially\n\nmeaningless,β and her conduct βimpacted the dozen witnesses who could not care for\n\npatients while responding to her claims and has also depleted the resources of [the\n\nvarious agencies that were necessarily involved].β And to justify dismissal rather than a\n\nlesser sanction, the court concluded that βthere is not another remedy that would\n\neffectively address [Rangarajanβs] violations.β Even if it attempted a more limited\n\nsanction, it noted, βdiscovery would need to be reopened and it is likely that plaintiff\n\nwould need to be re-deposed and [Johns Hopkinsβ] motion for summary judgment\n\nre-briefed. Doing so would foist considerabl[y] more expense on [Johns Hopkins].\n\nGiven the history of this litigation, were discovery to be reopened, the Court has little\n\nconfidence that [Rangarajanβs] counsel would be able to ensure [Rangarajanβs]\n\ncompliance with the rules of discovery.β The court also recognized βthe futility of\n\nredoing discovery and motions practiceβ because βit [was] apparent from the current\n\nrecord that those claims would fail on the merits.β\n\n From the district courtβs order, Rangarajan filed this appeal.\n\n\n II\n\n Rangarajan does not challenge the district courtβs factual findings. Indeed, she\n\nappears to acknowledge her βirregularitiesβ and βtransgressions,β blaming them on\n\nβdisagreements between [her] and her previous attorney.β Rather, she contends (1) that\n\n\n 11\n\fthe district court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction βwithout providing the\n\nrequired clear and explicit warning to [her] that her discovery transgressions could lead to\n\ndismissalβ and (2) that the court abused its discretion in βfail[ing] to use the restraint\n\nrequired in exercising this most extreme sanction without adequately addressing the\n\nrequired factors,β arguing that the βtransgressions . . . would have been rectifiable by\n\nlesser sanctions.β She also contends that the district court abused its discretion in\n\ndismissing the fourth action as part of the sanction. We address these points in order.\n\n\n A\n\n Rangarajan first argues that prior warning of sanctions was required and that she\n\ndid not receive prior warning. We reject both arguments.\n\n First, as a factual matter, Rangarajan did receive notice that dismissal of her\n\nactions was a potential sanction when the district court, in response to Johns Hopkinsβ\n\nmotion for sanctions, alerted her that the motion βraised some serious issuesβ regarding\n\nher failure to comply with rules relating to discovery and summary judgment. Johns\n\nHopkinsβ motion itself detailed the alleged failures and sought dismissal of the first and\n\nsecond actions as a sanction. The gravity of the issues was also conveyed to Rangarajan\n\nby the district courtβs order staying proceedings in not only the first and second actions,\n\nbut also in the fourth action. Moreover, Rangarajan conceded in her response that she\n\nknew that the sanction of dismissal was on the table, as she fully addressed the sanction\n\nof dismissal, arguing that it was βnot warrantedβ and that Johns Hopkinsβ motion was\n\nonly an effort at distracting the court from the truth. She also argued that she had not\n\n\n 12\n\freceived clear notice of potential dismissal, yet, in making that argument itself before any\n\nsanction was imposed, she revealed that she had notice. It does not ring true, therefore,\n\nthat the district court failed to warn Rangarajan. The fact remains that she not only was\n\nwarned, she argued her position on both the sanction of dismissal and the lack of notice\n\nbefore any sanction was issued.\n\n Moreover, Rangarajanβs contention that a clear and explicit warning of dismissal\n\nmust always be given is not supported by any specific authority. To be sure, giving\n\nnotice is an aspect of fairness in procedure that might relate to the ultimate fairness of\n\nimposing any sanction. But it is not a rubric to be applied mechanically. Federal Rule of\n\nCivil Procedure 37, on which Rangarajan relies, imposes no such requirement, and\n\nHathcock v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 1995), on\n\nwhich she also relies, did not mandate it in every situation. In Hathcock, we recognized\n\nthe βsignificance of warning a defendant about the possibility of default before entering\n\nsuch a harsh sanctionβ in circumstances where the district court had entered a default\n\njudgment for the defendantβs failure to follow general scheduling orders. Id. at 40. But a\n\nwarning was not held to be a necessary element for imposing a Rule 37 sanction. Rather,\n\nthe lack of warning was a deficiency reflecting on the district courtβs exercise of\n\ndiscretion in selecting a particular sanction for violating the courtβs general scheduling\n\norders.\n\n As importantly, in this case, the district court did not impose its sanction under\n\nRule 37. While the court did recognize its authority under Rule 37 to dismiss actions, it\n\nrelied on its inherent power to do so because the circumstances presented a party who\n\n 13\n\fβabuse[d] the process at a level that [was] utterly inconsistent with the orderly\n\nadministration of justice or undermine[d] the integrity of the process,β quoting Projects\n\nManagement Co. v. Dyncorp International, LLC, 734 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. 2013)\n\n(quoting United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993)). In\n\nDyncorp, we affirmed dismissal of an action as a sanction where the plaintiff βwas on\n\nclear notice of the district courtβs consideration of the use of its inherent authority and\n\nhad a full opportunity to argue its position before the court.β Id. at 376. So it was here,\n\nas the court stated in response to Johns Hopkinsβ motion for dismissal, that Johns\n\nHopkins had presented the court with βserious issues,β and Rangarajan then had a full\n\nopportunity to respond β and did respond β before any decision on sanctions was\n\nmade.\n\n\n B\n\n Rangarajanβs argument that the district court failed to exhibit restraint by declining\n\nto impose lesser sanctions challenges the courtβs exercise of discretion with respect to its\n\ninherent power to dismiss an action. We review that exercise of discretion for abuse. See\n\nShaffer, 11 F.3d at 462.\n\n In exercising its discretion, the district court relied on the six factors set forth in\n\nShaffer, 11 F.3d at 462β63. As we explained in Shaffer, when exercising its power to\n\ndismiss as a sanction, a court must consider:\n\n (1) the degree of the wrongdoerβs culpability; (2) the extent of the clientβs\n blameworthiness if the wrongful conduct is committed by its attorney,\n recognizing that we seldom dismiss claims against blameless clients; (3) the\n prejudice to the judicial process and the administration of justice; (4) the\n\n 14\n\f prejudice to the victim; (5) the availability of other sanctions to rectify the\n wrong by punishing culpable persons, compensating harmed persons, and\n deterring similar conduct in the future; and (6) the public interest.\n\nId. In addressing the first two factors, the district court found that Rangarajan was\n\npersonally responsible for her actions. As to the third and fourth factors, the court noted\n\nthat βDefendants have been forced to expend a tremendous amount of time, effort, and\n\nexpense in the discovery process and motions practiceβ and that Rangarajanβs βconduct\n\nhas rendered much of that activity essentially meaningless.β As to the fifth factor, while\n\nrecognizing that striking Rangarajanβs Declaration and the exhibits not produced in\n\ndiscovery could have cured the prejudice resulting from those specific failures, the court\n\nconcluded that such a sanction βwould not address her failure to produce the thousands of\n\nemails contained on her home computer.β Moreover, the court expressed its lack of\n\nconfidence that counsel could ensure Rangarajanβs compliance given her previous\n\nfailures. The court also concluded that reopening discovery would be futile because\n\nRangarajanβs βdesperate attempt to disavow her deposition testimony and replace it with\n\nher Declaration [was] an implicit acknowledgement that her claims were unsupported\n\nunder the record produced through discovery.β Finally, as to the sixth factor, the court\n\nfound that the public interest supported dismissal because the βlitigation ha[d] interrupted\n\nthe provision of care of numerous health care providers and impacted the resources of\n\nthis Court and several administrative agenciesβ and Rangarajanβs actions βseriously\n\nundermined the truth-seeking function of the Court.β Finding that all of the six factors\n\nweighed against Rangarajan and in favor of dismissal, the court imposed the sanction of\n\ndismissal.\n\n 15\n\f Rangarajan argues nonetheless that the district court abused its discretion in\n\nbypassing βthe analysis set forth by the Fourth Circuit for determining whether sanction\n\nis even appropriate for [her] failures to update disclosure in discovery and proceed[ing]\n\ndirectly to selecting a penalty.β She also argues that, β[i]n seeking an appropriate\n\npenalty, the court also bypassed those penalties contemplated specifically for this failure\n\nto disclose, as set forth in Rule 37(c)(1), and proceed[ed] directly to [the] harshest of the\n\nother sanctions enumerated under Rule 37(b)(2).β She then concludes:\n\n The several irregularities of discovery cited by the lower court in the instant\n matter either do not rise to the level of a violation worthy of sanction or, if\n found to be sanctionable, were by no means permanent, surprising, or\n fatally prejudicial. The lower court could have easily remedied these by\n sanctions tailored to the transgression, even though it may not be exactly\n commensurate, and still remain within its discretion.\n\nTo support that conclusion, Rangarajan then launches into a discussion of how each\n\nβirregularityβ or βtransgressionβ was justified, could have been rectified, or in any case\n\ndid not justify dismissal. For example, with respect to her failure to produce thousands of\n\nemails that she was required to produce during discovery, she argues that βthere has been\n\nno effort by the court and no agreement by the parties to provide for a finding of fact or\n\nagreeable method of determining which of those [8,612 emails] [was] discoverable,\n\nwhich may be personal or even privileged, or how they should be provided in discovery.β\n\nYet, during the discovery, Rangarajan made no objection to the request for documents β\n\nwhich called for the production of all emails in her βJhmiβ and βJhmi 1β inboxes, and\n\nmore β but rather confirmed that she was producing all of the documents covered by\n\nJohns Hopkinsβ requests. Her arguments typically turn a blind eye to the scope of her\n\n\n 16\n\fmisconduct as found by the district court and thus fail to address the specific misconduct\n\nfound.\n\n When reviewed it its totality, the record in this case reveals a totally dysfunctional\n\nperformance by Rangarajan and her counsel, but mostly by her, as she acknowledged in\n\nher brief that β[t]hough [I] was, in fact, represented by an attorney, the court was well\n\naware that [I] was in many ways acting without the benefit of counsel.β\n\n To begin, Rangarajan commenced four actions, when only one was proper and\n\nwould have sufficed, repeatedly reasserting claims that the district court had dismissed.\n\nAfter the district court denied her motion to replead qui tam claims in the first action, she\n\nnonetheless repleaded them in the third action, and when the district court dismissed the\n\nthird action, she refiled the same claims in the fourth action.\n\n In the course of discovery, Rangarajan flagrantly failed to produce thousands of\n\ndocuments, several of which were core documents relating to her claims. She later\n\nproduced some of those documents for the first time during the summary judgment\n\nprocess, because she thought she needed them to make her points. Also, after giving a\n\ndaylong deposition, she sought to undermine and recant her testimony in a long, 54-page\n\nDeclaration that, as the district court found, rendered her deposition essentially useless.\n\nFinally, she challenged the transcription of her deposition, claiming it was deliberately\n\naltered and recreated by the court reporter, a conclusion that the district court found to be\n\nconclusively false. In short, she rendered virtually useless the entire discovery process, in\n\nwhich the parties had invested substantial time and money.\n\n\n\n 17\n\f During summary judgment, which required additional expenditures of time and\n\nmoney, Rangarajan relied almost exclusively on her Declaration, which had not been\n\nmade part of the discovery record and which was often inconsistent with her deposition\n\ntestimony, placing the summary judgment practice on an untenable and virtually useless\n\nfooting.\n\n In addition to these specifics, it was also apparent throughout the entire\n\nproceedings that, while Rangarajan was represented by an attorney, she refused to follow\n\nhis advice and engaged in inappropriate actions, such as communicating arguments\n\ndirectly to the court ex parte and including substantive matters in her errata sheet. And\n\nthe district court attributed this dysfunction between attorney and client to Rangarajan\n\npersonally, a finding that Rangarajan has not disputed. As the court stated:\n\n It [was] [Rangarajan] who continue[d] the attempt to support the\n unsupportable contention that the court reporting service made hundreds of\n alterations to her deposition video and transcript. It is clear that it was\n [Rangarajan] who authored the embellished narrative contained in her\n Declaration. It was [Rangarajan] who failed to turn over to her counsel\n documents that were clearly responsive to discovery requests and it [was]\n [Rangarajan] who misrepresented the amount of emails from her work\n email account that were stored on her home computer.\n\nThe court also pointed to the statement of Rangarajanβs counsel that β[Rangarajan] had\n\nadditions and revisions to her declaration which . . . result[ed] in changes to the\n\nopposition, and [Rangarajan] and her counsel [were] not in agreement with the final\n\ncontent of the opposition.β\n\n Any effort to have retrieved useful products of some five years of the litigation\n\nprocess would undoubtedly have failed to produce much of what was needed to\n\n\n 18\n\fadjudicate the case. The district court so concluded β βRangarajanβs conduct has\n\nrendered much of [the litigation] activity essentially meaningless.β It observed that any\n\nattempt to remedy this would require a do-over β βdiscovery would need to be reopened\n\nand it is likely that [Rangarajan] would need to be re-deposed and [Johns Hopkinsβ]\n\nmotion for summary judgment re-briefed.β And all of this would be at much additional\n\nexpense. Also important to the courtβs ultimate sanction decision was its additional\n\nfinding that, in light of Rangarajanβs conduct, the court had βlittle confidence that\n\n[Rangarajanβs] counsel would be able to ensure [Rangarajanβs] compliance with the rules\n\nof discovery,β a finding that the court made while expressing doubt about the merits of\n\nRangarajanβs claims.\n\n We are mindful of the strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on the merits\n\nand disfavoring dismissals without a merits decision. See Shaffer, 11 F.3d at 462. But\n\nwhen a party βabuses the process at a level that is utterly inconsistent with the orderly\n\nadministration of justice or undermines the integrity of the processβ β as we conclude\n\nRangarajan did here β she forfeits her right to use the process. Id. We hold that the\n\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the actions.\n\n\n C\n\n Finally, Rangarajan contends that the sanction imposed by the district court should\n\nnot have included dismissal of the fourth action because the reasons that the district court\n\ngave for dismissal of the first and second actions were not applicable to the fourth action.\n\nThe district court, however, noted that the fourth action was essentially the same as the\n\n\n 19\n\fthird action, which it had dismissed earlier for nonprosecution. It also noted that the\n\nfourth action related to βtransactions that took place as long as nine years ago.β\n\nMoreover, we note that the claims in the fourth action were not only the same as the\n\nclaims in the third action, they were also the same as the claims that Rangarajan was\n\nbarred from repleading in the first action based on the courtβs finding that they were\n\nuntimely and prejudicial.\n\n All four actions that Rangarajan filed against Johns Hopkins were based on the\n\nsame term of employment and the same course of events, and the fact that two of the\n\nactions specifically suffered from Rangarajanβs misconduct does not spare the other two\n\nactions from being infected by the same misconduct. As the court found, Rangarajanβs\n\nmisconduct in litigating would not likely have abated in the future. We believe,\n\nmoreover, that the unnecessary multiplicity of actions was an abuse that colored\n\nRangarajanβs entire litigation efforts. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion\n\nin including the fourth action in the scope of its sanction.\n\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\n\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\n 20\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Mitra RANGARAJAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Defendant - Appellee. Mitra Rangarajan, United States of America, State of Maryland, Ex Rel., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation; Johns Hopkins Hospital, Incorporated, Trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; Anthony Kalloo, M.D.; Johns Hopkins University, Defendants - Appellees. Mitra Rangarajan, United States of America, State of Maryland, Ex Rel., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation and Johns Hopkins University, Trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; Johns Hopkins Hospital, Incorporated, Defendants - Appellees.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-1834\\n\\n\\nMITRA RANGARAJAN,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-1835\\n\\n\\nMITRA RANGARAJAN, United States of America, State of Maryland, ex rel.,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION; JOHNS HOPKINS\\nHOSPITAL, INCORPORATED, trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; ANTHONY\\nKALLOO, M.D.; JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,\\n\\n Defendants β Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-1836\\n\\n\\nMITRA RANGARAJAN, United States of America, State of Maryland, ex rel.,\\n\\f Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJOHNS HOPKINS HEALTH SYSTEM CORPORATION AND JOHNS\\nHOPKINS UNIVERSITY, trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; JOHNS HOPKINS\\nHOSPITAL, INCORPORATED,\\n\\n Defendants β Appellees.\\n\\n\\nAppeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.\\nWilliam M. Nickerson, Senior District Judge. (1:12-cv-01953-WMN; 1:13-cv-03630-\\nWMN; 1:17-cv-00807-WMN)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 1, 2018 Decided: February 22, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Chief\\nJudge Gregory and Judge Harris joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Erienne A. Sutherell, HANSEL LAW, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for\\nAppellant. Robert Thomas Smith, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, Washington\\nD.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Cary J. Hansel, III, HANSEL LAW, P.C., Baltimore,\\nMaryland, for Appellant. Maria E. Rodriguez, Elizabeth Clark Rinehart, VENABLE,\\nLLP, Baltimore, Maryland; Daniel E. Lipton, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fNIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Mitra Rangarajan, who claims that she was constructively discharged as a nurse\\n\\npractitioner at the School of Medicine of Johns Hopkins University β whether because\\n\\nof discrimination and retaliation, as she contends, or because of her performance, as\\n\\nJohns Hopkins contends β commenced four separate actions against the University *\\n\\narising out of the same course of events and alleging state torts of defamation and\\n\\ninterference with prospective advantage, as well as violations of the False Claims Act, the\\n\\nMaryland False Health Claims Act, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1981. Over the long\\n\\ncourse of proceedings in these cases, the district court dismissed one action for failure to\\n\\nprosecute and the remaining three actions as the sanction for Rangarajanβs βflagrant and\\n\\nunremittingβ violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, especially with respect to\\n\\ndiscovery and summary judgment practice.\\n\\n On appeal, Rangarajan contends that the district court abused its discretion by\\n\\nfailing to give her adequate warning of the sanction and failing to show required restraint\\n\\nby imposing lesser sanctions. After careful review of the lengthy procedural history of\\n\\nthe cases, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Rangarajanβs\\n\\nconduct under the procedural rules was inept and abusive to the degree that, as the district\\n\\ncourt found in its thorough 44-page opinion, it rendered virtually useless five years of\\n\\n\\n *\\n Rangarajan sued not only Johns Hopkins University but also the Johns Hopkins\\nHealth System Corp., the Johns Hopkins Hospital Inc., and related personnel whom she\\nrefers to in her brief collectively as Johns Hopkins or JH. We are satisfied also to refer to\\nJohns Hopkins collectively, as the issues in this appeal are not implicated by which entity\\nmight have been involved in any given activity.\\n\\n 3\\n\\fproceedings before the district court, and such abuse would likely have continued in any\\n\\nfuture proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n I\\n\\n Rangarajanβs employment at Johns Hopkins as a nurse over the period from 2007\\n\\nto 2011 was volatile and unsatisfactory to both Rangarajan and Johns Hopkins. From\\n\\nRangarajanβs viewpoint, as the district court summarized, she was a stellar healthcare\\n\\nprovider who was treated unfairly by supervisors and coworkers in the following\\n\\nrespects:\\n\\n [S]he was denied the $95,000 salary that she was allegedly promised; she\\n was assigned unmanageable workloads; she was not provided the training\\n she needed to advance her career while Dr. [Anthony] Kalloo, [the director\\n of the GI Division in which Rangarajan worked] showed favoritism and\\n provided those opportunities to another Nurse Practitioner . . . ; [she]\\n applied for but was denied permission to participate in a Nurse Practitioner\\n Fellowship Program; while she was accepted into a Doctor of Nursing\\n Practice (DNP) program, once in the program she was treated unfairly by\\n the program director . . . ; she was given an undeserved failing grade by the\\n Capstone Professor in the DNP program . . . ; and, she was denied vacation\\n leave and reimbursement for attending professional conferences.\\n\\nBut from Johns Hopkinsβ point of view, again as the district court summarized, she failed\\n\\nas a professional nurse:\\n\\n [Rangarajan] had attendance and tardiness issues, she failed to timely check\\n for test results and follow-up with patients, and her notes in medical\\n histories were often disorganized and unreliable. In response to a round of\\n negative performance reviews, [Rangarajan] was placed on a performance\\n improvement plan in January of 2011. Before that plan could be fully\\n implemented, [she] demonstrated poor judgment in the care of a patient that\\n [Johns Hopkins] assert[s] could have had catastrophic results for that\\n patient. In response to those concerns, Dr. Anthony Kalloo, the director of\\n the GI Division, suspended [Rangarajanβs] clinical privileges.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fAfter Rangarajan was suspended, she resigned from Johns Hopkins in May 2011,\\n\\nclaiming that she was constructively discharged. She then began litigation against Johns\\n\\nHopkins, filing four separate actions based on its treatment of her.\\n\\n In the first action filed in October 2012 β No. 12-1953 β Rangarajan alleged that\\n\\nJohns Hopkins engaged in widespread fraudulent billing of the U.S. Government and\\n\\nthen retaliated against her for reporting it internally. Because her claims under the False\\n\\nClaims Act and the Maryland False Health Claims Act were qui tam actions, the U.S.\\n\\nDepartment of Justice and the Maryland Attorney General investigated them but then\\n\\ndeclined to intervene, as those statutes would allow. Rangarajan thereafter voluntarily\\n\\ndismissed the qui tam claims but continued her claim alleging that Johns Hopkins\\n\\nretaliated against her for reporting fraudulent billing practices. Later, however, she filed\\n\\na motion to amend her complaint to reallege the qui tam claims, but the district court\\n\\ndenied her motion as untimely and prejudicial.\\n\\n Several months after filing the first action, Rangarajan filed a second action\\n\\nagainst Johns Hopkins β No. 13-3630 β alleging that Johns Hopkins had discriminated\\n\\nagainst her on the basis of race, national origin, age, and sex, in violation of Title VII and\\n\\n42 U.S.C. Β§ 1981. This action was based on the same conduct that formed the basis for\\n\\nher claims in the first action.\\n\\n A month after the district court denied Rangarajanβs motion to amend the first\\n\\naction to re-allege her qui tam claims, Rangarajan filed a third action β No. 15-1394 β\\n\\nalleging those same qui tam action claims again. She did not, however, pursue this action\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\fin accordance with the rules of procedure, and, after it languished for over a year and a\\n\\nhalf, the district court dismissed it for failure to prosecute.\\n\\n Rather than appealing the district courtβs ruling in the third action, Rangarajan\\n\\nfiled a fourth action β No. 17-807 β which the district court concluded was βessentially\\n\\nidentical to the just-dismissed [third] action.β The court by then, however, had before it\\n\\nJohns Hopkinsβ motion for sanctions based on Rangarajanβs discovery and summary\\n\\njudgment practices in the first and second actions, and accordingly it stayed the fourth\\n\\naction pending its ruling on the sanctions motion.\\n\\n After the second action was filed, the district court consolidated the first and\\n\\nsecond actions, and the parties conducted discovery in the consolidated actions. During\\n\\ndiscovery, Johns Hopkins provided Rangarajan with nearly 50,000 pages of documents,\\n\\nincluding tens of thousands of emails. It also arranged for and participated in the\\n\\ndepositions of 14 former and current employees of Johns Hopkins. During this period,\\n\\nRangarajan also responded to Johns Hopkinsβ discovery requests. In response to Johns\\n\\nHopkinsβ request for all βjhmi.eduβ and βjhu.eduβ emails in her possession, Rangarajan\\n\\nmade no objection and produced 1,573 pages of documents. After the close of discovery,\\n\\nshe produced an additional 85 pages, stating that they also responded to Johns Hopkinsβ\\n\\nrequest for her βjhmi.eduβ and βjhu.eduβ emails. Rangarajan also gave a deposition,\\n\\nwhich lasted roughly seven hours.\\n\\n After discovery closed in September 2016 as directed in the district courtβs\\n\\nscheduling order, Johns Hopkins filed a motion for summary judgment in both\\n\\nconsolidated actions, based on the record that discovery had produced. Johns Hopkins\\n\\n 6\\n\\fcontended that summary judgment in its favor was justified by βoverwhelming evidence\\n\\nthat Ms. Rangarajan did not satisfy the basic requirements of her job[] and that there were\\n\\nlegitimate, non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for any adverse employment\\n\\naction that she allegedly suffered.β\\n\\n In response to Johns Hopkinsβ motion for summary judgment, Rangarajan took a\\n\\nnumber of steps to expand, embellish, alter, and recast her deposition testimony. First,\\n\\nshe submitted a 51-page errata sheet to her deposition, proposing hundreds of edits to her\\n\\ntestimony and justifying many of the changes by claiming that the court reporter had\\n\\nintentionally altered both the transcript and the audio and video recording of her\\n\\ndeposition. She stated:\\n\\n The Court Reportersβ Office has informed me that they edited my video,\\n audio and typed deposition transcripts. It is clear that key testimony is\\n deleted, altered, cloned from various sound bites etc., to accomplish two\\n things. 1. Change the testimony 2. To induce grammar mistakes thus\\n making me sound as if I am speaking broken English.\\n\\nShe also sent an ex parte letter to the district court for the district judgeβs βeyes only,β\\n\\nclaiming similarly that the court reporter improperly edited her deposition.\\n\\n Second, in support of her opposition to the summary judgment motion, Rangarajan\\n\\nfiled a 54-page Declaration in which she introduced new allegations, attached 19 exhibits\\n\\nthat had never before been produced during discovery, and revised testimony that\\n\\nallegedly contradicted her deposition testimony. While the district court did not find the\\n\\nDeclaration to be βdiametrically opposedβ to Rangarajanβs statements in the deposition, it\\n\\nnonetheless concluded that reliance on the Declaration βwould render the taking of\\n\\n[Rangarajanβs] deposition essentially useless.β Rangarajanβs opposition to Johns\\n\\n 7\\n\\fHopkinsβ motion for summary judgment was grounded mainly on her Declaration and not\\n\\nthe evidence produced during discovery. As the district court noted, while Rangarajan\\n\\ncited her deposition testimony only 3 times in her opposition, she cited her subsequently\\n\\nfiled Declaration βover 750 times.β\\n\\n In addition, the newly disclosed exhibits revealed major failures by Rangarajan to\\n\\nproduce documents requested of her during discovery. For instance, several exhibits β\\n\\nscreenshots of Rangarajanβs emails β revealed her computerβs entire display showing\\n\\nretained copies of emails in two inboxes labeled βJhmiβ and βJhmi 1,β and one of those\\n\\ninboxes contained 8,612 emails, most of which had never been produced during\\n\\ndiscovery; Rangarajan had only produced 1,658 documents during discovery.\\n\\n After receiving Rangarajanβs opposition to its motion for summary judgment,\\n\\nJohns Hopkins filed a motion to stay further briefing on the summary judgment motion,\\n\\nto strike Rangarajanβs opposition to its motion for summary judgment, and to dismiss\\n\\nRangarajanβs actions as the sanction for her improper conduct. In support of its motion,\\n\\nit claimed that Rangarajan had βattempted to fundamentally alter the record that existed\\n\\nwhen discovery closedβ by, among other things,\\n\\n (1) submitting her 51-page errata, which baselessly accused the court\\n reporter of altering hundreds of lines of key testimony; (2) including\\n a 54-page declaration that sought to fill critical holes in her story;\\n (3) attaching at least 19 documents to her opposition that had not\\n been produced during discovery; and (4) concealing thousands of e-\\n mails responsive to [Johns Hopkinsβ] requests after falsely certifying\\n that she would produce these documents.\\n\\nAfter receiving Johns Hopkinsβ motion, the district court issued an order staying further\\n\\nproceedings on the summary judgment motion and informing Rangarajan that Johns\\n\\n 8\\n\\fHopkinsβ motion for sanctions βraise[d] some serious issues regarding [Rangarajanβs]\\n\\nlack of compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, both throughout the\\n\\ndiscovery process and in the submission of her opposition to the summary judgment\\n\\nmotion.β\\n\\n The next day, the court unsealed Rangarajanβs third action, which was again a qui\\n\\ntam action, and dismissed it for nonprosecution. Nonetheless, Rangarajan then proceeded\\n\\nto file the fourth action repeating the qui tam allegations she had made in the first and\\n\\nthird actions. The district court stayed the fourth action, pending disposition of the\\n\\nmotion for sanctions.\\n\\n In response to the motion for sanctions, Rangarajan argued that her Declaration\\n\\ndid not contradict her deposition testimony and that her errata sheet properly clarified her\\n\\ndeposition testimony. As to her accusation that the court reporter altered the deposition\\n\\ntranscript, she stated:\\n\\n Ms. Rangarajan believes that her deposition transcript was changed and that\\n Defendants are attempting to divert attention to this discrepancy through its\\n Motion to Strike. However, Ms. Rangarajan does not know who changed\\n the transcript. She also believes that the exhibits provided by the Court\\n Reporter were different than those shown to her during her deposition. In\\n addition, she believes that she did not receive her original deposition video.\\n Ms. Rangarajan has provided a detailed chart with examples of the\\n testimony in the transcript to show the discrepancy in the written testimony\\n and video and the statement of an expert who viewed the video, which\\n confirm her position.\\n\\nAs to her nonproduction of emails, Rangarajan stated that she βbelieve[d] that she\\n\\nprovided all her emails to her counsel.β\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f After briefing on the motion for sanctions was completed, Rangarajan filed yet\\n\\nanother paper entitled βNotice of Plaintiffβs Analysis,β again purporting to demonstrate\\n\\nthat the Court Reporter had altered the videotape of her deposition, again asserting\\n\\nmalfeasance, and again embellishing her testimony.\\n\\n By order dated June 16, 2017, the district court granted Johns Hopkinsβ motion for\\n\\nsanctions, dismissing Rangarajanβs three pending actions β the first, the second, and the\\n\\nfourth. In its thorough written opinion, which recited Rangarajanβs misconduct chapter\\n\\nand verse, the court concluded that β[n]othing that [Rangarajan] submitted lends any\\n\\ncredence to her claims that the videotape or transcript of her deposition was purposely\\n\\naltered in any way. . . . The Court suspects that [Rangarajanβs] inexorable need to deflect\\n\\nresponsibility and to project it on others perhaps sheds more light on [her] difficulties in\\n\\nthe GI Division than any of the actual testimony in her deposition.β With respect to the\\n\\nDeclaration that Rangarajan had filed, the court concluded that it was an effort βto\\n\\nreplace [Rangarajanβs deposition testimony] with [a] more favorable narrative of events.β\\n\\nThe court noted that if it were to rely on the Declaration, the Declaration βwould render\\n\\nthe taking of [Rangarajanβs] deposition essentially useless.β And with respect to Johns\\n\\nHopkinsβ claims that Rangarajan withheld documents during discovery, the court\\n\\nconcluded that Rangarajan βfailed to fulfill her discovery obligations under Rule 26(e).β\\n\\nMoreover, the court found that Rangarajan βflagrantly and unremittingly violated the\\n\\nrules governing discovery and summary judgment motions practiceβ and that Rangarajan\\n\\nherself was clearly culpable. βThe responsibility for the lack of compliance with the\\n\\npertinent rules [lay] primarily with her and not with her counsel.β While the court\\n\\n 10\\n\\fcriticized Rangarajanβs counsel for his judgment, the court concluded that Rangarajan\\n\\nherself βhas been and continues to be the prime offender.β Finally, the court concluded\\n\\nthat Rangarajanβs conduct βrendered much of [the litigation] activity essentially\\n\\nmeaningless,β and her conduct βimpacted the dozen witnesses who could not care for\\n\\npatients while responding to her claims and has also depleted the resources of [the\\n\\nvarious agencies that were necessarily involved].β And to justify dismissal rather than a\\n\\nlesser sanction, the court concluded that βthere is not another remedy that would\\n\\neffectively address [Rangarajanβs] violations.β Even if it attempted a more limited\\n\\nsanction, it noted, βdiscovery would need to be reopened and it is likely that plaintiff\\n\\nwould need to be re-deposed and [Johns Hopkinsβ] motion for summary judgment\\n\\nre-briefed. Doing so would foist considerabl[y] more expense on [Johns Hopkins].\\n\\nGiven the history of this litigation, were discovery to be reopened, the Court has little\\n\\nconfidence that [Rangarajanβs] counsel would be able to ensure [Rangarajanβs]\\n\\ncompliance with the rules of discovery.β The court also recognized βthe futility of\\n\\nredoing discovery and motions practiceβ because βit [was] apparent from the current\\n\\nrecord that those claims would fail on the merits.β\\n\\n From the district courtβs order, Rangarajan filed this appeal.\\n\\n\\n II\\n\\n Rangarajan does not challenge the district courtβs factual findings. Indeed, she\\n\\nappears to acknowledge her βirregularitiesβ and βtransgressions,β blaming them on\\n\\nβdisagreements between [her] and her previous attorney.β Rather, she contends (1) that\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\fthe district court abused its discretion in imposing the sanction βwithout providing the\\n\\nrequired clear and explicit warning to [her] that her discovery transgressions could lead to\\n\\ndismissalβ and (2) that the court abused its discretion in βfail[ing] to use the restraint\\n\\nrequired in exercising this most extreme sanction without adequately addressing the\\n\\nrequired factors,β arguing that the βtransgressions . . . would have been rectifiable by\\n\\nlesser sanctions.β She also contends that the district court abused its discretion in\\n\\ndismissing the fourth action as part of the sanction. We address these points in order.\\n\\n\\n A\\n\\n Rangarajan first argues that prior warning of sanctions was required and that she\\n\\ndid not receive prior warning. We reject both arguments.\\n\\n First, as a factual matter, Rangarajan did receive notice that dismissal of her\\n\\nactions was a potential sanction when the district court, in response to Johns Hopkinsβ\\n\\nmotion for sanctions, alerted her that the motion βraised some serious issuesβ regarding\\n\\nher failure to comply with rules relating to discovery and summary judgment. Johns\\n\\nHopkinsβ motion itself detailed the alleged failures and sought dismissal of the first and\\n\\nsecond actions as a sanction. The gravity of the issues was also conveyed to Rangarajan\\n\\nby the district courtβs order staying proceedings in not only the first and second actions,\\n\\nbut also in the fourth action. Moreover, Rangarajan conceded in her response that she\\n\\nknew that the sanction of dismissal was on the table, as she fully addressed the sanction\\n\\nof dismissal, arguing that it was βnot warrantedβ and that Johns Hopkinsβ motion was\\n\\nonly an effort at distracting the court from the truth. She also argued that she had not\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\freceived clear notice of potential dismissal, yet, in making that argument itself before any\\n\\nsanction was imposed, she revealed that she had notice. It does not ring true, therefore,\\n\\nthat the district court failed to warn Rangarajan. The fact remains that she not only was\\n\\nwarned, she argued her position on both the sanction of dismissal and the lack of notice\\n\\nbefore any sanction was issued.\\n\\n Moreover, Rangarajanβs contention that a clear and explicit warning of dismissal\\n\\nmust always be given is not supported by any specific authority. To be sure, giving\\n\\nnotice is an aspect of fairness in procedure that might relate to the ultimate fairness of\\n\\nimposing any sanction. But it is not a rubric to be applied mechanically. Federal Rule of\\n\\nCivil Procedure 37, on which Rangarajan relies, imposes no such requirement, and\\n\\nHathcock v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 53 F.3d 36 (4th Cir. 1995), on\\n\\nwhich she also relies, did not mandate it in every situation. In Hathcock, we recognized\\n\\nthe βsignificance of warning a defendant about the possibility of default before entering\\n\\nsuch a harsh sanctionβ in circumstances where the district court had entered a default\\n\\njudgment for the defendantβs failure to follow general scheduling orders. Id. at 40. But a\\n\\nwarning was not held to be a necessary element for imposing a Rule 37 sanction. Rather,\\n\\nthe lack of warning was a deficiency reflecting on the district courtβs exercise of\\n\\ndiscretion in selecting a particular sanction for violating the courtβs general scheduling\\n\\norders.\\n\\n As importantly, in this case, the district court did not impose its sanction under\\n\\nRule 37. While the court did recognize its authority under Rule 37 to dismiss actions, it\\n\\nrelied on its inherent power to do so because the circumstances presented a party who\\n\\n 13\\n\\fβabuse[d] the process at a level that [was] utterly inconsistent with the orderly\\n\\nadministration of justice or undermine[d] the integrity of the process,β quoting Projects\\n\\nManagement Co. v. Dyncorp International, LLC, 734 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. 2013)\\n\\n(quoting United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 462 (4th Cir. 1993)). In\\n\\nDyncorp, we affirmed dismissal of an action as a sanction where the plaintiff βwas on\\n\\nclear notice of the district courtβs consideration of the use of its inherent authority and\\n\\nhad a full opportunity to argue its position before the court.β Id. at 376. So it was here,\\n\\nas the court stated in response to Johns Hopkinsβ motion for dismissal, that Johns\\n\\nHopkins had presented the court with βserious issues,β and Rangarajan then had a full\\n\\nopportunity to respond β and did respond β before any decision on sanctions was\\n\\nmade.\\n\\n\\n B\\n\\n Rangarajanβs argument that the district court failed to exhibit restraint by declining\\n\\nto impose lesser sanctions challenges the courtβs exercise of discretion with respect to its\\n\\ninherent power to dismiss an action. We review that exercise of discretion for abuse. See\\n\\nShaffer, 11 F.3d at 462.\\n\\n In exercising its discretion, the district court relied on the six factors set forth in\\n\\nShaffer, 11 F.3d at 462β63. As we explained in Shaffer, when exercising its power to\\n\\ndismiss as a sanction, a court must consider:\\n\\n (1) the degree of the wrongdoerβs culpability; (2) the extent of the clientβs\\n blameworthiness if the wrongful conduct is committed by its attorney,\\n recognizing that we seldom dismiss claims against blameless clients; (3) the\\n prejudice to the judicial process and the administration of justice; (4) the\\n\\n 14\\n\\f prejudice to the victim; (5) the availability of other sanctions to rectify the\\n wrong by punishing culpable persons, compensating harmed persons, and\\n deterring similar conduct in the future; and (6) the public interest.\\n\\nId. In addressing the first two factors, the district court found that Rangarajan was\\n\\npersonally responsible for her actions. As to the third and fourth factors, the court noted\\n\\nthat βDefendants have been forced to expend a tremendous amount of time, effort, and\\n\\nexpense in the discovery process and motions practiceβ and that Rangarajanβs βconduct\\n\\nhas rendered much of that activity essentially meaningless.β As to the fifth factor, while\\n\\nrecognizing that striking Rangarajanβs Declaration and the exhibits not produced in\\n\\ndiscovery could have cured the prejudice resulting from those specific failures, the court\\n\\nconcluded that such a sanction βwould not address her failure to produce the thousands of\\n\\nemails contained on her home computer.β Moreover, the court expressed its lack of\\n\\nconfidence that counsel could ensure Rangarajanβs compliance given her previous\\n\\nfailures. The court also concluded that reopening discovery would be futile because\\n\\nRangarajanβs βdesperate attempt to disavow her deposition testimony and replace it with\\n\\nher Declaration [was] an implicit acknowledgement that her claims were unsupported\\n\\nunder the record produced through discovery.β Finally, as to the sixth factor, the court\\n\\nfound that the public interest supported dismissal because the βlitigation ha[d] interrupted\\n\\nthe provision of care of numerous health care providers and impacted the resources of\\n\\nthis Court and several administrative agenciesβ and Rangarajanβs actions βseriously\\n\\nundermined the truth-seeking function of the Court.β Finding that all of the six factors\\n\\nweighed against Rangarajan and in favor of dismissal, the court imposed the sanction of\\n\\ndismissal.\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Rangarajan argues nonetheless that the district court abused its discretion in\\n\\nbypassing βthe analysis set forth by the Fourth Circuit for determining whether sanction\\n\\nis even appropriate for [her] failures to update disclosure in discovery and proceed[ing]\\n\\ndirectly to selecting a penalty.β She also argues that, β[i]n seeking an appropriate\\n\\npenalty, the court also bypassed those penalties contemplated specifically for this failure\\n\\nto disclose, as set forth in Rule 37(c)(1), and proceed[ed] directly to [the] harshest of the\\n\\nother sanctions enumerated under Rule 37(b)(2).β She then concludes:\\n\\n The several irregularities of discovery cited by the lower court in the instant\\n matter either do not rise to the level of a violation worthy of sanction or, if\\n found to be sanctionable, were by no means permanent, surprising, or\\n fatally prejudicial. The lower court could have easily remedied these by\\n sanctions tailored to the transgression, even though it may not be exactly\\n commensurate, and still remain within its discretion.\\n\\nTo support that conclusion, Rangarajan then launches into a discussion of how each\\n\\nβirregularityβ or βtransgressionβ was justified, could have been rectified, or in any case\\n\\ndid not justify dismissal. For example, with respect to her failure to produce thousands of\\n\\nemails that she was required to produce during discovery, she argues that βthere has been\\n\\nno effort by the court and no agreement by the parties to provide for a finding of fact or\\n\\nagreeable method of determining which of those [8,612 emails] [was] discoverable,\\n\\nwhich may be personal or even privileged, or how they should be provided in discovery.β\\n\\nYet, during the discovery, Rangarajan made no objection to the request for documents β\\n\\nwhich called for the production of all emails in her βJhmiβ and βJhmi 1β inboxes, and\\n\\nmore β but rather confirmed that she was producing all of the documents covered by\\n\\nJohns Hopkinsβ requests. Her arguments typically turn a blind eye to the scope of her\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\fmisconduct as found by the district court and thus fail to address the specific misconduct\\n\\nfound.\\n\\n When reviewed it its totality, the record in this case reveals a totally dysfunctional\\n\\nperformance by Rangarajan and her counsel, but mostly by her, as she acknowledged in\\n\\nher brief that β[t]hough [I] was, in fact, represented by an attorney, the court was well\\n\\naware that [I] was in many ways acting without the benefit of counsel.β\\n\\n To begin, Rangarajan commenced four actions, when only one was proper and\\n\\nwould have sufficed, repeatedly reasserting claims that the district court had dismissed.\\n\\nAfter the district court denied her motion to replead qui tam claims in the first action, she\\n\\nnonetheless repleaded them in the third action, and when the district court dismissed the\\n\\nthird action, she refiled the same claims in the fourth action.\\n\\n In the course of discovery, Rangarajan flagrantly failed to produce thousands of\\n\\ndocuments, several of which were core documents relating to her claims. She later\\n\\nproduced some of those documents for the first time during the summary judgment\\n\\nprocess, because she thought she needed them to make her points. Also, after giving a\\n\\ndaylong deposition, she sought to undermine and recant her testimony in a long, 54-page\\n\\nDeclaration that, as the district court found, rendered her deposition essentially useless.\\n\\nFinally, she challenged the transcription of her deposition, claiming it was deliberately\\n\\naltered and recreated by the court reporter, a conclusion that the district court found to be\\n\\nconclusively false. In short, she rendered virtually useless the entire discovery process, in\\n\\nwhich the parties had invested substantial time and money.\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\f During summary judgment, which required additional expenditures of time and\\n\\nmoney, Rangarajan relied almost exclusively on her Declaration, which had not been\\n\\nmade part of the discovery record and which was often inconsistent with her deposition\\n\\ntestimony, placing the summary judgment practice on an untenable and virtually useless\\n\\nfooting.\\n\\n In addition to these specifics, it was also apparent throughout the entire\\n\\nproceedings that, while Rangarajan was represented by an attorney, she refused to follow\\n\\nhis advice and engaged in inappropriate actions, such as communicating arguments\\n\\ndirectly to the court ex parte and including substantive matters in her errata sheet. And\\n\\nthe district court attributed this dysfunction between attorney and client to Rangarajan\\n\\npersonally, a finding that Rangarajan has not disputed. As the court stated:\\n\\n It [was] [Rangarajan] who continue[d] the attempt to support the\\n unsupportable contention that the court reporting service made hundreds of\\n alterations to her deposition video and transcript. It is clear that it was\\n [Rangarajan] who authored the embellished narrative contained in her\\n Declaration. It was [Rangarajan] who failed to turn over to her counsel\\n documents that were clearly responsive to discovery requests and it [was]\\n [Rangarajan] who misrepresented the amount of emails from her work\\n email account that were stored on her home computer.\\n\\nThe court also pointed to the statement of Rangarajanβs counsel that β[Rangarajan] had\\n\\nadditions and revisions to her declaration which . . . result[ed] in changes to the\\n\\nopposition, and [Rangarajan] and her counsel [were] not in agreement with the final\\n\\ncontent of the opposition.β\\n\\n Any effort to have retrieved useful products of some five years of the litigation\\n\\nprocess would undoubtedly have failed to produce much of what was needed to\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\fadjudicate the case. The district court so concluded β βRangarajanβs conduct has\\n\\nrendered much of [the litigation] activity essentially meaningless.β It observed that any\\n\\nattempt to remedy this would require a do-over β βdiscovery would need to be reopened\\n\\nand it is likely that [Rangarajan] would need to be re-deposed and [Johns Hopkinsβ]\\n\\nmotion for summary judgment re-briefed.β And all of this would be at much additional\\n\\nexpense. Also important to the courtβs ultimate sanction decision was its additional\\n\\nfinding that, in light of Rangarajanβs conduct, the court had βlittle confidence that\\n\\n[Rangarajanβs] counsel would be able to ensure [Rangarajanβs] compliance with the rules\\n\\nof discovery,β a finding that the court made while expressing doubt about the merits of\\n\\nRangarajanβs claims.\\n\\n We are mindful of the strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on the merits\\n\\nand disfavoring dismissals without a merits decision. See Shaffer, 11 F.3d at 462. But\\n\\nwhen a party βabuses the process at a level that is utterly inconsistent with the orderly\\n\\nadministration of justice or undermines the integrity of the processβ β as we conclude\\n\\nRangarajan did here β she forfeits her right to use the process. Id. We hold that the\\n\\ndistrict court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the actions.\\n\\n\\n C\\n\\n Finally, Rangarajan contends that the sanction imposed by the district court should\\n\\nnot have included dismissal of the fourth action because the reasons that the district court\\n\\ngave for dismissal of the first and second actions were not applicable to the fourth action.\\n\\nThe district court, however, noted that the fourth action was essentially the same as the\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\fthird action, which it had dismissed earlier for nonprosecution. It also noted that the\\n\\nfourth action related to βtransactions that took place as long as nine years ago.β\\n\\nMoreover, we note that the claims in the fourth action were not only the same as the\\n\\nclaims in the third action, they were also the same as the claims that Rangarajan was\\n\\nbarred from repleading in the first action based on the courtβs finding that they were\\n\\nuntimely and prejudicial.\\n\\n All four actions that Rangarajan filed against Johns Hopkins were based on the\\n\\nsame term of employment and the same course of events, and the fact that two of the\\n\\nactions specifically suffered from Rangarajanβs misconduct does not spare the other two\\n\\nactions from being infected by the same misconduct. As the court found, Rangarajanβs\\n\\nmisconduct in litigating would not likely have abated in the future. We believe,\\n\\nmoreover, that the unnecessary multiplicity of actions was an abuse that colored\\n\\nRangarajanβs entire litigation efforts. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion\\n\\nin including the fourth action in the scope of its sanction.\\n\\n Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":567,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4593595,"string":"4,593,595"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Sarah ROE, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Linda HOWARD, Defendant - Appellant, and Estate of Russell Howard, Defendant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Sarah Roe v. Linda Howard"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-2338"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wilkinson, King, Quattlebaum\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"KING, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-2338\\n\\n\\nSARAH ROE,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nLINDA HOWARD,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant,\\n and\\n\\nESTATE OF RUSSELL HOWARD,\\n\\n Defendant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nAlexandria. Liam OβGrady, District Judge. (1:16-cv-00562-LO-JFA)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 30, 2018 Decided: February 25, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, KING, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion in which Judge Wilkinson\\nand Judge Quattlebaum joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Richard Francis Rinaldo, JONES, GREGG, CREEHAN & GERACE LLP,\\nPittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Melissa Lim Patterson, JONES DAY,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Timothy J. Battle, Alexandria, Virginia,\\n\\ffor Appellant. Alison B. Marshall, Christian G. Vergonis, JONES DAY, Washington,\\nD.C., for Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fKING, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Defendant Linda Howard appeals from a judgment entered against her in the\\n\\nEastern District of Virginia after a jury found her civilly liable to plaintiff Sarah Roe\\n\\nunder the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (the βTVPAβ). 1 Roe had sued Howard for\\n\\nher role in sexual abuse that Roe suffered at the hands of Russell Howard, Lindaβs\\n\\nhusband, when Roe worked in 2007 as the Howardsβ housekeeper in housing provided by\\n\\nthe Embassy of the United States in Yemen. 2 The jury found that Lindaβs conduct in\\n\\nYemen contravened criminal provisions of the TVPA and thus awarded Roe $3 million in\\n\\ndamages pursuant to the TVPAβs civil remedy provision. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. On\\n\\nappeal, Linda challenges the district courtβs denial of her post-trial motion for judgment\\n\\nas a matter of law, wherein she sought relief on the ground that, in 2007, the TVPAβs\\n\\ncivil remedy provision did not apply extraterritorially. Linda also challenges the courtβs\\n\\nadmission of testimonial evidence from another former housekeeper of Linda and Russell\\n\\nwhom they had similarly abused. As explained below, we are satisfied to affirm the\\n\\njudgment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The TVPA is generally codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1581 et seq.\\n 2\\n To avoid confusion, we generally refer to Linda Howard and Russell Howard by\\ntheir first names, that is, simply as Linda and Russell. We refer to the plaintiff by her\\npseudonym βSarah Roe,β pursuant to the district courtβs ruling in that regard. See Roe v.\\nHoward, No. 16-cv-562 (E.D. Va. May 27, 2016), ECF No. 11.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n On July 31, 2017, following a four-day trial, a jury in the Eastern District of\\n\\nVirginia found Linda Howard civilly liable for contravening criminal provisions of the\\n\\nTVPA. More specifically, the jury found that Linda had engaged in forced labor in\\n\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1589, forced labor trafficking in violation of Β§ 1590, commercial\\n\\nsex trafficking in violation of Β§ 1591, and conspiring to engage in those offenses in\\n\\nviolation of Β§ 1594. See J.A. 115-17. 3\\n\\n When we review an appeal following a jury verdict, we view the trial evidence in\\n\\nthe light most favorable to the prevailing party. See Randall v. Prince Georgeβs Cty., 302\\n\\nF.3d 188, 195 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Lowery v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431,\\n\\n442-43 (4th Cir. 2000)). We are likewise obliged to accord the prevailing party the\\n\\nbenefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See Lowery, 206 F.3d\\n\\nat 443. The facts recited herein are taken in that light and drawn from the record, which\\n\\nincludes evidence presented at trial and the partiesβ joint submission of stipulated facts.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Linda is an American citizen. She began working for the Department of State in\\n\\n1991 as a Communications Officer in Paris, France. In Paris, Linda met and married\\n\\nRussell, an Australian citizen who then worked for the Australian Embassy in France.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Citations herein to βJ.A.__β refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by\\nthe parties in this appeal.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fOver the next decade, Linda and Russell held similar postings around the world, usually\\n\\narranging their assignments so that they could pursue their careers in the same country.\\n\\nIn 2001, Russell retired from his position with the Australian government, and he\\n\\nthereafter followed Linda as she continued her career with the State Department.\\n\\n In 2005, the State Department assigned Linda to our Embassy in Sanaβa, Yemen.\\n\\nRussell accompanied Linda to Sanaβa and also found work at the Embassy. Among other\\n\\njobs, Russell performed administrative work for the Embassy Commissary. In Sanaβa,\\n\\nLinda and Russell lived in housing provided by the State Department, and they were\\n\\nprotected by U.S. government security. Linda and Russell remained in Sanaβa for\\n\\napproximately three years. Around December 2008, Linda and Russell moved to Japan,\\n\\nwhere Linda received her next State Department posting. By 2012, Linda and Russell\\n\\nhad relocated to Melbourne, Australia, where Russell died of pancreatic cancer that\\n\\nSeptember. Linda continues to reside in Melbourne.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Sarah Roe first met the Howards in September 2005, soon after their arrival in\\n\\nYemen. At that time, Roe was twenty years old. Born into an impoverished family in\\n\\nEthiopia, Roe had moved to Yemen to seek work, and she initially secured various\\n\\nhousekeeping and cleaning jobs. In September 2005, Roe was employed there as a\\n\\nwaitress at a restaurant on U.S. Embassy grounds called Uncle Samβs. It was at Uncle\\n\\nSamβs that the Howards first encountered Roe and sought to befriend her.\\n\\n As one of his odd jobs around the U.S. Embassy, Russell worked in a shop next\\n\\ndoor to Uncle Samβs. He first introduced himself to Roe, and then introduced Roe to\\n\\n 5\\n\\fLinda. Both Howards paid special attention to Roe: they complimented her appearance,\\n\\ninitiated friendly conversations, and encouraged her to work for them as their live-in\\n\\nhousekeeper. At first Roe declined the job offer, and Russell asked her to help βfind a\\n\\nbeautiful woman like [her]self to work in [the Howardsβ] home.β See J.A. 232. Linda\\n\\nwould stop by Uncle Samβs three or four times a week, where she would βgreetβ and\\n\\nβhugβ Roe. Id. at 231. Linda even gave Roe her personal phone number. Id. at 234.\\n\\n Around 2006, Roe returned to Ethiopia from Yemen for several months to care for\\n\\nher mother. As a result, she lost her job at Uncle Samβs. When Roe returned to Sanaβa, a\\n\\nyoung Ethiopian woman named Sabha was then employed as the Howardsβ live-in\\n\\nhousekeeper, but Linda helped Roe obtain a data-entry job at the U.S. Embassy. Linda\\n\\ngave Roe an application for the data-entry position and taught her how to use a basic\\n\\ndata-entry program on Lindaβs home computer. After Roe got the job, Linda continued\\n\\nto befriend her, meeting Roe to talk about her hair stylist and other non-work matters.\\n\\nLinda presented herself to Roe βas a friend, someone very easy to talk to, someone with a\\n\\nvery good heart.β See J.A. 239. Linda also promised to help Roe find another job after\\n\\nthe data-entry position ended. Roe believed Linda offered such help because Linda\\n\\nβreally likedβ her. Id. at 241.\\n\\n Some months later, in the spring of 2007, the Howardsβ then live-in housekeeper\\n\\n(another young Ethiopian woman named Brhan) left them. At the time, Roe was looking\\n\\nfor a new job and the Howards renewed their offer to Roe to fill the housekeeping\\n\\nposition. Roe was uncertain about accepting the Howardsβ offer. She made more money\\n\\nwhen she had jobs that allowed her to accept tips, like waitressing. Roe also had her own\\n\\n 6\\n\\fapartment and did not want to move in with the Howards, which was a requirement of the\\n\\nposition. But the Howards offered to help Roe get medical treatment for an eye ailment,\\n\\nrenew her work visa, and aid her family in Ethiopia. Linda also βknew that [Roe] had a\\n\\ndesire to improve [her] language skills,β and promised that Russell could help her with\\n\\nher English. See J.A. 247. As part of their discussions about the live-in position, Linda\\n\\nexplained to Roe βthat Russell is usually at home, he needs a friend.β Id. Linda told Roe\\n\\nthat βthe main part of this job is to make Russell happy.β Id. at 250. Roe understood this\\n\\nto mean that βdoing my job, cleaning, doing everything else was what was going to make\\n\\nhim happy.β Id. Roe accepted the position and agreed to move in with the Howards.\\n\\nShe began working for the Howards in June 2007.\\n\\n Once Roe moved into the Howardsβ apartment, she discovered that, although she\\n\\nhad her own room and bathroom, the door to her room could not be locked without a key.\\n\\nThe Howards told Roe they did not have the key. The Howards then presented Roe with\\n\\na uniform consisting of a βvery shortβ skirt and a blouse that βlooked like something you\\n\\nwould wear . . . when you go out.β See J.A. 253. Linda had made the outfit herself.\\n\\n When Roe refused to wear the uniform, Russell took Roe to the mall to go\\n\\nshopping. At the mall, he purchased a βvery revealingβ βone-pieceβ that βopen[ed] in the\\n\\nfront,β and βunderwear . . . with one tiny stringβ and βmany holes.β See J.A. 253. Back\\n\\nat the apartment, Russell asked Roe to put on the new purchases βand show him what it\\n\\nlooks like.β Id. at 254. Roe refused again and went to the kitchen to prepare Russellβs\\n\\nlunch. She then retired to her room. Suddenly, Russell entered the room, naked. Roe\\n\\ntried to escape but Russell cornered her, pinned her down on the bed, and raped her.\\n\\n 7\\n\\fRussell continually raped and sexually assaulted Roe for the duration of her time with the\\n\\nHowards. He repeatedly threatened Roe to maintain her silence: he verbally abused her,\\n\\nhe warned Roe that he could have her thrown in jail, he threatened to tell her religiously\\n\\nconservative family about the assaults, and he retained possession of her passport.\\n\\n As the district court succinctly put it in its post-trial opinion, βLinda Howard was\\n\\naware of these assaults.β See J.A. 145-46. Linda often watched as Russell touched Roeβs\\n\\nrear end and breasts. Roe overheard Russell talking to Linda on the phone about the\\n\\nassaults, including complaining that Roe βwasnβt like Brhan.β Id. at 258, 334. Roe knew\\n\\nit was Linda on the other end of the line based on the nature and content of those\\n\\nconversations. On one occasion, Russell related events to Linda over the phone as he\\n\\ntook Roe to a hospital to have an intrauterine contraceptive device implanted. Russell\\n\\nalso told Roe that he talked to Linda about the rapes.\\n\\n Eventually, Roeβs continued resistance to Russellβs repeated assaults and open,\\n\\nabject misery so enraged Russell that he fired her in December 2007. Linda then helped\\n\\nRoe obtain another restaurant job near the Howardsβ apartment and wrote a letter of\\n\\nrecommendation for her. Even then, Russell would often stop by the restaurant to\\n\\nthreaten Roe to maintain her silence about the rapes he had perpetrated.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Congress enacted the TVPA in the year 2000 βto combat trafficking in persons, a\\n\\ncontemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and\\n\\nchildren, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their\\n\\nvictims.β TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Β§ 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (codified at 22\\n\\n 8\\n\\fU.S.C. Β§ 7101(a)). The congressional findings that accompanied the TVPA in its original\\n\\nform repeatedly emphasized the transnational nature of human trafficking and sexual\\n\\nexploitation, and the enforcement challenges posed by the international scope of that\\n\\ncriminal activity. See id., Β§ 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466-69.\\n\\n By way of the TVPA, Congress created several new federal criminal offenses\\n\\nintended to more comprehensively and effectively combat human trafficking. Among\\n\\nother provisions, the TVPA criminalized: βForced labor,β β[t]rafficking with respect to\\n\\npeonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor,β and β[s]ex trafficking of\\n\\nchildren or by force, fraud or coercion.β See TVPA, Β§ 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1486-88.\\n\\nThose provisions are respectively codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591, all\\n\\nwithin chapter 77 of Title 18.\\n\\n In 2003, Congress reauthorized and amended the TVPA. See Trafficking Victims\\n\\nProtection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (the β2003\\n\\nTVPRAβ). In the findings accompanying the 2003 TVPRA, Congress stressed the\\n\\nchallenges that remained βin responding to the needs of victims of trafficking in the\\n\\nUnited States and abroad.β See id., Β§ 2(2), 117 Stat. at 2875. As part of the 2003\\n\\nTVPRA amendments, Congress added a civil remedy provision to chapter 77. See 2003\\n\\nTVPRA, Β§ 4(a)(4)(A), 117 Stat. at 2878. That civil remedy provision is codified at 18\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1595(a), which provides:\\n\\n (a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of [chapter 77] may bring a\\n civil action against the perpetrator . . . in an appropriate district court of the\\n United States and may recover damages . . . .\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f The 2003 TVPRA also amended Β§ 1591, which prohibits β[s]ex trafficking of\\n\\nchildren or by force, fraud, or coercion.β That amendment altered Β§ 1591 to expressly\\n\\napply to acts committed βwithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the\\n\\nUnited States.β See 2003 TVPRA, Β§ 5(a)(2), 117 Stat. at 2879. The phrase βspecial\\n\\nmaritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ is a term of art defined\\n\\nelsewhere in the U.S. Code. That term encompasses a variety of locations under varying\\n\\ndegrees of control by the United States and includes, with respect to offenses committed\\n\\nby U.S. nationals, the grounds of U.S. diplomatic installations and related premises. See\\n\\n18 U.S.C. Β§ 7(9). Specifically, Β§ 7(9) defines the term to reach:\\n\\n (A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other\\n United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including\\n the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto\\n or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of\\n ownership; and\\n\\n (B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary\\n thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or\\n entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or\\n entities.\\n\\nSee id.\\n\\n In 2006, Congress again reauthorized the TVPA. See Trafficking Victims\\n\\nProtection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (effective\\n\\nJan. 10, 2006) (the β2005 TVPRAβ). This time, Congress expressly found that β[t]he\\n\\ninvolvement of employees and contractors of the United States Government . . . in\\n\\ntrafficking in persons, facilitating the trafficking in persons, or exploiting the victims of\\n\\ntrafficking in persons is inconsistent with United States laws and policies and undermines\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\fthe credibility and mission of the United States Government programs in post-conflict\\n\\nregions.β See id., Β§ 2(10), 119 Stat. at 3559. Accordingly, Congress further expanded the\\n\\nTVPAβs extraterritorial reach by providing:\\n\\n Whoever, while employed by . . . the Federal Government outside the\\n United States, engages in conduct outside the United States that would\\n constitute an offense under chapter 77 . . . of this title if the conduct had\\n been engaged in within the United States or within the special maritime and\\n territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for\\n that offense.\\n\\nSee id., Β§ 103, 119 Stat. at 3562 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271). Each of the statutory\\n\\nprovisions and amendments discussed heretofore was in effect between June and\\n\\nDecember 2007, when the Howards exploited and abused Roe.\\n\\n In 2008, after Roe had left the Howards, Congress further amended and\\n\\nreauthorized the TVPA. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection\\n\\nReauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (the β2008 TVPRAβ).\\n\\nThe 2008 TVPRA further expanded the extraterritorial reach of the TVPA by providing:\\n\\n In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial jurisdiction otherwise\\n provided by law, the courts of the United States have extra-territorial\\n jurisdiction over any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an\\n offense) under section . . . 1589, 1590, or 1591 ifβ\\n\\n (1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States . . . .\\n\\nSee id., Β§ 223, 122 Stat. at 5071 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1596). The 2008 TVPRA also\\n\\nexpanded chapter 77 to prohibit conspiracy to commit the offenses codified at, inter alia,\\n\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591. See id., Β§ 222, 122 Stat. at 5070 (codified at 18\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1594(b)-(c)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f C.\\n\\n In May 2016, Roe sued Linda in the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the\\n\\nTVPA civil remedy provision codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. 4 See J.A. 15. Roe alleged\\n\\nthat Linda had violated multiple criminal provisions of the TVPA, including its\\n\\nprohibitions of forced labor under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1589, forced labor trafficking under\\n\\nΒ§ 1590, commercial sex trafficking under Β§ 1591, and conspiracy to engage in those\\n\\noffenses under Β§ 1594.\\n\\n Before trial, Linda sought summary judgment on the grounds that the TVPA did\\n\\nnot apply extraterritorially to reach her conduct in 2007, and that the 2008 amendments\\n\\nexpanding its extraterritorial application did not apply retroactively. The district court\\n\\ndenied that request without prejudice after argument.\\n\\n Linda also filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Jane Doe, a live-in\\n\\nhousekeeper who worked for the Howards after Roe was fired. 5 The district court denied\\n\\nthat motion and ruled that Doeβs testimony was admissible under either Rule 404(b) or\\n\\nRule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Roeβs claims proceeded to trial in Alexandria\\n\\non July 26, 2017.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Roe originally sued Russellβs estate in addition to Linda, but later dismissed the\\nestate as a defendant in these proceedings. See Roe v. Howard, No. 16-cv-562 (E.D. Va.\\nJuly 26, 2017), ECF No. 78.\\n 5\\n The district court permitted Jane Doe to testify using this pseudonym. See J.A.\\n156.\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f In accordance with the district courtβs ruling, Jane Doe took the stand at trial.\\n\\nLike Roe, Doe was a young Ethiopian woman who came to Yemen in search of work.\\n\\nDoe testified, inter alia, that she began working for the Howards in Sanaβa as a live-in\\n\\nhousekeeper in 2008. Doe followed the Howards to Tokyo when they relocated at the\\n\\nend of that year, based in part on the Howardsβ promises that they would increase her pay\\n\\nand help her obtain health insurance. Such insurance was a benefit of particular value to\\n\\nDoe, who had βkidney issues.β See J.A. 162-63. Doe knew no one in Japan other than\\n\\nthe Howards and did not speak Japanese.\\n\\n Shortly after Doe and the Howards arrived in Tokyo, Russellβs behavior toward\\n\\nDoe changed. Doe testified, over objection, that Russell told her about βsome of the\\n\\nways he abused his former employees.β See J.A. 165. She described how Russell began\\n\\nto touch her inappropriately, on her butt and thigh. Doe then testified that Russell\\n\\ncornered her in her bedroom in the Howardsβ home and raped her. Russell raped Doe\\n\\nrepeatedly during her employment with the Howards. Doe testified, over objection, that\\n\\nRussell told her that Linda knew βeverything that is happening.β Id. at 174. Doe also\\n\\nrelated that, after they had arrived in Tokyo, Linda told Doe βto make sure that I please\\n\\n[Russell], and thatβs my primary job, that she didnβt want him to be mad.β Id. at 175.\\n\\nSome months later, while Doe and the Howards were still in Tokyo, Russell fired Doe\\n\\nand threatened to have her deported.\\n\\n On July 31, 2017, after additional testimony and stipulated submissions consistent\\n\\nwith the preceding recitation of facts, the jury returned its verdict. The jury found Linda\\n\\nliable for each of the four alleged violations of the TVPA. The jury calculated Roeβs\\n\\n 13\\n\\fcompensatory damages at $1 million for each violation. The jury found, however, that\\n\\nthose compensatory damages were duplicative, and thus awarded Roe $1 million in total\\n\\ncompensatory damages. The jury also awarded Roe $2 million in punitive damages. See\\n\\nJ.A. 115-17.\\n\\n In September 2017, Linda filed multiple post-trial motions seeking to overturn the\\n\\njuryβs verdict. As relevant to this appeal, Linda sought a new trial pursuant to Federal\\n\\nRule of Civil Procedure 59(a), contending that the district court had erred in admitting\\n\\nDoeβs testimony. Linda also renewed her Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law\\n\\non the grounds that the TVPA did not apply to her extraterritorial conduct in 2007, and\\n\\nthat the 2008 TVPRA amendments did not apply retroactively. In October 2017, the\\n\\ncourt denied Lindaβs post-trial motions. The court then entered judgment in favor of Roe\\n\\nin accordance with the verdict.\\n\\n In January 2018, the district court issued a post-trial opinion that addressed, inter\\n\\nalia, Lindaβs contention that the TVPAβs civil remedy provision did not apply\\n\\nextraterritorially to reach her conduct in Yemen in 2007. See Roe v. Howard, No. 16-cv-\\n\\n562 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2018), ECF No. 125. The court ruled that, under the version of the\\n\\nTVPA in effect in 2007, the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted with\\n\\nrespect to Lindaβs relevant conduct. Specifically, the court applied the Supreme Courtβs\\n\\ndecision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013), and this Courtβs\\n\\ndecision in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014), to\\n\\nconclude that Lindaβs conduct sufficiently βtouche[d] and concern[ed] the United Statesβ\\n\\nto displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. See J.A. 148-49. Alternatively,\\n\\n 14\\n\\fthe court determined that 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1596, enacted in 2008, could apply retroactively\\n\\nand supported the extraterritorial application of the TVPA civil remedy provision to\\n\\nLindaβs conduct.\\n\\n Linda has timely appealed the judgment of the district court, and we possess\\n\\nappellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo a district courtβs denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a\\n\\nmatter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\\n\\nSee Fontenot v. Taser Intβl, Inc., 736 F.3d 318, 332 (4th Cir. 2013). We also review de\\n\\nnovo βthe conclusions of law on which the courtβs denial of judgment as a matter of law\\n\\nwas premised.β Adkins v. Crown Auto, Inc., 488 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007). Our de\\n\\nnovo review extends to all questions of statutory interpretation encompassed therein.\\n\\nSee, e.g., Stone v. Instrumentation Lab. Co., 591 F.3d 239, 242-43 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n By contrast, we review a district courtβs denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial\\n\\nfor abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only βin the most exceptional circumstances.β\\n\\nMinter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2014). Likewise, we\\n\\nreview rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including testimony, for abuse of\\n\\ndiscretion. See, e.g., United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\f III.\\n\\n Linda seeks to overturn the jury verdict against her by challenging two of the\\n\\ndistrict courtβs rulings in the proceedings below. First, Linda maintains that the court\\n\\nerred in concluding that the TVPAβs civil remedy provision applied to her extraterritorial\\n\\nconduct in 2007, and thus erred in denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law.\\n\\nBy her second contention, Linda argues that the court erred in admitting Jane Doeβs trial\\n\\ntestimony regarding her abuse by the Howards in 2008. We address each contention in\\n\\nturn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Linda seeks to vacate the judgment against her on the ground that the TVPAβs\\n\\ncivil remedy provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595, did not apply extraterritorially\\n\\nbefore 2008. Linda contends that this precludes any liability for her conduct toward Roe,\\n\\nwhich took place in Yemen in 2007. The district court rejected that argument when it\\n\\ndenied Lindaβs post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. In so ruling, the court\\n\\nrelied on the Supreme Courtβs decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., and\\n\\nconcluded that Lindaβs conduct sufficiently βtouch[ed] and concern[ed] the United\\n\\nStatesβ to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. See J.A. 149 (citing\\n\\nKiobel, 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013)). Alternatively, the court determined that 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1596 β which expanded the extraterritorial reach of the TVPA in 2008 β applied\\n\\nretroactively and sustained Lindaβs liability under the TVPA.\\n\\n As explained below, we affirm the district court and conclude that the TVPAβs\\n\\ncivil remedy provision applied to Lindaβs conduct in Yemen in 2007. We reach this\\n\\n 16\\n\\fconclusion, however, based on a somewhat different analysis than that employed by the\\n\\ndistrict court. See United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005) (confirming\\n\\nthat this Court βmay affirm on any grounds apparent from the recordβ). Specifically, we\\n\\nrely on the Supreme Courtβs more recent decision on extraterritoriality in RJR Nabisco,\\n\\nInc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). Adhering to the framework explained in\\n\\nRJR Nabisco, we ground our ruling on the text and structure of the relevant TVPA\\n\\nprovisions. Pursuant to our analysis, we are satisfied that the TVPAβs civil remedy\\n\\nprovision applied to Lindaβs conduct toward Roe in 2007.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Congress has the undisputed authority to apply its laws beyond βthe territorial\\n\\nboundaries of the United States.β See United States v. Ayesh, 702 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2012). Whether it has exercised that authority βis a matter of statutory construction.β Id.\\n\\n(citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded in part by\\n\\nstatute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in\\n\\nLandgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994)). The canon of statutory\\n\\ninterpretation known as the βpresumption against extraterritorialityβ instructs that\\n\\nβ[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be\\n\\nconstrued to have only domestic application.β RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100.\\n\\n In its 2016 ruling in RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court drew on its precedent to\\n\\ndescribe a βtwo-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.β See id. at 2101\\n\\n(citing Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108; Morrison v. Natβl Austr. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).\\n\\nThe first step of the RJR Nabisco framework asks βwhether the statute gives a clear,\\n\\n 17\\n\\faffirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially,β and thereby rebuts the\\n\\npresumption against extraterritoriality. Id. In making that determination, courts look to\\n\\nthe text of the statute, but βan express statement of extraterritoriality is not essential.β Id.\\n\\nat 2102. The structure and history of the statute are also relevant to this analysis, and in\\n\\nsome circumstances the statuteβs βcontextβ may be βdispositive.β Id. at 2102-03.\\n\\n If the first step reveals that a statute β or a specific statutory provision β has\\n\\nextraterritorial effect, our analysis is complete. See id. at 2101. If, on the other hand, the\\n\\nfirst step shows that a statute does not apply extraterritorially, a court must proceed to the\\n\\nsecond step identified in RJR Nabisco. Specifically, the court must then βdetermine\\n\\nwhether the case involves a domestic application of the statuteβ by considering the\\n\\nchallenged conduct in light of the statuteβs βfocus.β Id. at 2101. If βthe conduct relevant\\n\\nto the statuteβs focusβ occurred βin U.S. Territory,β then the application of the statute is\\n\\nnot truly extraterritorial. See id. 6 That is, such conduct would represent a βpermissible\\n\\ndomestic applicationβ of the statute at issue. See id. at 2100.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n In delineating the two-step framework in RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court drew\\non two of its key precedents addressing extraterritoriality: Morrison and Kiobel. The\\nsecond step described in RJR Nabisco, however, appears to privilege consideration of a\\nstatuteβs βfocusβ β the approach set out in Morrison β over the inquiry articulated in\\nKiobel, which asked whether the claims at issue βtouch and concern the territory of the\\nUnited States.β See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25. On the\\nother hand, RJR Nabisco did not overturn Kiobel and β in step two β retains a similar\\nemphasis on the relevant claimβs connection to U.S. territory. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.\\nCt. at 2101. We need not resolve the effect of RJR Nabisco on Kiobel because, as\\nexplained herein, we do not reach the second step of the RJR Nabisco framework.\\n\\n 18\\n\\f 2.\\n\\n The first step of the RJR Nabisco framework requires us to assess the specific\\n\\nstatutory provisions at issue to determine whether those provisions demonstrate βclearly\\n\\nexpressed congressional intentβ that they will apply extraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct. at\\n\\n2100, 2102; see also Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 (emphasizing that βwhen a statute\\n\\nprovides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality\\n\\noperates to limit that provision to its termsβ). Here, Roe sued Linda pursuant to the civil\\n\\nremedy provision of the TVPA, codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. Section 1595 permits\\n\\nvictims of the trafficking offenses specified in chapter 77 of Title 18 to sue the\\n\\nperpetrator of such an offense. Roe sought to recover damages based on Lindaβs\\n\\nviolations of the trafficking offenses codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591,\\n\\nwhich prohibit forced labor, trafficking in forced labor, and forced sex trafficking,\\n\\nrespectively. Roe also alleged that Linda conspired to commit those offenses in violation\\n\\nof Β§ 1594. As described above, the jury at Lindaβs trial found that she had committed\\n\\neach of those four offenses and awarded Roe damages under Β§ 1595.\\n\\n Applying the first step of the RJR Nabisco inquiry, we are satisfied that Β§ 1595 of\\n\\nthe TVPA evinces a βclear indication of extraterritorial effect,β at least with respect to the\\n\\nconduct at issue here. See 136 S. Ct. at 2102. Of crucial importance, Β§ 1595 directly\\n\\nincorporates predicate offenses that govern foreign conduct, providing strong textual\\n\\nevidence of its extraterritorial effect when applied to those predicates. See id. at 2102-03.\\n\\nAdditionally, the purpose, structure, history, and context of the TVPA militate toward the\\n\\nextraterritorial application of Β§ 1595, to the extent that the relevant predicate offenses\\n\\n 19\\n\\freach the challenged foreign conduct at issue. See id. at 2102 (consulting βcontextβ to\\n\\ndetermine extraterritoriality); In re French, 440 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining\\n\\nthat courts should consult βall available evidence,β including text, statutory scheme, and\\n\\nlegislative history to determine extraterritorial effect of statute).\\n\\n We begin our analysis by looking to the Supreme Courtβs application of the first\\n\\nRJR Nabisco step to the circumstances of that case. In RJR Nabisco, the Court addressed\\n\\nwhether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (βRICOβ) applied\\n\\nextraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct. at 2099. The central RICO provision, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1962,\\n\\ncontains four substantive prohibitions that criminalize certain means of influencing or\\n\\noperating an enterprise through βa pattern of racketeering activity.β See id. at 2097\\n\\n(citing 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1962(a)-(d)). RICO defines βracketeering activityβ as comprising a\\n\\nrange of state and federal offenses, referred to as predicate offenses. See id. at 2096\\n\\n(citing 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1961). To determine whether the substantive RICO provisions\\n\\napplied to foreign conduct, the Court examined the text and context of Β§ 1962. See id. at\\n\\n2101-03.\\n\\n The Court explained that β[t]he most obvious textual clueβ that Β§ 1962 applied\\n\\nextraterritorially was that RICO defined βracketeering activityβ to include βa number of\\n\\npredicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct.β See id. at 2101. The\\n\\nCourt reasoned that βCongressβs incorporation of [such] extraterritorial predicates into\\n\\nRICO gives a clear, affirmative indication that Β§ 1962 applies to foreign racketeering\\n\\nactivity β but only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a particular case\\n\\nthemselves apply extraterritorially.β See id. at 2102. Thus, although Congress had not\\n\\n 20\\n\\fincluded βan express statement of extraterritorialityβ in RICOβs text, the context and\\n\\nstructure of Β§ 1962 β specifically, its incorporation of βpredicate statutes that do apply\\n\\nextraterritoriallyβ β nonetheless provided the necessary βclear, affirmative indicationβ\\n\\nthat Β§ 1962 applied extraterritorially. See id. at 2101, 2102-03.\\n\\n Put simply, RJR Nabisco teaches that, even absent an express statement of\\n\\nextraterritoriality, a statute may apply to foreign conduct insofar as it clearly and directly\\n\\nincorporates a predicate statutory provision that applies extraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct.\\n\\nat 2102-03. Applying this rule to the TVPA, we are satisfied that Β§ 1595 reflects\\n\\ncongressional intent that it applies extraterritorially to the extent that a plaintiff seeks\\n\\nredress for a predicate offense βthat is itself extraterritorial.β See id. at 2103.\\n\\n Like Β§ 1962, the TVPAβs civil remedy provision directly incorporates a set of\\n\\npredicate offenses βthat plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct.β See RJR\\n\\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. More specifically, Β§ 1595 permits βa victim of a violation of\\n\\nthis chapter [chapter 77 of Title 18]β to bring βa civil action against the perpetrator.β See\\n\\n18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. Many of the predicate offenses proscribed by chapter 77 apply\\n\\nextraterritorially, either expressly or by way of other provisions delineating their\\n\\nextraterritorial application. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1585 (prohibiting, inter alia, seizure of\\n\\npersons βon any foreign shoreβ with βintent to make that person a slaveβ). Thus,\\n\\npursuant to RJR Nabisco, βCongressβs incorporationβ of such βextraterritorial predicatesβ\\n\\ninto Β§ 1595 βgives a clear, affirmative indicationβ that Β§ 1595 provides a civil remedy for\\n\\nthe foreign conduct that is prohibited by chapter 77. See 136 S. Ct. at 2102. That is,\\n\\n\\n\\n 21\\n\\fΒ§ 1595 applies extraterritorially to the extent that the particular predicate offense\\n\\nsupporting a specific claim applies extraterritorially. See id. at 2103.\\n\\n Reinforcing that conclusion, the purpose, structure, history, and context of the\\n\\nTVPA all support the extraterritorial application of Β§ 1595 for an appropriate predicate\\n\\noffense. The TVPAβs stated purpose and accompanying congressional findings\\n\\ndemonstrate that Congress enacted it to address the problem of human trafficking\\n\\nβthroughout the world.β See Pub. L. 106-386 §§ 101-102, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466-69\\n\\n(2000). The TVPA contains numerous provisions authorizing funds and programs to\\n\\nsupport international efforts to address that global problem. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 7104(c) (creating βborder interdictionβ programs to combat trafficking at βkey border\\n\\ncrossingsβ); Β§ 7105 (authorizing foreign assistance programs to protect and aid\\n\\ntrafficking victims abroad). Notably, Congress has consistently amended the TVPA to\\n\\nreach and proscribe additional categories of foreign conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591\\n\\n(amended by 2003 TVPRA to cover conduct committed in special maritime and\\n\\nterritorial jurisdiction of United States); Β§ 3271 (enacted as part of 2006 TVPRA\\n\\namendments to cover trafficking offenses by U.S. government employees abroad).\\n\\nViewed as a whole, the TVPA represents a far-reaching congressional effort to combat\\n\\ntransnational human trafficking on numerous fronts, including by expanding the civil\\n\\nclaims and remedies available to its victims.\\n\\n This is, in short, a situation in which Congress was clearly concerned with\\n\\ninternational rather than purely domestic matters. In these circumstances, unduly limiting\\n\\nthe TVPAβs scope risks frustrating its animating purpose. See Ayesh, 702 F.3d at 166\\n\\n 22\\n\\f(ruling that federal statute prohibiting U.S. employees from pilfering public funds applied\\n\\nextraterritorially because holding otherwise would immunize broad category of conduct\\n\\nand frustrate congressional intent); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337,\\n\\n1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concluding that statutes prohibiting inducement of aliens to enter\\n\\nUnited States illegally applied extraterritorially because, inter alia, they were\\n\\nβfundamentally internationalβ in βfocus and effectβ).\\n\\n Although we are satisfied that RJR Nabisco compels the extraterritorial application\\n\\nof Β§ 1595 with respect to its extraterritorial predicates, we recognize that Part IV of that\\n\\ndecision declined to apply RICOβs civil cause of action to foreign conduct. See 136 S.\\n\\nCt. at 2106. But that part of Justice Alitoβs opinion for the Court depended on factors\\n\\nthat do not apply to Β§ 1595 of the TVPA. First, RICOβs civil remedy provision, codified\\n\\nat 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1964(c), does not directly incorporate any extraterritorial predicates.\\n\\nIndeed, it makes no reference to any extraterritorial provision whatsoever. Rather, civil\\n\\nliability under Β§ 1964(c) is premised on Β§ 1962 criminal liability, but β crucially β is\\n\\nnot coextensive with Β§ 1962 liability. Justice Alito emphasized that the text of Β§ 1964(c)\\n\\nlimited its application to certain types of injuries, and thereby created a gap between the\\n\\nreach of Β§ 1964(c) civil liability and Β§ 1962 criminal liability. See id. at 2106, 2108.\\n\\nFurther, Β§ 1964 contained no other indication that it should apply extraterritorially; that\\n\\nis, it lacked the kind of βforeign-oriented languageβ or reference to foreign activity that\\n\\ncould sustain its extraterritorial application. See id. at 2108-10 & n.12.\\n\\n None of the foregoing considerations apply to Β§ 1595 of the TVPA. As explained\\n\\nabove, Β§ 1595 expressly and directly incorporates the TVPAβs criminal predicates, many\\n\\n 23\\n\\fof which manifestly apply to foreign conduct. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102. In\\n\\nthat regard, Β§ 1595 of the TVPA resembles Β§ 1962 of RICO rather than the circumscribed\\n\\ntext of Β§ 1964(c). See id. at 2109-10 (comparing and distinguishing Β§ 1962 and Β§ 1964);\\n\\nacc. Pfizer, Inc. v. Govβt of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978) (sustaining extraterritorial\\n\\napplication of Clayton Act civil remedy due to, inter alia, its incorporation of definitions\\n\\nexpressly addressing foreign entities). Moreover, the text of Β§ 1595 shows that it applies\\n\\ncoextensively with its predicate offenses, omitting any qualifying or modifying language,\\n\\nwhich further distinguishes it from Β§ 1964(c). Notably, as discussed above, the TVPA is\\n\\nreplete with the βforeign-oriented languageβ that Justice Alito found lacking in Β§ 1964(c),\\n\\nincluding in the predicates underpinning Roeβs claim. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at\\n\\n2110 n.12. Indeed, the TVPA more clearly targets foreign conduct than any provision of\\n\\nRICO, as demonstrated by its international scope and Congressβs repeated expansions of\\n\\nits extraterritorial reach. See, e.g., 2005 TVPRA, 119 Stat. at 3562.\\n\\n In short, Β§ 1595 evinces the same relationship to its extraterritorial predicate\\n\\noffenses that RICOβs substantive criminal provision does to its predicates, and is not\\n\\nsubject to textual limitations like those found in RICOβs private cause of action. Section\\n\\n1595 therefore provides a civil remedy for conduct that comes within the extraterritorial\\n\\npredicates of the TVPA. Accordingly, we now turn to the question of whether the\\n\\npredicate offenses underlying Roeβs civil suit applied to Lindaβs extraterritorial conduct\\n\\nin 2007.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24\\n\\f 3.\\n\\n The jury awarded Roe damages based on their findings that Linda had violated 18\\n\\nU.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, 1591, and 1594. Each of those offenses is a qualifying predicate\\n\\noffense for Β§ 1595 civil liability, as they are all found within chapter 77 of Title 18 of the\\n\\nU.S. Code. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595 (authorizing civil suits by βa victim of a violation of\\n\\nthis chapter [chapter 77]β against the perpetrator or βwhoever knowingly benefitsβ from\\n\\nthat violation). The remaining question for us today is whether those predicates applied\\n\\nextraterritorially and reached Lindaβs foreign conduct in 2007. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.\\n\\nCt. at 2102. We will therefore assess each predicate offense, mindful that βthe inclusion\\n\\nof some extraterritorial predicates does not mean that all [statutory] predicates extend to\\n\\nforeign conduct.β See id.\\n\\n a.\\n\\n Section 1591 β prohibiting sex trafficking β presents the simplest analysis.\\n\\nSince 2003, Β§ 1591 has applied to conduct committed βwithin the special maritime and\\n\\nterritorial jurisdiction of the United States.β See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591; 2003 TVPRA, 117\\n\\nStat. at 2879. Where an offense is committed by a United States national like Linda,\\n\\nTitle 18 defines the βspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ to\\n\\ninclude the βpremises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United\\n\\nStates Government missions or entities in foreign States,β including related residences,\\n\\nbuildings, and land, that, βirrespective of ownership,β are used βfor purposes of those\\n\\nmissions or entities.β See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 7(9). It is undisputed that Lindaβs part in Roeβs\\n\\nabuse occurred entirely on U.S. embassy grounds and housing in Sanaβa. Those premises\\n\\n 25\\n\\funquestionably fall within the βspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United\\n\\nStates,β as defined in Title 18. See id.; see also United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207,\\n\\n214 (4th Cir. 2009) (observing that American embassies are βplainly within Β§ 7(9)βs\\n\\nscopeβ); United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1973) (ruling that embassies\\n\\ncomprise part of βspecial territorial jurisdictionβ of United States); H.R. Rep. No. 107-\\n\\n236, at 74 (2001) (agreeing with Erdos and explaining that βembassies and embassy\\n\\nhousing of the United States in foreign states are included in the special maritime and\\n\\nterritorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ). Thus, Β§ 1591 expressly applied to Lindaβs\\n\\nconduct in Sanaβa in 2007, and she is liable for her violation thereof under Β§ 1595.\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Sections 1589 and 1590 of Title 18 β prohibiting forced labor and forced labor\\n\\ntrafficking β do not directly refer to foreign conduct. But since 2006, those sections\\n\\nhave applied to extraterritorial acts committed by United States employees like Linda.\\n\\nThe 2005 TVPRA amended the TVPA by enacting 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271, which provides:\\n\\n Whoever, while employed by . . . the Federal Government outside the\\n United States, engages in conduct outside the United States that would\\n constitute an offense under chapter 77 [of Title 18] if the conduct had been\\n engaged in within the United States or within the special maritime and\\n territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for\\n that offense.\\n\\nSee 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271; see also 2005 TVPRA, Β§ 103, 119 Stat. at 3562. Such language\\n\\nβmanifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially.β See RJR\\n\\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a plainer indication\\n\\nwas needed, Congress included Β§ 3271 in chapter 212A, titled βExtraterritorial\\n\\n\\n 26\\n\\fJurisdiction Over Certain Trafficking in Persons Offenses.β See 2005 TVPRA, 119 Stat.\\n\\nat 3562. By the TVPAβs own terms, this extraterritorial application is limited in scope;\\n\\nthat is, it applies only to persons employed abroad by the federal government. Linda,\\n\\nhowever, falls within that class of employees. Consequently, her actions in Sanaβa were\\n\\nwithin the extraterritorial scope of Β§ 1589 and Β§ 1590 in 2007. The jury therefore\\n\\nproperly found her liable for violating those provisions under Β§ 1595.\\n\\n c.\\n\\n Turning to Β§ 1594, however, our analysis differs. Regardless of Β§ 1594βs\\n\\nextraterritoriality, the conspiracy provision for which the jury found Linda liable had not\\n\\nbeen enacted by 2007. Rather, the conspiracy prohibitions contained in Β§ 1594(b) and (c)\\n\\nwere added as part of the 2008 TVPRA amendments. See 2008 TVPRA, Β§ 222, 122 Stat.\\n\\nat 5070. That said, we need not resolve whether Β§ 1594 applies retroactively in order to\\n\\naffirm the award of damages to Roe. If this Court is βreasonably certainβ that the jury\\n\\nwould have awarded the same amount of damages regardless of the βissues erroneously\\n\\nsubmitted to it,β we are entitled to affirm the award. See Tire Engβg & Distribution, LLC\\n\\nv. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 314 (4th Cir. 2012). That rule holds\\n\\nparticular force where, as here, the jury has completed a special verdict form addressing\\n\\nliability and damages. See id. at 313-14 (collecting and comparing cases). Because the\\n\\njury indicated that it calculated Roeβs damages at $1 million for each of the four TVPA\\n\\nviolations, but awarded only $1 million total because those damages were duplicative, it\\n\\nis beyond reasonable debate that the jury would have awarded Roe $1 million in\\n\\n\\n\\n 27\\n\\fcompensatory damages for any one of Lindaβs violations, and for any combination\\n\\nthereof. See J.A. 115-17.\\n\\n In sum, the facts established at trial show that Linda committed at least three\\n\\npredicate offenses that applied to her extraterritorial conduct toward Roe in 2007.\\n\\nPursuant to the Supreme Courtβs decision in RJR Nabisco, Β§ 1595 authorizes Lindaβs\\n\\ncivil liability based on her commission of those offenses. 7 We are entitled to affirm the\\n\\njuryβs award of damages because they were properly awarded pursuant to Β§ 1595, and\\n\\nbecause any error with regard to the applicability of Β§ 1594 did not affect that result.\\n\\n Because step one of the RJR Nabisco framework demonstrates that Β§ 1595 applied\\n\\nextraterritorially to Lindaβs conduct, we need not proceed to step two, which guides our\\n\\nanalysis only where the pertinent statute does not apply extraterritorially. See RJR\\n\\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. We thus have no occasion to determine whether, under step\\n\\ntwo, Lindaβs offenses involved βa domestic applicationβ of the TVPA. See id.\\n\\nAccordingly, we reserve for another day the issue of whether conduct occurring entirely\\n\\nwithin U.S. embassy grounds and associated housing takes place βin U.S. territory.β See\\n\\nid.; see also Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248. We confine our analysis today to the\\n\\ntext and context of Β§ 1595, and affirm the juryβs award of damages to Roe on that basis.\\n\\n 7\\n Lindaβs argument against the extraterritorial application of Β§ 1595 relies almost\\nentirely on the Fifth Circuitβs ruling in Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., where\\nthat court determined that Β§ 1595 failed to provide a remedy for the plaintiffsβ\\nextraterritorial TVPA claims. See 845 F.3d 184, 201-06 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Br. of\\nAppellant 8-16. That decision, however, is readily distinguishable because the Adhikari\\nplaintiffs did not allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591 and the defendantsβ conduct\\noccurred before the enactment of Β§ 3271. See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 190, 200.\\n\\n\\n 28\\n\\f B.\\n\\n Turning to Lindaβs second and final appellate contention, we must resolve whether\\n\\nthe district court properly admitted Jane Doeβs evidence concerning the sexual abuse she\\n\\nsuffered while working as the Howardsβ housekeeper in 2008. Linda raises various\\n\\nobjections to Doeβs testimony: that it was impermissible character evidence barred by\\n\\nFederal Rule of Evidence 404(a); that it could not be admitted under Rule 415, which\\n\\npermits testimony of βsimilar actsβ in sexual assault lawsuits; that it was unfairly\\n\\nprejudicial and thus barred by Rule 403; and that the portion of Doeβs testimony relating\\n\\nto Russellβs statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. Each assertion is without merit.\\n\\n First, Doeβs testimony was plainly admissible under Rule 404(b)βs exception to\\n\\nRule 404(a)βs general prohibition of character evidence to prove an action in conformity\\n\\ntherewith. Doeβs testimony described Lindaβs efforts to recruit Doe to work as the\\n\\nHowardsβ housekeeper, and her knowledge and facilitation of Russellβs repeated sexual\\n\\nassaults on Doe. Consistent with the permissible uses of character evidence under Rule\\n\\n404(b), Doeβs testimony constituted highly probative evidence regarding Lindaβs\\n\\nintentions in her interactions with Roe; the existence of a plan or pattern of behavior by\\n\\nthe Howards toward their live-in housekeepers; and Lindaβs knowledge of Russellβs\\n\\nabuse of their staff. Doeβs testimony was therefore admissible under Rule 404(b)(2),\\n\\nwhich permits the introduction of evidence of βa crime, wrong, or other actβ to show,\\n\\ninter alia, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake. Indeed, the\\n\\nsimilarity between Doe and Roeβs accounts of their abuse enhances the probative value\\n\\nand relevance of Doeβs evidence. See United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th\\n\\n 29\\n\\fCir. 1997). 8 Because we are satisfied that Doeβs testimony was properly admitted under\\n\\nRule 404(b), we need not assess whether it was also admissible under Rule 415.\\n\\n Nor was Doeβs testimony barred by Rule 403. Pursuant to Rule 403, a court may\\n\\nexclude evidence if its βprobative valueβ is βsubstantially outweighedβ by, inter alia, the\\n\\nrisk of βunfair prejudice.β As noted above, Doeβs testimony provided highly probative\\n\\nevidence of a pattern of abusive behavior by Russell, knowingly facilitated by Linda.\\n\\nMoreover, because the assaults Roe suffered occurred in Yemen nearly a decade prior to\\n\\nLindaβs trial, Doeβs evidence was particularly important given the lack of available\\n\\nphysical evidence to corroborate Roeβs claims. Finally, the district court limited the\\n\\nscope of Doeβs testimony to avoid revealing the upsetting details of Russellβs past\\n\\nassaults, and thus reduced the risk of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Mark, 943\\n\\nF.2d 444, 449 (4th Cir. 1991). In these circumstances, the court did not abuse its\\n\\ndiscretion in permitting Doe to testify. See Mohr, 318 F.3d at 619-20 (emphasizing that\\n\\nRule 403 only requires exclusion of evidence resulting in unfair prejudice that\\n\\nβsubstantiallyβ outweighs its probative value); United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339,\\n\\n351 (4th Cir. 1998) (sustaining admission of evidence of prior sexual assault in light of its\\n\\nβsignificant probative valueβ and trial courtβs effort to reduce its prejudicial impact).\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n Linda argues that the standard for admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) changes\\nwhen that evidence concerns βsubsequentβ (rather than prior) acts. Br. of Appellant 26.\\nNo such rule exists in this Circuit. Put simply, Rule 404(b) does not function differently\\nmerely because Doeβs experience occurred after Roeβs. See United States v. Mohr, 318\\nF.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n\\n 30\\n\\f Lastly, Doeβs testimony concerning Russellβs past statements was not inadmissible\\n\\nhearsay. Rule 804(b)(3) authorizes the admission of hearsay statements by an\\n\\nunavailable declarant that are manifestly against the declarantβs interest. Specifically, the\\n\\nstatement must be one that βa reasonable person in the declarantβs position would have\\n\\nmade only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it . . . had so great a\\n\\ntendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability.β Fed. R. Evid.\\n\\n804(b)(3). Russellβs statements to Doe β admitting to his past assaults of his former\\n\\nemployees β more than qualify as statements against interest as so defined, and his death\\n\\nin 2012 establishes his unavailability to testify. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its\\n\\ndiscretion by relying on that exception to admit Doeβs testimony regarding Russellβs\\n\\nincriminating statements. See, e.g., United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 267-68 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2008) (evaluating flexible requirements of Rule 804(b)(3) and sustaining admission\\n\\nof hearsay statements that implicated declarant in multiple crimes).\\n\\n In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Doeβs\\n\\ntestimony, and we are satisfied to affirm the courtβs rulings in that regard.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm the district courtβs judgment in favor of Roe\\n\\nand against Linda Howard.\\n\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 31\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4370848/\", \"author_raw\": \"KING, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILKINSON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"QUATTLEBAUM"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593595/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Sarah ROE, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Linda HOWARD, Defendant - Appellant, and Estate of Russell Howard, Defendant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-2338\n\n\nSARAH ROE,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\n\n v.\n\n\nLINDA HOWARD,\n\n Defendant β Appellant,\n and\n\nESTATE OF RUSSELL HOWARD,\n\n Defendant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\nAlexandria. Liam OβGrady, District Judge. (1:16-cv-00562-LO-JFA)\n\n\nArgued: October 30, 2018 Decided: February 25, 2019\n\n\nBefore WILKINSON, KING, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion in which Judge Wilkinson\nand Judge Quattlebaum joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Richard Francis Rinaldo, JONES, GREGG, CREEHAN & GERACE LLP,\nPittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Melissa Lim Patterson, JONES DAY,\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Timothy J. Battle, Alexandria, Virginia,\n\ffor Appellant. Alison B. Marshall, Christian G. Vergonis, JONES DAY, Washington,\nD.C., for Appellee.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\fKING, Circuit Judge:\n\n Defendant Linda Howard appeals from a judgment entered against her in the\n\nEastern District of Virginia after a jury found her civilly liable to plaintiff Sarah Roe\n\nunder the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (the βTVPAβ). 1 Roe had sued Howard for\n\nher role in sexual abuse that Roe suffered at the hands of Russell Howard, Lindaβs\n\nhusband, when Roe worked in 2007 as the Howardsβ housekeeper in housing provided by\n\nthe Embassy of the United States in Yemen. 2 The jury found that Lindaβs conduct in\n\nYemen contravened criminal provisions of the TVPA and thus awarded Roe $3 million in\n\ndamages pursuant to the TVPAβs civil remedy provision. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. On\n\nappeal, Linda challenges the district courtβs denial of her post-trial motion for judgment\n\nas a matter of law, wherein she sought relief on the ground that, in 2007, the TVPAβs\n\ncivil remedy provision did not apply extraterritorially. Linda also challenges the courtβs\n\nadmission of testimonial evidence from another former housekeeper of Linda and Russell\n\nwhom they had similarly abused. As explained below, we are satisfied to affirm the\n\njudgment.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The TVPA is generally codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1581 et seq.\n 2\n To avoid confusion, we generally refer to Linda Howard and Russell Howard by\ntheir first names, that is, simply as Linda and Russell. We refer to the plaintiff by her\npseudonym βSarah Roe,β pursuant to the district courtβs ruling in that regard. See Roe v.\nHoward, No. 16-cv-562 (E.D. Va. May 27, 2016), ECF No. 11.\n\n\n 3\n\f I.\n\n A.\n\n On July 31, 2017, following a four-day trial, a jury in the Eastern District of\n\nVirginia found Linda Howard civilly liable for contravening criminal provisions of the\n\nTVPA. More specifically, the jury found that Linda had engaged in forced labor in\n\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1589, forced labor trafficking in violation of Β§ 1590, commercial\n\nsex trafficking in violation of Β§ 1591, and conspiring to engage in those offenses in\n\nviolation of Β§ 1594. See J.A. 115-17. 3\n\n When we review an appeal following a jury verdict, we view the trial evidence in\n\nthe light most favorable to the prevailing party. See Randall v. Prince Georgeβs Cty., 302\n\nF.3d 188, 195 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Lowery v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431,\n\n442-43 (4th Cir. 2000)). We are likewise obliged to accord the prevailing party the\n\nbenefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See Lowery, 206 F.3d\n\nat 443. The facts recited herein are taken in that light and drawn from the record, which\n\nincludes evidence presented at trial and the partiesβ joint submission of stipulated facts.\n\n 1.\n\n Linda is an American citizen. She began working for the Department of State in\n\n1991 as a Communications Officer in Paris, France. In Paris, Linda met and married\n\nRussell, an Australian citizen who then worked for the Australian Embassy in France.\n\n\n 3\n Citations herein to βJ.A.__β refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by\nthe parties in this appeal.\n\n\n 4\n\fOver the next decade, Linda and Russell held similar postings around the world, usually\n\narranging their assignments so that they could pursue their careers in the same country.\n\nIn 2001, Russell retired from his position with the Australian government, and he\n\nthereafter followed Linda as she continued her career with the State Department.\n\n In 2005, the State Department assigned Linda to our Embassy in Sanaβa, Yemen.\n\nRussell accompanied Linda to Sanaβa and also found work at the Embassy. Among other\n\njobs, Russell performed administrative work for the Embassy Commissary. In Sanaβa,\n\nLinda and Russell lived in housing provided by the State Department, and they were\n\nprotected by U.S. government security. Linda and Russell remained in Sanaβa for\n\napproximately three years. Around December 2008, Linda and Russell moved to Japan,\n\nwhere Linda received her next State Department posting. By 2012, Linda and Russell\n\nhad relocated to Melbourne, Australia, where Russell died of pancreatic cancer that\n\nSeptember. Linda continues to reside in Melbourne.\n\n 2.\n\n Sarah Roe first met the Howards in September 2005, soon after their arrival in\n\nYemen. At that time, Roe was twenty years old. Born into an impoverished family in\n\nEthiopia, Roe had moved to Yemen to seek work, and she initially secured various\n\nhousekeeping and cleaning jobs. In September 2005, Roe was employed there as a\n\nwaitress at a restaurant on U.S. Embassy grounds called Uncle Samβs. It was at Uncle\n\nSamβs that the Howards first encountered Roe and sought to befriend her.\n\n As one of his odd jobs around the U.S. Embassy, Russell worked in a shop next\n\ndoor to Uncle Samβs. He first introduced himself to Roe, and then introduced Roe to\n\n 5\n\fLinda. Both Howards paid special attention to Roe: they complimented her appearance,\n\ninitiated friendly conversations, and encouraged her to work for them as their live-in\n\nhousekeeper. At first Roe declined the job offer, and Russell asked her to help βfind a\n\nbeautiful woman like [her]self to work in [the Howardsβ] home.β See J.A. 232. Linda\n\nwould stop by Uncle Samβs three or four times a week, where she would βgreetβ and\n\nβhugβ Roe. Id. at 231. Linda even gave Roe her personal phone number. Id. at 234.\n\n Around 2006, Roe returned to Ethiopia from Yemen for several months to care for\n\nher mother. As a result, she lost her job at Uncle Samβs. When Roe returned to Sanaβa, a\n\nyoung Ethiopian woman named Sabha was then employed as the Howardsβ live-in\n\nhousekeeper, but Linda helped Roe obtain a data-entry job at the U.S. Embassy. Linda\n\ngave Roe an application for the data-entry position and taught her how to use a basic\n\ndata-entry program on Lindaβs home computer. After Roe got the job, Linda continued\n\nto befriend her, meeting Roe to talk about her hair stylist and other non-work matters.\n\nLinda presented herself to Roe βas a friend, someone very easy to talk to, someone with a\n\nvery good heart.β See J.A. 239. Linda also promised to help Roe find another job after\n\nthe data-entry position ended. Roe believed Linda offered such help because Linda\n\nβreally likedβ her. Id. at 241.\n\n Some months later, in the spring of 2007, the Howardsβ then live-in housekeeper\n\n(another young Ethiopian woman named Brhan) left them. At the time, Roe was looking\n\nfor a new job and the Howards renewed their offer to Roe to fill the housekeeping\n\nposition. Roe was uncertain about accepting the Howardsβ offer. She made more money\n\nwhen she had jobs that allowed her to accept tips, like waitressing. Roe also had her own\n\n 6\n\fapartment and did not want to move in with the Howards, which was a requirement of the\n\nposition. But the Howards offered to help Roe get medical treatment for an eye ailment,\n\nrenew her work visa, and aid her family in Ethiopia. Linda also βknew that [Roe] had a\n\ndesire to improve [her] language skills,β and promised that Russell could help her with\n\nher English. See J.A. 247. As part of their discussions about the live-in position, Linda\n\nexplained to Roe βthat Russell is usually at home, he needs a friend.β Id. Linda told Roe\n\nthat βthe main part of this job is to make Russell happy.β Id. at 250. Roe understood this\n\nto mean that βdoing my job, cleaning, doing everything else was what was going to make\n\nhim happy.β Id. Roe accepted the position and agreed to move in with the Howards.\n\nShe began working for the Howards in June 2007.\n\n Once Roe moved into the Howardsβ apartment, she discovered that, although she\n\nhad her own room and bathroom, the door to her room could not be locked without a key.\n\nThe Howards told Roe they did not have the key. The Howards then presented Roe with\n\na uniform consisting of a βvery shortβ skirt and a blouse that βlooked like something you\n\nwould wear . . . when you go out.β See J.A. 253. Linda had made the outfit herself.\n\n When Roe refused to wear the uniform, Russell took Roe to the mall to go\n\nshopping. At the mall, he purchased a βvery revealingβ βone-pieceβ that βopen[ed] in the\n\nfront,β and βunderwear . . . with one tiny stringβ and βmany holes.β See J.A. 253. Back\n\nat the apartment, Russell asked Roe to put on the new purchases βand show him what it\n\nlooks like.β Id. at 254. Roe refused again and went to the kitchen to prepare Russellβs\n\nlunch. She then retired to her room. Suddenly, Russell entered the room, naked. Roe\n\ntried to escape but Russell cornered her, pinned her down on the bed, and raped her.\n\n 7\n\fRussell continually raped and sexually assaulted Roe for the duration of her time with the\n\nHowards. He repeatedly threatened Roe to maintain her silence: he verbally abused her,\n\nhe warned Roe that he could have her thrown in jail, he threatened to tell her religiously\n\nconservative family about the assaults, and he retained possession of her passport.\n\n As the district court succinctly put it in its post-trial opinion, βLinda Howard was\n\naware of these assaults.β See J.A. 145-46. Linda often watched as Russell touched Roeβs\n\nrear end and breasts. Roe overheard Russell talking to Linda on the phone about the\n\nassaults, including complaining that Roe βwasnβt like Brhan.β Id. at 258, 334. Roe knew\n\nit was Linda on the other end of the line based on the nature and content of those\n\nconversations. On one occasion, Russell related events to Linda over the phone as he\n\ntook Roe to a hospital to have an intrauterine contraceptive device implanted. Russell\n\nalso told Roe that he talked to Linda about the rapes.\n\n Eventually, Roeβs continued resistance to Russellβs repeated assaults and open,\n\nabject misery so enraged Russell that he fired her in December 2007. Linda then helped\n\nRoe obtain another restaurant job near the Howardsβ apartment and wrote a letter of\n\nrecommendation for her. Even then, Russell would often stop by the restaurant to\n\nthreaten Roe to maintain her silence about the rapes he had perpetrated.\n\n B.\n\n Congress enacted the TVPA in the year 2000 βto combat trafficking in persons, a\n\ncontemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and\n\nchildren, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their\n\nvictims.β TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Β§ 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (codified at 22\n\n 8\n\fU.S.C. Β§ 7101(a)). The congressional findings that accompanied the TVPA in its original\n\nform repeatedly emphasized the transnational nature of human trafficking and sexual\n\nexploitation, and the enforcement challenges posed by the international scope of that\n\ncriminal activity. See id., Β§ 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466-69.\n\n By way of the TVPA, Congress created several new federal criminal offenses\n\nintended to more comprehensively and effectively combat human trafficking. Among\n\nother provisions, the TVPA criminalized: βForced labor,β β[t]rafficking with respect to\n\npeonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor,β and β[s]ex trafficking of\n\nchildren or by force, fraud or coercion.β See TVPA, Β§ 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1486-88.\n\nThose provisions are respectively codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591, all\n\nwithin chapter 77 of Title 18.\n\n In 2003, Congress reauthorized and amended the TVPA. See Trafficking Victims\n\nProtection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (the β2003\n\nTVPRAβ). In the findings accompanying the 2003 TVPRA, Congress stressed the\n\nchallenges that remained βin responding to the needs of victims of trafficking in the\n\nUnited States and abroad.β See id., Β§ 2(2), 117 Stat. at 2875. As part of the 2003\n\nTVPRA amendments, Congress added a civil remedy provision to chapter 77. See 2003\n\nTVPRA, Β§ 4(a)(4)(A), 117 Stat. at 2878. That civil remedy provision is codified at 18\n\nU.S.C. Β§ 1595(a), which provides:\n\n (a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of [chapter 77] may bring a\n civil action against the perpetrator . . . in an appropriate district court of the\n United States and may recover damages . . . .\n\n\n\n 9\n\f The 2003 TVPRA also amended Β§ 1591, which prohibits β[s]ex trafficking of\n\nchildren or by force, fraud, or coercion.β That amendment altered Β§ 1591 to expressly\n\napply to acts committed βwithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the\n\nUnited States.β See 2003 TVPRA, Β§ 5(a)(2), 117 Stat. at 2879. The phrase βspecial\n\nmaritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ is a term of art defined\n\nelsewhere in the U.S. Code. That term encompasses a variety of locations under varying\n\ndegrees of control by the United States and includes, with respect to offenses committed\n\nby U.S. nationals, the grounds of U.S. diplomatic installations and related premises. See\n\n18 U.S.C. Β§ 7(9). Specifically, Β§ 7(9) defines the term to reach:\n\n (A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other\n United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including\n the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto\n or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of\n ownership; and\n\n (B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary\n thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or\n entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or\n entities.\n\nSee id.\n\n In 2006, Congress again reauthorized the TVPA. See Trafficking Victims\n\nProtection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (effective\n\nJan. 10, 2006) (the β2005 TVPRAβ). This time, Congress expressly found that β[t]he\n\ninvolvement of employees and contractors of the United States Government . . . in\n\ntrafficking in persons, facilitating the trafficking in persons, or exploiting the victims of\n\ntrafficking in persons is inconsistent with United States laws and policies and undermines\n\n\n 10\n\fthe credibility and mission of the United States Government programs in post-conflict\n\nregions.β See id., Β§ 2(10), 119 Stat. at 3559. Accordingly, Congress further expanded the\n\nTVPAβs extraterritorial reach by providing:\n\n Whoever, while employed by . . . the Federal Government outside the\n United States, engages in conduct outside the United States that would\n constitute an offense under chapter 77 . . . of this title if the conduct had\n been engaged in within the United States or within the special maritime and\n territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for\n that offense.\n\nSee id., Β§ 103, 119 Stat. at 3562 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271). Each of the statutory\n\nprovisions and amendments discussed heretofore was in effect between June and\n\nDecember 2007, when the Howards exploited and abused Roe.\n\n In 2008, after Roe had left the Howards, Congress further amended and\n\nreauthorized the TVPA. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection\n\nReauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (the β2008 TVPRAβ).\n\nThe 2008 TVPRA further expanded the extraterritorial reach of the TVPA by providing:\n\n In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial jurisdiction otherwise\n provided by law, the courts of the United States have extra-territorial\n jurisdiction over any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an\n offense) under section . . . 1589, 1590, or 1591 ifβ\n\n (1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States . . . .\n\nSee id., Β§ 223, 122 Stat. at 5071 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1596). The 2008 TVPRA also\n\nexpanded chapter 77 to prohibit conspiracy to commit the offenses codified at, inter alia,\n\n18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591. See id., Β§ 222, 122 Stat. at 5070 (codified at 18\n\nU.S.C. Β§ 1594(b)-(c)).\n\n\n\n 11\n\f C.\n\n In May 2016, Roe sued Linda in the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the\n\nTVPA civil remedy provision codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. 4 See J.A. 15. Roe alleged\n\nthat Linda had violated multiple criminal provisions of the TVPA, including its\n\nprohibitions of forced labor under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1589, forced labor trafficking under\n\nΒ§ 1590, commercial sex trafficking under Β§ 1591, and conspiracy to engage in those\n\noffenses under Β§ 1594.\n\n Before trial, Linda sought summary judgment on the grounds that the TVPA did\n\nnot apply extraterritorially to reach her conduct in 2007, and that the 2008 amendments\n\nexpanding its extraterritorial application did not apply retroactively. The district court\n\ndenied that request without prejudice after argument.\n\n Linda also filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Jane Doe, a live-in\n\nhousekeeper who worked for the Howards after Roe was fired. 5 The district court denied\n\nthat motion and ruled that Doeβs testimony was admissible under either Rule 404(b) or\n\nRule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Roeβs claims proceeded to trial in Alexandria\n\non July 26, 2017.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n Roe originally sued Russellβs estate in addition to Linda, but later dismissed the\nestate as a defendant in these proceedings. See Roe v. Howard, No. 16-cv-562 (E.D. Va.\nJuly 26, 2017), ECF No. 78.\n 5\n The district court permitted Jane Doe to testify using this pseudonym. See J.A.\n156.\n\n\n 12\n\f In accordance with the district courtβs ruling, Jane Doe took the stand at trial.\n\nLike Roe, Doe was a young Ethiopian woman who came to Yemen in search of work.\n\nDoe testified, inter alia, that she began working for the Howards in Sanaβa as a live-in\n\nhousekeeper in 2008. Doe followed the Howards to Tokyo when they relocated at the\n\nend of that year, based in part on the Howardsβ promises that they would increase her pay\n\nand help her obtain health insurance. Such insurance was a benefit of particular value to\n\nDoe, who had βkidney issues.β See J.A. 162-63. Doe knew no one in Japan other than\n\nthe Howards and did not speak Japanese.\n\n Shortly after Doe and the Howards arrived in Tokyo, Russellβs behavior toward\n\nDoe changed. Doe testified, over objection, that Russell told her about βsome of the\n\nways he abused his former employees.β See J.A. 165. She described how Russell began\n\nto touch her inappropriately, on her butt and thigh. Doe then testified that Russell\n\ncornered her in her bedroom in the Howardsβ home and raped her. Russell raped Doe\n\nrepeatedly during her employment with the Howards. Doe testified, over objection, that\n\nRussell told her that Linda knew βeverything that is happening.β Id. at 174. Doe also\n\nrelated that, after they had arrived in Tokyo, Linda told Doe βto make sure that I please\n\n[Russell], and thatβs my primary job, that she didnβt want him to be mad.β Id. at 175.\n\nSome months later, while Doe and the Howards were still in Tokyo, Russell fired Doe\n\nand threatened to have her deported.\n\n On July 31, 2017, after additional testimony and stipulated submissions consistent\n\nwith the preceding recitation of facts, the jury returned its verdict. The jury found Linda\n\nliable for each of the four alleged violations of the TVPA. The jury calculated Roeβs\n\n 13\n\fcompensatory damages at $1 million for each violation. The jury found, however, that\n\nthose compensatory damages were duplicative, and thus awarded Roe $1 million in total\n\ncompensatory damages. The jury also awarded Roe $2 million in punitive damages. See\n\nJ.A. 115-17.\n\n In September 2017, Linda filed multiple post-trial motions seeking to overturn the\n\njuryβs verdict. As relevant to this appeal, Linda sought a new trial pursuant to Federal\n\nRule of Civil Procedure 59(a), contending that the district court had erred in admitting\n\nDoeβs testimony. Linda also renewed her Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law\n\non the grounds that the TVPA did not apply to her extraterritorial conduct in 2007, and\n\nthat the 2008 TVPRA amendments did not apply retroactively. In October 2017, the\n\ncourt denied Lindaβs post-trial motions. The court then entered judgment in favor of Roe\n\nin accordance with the verdict.\n\n In January 2018, the district court issued a post-trial opinion that addressed, inter\n\nalia, Lindaβs contention that the TVPAβs civil remedy provision did not apply\n\nextraterritorially to reach her conduct in Yemen in 2007. See Roe v. Howard, No. 16-cv-\n\n562 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2018), ECF No. 125. The court ruled that, under the version of the\n\nTVPA in effect in 2007, the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted with\n\nrespect to Lindaβs relevant conduct. Specifically, the court applied the Supreme Courtβs\n\ndecision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013), and this Courtβs\n\ndecision in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014), to\n\nconclude that Lindaβs conduct sufficiently βtouche[d] and concern[ed] the United Statesβ\n\nto displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. See J.A. 148-49. Alternatively,\n\n 14\n\fthe court determined that 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1596, enacted in 2008, could apply retroactively\n\nand supported the extraterritorial application of the TVPA civil remedy provision to\n\nLindaβs conduct.\n\n Linda has timely appealed the judgment of the district court, and we possess\n\nappellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n We review de novo a district courtβs denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a\n\nmatter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\n\nSee Fontenot v. Taser Intβl, Inc., 736 F.3d 318, 332 (4th Cir. 2013). We also review de\n\nnovo βthe conclusions of law on which the courtβs denial of judgment as a matter of law\n\nwas premised.β Adkins v. Crown Auto, Inc., 488 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007). Our de\n\nnovo review extends to all questions of statutory interpretation encompassed therein.\n\nSee, e.g., Stone v. Instrumentation Lab. Co., 591 F.3d 239, 242-43 (4th Cir. 2009).\n\n By contrast, we review a district courtβs denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial\n\nfor abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only βin the most exceptional circumstances.β\n\nMinter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2014). Likewise, we\n\nreview rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including testimony, for abuse of\n\ndiscretion. See, e.g., United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\f III.\n\n Linda seeks to overturn the jury verdict against her by challenging two of the\n\ndistrict courtβs rulings in the proceedings below. First, Linda maintains that the court\n\nerred in concluding that the TVPAβs civil remedy provision applied to her extraterritorial\n\nconduct in 2007, and thus erred in denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law.\n\nBy her second contention, Linda argues that the court erred in admitting Jane Doeβs trial\n\ntestimony regarding her abuse by the Howards in 2008. We address each contention in\n\nturn.\n\n A.\n\n Linda seeks to vacate the judgment against her on the ground that the TVPAβs\n\ncivil remedy provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595, did not apply extraterritorially\n\nbefore 2008. Linda contends that this precludes any liability for her conduct toward Roe,\n\nwhich took place in Yemen in 2007. The district court rejected that argument when it\n\ndenied Lindaβs post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. In so ruling, the court\n\nrelied on the Supreme Courtβs decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., and\n\nconcluded that Lindaβs conduct sufficiently βtouch[ed] and concern[ed] the United\n\nStatesβ to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. See J.A. 149 (citing\n\nKiobel, 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013)). Alternatively, the court determined that 18 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 1596 β which expanded the extraterritorial reach of the TVPA in 2008 β applied\n\nretroactively and sustained Lindaβs liability under the TVPA.\n\n As explained below, we affirm the district court and conclude that the TVPAβs\n\ncivil remedy provision applied to Lindaβs conduct in Yemen in 2007. We reach this\n\n 16\n\fconclusion, however, based on a somewhat different analysis than that employed by the\n\ndistrict court. See United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005) (confirming\n\nthat this Court βmay affirm on any grounds apparent from the recordβ). Specifically, we\n\nrely on the Supreme Courtβs more recent decision on extraterritoriality in RJR Nabisco,\n\nInc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). Adhering to the framework explained in\n\nRJR Nabisco, we ground our ruling on the text and structure of the relevant TVPA\n\nprovisions. Pursuant to our analysis, we are satisfied that the TVPAβs civil remedy\n\nprovision applied to Lindaβs conduct toward Roe in 2007.\n\n 1.\n\n Congress has the undisputed authority to apply its laws beyond βthe territorial\n\nboundaries of the United States.β See United States v. Ayesh, 702 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir.\n\n2012). Whether it has exercised that authority βis a matter of statutory construction.β Id.\n\n(citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded in part by\n\nstatute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in\n\nLandgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994)). The canon of statutory\n\ninterpretation known as the βpresumption against extraterritorialityβ instructs that\n\nβ[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be\n\nconstrued to have only domestic application.β RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100.\n\n In its 2016 ruling in RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court drew on its precedent to\n\ndescribe a βtwo-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.β See id. at 2101\n\n(citing Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108; Morrison v. Natβl Austr. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).\n\nThe first step of the RJR Nabisco framework asks βwhether the statute gives a clear,\n\n 17\n\faffirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially,β and thereby rebuts the\n\npresumption against extraterritoriality. Id. In making that determination, courts look to\n\nthe text of the statute, but βan express statement of extraterritoriality is not essential.β Id.\n\nat 2102. The structure and history of the statute are also relevant to this analysis, and in\n\nsome circumstances the statuteβs βcontextβ may be βdispositive.β Id. at 2102-03.\n\n If the first step reveals that a statute β or a specific statutory provision β has\n\nextraterritorial effect, our analysis is complete. See id. at 2101. If, on the other hand, the\n\nfirst step shows that a statute does not apply extraterritorially, a court must proceed to the\n\nsecond step identified in RJR Nabisco. Specifically, the court must then βdetermine\n\nwhether the case involves a domestic application of the statuteβ by considering the\n\nchallenged conduct in light of the statuteβs βfocus.β Id. at 2101. If βthe conduct relevant\n\nto the statuteβs focusβ occurred βin U.S. Territory,β then the application of the statute is\n\nnot truly extraterritorial. See id. 6 That is, such conduct would represent a βpermissible\n\ndomestic applicationβ of the statute at issue. See id. at 2100.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n In delineating the two-step framework in RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court drew\non two of its key precedents addressing extraterritoriality: Morrison and Kiobel. The\nsecond step described in RJR Nabisco, however, appears to privilege consideration of a\nstatuteβs βfocusβ β the approach set out in Morrison β over the inquiry articulated in\nKiobel, which asked whether the claims at issue βtouch and concern the territory of the\nUnited States.β See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25. On the\nother hand, RJR Nabisco did not overturn Kiobel and β in step two β retains a similar\nemphasis on the relevant claimβs connection to U.S. territory. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.\nCt. at 2101. We need not resolve the effect of RJR Nabisco on Kiobel because, as\nexplained herein, we do not reach the second step of the RJR Nabisco framework.\n\n 18\n\f 2.\n\n The first step of the RJR Nabisco framework requires us to assess the specific\n\nstatutory provisions at issue to determine whether those provisions demonstrate βclearly\n\nexpressed congressional intentβ that they will apply extraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct. at\n\n2100, 2102; see also Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 (emphasizing that βwhen a statute\n\nprovides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality\n\noperates to limit that provision to its termsβ). Here, Roe sued Linda pursuant to the civil\n\nremedy provision of the TVPA, codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. Section 1595 permits\n\nvictims of the trafficking offenses specified in chapter 77 of Title 18 to sue the\n\nperpetrator of such an offense. Roe sought to recover damages based on Lindaβs\n\nviolations of the trafficking offenses codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591,\n\nwhich prohibit forced labor, trafficking in forced labor, and forced sex trafficking,\n\nrespectively. Roe also alleged that Linda conspired to commit those offenses in violation\n\nof Β§ 1594. As described above, the jury at Lindaβs trial found that she had committed\n\neach of those four offenses and awarded Roe damages under Β§ 1595.\n\n Applying the first step of the RJR Nabisco inquiry, we are satisfied that Β§ 1595 of\n\nthe TVPA evinces a βclear indication of extraterritorial effect,β at least with respect to the\n\nconduct at issue here. See 136 S. Ct. at 2102. Of crucial importance, Β§ 1595 directly\n\nincorporates predicate offenses that govern foreign conduct, providing strong textual\n\nevidence of its extraterritorial effect when applied to those predicates. See id. at 2102-03.\n\nAdditionally, the purpose, structure, history, and context of the TVPA militate toward the\n\nextraterritorial application of Β§ 1595, to the extent that the relevant predicate offenses\n\n 19\n\freach the challenged foreign conduct at issue. See id. at 2102 (consulting βcontextβ to\n\ndetermine extraterritoriality); In re French, 440 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining\n\nthat courts should consult βall available evidence,β including text, statutory scheme, and\n\nlegislative history to determine extraterritorial effect of statute).\n\n We begin our analysis by looking to the Supreme Courtβs application of the first\n\nRJR Nabisco step to the circumstances of that case. In RJR Nabisco, the Court addressed\n\nwhether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (βRICOβ) applied\n\nextraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct. at 2099. The central RICO provision, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1962,\n\ncontains four substantive prohibitions that criminalize certain means of influencing or\n\noperating an enterprise through βa pattern of racketeering activity.β See id. at 2097\n\n(citing 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1962(a)-(d)). RICO defines βracketeering activityβ as comprising a\n\nrange of state and federal offenses, referred to as predicate offenses. See id. at 2096\n\n(citing 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1961). To determine whether the substantive RICO provisions\n\napplied to foreign conduct, the Court examined the text and context of Β§ 1962. See id. at\n\n2101-03.\n\n The Court explained that β[t]he most obvious textual clueβ that Β§ 1962 applied\n\nextraterritorially was that RICO defined βracketeering activityβ to include βa number of\n\npredicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct.β See id. at 2101. The\n\nCourt reasoned that βCongressβs incorporation of [such] extraterritorial predicates into\n\nRICO gives a clear, affirmative indication that Β§ 1962 applies to foreign racketeering\n\nactivity β but only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a particular case\n\nthemselves apply extraterritorially.β See id. at 2102. Thus, although Congress had not\n\n 20\n\fincluded βan express statement of extraterritorialityβ in RICOβs text, the context and\n\nstructure of Β§ 1962 β specifically, its incorporation of βpredicate statutes that do apply\n\nextraterritoriallyβ β nonetheless provided the necessary βclear, affirmative indicationβ\n\nthat Β§ 1962 applied extraterritorially. See id. at 2101, 2102-03.\n\n Put simply, RJR Nabisco teaches that, even absent an express statement of\n\nextraterritoriality, a statute may apply to foreign conduct insofar as it clearly and directly\n\nincorporates a predicate statutory provision that applies extraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct.\n\nat 2102-03. Applying this rule to the TVPA, we are satisfied that Β§ 1595 reflects\n\ncongressional intent that it applies extraterritorially to the extent that a plaintiff seeks\n\nredress for a predicate offense βthat is itself extraterritorial.β See id. at 2103.\n\n Like Β§ 1962, the TVPAβs civil remedy provision directly incorporates a set of\n\npredicate offenses βthat plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct.β See RJR\n\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. More specifically, Β§ 1595 permits βa victim of a violation of\n\nthis chapter [chapter 77 of Title 18]β to bring βa civil action against the perpetrator.β See\n\n18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. Many of the predicate offenses proscribed by chapter 77 apply\n\nextraterritorially, either expressly or by way of other provisions delineating their\n\nextraterritorial application. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1585 (prohibiting, inter alia, seizure of\n\npersons βon any foreign shoreβ with βintent to make that person a slaveβ). Thus,\n\npursuant to RJR Nabisco, βCongressβs incorporationβ of such βextraterritorial predicatesβ\n\ninto Β§ 1595 βgives a clear, affirmative indicationβ that Β§ 1595 provides a civil remedy for\n\nthe foreign conduct that is prohibited by chapter 77. See 136 S. Ct. at 2102. That is,\n\n\n\n 21\n\fΒ§ 1595 applies extraterritorially to the extent that the particular predicate offense\n\nsupporting a specific claim applies extraterritorially. See id. at 2103.\n\n Reinforcing that conclusion, the purpose, structure, history, and context of the\n\nTVPA all support the extraterritorial application of Β§ 1595 for an appropriate predicate\n\noffense. The TVPAβs stated purpose and accompanying congressional findings\n\ndemonstrate that Congress enacted it to address the problem of human trafficking\n\nβthroughout the world.β See Pub. L. 106-386 §§ 101-102, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466-69\n\n(2000). The TVPA contains numerous provisions authorizing funds and programs to\n\nsupport international efforts to address that global problem. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 7104(c) (creating βborder interdictionβ programs to combat trafficking at βkey border\n\ncrossingsβ); Β§ 7105 (authorizing foreign assistance programs to protect and aid\n\ntrafficking victims abroad). Notably, Congress has consistently amended the TVPA to\n\nreach and proscribe additional categories of foreign conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591\n\n(amended by 2003 TVPRA to cover conduct committed in special maritime and\n\nterritorial jurisdiction of United States); Β§ 3271 (enacted as part of 2006 TVPRA\n\namendments to cover trafficking offenses by U.S. government employees abroad).\n\nViewed as a whole, the TVPA represents a far-reaching congressional effort to combat\n\ntransnational human trafficking on numerous fronts, including by expanding the civil\n\nclaims and remedies available to its victims.\n\n This is, in short, a situation in which Congress was clearly concerned with\n\ninternational rather than purely domestic matters. In these circumstances, unduly limiting\n\nthe TVPAβs scope risks frustrating its animating purpose. See Ayesh, 702 F.3d at 166\n\n 22\n\f(ruling that federal statute prohibiting U.S. employees from pilfering public funds applied\n\nextraterritorially because holding otherwise would immunize broad category of conduct\n\nand frustrate congressional intent); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337,\n\n1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concluding that statutes prohibiting inducement of aliens to enter\n\nUnited States illegally applied extraterritorially because, inter alia, they were\n\nβfundamentally internationalβ in βfocus and effectβ).\n\n Although we are satisfied that RJR Nabisco compels the extraterritorial application\n\nof Β§ 1595 with respect to its extraterritorial predicates, we recognize that Part IV of that\n\ndecision declined to apply RICOβs civil cause of action to foreign conduct. See 136 S.\n\nCt. at 2106. But that part of Justice Alitoβs opinion for the Court depended on factors\n\nthat do not apply to Β§ 1595 of the TVPA. First, RICOβs civil remedy provision, codified\n\nat 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1964(c), does not directly incorporate any extraterritorial predicates.\n\nIndeed, it makes no reference to any extraterritorial provision whatsoever. Rather, civil\n\nliability under Β§ 1964(c) is premised on Β§ 1962 criminal liability, but β crucially β is\n\nnot coextensive with Β§ 1962 liability. Justice Alito emphasized that the text of Β§ 1964(c)\n\nlimited its application to certain types of injuries, and thereby created a gap between the\n\nreach of Β§ 1964(c) civil liability and Β§ 1962 criminal liability. See id. at 2106, 2108.\n\nFurther, Β§ 1964 contained no other indication that it should apply extraterritorially; that\n\nis, it lacked the kind of βforeign-oriented languageβ or reference to foreign activity that\n\ncould sustain its extraterritorial application. See id. at 2108-10 & n.12.\n\n None of the foregoing considerations apply to Β§ 1595 of the TVPA. As explained\n\nabove, Β§ 1595 expressly and directly incorporates the TVPAβs criminal predicates, many\n\n 23\n\fof which manifestly apply to foreign conduct. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102. In\n\nthat regard, Β§ 1595 of the TVPA resembles Β§ 1962 of RICO rather than the circumscribed\n\ntext of Β§ 1964(c). See id. at 2109-10 (comparing and distinguishing Β§ 1962 and Β§ 1964);\n\nacc. Pfizer, Inc. v. Govβt of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978) (sustaining extraterritorial\n\napplication of Clayton Act civil remedy due to, inter alia, its incorporation of definitions\n\nexpressly addressing foreign entities). Moreover, the text of Β§ 1595 shows that it applies\n\ncoextensively with its predicate offenses, omitting any qualifying or modifying language,\n\nwhich further distinguishes it from Β§ 1964(c). Notably, as discussed above, the TVPA is\n\nreplete with the βforeign-oriented languageβ that Justice Alito found lacking in Β§ 1964(c),\n\nincluding in the predicates underpinning Roeβs claim. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at\n\n2110 n.12. Indeed, the TVPA more clearly targets foreign conduct than any provision of\n\nRICO, as demonstrated by its international scope and Congressβs repeated expansions of\n\nits extraterritorial reach. See, e.g., 2005 TVPRA, 119 Stat. at 3562.\n\n In short, Β§ 1595 evinces the same relationship to its extraterritorial predicate\n\noffenses that RICOβs substantive criminal provision does to its predicates, and is not\n\nsubject to textual limitations like those found in RICOβs private cause of action. Section\n\n1595 therefore provides a civil remedy for conduct that comes within the extraterritorial\n\npredicates of the TVPA. Accordingly, we now turn to the question of whether the\n\npredicate offenses underlying Roeβs civil suit applied to Lindaβs extraterritorial conduct\n\nin 2007.\n\n\n\n\n 24\n\f 3.\n\n The jury awarded Roe damages based on their findings that Linda had violated 18\n\nU.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, 1591, and 1594. Each of those offenses is a qualifying predicate\n\noffense for Β§ 1595 civil liability, as they are all found within chapter 77 of Title 18 of the\n\nU.S. Code. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595 (authorizing civil suits by βa victim of a violation of\n\nthis chapter [chapter 77]β against the perpetrator or βwhoever knowingly benefitsβ from\n\nthat violation). The remaining question for us today is whether those predicates applied\n\nextraterritorially and reached Lindaβs foreign conduct in 2007. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.\n\nCt. at 2102. We will therefore assess each predicate offense, mindful that βthe inclusion\n\nof some extraterritorial predicates does not mean that all [statutory] predicates extend to\n\nforeign conduct.β See id.\n\n a.\n\n Section 1591 β prohibiting sex trafficking β presents the simplest analysis.\n\nSince 2003, Β§ 1591 has applied to conduct committed βwithin the special maritime and\n\nterritorial jurisdiction of the United States.β See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591; 2003 TVPRA, 117\n\nStat. at 2879. Where an offense is committed by a United States national like Linda,\n\nTitle 18 defines the βspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ to\n\ninclude the βpremises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United\n\nStates Government missions or entities in foreign States,β including related residences,\n\nbuildings, and land, that, βirrespective of ownership,β are used βfor purposes of those\n\nmissions or entities.β See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 7(9). It is undisputed that Lindaβs part in Roeβs\n\nabuse occurred entirely on U.S. embassy grounds and housing in Sanaβa. Those premises\n\n 25\n\funquestionably fall within the βspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United\n\nStates,β as defined in Title 18. See id.; see also United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207,\n\n214 (4th Cir. 2009) (observing that American embassies are βplainly within Β§ 7(9)βs\n\nscopeβ); United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1973) (ruling that embassies\n\ncomprise part of βspecial territorial jurisdictionβ of United States); H.R. Rep. No. 107-\n\n236, at 74 (2001) (agreeing with Erdos and explaining that βembassies and embassy\n\nhousing of the United States in foreign states are included in the special maritime and\n\nterritorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ). Thus, Β§ 1591 expressly applied to Lindaβs\n\nconduct in Sanaβa in 2007, and she is liable for her violation thereof under Β§ 1595.\n\n b.\n\n Sections 1589 and 1590 of Title 18 β prohibiting forced labor and forced labor\n\ntrafficking β do not directly refer to foreign conduct. But since 2006, those sections\n\nhave applied to extraterritorial acts committed by United States employees like Linda.\n\nThe 2005 TVPRA amended the TVPA by enacting 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271, which provides:\n\n Whoever, while employed by . . . the Federal Government outside the\n United States, engages in conduct outside the United States that would\n constitute an offense under chapter 77 [of Title 18] if the conduct had been\n engaged in within the United States or within the special maritime and\n territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for\n that offense.\n\nSee 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271; see also 2005 TVPRA, Β§ 103, 119 Stat. at 3562. Such language\n\nβmanifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially.β See RJR\n\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a plainer indication\n\nwas needed, Congress included Β§ 3271 in chapter 212A, titled βExtraterritorial\n\n\n 26\n\fJurisdiction Over Certain Trafficking in Persons Offenses.β See 2005 TVPRA, 119 Stat.\n\nat 3562. By the TVPAβs own terms, this extraterritorial application is limited in scope;\n\nthat is, it applies only to persons employed abroad by the federal government. Linda,\n\nhowever, falls within that class of employees. Consequently, her actions in Sanaβa were\n\nwithin the extraterritorial scope of Β§ 1589 and Β§ 1590 in 2007. The jury therefore\n\nproperly found her liable for violating those provisions under Β§ 1595.\n\n c.\n\n Turning to Β§ 1594, however, our analysis differs. Regardless of Β§ 1594βs\n\nextraterritoriality, the conspiracy provision for which the jury found Linda liable had not\n\nbeen enacted by 2007. Rather, the conspiracy prohibitions contained in Β§ 1594(b) and (c)\n\nwere added as part of the 2008 TVPRA amendments. See 2008 TVPRA, Β§ 222, 122 Stat.\n\nat 5070. That said, we need not resolve whether Β§ 1594 applies retroactively in order to\n\naffirm the award of damages to Roe. If this Court is βreasonably certainβ that the jury\n\nwould have awarded the same amount of damages regardless of the βissues erroneously\n\nsubmitted to it,β we are entitled to affirm the award. See Tire Engβg & Distribution, LLC\n\nv. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 314 (4th Cir. 2012). That rule holds\n\nparticular force where, as here, the jury has completed a special verdict form addressing\n\nliability and damages. See id. at 313-14 (collecting and comparing cases). Because the\n\njury indicated that it calculated Roeβs damages at $1 million for each of the four TVPA\n\nviolations, but awarded only $1 million total because those damages were duplicative, it\n\nis beyond reasonable debate that the jury would have awarded Roe $1 million in\n\n\n\n 27\n\fcompensatory damages for any one of Lindaβs violations, and for any combination\n\nthereof. See J.A. 115-17.\n\n In sum, the facts established at trial show that Linda committed at least three\n\npredicate offenses that applied to her extraterritorial conduct toward Roe in 2007.\n\nPursuant to the Supreme Courtβs decision in RJR Nabisco, Β§ 1595 authorizes Lindaβs\n\ncivil liability based on her commission of those offenses. 7 We are entitled to affirm the\n\njuryβs award of damages because they were properly awarded pursuant to Β§ 1595, and\n\nbecause any error with regard to the applicability of Β§ 1594 did not affect that result.\n\n Because step one of the RJR Nabisco framework demonstrates that Β§ 1595 applied\n\nextraterritorially to Lindaβs conduct, we need not proceed to step two, which guides our\n\nanalysis only where the pertinent statute does not apply extraterritorially. See RJR\n\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. We thus have no occasion to determine whether, under step\n\ntwo, Lindaβs offenses involved βa domestic applicationβ of the TVPA. See id.\n\nAccordingly, we reserve for another day the issue of whether conduct occurring entirely\n\nwithin U.S. embassy grounds and associated housing takes place βin U.S. territory.β See\n\nid.; see also Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248. We confine our analysis today to the\n\ntext and context of Β§ 1595, and affirm the juryβs award of damages to Roe on that basis.\n\n 7\n Lindaβs argument against the extraterritorial application of Β§ 1595 relies almost\nentirely on the Fifth Circuitβs ruling in Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., where\nthat court determined that Β§ 1595 failed to provide a remedy for the plaintiffsβ\nextraterritorial TVPA claims. See 845 F.3d 184, 201-06 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Br. of\nAppellant 8-16. That decision, however, is readily distinguishable because the Adhikari\nplaintiffs did not allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591 and the defendantsβ conduct\noccurred before the enactment of Β§ 3271. See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 190, 200.\n\n\n 28\n\f B.\n\n Turning to Lindaβs second and final appellate contention, we must resolve whether\n\nthe district court properly admitted Jane Doeβs evidence concerning the sexual abuse she\n\nsuffered while working as the Howardsβ housekeeper in 2008. Linda raises various\n\nobjections to Doeβs testimony: that it was impermissible character evidence barred by\n\nFederal Rule of Evidence 404(a); that it could not be admitted under Rule 415, which\n\npermits testimony of βsimilar actsβ in sexual assault lawsuits; that it was unfairly\n\nprejudicial and thus barred by Rule 403; and that the portion of Doeβs testimony relating\n\nto Russellβs statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. Each assertion is without merit.\n\n First, Doeβs testimony was plainly admissible under Rule 404(b)βs exception to\n\nRule 404(a)βs general prohibition of character evidence to prove an action in conformity\n\ntherewith. Doeβs testimony described Lindaβs efforts to recruit Doe to work as the\n\nHowardsβ housekeeper, and her knowledge and facilitation of Russellβs repeated sexual\n\nassaults on Doe. Consistent with the permissible uses of character evidence under Rule\n\n404(b), Doeβs testimony constituted highly probative evidence regarding Lindaβs\n\nintentions in her interactions with Roe; the existence of a plan or pattern of behavior by\n\nthe Howards toward their live-in housekeepers; and Lindaβs knowledge of Russellβs\n\nabuse of their staff. Doeβs testimony was therefore admissible under Rule 404(b)(2),\n\nwhich permits the introduction of evidence of βa crime, wrong, or other actβ to show,\n\ninter alia, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake. Indeed, the\n\nsimilarity between Doe and Roeβs accounts of their abuse enhances the probative value\n\nand relevance of Doeβs evidence. See United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th\n\n 29\n\fCir. 1997). 8 Because we are satisfied that Doeβs testimony was properly admitted under\n\nRule 404(b), we need not assess whether it was also admissible under Rule 415.\n\n Nor was Doeβs testimony barred by Rule 403. Pursuant to Rule 403, a court may\n\nexclude evidence if its βprobative valueβ is βsubstantially outweighedβ by, inter alia, the\n\nrisk of βunfair prejudice.β As noted above, Doeβs testimony provided highly probative\n\nevidence of a pattern of abusive behavior by Russell, knowingly facilitated by Linda.\n\nMoreover, because the assaults Roe suffered occurred in Yemen nearly a decade prior to\n\nLindaβs trial, Doeβs evidence was particularly important given the lack of available\n\nphysical evidence to corroborate Roeβs claims. Finally, the district court limited the\n\nscope of Doeβs testimony to avoid revealing the upsetting details of Russellβs past\n\nassaults, and thus reduced the risk of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Mark, 943\n\nF.2d 444, 449 (4th Cir. 1991). In these circumstances, the court did not abuse its\n\ndiscretion in permitting Doe to testify. See Mohr, 318 F.3d at 619-20 (emphasizing that\n\nRule 403 only requires exclusion of evidence resulting in unfair prejudice that\n\nβsubstantiallyβ outweighs its probative value); United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339,\n\n351 (4th Cir. 1998) (sustaining admission of evidence of prior sexual assault in light of its\n\nβsignificant probative valueβ and trial courtβs effort to reduce its prejudicial impact).\n\n\n\n 8\n Linda argues that the standard for admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) changes\nwhen that evidence concerns βsubsequentβ (rather than prior) acts. Br. of Appellant 26.\nNo such rule exists in this Circuit. Put simply, Rule 404(b) does not function differently\nmerely because Doeβs experience occurred after Roeβs. See United States v. Mohr, 318\nF.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 2003).\n\n\n 30\n\f Lastly, Doeβs testimony concerning Russellβs past statements was not inadmissible\n\nhearsay. Rule 804(b)(3) authorizes the admission of hearsay statements by an\n\nunavailable declarant that are manifestly against the declarantβs interest. Specifically, the\n\nstatement must be one that βa reasonable person in the declarantβs position would have\n\nmade only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it . . . had so great a\n\ntendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability.β Fed. R. Evid.\n\n804(b)(3). Russellβs statements to Doe β admitting to his past assaults of his former\n\nemployees β more than qualify as statements against interest as so defined, and his death\n\nin 2012 establishes his unavailability to testify. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its\n\ndiscretion by relying on that exception to admit Doeβs testimony regarding Russellβs\n\nincriminating statements. See, e.g., United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 267-68 (4th\n\nCir. 2008) (evaluating flexible requirements of Rule 804(b)(3) and sustaining admission\n\nof hearsay statements that implicated declarant in multiple crimes).\n\n In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Doeβs\n\ntestimony, and we are satisfied to affirm the courtβs rulings in that regard.\n\n\n\n IV.\n\n Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm the district courtβs judgment in favor of Roe\n\nand against Linda Howard.\n\n\n AFFIRMED\n\n\n\n\n 31\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Sarah ROE, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Linda HOWARD, Defendant - Appellant, and Estate of Russell Howard, Defendant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-2338\\n\\n\\nSARAH ROE,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\n\\nLINDA HOWARD,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant,\\n and\\n\\nESTATE OF RUSSELL HOWARD,\\n\\n Defendant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nAlexandria. Liam OβGrady, District Judge. (1:16-cv-00562-LO-JFA)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 30, 2018 Decided: February 25, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, KING, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion in which Judge Wilkinson\\nand Judge Quattlebaum joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Richard Francis Rinaldo, JONES, GREGG, CREEHAN & GERACE LLP,\\nPittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Melissa Lim Patterson, JONES DAY,\\nWashington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Timothy J. Battle, Alexandria, Virginia,\\n\\ffor Appellant. Alison B. Marshall, Christian G. Vergonis, JONES DAY, Washington,\\nD.C., for Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fKING, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Defendant Linda Howard appeals from a judgment entered against her in the\\n\\nEastern District of Virginia after a jury found her civilly liable to plaintiff Sarah Roe\\n\\nunder the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (the βTVPAβ). 1 Roe had sued Howard for\\n\\nher role in sexual abuse that Roe suffered at the hands of Russell Howard, Lindaβs\\n\\nhusband, when Roe worked in 2007 as the Howardsβ housekeeper in housing provided by\\n\\nthe Embassy of the United States in Yemen. 2 The jury found that Lindaβs conduct in\\n\\nYemen contravened criminal provisions of the TVPA and thus awarded Roe $3 million in\\n\\ndamages pursuant to the TVPAβs civil remedy provision. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. On\\n\\nappeal, Linda challenges the district courtβs denial of her post-trial motion for judgment\\n\\nas a matter of law, wherein she sought relief on the ground that, in 2007, the TVPAβs\\n\\ncivil remedy provision did not apply extraterritorially. Linda also challenges the courtβs\\n\\nadmission of testimonial evidence from another former housekeeper of Linda and Russell\\n\\nwhom they had similarly abused. As explained below, we are satisfied to affirm the\\n\\njudgment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The TVPA is generally codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1581 et seq.\\n 2\\n To avoid confusion, we generally refer to Linda Howard and Russell Howard by\\ntheir first names, that is, simply as Linda and Russell. We refer to the plaintiff by her\\npseudonym βSarah Roe,β pursuant to the district courtβs ruling in that regard. See Roe v.\\nHoward, No. 16-cv-562 (E.D. Va. May 27, 2016), ECF No. 11.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n On July 31, 2017, following a four-day trial, a jury in the Eastern District of\\n\\nVirginia found Linda Howard civilly liable for contravening criminal provisions of the\\n\\nTVPA. More specifically, the jury found that Linda had engaged in forced labor in\\n\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1589, forced labor trafficking in violation of Β§ 1590, commercial\\n\\nsex trafficking in violation of Β§ 1591, and conspiring to engage in those offenses in\\n\\nviolation of Β§ 1594. See J.A. 115-17. 3\\n\\n When we review an appeal following a jury verdict, we view the trial evidence in\\n\\nthe light most favorable to the prevailing party. See Randall v. Prince Georgeβs Cty., 302\\n\\nF.3d 188, 195 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Lowery v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431,\\n\\n442-43 (4th Cir. 2000)). We are likewise obliged to accord the prevailing party the\\n\\nbenefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. See Lowery, 206 F.3d\\n\\nat 443. The facts recited herein are taken in that light and drawn from the record, which\\n\\nincludes evidence presented at trial and the partiesβ joint submission of stipulated facts.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Linda is an American citizen. She began working for the Department of State in\\n\\n1991 as a Communications Officer in Paris, France. In Paris, Linda met and married\\n\\nRussell, an Australian citizen who then worked for the Australian Embassy in France.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Citations herein to βJ.A.__β refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by\\nthe parties in this appeal.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fOver the next decade, Linda and Russell held similar postings around the world, usually\\n\\narranging their assignments so that they could pursue their careers in the same country.\\n\\nIn 2001, Russell retired from his position with the Australian government, and he\\n\\nthereafter followed Linda as she continued her career with the State Department.\\n\\n In 2005, the State Department assigned Linda to our Embassy in Sanaβa, Yemen.\\n\\nRussell accompanied Linda to Sanaβa and also found work at the Embassy. Among other\\n\\njobs, Russell performed administrative work for the Embassy Commissary. In Sanaβa,\\n\\nLinda and Russell lived in housing provided by the State Department, and they were\\n\\nprotected by U.S. government security. Linda and Russell remained in Sanaβa for\\n\\napproximately three years. Around December 2008, Linda and Russell moved to Japan,\\n\\nwhere Linda received her next State Department posting. By 2012, Linda and Russell\\n\\nhad relocated to Melbourne, Australia, where Russell died of pancreatic cancer that\\n\\nSeptember. Linda continues to reside in Melbourne.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Sarah Roe first met the Howards in September 2005, soon after their arrival in\\n\\nYemen. At that time, Roe was twenty years old. Born into an impoverished family in\\n\\nEthiopia, Roe had moved to Yemen to seek work, and she initially secured various\\n\\nhousekeeping and cleaning jobs. In September 2005, Roe was employed there as a\\n\\nwaitress at a restaurant on U.S. Embassy grounds called Uncle Samβs. It was at Uncle\\n\\nSamβs that the Howards first encountered Roe and sought to befriend her.\\n\\n As one of his odd jobs around the U.S. Embassy, Russell worked in a shop next\\n\\ndoor to Uncle Samβs. He first introduced himself to Roe, and then introduced Roe to\\n\\n 5\\n\\fLinda. Both Howards paid special attention to Roe: they complimented her appearance,\\n\\ninitiated friendly conversations, and encouraged her to work for them as their live-in\\n\\nhousekeeper. At first Roe declined the job offer, and Russell asked her to help βfind a\\n\\nbeautiful woman like [her]self to work in [the Howardsβ] home.β See J.A. 232. Linda\\n\\nwould stop by Uncle Samβs three or four times a week, where she would βgreetβ and\\n\\nβhugβ Roe. Id. at 231. Linda even gave Roe her personal phone number. Id. at 234.\\n\\n Around 2006, Roe returned to Ethiopia from Yemen for several months to care for\\n\\nher mother. As a result, she lost her job at Uncle Samβs. When Roe returned to Sanaβa, a\\n\\nyoung Ethiopian woman named Sabha was then employed as the Howardsβ live-in\\n\\nhousekeeper, but Linda helped Roe obtain a data-entry job at the U.S. Embassy. Linda\\n\\ngave Roe an application for the data-entry position and taught her how to use a basic\\n\\ndata-entry program on Lindaβs home computer. After Roe got the job, Linda continued\\n\\nto befriend her, meeting Roe to talk about her hair stylist and other non-work matters.\\n\\nLinda presented herself to Roe βas a friend, someone very easy to talk to, someone with a\\n\\nvery good heart.β See J.A. 239. Linda also promised to help Roe find another job after\\n\\nthe data-entry position ended. Roe believed Linda offered such help because Linda\\n\\nβreally likedβ her. Id. at 241.\\n\\n Some months later, in the spring of 2007, the Howardsβ then live-in housekeeper\\n\\n(another young Ethiopian woman named Brhan) left them. At the time, Roe was looking\\n\\nfor a new job and the Howards renewed their offer to Roe to fill the housekeeping\\n\\nposition. Roe was uncertain about accepting the Howardsβ offer. She made more money\\n\\nwhen she had jobs that allowed her to accept tips, like waitressing. Roe also had her own\\n\\n 6\\n\\fapartment and did not want to move in with the Howards, which was a requirement of the\\n\\nposition. But the Howards offered to help Roe get medical treatment for an eye ailment,\\n\\nrenew her work visa, and aid her family in Ethiopia. Linda also βknew that [Roe] had a\\n\\ndesire to improve [her] language skills,β and promised that Russell could help her with\\n\\nher English. See J.A. 247. As part of their discussions about the live-in position, Linda\\n\\nexplained to Roe βthat Russell is usually at home, he needs a friend.β Id. Linda told Roe\\n\\nthat βthe main part of this job is to make Russell happy.β Id. at 250. Roe understood this\\n\\nto mean that βdoing my job, cleaning, doing everything else was what was going to make\\n\\nhim happy.β Id. Roe accepted the position and agreed to move in with the Howards.\\n\\nShe began working for the Howards in June 2007.\\n\\n Once Roe moved into the Howardsβ apartment, she discovered that, although she\\n\\nhad her own room and bathroom, the door to her room could not be locked without a key.\\n\\nThe Howards told Roe they did not have the key. The Howards then presented Roe with\\n\\na uniform consisting of a βvery shortβ skirt and a blouse that βlooked like something you\\n\\nwould wear . . . when you go out.β See J.A. 253. Linda had made the outfit herself.\\n\\n When Roe refused to wear the uniform, Russell took Roe to the mall to go\\n\\nshopping. At the mall, he purchased a βvery revealingβ βone-pieceβ that βopen[ed] in the\\n\\nfront,β and βunderwear . . . with one tiny stringβ and βmany holes.β See J.A. 253. Back\\n\\nat the apartment, Russell asked Roe to put on the new purchases βand show him what it\\n\\nlooks like.β Id. at 254. Roe refused again and went to the kitchen to prepare Russellβs\\n\\nlunch. She then retired to her room. Suddenly, Russell entered the room, naked. Roe\\n\\ntried to escape but Russell cornered her, pinned her down on the bed, and raped her.\\n\\n 7\\n\\fRussell continually raped and sexually assaulted Roe for the duration of her time with the\\n\\nHowards. He repeatedly threatened Roe to maintain her silence: he verbally abused her,\\n\\nhe warned Roe that he could have her thrown in jail, he threatened to tell her religiously\\n\\nconservative family about the assaults, and he retained possession of her passport.\\n\\n As the district court succinctly put it in its post-trial opinion, βLinda Howard was\\n\\naware of these assaults.β See J.A. 145-46. Linda often watched as Russell touched Roeβs\\n\\nrear end and breasts. Roe overheard Russell talking to Linda on the phone about the\\n\\nassaults, including complaining that Roe βwasnβt like Brhan.β Id. at 258, 334. Roe knew\\n\\nit was Linda on the other end of the line based on the nature and content of those\\n\\nconversations. On one occasion, Russell related events to Linda over the phone as he\\n\\ntook Roe to a hospital to have an intrauterine contraceptive device implanted. Russell\\n\\nalso told Roe that he talked to Linda about the rapes.\\n\\n Eventually, Roeβs continued resistance to Russellβs repeated assaults and open,\\n\\nabject misery so enraged Russell that he fired her in December 2007. Linda then helped\\n\\nRoe obtain another restaurant job near the Howardsβ apartment and wrote a letter of\\n\\nrecommendation for her. Even then, Russell would often stop by the restaurant to\\n\\nthreaten Roe to maintain her silence about the rapes he had perpetrated.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Congress enacted the TVPA in the year 2000 βto combat trafficking in persons, a\\n\\ncontemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and\\n\\nchildren, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their\\n\\nvictims.β TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, Β§ 102(a), 114 Stat. 1464, 1466 (codified at 22\\n\\n 8\\n\\fU.S.C. Β§ 7101(a)). The congressional findings that accompanied the TVPA in its original\\n\\nform repeatedly emphasized the transnational nature of human trafficking and sexual\\n\\nexploitation, and the enforcement challenges posed by the international scope of that\\n\\ncriminal activity. See id., Β§ 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466-69.\\n\\n By way of the TVPA, Congress created several new federal criminal offenses\\n\\nintended to more comprehensively and effectively combat human trafficking. Among\\n\\nother provisions, the TVPA criminalized: βForced labor,β β[t]rafficking with respect to\\n\\npeonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor,β and β[s]ex trafficking of\\n\\nchildren or by force, fraud or coercion.β See TVPA, Β§ 112(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1486-88.\\n\\nThose provisions are respectively codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591, all\\n\\nwithin chapter 77 of Title 18.\\n\\n In 2003, Congress reauthorized and amended the TVPA. See Trafficking Victims\\n\\nProtection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (the β2003\\n\\nTVPRAβ). In the findings accompanying the 2003 TVPRA, Congress stressed the\\n\\nchallenges that remained βin responding to the needs of victims of trafficking in the\\n\\nUnited States and abroad.β See id., Β§ 2(2), 117 Stat. at 2875. As part of the 2003\\n\\nTVPRA amendments, Congress added a civil remedy provision to chapter 77. See 2003\\n\\nTVPRA, Β§ 4(a)(4)(A), 117 Stat. at 2878. That civil remedy provision is codified at 18\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1595(a), which provides:\\n\\n (a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of [chapter 77] may bring a\\n civil action against the perpetrator . . . in an appropriate district court of the\\n United States and may recover damages . . . .\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f The 2003 TVPRA also amended Β§ 1591, which prohibits β[s]ex trafficking of\\n\\nchildren or by force, fraud, or coercion.β That amendment altered Β§ 1591 to expressly\\n\\napply to acts committed βwithin the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the\\n\\nUnited States.β See 2003 TVPRA, Β§ 5(a)(2), 117 Stat. at 2879. The phrase βspecial\\n\\nmaritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ is a term of art defined\\n\\nelsewhere in the U.S. Code. That term encompasses a variety of locations under varying\\n\\ndegrees of control by the United States and includes, with respect to offenses committed\\n\\nby U.S. nationals, the grounds of U.S. diplomatic installations and related premises. See\\n\\n18 U.S.C. Β§ 7(9). Specifically, Β§ 7(9) defines the term to reach:\\n\\n (A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other\\n United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including\\n the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto\\n or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of\\n ownership; and\\n\\n (B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary\\n thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or\\n entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or\\n entities.\\n\\nSee id.\\n\\n In 2006, Congress again reauthorized the TVPA. See Trafficking Victims\\n\\nProtection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (effective\\n\\nJan. 10, 2006) (the β2005 TVPRAβ). This time, Congress expressly found that β[t]he\\n\\ninvolvement of employees and contractors of the United States Government . . . in\\n\\ntrafficking in persons, facilitating the trafficking in persons, or exploiting the victims of\\n\\ntrafficking in persons is inconsistent with United States laws and policies and undermines\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\fthe credibility and mission of the United States Government programs in post-conflict\\n\\nregions.β See id., Β§ 2(10), 119 Stat. at 3559. Accordingly, Congress further expanded the\\n\\nTVPAβs extraterritorial reach by providing:\\n\\n Whoever, while employed by . . . the Federal Government outside the\\n United States, engages in conduct outside the United States that would\\n constitute an offense under chapter 77 . . . of this title if the conduct had\\n been engaged in within the United States or within the special maritime and\\n territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for\\n that offense.\\n\\nSee id., Β§ 103, 119 Stat. at 3562 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271). Each of the statutory\\n\\nprovisions and amendments discussed heretofore was in effect between June and\\n\\nDecember 2007, when the Howards exploited and abused Roe.\\n\\n In 2008, after Roe had left the Howards, Congress further amended and\\n\\nreauthorized the TVPA. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection\\n\\nReauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (the β2008 TVPRAβ).\\n\\nThe 2008 TVPRA further expanded the extraterritorial reach of the TVPA by providing:\\n\\n In addition to any domestic or extra-territorial jurisdiction otherwise\\n provided by law, the courts of the United States have extra-territorial\\n jurisdiction over any offense (or any attempt or conspiracy to commit an\\n offense) under section . . . 1589, 1590, or 1591 ifβ\\n\\n (1) an alleged offender is a national of the United States . . . .\\n\\nSee id., Β§ 223, 122 Stat. at 5071 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1596). The 2008 TVPRA also\\n\\nexpanded chapter 77 to prohibit conspiracy to commit the offenses codified at, inter alia,\\n\\n18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591. See id., Β§ 222, 122 Stat. at 5070 (codified at 18\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1594(b)-(c)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f C.\\n\\n In May 2016, Roe sued Linda in the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the\\n\\nTVPA civil remedy provision codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. 4 See J.A. 15. Roe alleged\\n\\nthat Linda had violated multiple criminal provisions of the TVPA, including its\\n\\nprohibitions of forced labor under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1589, forced labor trafficking under\\n\\nΒ§ 1590, commercial sex trafficking under Β§ 1591, and conspiracy to engage in those\\n\\noffenses under Β§ 1594.\\n\\n Before trial, Linda sought summary judgment on the grounds that the TVPA did\\n\\nnot apply extraterritorially to reach her conduct in 2007, and that the 2008 amendments\\n\\nexpanding its extraterritorial application did not apply retroactively. The district court\\n\\ndenied that request without prejudice after argument.\\n\\n Linda also filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Jane Doe, a live-in\\n\\nhousekeeper who worked for the Howards after Roe was fired. 5 The district court denied\\n\\nthat motion and ruled that Doeβs testimony was admissible under either Rule 404(b) or\\n\\nRule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Roeβs claims proceeded to trial in Alexandria\\n\\non July 26, 2017.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Roe originally sued Russellβs estate in addition to Linda, but later dismissed the\\nestate as a defendant in these proceedings. See Roe v. Howard, No. 16-cv-562 (E.D. Va.\\nJuly 26, 2017), ECF No. 78.\\n 5\\n The district court permitted Jane Doe to testify using this pseudonym. See J.A.\\n156.\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f In accordance with the district courtβs ruling, Jane Doe took the stand at trial.\\n\\nLike Roe, Doe was a young Ethiopian woman who came to Yemen in search of work.\\n\\nDoe testified, inter alia, that she began working for the Howards in Sanaβa as a live-in\\n\\nhousekeeper in 2008. Doe followed the Howards to Tokyo when they relocated at the\\n\\nend of that year, based in part on the Howardsβ promises that they would increase her pay\\n\\nand help her obtain health insurance. Such insurance was a benefit of particular value to\\n\\nDoe, who had βkidney issues.β See J.A. 162-63. Doe knew no one in Japan other than\\n\\nthe Howards and did not speak Japanese.\\n\\n Shortly after Doe and the Howards arrived in Tokyo, Russellβs behavior toward\\n\\nDoe changed. Doe testified, over objection, that Russell told her about βsome of the\\n\\nways he abused his former employees.β See J.A. 165. She described how Russell began\\n\\nto touch her inappropriately, on her butt and thigh. Doe then testified that Russell\\n\\ncornered her in her bedroom in the Howardsβ home and raped her. Russell raped Doe\\n\\nrepeatedly during her employment with the Howards. Doe testified, over objection, that\\n\\nRussell told her that Linda knew βeverything that is happening.β Id. at 174. Doe also\\n\\nrelated that, after they had arrived in Tokyo, Linda told Doe βto make sure that I please\\n\\n[Russell], and thatβs my primary job, that she didnβt want him to be mad.β Id. at 175.\\n\\nSome months later, while Doe and the Howards were still in Tokyo, Russell fired Doe\\n\\nand threatened to have her deported.\\n\\n On July 31, 2017, after additional testimony and stipulated submissions consistent\\n\\nwith the preceding recitation of facts, the jury returned its verdict. The jury found Linda\\n\\nliable for each of the four alleged violations of the TVPA. The jury calculated Roeβs\\n\\n 13\\n\\fcompensatory damages at $1 million for each violation. The jury found, however, that\\n\\nthose compensatory damages were duplicative, and thus awarded Roe $1 million in total\\n\\ncompensatory damages. The jury also awarded Roe $2 million in punitive damages. See\\n\\nJ.A. 115-17.\\n\\n In September 2017, Linda filed multiple post-trial motions seeking to overturn the\\n\\njuryβs verdict. As relevant to this appeal, Linda sought a new trial pursuant to Federal\\n\\nRule of Civil Procedure 59(a), contending that the district court had erred in admitting\\n\\nDoeβs testimony. Linda also renewed her Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law\\n\\non the grounds that the TVPA did not apply to her extraterritorial conduct in 2007, and\\n\\nthat the 2008 TVPRA amendments did not apply retroactively. In October 2017, the\\n\\ncourt denied Lindaβs post-trial motions. The court then entered judgment in favor of Roe\\n\\nin accordance with the verdict.\\n\\n In January 2018, the district court issued a post-trial opinion that addressed, inter\\n\\nalia, Lindaβs contention that the TVPAβs civil remedy provision did not apply\\n\\nextraterritorially to reach her conduct in Yemen in 2007. See Roe v. Howard, No. 16-cv-\\n\\n562 (E.D. Va. Jan. 3, 2018), ECF No. 125. The court ruled that, under the version of the\\n\\nTVPA in effect in 2007, the presumption against extraterritoriality was rebutted with\\n\\nrespect to Lindaβs relevant conduct. Specifically, the court applied the Supreme Courtβs\\n\\ndecision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013), and this Courtβs\\n\\ndecision in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014), to\\n\\nconclude that Lindaβs conduct sufficiently βtouche[d] and concern[ed] the United Statesβ\\n\\nto displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. See J.A. 148-49. Alternatively,\\n\\n 14\\n\\fthe court determined that 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1596, enacted in 2008, could apply retroactively\\n\\nand supported the extraterritorial application of the TVPA civil remedy provision to\\n\\nLindaβs conduct.\\n\\n Linda has timely appealed the judgment of the district court, and we possess\\n\\nappellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo a district courtβs denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a\\n\\nmatter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.\\n\\nSee Fontenot v. Taser Intβl, Inc., 736 F.3d 318, 332 (4th Cir. 2013). We also review de\\n\\nnovo βthe conclusions of law on which the courtβs denial of judgment as a matter of law\\n\\nwas premised.β Adkins v. Crown Auto, Inc., 488 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007). Our de\\n\\nnovo review extends to all questions of statutory interpretation encompassed therein.\\n\\nSee, e.g., Stone v. Instrumentation Lab. Co., 591 F.3d 239, 242-43 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n By contrast, we review a district courtβs denial of a Rule 59 motion for a new trial\\n\\nfor abuse of discretion, and we will reverse only βin the most exceptional circumstances.β\\n\\nMinter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2014). Likewise, we\\n\\nreview rulings on the admissibility of evidence, including testimony, for abuse of\\n\\ndiscretion. See, e.g., United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\f III.\\n\\n Linda seeks to overturn the jury verdict against her by challenging two of the\\n\\ndistrict courtβs rulings in the proceedings below. First, Linda maintains that the court\\n\\nerred in concluding that the TVPAβs civil remedy provision applied to her extraterritorial\\n\\nconduct in 2007, and thus erred in denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law.\\n\\nBy her second contention, Linda argues that the court erred in admitting Jane Doeβs trial\\n\\ntestimony regarding her abuse by the Howards in 2008. We address each contention in\\n\\nturn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Linda seeks to vacate the judgment against her on the ground that the TVPAβs\\n\\ncivil remedy provision, codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595, did not apply extraterritorially\\n\\nbefore 2008. Linda contends that this precludes any liability for her conduct toward Roe,\\n\\nwhich took place in Yemen in 2007. The district court rejected that argument when it\\n\\ndenied Lindaβs post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. In so ruling, the court\\n\\nrelied on the Supreme Courtβs decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., and\\n\\nconcluded that Lindaβs conduct sufficiently βtouch[ed] and concern[ed] the United\\n\\nStatesβ to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. See J.A. 149 (citing\\n\\nKiobel, 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013)). Alternatively, the court determined that 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1596 β which expanded the extraterritorial reach of the TVPA in 2008 β applied\\n\\nretroactively and sustained Lindaβs liability under the TVPA.\\n\\n As explained below, we affirm the district court and conclude that the TVPAβs\\n\\ncivil remedy provision applied to Lindaβs conduct in Yemen in 2007. We reach this\\n\\n 16\\n\\fconclusion, however, based on a somewhat different analysis than that employed by the\\n\\ndistrict court. See United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005) (confirming\\n\\nthat this Court βmay affirm on any grounds apparent from the recordβ). Specifically, we\\n\\nrely on the Supreme Courtβs more recent decision on extraterritoriality in RJR Nabisco,\\n\\nInc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). Adhering to the framework explained in\\n\\nRJR Nabisco, we ground our ruling on the text and structure of the relevant TVPA\\n\\nprovisions. Pursuant to our analysis, we are satisfied that the TVPAβs civil remedy\\n\\nprovision applied to Lindaβs conduct toward Roe in 2007.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Congress has the undisputed authority to apply its laws beyond βthe territorial\\n\\nboundaries of the United States.β See United States v. Ayesh, 702 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2012). Whether it has exercised that authority βis a matter of statutory construction.β Id.\\n\\n(citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded in part by\\n\\nstatute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in\\n\\nLandgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994)). The canon of statutory\\n\\ninterpretation known as the βpresumption against extraterritorialityβ instructs that\\n\\nβ[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be\\n\\nconstrued to have only domestic application.β RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100.\\n\\n In its 2016 ruling in RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court drew on its precedent to\\n\\ndescribe a βtwo-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.β See id. at 2101\\n\\n(citing Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108; Morrison v. Natβl Austr. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).\\n\\nThe first step of the RJR Nabisco framework asks βwhether the statute gives a clear,\\n\\n 17\\n\\faffirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially,β and thereby rebuts the\\n\\npresumption against extraterritoriality. Id. In making that determination, courts look to\\n\\nthe text of the statute, but βan express statement of extraterritoriality is not essential.β Id.\\n\\nat 2102. The structure and history of the statute are also relevant to this analysis, and in\\n\\nsome circumstances the statuteβs βcontextβ may be βdispositive.β Id. at 2102-03.\\n\\n If the first step reveals that a statute β or a specific statutory provision β has\\n\\nextraterritorial effect, our analysis is complete. See id. at 2101. If, on the other hand, the\\n\\nfirst step shows that a statute does not apply extraterritorially, a court must proceed to the\\n\\nsecond step identified in RJR Nabisco. Specifically, the court must then βdetermine\\n\\nwhether the case involves a domestic application of the statuteβ by considering the\\n\\nchallenged conduct in light of the statuteβs βfocus.β Id. at 2101. If βthe conduct relevant\\n\\nto the statuteβs focusβ occurred βin U.S. Territory,β then the application of the statute is\\n\\nnot truly extraterritorial. See id. 6 That is, such conduct would represent a βpermissible\\n\\ndomestic applicationβ of the statute at issue. See id. at 2100.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n In delineating the two-step framework in RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court drew\\non two of its key precedents addressing extraterritoriality: Morrison and Kiobel. The\\nsecond step described in RJR Nabisco, however, appears to privilege consideration of a\\nstatuteβs βfocusβ β the approach set out in Morrison β over the inquiry articulated in\\nKiobel, which asked whether the claims at issue βtouch and concern the territory of the\\nUnited States.β See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102; Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 124-25. On the\\nother hand, RJR Nabisco did not overturn Kiobel and β in step two β retains a similar\\nemphasis on the relevant claimβs connection to U.S. territory. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.\\nCt. at 2101. We need not resolve the effect of RJR Nabisco on Kiobel because, as\\nexplained herein, we do not reach the second step of the RJR Nabisco framework.\\n\\n 18\\n\\f 2.\\n\\n The first step of the RJR Nabisco framework requires us to assess the specific\\n\\nstatutory provisions at issue to determine whether those provisions demonstrate βclearly\\n\\nexpressed congressional intentβ that they will apply extraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct. at\\n\\n2100, 2102; see also Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265 (emphasizing that βwhen a statute\\n\\nprovides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality\\n\\noperates to limit that provision to its termsβ). Here, Roe sued Linda pursuant to the civil\\n\\nremedy provision of the TVPA, codified at 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. Section 1595 permits\\n\\nvictims of the trafficking offenses specified in chapter 77 of Title 18 to sue the\\n\\nperpetrator of such an offense. Roe sought to recover damages based on Lindaβs\\n\\nviolations of the trafficking offenses codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, and 1591,\\n\\nwhich prohibit forced labor, trafficking in forced labor, and forced sex trafficking,\\n\\nrespectively. Roe also alleged that Linda conspired to commit those offenses in violation\\n\\nof Β§ 1594. As described above, the jury at Lindaβs trial found that she had committed\\n\\neach of those four offenses and awarded Roe damages under Β§ 1595.\\n\\n Applying the first step of the RJR Nabisco inquiry, we are satisfied that Β§ 1595 of\\n\\nthe TVPA evinces a βclear indication of extraterritorial effect,β at least with respect to the\\n\\nconduct at issue here. See 136 S. Ct. at 2102. Of crucial importance, Β§ 1595 directly\\n\\nincorporates predicate offenses that govern foreign conduct, providing strong textual\\n\\nevidence of its extraterritorial effect when applied to those predicates. See id. at 2102-03.\\n\\nAdditionally, the purpose, structure, history, and context of the TVPA militate toward the\\n\\nextraterritorial application of Β§ 1595, to the extent that the relevant predicate offenses\\n\\n 19\\n\\freach the challenged foreign conduct at issue. See id. at 2102 (consulting βcontextβ to\\n\\ndetermine extraterritoriality); In re French, 440 F.3d 145, 151 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining\\n\\nthat courts should consult βall available evidence,β including text, statutory scheme, and\\n\\nlegislative history to determine extraterritorial effect of statute).\\n\\n We begin our analysis by looking to the Supreme Courtβs application of the first\\n\\nRJR Nabisco step to the circumstances of that case. In RJR Nabisco, the Court addressed\\n\\nwhether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (βRICOβ) applied\\n\\nextraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct. at 2099. The central RICO provision, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1962,\\n\\ncontains four substantive prohibitions that criminalize certain means of influencing or\\n\\noperating an enterprise through βa pattern of racketeering activity.β See id. at 2097\\n\\n(citing 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1962(a)-(d)). RICO defines βracketeering activityβ as comprising a\\n\\nrange of state and federal offenses, referred to as predicate offenses. See id. at 2096\\n\\n(citing 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1961). To determine whether the substantive RICO provisions\\n\\napplied to foreign conduct, the Court examined the text and context of Β§ 1962. See id. at\\n\\n2101-03.\\n\\n The Court explained that β[t]he most obvious textual clueβ that Β§ 1962 applied\\n\\nextraterritorially was that RICO defined βracketeering activityβ to include βa number of\\n\\npredicates that plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct.β See id. at 2101. The\\n\\nCourt reasoned that βCongressβs incorporation of [such] extraterritorial predicates into\\n\\nRICO gives a clear, affirmative indication that Β§ 1962 applies to foreign racketeering\\n\\nactivity β but only to the extent that the predicates alleged in a particular case\\n\\nthemselves apply extraterritorially.β See id. at 2102. Thus, although Congress had not\\n\\n 20\\n\\fincluded βan express statement of extraterritorialityβ in RICOβs text, the context and\\n\\nstructure of Β§ 1962 β specifically, its incorporation of βpredicate statutes that do apply\\n\\nextraterritoriallyβ β nonetheless provided the necessary βclear, affirmative indicationβ\\n\\nthat Β§ 1962 applied extraterritorially. See id. at 2101, 2102-03.\\n\\n Put simply, RJR Nabisco teaches that, even absent an express statement of\\n\\nextraterritoriality, a statute may apply to foreign conduct insofar as it clearly and directly\\n\\nincorporates a predicate statutory provision that applies extraterritorially. See 136 S. Ct.\\n\\nat 2102-03. Applying this rule to the TVPA, we are satisfied that Β§ 1595 reflects\\n\\ncongressional intent that it applies extraterritorially to the extent that a plaintiff seeks\\n\\nredress for a predicate offense βthat is itself extraterritorial.β See id. at 2103.\\n\\n Like Β§ 1962, the TVPAβs civil remedy provision directly incorporates a set of\\n\\npredicate offenses βthat plainly apply to at least some foreign conduct.β See RJR\\n\\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. More specifically, Β§ 1595 permits βa victim of a violation of\\n\\nthis chapter [chapter 77 of Title 18]β to bring βa civil action against the perpetrator.β See\\n\\n18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595. Many of the predicate offenses proscribed by chapter 77 apply\\n\\nextraterritorially, either expressly or by way of other provisions delineating their\\n\\nextraterritorial application. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1585 (prohibiting, inter alia, seizure of\\n\\npersons βon any foreign shoreβ with βintent to make that person a slaveβ). Thus,\\n\\npursuant to RJR Nabisco, βCongressβs incorporationβ of such βextraterritorial predicatesβ\\n\\ninto Β§ 1595 βgives a clear, affirmative indicationβ that Β§ 1595 provides a civil remedy for\\n\\nthe foreign conduct that is prohibited by chapter 77. See 136 S. Ct. at 2102. That is,\\n\\n\\n\\n 21\\n\\fΒ§ 1595 applies extraterritorially to the extent that the particular predicate offense\\n\\nsupporting a specific claim applies extraterritorially. See id. at 2103.\\n\\n Reinforcing that conclusion, the purpose, structure, history, and context of the\\n\\nTVPA all support the extraterritorial application of Β§ 1595 for an appropriate predicate\\n\\noffense. The TVPAβs stated purpose and accompanying congressional findings\\n\\ndemonstrate that Congress enacted it to address the problem of human trafficking\\n\\nβthroughout the world.β See Pub. L. 106-386 §§ 101-102, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466-69\\n\\n(2000). The TVPA contains numerous provisions authorizing funds and programs to\\n\\nsupport international efforts to address that global problem. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 7104(c) (creating βborder interdictionβ programs to combat trafficking at βkey border\\n\\ncrossingsβ); Β§ 7105 (authorizing foreign assistance programs to protect and aid\\n\\ntrafficking victims abroad). Notably, Congress has consistently amended the TVPA to\\n\\nreach and proscribe additional categories of foreign conduct. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591\\n\\n(amended by 2003 TVPRA to cover conduct committed in special maritime and\\n\\nterritorial jurisdiction of United States); Β§ 3271 (enacted as part of 2006 TVPRA\\n\\namendments to cover trafficking offenses by U.S. government employees abroad).\\n\\nViewed as a whole, the TVPA represents a far-reaching congressional effort to combat\\n\\ntransnational human trafficking on numerous fronts, including by expanding the civil\\n\\nclaims and remedies available to its victims.\\n\\n This is, in short, a situation in which Congress was clearly concerned with\\n\\ninternational rather than purely domestic matters. In these circumstances, unduly limiting\\n\\nthe TVPAβs scope risks frustrating its animating purpose. See Ayesh, 702 F.3d at 166\\n\\n 22\\n\\f(ruling that federal statute prohibiting U.S. employees from pilfering public funds applied\\n\\nextraterritorially because holding otherwise would immunize broad category of conduct\\n\\nand frustrate congressional intent); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337,\\n\\n1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (concluding that statutes prohibiting inducement of aliens to enter\\n\\nUnited States illegally applied extraterritorially because, inter alia, they were\\n\\nβfundamentally internationalβ in βfocus and effectβ).\\n\\n Although we are satisfied that RJR Nabisco compels the extraterritorial application\\n\\nof Β§ 1595 with respect to its extraterritorial predicates, we recognize that Part IV of that\\n\\ndecision declined to apply RICOβs civil cause of action to foreign conduct. See 136 S.\\n\\nCt. at 2106. But that part of Justice Alitoβs opinion for the Court depended on factors\\n\\nthat do not apply to Β§ 1595 of the TVPA. First, RICOβs civil remedy provision, codified\\n\\nat 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1964(c), does not directly incorporate any extraterritorial predicates.\\n\\nIndeed, it makes no reference to any extraterritorial provision whatsoever. Rather, civil\\n\\nliability under Β§ 1964(c) is premised on Β§ 1962 criminal liability, but β crucially β is\\n\\nnot coextensive with Β§ 1962 liability. Justice Alito emphasized that the text of Β§ 1964(c)\\n\\nlimited its application to certain types of injuries, and thereby created a gap between the\\n\\nreach of Β§ 1964(c) civil liability and Β§ 1962 criminal liability. See id. at 2106, 2108.\\n\\nFurther, Β§ 1964 contained no other indication that it should apply extraterritorially; that\\n\\nis, it lacked the kind of βforeign-oriented languageβ or reference to foreign activity that\\n\\ncould sustain its extraterritorial application. See id. at 2108-10 & n.12.\\n\\n None of the foregoing considerations apply to Β§ 1595 of the TVPA. As explained\\n\\nabove, Β§ 1595 expressly and directly incorporates the TVPAβs criminal predicates, many\\n\\n 23\\n\\fof which manifestly apply to foreign conduct. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102. In\\n\\nthat regard, Β§ 1595 of the TVPA resembles Β§ 1962 of RICO rather than the circumscribed\\n\\ntext of Β§ 1964(c). See id. at 2109-10 (comparing and distinguishing Β§ 1962 and Β§ 1964);\\n\\nacc. Pfizer, Inc. v. Govβt of India, 434 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1978) (sustaining extraterritorial\\n\\napplication of Clayton Act civil remedy due to, inter alia, its incorporation of definitions\\n\\nexpressly addressing foreign entities). Moreover, the text of Β§ 1595 shows that it applies\\n\\ncoextensively with its predicate offenses, omitting any qualifying or modifying language,\\n\\nwhich further distinguishes it from Β§ 1964(c). Notably, as discussed above, the TVPA is\\n\\nreplete with the βforeign-oriented languageβ that Justice Alito found lacking in Β§ 1964(c),\\n\\nincluding in the predicates underpinning Roeβs claim. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at\\n\\n2110 n.12. Indeed, the TVPA more clearly targets foreign conduct than any provision of\\n\\nRICO, as demonstrated by its international scope and Congressβs repeated expansions of\\n\\nits extraterritorial reach. See, e.g., 2005 TVPRA, 119 Stat. at 3562.\\n\\n In short, Β§ 1595 evinces the same relationship to its extraterritorial predicate\\n\\noffenses that RICOβs substantive criminal provision does to its predicates, and is not\\n\\nsubject to textual limitations like those found in RICOβs private cause of action. Section\\n\\n1595 therefore provides a civil remedy for conduct that comes within the extraterritorial\\n\\npredicates of the TVPA. Accordingly, we now turn to the question of whether the\\n\\npredicate offenses underlying Roeβs civil suit applied to Lindaβs extraterritorial conduct\\n\\nin 2007.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24\\n\\f 3.\\n\\n The jury awarded Roe damages based on their findings that Linda had violated 18\\n\\nU.S.C. §§ 1589, 1590, 1591, and 1594. Each of those offenses is a qualifying predicate\\n\\noffense for Β§ 1595 civil liability, as they are all found within chapter 77 of Title 18 of the\\n\\nU.S. Code. See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1595 (authorizing civil suits by βa victim of a violation of\\n\\nthis chapter [chapter 77]β against the perpetrator or βwhoever knowingly benefitsβ from\\n\\nthat violation). The remaining question for us today is whether those predicates applied\\n\\nextraterritorially and reached Lindaβs foreign conduct in 2007. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S.\\n\\nCt. at 2102. We will therefore assess each predicate offense, mindful that βthe inclusion\\n\\nof some extraterritorial predicates does not mean that all [statutory] predicates extend to\\n\\nforeign conduct.β See id.\\n\\n a.\\n\\n Section 1591 β prohibiting sex trafficking β presents the simplest analysis.\\n\\nSince 2003, Β§ 1591 has applied to conduct committed βwithin the special maritime and\\n\\nterritorial jurisdiction of the United States.β See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591; 2003 TVPRA, 117\\n\\nStat. at 2879. Where an offense is committed by a United States national like Linda,\\n\\nTitle 18 defines the βspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ to\\n\\ninclude the βpremises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United\\n\\nStates Government missions or entities in foreign States,β including related residences,\\n\\nbuildings, and land, that, βirrespective of ownership,β are used βfor purposes of those\\n\\nmissions or entities.β See 18 U.S.C. Β§ 7(9). It is undisputed that Lindaβs part in Roeβs\\n\\nabuse occurred entirely on U.S. embassy grounds and housing in Sanaβa. Those premises\\n\\n 25\\n\\funquestionably fall within the βspecial maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United\\n\\nStates,β as defined in Title 18. See id.; see also United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207,\\n\\n214 (4th Cir. 2009) (observing that American embassies are βplainly within Β§ 7(9)βs\\n\\nscopeβ); United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1973) (ruling that embassies\\n\\ncomprise part of βspecial territorial jurisdictionβ of United States); H.R. Rep. No. 107-\\n\\n236, at 74 (2001) (agreeing with Erdos and explaining that βembassies and embassy\\n\\nhousing of the United States in foreign states are included in the special maritime and\\n\\nterritorial jurisdiction of the United Statesβ). Thus, Β§ 1591 expressly applied to Lindaβs\\n\\nconduct in Sanaβa in 2007, and she is liable for her violation thereof under Β§ 1595.\\n\\n b.\\n\\n Sections 1589 and 1590 of Title 18 β prohibiting forced labor and forced labor\\n\\ntrafficking β do not directly refer to foreign conduct. But since 2006, those sections\\n\\nhave applied to extraterritorial acts committed by United States employees like Linda.\\n\\nThe 2005 TVPRA amended the TVPA by enacting 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271, which provides:\\n\\n Whoever, while employed by . . . the Federal Government outside the\\n United States, engages in conduct outside the United States that would\\n constitute an offense under chapter 77 [of Title 18] if the conduct had been\\n engaged in within the United States or within the special maritime and\\n territorial jurisdiction of the United States shall be punished as provided for\\n that offense.\\n\\nSee 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3271; see also 2005 TVPRA, Β§ 103, 119 Stat. at 3562. Such language\\n\\nβmanifests an unmistakable congressional intent to apply extraterritorially.β See RJR\\n\\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a plainer indication\\n\\nwas needed, Congress included Β§ 3271 in chapter 212A, titled βExtraterritorial\\n\\n\\n 26\\n\\fJurisdiction Over Certain Trafficking in Persons Offenses.β See 2005 TVPRA, 119 Stat.\\n\\nat 3562. By the TVPAβs own terms, this extraterritorial application is limited in scope;\\n\\nthat is, it applies only to persons employed abroad by the federal government. Linda,\\n\\nhowever, falls within that class of employees. Consequently, her actions in Sanaβa were\\n\\nwithin the extraterritorial scope of Β§ 1589 and Β§ 1590 in 2007. The jury therefore\\n\\nproperly found her liable for violating those provisions under Β§ 1595.\\n\\n c.\\n\\n Turning to Β§ 1594, however, our analysis differs. Regardless of Β§ 1594βs\\n\\nextraterritoriality, the conspiracy provision for which the jury found Linda liable had not\\n\\nbeen enacted by 2007. Rather, the conspiracy prohibitions contained in Β§ 1594(b) and (c)\\n\\nwere added as part of the 2008 TVPRA amendments. See 2008 TVPRA, Β§ 222, 122 Stat.\\n\\nat 5070. That said, we need not resolve whether Β§ 1594 applies retroactively in order to\\n\\naffirm the award of damages to Roe. If this Court is βreasonably certainβ that the jury\\n\\nwould have awarded the same amount of damages regardless of the βissues erroneously\\n\\nsubmitted to it,β we are entitled to affirm the award. See Tire Engβg & Distribution, LLC\\n\\nv. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 314 (4th Cir. 2012). That rule holds\\n\\nparticular force where, as here, the jury has completed a special verdict form addressing\\n\\nliability and damages. See id. at 313-14 (collecting and comparing cases). Because the\\n\\njury indicated that it calculated Roeβs damages at $1 million for each of the four TVPA\\n\\nviolations, but awarded only $1 million total because those damages were duplicative, it\\n\\nis beyond reasonable debate that the jury would have awarded Roe $1 million in\\n\\n\\n\\n 27\\n\\fcompensatory damages for any one of Lindaβs violations, and for any combination\\n\\nthereof. See J.A. 115-17.\\n\\n In sum, the facts established at trial show that Linda committed at least three\\n\\npredicate offenses that applied to her extraterritorial conduct toward Roe in 2007.\\n\\nPursuant to the Supreme Courtβs decision in RJR Nabisco, Β§ 1595 authorizes Lindaβs\\n\\ncivil liability based on her commission of those offenses. 7 We are entitled to affirm the\\n\\njuryβs award of damages because they were properly awarded pursuant to Β§ 1595, and\\n\\nbecause any error with regard to the applicability of Β§ 1594 did not affect that result.\\n\\n Because step one of the RJR Nabisco framework demonstrates that Β§ 1595 applied\\n\\nextraterritorially to Lindaβs conduct, we need not proceed to step two, which guides our\\n\\nanalysis only where the pertinent statute does not apply extraterritorially. See RJR\\n\\nNabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. We thus have no occasion to determine whether, under step\\n\\ntwo, Lindaβs offenses involved βa domestic applicationβ of the TVPA. See id.\\n\\nAccordingly, we reserve for another day the issue of whether conduct occurring entirely\\n\\nwithin U.S. embassy grounds and associated housing takes place βin U.S. territory.β See\\n\\nid.; see also Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248. We confine our analysis today to the\\n\\ntext and context of Β§ 1595, and affirm the juryβs award of damages to Roe on that basis.\\n\\n 7\\n Lindaβs argument against the extraterritorial application of Β§ 1595 relies almost\\nentirely on the Fifth Circuitβs ruling in Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., where\\nthat court determined that Β§ 1595 failed to provide a remedy for the plaintiffsβ\\nextraterritorial TVPA claims. See 845 F.3d 184, 201-06 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Br. of\\nAppellant 8-16. That decision, however, is readily distinguishable because the Adhikari\\nplaintiffs did not allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1591 and the defendantsβ conduct\\noccurred before the enactment of Β§ 3271. See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 190, 200.\\n\\n\\n 28\\n\\f B.\\n\\n Turning to Lindaβs second and final appellate contention, we must resolve whether\\n\\nthe district court properly admitted Jane Doeβs evidence concerning the sexual abuse she\\n\\nsuffered while working as the Howardsβ housekeeper in 2008. Linda raises various\\n\\nobjections to Doeβs testimony: that it was impermissible character evidence barred by\\n\\nFederal Rule of Evidence 404(a); that it could not be admitted under Rule 415, which\\n\\npermits testimony of βsimilar actsβ in sexual assault lawsuits; that it was unfairly\\n\\nprejudicial and thus barred by Rule 403; and that the portion of Doeβs testimony relating\\n\\nto Russellβs statements constituted inadmissible hearsay. Each assertion is without merit.\\n\\n First, Doeβs testimony was plainly admissible under Rule 404(b)βs exception to\\n\\nRule 404(a)βs general prohibition of character evidence to prove an action in conformity\\n\\ntherewith. Doeβs testimony described Lindaβs efforts to recruit Doe to work as the\\n\\nHowardsβ housekeeper, and her knowledge and facilitation of Russellβs repeated sexual\\n\\nassaults on Doe. Consistent with the permissible uses of character evidence under Rule\\n\\n404(b), Doeβs testimony constituted highly probative evidence regarding Lindaβs\\n\\nintentions in her interactions with Roe; the existence of a plan or pattern of behavior by\\n\\nthe Howards toward their live-in housekeepers; and Lindaβs knowledge of Russellβs\\n\\nabuse of their staff. Doeβs testimony was therefore admissible under Rule 404(b)(2),\\n\\nwhich permits the introduction of evidence of βa crime, wrong, or other actβ to show,\\n\\ninter alia, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake. Indeed, the\\n\\nsimilarity between Doe and Roeβs accounts of their abuse enhances the probative value\\n\\nand relevance of Doeβs evidence. See United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th\\n\\n 29\\n\\fCir. 1997). 8 Because we are satisfied that Doeβs testimony was properly admitted under\\n\\nRule 404(b), we need not assess whether it was also admissible under Rule 415.\\n\\n Nor was Doeβs testimony barred by Rule 403. Pursuant to Rule 403, a court may\\n\\nexclude evidence if its βprobative valueβ is βsubstantially outweighedβ by, inter alia, the\\n\\nrisk of βunfair prejudice.β As noted above, Doeβs testimony provided highly probative\\n\\nevidence of a pattern of abusive behavior by Russell, knowingly facilitated by Linda.\\n\\nMoreover, because the assaults Roe suffered occurred in Yemen nearly a decade prior to\\n\\nLindaβs trial, Doeβs evidence was particularly important given the lack of available\\n\\nphysical evidence to corroborate Roeβs claims. Finally, the district court limited the\\n\\nscope of Doeβs testimony to avoid revealing the upsetting details of Russellβs past\\n\\nassaults, and thus reduced the risk of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Mark, 943\\n\\nF.2d 444, 449 (4th Cir. 1991). In these circumstances, the court did not abuse its\\n\\ndiscretion in permitting Doe to testify. See Mohr, 318 F.3d at 619-20 (emphasizing that\\n\\nRule 403 only requires exclusion of evidence resulting in unfair prejudice that\\n\\nβsubstantiallyβ outweighs its probative value); United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339,\\n\\n351 (4th Cir. 1998) (sustaining admission of evidence of prior sexual assault in light of its\\n\\nβsignificant probative valueβ and trial courtβs effort to reduce its prejudicial impact).\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n Linda argues that the standard for admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) changes\\nwhen that evidence concerns βsubsequentβ (rather than prior) acts. Br. of Appellant 26.\\nNo such rule exists in this Circuit. Put simply, Rule 404(b) does not function differently\\nmerely because Doeβs experience occurred after Roeβs. See United States v. Mohr, 318\\nF.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 2003).\\n\\n\\n 30\\n\\f Lastly, Doeβs testimony concerning Russellβs past statements was not inadmissible\\n\\nhearsay. Rule 804(b)(3) authorizes the admission of hearsay statements by an\\n\\nunavailable declarant that are manifestly against the declarantβs interest. Specifically, the\\n\\nstatement must be one that βa reasonable person in the declarantβs position would have\\n\\nmade only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it . . . had so great a\\n\\ntendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability.β Fed. R. Evid.\\n\\n804(b)(3). Russellβs statements to Doe β admitting to his past assaults of his former\\n\\nemployees β more than qualify as statements against interest as so defined, and his death\\n\\nin 2012 establishes his unavailability to testify. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its\\n\\ndiscretion by relying on that exception to admit Doeβs testimony regarding Russellβs\\n\\nincriminating statements. See, e.g., United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 267-68 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2008) (evaluating flexible requirements of Rule 804(b)(3) and sustaining admission\\n\\nof hearsay statements that implicated declarant in multiple crimes).\\n\\n In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Doeβs\\n\\ntestimony, and we are satisfied to affirm the courtβs rulings in that regard.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Pursuant to the foregoing, we affirm the district courtβs judgment in favor of Roe\\n\\nand against Linda Howard.\\n\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 31\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":568,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4593603,"string":"4,593,603"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Jesus Christ is the Answer v. Baltimore County, Maryland"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-25"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1450"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1450\\n\\n\\nJESUS CHRIST IS THE ANSWER MINISTRIES, INC.; REV. LUCY WARE,\\n\\n Plaintiffs β Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nBALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND; BOARD OF APPEALS OF\\nBALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,\\n\\n Defendants β Appellees.\\n\\n------------------------------\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Amicus Supporting Appellants.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.\\nRichard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:17-cv-03010-RDB)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 7, 2019\\n Amended: February 25, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which\\nJudge Niemeyer and Judge Agee joined.\\n\\fARGUED: Roman P. Storzer, STORZER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Washington, D.C.,\\nfor Appellants. James Joseph Nolan, Jr., Paul M. Mayhew, BALTIMORE COUNTY\\nOFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. John Matthew Gore, UNITED\\nSTATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus United States of\\nAmerica. ON BRIEF: Sieglinde K. Rath, STORZER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,\\nWashington, D.C.; Lawrence E. Schmidt, SMITH GILDEA & SCHMIDT LLC, Towson,\\nMaryland, for Appellants. Michael E. Field, County Attorney, R. Brady Locher,\\nAssistant County Attorney, BALTIMORE COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Towson,\\nMaryland, for Appellees. Tovah R. Calderon, Katherine E. Lamm, Appellate Section,\\nCivil Rights Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,\\nD.C., for Amicus United States of America.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Jesus Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. (the βChurchβ) and Reverend Lucy\\n\\nWare appeal the dismissal of their claims against Baltimore County and the Board of\\n\\nAppeals of Baltimore County. The district court dismissed Plaintiffsβ suit for failure to\\n\\nstate a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act\\n\\n(βRLUIPAβ), 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc et seq., the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection\\n\\nClause, and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. For the reasons that\\n\\nfollow, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries, Inc. is a nondenominational Christian\\n\\nchurch founded in Baltimore in 1997 by Reverend Lucy Ware. 1 The Church describes\\n\\nitself as evangelical and multicultural. It has associated churches in Kenya and the\\n\\nSeychelles, and many of the Churchβs congregants were born in Africa. Reverend Ware\\n\\nwas born in Kenya, where she was active in her family church until moving to the United\\n\\nStates.\\n\\n The Church has struggled to secure an adequate house of worship, and this has\\n\\nimpeded its religious mission. This lawsuit arises from Wareβs unsuccessful efforts to\\n\\n 1\\n Our recitation of the facts is based on the allegations in Plaintiffsβ complaint,\\nwhich we accept as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,\\n178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\fobtain County approval to operate a church on property that she purchased for that\\n\\npurpose in 2012 (the βPropertyβ).\\n\\n The Property consists of 1.2 acres of land with a building previously used as a\\n\\ndwelling. It is zoned under the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations (βBCZRβ) as\\n\\nβDensity Residential 3.5.β\\n\\n In this zone, churches are permitted as of right subject to certain conditions,\\n\\nincluding that parking lots and structures are (1) set back 75 feet from tract boundaries,\\n\\nand (2) separated from adjacent lots by a 50-foot landscaped buffer. BCZR\\n\\n§§ 1B01.1.A.3, 1B01.1.B.1.e. These conditions, however, donβt apply to new churches\\n\\nwhose site plans have been approved after a public hearing finding that compliance with\\n\\nthe conditions will be maintained βto the extent possible,β and that the plan βcan\\n\\notherwise be expected to be compatible with the character and general welfare of the\\n\\nsurrounding residential premises.β Id. Β§ 1B01.1.B.1.g.(6).\\n\\n Before Ware purchased the Property, her realtor advised her that a church was a\\n\\npermitted use on the Property.\\n\\n After buying the Property, Ware made improvements to the building and parking\\n\\nlot and held a church service and cookout. Neighbors complained to the County, and a\\n\\nCounty inspector notified Ware that she couldnβt use the Property as a church unless she\\n\\ncomplied with applicable zoning requirements.\\n\\n Ware filed a petition with the County to approve use of the Property as a church.\\n\\nThe petition proposed a buffer and setback of zero feet, seeking complete relief from the\\n\\nzoning requirements. It also sought variances from parking requirements. The County\\n\\n 4\\n\\fDirector of the Department of Planning did not oppose the petition, βprovided a\\n\\nlandscape and signage plan is submitted to the department for review and approval.β J.A.\\n\\n19 ΒΆ 105. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (βALJβ). Neighbors\\n\\nwho opposed the petition attended and participated.\\n\\n At the hearing, several neighbors made comments displaying open hostility to\\n\\nWare and the Church. These comments included: (1) βdancing and hollering like they\\n\\nback at their home back in Africa somewhereβ; (2) β[s]he can come over here from\\n\\nAfrica . . . branch out from another church and put all of this in our neighborhoodβ; and\\n\\n(3) β[t]hey were out here dancing like from Africa. We donβt have that in our block.β\\n\\nJ.A. 19 ΒΆ 108. Since the hearing, neighbors have subjected the Church and its members\\n\\nto a sustained barrage of harassment, including racial slurs. The Property has also been\\n\\nsubject to vandalism and theft.\\n\\n The ALJ recommended denying Wareβs petition. Ware appealed this\\n\\nrecommendation to the Board of Appeals. The Board denied the petition, finding that\\n\\nβthe proposed Church does not even minimally complyβ with the applicable zoning\\n\\nrequirements and that the plan would not be compatible with βthe character or general\\n\\nwelfare of the surrounding homes which homes are occupied by the [neighbors] who\\n\\ntestified.β J.A. 57. The Boardβs decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court for\\n\\nBaltimore County and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Ware v. Peopleβs\\n\\nCounsel, 117 A.3d 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).\\n\\n While the first petition was pending appeal, Ware filed a second petition. This\\n\\nnew petition included a modified site plan that (1) moved the parking lot to increase the\\n\\n 5\\n\\fsetback to 55β72.7 feet and the buffer to 50 feet, and (2) did not seek any parking\\n\\nvariances. The new petition also differed from its predecessor in that it sought approval\\n\\nnot only under the zoning provision governing new churches, but also under a separate\\n\\nprovision governing existing churches.\\n\\n The Peopleβs Counsel (a county official) initially sought dismissal of the new\\n\\npetition, on the ground that it sought essentially the same relief as its predecessor. The\\n\\nneighbors who opposed the first petition adopted the Peopleβs Counselβs motion to\\n\\ndismiss. But the Peopleβs Counsel subsequently withdrew his motion based on the\\n\\ndifferences between the two petitions. Nevertheless, the neighbors continued to pursue\\n\\ndismissal. The Board granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the new petition was\\n\\nbarred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Ware and the Church then filed suit in federal district court, alleging that the\\n\\nBoardβs dismissal of the second petition violated RLUIPAβs substantial burden and\\n\\nnondiscrimination provisions, the First Amendmentβs Free Exercise Clause, the\\n\\nFourteenth Amendmentβs Equal Protection Clause, and Article 36 of the Maryland\\n\\nDeclaration of Rights, which protects freedom of religion at the state level. The district\\n\\ncourt dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review the district courtβs dismissal order de novo, accepting as true the facts\\n\\nalleged in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffsβ favor, to\\n\\n 6\\n\\fdetermine whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a claim that is\\n\\nβplausible on its face.β Kensington Volunteer Fire Depβt, Inc. v. Montgomery County,\\n\\n684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570\\n\\n(2007)).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with Plaintiffsβ claim that Defendants substantially burdened their\\n\\nreligious exercise, in violation of RLUIPA, by dismissing the second petition. 2 We agree\\n\\nwith the Plaintiffs that the district court erred in dismissing this claim.\\n\\n RLUIPA prohibits land use regulations that impose a βsubstantial burdenβ on\\n\\nreligious practice, unless they are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling\\n\\ngovernmental interest. 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(a)(1). A substantial burden exists where a\\n\\nregulation βputs substantial pressure on [the plaintiff] to modify its behavior.β Bethel\\n\\nWorld Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 556 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2013).\\n\\n As relevant here, land use regulations can substantially burden religious exercise\\n\\nwhere an organization acquires property expecting to use it for a religious purpose but is\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Defendants argue, for the first time on appeal, that the Church canβt bring an\\nRLUIPA claim because it doesnβt own the Property (Ware does). This argument doesnβt\\nimplicate any jurisdictional issue such as the Churchβs constitutional standing. Instead, it\\nconcerns whether a regulation affecting the Church fits within RLUIPAβs definition of\\nβland use regulation.β See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-5(5). Because Defendantsβ argument\\ndoesnβt call our subject matter jurisdiction into question or implicate βexceptional\\ncircumstances,β we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. Muth v. United\\nStates, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\fprevented from doing so by the application of a zoning ordinance. In such a case, two\\n\\nquestions are usually relevant to determining whether RLUIPA has been violated.\\n\\n First, is the impediment to the organizationβs religious practice substantial? The\\n\\nanswer will usually be βyesβ where use of the property would serve an unmet religious\\n\\nneed, the restriction on religious use is absolute rather than conditional, and the\\n\\norganization must acquire a different property as a result. See Bethel, 706 F.3d at 557β\\n\\n58.\\n\\n Second, who is responsible for the impedimentβthe government, or the religious\\n\\norganization? In answering this question, we have considered whether the organization\\n\\nhad a βreasonable expectationβ of religious land use, see Bethel, 706 F.3d at 558, and\\n\\nwhether the burden faced by the organization is βself-imposed,β see Andon, LLC v. City\\n\\nof Newport News, 813 F.3d 510, 515 (4th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n In this case there is little dispute that the impediment is substantial, since the\\n\\nChurch is barred from using the Property, so the district court sensibly focused on the\\n\\nsecond question: Are Plaintiffs responsible for their present inability to use the Property\\n\\nas a church? But in addressing this question, the court wrongly emphasized Plaintiffsβ\\n\\npurported βfailure to exercise due diligence before acquiring and altering the propertyβ\\n\\nand their βsubsequent proposal [in Wareβs first petition] of a site plan that disregarded the\\n\\nzoning requirements.β Jesus Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore County,\\n\\n303 F. Supp. 3d 378, 396 (D. Md. 2018). The first of these supposed failings is irrelevant\\n\\nto whether the zoning regulations in fact authorize Plaintiffs to use the Property as a\\n\\nchurch. And the second is irrelevant to whether Plaintiffs were responsible for the\\n\\n 8\\n\\fdismissal of Wareβs second petition, which is what now stands in the way of their\\n\\nreligious practice.\\n\\n Ware sufficiently alleged that she had a reasonable expectation of using the\\n\\nProperty as a church. Her realtor told her that such a use was permitted on the Property.\\n\\nThis advice was of course correct because churches are βpermitted as of right,β provided\\n\\nthat their site plans comply βto the extent possible with [applicable] requirementsβ and\\n\\ncan βotherwise be expected to be compatible with the character and general welfare of the\\n\\nsurrounding residential premises.β BCZR §§ 1B01.1.A.3, 1B01.1.B.1.g.(6). Ware was\\n\\njustified in believing that she could satisfy these broadly and permissibly phrased\\n\\nconditions, especially given that the zoning regulations permit churches as of right.\\n\\n Wareβs efforts to meet the zoning conditions were frustrated, however, when the\\n\\nBoard dismissed her second petition. As the district court recognized, the second petition\\n\\nwas based on a site plan that substantially differed from and attempted to address the\\n\\nshortcomings of its predecessor. The Board failed to recognize these differences when it\\n\\ndismissed the petition based on res judicata and collateral estoppel, relying on the faulty\\n\\npremise that the two petitions sought essentially the same relief.\\n\\n The district court declined to dismiss Plaintiffsβ suit on grounds of res judicata and\\n\\ncollateral estoppel, but nonetheless determined that the Board correctly dismissed the\\n\\nsecond petition on these grounds. The court explained this anomaly by noting that Ware\\n\\nadvanced different bases for distinguishing the two petitions before the Board and the\\n\\ndistrict court. Specifically, the Board took the βreal thrustβ of Wareβs argument to be that\\n\\nthe second petition invoked a different subsection of the zoning regulations than the first.\\n\\n 9\\n\\fJ.A. 125. Before the district court, however, Plaintiffs emphasized the differences\\n\\nbetween the site plans accompanying the two petitions.\\n\\n We are not persuaded by the district courtβs reasoning. First, Ware did highlight\\n\\nthe differences between the site plans in the administrative proceedings. See J.A. 90,\\n\\n106β10, 113. It was the Board (not Ware) that decided the βreal thrustβ of Wareβs\\n\\nargument was the different zoning provisions invoked by the two petitions. Second, and\\n\\nmore importantly, the two site plans are in fact markedly different. The second plan\\n\\naddressed the first oneβs main deficiencies by moving the parking lot to the center of the\\n\\nProperty. This increased the landscaped buffer from zero to 50 feet, which fully\\n\\ncomplied with the buffer requirements. The second plan also increased the parking lotβs\\n\\nsetback from zero to between 55 and 72.7 feet, which complied to a much greater extent\\n\\n(and arguably βto the extent possibleβ) with the 75-foot setback requirement. In light of\\n\\nthese substantial changes and improvements, we cannot say that the dismissal of Wareβs\\n\\nsecond petition was self-imposed.\\n\\n Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the dismissal of the second petition\\n\\nimposed a substantial burden on their religious practice. We therefore vacate the district\\n\\ncourtβs dismissal of Plaintiffsβ substantial burden claim. 3\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The district court did not reach RLUIPAβs second prong, which considers\\nwhether, despite substantially burdening religious exercise, a government action βis the\\nleast restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2000ccβ1. As we discuss, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that dismissal of the\\nsecond petition was motivated by religious animus. Such animus is not a permissible\\ngovernment interest, much less a compelling one. And the dismissal wasnβt narrowly\\ntailored to further the finality interests that are normally served by res judicata and\\n(Continued)\\n 10\\n\\f B.\\n\\n Next, we consider the Churchβs claim that Defendants discriminated against it\\n\\nbased on religion or religious denomination in violation of RLUIPA. 4 The district court\\n\\ndismissed this claim, concluding that the Church failed to allege that the Board approved\\n\\nspecial exceptions to the zoning regulations for similarly situated churches or that its\\n\\ndecision was influenced by discriminatory intent.\\n\\n The Church argues that the district court erred by ignoring allegations that the\\n\\nβBoard was knowingly responsive to a hostile communityβ of bigoted neighbors. J.A. 8\\n\\nΒΆ 5. Defendants respond that the neighborsβ discriminatory remarks canβt be attributed to\\n\\nthem, and that the remarks couldnβt have influenced the decision to dismiss the second\\n\\npetition because they were allegedly made during the hearing on the first petition.\\n\\n RLUIPA prohibits land use regulations that discriminate βon the basis of religion\\n\\nor religious denomination.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(b)(2). In applying RLUIPAβs\\n\\nnondiscrimination provision, courts have looked to equal protection precedent. Chabad\\n\\nLubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Commβn, 768 F.3d 183, 198\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ncollateral estoppel because the second petition substantially differed from the first.\\nTherefore, RLUIPAβs second prong poses no barrier to Plaintiffsβ substantial burden\\nclaim at this stage of the case.\\n 4\\n The complaint alleges religious discrimination against both the Church and\\nWare. J.A. 32 ΒΆ 203. However, RLUIPAβs nondiscrimination provision applies only to\\nregulations that discriminate against βany assembly or institution.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2000cc(b)(2). The district court was therefore correct to dismiss Wareβs\\nnondiscrimination claim.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f(2d Cir. 2014) (citing Bethel, 706 F.3d at 559). Under that precedent, a plaintiff must\\n\\ndemonstrate that the government decision was motivated at least in part by discriminatory\\n\\nintent, which is evaluated using the βsensitive inquiryβ established in Village of Arlington\\n\\nHeights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266β68 (1977).\\n\\n One factor which this inquiry recognizes as potentially probative of the\\n\\ndecisionmakerβs intent is the βspecific sequence of events leading up to the challenged\\n\\ndecision.β Id. at 267. Departures from normal procedures can suggest that the decision\\n\\nwas based on unlawful motives, as can β[s]ubstantive departures . . . particularly if the\\n\\nfactors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision\\n\\ncontrary to the one reached.β Id. (citing Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1040\\n\\n(10th Cir. 1970) (finding racial motivation where a city refused to rezone a plot despite\\n\\npresent and former city planning directorsβ testimony that there was no reason not to\\n\\nrezone)).\\n\\n Particularly relevant to this case, a government decision influenced by community\\n\\nmembersβ religious bias is unlawful, even if the government decisionmakers display no\\n\\nbias themselves. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985);\\n\\nMarks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311β13 (4th Cir. 1989). Such impermissible\\n\\ninfluence may be inferred where expressions of community bias are followed by\\n\\nirregularities in government decision-making. See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d\\n\\n1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982).\\n\\n Under RLUIPA, a plaintiff need only establish a prima facie claim of religious\\n\\ndiscrimination, after which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on all elements\\n\\n 12\\n\\fof the claim. 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-2(b); Chabad Lubavitch, 768 F.3d at 198. And as with\\n\\nall claims, at the motion to dismiss stage βa plaintiff need not demonstrate that her right\\n\\nto relief is probable or that alternative explanations are less likely; rather, she must\\n\\nmerely advance her claim βacross the line from conceivable to plausible.ββ Houck v.\\n\\nSubstitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.\\n\\nat 570). So long as a plaintiff alleges a plausible prima facie claim of discrimination, a\\n\\ncourt may not dismiss that claimβeven if the defendant advances a nondiscriminatory\\n\\nalternative explanation for its decision, and even if that alternative appears more\\n\\nprobable. Id.; see Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 649 (4th Cir. 2017) (βThe\\n\\nquestion is not whether there are more likely explanations for the Cityβs action . . . but\\n\\nwhether the Cityβs impliedly proffered reason . . . is so obviously an irrefutably sound\\n\\nand unambiguously nondiscriminatory and non-pretextual explanation that it renders [the\\n\\nplaintiffβs] claim of pretext implausible.β).\\n\\n The district court reasoned that the complaint failed to allege disparate treatment\\n\\nbecause other churches that ultimately received approval are situated on larger lots and\\n\\nhave sufficient space for parking. However, RLUIPAβs nondiscrimination provision\\n\\ndoesnβt require a comparison to similarly situated entities. Chabad Lubavitch, 768 F.3d\\n\\nat 199. The Church has alleged that the Boardβs dismissal of Wareβs second petition was\\n\\nmotivated by religious discrimination. This is enough to make out a prima facie claim of\\n\\nreligious discrimination, provided that the Church can establish discriminatory intent.\\n\\n In this case, the alleged sequence of events leading to the challenged decision is\\n\\nhighly probative of Defendantsβ motives. It is especially significant that irregularities in\\n\\n 13\\n\\fDefendantsβ decision-making process followed the neighborsβ expressions of animus.\\n\\nSee Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1066 (describing a townβs unprecedented use of an\\n\\nopinion poll following expressions of racial opposition to a public housing project as a\\n\\nβsignificantβ and βsuspectβ deviation from the procedural norm).\\n\\n The first irregularity occurred when the Board denied Wareβs first petition even\\n\\nthough the County Director of the Department of Planning didnβt oppose it. The\\n\\nneighbors who opposed the first petition allegedly made bigoted remarks in the hearing\\n\\nbefore the ALJ, and seven neighbors also testified during the Boardβs hearing on the first\\n\\npetition.\\n\\n In our view, the neighborsβ remarks clearly display ethnic bias, and they can\\n\\nplausibly be understood as displaying religious bias too. We recognize that RLUIPA by\\n\\nits terms prohibits discrimination βon the basis of religion or religious denomination.β 42\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(b)(2). But we do not attempt to disentangle Plaintiffsβ allegations of\\n\\nreligious and ethnic bias, at least at the motion to dismiss stage where we must view the\\n\\nalleged facts in Plaintiffsβ favor.\\n\\n The remarks targeted (1) Wareβs African heritage and that of other congregants,\\n\\n(2) a Church gathering that (according to the neighbors) involved βdancingβ and\\n\\nβhollering,β and (3) the fact that the Church βbranch[ed] out from another church.β J.A.\\n\\n19 ΒΆ 108. The first of these topics targets the Churchβs multicultural identity. The\\n\\nsecond targets activities conducted at Church gatherings, which we may infer involved\\n\\nreligious exercise as defined in RLUIPA. See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-5(7). The third targets\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\fthe Churchβs connection to other churches and denominationsβa paradigm example of\\n\\nreligious bias.\\n\\n Plaintiffs also alleged that they βhave faced tremendous opposition based on the\\n\\nnature of their ministry and the ethnic background of Reverend Ware and the\\n\\ncongregationβ and βtheir status as African immigrants.β J.A. 27 ΒΆ 166β67. Though the\\n\\nChurch is expressly βnondenominational,β J.A. 9 ΒΆ 15, and has no religious affiliation\\n\\nexcept its βassociat[ion with] churches in Kenya and the Seychelles,β J.A. 10 ΒΆ 18,\\n\\nPlaintiffsβ other allegations are drafted in such a way that we can infer their religious\\n\\npractice is tied to their ethnicity.\\n\\n Accordingly, when we draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiffsβ favor and consider\\n\\nRLUIPAβs βvery broad protection for religious liberty,β Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853,\\n\\n859 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), we are convinced that, as alleged, the\\n\\nneighbors displayed the behavior Congress sought to eradicate from zoning decisions.\\n\\nRLUIPA is designed to protect β[c]hurches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar\\n\\nchurches in particular, [from being] frequently discriminated againstβ in land use\\n\\nregulation, including when βzoning board members or neighborhood residents explicitly\\n\\noffer race or religion as the reason to exclude a proposed church, especially in cases of\\n\\nblack churches and Jewish shuls and synagogues.β 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (July 27,\\n\\n2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).\\n\\n Following the neighborsβ remarks, the Board denied the petition. Although the\\n\\nCounty Directorβs statement that she didnβt oppose the petition doesnβt bind the Board, it\\n\\nis a βfactor[] usually considered importantβ in zoning proceedings, and it βstrongly\\n\\n 15\\n\\ffavor[s] a decision contrary to the one reachedβ by the Board. Arlington Heights, 429\\n\\nU.S. at 267. And although Plaintiffs didnβt allege how often the Board departs from the\\n\\nCounty Directorβs recommendations, the fact that the Board disagreed with a County\\n\\nofficial who has relevant expertise and a formal role as the Boardβs advisor is enough to\\n\\nraise a plausible suspicion of improper motive.\\n\\n As Defendants rightly point out, the neighborsβ remarks before the ALJ and the\\n\\nBoardβs disagreement with the County Director occurred well before the Board decided\\n\\nto dismiss the second petition. But these events are part of the sequence that led to the\\n\\nchallenged decision, and Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that they influenced it. This\\n\\nconnection is strengthened by the neighborsβ ongoing involvement in the dispute, right up\\n\\nthrough the dismissal of the second petition.\\n\\n The second irregularity occurred when the Board granted the neighborsβ motion to\\n\\ndismiss the second petition, contrary to the position of the Peopleβs Counsel (a County\\n\\nofficial). The Peopleβs Counsel initially sought dismissal based on res judicata and\\n\\ncollateral estoppel, but later abandoned this posture. The neighbors continued to seek\\n\\ndismissal on these grounds, and the Board adopted their position. This second\\n\\nirregularity adds further plausibility to the inference that Defendants dismissed the\\n\\nsecond petition based on improper motives.\\n\\n We express no opinion on whether the neighborsβ animus ultimately swayed the\\n\\nBoardβs decision to dismiss the second petition. Rather, we conclude only that the\\n\\ncomplaint plausibly alleges a prima facie claim of religious discrimination.\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\f C.\\n\\n Plaintiffs also appeal the district courtβs dismissal of their First Amendment free\\n\\nexercise claim and their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, in which they\\n\\nallege (as in their RLUIPA claims) that Defendants substantially burdened their religious\\n\\nexercise and discriminated against them on the basis of religion.\\n\\n We first must determine the correct standard of review. Under the Supreme\\n\\nCourtβs free exercise doctrine, a neutral government decision of general applicability is\\n\\nsubject to rational basis review, even where it has the incidental effect of burdening\\n\\nreligious exercise. Empβt Div., Depβt of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).\\n\\nHowever, a decision whose object βis to infringe upon or restrict practices because of\\n\\ntheir religious motivationβ is not neutral and is subject to strict scrutiny. Church of the\\n\\nLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 546 (1993). As we\\n\\nexplained in Section II.B, Plaintiffs have alleged that the object of the Boardβs decision\\n\\nwas to restrict their use of the Property in response to community opposition to the\\n\\nChurchβs religious denomination. This allegedly discriminatory motive triggers strict\\n\\nscrutiny.\\n\\n Similarly, we apply strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause where (as\\n\\nhere) the challenged action interferes with a fundamental right. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760\\n\\nF.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978)).\\n\\nAnd β[u]nquestionably, the free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional\\n\\nright.β Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); see also Reaching Hearts\\n\\nIntβl, Inc. v. Prince Georgeβs County, 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781 n.9 (D. Md. 2008) (citing\\n\\n 17\\n\\fJohnson v. Robison in applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection claim based on\\n\\nreligious discrimination).\\n\\n A government decision fails strict scrutiny if it is not narrowly tailored to advance\\n\\na compelling state interest. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546. While Baltimore\\n\\nCounty may have a significant interest in finality and economy that would ordinarily be\\n\\nserved by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the dismissal of Wareβs\\n\\nsecond petition isnβt narrowly tailored to serve that interest because the second petition\\n\\ndidnβt seek to revisit the Boardβs decision about the first petition. We therefore vacate\\n\\nthe dismissal of their free exercise and equal protection claims.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Finally, Plaintiffs brought a claim under Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of\\n\\nRights, which protects freedom of religion at the state level. The district court had\\n\\nsupplemental jurisdiction over this state constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(a)\\n\\nbecause it formed part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiffsβ federal claims.\\n\\nHowever, after dismissing the federal claims, the district court exercised its discretion\\n\\nunder 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(3) to dismiss the state constitutional claim. 5 Given our\\n\\ndecision on Plaintiffsβ federal claims, Β§ 1367(c)(3) no longer provides a basis for\\n\\ndismissing the state constitutional claim. We therefore vacate the dismissal of the state\\n\\n 5\\n The district court also noted that Maryland state law is unsettled regarding\\nwhether Article 36 provides a private cause of action. However, the court didnβt\\nexpressly invoke 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(1), which authorizes it to decline to exercise\\nsupplemental jurisdiction over claims that raise novel or complex issues of state law. We\\nexpress no opinion about whether dismissal under Β§ 1367(c)(1) is appropriate on remand.\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\fconstitutional claim and remand so that the district court may decide whether to retain\\n\\nsupplemental jurisdiction over it.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district courtβs judgment and remand for\\n\\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n VACATED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 19\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4370856/\", \"author_raw\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NIEMEYER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"AGEE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DIAZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"NIEMEYER\": \", Circuit\", \"AGEE\": \", Circuit\", \"DIAZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593603/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Jesus Christ is the Answer v. Baltimore County, Maryland\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-25\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1450\n\n\nJESUS CHRIST IS THE ANSWER MINISTRIES, INC.; REV. LUCY WARE,\n\n Plaintiffs β Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nBALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND; BOARD OF APPEALS OF\nBALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,\n\n Defendants β Appellees.\n\n------------------------------\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Amicus Supporting Appellants.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.\nRichard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:17-cv-03010-RDB)\n\n\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 7, 2019\n Amended: February 25, 2019\n\n\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which\nJudge Niemeyer and Judge Agee joined.\n\fARGUED: Roman P. Storzer, STORZER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Washington, D.C.,\nfor Appellants. James Joseph Nolan, Jr., Paul M. Mayhew, BALTIMORE COUNTY\nOFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. John Matthew Gore, UNITED\nSTATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus United States of\nAmerica. ON BRIEF: Sieglinde K. Rath, STORZER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,\nWashington, D.C.; Lawrence E. Schmidt, SMITH GILDEA & SCHMIDT LLC, Towson,\nMaryland, for Appellants. Michael E. Field, County Attorney, R. Brady Locher,\nAssistant County Attorney, BALTIMORE COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Towson,\nMaryland, for Appellees. Tovah R. Calderon, Katherine E. Lamm, Appellate Section,\nCivil Rights Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,\nD.C., for Amicus United States of America.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\n\n Jesus Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. (the βChurchβ) and Reverend Lucy\n\nWare appeal the dismissal of their claims against Baltimore County and the Board of\n\nAppeals of Baltimore County. The district court dismissed Plaintiffsβ suit for failure to\n\nstate a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act\n\n(βRLUIPAβ), 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc et seq., the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection\n\nClause, and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. For the reasons that\n\nfollow, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n A.\n\n Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries, Inc. is a nondenominational Christian\n\nchurch founded in Baltimore in 1997 by Reverend Lucy Ware. 1 The Church describes\n\nitself as evangelical and multicultural. It has associated churches in Kenya and the\n\nSeychelles, and many of the Churchβs congregants were born in Africa. Reverend Ware\n\nwas born in Kenya, where she was active in her family church until moving to the United\n\nStates.\n\n The Church has struggled to secure an adequate house of worship, and this has\n\nimpeded its religious mission. This lawsuit arises from Wareβs unsuccessful efforts to\n\n 1\n Our recitation of the facts is based on the allegations in Plaintiffsβ complaint,\nwhich we accept as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,\n178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).\n\n\n 3\n\fobtain County approval to operate a church on property that she purchased for that\n\npurpose in 2012 (the βPropertyβ).\n\n The Property consists of 1.2 acres of land with a building previously used as a\n\ndwelling. It is zoned under the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations (βBCZRβ) as\n\nβDensity Residential 3.5.β\n\n In this zone, churches are permitted as of right subject to certain conditions,\n\nincluding that parking lots and structures are (1) set back 75 feet from tract boundaries,\n\nand (2) separated from adjacent lots by a 50-foot landscaped buffer. BCZR\n\n§§ 1B01.1.A.3, 1B01.1.B.1.e. These conditions, however, donβt apply to new churches\n\nwhose site plans have been approved after a public hearing finding that compliance with\n\nthe conditions will be maintained βto the extent possible,β and that the plan βcan\n\notherwise be expected to be compatible with the character and general welfare of the\n\nsurrounding residential premises.β Id. Β§ 1B01.1.B.1.g.(6).\n\n Before Ware purchased the Property, her realtor advised her that a church was a\n\npermitted use on the Property.\n\n After buying the Property, Ware made improvements to the building and parking\n\nlot and held a church service and cookout. Neighbors complained to the County, and a\n\nCounty inspector notified Ware that she couldnβt use the Property as a church unless she\n\ncomplied with applicable zoning requirements.\n\n Ware filed a petition with the County to approve use of the Property as a church.\n\nThe petition proposed a buffer and setback of zero feet, seeking complete relief from the\n\nzoning requirements. It also sought variances from parking requirements. The County\n\n 4\n\fDirector of the Department of Planning did not oppose the petition, βprovided a\n\nlandscape and signage plan is submitted to the department for review and approval.β J.A.\n\n19 ΒΆ 105. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (βALJβ). Neighbors\n\nwho opposed the petition attended and participated.\n\n At the hearing, several neighbors made comments displaying open hostility to\n\nWare and the Church. These comments included: (1) βdancing and hollering like they\n\nback at their home back in Africa somewhereβ; (2) β[s]he can come over here from\n\nAfrica . . . branch out from another church and put all of this in our neighborhoodβ; and\n\n(3) β[t]hey were out here dancing like from Africa. We donβt have that in our block.β\n\nJ.A. 19 ΒΆ 108. Since the hearing, neighbors have subjected the Church and its members\n\nto a sustained barrage of harassment, including racial slurs. The Property has also been\n\nsubject to vandalism and theft.\n\n The ALJ recommended denying Wareβs petition. Ware appealed this\n\nrecommendation to the Board of Appeals. The Board denied the petition, finding that\n\nβthe proposed Church does not even minimally complyβ with the applicable zoning\n\nrequirements and that the plan would not be compatible with βthe character or general\n\nwelfare of the surrounding homes which homes are occupied by the [neighbors] who\n\ntestified.β J.A. 57. The Boardβs decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court for\n\nBaltimore County and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Ware v. Peopleβs\n\nCounsel, 117 A.3d 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).\n\n While the first petition was pending appeal, Ware filed a second petition. This\n\nnew petition included a modified site plan that (1) moved the parking lot to increase the\n\n 5\n\fsetback to 55β72.7 feet and the buffer to 50 feet, and (2) did not seek any parking\n\nvariances. The new petition also differed from its predecessor in that it sought approval\n\nnot only under the zoning provision governing new churches, but also under a separate\n\nprovision governing existing churches.\n\n The Peopleβs Counsel (a county official) initially sought dismissal of the new\n\npetition, on the ground that it sought essentially the same relief as its predecessor. The\n\nneighbors who opposed the first petition adopted the Peopleβs Counselβs motion to\n\ndismiss. But the Peopleβs Counsel subsequently withdrew his motion based on the\n\ndifferences between the two petitions. Nevertheless, the neighbors continued to pursue\n\ndismissal. The Board granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the new petition was\n\nbarred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.\n\n B.\n\n Ware and the Church then filed suit in federal district court, alleging that the\n\nBoardβs dismissal of the second petition violated RLUIPAβs substantial burden and\n\nnondiscrimination provisions, the First Amendmentβs Free Exercise Clause, the\n\nFourteenth Amendmentβs Equal Protection Clause, and Article 36 of the Maryland\n\nDeclaration of Rights, which protects freedom of religion at the state level. The district\n\ncourt dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n We review the district courtβs dismissal order de novo, accepting as true the facts\n\nalleged in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffsβ favor, to\n\n 6\n\fdetermine whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a claim that is\n\nβplausible on its face.β Kensington Volunteer Fire Depβt, Inc. v. Montgomery County,\n\n684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570\n\n(2007)).\n\n A.\n\n We begin with Plaintiffsβ claim that Defendants substantially burdened their\n\nreligious exercise, in violation of RLUIPA, by dismissing the second petition. 2 We agree\n\nwith the Plaintiffs that the district court erred in dismissing this claim.\n\n RLUIPA prohibits land use regulations that impose a βsubstantial burdenβ on\n\nreligious practice, unless they are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling\n\ngovernmental interest. 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(a)(1). A substantial burden exists where a\n\nregulation βputs substantial pressure on [the plaintiff] to modify its behavior.β Bethel\n\nWorld Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 556 (4th Cir.\n\n2013).\n\n As relevant here, land use regulations can substantially burden religious exercise\n\nwhere an organization acquires property expecting to use it for a religious purpose but is\n\n\n 2\n Defendants argue, for the first time on appeal, that the Church canβt bring an\nRLUIPA claim because it doesnβt own the Property (Ware does). This argument doesnβt\nimplicate any jurisdictional issue such as the Churchβs constitutional standing. Instead, it\nconcerns whether a regulation affecting the Church fits within RLUIPAβs definition of\nβland use regulation.β See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-5(5). Because Defendantsβ argument\ndoesnβt call our subject matter jurisdiction into question or implicate βexceptional\ncircumstances,β we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. Muth v. United\nStates, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).\n\n\n 7\n\fprevented from doing so by the application of a zoning ordinance. In such a case, two\n\nquestions are usually relevant to determining whether RLUIPA has been violated.\n\n First, is the impediment to the organizationβs religious practice substantial? The\n\nanswer will usually be βyesβ where use of the property would serve an unmet religious\n\nneed, the restriction on religious use is absolute rather than conditional, and the\n\norganization must acquire a different property as a result. See Bethel, 706 F.3d at 557β\n\n58.\n\n Second, who is responsible for the impedimentβthe government, or the religious\n\norganization? In answering this question, we have considered whether the organization\n\nhad a βreasonable expectationβ of religious land use, see Bethel, 706 F.3d at 558, and\n\nwhether the burden faced by the organization is βself-imposed,β see Andon, LLC v. City\n\nof Newport News, 813 F.3d 510, 515 (4th Cir. 2016).\n\n In this case there is little dispute that the impediment is substantial, since the\n\nChurch is barred from using the Property, so the district court sensibly focused on the\n\nsecond question: Are Plaintiffs responsible for their present inability to use the Property\n\nas a church? But in addressing this question, the court wrongly emphasized Plaintiffsβ\n\npurported βfailure to exercise due diligence before acquiring and altering the propertyβ\n\nand their βsubsequent proposal [in Wareβs first petition] of a site plan that disregarded the\n\nzoning requirements.β Jesus Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore County,\n\n303 F. Supp. 3d 378, 396 (D. Md. 2018). The first of these supposed failings is irrelevant\n\nto whether the zoning regulations in fact authorize Plaintiffs to use the Property as a\n\nchurch. And the second is irrelevant to whether Plaintiffs were responsible for the\n\n 8\n\fdismissal of Wareβs second petition, which is what now stands in the way of their\n\nreligious practice.\n\n Ware sufficiently alleged that she had a reasonable expectation of using the\n\nProperty as a church. Her realtor told her that such a use was permitted on the Property.\n\nThis advice was of course correct because churches are βpermitted as of right,β provided\n\nthat their site plans comply βto the extent possible with [applicable] requirementsβ and\n\ncan βotherwise be expected to be compatible with the character and general welfare of the\n\nsurrounding residential premises.β BCZR §§ 1B01.1.A.3, 1B01.1.B.1.g.(6). Ware was\n\njustified in believing that she could satisfy these broadly and permissibly phrased\n\nconditions, especially given that the zoning regulations permit churches as of right.\n\n Wareβs efforts to meet the zoning conditions were frustrated, however, when the\n\nBoard dismissed her second petition. As the district court recognized, the second petition\n\nwas based on a site plan that substantially differed from and attempted to address the\n\nshortcomings of its predecessor. The Board failed to recognize these differences when it\n\ndismissed the petition based on res judicata and collateral estoppel, relying on the faulty\n\npremise that the two petitions sought essentially the same relief.\n\n The district court declined to dismiss Plaintiffsβ suit on grounds of res judicata and\n\ncollateral estoppel, but nonetheless determined that the Board correctly dismissed the\n\nsecond petition on these grounds. The court explained this anomaly by noting that Ware\n\nadvanced different bases for distinguishing the two petitions before the Board and the\n\ndistrict court. Specifically, the Board took the βreal thrustβ of Wareβs argument to be that\n\nthe second petition invoked a different subsection of the zoning regulations than the first.\n\n 9\n\fJ.A. 125. Before the district court, however, Plaintiffs emphasized the differences\n\nbetween the site plans accompanying the two petitions.\n\n We are not persuaded by the district courtβs reasoning. First, Ware did highlight\n\nthe differences between the site plans in the administrative proceedings. See J.A. 90,\n\n106β10, 113. It was the Board (not Ware) that decided the βreal thrustβ of Wareβs\n\nargument was the different zoning provisions invoked by the two petitions. Second, and\n\nmore importantly, the two site plans are in fact markedly different. The second plan\n\naddressed the first oneβs main deficiencies by moving the parking lot to the center of the\n\nProperty. This increased the landscaped buffer from zero to 50 feet, which fully\n\ncomplied with the buffer requirements. The second plan also increased the parking lotβs\n\nsetback from zero to between 55 and 72.7 feet, which complied to a much greater extent\n\n(and arguably βto the extent possibleβ) with the 75-foot setback requirement. In light of\n\nthese substantial changes and improvements, we cannot say that the dismissal of Wareβs\n\nsecond petition was self-imposed.\n\n Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the dismissal of the second petition\n\nimposed a substantial burden on their religious practice. We therefore vacate the district\n\ncourtβs dismissal of Plaintiffsβ substantial burden claim. 3\n\n\n 3\n The district court did not reach RLUIPAβs second prong, which considers\nwhether, despite substantially burdening religious exercise, a government action βis the\nleast restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.β 42 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 2000ccβ1. As we discuss, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that dismissal of the\nsecond petition was motivated by religious animus. Such animus is not a permissible\ngovernment interest, much less a compelling one. And the dismissal wasnβt narrowly\ntailored to further the finality interests that are normally served by res judicata and\n(Continued)\n 10\n\f B.\n\n Next, we consider the Churchβs claim that Defendants discriminated against it\n\nbased on religion or religious denomination in violation of RLUIPA. 4 The district court\n\ndismissed this claim, concluding that the Church failed to allege that the Board approved\n\nspecial exceptions to the zoning regulations for similarly situated churches or that its\n\ndecision was influenced by discriminatory intent.\n\n The Church argues that the district court erred by ignoring allegations that the\n\nβBoard was knowingly responsive to a hostile communityβ of bigoted neighbors. J.A. 8\n\nΒΆ 5. Defendants respond that the neighborsβ discriminatory remarks canβt be attributed to\n\nthem, and that the remarks couldnβt have influenced the decision to dismiss the second\n\npetition because they were allegedly made during the hearing on the first petition.\n\n RLUIPA prohibits land use regulations that discriminate βon the basis of religion\n\nor religious denomination.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(b)(2). In applying RLUIPAβs\n\nnondiscrimination provision, courts have looked to equal protection precedent. Chabad\n\nLubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Commβn, 768 F.3d 183, 198\n\n\n\n\ncollateral estoppel because the second petition substantially differed from the first.\nTherefore, RLUIPAβs second prong poses no barrier to Plaintiffsβ substantial burden\nclaim at this stage of the case.\n 4\n The complaint alleges religious discrimination against both the Church and\nWare. J.A. 32 ΒΆ 203. However, RLUIPAβs nondiscrimination provision applies only to\nregulations that discriminate against βany assembly or institution.β 42 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 2000cc(b)(2). The district court was therefore correct to dismiss Wareβs\nnondiscrimination claim.\n\n\n 11\n\f(2d Cir. 2014) (citing Bethel, 706 F.3d at 559). Under that precedent, a plaintiff must\n\ndemonstrate that the government decision was motivated at least in part by discriminatory\n\nintent, which is evaluated using the βsensitive inquiryβ established in Village of Arlington\n\nHeights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266β68 (1977).\n\n One factor which this inquiry recognizes as potentially probative of the\n\ndecisionmakerβs intent is the βspecific sequence of events leading up to the challenged\n\ndecision.β Id. at 267. Departures from normal procedures can suggest that the decision\n\nwas based on unlawful motives, as can β[s]ubstantive departures . . . particularly if the\n\nfactors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision\n\ncontrary to the one reached.β Id. (citing Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1040\n\n(10th Cir. 1970) (finding racial motivation where a city refused to rezone a plot despite\n\npresent and former city planning directorsβ testimony that there was no reason not to\n\nrezone)).\n\n Particularly relevant to this case, a government decision influenced by community\n\nmembersβ religious bias is unlawful, even if the government decisionmakers display no\n\nbias themselves. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985);\n\nMarks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311β13 (4th Cir. 1989). Such impermissible\n\ninfluence may be inferred where expressions of community bias are followed by\n\nirregularities in government decision-making. See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d\n\n1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982).\n\n Under RLUIPA, a plaintiff need only establish a prima facie claim of religious\n\ndiscrimination, after which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on all elements\n\n 12\n\fof the claim. 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-2(b); Chabad Lubavitch, 768 F.3d at 198. And as with\n\nall claims, at the motion to dismiss stage βa plaintiff need not demonstrate that her right\n\nto relief is probable or that alternative explanations are less likely; rather, she must\n\nmerely advance her claim βacross the line from conceivable to plausible.ββ Houck v.\n\nSubstitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.\n\nat 570). So long as a plaintiff alleges a plausible prima facie claim of discrimination, a\n\ncourt may not dismiss that claimβeven if the defendant advances a nondiscriminatory\n\nalternative explanation for its decision, and even if that alternative appears more\n\nprobable. Id.; see Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 649 (4th Cir. 2017) (βThe\n\nquestion is not whether there are more likely explanations for the Cityβs action . . . but\n\nwhether the Cityβs impliedly proffered reason . . . is so obviously an irrefutably sound\n\nand unambiguously nondiscriminatory and non-pretextual explanation that it renders [the\n\nplaintiffβs] claim of pretext implausible.β).\n\n The district court reasoned that the complaint failed to allege disparate treatment\n\nbecause other churches that ultimately received approval are situated on larger lots and\n\nhave sufficient space for parking. However, RLUIPAβs nondiscrimination provision\n\ndoesnβt require a comparison to similarly situated entities. Chabad Lubavitch, 768 F.3d\n\nat 199. The Church has alleged that the Boardβs dismissal of Wareβs second petition was\n\nmotivated by religious discrimination. This is enough to make out a prima facie claim of\n\nreligious discrimination, provided that the Church can establish discriminatory intent.\n\n In this case, the alleged sequence of events leading to the challenged decision is\n\nhighly probative of Defendantsβ motives. It is especially significant that irregularities in\n\n 13\n\fDefendantsβ decision-making process followed the neighborsβ expressions of animus.\n\nSee Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1066 (describing a townβs unprecedented use of an\n\nopinion poll following expressions of racial opposition to a public housing project as a\n\nβsignificantβ and βsuspectβ deviation from the procedural norm).\n\n The first irregularity occurred when the Board denied Wareβs first petition even\n\nthough the County Director of the Department of Planning didnβt oppose it. The\n\nneighbors who opposed the first petition allegedly made bigoted remarks in the hearing\n\nbefore the ALJ, and seven neighbors also testified during the Boardβs hearing on the first\n\npetition.\n\n In our view, the neighborsβ remarks clearly display ethnic bias, and they can\n\nplausibly be understood as displaying religious bias too. We recognize that RLUIPA by\n\nits terms prohibits discrimination βon the basis of religion or religious denomination.β 42\n\nU.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(b)(2). But we do not attempt to disentangle Plaintiffsβ allegations of\n\nreligious and ethnic bias, at least at the motion to dismiss stage where we must view the\n\nalleged facts in Plaintiffsβ favor.\n\n The remarks targeted (1) Wareβs African heritage and that of other congregants,\n\n(2) a Church gathering that (according to the neighbors) involved βdancingβ and\n\nβhollering,β and (3) the fact that the Church βbranch[ed] out from another church.β J.A.\n\n19 ΒΆ 108. The first of these topics targets the Churchβs multicultural identity. The\n\nsecond targets activities conducted at Church gatherings, which we may infer involved\n\nreligious exercise as defined in RLUIPA. See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-5(7). The third targets\n\n\n\n 14\n\fthe Churchβs connection to other churches and denominationsβa paradigm example of\n\nreligious bias.\n\n Plaintiffs also alleged that they βhave faced tremendous opposition based on the\n\nnature of their ministry and the ethnic background of Reverend Ware and the\n\ncongregationβ and βtheir status as African immigrants.β J.A. 27 ΒΆ 166β67. Though the\n\nChurch is expressly βnondenominational,β J.A. 9 ΒΆ 15, and has no religious affiliation\n\nexcept its βassociat[ion with] churches in Kenya and the Seychelles,β J.A. 10 ΒΆ 18,\n\nPlaintiffsβ other allegations are drafted in such a way that we can infer their religious\n\npractice is tied to their ethnicity.\n\n Accordingly, when we draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiffsβ favor and consider\n\nRLUIPAβs βvery broad protection for religious liberty,β Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853,\n\n859 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), we are convinced that, as alleged, the\n\nneighbors displayed the behavior Congress sought to eradicate from zoning decisions.\n\nRLUIPA is designed to protect β[c]hurches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar\n\nchurches in particular, [from being] frequently discriminated againstβ in land use\n\nregulation, including when βzoning board members or neighborhood residents explicitly\n\noffer race or religion as the reason to exclude a proposed church, especially in cases of\n\nblack churches and Jewish shuls and synagogues.β 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (July 27,\n\n2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).\n\n Following the neighborsβ remarks, the Board denied the petition. Although the\n\nCounty Directorβs statement that she didnβt oppose the petition doesnβt bind the Board, it\n\nis a βfactor[] usually considered importantβ in zoning proceedings, and it βstrongly\n\n 15\n\ffavor[s] a decision contrary to the one reachedβ by the Board. Arlington Heights, 429\n\nU.S. at 267. And although Plaintiffs didnβt allege how often the Board departs from the\n\nCounty Directorβs recommendations, the fact that the Board disagreed with a County\n\nofficial who has relevant expertise and a formal role as the Boardβs advisor is enough to\n\nraise a plausible suspicion of improper motive.\n\n As Defendants rightly point out, the neighborsβ remarks before the ALJ and the\n\nBoardβs disagreement with the County Director occurred well before the Board decided\n\nto dismiss the second petition. But these events are part of the sequence that led to the\n\nchallenged decision, and Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that they influenced it. This\n\nconnection is strengthened by the neighborsβ ongoing involvement in the dispute, right up\n\nthrough the dismissal of the second petition.\n\n The second irregularity occurred when the Board granted the neighborsβ motion to\n\ndismiss the second petition, contrary to the position of the Peopleβs Counsel (a County\n\nofficial). The Peopleβs Counsel initially sought dismissal based on res judicata and\n\ncollateral estoppel, but later abandoned this posture. The neighbors continued to seek\n\ndismissal on these grounds, and the Board adopted their position. This second\n\nirregularity adds further plausibility to the inference that Defendants dismissed the\n\nsecond petition based on improper motives.\n\n We express no opinion on whether the neighborsβ animus ultimately swayed the\n\nBoardβs decision to dismiss the second petition. Rather, we conclude only that the\n\ncomplaint plausibly alleges a prima facie claim of religious discrimination.\n\n\n\n 16\n\f C.\n\n Plaintiffs also appeal the district courtβs dismissal of their First Amendment free\n\nexercise claim and their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, in which they\n\nallege (as in their RLUIPA claims) that Defendants substantially burdened their religious\n\nexercise and discriminated against them on the basis of religion.\n\n We first must determine the correct standard of review. Under the Supreme\n\nCourtβs free exercise doctrine, a neutral government decision of general applicability is\n\nsubject to rational basis review, even where it has the incidental effect of burdening\n\nreligious exercise. Empβt Div., Depβt of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).\n\nHowever, a decision whose object βis to infringe upon or restrict practices because of\n\ntheir religious motivationβ is not neutral and is subject to strict scrutiny. Church of the\n\nLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 546 (1993). As we\n\nexplained in Section II.B, Plaintiffs have alleged that the object of the Boardβs decision\n\nwas to restrict their use of the Property in response to community opposition to the\n\nChurchβs religious denomination. This allegedly discriminatory motive triggers strict\n\nscrutiny.\n\n Similarly, we apply strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause where (as\n\nhere) the challenged action interferes with a fundamental right. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760\n\nF.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978)).\n\nAnd β[u]nquestionably, the free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional\n\nright.β Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); see also Reaching Hearts\n\nIntβl, Inc. v. Prince Georgeβs County, 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781 n.9 (D. Md. 2008) (citing\n\n 17\n\fJohnson v. Robison in applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection claim based on\n\nreligious discrimination).\n\n A government decision fails strict scrutiny if it is not narrowly tailored to advance\n\na compelling state interest. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546. While Baltimore\n\nCounty may have a significant interest in finality and economy that would ordinarily be\n\nserved by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the dismissal of Wareβs\n\nsecond petition isnβt narrowly tailored to serve that interest because the second petition\n\ndidnβt seek to revisit the Boardβs decision about the first petition. We therefore vacate\n\nthe dismissal of their free exercise and equal protection claims.\n\n D.\n\n Finally, Plaintiffs brought a claim under Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of\n\nRights, which protects freedom of religion at the state level. The district court had\n\nsupplemental jurisdiction over this state constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(a)\n\nbecause it formed part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiffsβ federal claims.\n\nHowever, after dismissing the federal claims, the district court exercised its discretion\n\nunder 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(3) to dismiss the state constitutional claim. 5 Given our\n\ndecision on Plaintiffsβ federal claims, Β§ 1367(c)(3) no longer provides a basis for\n\ndismissing the state constitutional claim. We therefore vacate the dismissal of the state\n\n 5\n The district court also noted that Maryland state law is unsettled regarding\nwhether Article 36 provides a private cause of action. However, the court didnβt\nexpressly invoke 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(1), which authorizes it to decline to exercise\nsupplemental jurisdiction over claims that raise novel or complex issues of state law. We\nexpress no opinion about whether dismissal under Β§ 1367(c)(1) is appropriate on remand.\n\n\n 18\n\fconstitutional claim and remand so that the district court may decide whether to retain\n\nsupplemental jurisdiction over it.\n\n\n\n III.\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district courtβs judgment and remand for\n\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n VACATED AND REMANDED\n\n\n\n\n 19\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Jesus Christ is the Answer v. Baltimore County, Maryland\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-25\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1450\\n\\n\\nJESUS CHRIST IS THE ANSWER MINISTRIES, INC.; REV. LUCY WARE,\\n\\n Plaintiffs β Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nBALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND; BOARD OF APPEALS OF\\nBALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,\\n\\n Defendants β Appellees.\\n\\n------------------------------\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Amicus Supporting Appellants.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.\\nRichard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:17-cv-03010-RDB)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 7, 2019\\n Amended: February 25, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which\\nJudge Niemeyer and Judge Agee joined.\\n\\fARGUED: Roman P. Storzer, STORZER & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Washington, D.C.,\\nfor Appellants. James Joseph Nolan, Jr., Paul M. Mayhew, BALTIMORE COUNTY\\nOFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellees. John Matthew Gore, UNITED\\nSTATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus United States of\\nAmerica. ON BRIEF: Sieglinde K. Rath, STORZER & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,\\nWashington, D.C.; Lawrence E. Schmidt, SMITH GILDEA & SCHMIDT LLC, Towson,\\nMaryland, for Appellants. Michael E. Field, County Attorney, R. Brady Locher,\\nAssistant County Attorney, BALTIMORE COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Towson,\\nMaryland, for Appellees. Tovah R. Calderon, Katherine E. Lamm, Appellate Section,\\nCivil Rights Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,\\nD.C., for Amicus United States of America.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Jesus Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. (the βChurchβ) and Reverend Lucy\\n\\nWare appeal the dismissal of their claims against Baltimore County and the Board of\\n\\nAppeals of Baltimore County. The district court dismissed Plaintiffsβ suit for failure to\\n\\nstate a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act\\n\\n(βRLUIPAβ), 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc et seq., the Free Exercise Clause, the Equal Protection\\n\\nClause, and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. For the reasons that\\n\\nfollow, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries, Inc. is a nondenominational Christian\\n\\nchurch founded in Baltimore in 1997 by Reverend Lucy Ware. 1 The Church describes\\n\\nitself as evangelical and multicultural. It has associated churches in Kenya and the\\n\\nSeychelles, and many of the Churchβs congregants were born in Africa. Reverend Ware\\n\\nwas born in Kenya, where she was active in her family church until moving to the United\\n\\nStates.\\n\\n The Church has struggled to secure an adequate house of worship, and this has\\n\\nimpeded its religious mission. This lawsuit arises from Wareβs unsuccessful efforts to\\n\\n 1\\n Our recitation of the facts is based on the allegations in Plaintiffsβ complaint,\\nwhich we accept as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,\\n178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999).\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\fobtain County approval to operate a church on property that she purchased for that\\n\\npurpose in 2012 (the βPropertyβ).\\n\\n The Property consists of 1.2 acres of land with a building previously used as a\\n\\ndwelling. It is zoned under the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations (βBCZRβ) as\\n\\nβDensity Residential 3.5.β\\n\\n In this zone, churches are permitted as of right subject to certain conditions,\\n\\nincluding that parking lots and structures are (1) set back 75 feet from tract boundaries,\\n\\nand (2) separated from adjacent lots by a 50-foot landscaped buffer. BCZR\\n\\n§§ 1B01.1.A.3, 1B01.1.B.1.e. These conditions, however, donβt apply to new churches\\n\\nwhose site plans have been approved after a public hearing finding that compliance with\\n\\nthe conditions will be maintained βto the extent possible,β and that the plan βcan\\n\\notherwise be expected to be compatible with the character and general welfare of the\\n\\nsurrounding residential premises.β Id. Β§ 1B01.1.B.1.g.(6).\\n\\n Before Ware purchased the Property, her realtor advised her that a church was a\\n\\npermitted use on the Property.\\n\\n After buying the Property, Ware made improvements to the building and parking\\n\\nlot and held a church service and cookout. Neighbors complained to the County, and a\\n\\nCounty inspector notified Ware that she couldnβt use the Property as a church unless she\\n\\ncomplied with applicable zoning requirements.\\n\\n Ware filed a petition with the County to approve use of the Property as a church.\\n\\nThe petition proposed a buffer and setback of zero feet, seeking complete relief from the\\n\\nzoning requirements. It also sought variances from parking requirements. The County\\n\\n 4\\n\\fDirector of the Department of Planning did not oppose the petition, βprovided a\\n\\nlandscape and signage plan is submitted to the department for review and approval.β J.A.\\n\\n19 ΒΆ 105. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (βALJβ). Neighbors\\n\\nwho opposed the petition attended and participated.\\n\\n At the hearing, several neighbors made comments displaying open hostility to\\n\\nWare and the Church. These comments included: (1) βdancing and hollering like they\\n\\nback at their home back in Africa somewhereβ; (2) β[s]he can come over here from\\n\\nAfrica . . . branch out from another church and put all of this in our neighborhoodβ; and\\n\\n(3) β[t]hey were out here dancing like from Africa. We donβt have that in our block.β\\n\\nJ.A. 19 ΒΆ 108. Since the hearing, neighbors have subjected the Church and its members\\n\\nto a sustained barrage of harassment, including racial slurs. The Property has also been\\n\\nsubject to vandalism and theft.\\n\\n The ALJ recommended denying Wareβs petition. Ware appealed this\\n\\nrecommendation to the Board of Appeals. The Board denied the petition, finding that\\n\\nβthe proposed Church does not even minimally complyβ with the applicable zoning\\n\\nrequirements and that the plan would not be compatible with βthe character or general\\n\\nwelfare of the surrounding homes which homes are occupied by the [neighbors] who\\n\\ntestified.β J.A. 57. The Boardβs decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court for\\n\\nBaltimore County and the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Ware v. Peopleβs\\n\\nCounsel, 117 A.3d 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).\\n\\n While the first petition was pending appeal, Ware filed a second petition. This\\n\\nnew petition included a modified site plan that (1) moved the parking lot to increase the\\n\\n 5\\n\\fsetback to 55β72.7 feet and the buffer to 50 feet, and (2) did not seek any parking\\n\\nvariances. The new petition also differed from its predecessor in that it sought approval\\n\\nnot only under the zoning provision governing new churches, but also under a separate\\n\\nprovision governing existing churches.\\n\\n The Peopleβs Counsel (a county official) initially sought dismissal of the new\\n\\npetition, on the ground that it sought essentially the same relief as its predecessor. The\\n\\nneighbors who opposed the first petition adopted the Peopleβs Counselβs motion to\\n\\ndismiss. But the Peopleβs Counsel subsequently withdrew his motion based on the\\n\\ndifferences between the two petitions. Nevertheless, the neighbors continued to pursue\\n\\ndismissal. The Board granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the new petition was\\n\\nbarred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Ware and the Church then filed suit in federal district court, alleging that the\\n\\nBoardβs dismissal of the second petition violated RLUIPAβs substantial burden and\\n\\nnondiscrimination provisions, the First Amendmentβs Free Exercise Clause, the\\n\\nFourteenth Amendmentβs Equal Protection Clause, and Article 36 of the Maryland\\n\\nDeclaration of Rights, which protects freedom of religion at the state level. The district\\n\\ncourt dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. This appeal followed.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n We review the district courtβs dismissal order de novo, accepting as true the facts\\n\\nalleged in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffsβ favor, to\\n\\n 6\\n\\fdetermine whether the complaint contains facts sufficient to state a claim that is\\n\\nβplausible on its face.β Kensington Volunteer Fire Depβt, Inc. v. Montgomery County,\\n\\n684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570\\n\\n(2007)).\\n\\n A.\\n\\n We begin with Plaintiffsβ claim that Defendants substantially burdened their\\n\\nreligious exercise, in violation of RLUIPA, by dismissing the second petition. 2 We agree\\n\\nwith the Plaintiffs that the district court erred in dismissing this claim.\\n\\n RLUIPA prohibits land use regulations that impose a βsubstantial burdenβ on\\n\\nreligious practice, unless they are the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling\\n\\ngovernmental interest. 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(a)(1). A substantial burden exists where a\\n\\nregulation βputs substantial pressure on [the plaintiff] to modify its behavior.β Bethel\\n\\nWorld Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 706 F.3d 548, 556 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2013).\\n\\n As relevant here, land use regulations can substantially burden religious exercise\\n\\nwhere an organization acquires property expecting to use it for a religious purpose but is\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Defendants argue, for the first time on appeal, that the Church canβt bring an\\nRLUIPA claim because it doesnβt own the Property (Ware does). This argument doesnβt\\nimplicate any jurisdictional issue such as the Churchβs constitutional standing. Instead, it\\nconcerns whether a regulation affecting the Church fits within RLUIPAβs definition of\\nβland use regulation.β See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-5(5). Because Defendantsβ argument\\ndoesnβt call our subject matter jurisdiction into question or implicate βexceptional\\ncircumstances,β we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. Muth v. United\\nStates, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\fprevented from doing so by the application of a zoning ordinance. In such a case, two\\n\\nquestions are usually relevant to determining whether RLUIPA has been violated.\\n\\n First, is the impediment to the organizationβs religious practice substantial? The\\n\\nanswer will usually be βyesβ where use of the property would serve an unmet religious\\n\\nneed, the restriction on religious use is absolute rather than conditional, and the\\n\\norganization must acquire a different property as a result. See Bethel, 706 F.3d at 557β\\n\\n58.\\n\\n Second, who is responsible for the impedimentβthe government, or the religious\\n\\norganization? In answering this question, we have considered whether the organization\\n\\nhad a βreasonable expectationβ of religious land use, see Bethel, 706 F.3d at 558, and\\n\\nwhether the burden faced by the organization is βself-imposed,β see Andon, LLC v. City\\n\\nof Newport News, 813 F.3d 510, 515 (4th Cir. 2016).\\n\\n In this case there is little dispute that the impediment is substantial, since the\\n\\nChurch is barred from using the Property, so the district court sensibly focused on the\\n\\nsecond question: Are Plaintiffs responsible for their present inability to use the Property\\n\\nas a church? But in addressing this question, the court wrongly emphasized Plaintiffsβ\\n\\npurported βfailure to exercise due diligence before acquiring and altering the propertyβ\\n\\nand their βsubsequent proposal [in Wareβs first petition] of a site plan that disregarded the\\n\\nzoning requirements.β Jesus Christ Is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Baltimore County,\\n\\n303 F. Supp. 3d 378, 396 (D. Md. 2018). The first of these supposed failings is irrelevant\\n\\nto whether the zoning regulations in fact authorize Plaintiffs to use the Property as a\\n\\nchurch. And the second is irrelevant to whether Plaintiffs were responsible for the\\n\\n 8\\n\\fdismissal of Wareβs second petition, which is what now stands in the way of their\\n\\nreligious practice.\\n\\n Ware sufficiently alleged that she had a reasonable expectation of using the\\n\\nProperty as a church. Her realtor told her that such a use was permitted on the Property.\\n\\nThis advice was of course correct because churches are βpermitted as of right,β provided\\n\\nthat their site plans comply βto the extent possible with [applicable] requirementsβ and\\n\\ncan βotherwise be expected to be compatible with the character and general welfare of the\\n\\nsurrounding residential premises.β BCZR §§ 1B01.1.A.3, 1B01.1.B.1.g.(6). Ware was\\n\\njustified in believing that she could satisfy these broadly and permissibly phrased\\n\\nconditions, especially given that the zoning regulations permit churches as of right.\\n\\n Wareβs efforts to meet the zoning conditions were frustrated, however, when the\\n\\nBoard dismissed her second petition. As the district court recognized, the second petition\\n\\nwas based on a site plan that substantially differed from and attempted to address the\\n\\nshortcomings of its predecessor. The Board failed to recognize these differences when it\\n\\ndismissed the petition based on res judicata and collateral estoppel, relying on the faulty\\n\\npremise that the two petitions sought essentially the same relief.\\n\\n The district court declined to dismiss Plaintiffsβ suit on grounds of res judicata and\\n\\ncollateral estoppel, but nonetheless determined that the Board correctly dismissed the\\n\\nsecond petition on these grounds. The court explained this anomaly by noting that Ware\\n\\nadvanced different bases for distinguishing the two petitions before the Board and the\\n\\ndistrict court. Specifically, the Board took the βreal thrustβ of Wareβs argument to be that\\n\\nthe second petition invoked a different subsection of the zoning regulations than the first.\\n\\n 9\\n\\fJ.A. 125. Before the district court, however, Plaintiffs emphasized the differences\\n\\nbetween the site plans accompanying the two petitions.\\n\\n We are not persuaded by the district courtβs reasoning. First, Ware did highlight\\n\\nthe differences between the site plans in the administrative proceedings. See J.A. 90,\\n\\n106β10, 113. It was the Board (not Ware) that decided the βreal thrustβ of Wareβs\\n\\nargument was the different zoning provisions invoked by the two petitions. Second, and\\n\\nmore importantly, the two site plans are in fact markedly different. The second plan\\n\\naddressed the first oneβs main deficiencies by moving the parking lot to the center of the\\n\\nProperty. This increased the landscaped buffer from zero to 50 feet, which fully\\n\\ncomplied with the buffer requirements. The second plan also increased the parking lotβs\\n\\nsetback from zero to between 55 and 72.7 feet, which complied to a much greater extent\\n\\n(and arguably βto the extent possibleβ) with the 75-foot setback requirement. In light of\\n\\nthese substantial changes and improvements, we cannot say that the dismissal of Wareβs\\n\\nsecond petition was self-imposed.\\n\\n Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the dismissal of the second petition\\n\\nimposed a substantial burden on their religious practice. We therefore vacate the district\\n\\ncourtβs dismissal of Plaintiffsβ substantial burden claim. 3\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The district court did not reach RLUIPAβs second prong, which considers\\nwhether, despite substantially burdening religious exercise, a government action βis the\\nleast restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2000ccβ1. As we discuss, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that dismissal of the\\nsecond petition was motivated by religious animus. Such animus is not a permissible\\ngovernment interest, much less a compelling one. And the dismissal wasnβt narrowly\\ntailored to further the finality interests that are normally served by res judicata and\\n(Continued)\\n 10\\n\\f B.\\n\\n Next, we consider the Churchβs claim that Defendants discriminated against it\\n\\nbased on religion or religious denomination in violation of RLUIPA. 4 The district court\\n\\ndismissed this claim, concluding that the Church failed to allege that the Board approved\\n\\nspecial exceptions to the zoning regulations for similarly situated churches or that its\\n\\ndecision was influenced by discriminatory intent.\\n\\n The Church argues that the district court erred by ignoring allegations that the\\n\\nβBoard was knowingly responsive to a hostile communityβ of bigoted neighbors. J.A. 8\\n\\nΒΆ 5. Defendants respond that the neighborsβ discriminatory remarks canβt be attributed to\\n\\nthem, and that the remarks couldnβt have influenced the decision to dismiss the second\\n\\npetition because they were allegedly made during the hearing on the first petition.\\n\\n RLUIPA prohibits land use regulations that discriminate βon the basis of religion\\n\\nor religious denomination.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(b)(2). In applying RLUIPAβs\\n\\nnondiscrimination provision, courts have looked to equal protection precedent. Chabad\\n\\nLubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Commβn, 768 F.3d 183, 198\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ncollateral estoppel because the second petition substantially differed from the first.\\nTherefore, RLUIPAβs second prong poses no barrier to Plaintiffsβ substantial burden\\nclaim at this stage of the case.\\n 4\\n The complaint alleges religious discrimination against both the Church and\\nWare. J.A. 32 ΒΆ 203. However, RLUIPAβs nondiscrimination provision applies only to\\nregulations that discriminate against βany assembly or institution.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2000cc(b)(2). The district court was therefore correct to dismiss Wareβs\\nnondiscrimination claim.\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f(2d Cir. 2014) (citing Bethel, 706 F.3d at 559). Under that precedent, a plaintiff must\\n\\ndemonstrate that the government decision was motivated at least in part by discriminatory\\n\\nintent, which is evaluated using the βsensitive inquiryβ established in Village of Arlington\\n\\nHeights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266β68 (1977).\\n\\n One factor which this inquiry recognizes as potentially probative of the\\n\\ndecisionmakerβs intent is the βspecific sequence of events leading up to the challenged\\n\\ndecision.β Id. at 267. Departures from normal procedures can suggest that the decision\\n\\nwas based on unlawful motives, as can β[s]ubstantive departures . . . particularly if the\\n\\nfactors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a decision\\n\\ncontrary to the one reached.β Id. (citing Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1040\\n\\n(10th Cir. 1970) (finding racial motivation where a city refused to rezone a plot despite\\n\\npresent and former city planning directorsβ testimony that there was no reason not to\\n\\nrezone)).\\n\\n Particularly relevant to this case, a government decision influenced by community\\n\\nmembersβ religious bias is unlawful, even if the government decisionmakers display no\\n\\nbias themselves. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985);\\n\\nMarks v. City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308, 311β13 (4th Cir. 1989). Such impermissible\\n\\ninfluence may be inferred where expressions of community bias are followed by\\n\\nirregularities in government decision-making. See Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d\\n\\n1055, 1066 (4th Cir. 1982).\\n\\n Under RLUIPA, a plaintiff need only establish a prima facie claim of religious\\n\\ndiscrimination, after which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion on all elements\\n\\n 12\\n\\fof the claim. 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-2(b); Chabad Lubavitch, 768 F.3d at 198. And as with\\n\\nall claims, at the motion to dismiss stage βa plaintiff need not demonstrate that her right\\n\\nto relief is probable or that alternative explanations are less likely; rather, she must\\n\\nmerely advance her claim βacross the line from conceivable to plausible.ββ Houck v.\\n\\nSubstitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.\\n\\nat 570). So long as a plaintiff alleges a plausible prima facie claim of discrimination, a\\n\\ncourt may not dismiss that claimβeven if the defendant advances a nondiscriminatory\\n\\nalternative explanation for its decision, and even if that alternative appears more\\n\\nprobable. Id.; see Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 649 (4th Cir. 2017) (βThe\\n\\nquestion is not whether there are more likely explanations for the Cityβs action . . . but\\n\\nwhether the Cityβs impliedly proffered reason . . . is so obviously an irrefutably sound\\n\\nand unambiguously nondiscriminatory and non-pretextual explanation that it renders [the\\n\\nplaintiffβs] claim of pretext implausible.β).\\n\\n The district court reasoned that the complaint failed to allege disparate treatment\\n\\nbecause other churches that ultimately received approval are situated on larger lots and\\n\\nhave sufficient space for parking. However, RLUIPAβs nondiscrimination provision\\n\\ndoesnβt require a comparison to similarly situated entities. Chabad Lubavitch, 768 F.3d\\n\\nat 199. The Church has alleged that the Boardβs dismissal of Wareβs second petition was\\n\\nmotivated by religious discrimination. This is enough to make out a prima facie claim of\\n\\nreligious discrimination, provided that the Church can establish discriminatory intent.\\n\\n In this case, the alleged sequence of events leading to the challenged decision is\\n\\nhighly probative of Defendantsβ motives. It is especially significant that irregularities in\\n\\n 13\\n\\fDefendantsβ decision-making process followed the neighborsβ expressions of animus.\\n\\nSee Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1066 (describing a townβs unprecedented use of an\\n\\nopinion poll following expressions of racial opposition to a public housing project as a\\n\\nβsignificantβ and βsuspectβ deviation from the procedural norm).\\n\\n The first irregularity occurred when the Board denied Wareβs first petition even\\n\\nthough the County Director of the Department of Planning didnβt oppose it. The\\n\\nneighbors who opposed the first petition allegedly made bigoted remarks in the hearing\\n\\nbefore the ALJ, and seven neighbors also testified during the Boardβs hearing on the first\\n\\npetition.\\n\\n In our view, the neighborsβ remarks clearly display ethnic bias, and they can\\n\\nplausibly be understood as displaying religious bias too. We recognize that RLUIPA by\\n\\nits terms prohibits discrimination βon the basis of religion or religious denomination.β 42\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 2000cc(b)(2). But we do not attempt to disentangle Plaintiffsβ allegations of\\n\\nreligious and ethnic bias, at least at the motion to dismiss stage where we must view the\\n\\nalleged facts in Plaintiffsβ favor.\\n\\n The remarks targeted (1) Wareβs African heritage and that of other congregants,\\n\\n(2) a Church gathering that (according to the neighbors) involved βdancingβ and\\n\\nβhollering,β and (3) the fact that the Church βbranch[ed] out from another church.β J.A.\\n\\n19 ΒΆ 108. The first of these topics targets the Churchβs multicultural identity. The\\n\\nsecond targets activities conducted at Church gatherings, which we may infer involved\\n\\nreligious exercise as defined in RLUIPA. See 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000cc-5(7). The third targets\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\fthe Churchβs connection to other churches and denominationsβa paradigm example of\\n\\nreligious bias.\\n\\n Plaintiffs also alleged that they βhave faced tremendous opposition based on the\\n\\nnature of their ministry and the ethnic background of Reverend Ware and the\\n\\ncongregationβ and βtheir status as African immigrants.β J.A. 27 ΒΆ 166β67. Though the\\n\\nChurch is expressly βnondenominational,β J.A. 9 ΒΆ 15, and has no religious affiliation\\n\\nexcept its βassociat[ion with] churches in Kenya and the Seychelles,β J.A. 10 ΒΆ 18,\\n\\nPlaintiffsβ other allegations are drafted in such a way that we can infer their religious\\n\\npractice is tied to their ethnicity.\\n\\n Accordingly, when we draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiffsβ favor and consider\\n\\nRLUIPAβs βvery broad protection for religious liberty,β Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853,\\n\\n859 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), we are convinced that, as alleged, the\\n\\nneighbors displayed the behavior Congress sought to eradicate from zoning decisions.\\n\\nRLUIPA is designed to protect β[c]hurches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar\\n\\nchurches in particular, [from being] frequently discriminated againstβ in land use\\n\\nregulation, including when βzoning board members or neighborhood residents explicitly\\n\\noffer race or religion as the reason to exclude a proposed church, especially in cases of\\n\\nblack churches and Jewish shuls and synagogues.β 146 Cong. Rec. S7774 (July 27,\\n\\n2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).\\n\\n Following the neighborsβ remarks, the Board denied the petition. Although the\\n\\nCounty Directorβs statement that she didnβt oppose the petition doesnβt bind the Board, it\\n\\nis a βfactor[] usually considered importantβ in zoning proceedings, and it βstrongly\\n\\n 15\\n\\ffavor[s] a decision contrary to the one reachedβ by the Board. Arlington Heights, 429\\n\\nU.S. at 267. And although Plaintiffs didnβt allege how often the Board departs from the\\n\\nCounty Directorβs recommendations, the fact that the Board disagreed with a County\\n\\nofficial who has relevant expertise and a formal role as the Boardβs advisor is enough to\\n\\nraise a plausible suspicion of improper motive.\\n\\n As Defendants rightly point out, the neighborsβ remarks before the ALJ and the\\n\\nBoardβs disagreement with the County Director occurred well before the Board decided\\n\\nto dismiss the second petition. But these events are part of the sequence that led to the\\n\\nchallenged decision, and Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that they influenced it. This\\n\\nconnection is strengthened by the neighborsβ ongoing involvement in the dispute, right up\\n\\nthrough the dismissal of the second petition.\\n\\n The second irregularity occurred when the Board granted the neighborsβ motion to\\n\\ndismiss the second petition, contrary to the position of the Peopleβs Counsel (a County\\n\\nofficial). The Peopleβs Counsel initially sought dismissal based on res judicata and\\n\\ncollateral estoppel, but later abandoned this posture. The neighbors continued to seek\\n\\ndismissal on these grounds, and the Board adopted their position. This second\\n\\nirregularity adds further plausibility to the inference that Defendants dismissed the\\n\\nsecond petition based on improper motives.\\n\\n We express no opinion on whether the neighborsβ animus ultimately swayed the\\n\\nBoardβs decision to dismiss the second petition. Rather, we conclude only that the\\n\\ncomplaint plausibly alleges a prima facie claim of religious discrimination.\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\f C.\\n\\n Plaintiffs also appeal the district courtβs dismissal of their First Amendment free\\n\\nexercise claim and their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, in which they\\n\\nallege (as in their RLUIPA claims) that Defendants substantially burdened their religious\\n\\nexercise and discriminated against them on the basis of religion.\\n\\n We first must determine the correct standard of review. Under the Supreme\\n\\nCourtβs free exercise doctrine, a neutral government decision of general applicability is\\n\\nsubject to rational basis review, even where it has the incidental effect of burdening\\n\\nreligious exercise. Empβt Div., Depβt of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).\\n\\nHowever, a decision whose object βis to infringe upon or restrict practices because of\\n\\ntheir religious motivationβ is not neutral and is subject to strict scrutiny. Church of the\\n\\nLukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 546 (1993). As we\\n\\nexplained in Section II.B, Plaintiffs have alleged that the object of the Boardβs decision\\n\\nwas to restrict their use of the Property in response to community opposition to the\\n\\nChurchβs religious denomination. This allegedly discriminatory motive triggers strict\\n\\nscrutiny.\\n\\n Similarly, we apply strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause where (as\\n\\nhere) the challenged action interferes with a fundamental right. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760\\n\\nF.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978)).\\n\\nAnd β[u]nquestionably, the free exercise of religion is a fundamental constitutional\\n\\nright.β Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974); see also Reaching Hearts\\n\\nIntβl, Inc. v. Prince Georgeβs County, 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 781 n.9 (D. Md. 2008) (citing\\n\\n 17\\n\\fJohnson v. Robison in applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection claim based on\\n\\nreligious discrimination).\\n\\n A government decision fails strict scrutiny if it is not narrowly tailored to advance\\n\\na compelling state interest. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546. While Baltimore\\n\\nCounty may have a significant interest in finality and economy that would ordinarily be\\n\\nserved by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the dismissal of Wareβs\\n\\nsecond petition isnβt narrowly tailored to serve that interest because the second petition\\n\\ndidnβt seek to revisit the Boardβs decision about the first petition. We therefore vacate\\n\\nthe dismissal of their free exercise and equal protection claims.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n Finally, Plaintiffs brought a claim under Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of\\n\\nRights, which protects freedom of religion at the state level. The district court had\\n\\nsupplemental jurisdiction over this state constitutional claim under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(a)\\n\\nbecause it formed part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiffsβ federal claims.\\n\\nHowever, after dismissing the federal claims, the district court exercised its discretion\\n\\nunder 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(3) to dismiss the state constitutional claim. 5 Given our\\n\\ndecision on Plaintiffsβ federal claims, Β§ 1367(c)(3) no longer provides a basis for\\n\\ndismissing the state constitutional claim. We therefore vacate the dismissal of the state\\n\\n 5\\n The district court also noted that Maryland state law is unsettled regarding\\nwhether Article 36 provides a private cause of action. However, the court didnβt\\nexpressly invoke 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1367(c)(1), which authorizes it to decline to exercise\\nsupplemental jurisdiction over claims that raise novel or complex issues of state law. We\\nexpress no opinion about whether dismissal under Β§ 1367(c)(1) is appropriate on remand.\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\fconstitutional claim and remand so that the district court may decide whether to retain\\n\\nsupplemental jurisdiction over it.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district courtβs judgment and remand for\\n\\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n VACATED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 19\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":569,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4594017,"string":"4,594,017"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paulette MARTIN, A/K/A Paulette Murphy, A/K/A Paulette Akuffo, A/K/A Paula Murphy, A/K/A Auntie, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis Felipe Mangual, Sr., Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Paulette Martin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-6199; 17-6200"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gregory, Motz, Floyd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-6199\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPAULETTE MARTIN, a/k/a Paulette Murphy, a/k/a Paulette Akuffo, a/k/a\\nPaula Murphy, a/k/a Auntie,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:04-cr-00235-RWT-1)\\n\\n\\n No. 17-6200\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nLUIS FELIPE MANGUAL, SR.,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:04-cr-00235-RWT-25)\\n\\fArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 26, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in\\nwhich Judge Motz and Judge Floyd joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Sapna Mirchandani, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\\nGreenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Ellen Elisabeth Cobb, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda,\\nFederal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\\nBaltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney,\\nStephen M. Schenning, Acting United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,\\nDavid I. Salem, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fGREGORY, Chief Judge:\\n\\n Defendants-Appellants Paulette Martin and Luis Felipe Mangual Sr. both filed\\n\\nmotions for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3582(c)(2) and now appeal adverse\\n\\ndistrict court rulings. Because the district court failed to provide Martin and Mangual\\n\\nwith individualized explanations for its rulings on their respective motions, we vacate and\\n\\nremand.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n A jury convicted Martin in 2006 of various drug and drug-related offenses in\\n\\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846, 21 U.S.C. Β§ 843(b), and 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a). Martin served\\n\\nas a leader in a drug conspiracy for at least seven yearsβa conspiracy involving a large\\n\\nquantity of cocaine and heroinβand even though she did not engage in violence, her co-\\n\\nconspirators carried firearms. Given this information, the Presentence Report calculated\\n\\nMartinβs adjusted combined offense level as a 44. Martin had only one prior conviction,\\n\\ndating back to 1986 and therefore had a criminal history category of I. The Sentencing\\n\\nGuidelinesβ calculations recommended Martin face life imprisonment for her crimes.\\n\\nThe district court noted the severity of Martinβs criminal activity and sentenced her to life\\n\\nimprisonment, and this Court affirmed Martinβs conviction and sentence. United States\\n\\nv. Martin, 452 F. Appβx 239 (4th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f In February 2015, Martin filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction under 18\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 3582(c)(2), seeking the benefit of Amendment 782, * which lowered the base\\n\\noffense levels applicable to drug offenses by two offense levels. This could afford\\n\\nMartin sentencing relief if her Guidelines range were recalculated at an adjusted\\n\\ncombined offense level of 42 instead of her original 44. Martin asserted her eligibility for\\n\\nreduction based on Amendment 782, but also emphasized her work tutoring other\\n\\ninmates, the number and variety of courses she completed while incarcerated, and her\\n\\nexemplary prison record. Martin explained how she lacked any connection to organized\\n\\ndrug-based criminal enterprises and that she would not be a threat to society at her age.\\n\\nMartin further contended that she could possibly serve as a mentor to misguided youth\\n\\nupon her release from prison. In addition to Martinβs pro se motion, the Office of the\\n\\nFederal Public Defender filed a motion on her behalf, argued that her revised Guidelines\\n\\nrange after factoring in Amendment 782 would be 360 months to life imprisonment, and\\n\\nrequested the court to provide a sentence on the low end of that range. The probation\\n\\nofficer agreed and recommended a reduction in the sentence from life to 360 months.\\n\\n The Government opposed Martinβs motion and countered both that Martin was\\n\\nineligible for relief and that the Β§ 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of granting the\\n\\n\\n * On November 1, 2014, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 782 to\\nits Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the recommended sentences for certain drug\\ncrimes, including the crime of which Martin was convicted. See United States\\nSentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, supp. Appβx. C, amend. 782 (2014). At the\\nsame time, the Commission promulgated another amendment, Amendment 788, which\\namended Β§ 1B1.10 of the Guidelines to authorize district courts to apply Amendment 782\\nretroactively to reduce the length of certain already imposed sentences.\\n\\n 4\\n\\fmotion, emphasizing the courtβs comments at sentencing about the seriousness of the\\n\\ncrimes and the need to protect the public from Martin, a leader of an extensive drug-\\n\\ntrafficking operation.\\n\\n Martinβs counsel argued at the hearing that she is eligible for the reduction and\\n\\nthat the Sentencing Guidelines previously offered only one maximum advisory sentence\\n\\nto the court, life imprisonment, and that there was nothing to indicate from the sentencing\\n\\nhearing that a 360-month sentence would not also serve the goals of sentencing. Counsel\\n\\ninformed the court that Martinβs good behavior had earned her a place in a low security\\n\\nfacility and that she had earned her GED and become a respected tutor for other inmates.\\n\\nDespite this productive record, counsel explained, Martin is precluded from earning good\\n\\ntime credits and participating in other programs because of her life sentence. Counsel\\n\\nrejected the suggestion that Martin would be a threat to society if released after 360\\n\\nmonths, considering her history of nonviolence and her age of 84 at the time of her\\n\\nrelease. Finally, counsel argued that it would be costly and promote no legitimate\\n\\ngovernmental aim to incarcerate Martin in her advanced years.\\n\\n In March 2016, the district court denied Martinβs motion for a sentence reduction\\n\\nby checking the βDENIEDβ box on the form order. We vacated the judgment and\\n\\nremanded because we could not determine βwhether the court concluded that Martin was\\n\\nineligible for a sentence reduction or, alternatively, whether the court decided that such a\\n\\nreduction was unwarranted in light of the Β§ 3553(a) factors and Martinβs post-sentencing\\n\\nconduct.β United States v. Martin, 669 F. Appβx 132, 133 (4th Cir. 2016). This Court\\n\\nfound that β[b]ecause the parties presented fully developed, nonfrivolous arguments as to\\n\\n 5\\n\\fboth steps of the sentence reduction inquiry, we could only speculate as to the basis for\\n\\nthe district courtβs decision.β Id.\\n\\n Upon remand, the district court stated in an order that it had once again reviewed\\n\\nMartinβs motion for a sentence reduction, counselβs correspondence to the court, and the\\n\\nGovernmentβs response in opposition. As an initial matter, the district court found\\n\\nMartin eligible for relief because the bottom of her Guidelines range had been reduced\\n\\nfrom life to 360 months under Amendment 782. However, the court determined that a\\n\\nsentence reduction was not warranted based on its discretion β[a]fter carefully weighing\\n\\nthe Β§ 3553(a) factors.β The court explained that Martin βran a large, multi-million-dollar,\\n\\nmulti-jurisdiction drug operation, spanning Maryland, Virginia, and the District of\\n\\nColumbia, and operated it for years. The seriousness of her actions and offenses cannot\\n\\neasily be overstated.β For those reasons and the ones βset forth in the Governmentβs\\n\\nResponse,β the court denied Martinβs motion for a sentence reduction. Martin timely\\n\\nfiled her notice of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over Martinβs appeal pursuant to 28\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n In 2006, Mangual entered into a guilty plea agreement for a nonviolent drug\\n\\noffense in violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846. Mangual admitted that for about two years he\\n\\nengaged in a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving over 150 kilograms of cocaine and 20\\n\\nkilograms of heroin. The Presentence Report calculated Mangualβs adjusted combined\\n\\noffense level as a 36. Mangual had a 1994 drug offense and a criminal history category\\n\\nof II. His Sentencing Guidelines range was 210 to 262 monthsβ imprisonment.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f The district court sentenced Mangual to 262 monthsβ imprisonment, the top of the\\n\\nguidelines range. Mangualβs sentencing transcript is not in the record, and the only\\n\\nindication this Court has of the district courtβs reasoning is a brief note included in the\\n\\nStatement of Reasons in the courtβs Judgement. There, the district court stated that a\\n\\nβsentence at the top of the guideline range is appropriate because of the large quantity of\\n\\ndrugs and the defendantβs prior conviction of the same type of offense.β\\n\\n In April 2015, Mangual filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction under\\n\\nΒ§ 3582(c)(2), seeking the benefit of Amendment 782. Mangual contended that after the\\n\\napplication of Amendment 782, his Sentencing Guidelines range is 168 to 210 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonment. In a 2015 letter to the court, Mangual, a 75-year-old inmate at that time,\\n\\nasserted that, during his 10 years in prison, his sole disciplinary infraction was for\\n\\nmissing count when he did not hear the count call. He further notified the court that the\\n\\njail placed him on medical furloughs four times, that he has had open heart surgery, and\\n\\nthat he is in βchronic careβ and taking multiple medications. Mangual explained that the\\n\\nmother of his children is also sick, and he expressed his desire to spend his last years with\\n\\nher and their children, 15 grandchildren, and 8 great grandchildren. Mangual said he\\n\\nexhausted the educational opportunities he had access to while incarcerated. Moreover,\\n\\nMangual asserted that he has tried to better himself while in jail: he and another inmate\\n\\nβput together a concept called βThe People/The Solution,ββ which is βan educational and\\n\\nawareness tool to motivate the people to help othersβ and thereby help themselves.\\n\\n On December 14, 2016, the Federal Defender filed a motion on Mangualβs behalf,\\n\\nurging the court to reduce his sentence to 168 monthsβ imprisonment, the bottom of his\\n\\n 7\\n\\famended Guidelines range. Counsel emphasized that Mangual βwas not a leader or\\n\\nmanager of the conspiracy (of the 31 people charged, he was the 25th named defendant);\\n\\nhis conduct was not violent (he served as a middleman in drug sales); and he neither used\\n\\nnor possessed a weapon at any time.β Counsel also observed that Mangualβs post-\\n\\nsentencing conduct was βoutstandingβ: he βhas built a solid employment recordβ in\\n\\nprison; βhas completed his court-ordered financial obligationsβ; and βhas a nearly\\n\\nflawless disciplinary record.β Indeed, due to his exemplary conduct, he has been\\n\\ndesignated to a minimum-security facility and is eligible to work outside the prison\\n\\ncompound. Finally, counsel argued that Mangual was unlikely to recidivate due to his\\n\\nβadvanced age, his deteriorating health, and the stable home to which he will be\\n\\nreleased.β\\n\\n The probation officer agreed that Mangual was eligible for a sentence reduction\\n\\nbut recommended a sentence at the top of the amended rangeβ210 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonment. Similarly, in a response dated December 16, 2016, the Government did\\n\\nnot oppose a sentence reduction but objected to the extent of the relief sought by\\n\\nMangual and urged the court to impose a 210-month sentence. The Government\\n\\nexplained that it βaims to recommend an amended sentence that is consistent with the\\n\\noriginal sentenceβ and, therefore, Mangual βis eligible for a comparable sentence at the\\n\\ntop of the amended guidelines range.β In a footnote, the Government acknowledged\\n\\nMangualβs βapparently positive post-sentencing conduct, advanced age, and minimal\\n\\ncriminal historyβ but βrecommend[ed] a comparable sentence in the interest of fairness\\n\\nand consistency.β\\n\\n 8\\n\\f On December 21, 2016, the district court granted Mangualβs motion for a sentence\\n\\nreduction but did not reduce the sentence to the extent requested, instead imposing the\\n\\nsentence recommended by the Governmentβ210 monthsβ imprisonment. The court used\\n\\nthe standard form, which included a statement confirming that the court had taken into\\n\\naccount the policy statement in USSG Β§ 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors in Β§ 3553(a).\\n\\nThe parties filed motions arguing over the propriety of the district courtβs partial grant\\n\\nbased on the Governmentβs desire to have a sentence comparable to Mangualβs original\\n\\nterm of imprisonment. The district court agreed with the Governmentβs position.\\n\\nAccordingly, the court declined to modify its prior order. The court entered an order\\n\\ngranting in part Mangualβs motion for a reduced sentence on February 3, 2017 and\\n\\nreduced his sentence to 210 months. Mangual timely filed a notice of appeal on February\\n\\n17, 2017. This Court has jurisdiction over Mangualβs appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n In general, a court βmay not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been\\n\\nimposed.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3582(c). However, section 3582(c)(2) provides that a district\\n\\ncourt may reduce a sentence βin the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term\\n\\nof imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the\\n\\nSentencing Commission.β The Supreme Court promulgated a two-step process for\\n\\ndetermining where, and to what extent, a reduction is permissible under section\\n\\n3582(c)(2).\\n\\n 9\\n\\f First, the court is required βto follow the Commissionβs instructions in Β§ 1B1.10 to\\n\\ndetermine the prisonerβs eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the\\n\\nreduction authorized.β Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). In particular,\\n\\nsection β1B1.10(b)(1) requires the court to begin by determining the amended guideline\\n\\nrange that would have been applicable to the defendant had the relevant amendment been\\n\\nin effect at the time of the initial sentencing.β Dillon, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (internal\\n\\nquotation marks omitted). Second, the court is required to βconsider any applicable\\n\\nΒ§ 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by\\n\\nreference to the policies relevant at step one is warranted in whole or in part under the\\n\\nparticular circumstances of the case.β Id.\\n\\n This Court βreview[s] a district courtβs grant or denial of a Β§ 3582(c)(2) motion for\\n\\nabuse of discretion.β United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 2013).\\n\\nNonetheless, whether a court ruling on a motion to reduce under Β§ 3582(c)(2) must\\n\\nprovide an individualized explanation is considered de novo by this Court. Smalls, 720\\n\\nF.3d 193, 195.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The Supreme Courtβs recent holding in United States v. Chavez-Meza provides\\n\\nguidance regarding the level of detail a sentencing court must provide when evaluating\\n\\nsection 3582(c)(2) motions to reduce sentences like the ones filed by Martin and\\n\\nMangual. 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018). It held that β[a]t bottom, the sentencing judge need\\n\\n 10\\n\\fonly set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the partiesβ\\n\\narguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking\\n\\nauthority.β Id. at 1964 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme\\n\\nCourt sets forth a fact specific legal standard.\\n\\n Just how much of an explanation this requires, however, depends, as we\\n have said, upon the circumstances of the particular case. In some cases, it\\n may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge simply\\n relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has considered the\\n partiesβ arguments and taken account of the Β§ 3553(a) factors, among\\n others. But in other cases, more explanation may be necessary (depending,\\n perhaps, upon the legal arguments raised at sentencing).\\n\\nId. at 165. Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit, when evaluating the sufficiency of a\\n\\nsentencing courtβs explanation, there is a presumption that the district court sufficiently\\n\\nconsidered relevant factors in deciding a section 3582(c)(2) motion. United States v.\\n\\nLegree, 205 F.3d 724, 729-30 (4th Cir. 2000); Smalls, 720 F.3d at 196. Nonetheless, the\\n\\npresumption is not irrebuttable, and this Court in Legree suggested that a defendant failed\\n\\nto overcome the presumption because βhe point[ed] to no mitigating evidence which was\\n\\nnot before the sentencing court.β Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 730. Evidence of mitigating\\n\\nfactors not available at the original sentencing has indeed been used to rebut the Legree\\n\\npresumption. United States v. Hardy, 665 F. Appβx 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2016); United\\n\\nStates v. McKenzie, 318 F. Appβx 202, 204 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n The district court improperly denied Martinβs motion to reduce her sentence by\\n\\nfailing to give her an individualized explanation for why it chose to deny her motion.\\n\\nSmalls, 720 F.3d at 198. The Supreme Court has clarified that the extent of explanation\\n\\n 11\\n\\frequired depends on the facts of each case, and βgiven the simplicity of [Chavez-Meza],\\n\\nthe judgeβs awareness of the arguments, his consideration of the relevant sentencing\\n\\nfactors, and the intuitive reason why he picked a sentence above the very bottom of the\\n\\nnew range,β the Court held that βthe judgeβs explanation (minimal as it was) fell within\\n\\nthe scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing\\n\\njudge.β 138 S. Ct. at 1967-68.\\n\\n In contrast, the complexity of Martinβs case required the district court to provide a\\n\\nmore robust and detailed explanation for why it denied her motion to reduce. Martin has\\n\\npresented a mountain of new mitigating evidence that the sentencing court never\\n\\nevaluated. For example, Martin not only successfully pursued her GED but also became\\n\\na respected tutor for other inmates and helped incarcerated women follow her footsteps in\\n\\nachieving their educational goals. Martin exhibited such exemplary behavior while\\n\\nincarcerated that correctional staff moved her into a low security facility. Martin also\\n\\nsubmitted documentary evidence that corroborates her coursework and her good\\n\\nbehavior. Moreover, given her old age and marked rehabilitation, Martin argues that she\\n\\nis no longer a threat to society.\\n\\n The district court, during Martinβs remand proceedings, failed to address any of\\n\\nthis new mitigation evidence. In Chavez-Meza, the defendantβs educational classes and\\n\\n114-month sentence did not warrant a significant explanation of the district courtβs\\n\\nreasoning regarding the motion to reduce. In Martinβs case, her years of being both a\\n\\nstudent and now a tutor/instructor to other inmates, coupled with a sentence of life\\n\\nimprisonment, entitle her to a more robust explanation for why her mitigation evidence\\n\\n 12\\n\\fholds no weight. The failure to provide an individualized explanation, especially in light\\n\\nof the significant amount of mitigation evidence, runs afoul of Chavez-Meza and allows\\n\\nMartin to rebut the Fourth Circuitβs Legree presumption.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has made it clear that a βsentence modification is not a plenary\\n\\nresentencing proceeding. We therefore need not turn a blind eye to what the judge said at\\n\\npetitionerβs initial sentencing.β Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967 (internal quotations\\n\\nomitted). However, Martin does not ask this Court to disregard the old evidence of the\\n\\nrationale from her original sentence. Rather Martin asks this Court to follow our\\n\\nprecedent which requires a district court to consider evidence of post-sentencing\\n\\nmitigation that would be relevant to the Β§ 3553(a) factors.\\n\\n The explanation the district court provided upon remand was merely a recitation of\\n\\nMartinβs original criminal behavior. That is not the standard that the Supreme Court and\\n\\nthe Fourth Circuit articulate for sentence-reduction motions. The district court was\\n\\ncontent to memorialize Martinβs past transgressions without giving any weight to the\\n\\nmultitude of redemptive measures that Martin has taken since she was initially sentenced\\n\\nto life in prison. The Government at oral argument even conceded that Martinβs post-\\n\\nsentencing behavior is among the best that it has seen. Martinβs journey toward\\n\\nrehabilitation is especially noteworthy because she was given a life sentence and had no\\n\\nidea that Amendment 782 would eventually arrive to give her a glimmer of hope. Martin\\n\\nstrove to better herself and those around her without the prospect of any incentive or\\n\\nreward. The district court must provide an individualized explanation for why Martinβs\\n\\nsteps toward rehabilitation are meaningless. On remand, the district court should explain\\n\\n 13\\n\\fto Martin why her sentence of life imprisonment for a nonviolent drug offense must\\n\\nremain undisturbed despite overwhelming evidence of rehabilitation.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Mangual is also entitled to relief under the law of this Circuit and the Supreme\\n\\nCourt. As an initial matter, Mangual, like Martin, has significant evidence of mitigation\\n\\nthat was not addressed by the district court when it partially granted his motion. In his\\n\\nten years of incarceration Mangual has been a model inmate. The only infraction on his\\n\\ndisciplinary record stems from his failure to hear his name during count call. He has used\\n\\nhis time while incarcerated to create an educational and awareness tool to help his fellow\\n\\ninmates help each other. Mangualβs behavior has led to his placement in a minimum-\\n\\nsecurity facility. Prison officials trust Mangual at such a high level that he is allowed to\\n\\nwork outside of the prison compound. The evidence of his exemplary conduct must\\n\\nproperly be factored into the decision regarding his liberty interests. In addition,\\n\\nMangual argues that he is unlikely to recidivate due to his advanced age, deteriorating\\n\\nhealth, and stable home upon release. Given that there is no reference to Mangualβs new\\n\\nmitigation evidence, it is clear that the district court did not comply with the standards set\\n\\nforth in Chavez-Meza, and Mangual has rebutted the Legree presumption.\\n\\n Moreover, this Court lacks Mangualβs original sentencing transcript, and this\\n\\nomission provides another basis for remand given that we cannot conduct meaningful\\n\\nappellate review without such a transcript. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965. In a\\n\\nprior decision, this Court found that a defendant rebutted the Legree presumption in a\\n\\nsimilar situation where the record did not contain the original sentencing transcript.\\n\\n 14\\n\\fMcKenzie, 318 F. Appβx at 203. Here, without the transcript, this Court is left to\\n\\nspeculate as to the reasons that led to Mangualβs original sentence. At the initial\\n\\nsentencing hearing, the court explained in the statement of reasons that a sentence at the\\n\\ntop of the Guidelines range was appropriate because of the significant quantity of drugs\\n\\ninvolved in the offense and Mangualβs prior drug conviction. This Court cannot look to\\n\\nlanguage about drug quantities and ascertain how the original sentencing courtβs rationale\\n\\nwould interact with the host of mitigation evidence that arose post-sentencing. The\\n\\ndistrict court must provide Mangual an individualized explanation as to why his lengthy\\n\\nsentence for a nonviolent drug offense must remain only partially reduced given the\\n\\nsignificant amount of mitigation evidence that Mangual has proffered post sentencing.\\n\\n Chavez-Meza grants appellate courts broad discretion in reviewing section\\n\\n3582(c)(2) orders. βIf the court of appeals considers an explanation inadequate in a\\n\\nparticular case, it can send the case back to the district court for a more complete\\n\\nexplanation.β 138 S. Ct. at 1965. Here, given the complex record full of new mitigation\\n\\nevidence and the lack of the original sentencing transcript, this Court requires more\\n\\nexplanation. We cannot conduct a proper appellate review and must remand in order to\\n\\nensure that Mangualβs acts toward rehabilitation are properly examined and addressed\\n\\nthrough an individualized explanation.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n There is no right to a sentence reduction under Β§ 3582(c)(2). However, a district\\n\\ncourt cannot ignore a host of mitigation evidence and summarily deny a motion to reduce\\n\\n 15\\n\\fa sentence and leave both the defendant and the appellate court in the dark as to the\\n\\nreasons for its decision. This Court makes no assessments as to whether the motions to\\n\\nreduce appellantsβ sentences should have been granted or to what extent they should have\\n\\nbeen granted. However, the district court must provide a rationale as to why two\\n\\nindividuals who have placed themselves on a positive life trajectory, despite the\\n\\nchallenges of a lengthy period of incarceration, should receive no relief for their\\n\\nrehabilitation. The district court needs to explain to Martin and Mangual why their\\n\\nattempts at rehabilitation are futile. Accordingly, we vacate the district courtβs orders and\\n\\nremand the case for the district court to provide adequate reasoning for its decisions.\\n\\n\\n\\n VACATED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371270/\", \"author_raw\": \"Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GREGORY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MOTZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"FLOYD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594017/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paulette MARTIN, A/K/A Paulette Murphy, A/K/A Paulette Akuffo, A/K/A Paula Murphy, A/K/A Auntie, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis Felipe Mangual, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-6199\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nPAULETTE MARTIN, a/k/a Paulette Murphy, a/k/a Paulette Akuffo, a/k/a\nPaula Murphy, a/k/a Auntie,\n\n Defendant β Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:04-cr-00235-RWT-1)\n\n\n No. 17-6200\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nLUIS FELIPE MANGUAL, SR.,\n\n Defendant β Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:04-cr-00235-RWT-25)\n\fArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 26, 2019\n\n\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in\nwhich Judge Motz and Judge Floyd joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Sapna Mirchandani, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\nGreenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Ellen Elisabeth Cobb, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda,\nFederal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\nBaltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney,\nStephen M. Schenning, Acting United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,\nDavid I. Salem, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\nATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\fGREGORY, Chief Judge:\n\n Defendants-Appellants Paulette Martin and Luis Felipe Mangual Sr. both filed\n\nmotions for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3582(c)(2) and now appeal adverse\n\ndistrict court rulings. Because the district court failed to provide Martin and Mangual\n\nwith individualized explanations for its rulings on their respective motions, we vacate and\n\nremand.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n A.\n\n A jury convicted Martin in 2006 of various drug and drug-related offenses in\n\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846, 21 U.S.C. Β§ 843(b), and 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a). Martin served\n\nas a leader in a drug conspiracy for at least seven yearsβa conspiracy involving a large\n\nquantity of cocaine and heroinβand even though she did not engage in violence, her co-\n\nconspirators carried firearms. Given this information, the Presentence Report calculated\n\nMartinβs adjusted combined offense level as a 44. Martin had only one prior conviction,\n\ndating back to 1986 and therefore had a criminal history category of I. The Sentencing\n\nGuidelinesβ calculations recommended Martin face life imprisonment for her crimes.\n\nThe district court noted the severity of Martinβs criminal activity and sentenced her to life\n\nimprisonment, and this Court affirmed Martinβs conviction and sentence. United States\n\nv. Martin, 452 F. Appβx 239 (4th Cir. 2011).\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f In February 2015, Martin filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction under 18\n\nU.S.C. Β§ 3582(c)(2), seeking the benefit of Amendment 782, * which lowered the base\n\noffense levels applicable to drug offenses by two offense levels. This could afford\n\nMartin sentencing relief if her Guidelines range were recalculated at an adjusted\n\ncombined offense level of 42 instead of her original 44. Martin asserted her eligibility for\n\nreduction based on Amendment 782, but also emphasized her work tutoring other\n\ninmates, the number and variety of courses she completed while incarcerated, and her\n\nexemplary prison record. Martin explained how she lacked any connection to organized\n\ndrug-based criminal enterprises and that she would not be a threat to society at her age.\n\nMartin further contended that she could possibly serve as a mentor to misguided youth\n\nupon her release from prison. In addition to Martinβs pro se motion, the Office of the\n\nFederal Public Defender filed a motion on her behalf, argued that her revised Guidelines\n\nrange after factoring in Amendment 782 would be 360 months to life imprisonment, and\n\nrequested the court to provide a sentence on the low end of that range. The probation\n\nofficer agreed and recommended a reduction in the sentence from life to 360 months.\n\n The Government opposed Martinβs motion and countered both that Martin was\n\nineligible for relief and that the Β§ 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of granting the\n\n\n * On November 1, 2014, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 782 to\nits Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the recommended sentences for certain drug\ncrimes, including the crime of which Martin was convicted. See United States\nSentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, supp. Appβx. C, amend. 782 (2014). At the\nsame time, the Commission promulgated another amendment, Amendment 788, which\namended Β§ 1B1.10 of the Guidelines to authorize district courts to apply Amendment 782\nretroactively to reduce the length of certain already imposed sentences.\n\n 4\n\fmotion, emphasizing the courtβs comments at sentencing about the seriousness of the\n\ncrimes and the need to protect the public from Martin, a leader of an extensive drug-\n\ntrafficking operation.\n\n Martinβs counsel argued at the hearing that she is eligible for the reduction and\n\nthat the Sentencing Guidelines previously offered only one maximum advisory sentence\n\nto the court, life imprisonment, and that there was nothing to indicate from the sentencing\n\nhearing that a 360-month sentence would not also serve the goals of sentencing. Counsel\n\ninformed the court that Martinβs good behavior had earned her a place in a low security\n\nfacility and that she had earned her GED and become a respected tutor for other inmates.\n\nDespite this productive record, counsel explained, Martin is precluded from earning good\n\ntime credits and participating in other programs because of her life sentence. Counsel\n\nrejected the suggestion that Martin would be a threat to society if released after 360\n\nmonths, considering her history of nonviolence and her age of 84 at the time of her\n\nrelease. Finally, counsel argued that it would be costly and promote no legitimate\n\ngovernmental aim to incarcerate Martin in her advanced years.\n\n In March 2016, the district court denied Martinβs motion for a sentence reduction\n\nby checking the βDENIEDβ box on the form order. We vacated the judgment and\n\nremanded because we could not determine βwhether the court concluded that Martin was\n\nineligible for a sentence reduction or, alternatively, whether the court decided that such a\n\nreduction was unwarranted in light of the Β§ 3553(a) factors and Martinβs post-sentencing\n\nconduct.β United States v. Martin, 669 F. Appβx 132, 133 (4th Cir. 2016). This Court\n\nfound that β[b]ecause the parties presented fully developed, nonfrivolous arguments as to\n\n 5\n\fboth steps of the sentence reduction inquiry, we could only speculate as to the basis for\n\nthe district courtβs decision.β Id.\n\n Upon remand, the district court stated in an order that it had once again reviewed\n\nMartinβs motion for a sentence reduction, counselβs correspondence to the court, and the\n\nGovernmentβs response in opposition. As an initial matter, the district court found\n\nMartin eligible for relief because the bottom of her Guidelines range had been reduced\n\nfrom life to 360 months under Amendment 782. However, the court determined that a\n\nsentence reduction was not warranted based on its discretion β[a]fter carefully weighing\n\nthe Β§ 3553(a) factors.β The court explained that Martin βran a large, multi-million-dollar,\n\nmulti-jurisdiction drug operation, spanning Maryland, Virginia, and the District of\n\nColumbia, and operated it for years. The seriousness of her actions and offenses cannot\n\neasily be overstated.β For those reasons and the ones βset forth in the Governmentβs\n\nResponse,β the court denied Martinβs motion for a sentence reduction. Martin timely\n\nfiled her notice of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over Martinβs appeal pursuant to 28\n\nU.S.C. Β§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\n\n B.\n\n In 2006, Mangual entered into a guilty plea agreement for a nonviolent drug\n\noffense in violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846. Mangual admitted that for about two years he\n\nengaged in a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving over 150 kilograms of cocaine and 20\n\nkilograms of heroin. The Presentence Report calculated Mangualβs adjusted combined\n\noffense level as a 36. Mangual had a 1994 drug offense and a criminal history category\n\nof II. His Sentencing Guidelines range was 210 to 262 monthsβ imprisonment.\n\n 6\n\f The district court sentenced Mangual to 262 monthsβ imprisonment, the top of the\n\nguidelines range. Mangualβs sentencing transcript is not in the record, and the only\n\nindication this Court has of the district courtβs reasoning is a brief note included in the\n\nStatement of Reasons in the courtβs Judgement. There, the district court stated that a\n\nβsentence at the top of the guideline range is appropriate because of the large quantity of\n\ndrugs and the defendantβs prior conviction of the same type of offense.β\n\n In April 2015, Mangual filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction under\n\nΒ§ 3582(c)(2), seeking the benefit of Amendment 782. Mangual contended that after the\n\napplication of Amendment 782, his Sentencing Guidelines range is 168 to 210 monthsβ\n\nimprisonment. In a 2015 letter to the court, Mangual, a 75-year-old inmate at that time,\n\nasserted that, during his 10 years in prison, his sole disciplinary infraction was for\n\nmissing count when he did not hear the count call. He further notified the court that the\n\njail placed him on medical furloughs four times, that he has had open heart surgery, and\n\nthat he is in βchronic careβ and taking multiple medications. Mangual explained that the\n\nmother of his children is also sick, and he expressed his desire to spend his last years with\n\nher and their children, 15 grandchildren, and 8 great grandchildren. Mangual said he\n\nexhausted the educational opportunities he had access to while incarcerated. Moreover,\n\nMangual asserted that he has tried to better himself while in jail: he and another inmate\n\nβput together a concept called βThe People/The Solution,ββ which is βan educational and\n\nawareness tool to motivate the people to help othersβ and thereby help themselves.\n\n On December 14, 2016, the Federal Defender filed a motion on Mangualβs behalf,\n\nurging the court to reduce his sentence to 168 monthsβ imprisonment, the bottom of his\n\n 7\n\famended Guidelines range. Counsel emphasized that Mangual βwas not a leader or\n\nmanager of the conspiracy (of the 31 people charged, he was the 25th named defendant);\n\nhis conduct was not violent (he served as a middleman in drug sales); and he neither used\n\nnor possessed a weapon at any time.β Counsel also observed that Mangualβs post-\n\nsentencing conduct was βoutstandingβ: he βhas built a solid employment recordβ in\n\nprison; βhas completed his court-ordered financial obligationsβ; and βhas a nearly\n\nflawless disciplinary record.β Indeed, due to his exemplary conduct, he has been\n\ndesignated to a minimum-security facility and is eligible to work outside the prison\n\ncompound. Finally, counsel argued that Mangual was unlikely to recidivate due to his\n\nβadvanced age, his deteriorating health, and the stable home to which he will be\n\nreleased.β\n\n The probation officer agreed that Mangual was eligible for a sentence reduction\n\nbut recommended a sentence at the top of the amended rangeβ210 monthsβ\n\nimprisonment. Similarly, in a response dated December 16, 2016, the Government did\n\nnot oppose a sentence reduction but objected to the extent of the relief sought by\n\nMangual and urged the court to impose a 210-month sentence. The Government\n\nexplained that it βaims to recommend an amended sentence that is consistent with the\n\noriginal sentenceβ and, therefore, Mangual βis eligible for a comparable sentence at the\n\ntop of the amended guidelines range.β In a footnote, the Government acknowledged\n\nMangualβs βapparently positive post-sentencing conduct, advanced age, and minimal\n\ncriminal historyβ but βrecommend[ed] a comparable sentence in the interest of fairness\n\nand consistency.β\n\n 8\n\f On December 21, 2016, the district court granted Mangualβs motion for a sentence\n\nreduction but did not reduce the sentence to the extent requested, instead imposing the\n\nsentence recommended by the Governmentβ210 monthsβ imprisonment. The court used\n\nthe standard form, which included a statement confirming that the court had taken into\n\naccount the policy statement in USSG Β§ 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors in Β§ 3553(a).\n\nThe parties filed motions arguing over the propriety of the district courtβs partial grant\n\nbased on the Governmentβs desire to have a sentence comparable to Mangualβs original\n\nterm of imprisonment. The district court agreed with the Governmentβs position.\n\nAccordingly, the court declined to modify its prior order. The court entered an order\n\ngranting in part Mangualβs motion for a reduced sentence on February 3, 2017 and\n\nreduced his sentence to 210 months. Mangual timely filed a notice of appeal on February\n\n17, 2017. This Court has jurisdiction over Mangualβs appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n In general, a court βmay not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been\n\nimposed.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3582(c). However, section 3582(c)(2) provides that a district\n\ncourt may reduce a sentence βin the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term\n\nof imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the\n\nSentencing Commission.β The Supreme Court promulgated a two-step process for\n\ndetermining where, and to what extent, a reduction is permissible under section\n\n3582(c)(2).\n\n 9\n\f First, the court is required βto follow the Commissionβs instructions in Β§ 1B1.10 to\n\ndetermine the prisonerβs eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the\n\nreduction authorized.β Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). In particular,\n\nsection β1B1.10(b)(1) requires the court to begin by determining the amended guideline\n\nrange that would have been applicable to the defendant had the relevant amendment been\n\nin effect at the time of the initial sentencing.β Dillon, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (internal\n\nquotation marks omitted). Second, the court is required to βconsider any applicable\n\nΒ§ 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by\n\nreference to the policies relevant at step one is warranted in whole or in part under the\n\nparticular circumstances of the case.β Id.\n\n This Court βreview[s] a district courtβs grant or denial of a Β§ 3582(c)(2) motion for\n\nabuse of discretion.β United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 2013).\n\nNonetheless, whether a court ruling on a motion to reduce under Β§ 3582(c)(2) must\n\nprovide an individualized explanation is considered de novo by this Court. Smalls, 720\n\nF.3d 193, 195.\n\n\n\n III.\n\n A.\n\n The Supreme Courtβs recent holding in United States v. Chavez-Meza provides\n\nguidance regarding the level of detail a sentencing court must provide when evaluating\n\nsection 3582(c)(2) motions to reduce sentences like the ones filed by Martin and\n\nMangual. 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018). It held that β[a]t bottom, the sentencing judge need\n\n 10\n\fonly set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the partiesβ\n\narguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking\n\nauthority.β Id. at 1964 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme\n\nCourt sets forth a fact specific legal standard.\n\n Just how much of an explanation this requires, however, depends, as we\n have said, upon the circumstances of the particular case. In some cases, it\n may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge simply\n relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has considered the\n partiesβ arguments and taken account of the Β§ 3553(a) factors, among\n others. But in other cases, more explanation may be necessary (depending,\n perhaps, upon the legal arguments raised at sentencing).\n\nId. at 165. Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit, when evaluating the sufficiency of a\n\nsentencing courtβs explanation, there is a presumption that the district court sufficiently\n\nconsidered relevant factors in deciding a section 3582(c)(2) motion. United States v.\n\nLegree, 205 F.3d 724, 729-30 (4th Cir. 2000); Smalls, 720 F.3d at 196. Nonetheless, the\n\npresumption is not irrebuttable, and this Court in Legree suggested that a defendant failed\n\nto overcome the presumption because βhe point[ed] to no mitigating evidence which was\n\nnot before the sentencing court.β Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 730. Evidence of mitigating\n\nfactors not available at the original sentencing has indeed been used to rebut the Legree\n\npresumption. United States v. Hardy, 665 F. Appβx 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2016); United\n\nStates v. McKenzie, 318 F. Appβx 202, 204 (4th Cir. 2009).\n\n B.\n\n The district court improperly denied Martinβs motion to reduce her sentence by\n\nfailing to give her an individualized explanation for why it chose to deny her motion.\n\nSmalls, 720 F.3d at 198. The Supreme Court has clarified that the extent of explanation\n\n 11\n\frequired depends on the facts of each case, and βgiven the simplicity of [Chavez-Meza],\n\nthe judgeβs awareness of the arguments, his consideration of the relevant sentencing\n\nfactors, and the intuitive reason why he picked a sentence above the very bottom of the\n\nnew range,β the Court held that βthe judgeβs explanation (minimal as it was) fell within\n\nthe scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing\n\njudge.β 138 S. Ct. at 1967-68.\n\n In contrast, the complexity of Martinβs case required the district court to provide a\n\nmore robust and detailed explanation for why it denied her motion to reduce. Martin has\n\npresented a mountain of new mitigating evidence that the sentencing court never\n\nevaluated. For example, Martin not only successfully pursued her GED but also became\n\na respected tutor for other inmates and helped incarcerated women follow her footsteps in\n\nachieving their educational goals. Martin exhibited such exemplary behavior while\n\nincarcerated that correctional staff moved her into a low security facility. Martin also\n\nsubmitted documentary evidence that corroborates her coursework and her good\n\nbehavior. Moreover, given her old age and marked rehabilitation, Martin argues that she\n\nis no longer a threat to society.\n\n The district court, during Martinβs remand proceedings, failed to address any of\n\nthis new mitigation evidence. In Chavez-Meza, the defendantβs educational classes and\n\n114-month sentence did not warrant a significant explanation of the district courtβs\n\nreasoning regarding the motion to reduce. In Martinβs case, her years of being both a\n\nstudent and now a tutor/instructor to other inmates, coupled with a sentence of life\n\nimprisonment, entitle her to a more robust explanation for why her mitigation evidence\n\n 12\n\fholds no weight. The failure to provide an individualized explanation, especially in light\n\nof the significant amount of mitigation evidence, runs afoul of Chavez-Meza and allows\n\nMartin to rebut the Fourth Circuitβs Legree presumption.\n\n The Supreme Court has made it clear that a βsentence modification is not a plenary\n\nresentencing proceeding. We therefore need not turn a blind eye to what the judge said at\n\npetitionerβs initial sentencing.β Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967 (internal quotations\n\nomitted). However, Martin does not ask this Court to disregard the old evidence of the\n\nrationale from her original sentence. Rather Martin asks this Court to follow our\n\nprecedent which requires a district court to consider evidence of post-sentencing\n\nmitigation that would be relevant to the Β§ 3553(a) factors.\n\n The explanation the district court provided upon remand was merely a recitation of\n\nMartinβs original criminal behavior. That is not the standard that the Supreme Court and\n\nthe Fourth Circuit articulate for sentence-reduction motions. The district court was\n\ncontent to memorialize Martinβs past transgressions without giving any weight to the\n\nmultitude of redemptive measures that Martin has taken since she was initially sentenced\n\nto life in prison. The Government at oral argument even conceded that Martinβs post-\n\nsentencing behavior is among the best that it has seen. Martinβs journey toward\n\nrehabilitation is especially noteworthy because she was given a life sentence and had no\n\nidea that Amendment 782 would eventually arrive to give her a glimmer of hope. Martin\n\nstrove to better herself and those around her without the prospect of any incentive or\n\nreward. The district court must provide an individualized explanation for why Martinβs\n\nsteps toward rehabilitation are meaningless. On remand, the district court should explain\n\n 13\n\fto Martin why her sentence of life imprisonment for a nonviolent drug offense must\n\nremain undisturbed despite overwhelming evidence of rehabilitation.\n\n C.\n\n Mangual is also entitled to relief under the law of this Circuit and the Supreme\n\nCourt. As an initial matter, Mangual, like Martin, has significant evidence of mitigation\n\nthat was not addressed by the district court when it partially granted his motion. In his\n\nten years of incarceration Mangual has been a model inmate. The only infraction on his\n\ndisciplinary record stems from his failure to hear his name during count call. He has used\n\nhis time while incarcerated to create an educational and awareness tool to help his fellow\n\ninmates help each other. Mangualβs behavior has led to his placement in a minimum-\n\nsecurity facility. Prison officials trust Mangual at such a high level that he is allowed to\n\nwork outside of the prison compound. The evidence of his exemplary conduct must\n\nproperly be factored into the decision regarding his liberty interests. In addition,\n\nMangual argues that he is unlikely to recidivate due to his advanced age, deteriorating\n\nhealth, and stable home upon release. Given that there is no reference to Mangualβs new\n\nmitigation evidence, it is clear that the district court did not comply with the standards set\n\nforth in Chavez-Meza, and Mangual has rebutted the Legree presumption.\n\n Moreover, this Court lacks Mangualβs original sentencing transcript, and this\n\nomission provides another basis for remand given that we cannot conduct meaningful\n\nappellate review without such a transcript. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965. In a\n\nprior decision, this Court found that a defendant rebutted the Legree presumption in a\n\nsimilar situation where the record did not contain the original sentencing transcript.\n\n 14\n\fMcKenzie, 318 F. Appβx at 203. Here, without the transcript, this Court is left to\n\nspeculate as to the reasons that led to Mangualβs original sentence. At the initial\n\nsentencing hearing, the court explained in the statement of reasons that a sentence at the\n\ntop of the Guidelines range was appropriate because of the significant quantity of drugs\n\ninvolved in the offense and Mangualβs prior drug conviction. This Court cannot look to\n\nlanguage about drug quantities and ascertain how the original sentencing courtβs rationale\n\nwould interact with the host of mitigation evidence that arose post-sentencing. The\n\ndistrict court must provide Mangual an individualized explanation as to why his lengthy\n\nsentence for a nonviolent drug offense must remain only partially reduced given the\n\nsignificant amount of mitigation evidence that Mangual has proffered post sentencing.\n\n Chavez-Meza grants appellate courts broad discretion in reviewing section\n\n3582(c)(2) orders. βIf the court of appeals considers an explanation inadequate in a\n\nparticular case, it can send the case back to the district court for a more complete\n\nexplanation.β 138 S. Ct. at 1965. Here, given the complex record full of new mitigation\n\nevidence and the lack of the original sentencing transcript, this Court requires more\n\nexplanation. We cannot conduct a proper appellate review and must remand in order to\n\nensure that Mangualβs acts toward rehabilitation are properly examined and addressed\n\nthrough an individualized explanation.\n\n\n\n IV.\n\n There is no right to a sentence reduction under Β§ 3582(c)(2). However, a district\n\ncourt cannot ignore a host of mitigation evidence and summarily deny a motion to reduce\n\n 15\n\fa sentence and leave both the defendant and the appellate court in the dark as to the\n\nreasons for its decision. This Court makes no assessments as to whether the motions to\n\nreduce appellantsβ sentences should have been granted or to what extent they should have\n\nbeen granted. However, the district court must provide a rationale as to why two\n\nindividuals who have placed themselves on a positive life trajectory, despite the\n\nchallenges of a lengthy period of incarceration, should receive no relief for their\n\nrehabilitation. The district court needs to explain to Martin and Mangual why their\n\nattempts at rehabilitation are futile. Accordingly, we vacate the district courtβs orders and\n\nremand the case for the district court to provide adequate reasoning for its decisions.\n\n\n\n VACATED AND REMANDED\n\n\n\n\n 16\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paulette MARTIN, A/K/A Paulette Murphy, A/K/A Paulette Akuffo, A/K/A Paula Murphy, A/K/A Auntie, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis Felipe Mangual, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-6199\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nPAULETTE MARTIN, a/k/a Paulette Murphy, a/k/a Paulette Akuffo, a/k/a\\nPaula Murphy, a/k/a Auntie,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:04-cr-00235-RWT-1)\\n\\n\\n No. 17-6200\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nLUIS FELIPE MANGUAL, SR.,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.\\nRoger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:04-cr-00235-RWT-25)\\n\\fArgued: December 11, 2018 Decided: February 26, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nVacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in\\nwhich Judge Motz and Judge Floyd joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Sapna Mirchandani, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\\nGreenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Ellen Elisabeth Cobb, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda,\\nFederal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\\nBaltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney,\\nStephen M. Schenning, Acting United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,\\nDavid I. Salem, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\fGREGORY, Chief Judge:\\n\\n Defendants-Appellants Paulette Martin and Luis Felipe Mangual Sr. both filed\\n\\nmotions for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3582(c)(2) and now appeal adverse\\n\\ndistrict court rulings. Because the district court failed to provide Martin and Mangual\\n\\nwith individualized explanations for its rulings on their respective motions, we vacate and\\n\\nremand.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n A jury convicted Martin in 2006 of various drug and drug-related offenses in\\n\\nviolation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846, 21 U.S.C. Β§ 843(b), and 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a). Martin served\\n\\nas a leader in a drug conspiracy for at least seven yearsβa conspiracy involving a large\\n\\nquantity of cocaine and heroinβand even though she did not engage in violence, her co-\\n\\nconspirators carried firearms. Given this information, the Presentence Report calculated\\n\\nMartinβs adjusted combined offense level as a 44. Martin had only one prior conviction,\\n\\ndating back to 1986 and therefore had a criminal history category of I. The Sentencing\\n\\nGuidelinesβ calculations recommended Martin face life imprisonment for her crimes.\\n\\nThe district court noted the severity of Martinβs criminal activity and sentenced her to life\\n\\nimprisonment, and this Court affirmed Martinβs conviction and sentence. United States\\n\\nv. Martin, 452 F. Appβx 239 (4th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f In February 2015, Martin filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction under 18\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 3582(c)(2), seeking the benefit of Amendment 782, * which lowered the base\\n\\noffense levels applicable to drug offenses by two offense levels. This could afford\\n\\nMartin sentencing relief if her Guidelines range were recalculated at an adjusted\\n\\ncombined offense level of 42 instead of her original 44. Martin asserted her eligibility for\\n\\nreduction based on Amendment 782, but also emphasized her work tutoring other\\n\\ninmates, the number and variety of courses she completed while incarcerated, and her\\n\\nexemplary prison record. Martin explained how she lacked any connection to organized\\n\\ndrug-based criminal enterprises and that she would not be a threat to society at her age.\\n\\nMartin further contended that she could possibly serve as a mentor to misguided youth\\n\\nupon her release from prison. In addition to Martinβs pro se motion, the Office of the\\n\\nFederal Public Defender filed a motion on her behalf, argued that her revised Guidelines\\n\\nrange after factoring in Amendment 782 would be 360 months to life imprisonment, and\\n\\nrequested the court to provide a sentence on the low end of that range. The probation\\n\\nofficer agreed and recommended a reduction in the sentence from life to 360 months.\\n\\n The Government opposed Martinβs motion and countered both that Martin was\\n\\nineligible for relief and that the Β§ 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of granting the\\n\\n\\n * On November 1, 2014, the Sentencing Commission issued Amendment 782 to\\nits Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the recommended sentences for certain drug\\ncrimes, including the crime of which Martin was convicted. See United States\\nSentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, supp. Appβx. C, amend. 782 (2014). At the\\nsame time, the Commission promulgated another amendment, Amendment 788, which\\namended Β§ 1B1.10 of the Guidelines to authorize district courts to apply Amendment 782\\nretroactively to reduce the length of certain already imposed sentences.\\n\\n 4\\n\\fmotion, emphasizing the courtβs comments at sentencing about the seriousness of the\\n\\ncrimes and the need to protect the public from Martin, a leader of an extensive drug-\\n\\ntrafficking operation.\\n\\n Martinβs counsel argued at the hearing that she is eligible for the reduction and\\n\\nthat the Sentencing Guidelines previously offered only one maximum advisory sentence\\n\\nto the court, life imprisonment, and that there was nothing to indicate from the sentencing\\n\\nhearing that a 360-month sentence would not also serve the goals of sentencing. Counsel\\n\\ninformed the court that Martinβs good behavior had earned her a place in a low security\\n\\nfacility and that she had earned her GED and become a respected tutor for other inmates.\\n\\nDespite this productive record, counsel explained, Martin is precluded from earning good\\n\\ntime credits and participating in other programs because of her life sentence. Counsel\\n\\nrejected the suggestion that Martin would be a threat to society if released after 360\\n\\nmonths, considering her history of nonviolence and her age of 84 at the time of her\\n\\nrelease. Finally, counsel argued that it would be costly and promote no legitimate\\n\\ngovernmental aim to incarcerate Martin in her advanced years.\\n\\n In March 2016, the district court denied Martinβs motion for a sentence reduction\\n\\nby checking the βDENIEDβ box on the form order. We vacated the judgment and\\n\\nremanded because we could not determine βwhether the court concluded that Martin was\\n\\nineligible for a sentence reduction or, alternatively, whether the court decided that such a\\n\\nreduction was unwarranted in light of the Β§ 3553(a) factors and Martinβs post-sentencing\\n\\nconduct.β United States v. Martin, 669 F. Appβx 132, 133 (4th Cir. 2016). This Court\\n\\nfound that β[b]ecause the parties presented fully developed, nonfrivolous arguments as to\\n\\n 5\\n\\fboth steps of the sentence reduction inquiry, we could only speculate as to the basis for\\n\\nthe district courtβs decision.β Id.\\n\\n Upon remand, the district court stated in an order that it had once again reviewed\\n\\nMartinβs motion for a sentence reduction, counselβs correspondence to the court, and the\\n\\nGovernmentβs response in opposition. As an initial matter, the district court found\\n\\nMartin eligible for relief because the bottom of her Guidelines range had been reduced\\n\\nfrom life to 360 months under Amendment 782. However, the court determined that a\\n\\nsentence reduction was not warranted based on its discretion β[a]fter carefully weighing\\n\\nthe Β§ 3553(a) factors.β The court explained that Martin βran a large, multi-million-dollar,\\n\\nmulti-jurisdiction drug operation, spanning Maryland, Virginia, and the District of\\n\\nColumbia, and operated it for years. The seriousness of her actions and offenses cannot\\n\\neasily be overstated.β For those reasons and the ones βset forth in the Governmentβs\\n\\nResponse,β the court denied Martinβs motion for a sentence reduction. Martin timely\\n\\nfiled her notice of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over Martinβs appeal pursuant to 28\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n In 2006, Mangual entered into a guilty plea agreement for a nonviolent drug\\n\\noffense in violation of 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846. Mangual admitted that for about two years he\\n\\nengaged in a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving over 150 kilograms of cocaine and 20\\n\\nkilograms of heroin. The Presentence Report calculated Mangualβs adjusted combined\\n\\noffense level as a 36. Mangual had a 1994 drug offense and a criminal history category\\n\\nof II. His Sentencing Guidelines range was 210 to 262 monthsβ imprisonment.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f The district court sentenced Mangual to 262 monthsβ imprisonment, the top of the\\n\\nguidelines range. Mangualβs sentencing transcript is not in the record, and the only\\n\\nindication this Court has of the district courtβs reasoning is a brief note included in the\\n\\nStatement of Reasons in the courtβs Judgement. There, the district court stated that a\\n\\nβsentence at the top of the guideline range is appropriate because of the large quantity of\\n\\ndrugs and the defendantβs prior conviction of the same type of offense.β\\n\\n In April 2015, Mangual filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction under\\n\\nΒ§ 3582(c)(2), seeking the benefit of Amendment 782. Mangual contended that after the\\n\\napplication of Amendment 782, his Sentencing Guidelines range is 168 to 210 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonment. In a 2015 letter to the court, Mangual, a 75-year-old inmate at that time,\\n\\nasserted that, during his 10 years in prison, his sole disciplinary infraction was for\\n\\nmissing count when he did not hear the count call. He further notified the court that the\\n\\njail placed him on medical furloughs four times, that he has had open heart surgery, and\\n\\nthat he is in βchronic careβ and taking multiple medications. Mangual explained that the\\n\\nmother of his children is also sick, and he expressed his desire to spend his last years with\\n\\nher and their children, 15 grandchildren, and 8 great grandchildren. Mangual said he\\n\\nexhausted the educational opportunities he had access to while incarcerated. Moreover,\\n\\nMangual asserted that he has tried to better himself while in jail: he and another inmate\\n\\nβput together a concept called βThe People/The Solution,ββ which is βan educational and\\n\\nawareness tool to motivate the people to help othersβ and thereby help themselves.\\n\\n On December 14, 2016, the Federal Defender filed a motion on Mangualβs behalf,\\n\\nurging the court to reduce his sentence to 168 monthsβ imprisonment, the bottom of his\\n\\n 7\\n\\famended Guidelines range. Counsel emphasized that Mangual βwas not a leader or\\n\\nmanager of the conspiracy (of the 31 people charged, he was the 25th named defendant);\\n\\nhis conduct was not violent (he served as a middleman in drug sales); and he neither used\\n\\nnor possessed a weapon at any time.β Counsel also observed that Mangualβs post-\\n\\nsentencing conduct was βoutstandingβ: he βhas built a solid employment recordβ in\\n\\nprison; βhas completed his court-ordered financial obligationsβ; and βhas a nearly\\n\\nflawless disciplinary record.β Indeed, due to his exemplary conduct, he has been\\n\\ndesignated to a minimum-security facility and is eligible to work outside the prison\\n\\ncompound. Finally, counsel argued that Mangual was unlikely to recidivate due to his\\n\\nβadvanced age, his deteriorating health, and the stable home to which he will be\\n\\nreleased.β\\n\\n The probation officer agreed that Mangual was eligible for a sentence reduction\\n\\nbut recommended a sentence at the top of the amended rangeβ210 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonment. Similarly, in a response dated December 16, 2016, the Government did\\n\\nnot oppose a sentence reduction but objected to the extent of the relief sought by\\n\\nMangual and urged the court to impose a 210-month sentence. The Government\\n\\nexplained that it βaims to recommend an amended sentence that is consistent with the\\n\\noriginal sentenceβ and, therefore, Mangual βis eligible for a comparable sentence at the\\n\\ntop of the amended guidelines range.β In a footnote, the Government acknowledged\\n\\nMangualβs βapparently positive post-sentencing conduct, advanced age, and minimal\\n\\ncriminal historyβ but βrecommend[ed] a comparable sentence in the interest of fairness\\n\\nand consistency.β\\n\\n 8\\n\\f On December 21, 2016, the district court granted Mangualβs motion for a sentence\\n\\nreduction but did not reduce the sentence to the extent requested, instead imposing the\\n\\nsentence recommended by the Governmentβ210 monthsβ imprisonment. The court used\\n\\nthe standard form, which included a statement confirming that the court had taken into\\n\\naccount the policy statement in USSG Β§ 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors in Β§ 3553(a).\\n\\nThe parties filed motions arguing over the propriety of the district courtβs partial grant\\n\\nbased on the Governmentβs desire to have a sentence comparable to Mangualβs original\\n\\nterm of imprisonment. The district court agreed with the Governmentβs position.\\n\\nAccordingly, the court declined to modify its prior order. The court entered an order\\n\\ngranting in part Mangualβs motion for a reduced sentence on February 3, 2017 and\\n\\nreduced his sentence to 210 months. Mangual timely filed a notice of appeal on February\\n\\n17, 2017. This Court has jurisdiction over Mangualβs appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n In general, a court βmay not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been\\n\\nimposed.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3582(c). However, section 3582(c)(2) provides that a district\\n\\ncourt may reduce a sentence βin the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term\\n\\nof imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the\\n\\nSentencing Commission.β The Supreme Court promulgated a two-step process for\\n\\ndetermining where, and to what extent, a reduction is permissible under section\\n\\n3582(c)(2).\\n\\n 9\\n\\f First, the court is required βto follow the Commissionβs instructions in Β§ 1B1.10 to\\n\\ndetermine the prisonerβs eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the\\n\\nreduction authorized.β Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). In particular,\\n\\nsection β1B1.10(b)(1) requires the court to begin by determining the amended guideline\\n\\nrange that would have been applicable to the defendant had the relevant amendment been\\n\\nin effect at the time of the initial sentencing.β Dillon, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (internal\\n\\nquotation marks omitted). Second, the court is required to βconsider any applicable\\n\\nΒ§ 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by\\n\\nreference to the policies relevant at step one is warranted in whole or in part under the\\n\\nparticular circumstances of the case.β Id.\\n\\n This Court βreview[s] a district courtβs grant or denial of a Β§ 3582(c)(2) motion for\\n\\nabuse of discretion.β United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 2013).\\n\\nNonetheless, whether a court ruling on a motion to reduce under Β§ 3582(c)(2) must\\n\\nprovide an individualized explanation is considered de novo by this Court. Smalls, 720\\n\\nF.3d 193, 195.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The Supreme Courtβs recent holding in United States v. Chavez-Meza provides\\n\\nguidance regarding the level of detail a sentencing court must provide when evaluating\\n\\nsection 3582(c)(2) motions to reduce sentences like the ones filed by Martin and\\n\\nMangual. 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018). It held that β[a]t bottom, the sentencing judge need\\n\\n 10\\n\\fonly set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the partiesβ\\n\\narguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking\\n\\nauthority.β Id. at 1964 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme\\n\\nCourt sets forth a fact specific legal standard.\\n\\n Just how much of an explanation this requires, however, depends, as we\\n have said, upon the circumstances of the particular case. In some cases, it\\n may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review that the judge simply\\n relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has considered the\\n partiesβ arguments and taken account of the Β§ 3553(a) factors, among\\n others. But in other cases, more explanation may be necessary (depending,\\n perhaps, upon the legal arguments raised at sentencing).\\n\\nId. at 165. Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit, when evaluating the sufficiency of a\\n\\nsentencing courtβs explanation, there is a presumption that the district court sufficiently\\n\\nconsidered relevant factors in deciding a section 3582(c)(2) motion. United States v.\\n\\nLegree, 205 F.3d 724, 729-30 (4th Cir. 2000); Smalls, 720 F.3d at 196. Nonetheless, the\\n\\npresumption is not irrebuttable, and this Court in Legree suggested that a defendant failed\\n\\nto overcome the presumption because βhe point[ed] to no mitigating evidence which was\\n\\nnot before the sentencing court.β Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 730. Evidence of mitigating\\n\\nfactors not available at the original sentencing has indeed been used to rebut the Legree\\n\\npresumption. United States v. Hardy, 665 F. Appβx 268, 272 (4th Cir. 2016); United\\n\\nStates v. McKenzie, 318 F. Appβx 202, 204 (4th Cir. 2009).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n The district court improperly denied Martinβs motion to reduce her sentence by\\n\\nfailing to give her an individualized explanation for why it chose to deny her motion.\\n\\nSmalls, 720 F.3d at 198. The Supreme Court has clarified that the extent of explanation\\n\\n 11\\n\\frequired depends on the facts of each case, and βgiven the simplicity of [Chavez-Meza],\\n\\nthe judgeβs awareness of the arguments, his consideration of the relevant sentencing\\n\\nfactors, and the intuitive reason why he picked a sentence above the very bottom of the\\n\\nnew range,β the Court held that βthe judgeβs explanation (minimal as it was) fell within\\n\\nthe scope of the lawful professional judgment that the law confers upon the sentencing\\n\\njudge.β 138 S. Ct. at 1967-68.\\n\\n In contrast, the complexity of Martinβs case required the district court to provide a\\n\\nmore robust and detailed explanation for why it denied her motion to reduce. Martin has\\n\\npresented a mountain of new mitigating evidence that the sentencing court never\\n\\nevaluated. For example, Martin not only successfully pursued her GED but also became\\n\\na respected tutor for other inmates and helped incarcerated women follow her footsteps in\\n\\nachieving their educational goals. Martin exhibited such exemplary behavior while\\n\\nincarcerated that correctional staff moved her into a low security facility. Martin also\\n\\nsubmitted documentary evidence that corroborates her coursework and her good\\n\\nbehavior. Moreover, given her old age and marked rehabilitation, Martin argues that she\\n\\nis no longer a threat to society.\\n\\n The district court, during Martinβs remand proceedings, failed to address any of\\n\\nthis new mitigation evidence. In Chavez-Meza, the defendantβs educational classes and\\n\\n114-month sentence did not warrant a significant explanation of the district courtβs\\n\\nreasoning regarding the motion to reduce. In Martinβs case, her years of being both a\\n\\nstudent and now a tutor/instructor to other inmates, coupled with a sentence of life\\n\\nimprisonment, entitle her to a more robust explanation for why her mitigation evidence\\n\\n 12\\n\\fholds no weight. The failure to provide an individualized explanation, especially in light\\n\\nof the significant amount of mitigation evidence, runs afoul of Chavez-Meza and allows\\n\\nMartin to rebut the Fourth Circuitβs Legree presumption.\\n\\n The Supreme Court has made it clear that a βsentence modification is not a plenary\\n\\nresentencing proceeding. We therefore need not turn a blind eye to what the judge said at\\n\\npetitionerβs initial sentencing.β Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967 (internal quotations\\n\\nomitted). However, Martin does not ask this Court to disregard the old evidence of the\\n\\nrationale from her original sentence. Rather Martin asks this Court to follow our\\n\\nprecedent which requires a district court to consider evidence of post-sentencing\\n\\nmitigation that would be relevant to the Β§ 3553(a) factors.\\n\\n The explanation the district court provided upon remand was merely a recitation of\\n\\nMartinβs original criminal behavior. That is not the standard that the Supreme Court and\\n\\nthe Fourth Circuit articulate for sentence-reduction motions. The district court was\\n\\ncontent to memorialize Martinβs past transgressions without giving any weight to the\\n\\nmultitude of redemptive measures that Martin has taken since she was initially sentenced\\n\\nto life in prison. The Government at oral argument even conceded that Martinβs post-\\n\\nsentencing behavior is among the best that it has seen. Martinβs journey toward\\n\\nrehabilitation is especially noteworthy because she was given a life sentence and had no\\n\\nidea that Amendment 782 would eventually arrive to give her a glimmer of hope. Martin\\n\\nstrove to better herself and those around her without the prospect of any incentive or\\n\\nreward. The district court must provide an individualized explanation for why Martinβs\\n\\nsteps toward rehabilitation are meaningless. On remand, the district court should explain\\n\\n 13\\n\\fto Martin why her sentence of life imprisonment for a nonviolent drug offense must\\n\\nremain undisturbed despite overwhelming evidence of rehabilitation.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Mangual is also entitled to relief under the law of this Circuit and the Supreme\\n\\nCourt. As an initial matter, Mangual, like Martin, has significant evidence of mitigation\\n\\nthat was not addressed by the district court when it partially granted his motion. In his\\n\\nten years of incarceration Mangual has been a model inmate. The only infraction on his\\n\\ndisciplinary record stems from his failure to hear his name during count call. He has used\\n\\nhis time while incarcerated to create an educational and awareness tool to help his fellow\\n\\ninmates help each other. Mangualβs behavior has led to his placement in a minimum-\\n\\nsecurity facility. Prison officials trust Mangual at such a high level that he is allowed to\\n\\nwork outside of the prison compound. The evidence of his exemplary conduct must\\n\\nproperly be factored into the decision regarding his liberty interests. In addition,\\n\\nMangual argues that he is unlikely to recidivate due to his advanced age, deteriorating\\n\\nhealth, and stable home upon release. Given that there is no reference to Mangualβs new\\n\\nmitigation evidence, it is clear that the district court did not comply with the standards set\\n\\nforth in Chavez-Meza, and Mangual has rebutted the Legree presumption.\\n\\n Moreover, this Court lacks Mangualβs original sentencing transcript, and this\\n\\nomission provides another basis for remand given that we cannot conduct meaningful\\n\\nappellate review without such a transcript. See Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965. In a\\n\\nprior decision, this Court found that a defendant rebutted the Legree presumption in a\\n\\nsimilar situation where the record did not contain the original sentencing transcript.\\n\\n 14\\n\\fMcKenzie, 318 F. Appβx at 203. Here, without the transcript, this Court is left to\\n\\nspeculate as to the reasons that led to Mangualβs original sentence. At the initial\\n\\nsentencing hearing, the court explained in the statement of reasons that a sentence at the\\n\\ntop of the Guidelines range was appropriate because of the significant quantity of drugs\\n\\ninvolved in the offense and Mangualβs prior drug conviction. This Court cannot look to\\n\\nlanguage about drug quantities and ascertain how the original sentencing courtβs rationale\\n\\nwould interact with the host of mitigation evidence that arose post-sentencing. The\\n\\ndistrict court must provide Mangual an individualized explanation as to why his lengthy\\n\\nsentence for a nonviolent drug offense must remain only partially reduced given the\\n\\nsignificant amount of mitigation evidence that Mangual has proffered post sentencing.\\n\\n Chavez-Meza grants appellate courts broad discretion in reviewing section\\n\\n3582(c)(2) orders. βIf the court of appeals considers an explanation inadequate in a\\n\\nparticular case, it can send the case back to the district court for a more complete\\n\\nexplanation.β 138 S. Ct. at 1965. Here, given the complex record full of new mitigation\\n\\nevidence and the lack of the original sentencing transcript, this Court requires more\\n\\nexplanation. We cannot conduct a proper appellate review and must remand in order to\\n\\nensure that Mangualβs acts toward rehabilitation are properly examined and addressed\\n\\nthrough an individualized explanation.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n There is no right to a sentence reduction under Β§ 3582(c)(2). However, a district\\n\\ncourt cannot ignore a host of mitigation evidence and summarily deny a motion to reduce\\n\\n 15\\n\\fa sentence and leave both the defendant and the appellate court in the dark as to the\\n\\nreasons for its decision. This Court makes no assessments as to whether the motions to\\n\\nreduce appellantsβ sentences should have been granted or to what extent they should have\\n\\nbeen granted. However, the district court must provide a rationale as to why two\\n\\nindividuals who have placed themselves on a positive life trajectory, despite the\\n\\nchallenges of a lengthy period of incarceration, should receive no relief for their\\n\\nrehabilitation. The district court needs to explain to Martin and Mangual why their\\n\\nattempts at rehabilitation are futile. Accordingly, we vacate the district courtβs orders and\\n\\nremand the case for the district court to provide adequate reasoning for its decisions.\\n\\n\\n\\n VACATED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":570,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4594024,"string":"4,594,024"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Keith Wayne CARVER, Jr., Defendant - Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Keith Carver, Jr."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-4153"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Wilkinson, Niemeyer, King\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-4153\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nKEITH WAYNE CARVER, JR.,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at\\nGreenville. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (6:16-cr-00281-TMC-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: January 31, 2019 Decided: February 26, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge\\nNiemeyer and Judge King joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Emily Deck Harrill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\\nColumbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jeanne Howard, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\\nSherri A. Lydon, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fWILKINSON, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Keith Carver entered a guilty plea in 2016 on two counts: possession of at least\\n\\nfifteen access devices with intent to defraud and possession of device-making equipment\\n\\nwith intent to defraud. Later, in 2017, he pled guilty to an Information alleging\\n\\naggravated identity theft. In this appeal, Carver challenges the validity of the latter guilty\\n\\nplea. He also challenges various aspects of sentencing for the first two counts, including\\n\\nthe calculated amount of loss, the number of victims, and the district courtβs refusal to\\n\\ngrant him an acceptance of responsibility reduction. For the following reasons, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n What happens in Vegas may stay in Vegas, but during John Emmertβs visit there\\n\\nin 2015 he learned he was somehow also staying in Greenville, South Carolinaβor at\\n\\nleast, his credit card was. Alarmed, he called the hotel, and hotel staff called the police.\\n\\nAfter a little detective work, officers Jeffrey Long and Mike Dean obtained a warrant and\\n\\nsearched the room that Emmert had purportedly used his credit card to pay for. Keith\\n\\nCarver and Haidee Gillespie were inside, as well as an encoder machine (also called an\\n\\nβoverwriterβ), driverβs licenses in various names, banking paperwork, more than fifty gift\\n\\nand credit cards under various names, drug paraphernalia, and a laptop computer. Later,\\n\\nCarolyn Root, a recent burglary victim, identified the laptop and some cards and\\n\\npaperwork as hers. The officers arrested Carver. A grand jury indicted him on three\\n\\ncounts, and in September 2016, he pled guilty to two counts: possession of at least fifteen\\n\\naccess devices with intent to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(a)(2) and (3), and\\n\\n 2\\n\\fpossession of device-making equipment with intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1029(a)(2) and (4).\\n\\n Carver initially planned to go to trial on a third count for aggravated identity theft\\n\\nunder 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1028A. Upon reflection, and after learning that going to trial could\\n\\naffect his prospects for an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Carver\\n\\npled guilty to an Information alleging aggravated identity theft (the only difference\\n\\nbetween the Information and Count 3 of the indictment being the name of the victim).\\n\\n The Presentence Investigation Report calculated a base offense level of six for\\n\\nCounts 1 and 2. Because the offense involved the use of device-making equipment, the\\n\\nPSR added two levels under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i). In addition, the PSR recommended a four-level enhancement\\n\\nbecause the amount of loss was between $15,000 and $40,000 under U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(C). The amount of loss figure was calculated under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2B1.1 cmt.\\n\\nn.3(F)(i), which instructs that the loss per access device is always at least $500. Relying\\n\\non this, the PSR multiplied the number of cards found during the search of Carverβs room\\n\\n(fifty-three) by $500, then added the amounts which were more than $500 that were\\n\\ncharged on two devices ($540 and $1,342). The total was $28,382. The PSR next\\n\\nconcluded the offense involved twenty-seven victims; because this number exceeds ten,\\n\\nthat conclusion increased Carverβs offense level by two under U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). However, because the probation officer concluded Carver had\\n\\naccepted responsibility, the PSR gave him a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 3E1.1(a). The total offense level was therefore twelve in the PSR.\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Carver objected to the enhancements for the amount of loss and number of\\n\\nvictims. The district court held a hearing, at which Detective Mike Deanβone of the\\n\\nofficers who searched the roomβtestified. He explained that he found sixty-four cards in\\n\\nthe hotel room. Forty-four had numbers written on the back, which in his experience is\\n\\ncommon for fraudulent cards since it helps remind the user that the number on the front\\n\\nno longer matches what is encoded on the magnetic strip. He ran each card through a card\\n\\nreader to discern if the magnetic strip had been overwritten. Fifty-one of them had been.\\n\\nSome of the overwritten cards gave a readout of βEβ as part of the code, which he thought\\n\\nmight mean the strip now had nothing on it or was encoded improperly. Detective Dean\\n\\ntestified that he found identification documents for eighteen victims, and he identified all\\n\\neighteen by name. After this hearing, government counsel suggested that each\\n\\noverwritten card was an unauthorized access device, and so the proper number was fifty-\\n\\none (not fifty-three). The government also revised its submission for the number of\\n\\nvictims to eighteen (not twenty-seven). The district court agreed, but this change did not\\n\\naffect the offense level.\\n\\n After conducting this hearing and resolving Carverβs objections, the district court\\n\\nrequested argument on whether to grant an acceptance of responsibility reduction. The\\n\\nplea transcript for the first two counts showed that Carver had agreed that β[t]here were\\n\\nover 50 gift cards and credit cards in various names scattered throughout the room β¦.β\\n\\nJ.A. 128. The district court concluded, however, that Carverβs remorse was not credible,\\n\\nthat the sentencing objections were βessentially not warranted,β and that the objection to\\n\\nthe number of devices was in tension with facts agreed to in the plea transcript. It denied\\n\\n 4\\n\\fthe acceptance of responsibility reduction. Carverβs offense level was consequently 14,\\n\\nhis criminal history category being IV, and he was sentenced to 33 monthsβ imprisonment\\n\\non Counts 1 and 2 to run concurrently, at the high end of the Guidelines range. For the\\n\\nidentity theft charge, Carver received 24 monthsβ imprisonment, to be served consecutive\\n\\nto the first 33 months, as required by statute.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Carver challenges the validity of his guilty plea to the Information by pointing to\\n\\nvarious putative errors in the Rule 11 proceeding. Carver never objected to these\\n\\npurported errors, however, nor did he seek to withdraw his guilty plea. Notably, appellant\\n\\nhere challenges only his second guilty plea. There is no question respecting Counts 1 and\\n\\n2 of the indictment, only the Information alleging identity theft (which substituted for\\n\\nCount 3). In the relevant colloquy of February 16, 2017, Carver averred that he had\\n\\nreviewed his case with counsel, and he answered various questions under oath. He was\\n\\nforty-five; he attended college for two years; he was taking no medication or drugs.\\n\\nNeither counsel had any reservations in affirming that he was competent.\\n\\n The government then read the Information alleging that he knowingly and\\n\\nunlawfully possessed a means of identification and noting the maximum punishment. The\\n\\ngovernment likewise read the factual allegations, to which Carver agreed. The court then\\n\\nasked question after question assuring that Carver understood the nature and gravity of\\n\\nwhat he gave up by pleading guilty. He was waiving his right to go to trial, to be\\n\\npresumed innocent, to cross examine witnesses, to demand that the government prove all\\n\\n 5\\n\\felements, and to refrain from incriminating himself. J.A. 69-70. He stated that no one had\\n\\npromised him anything, and that knowing all this, he wished to plead guilty. Carverβs\\n\\nchallenges on appeal to this proceeding are insubstantial, and none comes close to\\n\\nmeeting a plain error standard.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Carver likewise lodges challenges to his sentencing on Counts 1 and 2. He raises\\n\\nthree arguments: first that the amount of loss caused by his criminal actions was\\n\\nmiscalculated, second that the number of victims was overstated, and third that the court\\n\\nerroneously refused to reduce his offense level in light of his acceptance of responsibility.\\n\\nWe deal with each in turn, holding that they are without merit. Questions of law are\\n\\nreviewed de novo, but factual findings will stand unless clearly erroneous. United States\\n\\nv. Horton, 693 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The first and most substantial objection is that the amount of loss for Counts 1 and\\n\\n2 was calculated improperly because the government failed to prove that each\\n\\nfraudulently altered card would actually work. The Guidelines commentary gives a\\n\\nβSpecial Rule[]β for βStolen or Counterfeit Credit Cards and Access Devices.β U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(i). That rule is: βloss includes any unauthorized charges made with\\n\\nthe β¦ unauthorized access device and shall be not less than $500 per access device.β Id.\\n\\nCarver argues that, because they were not proven to work, not every overwritten card\\n\\n 6\\n\\ffound in the hotel room counts as an βunauthorized access device,β and so the $500\\n\\nminimum should be applied to fewer devices.\\n\\n In United States v. Onyesoh, 674 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) the Ninth Circuit\\n\\nheld that a card is not an access device if it is not functional. The court reasoned as\\n\\nfollows: First, an βaccess deviceβ is by its statutory definition βany card β¦ account\\n\\nnumber β¦ or other means of account access that can be used β¦ to obtain money β¦ or\\n\\nany other thing of value.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(e)(1). Any device that cannot βbe used β¦ to\\n\\nobtain moneyβ is therefore not an access device at all. Second, an βunauthorized access\\n\\ndeviceβ is a subset of all access devices. Therefore, any device that cannot βbe usedβ to\\n\\nobtain money is not an unauthorized access device either. By this reasoning, the\\n\\ngovernment would have needed to show which of the fifty-one cards could at that\\n\\nmoment be used to obtain money, which it did not doβindeed, the district court included\\n\\nin the total those cards with an βEβ readout.\\n\\n We decline to adopt the Onyesoh usability standard. The full definition of\\n\\nβunauthorized access deviceβ refutes this argument: βthe term βunauthorized access\\n\\ndeviceβ means any access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or\\n\\nobtained with intent to defraud.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(e)(3) (emphasis added). Expired,\\n\\nrevoked, or canceled cards cannot be used to obtain money, and so Onyesoh would have\\n\\nthree words in its statutory definition that mean nothing. A better statutory reading is\\n\\napparent. Congress, mindful of the need to βencompass future technological changes,β\\n\\nH.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 19 (1984), wrote broadly to include any device of the general\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\fsort that people use to get money. The general words βcan be usedβ signify an intent to\\n\\nexpand the reach of the definition.\\n\\n This reading is perfectly natural. A salesperson describing the features of a\\n\\nuniversal remote control might say, βThis can be used on any model of television we\\n\\nsell.β No one would think the salesperson is representing that the remote control would\\n\\nbe currently functionalβit might need batteries, reprogramming, or various other\\n\\nadjustments before it would work. The promise is that it is the kind of thing that, under\\n\\nplausible circumstances, could change channels, adjust volume, and so forth on\\n\\ntelevisions. The same is true of a fraudulently altered card. Even if it could not complete\\n\\na transaction now, it is the type of thing that could do so, and was altered for precisely\\n\\nthat purpose.\\n\\n Reading the phrase βcan be usedβ in this way is consonant with including expired,\\n\\nrevoked, or canceled devices in the definition of βunauthorized access device.β There is\\n\\nno need to add an extra element of current functionality that prosecutors must prove in\\n\\nsentencing, especially when the $500 minimum and capacious definition of βaccess\\n\\ndeviceβ shows that Congress sought to make the calculation straightforward. We\\n\\ntherefore join the circuits that have rejected the usability standard from Onyesoh. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Popovski, 872 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Moon, 808\\n\\nF.3d 1085, 1092 (6th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Thomas, 841 F.3d 760, 764-65\\n\\n(8th Cir. 2016) (noting the circuit split and holding that a district court did not commit\\n\\nplain error by failing to evaluate usability).\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\f To meet the definition of unauthorized access device under 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1029(e)(3), therefore, the government did not need to show that each device was\\n\\ncurrently functional, but only that it was in principle the sort of thing that people use to\\n\\nobtain money (like a credit card or bank number). This it did prove. Detective Dean\\n\\nexamined each card and found that fifty-one were fraudulently overwritten. The district\\n\\ncourt did not err in accepting these as unauthorized access devices. And even if there\\n\\nwere some error, any small error would be harmless. The same Guidelines enhancement\\n\\nwould apply to any amount exceeding $15,000, while the district court calculated an\\n\\namount more than $10,000 higher than that.\\n\\n\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Carverβs second sentencing objection presented on appeal is that the number of\\n\\nvictims for Counts 1 and 2 was miscalculated. The argument does not appear to be\\n\\nspecific to any of the eighteen victims Detective Dean identified before the district court.\\n\\nInstead, the argument is simply that seeing their names on cards, bank account numbers,\\n\\nand identification documents is not enough to count them as victims absent corroborating\\n\\nevidence that they suffered pecuniary loss (which was presented for only two victims).\\n\\n This argument is meritless. Moreover, it was conceded below. When asked by the\\n\\ndistrict court whether the number of victims was βunder ten or over ten,β J.A. 122,\\n\\ndefense counsel responded:\\n\\n I asked him [Detective Dean] to identify the people and he has come up\\n with the names. So I got nothing more to say about that part. It is just a\\n question of whether you want to accept that testimony as people who they\\n\\n 9\\n\\f identify with this particular incident from 2015β¦. As far as the number of\\n victims, he has identified I think 18, anyway, victims in connection with\\n this case by name here in the courtroomβ¦. [W]e have clarity, I believe, on\\n the victim issue because the officer testified to that and I have nothing to\\n refute that. J.A. 122-23.\\n\\nThis concession is fatal to Carverβs appeal on this ground.\\n\\n Even on its own terms, Carverβs argument lacks merit. A βvictimβ is βany person\\n\\nwho sustained any part of the actual loss β¦.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. The actual loss,\\n\\nin turn, is, for cases involving an unauthorized access device, βany unauthorized charges\\n\\nmade with the β¦ device and shall be not less than $500 per access device.β U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(i). This provision takes note of the costs these types of crimes cause\\n\\nthat can be difficult to measure or proveβthe cost of taking protective and corrective\\n\\nmeasures, of harm to oneβs credit card rating, and so forth. It makes little sense to say in\\n\\none breath that the harm is never less than $500, then in the next to say the persons\\n\\naffected sustained no loss. The district court did not err in concluding that the eighteen\\n\\npersons identified were victims. The fact that their names were on a card or device here\\n\\nwas more than enough.\\n\\n\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Carverβs final objection to his sentencing on Counts 1 and 2 is that the district\\n\\ncourt erred in denying him an acceptance of responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 3E1.1(a). The defendant bears the burden of showing βhe has clearly recognized and\\n\\naffirmatively accepted personal responsibility for his criminal conduct,β and this βdoes\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\fnot flow automatically from a guilty plea.β United States v. May, 359 F.3d 683, 693 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2004). We review only for clear error. Id. at 688. There was no clear error here.\\n\\n The district court properly noted the delay caused by numerous objections and the\\n\\ndefendantβs seeming contradiction of facts he had previously agreed to. More\\n\\nimportantly, the district court, which heard from Carver in-person, concluded he βreally\\n\\nis not remorseful for what he has done. I donβt find his testimony that he is sorry for what\\n\\nhe has done to be credible.β J.A. 148-49. Pleading guilty is not enough, by itself, and we\\n\\nmust defer to the district courtβs credibility determination.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Financial fraud is a modern scourge. It preys especially upon the unsophisticated\\n\\nand vulnerable. As the district court noted, crimes like those in this case harm victims βin\\n\\nalmost irreparable ways by causing them loss of work, mental anguish, monetary loss,\\n\\nand loss of peace of mind.β J.A. 152. It raises costs for businesses, which must invest in\\n\\nsecurity measures. These crimes require time and expertise to investigate and can be\\n\\ndifficult to unravel and prove. This time, the government has done so, and the district\\n\\ncourt imposed a just sentence. The judgment is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371277/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILKINSON"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"NIEMEYER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594024/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Keith Wayne CARVER, Jr., Defendant - Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-4153\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nKEITH WAYNE CARVER, JR.,\n\n Defendant β Appellant.\n\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at\nGreenville. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (6:16-cr-00281-TMC-1)\n\n\nArgued: January 31, 2019 Decided: February 26, 2019\n\n\nBefore WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge\nNiemeyer and Judge King joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Emily Deck Harrill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\nColumbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jeanne Howard, OFFICE OF THE\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\nSherri A. Lydon, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\nATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.\n\fWILKINSON, Circuit Judge:\n\n Keith Carver entered a guilty plea in 2016 on two counts: possession of at least\n\nfifteen access devices with intent to defraud and possession of device-making equipment\n\nwith intent to defraud. Later, in 2017, he pled guilty to an Information alleging\n\naggravated identity theft. In this appeal, Carver challenges the validity of the latter guilty\n\nplea. He also challenges various aspects of sentencing for the first two counts, including\n\nthe calculated amount of loss, the number of victims, and the district courtβs refusal to\n\ngrant him an acceptance of responsibility reduction. For the following reasons, we affirm.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n What happens in Vegas may stay in Vegas, but during John Emmertβs visit there\n\nin 2015 he learned he was somehow also staying in Greenville, South Carolinaβor at\n\nleast, his credit card was. Alarmed, he called the hotel, and hotel staff called the police.\n\nAfter a little detective work, officers Jeffrey Long and Mike Dean obtained a warrant and\n\nsearched the room that Emmert had purportedly used his credit card to pay for. Keith\n\nCarver and Haidee Gillespie were inside, as well as an encoder machine (also called an\n\nβoverwriterβ), driverβs licenses in various names, banking paperwork, more than fifty gift\n\nand credit cards under various names, drug paraphernalia, and a laptop computer. Later,\n\nCarolyn Root, a recent burglary victim, identified the laptop and some cards and\n\npaperwork as hers. The officers arrested Carver. A grand jury indicted him on three\n\ncounts, and in September 2016, he pled guilty to two counts: possession of at least fifteen\n\naccess devices with intent to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(a)(2) and (3), and\n\n 2\n\fpossession of device-making equipment with intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 1029(a)(2) and (4).\n\n Carver initially planned to go to trial on a third count for aggravated identity theft\n\nunder 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1028A. Upon reflection, and after learning that going to trial could\n\naffect his prospects for an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Carver\n\npled guilty to an Information alleging aggravated identity theft (the only difference\n\nbetween the Information and Count 3 of the indictment being the name of the victim).\n\n The Presentence Investigation Report calculated a base offense level of six for\n\nCounts 1 and 2. Because the offense involved the use of device-making equipment, the\n\nPSR added two levels under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual\n\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i). In addition, the PSR recommended a four-level enhancement\n\nbecause the amount of loss was between $15,000 and $40,000 under U.S.S.G.\n\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(C). The amount of loss figure was calculated under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2B1.1 cmt.\n\nn.3(F)(i), which instructs that the loss per access device is always at least $500. Relying\n\non this, the PSR multiplied the number of cards found during the search of Carverβs room\n\n(fifty-three) by $500, then added the amounts which were more than $500 that were\n\ncharged on two devices ($540 and $1,342). The total was $28,382. The PSR next\n\nconcluded the offense involved twenty-seven victims; because this number exceeds ten,\n\nthat conclusion increased Carverβs offense level by two under U.S.S.G.\n\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). However, because the probation officer concluded Carver had\n\naccepted responsibility, the PSR gave him a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G.\n\nΒ§ 3E1.1(a). The total offense level was therefore twelve in the PSR.\n\n 3\n\f Carver objected to the enhancements for the amount of loss and number of\n\nvictims. The district court held a hearing, at which Detective Mike Deanβone of the\n\nofficers who searched the roomβtestified. He explained that he found sixty-four cards in\n\nthe hotel room. Forty-four had numbers written on the back, which in his experience is\n\ncommon for fraudulent cards since it helps remind the user that the number on the front\n\nno longer matches what is encoded on the magnetic strip. He ran each card through a card\n\nreader to discern if the magnetic strip had been overwritten. Fifty-one of them had been.\n\nSome of the overwritten cards gave a readout of βEβ as part of the code, which he thought\n\nmight mean the strip now had nothing on it or was encoded improperly. Detective Dean\n\ntestified that he found identification documents for eighteen victims, and he identified all\n\neighteen by name. After this hearing, government counsel suggested that each\n\noverwritten card was an unauthorized access device, and so the proper number was fifty-\n\none (not fifty-three). The government also revised its submission for the number of\n\nvictims to eighteen (not twenty-seven). The district court agreed, but this change did not\n\naffect the offense level.\n\n After conducting this hearing and resolving Carverβs objections, the district court\n\nrequested argument on whether to grant an acceptance of responsibility reduction. The\n\nplea transcript for the first two counts showed that Carver had agreed that β[t]here were\n\nover 50 gift cards and credit cards in various names scattered throughout the room β¦.β\n\nJ.A. 128. The district court concluded, however, that Carverβs remorse was not credible,\n\nthat the sentencing objections were βessentially not warranted,β and that the objection to\n\nthe number of devices was in tension with facts agreed to in the plea transcript. It denied\n\n 4\n\fthe acceptance of responsibility reduction. Carverβs offense level was consequently 14,\n\nhis criminal history category being IV, and he was sentenced to 33 monthsβ imprisonment\n\non Counts 1 and 2 to run concurrently, at the high end of the Guidelines range. For the\n\nidentity theft charge, Carver received 24 monthsβ imprisonment, to be served consecutive\n\nto the first 33 months, as required by statute.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n Carver challenges the validity of his guilty plea to the Information by pointing to\n\nvarious putative errors in the Rule 11 proceeding. Carver never objected to these\n\npurported errors, however, nor did he seek to withdraw his guilty plea. Notably, appellant\n\nhere challenges only his second guilty plea. There is no question respecting Counts 1 and\n\n2 of the indictment, only the Information alleging identity theft (which substituted for\n\nCount 3). In the relevant colloquy of February 16, 2017, Carver averred that he had\n\nreviewed his case with counsel, and he answered various questions under oath. He was\n\nforty-five; he attended college for two years; he was taking no medication or drugs.\n\nNeither counsel had any reservations in affirming that he was competent.\n\n The government then read the Information alleging that he knowingly and\n\nunlawfully possessed a means of identification and noting the maximum punishment. The\n\ngovernment likewise read the factual allegations, to which Carver agreed. The court then\n\nasked question after question assuring that Carver understood the nature and gravity of\n\nwhat he gave up by pleading guilty. He was waiving his right to go to trial, to be\n\npresumed innocent, to cross examine witnesses, to demand that the government prove all\n\n 5\n\felements, and to refrain from incriminating himself. J.A. 69-70. He stated that no one had\n\npromised him anything, and that knowing all this, he wished to plead guilty. Carverβs\n\nchallenges on appeal to this proceeding are insubstantial, and none comes close to\n\nmeeting a plain error standard.\n\n\n\n III.\n\n Carver likewise lodges challenges to his sentencing on Counts 1 and 2. He raises\n\nthree arguments: first that the amount of loss caused by his criminal actions was\n\nmiscalculated, second that the number of victims was overstated, and third that the court\n\nerroneously refused to reduce his offense level in light of his acceptance of responsibility.\n\nWe deal with each in turn, holding that they are without merit. Questions of law are\n\nreviewed de novo, but factual findings will stand unless clearly erroneous. United States\n\nv. Horton, 693 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir. 2012).\n\n\n\n A.\n\n The first and most substantial objection is that the amount of loss for Counts 1 and\n\n2 was calculated improperly because the government failed to prove that each\n\nfraudulently altered card would actually work. The Guidelines commentary gives a\n\nβSpecial Rule[]β for βStolen or Counterfeit Credit Cards and Access Devices.β U.S.S.G.\n\nΒ§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(i). That rule is: βloss includes any unauthorized charges made with\n\nthe β¦ unauthorized access device and shall be not less than $500 per access device.β Id.\n\nCarver argues that, because they were not proven to work, not every overwritten card\n\n 6\n\ffound in the hotel room counts as an βunauthorized access device,β and so the $500\n\nminimum should be applied to fewer devices.\n\n In United States v. Onyesoh, 674 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) the Ninth Circuit\n\nheld that a card is not an access device if it is not functional. The court reasoned as\n\nfollows: First, an βaccess deviceβ is by its statutory definition βany card β¦ account\n\nnumber β¦ or other means of account access that can be used β¦ to obtain money β¦ or\n\nany other thing of value.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(e)(1). Any device that cannot βbe used β¦ to\n\nobtain moneyβ is therefore not an access device at all. Second, an βunauthorized access\n\ndeviceβ is a subset of all access devices. Therefore, any device that cannot βbe usedβ to\n\nobtain money is not an unauthorized access device either. By this reasoning, the\n\ngovernment would have needed to show which of the fifty-one cards could at that\n\nmoment be used to obtain money, which it did not doβindeed, the district court included\n\nin the total those cards with an βEβ readout.\n\n We decline to adopt the Onyesoh usability standard. The full definition of\n\nβunauthorized access deviceβ refutes this argument: βthe term βunauthorized access\n\ndeviceβ means any access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or\n\nobtained with intent to defraud.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(e)(3) (emphasis added). Expired,\n\nrevoked, or canceled cards cannot be used to obtain money, and so Onyesoh would have\n\nthree words in its statutory definition that mean nothing. A better statutory reading is\n\napparent. Congress, mindful of the need to βencompass future technological changes,β\n\nH.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 19 (1984), wrote broadly to include any device of the general\n\n\n\n 7\n\fsort that people use to get money. The general words βcan be usedβ signify an intent to\n\nexpand the reach of the definition.\n\n This reading is perfectly natural. A salesperson describing the features of a\n\nuniversal remote control might say, βThis can be used on any model of television we\n\nsell.β No one would think the salesperson is representing that the remote control would\n\nbe currently functionalβit might need batteries, reprogramming, or various other\n\nadjustments before it would work. The promise is that it is the kind of thing that, under\n\nplausible circumstances, could change channels, adjust volume, and so forth on\n\ntelevisions. The same is true of a fraudulently altered card. Even if it could not complete\n\na transaction now, it is the type of thing that could do so, and was altered for precisely\n\nthat purpose.\n\n Reading the phrase βcan be usedβ in this way is consonant with including expired,\n\nrevoked, or canceled devices in the definition of βunauthorized access device.β There is\n\nno need to add an extra element of current functionality that prosecutors must prove in\n\nsentencing, especially when the $500 minimum and capacious definition of βaccess\n\ndeviceβ shows that Congress sought to make the calculation straightforward. We\n\ntherefore join the circuits that have rejected the usability standard from Onyesoh. See\n\nUnited States v. Popovski, 872 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Moon, 808\n\nF.3d 1085, 1092 (6th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Thomas, 841 F.3d 760, 764-65\n\n(8th Cir. 2016) (noting the circuit split and holding that a district court did not commit\n\nplain error by failing to evaluate usability).\n\n\n\n 8\n\f To meet the definition of unauthorized access device under 18 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 1029(e)(3), therefore, the government did not need to show that each device was\n\ncurrently functional, but only that it was in principle the sort of thing that people use to\n\nobtain money (like a credit card or bank number). This it did prove. Detective Dean\n\nexamined each card and found that fifty-one were fraudulently overwritten. The district\n\ncourt did not err in accepting these as unauthorized access devices. And even if there\n\nwere some error, any small error would be harmless. The same Guidelines enhancement\n\nwould apply to any amount exceeding $15,000, while the district court calculated an\n\namount more than $10,000 higher than that.\n\n\n\n B.\n\n Carverβs second sentencing objection presented on appeal is that the number of\n\nvictims for Counts 1 and 2 was miscalculated. The argument does not appear to be\n\nspecific to any of the eighteen victims Detective Dean identified before the district court.\n\nInstead, the argument is simply that seeing their names on cards, bank account numbers,\n\nand identification documents is not enough to count them as victims absent corroborating\n\nevidence that they suffered pecuniary loss (which was presented for only two victims).\n\n This argument is meritless. Moreover, it was conceded below. When asked by the\n\ndistrict court whether the number of victims was βunder ten or over ten,β J.A. 122,\n\ndefense counsel responded:\n\n I asked him [Detective Dean] to identify the people and he has come up\n with the names. So I got nothing more to say about that part. It is just a\n question of whether you want to accept that testimony as people who they\n\n 9\n\f identify with this particular incident from 2015β¦. As far as the number of\n victims, he has identified I think 18, anyway, victims in connection with\n this case by name here in the courtroomβ¦. [W]e have clarity, I believe, on\n the victim issue because the officer testified to that and I have nothing to\n refute that. J.A. 122-23.\n\nThis concession is fatal to Carverβs appeal on this ground.\n\n Even on its own terms, Carverβs argument lacks merit. A βvictimβ is βany person\n\nwho sustained any part of the actual loss β¦.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. The actual loss,\n\nin turn, is, for cases involving an unauthorized access device, βany unauthorized charges\n\nmade with the β¦ device and shall be not less than $500 per access device.β U.S.S.G.\n\nΒ§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(i). This provision takes note of the costs these types of crimes cause\n\nthat can be difficult to measure or proveβthe cost of taking protective and corrective\n\nmeasures, of harm to oneβs credit card rating, and so forth. It makes little sense to say in\n\none breath that the harm is never less than $500, then in the next to say the persons\n\naffected sustained no loss. The district court did not err in concluding that the eighteen\n\npersons identified were victims. The fact that their names were on a card or device here\n\nwas more than enough.\n\n\n\n C.\n\n Carverβs final objection to his sentencing on Counts 1 and 2 is that the district\n\ncourt erred in denying him an acceptance of responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G.\n\nΒ§ 3E1.1(a). The defendant bears the burden of showing βhe has clearly recognized and\n\naffirmatively accepted personal responsibility for his criminal conduct,β and this βdoes\n\n\n\n 10\n\fnot flow automatically from a guilty plea.β United States v. May, 359 F.3d 683, 693 (4th\n\nCir. 2004). We review only for clear error. Id. at 688. There was no clear error here.\n\n The district court properly noted the delay caused by numerous objections and the\n\ndefendantβs seeming contradiction of facts he had previously agreed to. More\n\nimportantly, the district court, which heard from Carver in-person, concluded he βreally\n\nis not remorseful for what he has done. I donβt find his testimony that he is sorry for what\n\nhe has done to be credible.β J.A. 148-49. Pleading guilty is not enough, by itself, and we\n\nmust defer to the district courtβs credibility determination.\n\n\n\n IV.\n\n Financial fraud is a modern scourge. It preys especially upon the unsophisticated\n\nand vulnerable. As the district court noted, crimes like those in this case harm victims βin\n\nalmost irreparable ways by causing them loss of work, mental anguish, monetary loss,\n\nand loss of peace of mind.β J.A. 152. It raises costs for businesses, which must invest in\n\nsecurity measures. These crimes require time and expertise to investigate and can be\n\ndifficult to unravel and prove. This time, the government has done so, and the district\n\ncourt imposed a just sentence. The judgment is\n\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 11\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Keith Wayne CARVER, Jr., Defendant - Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-4153\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nKEITH WAYNE CARVER, JR.,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at\\nGreenville. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (6:16-cr-00281-TMC-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: January 31, 2019 Decided: February 26, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge\\nNiemeyer and Judge King joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Emily Deck Harrill, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,\\nColumbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jeanne Howard, OFFICE OF THE\\nUNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:\\nSherri A. Lydon, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES\\nATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fWILKINSON, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Keith Carver entered a guilty plea in 2016 on two counts: possession of at least\\n\\nfifteen access devices with intent to defraud and possession of device-making equipment\\n\\nwith intent to defraud. Later, in 2017, he pled guilty to an Information alleging\\n\\naggravated identity theft. In this appeal, Carver challenges the validity of the latter guilty\\n\\nplea. He also challenges various aspects of sentencing for the first two counts, including\\n\\nthe calculated amount of loss, the number of victims, and the district courtβs refusal to\\n\\ngrant him an acceptance of responsibility reduction. For the following reasons, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n What happens in Vegas may stay in Vegas, but during John Emmertβs visit there\\n\\nin 2015 he learned he was somehow also staying in Greenville, South Carolinaβor at\\n\\nleast, his credit card was. Alarmed, he called the hotel, and hotel staff called the police.\\n\\nAfter a little detective work, officers Jeffrey Long and Mike Dean obtained a warrant and\\n\\nsearched the room that Emmert had purportedly used his credit card to pay for. Keith\\n\\nCarver and Haidee Gillespie were inside, as well as an encoder machine (also called an\\n\\nβoverwriterβ), driverβs licenses in various names, banking paperwork, more than fifty gift\\n\\nand credit cards under various names, drug paraphernalia, and a laptop computer. Later,\\n\\nCarolyn Root, a recent burglary victim, identified the laptop and some cards and\\n\\npaperwork as hers. The officers arrested Carver. A grand jury indicted him on three\\n\\ncounts, and in September 2016, he pled guilty to two counts: possession of at least fifteen\\n\\naccess devices with intent to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(a)(2) and (3), and\\n\\n 2\\n\\fpossession of device-making equipment with intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1029(a)(2) and (4).\\n\\n Carver initially planned to go to trial on a third count for aggravated identity theft\\n\\nunder 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1028A. Upon reflection, and after learning that going to trial could\\n\\naffect his prospects for an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Carver\\n\\npled guilty to an Information alleging aggravated identity theft (the only difference\\n\\nbetween the Information and Count 3 of the indictment being the name of the victim).\\n\\n The Presentence Investigation Report calculated a base offense level of six for\\n\\nCounts 1 and 2. Because the offense involved the use of device-making equipment, the\\n\\nPSR added two levels under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(i). In addition, the PSR recommended a four-level enhancement\\n\\nbecause the amount of loss was between $15,000 and $40,000 under U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(C). The amount of loss figure was calculated under U.S.S.G. Β§ 2B1.1 cmt.\\n\\nn.3(F)(i), which instructs that the loss per access device is always at least $500. Relying\\n\\non this, the PSR multiplied the number of cards found during the search of Carverβs room\\n\\n(fifty-three) by $500, then added the amounts which were more than $500 that were\\n\\ncharged on two devices ($540 and $1,342). The total was $28,382. The PSR next\\n\\nconcluded the offense involved twenty-seven victims; because this number exceeds ten,\\n\\nthat conclusion increased Carverβs offense level by two under U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). However, because the probation officer concluded Carver had\\n\\naccepted responsibility, the PSR gave him a two-level reduction under U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 3E1.1(a). The total offense level was therefore twelve in the PSR.\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Carver objected to the enhancements for the amount of loss and number of\\n\\nvictims. The district court held a hearing, at which Detective Mike Deanβone of the\\n\\nofficers who searched the roomβtestified. He explained that he found sixty-four cards in\\n\\nthe hotel room. Forty-four had numbers written on the back, which in his experience is\\n\\ncommon for fraudulent cards since it helps remind the user that the number on the front\\n\\nno longer matches what is encoded on the magnetic strip. He ran each card through a card\\n\\nreader to discern if the magnetic strip had been overwritten. Fifty-one of them had been.\\n\\nSome of the overwritten cards gave a readout of βEβ as part of the code, which he thought\\n\\nmight mean the strip now had nothing on it or was encoded improperly. Detective Dean\\n\\ntestified that he found identification documents for eighteen victims, and he identified all\\n\\neighteen by name. After this hearing, government counsel suggested that each\\n\\noverwritten card was an unauthorized access device, and so the proper number was fifty-\\n\\none (not fifty-three). The government also revised its submission for the number of\\n\\nvictims to eighteen (not twenty-seven). The district court agreed, but this change did not\\n\\naffect the offense level.\\n\\n After conducting this hearing and resolving Carverβs objections, the district court\\n\\nrequested argument on whether to grant an acceptance of responsibility reduction. The\\n\\nplea transcript for the first two counts showed that Carver had agreed that β[t]here were\\n\\nover 50 gift cards and credit cards in various names scattered throughout the room β¦.β\\n\\nJ.A. 128. The district court concluded, however, that Carverβs remorse was not credible,\\n\\nthat the sentencing objections were βessentially not warranted,β and that the objection to\\n\\nthe number of devices was in tension with facts agreed to in the plea transcript. It denied\\n\\n 4\\n\\fthe acceptance of responsibility reduction. Carverβs offense level was consequently 14,\\n\\nhis criminal history category being IV, and he was sentenced to 33 monthsβ imprisonment\\n\\non Counts 1 and 2 to run concurrently, at the high end of the Guidelines range. For the\\n\\nidentity theft charge, Carver received 24 monthsβ imprisonment, to be served consecutive\\n\\nto the first 33 months, as required by statute.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Carver challenges the validity of his guilty plea to the Information by pointing to\\n\\nvarious putative errors in the Rule 11 proceeding. Carver never objected to these\\n\\npurported errors, however, nor did he seek to withdraw his guilty plea. Notably, appellant\\n\\nhere challenges only his second guilty plea. There is no question respecting Counts 1 and\\n\\n2 of the indictment, only the Information alleging identity theft (which substituted for\\n\\nCount 3). In the relevant colloquy of February 16, 2017, Carver averred that he had\\n\\nreviewed his case with counsel, and he answered various questions under oath. He was\\n\\nforty-five; he attended college for two years; he was taking no medication or drugs.\\n\\nNeither counsel had any reservations in affirming that he was competent.\\n\\n The government then read the Information alleging that he knowingly and\\n\\nunlawfully possessed a means of identification and noting the maximum punishment. The\\n\\ngovernment likewise read the factual allegations, to which Carver agreed. The court then\\n\\nasked question after question assuring that Carver understood the nature and gravity of\\n\\nwhat he gave up by pleading guilty. He was waiving his right to go to trial, to be\\n\\npresumed innocent, to cross examine witnesses, to demand that the government prove all\\n\\n 5\\n\\felements, and to refrain from incriminating himself. J.A. 69-70. He stated that no one had\\n\\npromised him anything, and that knowing all this, he wished to plead guilty. Carverβs\\n\\nchallenges on appeal to this proceeding are insubstantial, and none comes close to\\n\\nmeeting a plain error standard.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Carver likewise lodges challenges to his sentencing on Counts 1 and 2. He raises\\n\\nthree arguments: first that the amount of loss caused by his criminal actions was\\n\\nmiscalculated, second that the number of victims was overstated, and third that the court\\n\\nerroneously refused to reduce his offense level in light of his acceptance of responsibility.\\n\\nWe deal with each in turn, holding that they are without merit. Questions of law are\\n\\nreviewed de novo, but factual findings will stand unless clearly erroneous. United States\\n\\nv. Horton, 693 F.3d 463, 474 (4th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n\\n\\n A.\\n\\n The first and most substantial objection is that the amount of loss for Counts 1 and\\n\\n2 was calculated improperly because the government failed to prove that each\\n\\nfraudulently altered card would actually work. The Guidelines commentary gives a\\n\\nβSpecial Rule[]β for βStolen or Counterfeit Credit Cards and Access Devices.β U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(i). That rule is: βloss includes any unauthorized charges made with\\n\\nthe β¦ unauthorized access device and shall be not less than $500 per access device.β Id.\\n\\nCarver argues that, because they were not proven to work, not every overwritten card\\n\\n 6\\n\\ffound in the hotel room counts as an βunauthorized access device,β and so the $500\\n\\nminimum should be applied to fewer devices.\\n\\n In United States v. Onyesoh, 674 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) the Ninth Circuit\\n\\nheld that a card is not an access device if it is not functional. The court reasoned as\\n\\nfollows: First, an βaccess deviceβ is by its statutory definition βany card β¦ account\\n\\nnumber β¦ or other means of account access that can be used β¦ to obtain money β¦ or\\n\\nany other thing of value.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(e)(1). Any device that cannot βbe used β¦ to\\n\\nobtain moneyβ is therefore not an access device at all. Second, an βunauthorized access\\n\\ndeviceβ is a subset of all access devices. Therefore, any device that cannot βbe usedβ to\\n\\nobtain money is not an unauthorized access device either. By this reasoning, the\\n\\ngovernment would have needed to show which of the fifty-one cards could at that\\n\\nmoment be used to obtain money, which it did not doβindeed, the district court included\\n\\nin the total those cards with an βEβ readout.\\n\\n We decline to adopt the Onyesoh usability standard. The full definition of\\n\\nβunauthorized access deviceβ refutes this argument: βthe term βunauthorized access\\n\\ndeviceβ means any access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or\\n\\nobtained with intent to defraud.β 18 U.S.C. Β§ 1029(e)(3) (emphasis added). Expired,\\n\\nrevoked, or canceled cards cannot be used to obtain money, and so Onyesoh would have\\n\\nthree words in its statutory definition that mean nothing. A better statutory reading is\\n\\napparent. Congress, mindful of the need to βencompass future technological changes,β\\n\\nH.R. Rep. No. 98-894, at 19 (1984), wrote broadly to include any device of the general\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\fsort that people use to get money. The general words βcan be usedβ signify an intent to\\n\\nexpand the reach of the definition.\\n\\n This reading is perfectly natural. A salesperson describing the features of a\\n\\nuniversal remote control might say, βThis can be used on any model of television we\\n\\nsell.β No one would think the salesperson is representing that the remote control would\\n\\nbe currently functionalβit might need batteries, reprogramming, or various other\\n\\nadjustments before it would work. The promise is that it is the kind of thing that, under\\n\\nplausible circumstances, could change channels, adjust volume, and so forth on\\n\\ntelevisions. The same is true of a fraudulently altered card. Even if it could not complete\\n\\na transaction now, it is the type of thing that could do so, and was altered for precisely\\n\\nthat purpose.\\n\\n Reading the phrase βcan be usedβ in this way is consonant with including expired,\\n\\nrevoked, or canceled devices in the definition of βunauthorized access device.β There is\\n\\nno need to add an extra element of current functionality that prosecutors must prove in\\n\\nsentencing, especially when the $500 minimum and capacious definition of βaccess\\n\\ndeviceβ shows that Congress sought to make the calculation straightforward. We\\n\\ntherefore join the circuits that have rejected the usability standard from Onyesoh. See\\n\\nUnited States v. Popovski, 872 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Moon, 808\\n\\nF.3d 1085, 1092 (6th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Thomas, 841 F.3d 760, 764-65\\n\\n(8th Cir. 2016) (noting the circuit split and holding that a district court did not commit\\n\\nplain error by failing to evaluate usability).\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\f To meet the definition of unauthorized access device under 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1029(e)(3), therefore, the government did not need to show that each device was\\n\\ncurrently functional, but only that it was in principle the sort of thing that people use to\\n\\nobtain money (like a credit card or bank number). This it did prove. Detective Dean\\n\\nexamined each card and found that fifty-one were fraudulently overwritten. The district\\n\\ncourt did not err in accepting these as unauthorized access devices. And even if there\\n\\nwere some error, any small error would be harmless. The same Guidelines enhancement\\n\\nwould apply to any amount exceeding $15,000, while the district court calculated an\\n\\namount more than $10,000 higher than that.\\n\\n\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Carverβs second sentencing objection presented on appeal is that the number of\\n\\nvictims for Counts 1 and 2 was miscalculated. The argument does not appear to be\\n\\nspecific to any of the eighteen victims Detective Dean identified before the district court.\\n\\nInstead, the argument is simply that seeing their names on cards, bank account numbers,\\n\\nand identification documents is not enough to count them as victims absent corroborating\\n\\nevidence that they suffered pecuniary loss (which was presented for only two victims).\\n\\n This argument is meritless. Moreover, it was conceded below. When asked by the\\n\\ndistrict court whether the number of victims was βunder ten or over ten,β J.A. 122,\\n\\ndefense counsel responded:\\n\\n I asked him [Detective Dean] to identify the people and he has come up\\n with the names. So I got nothing more to say about that part. It is just a\\n question of whether you want to accept that testimony as people who they\\n\\n 9\\n\\f identify with this particular incident from 2015β¦. As far as the number of\\n victims, he has identified I think 18, anyway, victims in connection with\\n this case by name here in the courtroomβ¦. [W]e have clarity, I believe, on\\n the victim issue because the officer testified to that and I have nothing to\\n refute that. J.A. 122-23.\\n\\nThis concession is fatal to Carverβs appeal on this ground.\\n\\n Even on its own terms, Carverβs argument lacks merit. A βvictimβ is βany person\\n\\nwho sustained any part of the actual loss β¦.β U.S.S.G. Β§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. The actual loss,\\n\\nin turn, is, for cases involving an unauthorized access device, βany unauthorized charges\\n\\nmade with the β¦ device and shall be not less than $500 per access device.β U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(i). This provision takes note of the costs these types of crimes cause\\n\\nthat can be difficult to measure or proveβthe cost of taking protective and corrective\\n\\nmeasures, of harm to oneβs credit card rating, and so forth. It makes little sense to say in\\n\\none breath that the harm is never less than $500, then in the next to say the persons\\n\\naffected sustained no loss. The district court did not err in concluding that the eighteen\\n\\npersons identified were victims. The fact that their names were on a card or device here\\n\\nwas more than enough.\\n\\n\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Carverβs final objection to his sentencing on Counts 1 and 2 is that the district\\n\\ncourt erred in denying him an acceptance of responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G.\\n\\nΒ§ 3E1.1(a). The defendant bears the burden of showing βhe has clearly recognized and\\n\\naffirmatively accepted personal responsibility for his criminal conduct,β and this βdoes\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\fnot flow automatically from a guilty plea.β United States v. May, 359 F.3d 683, 693 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2004). We review only for clear error. Id. at 688. There was no clear error here.\\n\\n The district court properly noted the delay caused by numerous objections and the\\n\\ndefendantβs seeming contradiction of facts he had previously agreed to. More\\n\\nimportantly, the district court, which heard from Carver in-person, concluded he βreally\\n\\nis not remorseful for what he has done. I donβt find his testimony that he is sorry for what\\n\\nhe has done to be credible.β J.A. 148-49. Pleading guilty is not enough, by itself, and we\\n\\nmust defer to the district courtβs credibility determination.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n Financial fraud is a modern scourge. It preys especially upon the unsophisticated\\n\\nand vulnerable. As the district court noted, crimes like those in this case harm victims βin\\n\\nalmost irreparable ways by causing them loss of work, mental anguish, monetary loss,\\n\\nand loss of peace of mind.β J.A. 152. It raises costs for businesses, which must invest in\\n\\nsecurity measures. These crimes require time and expertise to investigate and can be\\n\\ndifficult to unravel and prove. This time, the government has done so, and the district\\n\\ncourt imposed a just sentence. The judgment is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":571,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4594028,"string":"4,594,028"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Antonio Tillmon"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-26"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-4648"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before NIEMEYER, AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"AGEE, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-4648\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nANTONIO TILLMON,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\\nElizabeth City. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (2:15-cr-00009-H-9)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 26, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion,\\nin which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Diaz joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Paul K. Sun, Jr., ELLIS & WINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for\\nAppellant. Banumathi Rangarajan, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,\\nRaleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kelly Margolis Dagger, ELLIS &\\nWINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United\\nStates Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Acting First Assistant United States Attorney,\\nBarbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fAGEE, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n After being caught in a sting operation aimed at exposing corrupt law enforcement\\n\\nofficers, Antonio Tillmon was convicted by a jury on multiple counts: conspiracy to\\n\\ncommit drug trafficking, conspiracy to use firearms while drug trafficking, attempted\\n\\npossession of heroin with intent to distribute, using or carrying a firearm while drug\\n\\ntrafficking, and three counts of federal programs bribery. On appeal, Tillmon challenges\\n\\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal as to these offenses and\\n\\nits admission of a video-recorded conversation between Tillmon and an undercover agent.\\n\\nFor the reasons discussed below, we affirm the conspiracy, attempted possession and\\n\\nfirearms convictions, but vacate the federal programs bribery convictions.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Tillmonβs prosecution arose from a multi-year FBI investigation into reports of law\\n\\nenforcement corruption in the counties of Northampton and Halifax, North Carolina. 1 This\\n\\ninvestigation, βOperation Rockfish,β began in 2013 after the FBI received information that\\n\\nLann Clanton, a police officer with the Weldon, North Carolina, Police Department, was\\n\\ninvolved in criminal activity. Operation Rockfish consisted of undercover agents posing as\\n\\nmembers of a transnational drug trafficking organization (βDTOβ) that transported\\n\\nkilograms of heroin and cocaine to New York City. Part of the DTOβs strategy was\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We recite the facts established at trial in the light most favorable to the\\nGovernment. United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).\\n 2\\n\\fβspecifically tr[ying] to recruit law enforcement officers for their ability to badge their way\\n\\nout of legitimate traffic stops by other law enforcement officers.β J.A. 406.\\n\\n The FBI established a βgeneral templateβ for the DTO, setting up a warehouse to\\n\\nprepare βcocaineβ and βheroinβ for shipment by storing those drugs in hidden\\n\\ncompartments of vehicles. J.A. 412. No real drugs were used, but a lookalike substance\\n\\nwas packaged to βlook like kilograms of illegal drugs that had been seized in other\\n\\ninvestigations.β J.A. 411. Ten one-kilogram packages were color-coded to identify the type\\n\\nof drug each package purportedly contained. Once the packages were loaded into a vehicle\\n\\nfor transport (βthe load vehicleβ), team members rode in that vehicle, a scout vehicle that\\n\\ndrove ahead of it, and a rear guard vehicle that drove behind it.\\n\\n Once the ersatz DTO was operational, the FBI used a confidential informant to let\\n\\nClanton know about its existence. Clanton then contacted the DTO, where his first\\n\\nassignment was to recruit law enforcement officers to implement the DTOβs cover strategy.\\n\\nClantonβs first recruit was Ikeisha Jacobs, another member of the Weldon Police\\n\\nDepartment. Clanton and Jacobs then enlisted other current and former law enforcement\\n\\nand correctional officers to join their teams.\\n\\n Jacobs recruited Tillmon, a former coworker, for her team. At the time he was\\n\\nrecruited to the DTO, Tillmon was a police officer with the Windsor, North Carolina,\\n\\nPolice Department. On August 19, 2014, Jacobs invited Tillmon to join her and other team\\n\\nmembers for a preparatory meeting. The gathering included Jacobs, two undercover FBI\\n\\nagents (John and Lisa), and four new recruits (Adrienne Moody, Alaina Sue-Kam-Lang,\\n\\nCrystal Pierce, and Tillmon). During the meeting, the undercover agents and Jacobs\\n\\n 3\\n\\fdescribed the plan for the next dayβs transport and explained the DTOβs reason for using\\n\\nlaw enforcement officers. They gave the team members a cover story to use if police\\n\\nstopped them during the transport: they were transporting a vehicle that had been sold out\\n\\nof state. During the meeting, one undercover agent asked whether the recruits carried guns.\\n\\nTillmon indicated that he would carry his gun. Toward the end of the meeting, the agents\\n\\ntold the recruits that they did not have to participate in the operation if they wanted out.\\n\\n The next morning (βthe August 2014 transportβ), Tillmon picked up Jacobs and Sue-\\n\\nKam-Lang before driving to a prearranged rendezvous point where they met Lisa and other\\n\\nteam members. They all then drove to a warehouse in Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Upon\\n\\narrival, Tillmon helped move a large white cooler from one area of the warehouse to the\\n\\nback of the load vehicle, a white GMC Acadia. One of the undercover agents, Paul, pulled\\n\\nout ten packages from underneath the ice and drinks in the cooler, counted them, and put\\n\\nthem on the ground. Paul handed the packages to John, another agent, who was underneath\\n\\nthe Acadia putting the packages into a hidden compartment. Tillmon never touched the\\n\\npackages, but he watched as they were loaded into the compartment in plain view of him\\n\\nand the other team members. 2 While standing behind the vehicle, Lisa explained to Tillmon\\n\\nthat they were βstarting to move H.β J.A. 591β92. Lisa testified at trial that by βHβ she\\n\\nmeant βheroin,β though she did not clarify her meaning to the team members at the time.\\n\\n After the packages were stored in the Acadia, it and two other vehicles caravanned\\n\\nto National Harbor in Maryland. Jacobs drove the load vehicle, two team members drove\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The trial evidence shows that Tillmon did not touch, handle, or assist in loading\\nthe staged packages into the vehicles during any of the events described.\\n 4\\n\\fthe scout vehicle, and Tillmon and Sue-Kam-Lang followed as the rear guard. When they\\n\\narrived at National Harbor, the team members met βTee,β another undercover agent who\\n\\nwas posing as the supervisor of that portion of the route. Tee and the team boarded an\\n\\nenclosed car of a Ferris wheel, where Tee paid each member of the group. Tillmon received\\n\\n$2,000 and then returned to North Carolina.\\n\\n In October 2014 (βthe October 2014 transportβ), Jacobs and Tillmon rode together\\n\\nto the Rocky Mount warehouse. While waiting for drugs to be loaded into the hidden\\n\\ncompartment of the load vehicle, Tillmon was shown a fake bill of sale that would back\\n\\ntheir cover story. This time, Tillmon drove the load vehicle to the parking lot of an outlet\\n\\nmall in Maryland. He then got into a large van, where Tee paid him and the other team\\n\\nmembers. Tee paid Tillmon $2,000.\\n\\n In March 2015 (βthe March 2015 transportβ), Jacobs asked Tillmon to join her a\\n\\nthird time. When Tillmon arrived at the Rocky Mount warehouse, the agents had a pickup\\n\\ntruck staged with packages of drugs laid out in plain view on the tailgate. The team\\n\\nmembers, including Tillmon, walked by the back of the truck as they entered the\\n\\nwarehouseβs office. Inside, Lisa asked everyone if they had guns; after Sue-Kam-Lang\\n\\nindicated that she did not have a gun, Tillmon gave her one of his extra guns.\\n\\n The team exited the office and went back into the main part of the warehouse. As\\n\\nthe drugs were being loaded into the hidden compartment of the vehicle, Lisa said, βyou\\n\\nguys got to be carrying from now on . . . a million dollars of heroin, you canβt f[***] around\\n\\nwith that.β Supp. J.A. 1625 at 12:47:16β47:24. She was within three feet of Tillmon as she\\n\\nspoke.\\n\\n 5\\n\\f After the drugs were loaded, the team departed, with Tillmon and Jacobs driving the\\n\\nrear guard vehicle. After the team left the load vehicle at a carport in Maryland, they met\\n\\nTee at the same outlet mall parking lot as in October. Each member entered Teeβs vehicle\\n\\nseparately, where they were paid. As Tillmon was paid $2,500, Tee asked him if he was\\n\\ncarrying a gun, and Tillmon confirmed he was. Then Tee indicated he was interested in\\n\\ngetting a small firearm. Tillmon responded, βWhat [do] you need?β and Tee said he wanted\\n\\nβa thirty-eight (.38), something small, a revolver that donβt need no shells, know what I\\n\\nmean?β J.A. 1402. Tillmon recommended a few firearms that would meet Teeβs need to\\n\\nβjust walk right up on βem and keep rollingβ and βboom-boom and then throw that s[***]\\n\\naway and [not worry] about it no more.β J.A. 1403β04. Tee asked Tillmon to let him know\\n\\nif he heard of anything available, and Tillmon replied, βOkay . . . . Weβll talk.β J.A. 1404.\\n\\nTillmon exited Teeβs vehicle and returned to North Carolina.\\n\\n In April 2015, Jacobs asked Tillmon to join her again. When they arrived at the\\n\\nRocky Mount warehouse, the undercover agents arrested them. At the time of his arrest,\\n\\nTillmon had in his possession his badge, his Windsor police identification, four semi-\\n\\nautomatic pistols, a .223 caliber rifle, and ammunition for each of the guns. 3\\n\\n A grand jury indicted Tillmon and fourteen others, including Clanton and Jacobs,\\n\\nin a fifty-four count indictment. Tillmon was charged in ten of the counts. All other\\n\\ndefendants negotiated guilty pleas, but Tillmon pleaded not guilty and invoked his right to\\n\\na jury trial on all charges: (1) one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent\\n\\n\\n 3\\n These items, all of which belonged to Tillmon, were found on his person, in his\\nbag, and in Moodyβs vehicle, in which he had come to the warehouse.\\n 6\\n\\fto distribute controlled substances, namely heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n\\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 1); (2) one count of conspiracy to use firearms during and in\\n\\nrelation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(o) (Count 2); (3) three\\n\\ncounts of attempted possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n\\n§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(i), 846, and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2, corresponding to the three transports\\n\\n(August 2014, Count 28; October 2014, Count 33; and March 2015, Count 48); (4) two\\n\\ncounts of use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in\\n\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A), corresponding to two of the transports (October\\n\\n2014, Count 34; and March 2015, Count 49); and (5) three counts of federal programs\\n\\nbribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B), corresponding to each transport (August\\n\\n2014, Count 32; October 2014, Count 36; and March 2015, Count 54).\\n\\n At trial, the Government argued that Tillmon conspired with other law enforcement\\n\\nofficers to use their badges and firearms to assist in transporting a substance they believed\\n\\nto be heroin out of North Carolina. Because the entire DTO was a sting operation that had\\n\\nbeen captured in video and audio recordings, the Government introduced into evidence the\\n\\nrecordings of the preparatory meeting in August 2014 and the interactions at the Rocky\\n\\nMount warehouse on each transport day.\\n\\n At the close of the Governmentβs evidence, Tillmon moved for a judgment of\\n\\nacquittal on all counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court\\n\\ndenied the motion on all but one count, granting the motion as to the charge of attempted\\n\\npossession with intent to distribute heroin based on the August 2014 transport. The district\\n\\ncourt reasoned that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge because it was\\n\\n 7\\n\\fbased solely on Lisaβs reference to βH,β and while she was βprobablyβ talking about\\n\\nheroin, there was no evidence that anyone specifically identified the substance as heroin.\\n\\nJ.A. 1057.\\n\\n Tillmonβs defense centered on his contention that he did not have the requisite intent\\n\\nor knowledge to commit the crimes. For example, Tillmon testified that he did not recall\\n\\nany discussion of his police badge or identification card at the preparatory meeting and that\\n\\nhe did not realize he had a job during the transports or that he would be paid for that job.\\n\\nHe further testified that he did not hear or misheard Lisaβs statements at the Rocky Mount\\n\\nwarehouse about transporting heroin. Tillmon stated that he did not have any understanding\\n\\nof what was happening, only that others were loading something into a vehicle to be\\n\\ndelivered to Maryland.\\n\\n During Tillmonβs cross-examination, the Government introducedβover Tillmonβs\\n\\nobjectionβa video recording of the conversation between Tillmon and Tee from the March\\n\\n2015 transport in which Tee requested Tillmonβs assistance in procuring a small-caliber\\n\\nfirearm. Tillmon argued that the recording was unfairly prejudicial because it implicated\\n\\nhim in uncharged violent crimes. The district court overruled the objection, concluding that\\n\\nany prejudicial effect was overridden by the fact that the video showed there was βa clear\\n\\nrelationship and friendshipβ between Tee and Tillmon. J.A. 1001.\\n\\n The jury found Tillmon guilty on the remaining nine counts. After the verdict,\\n\\nTillmon renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, for a new\\n\\ntrial. The district court denied the motions as to all but two counts, granting the motion for\\n\\na judgment of acquittal only with respect to the attempted possession with intent to\\n\\n 8\\n\\fdistribute heroin and corresponding firearm conviction arising from the October 2014\\n\\ntransport (Counts 33 and 34). 4 The district court observed that sufficient evidence\\n\\nsupported the juryβs decision to convict on the conspiracy charges (Counts 1 and 2),\\n\\nattempted possession charge (Count 48), and firearm charge (Count 49), largely based on\\n\\nLisaβs reference to the βmillion dollars[β] worth of heroinβ that Tillmon received payment\\n\\nfor accompanying to Maryland during the March 2015 transport. J.A. 1527. Further, and\\n\\nin relevant part, the district court concluded sufficient evidence supported the three federal\\n\\nprograms bribery convictions (Counts 32, 36, and 54) because the record showed Tillmon\\n\\nand his co-defendants collectively received more than $5,000 for each transport and he was\\n\\ntold he was transporting drugs valued at more than a million dollars.\\n\\n Tillmonβs sentencing was affected by two statutory mandatory minimums. Because\\n\\nthe jury attributed at least 1 kilogram of heroin to Tillmon, the two drug offenses (Counts\\n\\n1 and 32) carried a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsβ imprisonment. See 21\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i). In addition, the firearm conviction carried a mandatory minimum\\n\\nsentence of 60 monthsβ imprisonment that must be served consecutively to any other\\n\\nsentence. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)(1)(A) (stating that a term of imprisonment of βnot less than 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n The district court explained that the Government had not introduced evidence of\\nTillmonβs specific intent to transport heroin, as the indictment charged in Count 33.\\nSpecifically, none of the recordings regarding the October 2014 transport referenced the\\ntype of drugs supposedly being transported even though they showed the staged packages\\nbeing loaded into the load vehicleβs fake compartment, and one of the undercover agents\\nhad testified that she thought that substance transported during this transport was supposed\\nto be cocaine. The Government has not cross-appealed the Courtβs decision and thus\\nCounts 33 and 34 are not directly at issue on appeal.\\n 9\\n\\fyearsβ for the possession offense βshallβ be imposed βin addition to the punishment\\n\\nprovided for such . . . drug trafficking crimeβ).\\n\\n Although the district court calculated Tillmonβs Guidelines range to be 188 to 235\\n\\nmonthsβ imprisonment for all but the firearm-possession conviction, it granted Tillmonβs\\n\\nrequest for a downward variance to the statutory mandatory minimums. Accordingly, the\\n\\ndistrict court sentenced Tillmon to 180 monthsβ imprisonment consisting of 120 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonment for the conspiracy, attempted possession, and federal programs bribery\\n\\noffenses (Counts 1, 2, 32, 36, 48, and 54), to be served concurrently, and 60 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonment for the firearm offense (Count 49), to be served consecutively to the sentence\\n\\non the other counts.\\n\\n Tillmon noted a timely appeal, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1291.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Tillmon appeals the denial of his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal on all\\n\\nseven remaining counts. First, he argues the evidence was insufficient to show his intent to\\n\\nengage in the drug trafficking offenses, and that if those charges are vacated, then the\\n\\nfirearms charges must also be vacated. Second, he contends that even if the convictions\\n\\nstand, the evidence was insufficient to show that the drug crimes involved more than 1\\n\\nkilogram of heroin, so he should not have been subjected to an enhanced sentencing range.\\n\\nThird, Tillmon challenges the district courtβs admission of the video evidence from the\\n\\nMarch 2015 transport on the basis that it was cumulative and unfairly prejudicial. Fourth\\n\\n 10\\n\\fand lastly, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support several elements of the\\n\\nfederal programs bribery charges. We address each argument in turn.\\n\\n The Court reviews de novo the district courtβs denial of a Rule 29 motion for a\\n\\njudgment of acquittal. United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir. 2015). A\\n\\ndefendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence βbears a heavy burden.β United\\n\\nStates v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation marks omitted).\\n\\nThe Court reviews whether there is βsubstantial evidence . . . to support the jury verdict,β\\n\\nUnited States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted), meaning that, to reverse, the record must βdemonstrate[] a lack of evidence from\\n\\nwhich a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,β United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d\\n\\n849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996). Significantly, the juryβnot this Courtββweighs the credibility\\n\\nof the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presentedβ when such\\n\\ndeterminations need to be made. Id.\\n\\n The Court reviews the district courtβs evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion.\\n\\nUnited States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009). We βwill not vacate a\\n\\nconviction unless we find that the district court judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally in\\n\\nadmitting evidence.β Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n A. Attempted Heroin Possession in March 2015 (Count 48)\\n\\n Because our consideration of the attempted possession offense facilitates review of\\n\\nthe conspiracy and firearms convictions, we begin with it. Tillmon argues that the\\n\\n 11\\n\\fGovernment did not put forward sufficient evidence to establish the necessary mens rea to\\n\\nsupport his conviction.\\n\\n It is a federal crime to βknowingly or intentionally . . . possess with intent to . . .\\n\\ndistribute . . . a controlled substanceβ like heroin. 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A)(i). A\\n\\nconviction for an attempt to commit this offense, see 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846, βpunishes conduct\\n\\nthat puts in motion events that would, from the defendantβs point of view, result in the\\n\\ncommission of a crime but for some intervening circumstance.β United States v. Pratt, 351\\n\\nF.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). To convict Tillmon of the charged offense, the Government\\n\\nhad to prove\\n\\n that (1) [Tillmon] had the requisite intent to commit a crime; (2) [he]\\n undertook a direct act in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his\\n commission of the crime; (3) the act was substantial, in that it was strongly\\n corroborative of [his] criminal purpose; and (4) the act fell short of the\\n commission of the intended crime due to intervening circumstances.\\n\\nId.\\n\\n In rejecting Tillmonβs renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court\\n\\nconcluded the evidence was sufficient on each element. Specifically, it observed that Lisa\\n\\npointed to the staged packages being loaded into the vehicle and said that the team was\\n\\ntransporting a million dollarsβ worth of heroin. Then, Tillmon followed the load vehicle to\\n\\nMaryland, providing protection during the transport.\\n\\n Tillmon argues that this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he attempted,\\n\\nor aided or abetted the attempt, to possess with intent to distribute heroin in March 2015.\\n\\nHe argues that Lisaβs comment about the value of the heroin does not show that he heard\\n\\nher statement or that he believed the group was trafficking heroin. Tillmon also argues that\\n\\n 12\\n\\fthere was no evidence that he exhibited guilty knowledge because he was not shown a\\n\\nsubstance that looked or felt like heroin, nor was there evidence that he directly handled\\n\\nthe packages or saw their contents. Additionally, Tillmon asserts that he did not take a\\n\\nsubstantial step towards completion of the offense that strongly corroborated an intent to\\n\\npossess with the intent to distribute heroin. He argues that neither his presence at the\\n\\nwarehouse nor his driving from Rocky Mount to Maryland with the team proves a specific\\n\\nintent to possess with the intent to distribute heroin. Consequently, Tillmon contends, the\\n\\njury did not have the evidence necessary to convict him.\\n\\n We disagree with Tillmon. To say that he lacked intent and was βa mere passive\\n\\nobserver of these goings-on, would defy reason.β See United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d\\n\\n1284, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993). At a minimum, the following evidence shows Tillmonβs\\n\\nculpable intent: (1) he had basic law enforcement drug trafficking training; (2) the fake\\n\\nheroin was packaged in a manner commonly used to traffic controlled substances; (3) the\\n\\nstaged packages were in plain view of Tillmon before and while it was secreted into a\\n\\nhidden compartment of the load vehicle; (4) while standing about three feet from Tillmon,\\n\\nLisa pointed to the staged packages and said that the team was moving heroin valued at a\\n\\nmillion dollars; (5) two vehicles accompanied the load vehicle and each team member was\\n\\npaid thousands of dollars for accompanying the shipment; and (6) Tillmon not only\\n\\npossessed a firearm for his own use, but also loaned a team member a second firearm\\n\\nbecause they all had been instructed to carry firearms. From these facts, a jury could\\n\\nreasonably conclude that Tillmon had the requisite intent to attempt to possess heroin with\\n\\nthe intent to distribute it.\\n\\n 13\\n\\f We also reject Tillmonβs contention that the evidence does not show that his conduct\\n\\nconstituted an βattemptβ to commit the completed act of possession because he did not take\\n\\nat least one act calculated to culminate in the completed offense. To the contrary, Tillmon\\n\\ncompleted the offense and the only circumstance that prevented the Government from\\n\\ncharging Tillmon with actual possession of heroin was that the substance at issue involved\\n\\nfake heroin instead of real heroin. This was not a case in which some intervening act early\\n\\nin the planning prevented Tillmon and his co-conspirators from completing their intended\\n\\nactivity. Rather, they successfully transported the fake substance from North Carolina to\\n\\nMaryland. And Tillmon willingly participated in doing soβeven after Lisa commented in\\n\\nthe warehouse that the staged packages contained heroin and Tillmon watched the team\\n\\nmembers stash the packages in the load vehicle, he took his place in the vehicle caravan,\\n\\nescorted the packages to Maryland, and accepted payment for his part in the scheme.\\n\\n Tillmonβs arguments misapply the relevant appellate standards. Some of his\\n\\ncontentions ask the Court to assume the role of the jury and revisit credibility\\n\\ndeterminations to decide between competing evidence. However, the jury was not required\\n\\nto believe Tillmonβs defense that he did not understand what the packages were and that\\n\\nhe did not hear Lisaβs reference to moving heroin. E.g., Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862 (β[T]he\\n\\njury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any\\n\\nconflicts in the evidence presented, and if the evidence supports different, reasonable\\n\\ninterpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe.β (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Some of Tillmonβs arguments ask us to attach only benign, if not nonsensical,\\n\\nmeaning to his βpresenceβ at the warehouse and in the transport. But we have previously\\n\\nrecognized that presence during obvious criminal activity is relevant to the analysis in a\\n\\npossession offense. E.g., id. at 869 (citing United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1246\\n\\n(11th Cir. 1983) for the proposition that βwhen the circumstances surrounding a personβs\\n\\npresence at the scene of conspiratorial activity are so obvious[, the] knowledge of its\\n\\ncharacter can fairly be attributed to himβ). Here, Tillmon participated in the transport after\\n\\nLisa pointed to the packages and stated that they contained a million dollars of heroin. He\\n\\nloaned a team member a firearm for protection during the transport and then accepted\\n\\n$2,500 for his βpresence.β Although Tillmon never touched the packages himself, his role\\n\\nin the transport was more than that of βa mere passive observer.β See McLamb, 985 F.2d\\n\\nat 1292. And the jury was entitled to conclude that Tillmon believed the staged packages\\n\\nwere heroin being transported for distribution, and that he possessed those packages\\n\\nthrough his role as a hired guard during the transport of those packages from North Carolina\\n\\nto Maryland. See Pratt, 351 F.3d at 136β37 (recognizing that a personβs criminal role in a\\n\\npossession with intent to distribute offense can take various forms).\\n\\n Lastly, to the extent that Tillmon argues that the district courtβs dismissal of the\\n\\nother attempted possession counts supports dismissal of this count, he ignores the specific\\n\\ncircumstances surrounding the district courtβs decisions. The dismissals of the other counts\\n\\nwere not based on a broad assessment of lack of evidence of his intent, but rather on narrow\\n\\nevidentiary gaps in the Governmentβs case. All three attempted possession with intent to\\n\\ndistribute counts alleged not just the baseline offense set out in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1), but\\n\\n 15\\n\\falso the aggravated possession with intent to distribute offense for a violation involving\\n\\nmore than one kilogram of heroin, see Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i). See also United States v. Collins,\\n\\n415 F.3d 304, 312β14 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing the difference between the baseline\\n\\noffense and aggravated offense); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 152 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2001) (en banc) (holding that, in light of Apprendi, Β§ 841(b)(1)(A) sets out elements of an\\n\\naggravated drug trafficking offense that must be found by a jury rather than constituting\\n\\nmere sentencing factors). The baseline offense does not require proof of the drug type and\\n\\nweight; in relevant part, it requires only that the defendant knowingly possessed a\\n\\ncontrolled substance of some kind. United States v. Ali, 735 F.3d 176, 186β88 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2013) (holding that while 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1) βrequires specific intent to distribute a\\n\\ncontrolled substance or to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, it does\\n\\nnot require that the defendant have, within that intent, specific knowledge of the controlled\\n\\nsubstance[.]β). To convict Tillmon of the aggravated offense, however, the Government\\n\\nhad to introduce proof that Tillmonβs Β§ 841(a)(1) violation involved at least one kilogram\\n\\nof heroin. See Β§ 841(b)(1)(A) (stating that the enhanced penalties apply if βany person . . .\\n\\nviolates subsection (a)β and that violation βinvolv[ed]β the type and quantity of drugs\\n\\nlisted). At trial, the Government urged the district court not to dismiss the attempted\\n\\npossession counts relating to the August and October 2014 transports because there was\\n\\nsufficient evidence to convict Tillmon of the aggravated charges involving heroin. For\\n\\nreasons not readily apparent in the record, it did not rely on the fallback position that even\\n\\nif the evidence did not prove the aggravated offense elements, it was nonetheless sufficient\\n\\nto convict Tillmon of the attempted Β§ 841(a)(1) baseline offense. The district court in turn\\n\\n 16\\n\\fdismissed the counts based on the August 2014 and December 2014 transports because of\\n\\ninsufficient evidence to conclude that Tillmon believed the staged packages were heroin,\\n\\nas opposed to some other controlled substance. By contrast, no such gap exists with respect\\n\\nto the March 2015 evidence. In the warehouse just prior to that transport, Lisa specifically\\n\\nreferred to the packages as heroin while in Tillmonβs immediate presence.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Tillmonβs renewed motion\\n\\nfor a judgment of acquittal on Tillmonβs conviction for attempted possession with intent to\\n\\ndistribute heroin in March 2015.\\n\\n B. Drug Trafficking Conspiracy (Count 1)\\n\\n Tillmon also appeals the district courtβs denial of his renewed motion for a judgment\\n\\nof acquittal with respect to his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with\\n\\nintent to distribute controlled substances, namely heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21\\n\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 1). He contends the record contains insufficient evidence\\n\\nof his intent.\\n\\n To prove conspiracy to possess drugs with an intent to distribute, the Government\\n\\nmust establish that: β(1) an agreement to possess cocaine [and heroin] with intent to\\n\\ndistribute existed between two or more persons; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy;\\n\\nand (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy.β Burgos,\\n\\n94 F.3d at 857. Due to the clandestine nature of a conspiracy, the offense is often proved\\n\\nby circumstantial evidence and the context in which the circumstantial evidence is adduced.\\n\\nId. A conspiracy βmay be inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances.β\\n\\nId. at 858 (internal quotation marks omitted). βCircumstantial evidence sufficient to\\n\\n 17\\n\\fsupport a conspiracy conviction need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of\\n\\ninnocence, provided the summation of the evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a\\n\\nreasonable doubt.β Id.\\n\\n The Government must establish proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt.\\n\\nId. And although the Government must satisfy its burden of proving a connection between\\n\\nthe defendant and the conspiracy, it need not prove the defendant βknew the particulars of\\n\\nthe conspiracy.β Id. Instead, it is sufficient to show that the defendant joined βwith an\\n\\nunderstanding of the unlawful nature thereof and willfully join[ed] in the plan on one\\n\\noccasion [even if] he played only a minor part.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Tillmonβs arguments challenging his conviction on Count 1 mirror the arguments\\n\\nhe made regarding the attempted possession conviction. For example, he contends there\\n\\nwas no evidence to support that he knew about an agreement to possess with the intent to\\n\\ndistribute heroin, or that he agreed to join that endeavor. He asserts no one mentioned drug\\n\\ntrafficking at the preparatory meeting. Further, Tillmon asserts no evidence contradicts his\\n\\ntestimony that he did not hear Lisaβs reference to heroin during the March 2015 transport.\\n\\nHe points to the fact that he never saw a substance identified as heroin (because it was all\\n\\nin packages) and that he never touched the packages. And he points to his taking\\n\\nphotographs on one of the transports as proof that he lacked a criminal mindset.\\n\\n We disagree with Tillmon and do not need to add much to our preceding analysis\\n\\nrejecting his arguments regarding the attempted possession conviction. His arguments are\\n\\ngrounded primarily in reweighing the credibility of witnesses and choosing between\\n\\ndifferent interpretations of conflicting evidence, all of which is squarely in the province of\\n\\n 18\\n\\fthe jury and not reviewable on appeal. The rest of his arguments challenge minor details\\n\\nthat do not affect the substantial evidence recounted above showing that he knowingly and\\n\\nvoluntarily participated in an agreement to possess heroin and cocaine with the intent to\\n\\ndistribute. In sum, Tillmon met with both undercover agents and co-conspirators at the\\n\\npreparatory meeting; observed the Rocky Mount warehouse operations on three occasions\\n\\nin which staged packages of heroin or cocaine were loaded into the hidden compartment\\n\\nof a vehicle; was trained in drug trafficking techniques; participated in the August 2014,\\n\\nOctober 2014, and March 2015 transports along with other co-conspirators; heard Lisa\\n\\nrefer to the packages used during the March transport as βheroinβ; and received $2,000\\n\\n(twice) and $2,500 (once) for his services related to these transports.\\n\\n To accept Tillmonβs arguments, the jury would have had to believe that heβa\\n\\ntrained law enforcement officerβdid not know what was happening right in front of him.\\n\\nEven in cases involving defendants without Tillmonβs background and training, we have\\n\\nrecognized that jurors can find that defendants have the requisite knowledge and intent for\\n\\nparticipating in a drug trafficking offense based on their knowledge of circumstances that\\n\\nare βsurreptitious and totally distinguishable from open and normal channels of business,β\\n\\nsuch as drugs packaged for transport and stashed in a hidden compartment of a vehicle. See\\n\\nAli, 735 F.3d at 188β89. The jury had all the more reason to find Tillmon responsible for\\n\\nsuch knowledge given his background and training. Further, the jury would have had to\\n\\nbelieve that Tillmon thought he was paid a total of $6,500 to accompany his friend Jacobs\\n\\non three innocent drives to Maryland so that he could, on one occasion, take photographs\\n\\nof the harbor. This conclusion, too, defies common sense. The substantial evidence in the\\n\\n 19\\n\\frecord, including audio and video recordings of the events the witnesses described,\\n\\nsupported the juryβs determination of guilt.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Tillmonβs motion for a\\n\\njudgment of acquittal with respect to the drug trafficking conspiracy (Count 1).\\n\\n C. Aggravated Offense Drug Weights (Counts 1 and 48)\\n\\n Tillmon argues that even if the evidence is sufficient to affirm his convictions for\\n\\nthe drug conspiracy and attempted possession offenses, he is at least entitled to\\n\\nresentencing because the evidence does not support the juryβs finding that his offenses\\n\\ninvolved at least one kilogram of heroin. Again, we disagree.\\n\\n As noted, while the baseline 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841 offense does not require the\\n\\nGovernment to prove the quantity of the controlled substance at issue, it does provide for\\n\\nincreased penalties when certain threshold amounts are established. The βspecific threshold\\n\\ndrug quantities [are] treated as elements of aggravated drug trafficking offenses, rather than\\n\\nas mere sentencing factorsβ and thus must be either admitted by the defendant or found by\\n\\na jury to be βreasonably foreseeable to the individual defendant.β United States v. Brooks,\\n\\n524 F.3d 549, 557β58 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the\\n\\nGovernment had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tillmon was responsible for βone\\n\\n(1) kilogram or more of heroin,β J.A. 118, the enhanced drug quantity charged in the\\n\\nindictment. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 156β57. Only then could Tillmon be properly\\n\\nsubjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 yearsβ imprisonment and a statutory\\n\\nmaximum of life. 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i).\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\f Tillmon argues that the evidence did not allow the jury to find him responsible for\\n\\nan offense involving at least 1 kilogram of heroin. Specifically, he asserts the record lacked\\n\\nevidence that agents ever told him how many kilograms they expected him to transport,\\n\\nthat they ever mentioned the word βkilogramβ or its variants, or that Tillmon knew how\\n\\nmuch heroin was in each package.\\n\\n Tillmonβs argument lacks merit. Trial evidence demonstrated the packages each\\n\\ncontained roughly one kilogram of fake drugs, consistent with the way drugs are commonly\\n\\npackaged for distribution. E.g., J.A. 544 (βAnybody who looks at one of those knows thatβs\\n\\na brick or a kilo.β). In addition, testimony established that Tillmon had been trained in drug\\n\\ninterdiction as part of his law enforcement duties. Further, the record contained evidence\\n\\nthat ten staged packages were positioned in plain view of Tillmon as they were loaded into\\n\\nthe load vehicle, and each package weighed one kilogram. All told, this evidence is a\\n\\nsufficient basis for the jury to have found that Tillmonβs drug offenses involved at least\\n\\none kilogram of heroin. Therefore, the sentencing enhancement was proper and Tillmon\\n\\nwas properly subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 monthsβ imprisonment\\n\\nand a maximum term of life for his attempted possession (Count 48) and drug trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy (Count 1) convictions.\\n\\n D. Firearms Counts (Counts 2 and 49)\\n\\n Tillmon also appeals the district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of\\n\\nacquittal with respect to his charges for conspiracy to use firearms during and in relation\\n\\nto a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(o) (Count 2), and use and\\n\\ncarry of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (attempted possession\\n\\n 21\\n\\fon March 2015), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 49). But Tillmonβs\\n\\nsole argument here is that because the evidence was insufficient to support the underlying\\n\\ndrug trafficking conspiracy (Count 1) and attempted possession with the intent to distribute\\n\\nheroin (Count 48) convictions, he is also entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the\\n\\ncorresponding firearms convictions. Put another way, Tillmon does not challenge that he\\n\\nconspired to use or carry a firearm as part of the drug trafficking conspiracy, or that he used\\n\\nor carried firearms during the March 2015 transport, only that he did not commit the\\n\\nunderlying drug offenses and so could not have committed the firearms offenses that\\n\\nrequired those predicates.\\n\\n Because the evidence is sufficient to affirm Tillmonβs convictions for the underlying\\n\\ndrug trafficking offenses, Tillmonβs argument fails. We therefore affirm his convictions\\n\\nfor the firearms conspiracy (Count 2) and using or carrying a firearm (Count 49).\\n\\n E. Admission of Video Recording\\n\\n Tillmon next contends that the district court committed reversible error in admitting\\n\\na video recording of his conversation with Tee while he was being paid for the March 2015\\n\\ntransport. Specifically, Tillmon asserts that the video improperly suggested that he was\\n\\ncomplicit in plotting a murder because Tee said he wanted a firearm to kill someone. 5 On\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Tillmon also argues the evidence was needlessly cumulative and suggests the\\ndistrict courtβs decision is suspect because it had initially ruled the video inadmissible\\nduring the Governmentβs case-in-chief. Even if the evidence was cumulative of other\\nevidence in the record, that would not constitute reversible error on its own in this case.\\nRule 403 lists cumulativeness as a reason that a district court may decide to rule evidence\\ninadmissible; it does not bar evidence merely because it overlaps with prior evidence. See\\nFed. R. Evid. 403.\\n(Continued)\\n 22\\n\\fthat basis, Tillmon argues the recording was unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible under\\n\\nFederal Rule of Evidence 403.\\n\\n Rule 403 states that a district βcourt may exclude relevant evidence if its probative\\n\\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly\\n\\npresenting cumulative evidence.β Fed. R. Evid. 403. βRule 403 is a rule of inclusion,\\n\\ngenerally favoring admissibility.β United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 264β65 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, we have said that when\\n\\nconsidering whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial, βdamage to a defendantβs case is not\\n\\na basis for excluding probative evidence because evidence that is highly probative\\n\\ninvariably will be prejudicial to the defense.β Basham, 561 F.3d at 326 (internal quotation\\n\\nmarks omitted). Instead, β[u]nfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly\\n\\nrelevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof\\n\\nspecific to the offense charged.β Id. at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis\\n\\nadded).\\n\\n The video evidence was highly probative of Tillmonβs role in the charged conduct\\n\\nand it specifically rebutted Tillmonβs defense that he did not understand the criminal nature\\n\\n\\n In addition, the record readily explains the district courtβs changed admissibility\\nrulings. When the Government sought to introduce the exhibit in its case-in-chief, the court\\nsustained Tillmonβs challenge to the ability of that witness to authenticate the recording.\\nThe courtβs decision to sustain Tillmonβs objection related solely to the foundation for its\\nintroduction, not whether the recording was admissible on other grounds. By the time the\\nGovernment later attempted to introduce the recording to rebut Tillmonβs defense, the\\nfoundation for its accuracy had been resolved by intervening testimony. This time,\\nTillmonβs objection to the recordingβs admissibility was based on Rule 403, giving the\\ndistrict court its first opportunity to rule on the admissibility of the recording on that\\nground.\\n 23\\n\\fof the underlying events and that he lacked the requisite intent to engage in criminal\\n\\nconduct. For instance, the recording demonstrated Tillmonβs admission to possessing a\\n\\nfirearm during the March 2015 transport; his receiving $2,500 for his participation in that\\n\\ntransport; and his familiarity and rapport with Tee, whom Tillmon believed to be part of\\n\\nthe DTO. All of these actions are specific to the charged offenses and directly relevant to\\n\\nthe juryβs determination of Tillmonβs culpability.\\n\\n Nor was the video unfairly prejudicial. Tillmon and Teeβs recorded conversation\\n\\nshowed the interactions between Tillmon and another purported member of the DTO in a\\n\\nway that the other evidence did not. Its probative valueβparticularly in light of Tillmonβs\\n\\ndefense that he lacked a culpable intent to engage in drug trafficking offensesβoutweighed\\n\\nany minimal prejudice that arose from the subject matter of their conversation. Moreover,\\n\\nbecause the jurors also knew that Tee was actually an undercover agent, they knew that his\\n\\nside of the conversation was role-playing rather than implicating Tillmon in any actual\\n\\nviolent crime.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video\\n\\nevidence.\\n\\n F. Federal Programs Bribery (Counts 32, 36, and 54)\\n\\n Lastly, Tillmon appeals the district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of\\n\\nacquittal with respect to the three charges of federal programs bribery, in violation of 18\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B) (Counts 32, 36, and 54).\\n\\n In relevant part, this statute prohibits individuals who are agents of a local\\n\\ngovernment agency from βaccept[ing] . . . anything of value from any person, intending to\\n\\n 24\\n\\fbe influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of\\n\\ntransactions of such . . . [government agency] . . . involving any thing of value of $5,000\\n\\nor more.β Id. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B). As a threshold to liability under this statute, the Government\\n\\nmust demonstrate that the local government at issue βreceive[d], in any one year period,\\n\\nbenefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy,\\n\\nloan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.β Β§ 666(b); see also id.\\n\\nΒ§ 666(d)(5) (defining βin any one-year periodβ).\\n\\n Pointing to the amount he was paid for each individual transport, Tillmon asserts\\n\\nthe Government failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish that his services to the\\n\\nfake DTO were worth at least $5,000. 6\\n\\n We have not previously considered Β§ 666(a)(1)(B)βs requirement that charged\\n\\nconduct involve βany thing of value of $5,000 or more.β But the statutory language reveals\\n\\nthat this element requires proof of the value of whatever was exchanged for the bribe. See\\n\\nΒ§ 666(a)(1)(B) (requiring that the business, transaction, or series of transactions of the\\n\\ngovernment agency βinvolve[d] any thing of value of $5,000 or moreβ). This has led our\\n\\nsister circuits to describe the requisite proof as identifying the value of the βsubject matterβ\\n\\nof the bribe. United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 271β76 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n The indictment charged Tillmon with accepting cash from the undercover agents\\n\\nposing as members of the DTO on each of the three transports, with each count\\n\\ncorresponding to one of the transports, and it identified the subject matter of each of the\\n\\n\\n 6\\n Tillmon challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on two other elements of the\\noffenses as well, but for the reasons discussed, we need not address those arguments.\\n 25\\n\\fthree bribes as βprotecting shipments of purported narcotics.β J.A. 149, 153, 171. As we\\n\\nhave already recounted, the record depicted what that protection entailed: Tillmon was to\\n\\naccompany the drugs on a journey up the East Coast, drive or ride in one of the vehicles\\n\\ncontaining or accompanying the narcotics, and recite a cover story if the caravan was\\n\\nstopped. And once the drugs were delivered to another member of the DTO in Maryland,\\n\\nhe was paidβ$2,000 in October 2014; $2,000 in December 2014; and $2,500 in March\\n\\n2015.\\n\\n Our sister circuits have recognized that one valid method of valuing an intangible,\\n\\nsuch as a service provided, is the amount of the bribe. E.g., United States v. Hardin, 874\\n\\nF.3d 672, 676 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 12β13 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2013) (rejecting the value of the bribe test in favor of the value of the βtransactionβ test but\\n\\nacknowledging that the bribe amount βmay be relevant [evidence] in determining the value\\n\\nof the bribeβs objectiveβ when βthe subject matter of the bribe is a βthing of valueβ without\\n\\na fixed priceβ); Robinson, 663 F.3d at 271, 275 (βWithout excluding other possible\\n\\nmethods of valuation, we agree that the amount of the bribe may suffice as a proxy for\\n\\nvalue; at least it provides a floor for the valuation question.β). This approach is akin to\\n\\nβappraisingβ the service as an appraiser values a tangible assetββby looking at how much\\n\\na person in the market would be willing to pay forβ it. United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d\\n\\n1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1996).\\n\\n The Government properly recognizes that using the straightforward bribe-as-proxy\\n\\nmethod does not satisfy its burden in this case. The Government chose to charge Tillmon\\n\\nseparately for each of the three transports, meaning that the Government had the burden to\\n\\n 26\\n\\fprove that the value of his services on each of the individual transports was $5,000 or more.\\n\\nUnder the bribe-as-proxy method, the Governmentβs evidence is insufficient because\\n\\nTillmonβs aid on each transport was valued at less than $5,000 each time.\\n\\n Instead, the Government advances three arguments for what other evidence could\\n\\nhave been used to satisfy its burden: (1) that the amount of the bribes paid to the team as a\\n\\nwhole on each transport exceeded $5,000 (the βaggregation theoryβ); (2) that the market\\n\\nvalue of the drugs being trafficked on each transport exceeded $5,000 (the βmarket value\\n\\ntheoryβ); and (3) that the amount the Town of Windsor paid for public safety in each year\\n\\nat issue exceeded $5,000 (the βpublic safety theoryβ).\\n\\n Although the Government claims its aggregation theory is merely a variation on the\\n\\napproved bribes-as-proxy method, it is not the equivalent and we cannot use it here. The\\n\\nGovernment contends that the jury was permitted to aggregate the bribes paid to all of the\\n\\nteam members on a particular transport to arrive at the requisite $5,000. To be sure,\\n\\nemploying that method brings the dollar amount expended on each transport to more than\\n\\n$5,000. Fatally for the Government, however, the aggregation method does not arrive at an\\n\\namount that reflects the statutory obligation to produce evidence of the value of the subject\\n\\nmatter of the bribe charged in the indictmentβthat is, Tillmonβs βprotecting shipments of\\n\\npurported narcotics.β J.A. 149, 153, 171. The aggregation method conflates the value of\\n\\nTillmonβs services to the DTO with the value of the teamβs services to the DTO. The record\\n\\ndoes not permit the conclusion that Tillmon single-handedly provided services equal to the\\n\\namount paid to the team as a whole. And without such evidence demonstrating that\\n\\nTillmonβs services were worth that amount, the aggregation method is not an acceptable\\n\\n 27\\n\\fvaluation method. For these reasons, we reject the aggregation method as an appropriate\\n\\nvaluation method in this case.\\n\\n The Governmentβs proposed market value theory fares no better. As our sister\\n\\ncircuits have recognized, in some instances, it may be appropriate to look at the market\\n\\nvalue of the bribe from the perspective of the briber or an interested third party as a means\\n\\nof valuing the subject matter of the bribe. E.g., Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 15 (approving\\n\\nvaluation method for votes related to pending legislation by looking to the briberβs\\n\\nexpected financial gain flowing from the passage of that legislation); United States v.\\n\\nCurescu, 674 F.3d 735, 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2012) (approving valuation of a bribe given to\\n\\nfalsely certify that plumbing had been completed by a licensed plumber based on the\\n\\namount of money the briber did not have to pay a licensed plumber to perform the work);\\n\\nUnited States v. Hines, 541 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2008) (using market value theory to\\n\\nvalue expedited eviction orders based on the savings to the property owners in avoiding\\n\\nthe costs typically incurred in eviction). But even then, in addition to evidence of something\\n\\nhaving value to the briber or a third party, the Government also must come forward with\\n\\nevidence βlinkingβ that valued item to the services the defendant provided. See United\\n\\nStates v. Owens, 697 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 2012). To reiterate, the Governmentβs\\n\\nevidence must bear on the value of the subject matter of the bribe, and that obligation is\\n\\nnot satisfied with evidence of something βto which the subject matter of the bribe is\\n\\ntangentially related.β Id.\\n\\n In this case, the Government pointed to something of purported value to the briberβ\\n\\nthe market value of the narcoticsβbut it failed to put forward any evidence linking that\\n\\n 28\\n\\fvalue to Tillmonβs protection of the caravan, the subject matter of the bribe. Specifically,\\n\\nthe Government relies on Lisaβs statement during the March 2015 transport that the team\\n\\nwas shipping a million dollars of heroin and argues that because Tillmon was hired to\\n\\nprotect a million-dollar transport on that occasion and to protect similar package quantities\\n\\nduring the other two transports, his services on each transport were worth a million dollars.\\n\\nThe Government then contends that the Court can infer from the evidence that the other\\n\\ntransports involved similar drug packages and that they also thereby satisfied the $5,000\\n\\nrequirement. That reasoning is flawed because no evidence in the record links the purported\\n\\nvalue of the drugs to the value of Tillmonβs protection services. As the record stands, the\\n\\ntwo are merely tangentially related. The Government could have attempted to provide\\n\\nevidence sufficient to create the necessary linkage in several ways. For example, it could\\n\\nhave offered evidence that trafficking organizations typically provide protection with a cut\\n\\nof the profits from eventual sales. Or it could have offered evidence that the cost of\\n\\nlegitimate protection for drug transports involving that amount of drugs costs real DTOs\\n\\n$5,000 or more. But the Government offered no such evidence. In fact, it failed to introduce\\n\\nany evidence allowing the inference that the value of Tillmonβs services was connected to\\n\\nthe value of the drugs. Thus, the Governmentβs market value theory lacks any evidentiary\\n\\nbasis.\\n\\n The Governmentβs third argument, the public safety theory of valuation, can be\\n\\ndisposed of quickly. For the first and only time in this appeal, the Government mentions in\\n\\na single sentence of its Response Brief that the $5,000 value of Tillmonβs services could\\n\\nbe measured based on the Town of Windsorβs annual public safety budget. Setting aside\\n\\n 29\\n\\fany concerns regarding the timeliness and adequacy of the Governmentβs argument, we\\n\\nobserve that Windsorβs entire public safety budget is unrelated to and would vastly\\n\\noverstate the value of Tillmonβs services to the DTO. As such, it would be an improper\\n\\nmeasure of the subject matter of the bribe.\\n\\n In sum, the Government failed to produce evidence from which a jury could find\\n\\nthat Tillmonβs services to the DTO had a value of $5,000 or more. Though the Government\\n\\nmight have satisfied this requirement in several ways, it failed to introduce any evidence\\n\\nother than the amount Tillmon was paid as a bribe to establish that the value of his\\n\\nprotection services were worth at least $5,000. And in the absence of evidence to support\\n\\nthat element of the offense, Tillmonβs convictions for federal programs bribery, Counts 32,\\n\\n36, and 54, cannot stand and we vacate each of these convictions.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV. Conclusion\\n\\n For the reasons explained above, we affirm Tillmonβs convictions on the drug\\n\\ntrafficking and firearms offenses (Counts 1, 2, 48, and 49), but we vacate Tillmonβs\\n\\nconvictions for federal programs bribery (Counts 32, 36, and 54).\\n\\n As the parties agree, the record shows that Tillmonβs sentence cannot be affected by\\n\\nthe vacation of his federal programs bribery convictions. After calculating Tillmonβs\\n\\nGuidelines range, the district court imposed a downward variant sentence of 180 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonmentβ120 months to run concurrently on Counts 1, 2, 48, 32, 36, and 54; and 60\\n\\nmonths to run consecutively on Count 49. Vacating Tillmonβs federal programs bribery\\n\\nconvictions does not change his sentence, which is still 120 monthsβ imprisonment for\\n\\n 30\\n\\fCounts 1, 2, and 48, to run concurrently with each other, and 60 monthsβ mandatory\\n\\nminimum imprisonment for Count 49, to run consecutively to the others. Because 120\\n\\nmonths is the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for the drug trafficking conspiracy\\n\\n(Count 1) and attempted possession (Count 48) convictions, Tillmon cannot be sentenced\\n\\nto a lower term of imprisonment on the part of the sentence that was running concurrently\\n\\nwith his sentence for the now-vacated federal programs bribery convictions. Similarly,\\n\\nTillmonβs consecutive sentence for Count 49 must continue to run consecutively to the\\n\\nother term of imprisonment. As such, we need not remand for resentencing.\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART\\n AND VACATED IN PART\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 31\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371281/\", \"author_raw\": \"AGEE, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NIEMEYER"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"AGEE"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DIAZ"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"NIEMEYER\": \", Circuit\", \"AGEE\": \", Circuit\", \"DIAZ\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594028/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Antonio Tillmon\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-26\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-4648\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nANTONIO TILLMON,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\nElizabeth City. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (2:15-cr-00009-H-9)\n\n\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 26, 2019\n\n\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion,\nin which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Diaz joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Paul K. Sun, Jr., ELLIS & WINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for\nAppellant. Banumathi Rangarajan, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,\nRaleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kelly Margolis Dagger, ELLIS &\nWINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United\nStates Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Acting First Assistant United States Attorney,\nBarbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.\n\fAGEE, Circuit Judge:\n\n After being caught in a sting operation aimed at exposing corrupt law enforcement\n\nofficers, Antonio Tillmon was convicted by a jury on multiple counts: conspiracy to\n\ncommit drug trafficking, conspiracy to use firearms while drug trafficking, attempted\n\npossession of heroin with intent to distribute, using or carrying a firearm while drug\n\ntrafficking, and three counts of federal programs bribery. On appeal, Tillmon challenges\n\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal as to these offenses and\n\nits admission of a video-recorded conversation between Tillmon and an undercover agent.\n\nFor the reasons discussed below, we affirm the conspiracy, attempted possession and\n\nfirearms convictions, but vacate the federal programs bribery convictions.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n Tillmonβs prosecution arose from a multi-year FBI investigation into reports of law\n\nenforcement corruption in the counties of Northampton and Halifax, North Carolina. 1 This\n\ninvestigation, βOperation Rockfish,β began in 2013 after the FBI received information that\n\nLann Clanton, a police officer with the Weldon, North Carolina, Police Department, was\n\ninvolved in criminal activity. Operation Rockfish consisted of undercover agents posing as\n\nmembers of a transnational drug trafficking organization (βDTOβ) that transported\n\nkilograms of heroin and cocaine to New York City. Part of the DTOβs strategy was\n\n\n\n\n 1\n We recite the facts established at trial in the light most favorable to the\nGovernment. United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).\n 2\n\fβspecifically tr[ying] to recruit law enforcement officers for their ability to badge their way\n\nout of legitimate traffic stops by other law enforcement officers.β J.A. 406.\n\n The FBI established a βgeneral templateβ for the DTO, setting up a warehouse to\n\nprepare βcocaineβ and βheroinβ for shipment by storing those drugs in hidden\n\ncompartments of vehicles. J.A. 412. No real drugs were used, but a lookalike substance\n\nwas packaged to βlook like kilograms of illegal drugs that had been seized in other\n\ninvestigations.β J.A. 411. Ten one-kilogram packages were color-coded to identify the type\n\nof drug each package purportedly contained. Once the packages were loaded into a vehicle\n\nfor transport (βthe load vehicleβ), team members rode in that vehicle, a scout vehicle that\n\ndrove ahead of it, and a rear guard vehicle that drove behind it.\n\n Once the ersatz DTO was operational, the FBI used a confidential informant to let\n\nClanton know about its existence. Clanton then contacted the DTO, where his first\n\nassignment was to recruit law enforcement officers to implement the DTOβs cover strategy.\n\nClantonβs first recruit was Ikeisha Jacobs, another member of the Weldon Police\n\nDepartment. Clanton and Jacobs then enlisted other current and former law enforcement\n\nand correctional officers to join their teams.\n\n Jacobs recruited Tillmon, a former coworker, for her team. At the time he was\n\nrecruited to the DTO, Tillmon was a police officer with the Windsor, North Carolina,\n\nPolice Department. On August 19, 2014, Jacobs invited Tillmon to join her and other team\n\nmembers for a preparatory meeting. The gathering included Jacobs, two undercover FBI\n\nagents (John and Lisa), and four new recruits (Adrienne Moody, Alaina Sue-Kam-Lang,\n\nCrystal Pierce, and Tillmon). During the meeting, the undercover agents and Jacobs\n\n 3\n\fdescribed the plan for the next dayβs transport and explained the DTOβs reason for using\n\nlaw enforcement officers. They gave the team members a cover story to use if police\n\nstopped them during the transport: they were transporting a vehicle that had been sold out\n\nof state. During the meeting, one undercover agent asked whether the recruits carried guns.\n\nTillmon indicated that he would carry his gun. Toward the end of the meeting, the agents\n\ntold the recruits that they did not have to participate in the operation if they wanted out.\n\n The next morning (βthe August 2014 transportβ), Tillmon picked up Jacobs and Sue-\n\nKam-Lang before driving to a prearranged rendezvous point where they met Lisa and other\n\nteam members. They all then drove to a warehouse in Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Upon\n\narrival, Tillmon helped move a large white cooler from one area of the warehouse to the\n\nback of the load vehicle, a white GMC Acadia. One of the undercover agents, Paul, pulled\n\nout ten packages from underneath the ice and drinks in the cooler, counted them, and put\n\nthem on the ground. Paul handed the packages to John, another agent, who was underneath\n\nthe Acadia putting the packages into a hidden compartment. Tillmon never touched the\n\npackages, but he watched as they were loaded into the compartment in plain view of him\n\nand the other team members. 2 While standing behind the vehicle, Lisa explained to Tillmon\n\nthat they were βstarting to move H.β J.A. 591β92. Lisa testified at trial that by βHβ she\n\nmeant βheroin,β though she did not clarify her meaning to the team members at the time.\n\n After the packages were stored in the Acadia, it and two other vehicles caravanned\n\nto National Harbor in Maryland. Jacobs drove the load vehicle, two team members drove\n\n\n 2\n The trial evidence shows that Tillmon did not touch, handle, or assist in loading\nthe staged packages into the vehicles during any of the events described.\n 4\n\fthe scout vehicle, and Tillmon and Sue-Kam-Lang followed as the rear guard. When they\n\narrived at National Harbor, the team members met βTee,β another undercover agent who\n\nwas posing as the supervisor of that portion of the route. Tee and the team boarded an\n\nenclosed car of a Ferris wheel, where Tee paid each member of the group. Tillmon received\n\n$2,000 and then returned to North Carolina.\n\n In October 2014 (βthe October 2014 transportβ), Jacobs and Tillmon rode together\n\nto the Rocky Mount warehouse. While waiting for drugs to be loaded into the hidden\n\ncompartment of the load vehicle, Tillmon was shown a fake bill of sale that would back\n\ntheir cover story. This time, Tillmon drove the load vehicle to the parking lot of an outlet\n\nmall in Maryland. He then got into a large van, where Tee paid him and the other team\n\nmembers. Tee paid Tillmon $2,000.\n\n In March 2015 (βthe March 2015 transportβ), Jacobs asked Tillmon to join her a\n\nthird time. When Tillmon arrived at the Rocky Mount warehouse, the agents had a pickup\n\ntruck staged with packages of drugs laid out in plain view on the tailgate. The team\n\nmembers, including Tillmon, walked by the back of the truck as they entered the\n\nwarehouseβs office. Inside, Lisa asked everyone if they had guns; after Sue-Kam-Lang\n\nindicated that she did not have a gun, Tillmon gave her one of his extra guns.\n\n The team exited the office and went back into the main part of the warehouse. As\n\nthe drugs were being loaded into the hidden compartment of the vehicle, Lisa said, βyou\n\nguys got to be carrying from now on . . . a million dollars of heroin, you canβt f[***] around\n\nwith that.β Supp. J.A. 1625 at 12:47:16β47:24. She was within three feet of Tillmon as she\n\nspoke.\n\n 5\n\f After the drugs were loaded, the team departed, with Tillmon and Jacobs driving the\n\nrear guard vehicle. After the team left the load vehicle at a carport in Maryland, they met\n\nTee at the same outlet mall parking lot as in October. Each member entered Teeβs vehicle\n\nseparately, where they were paid. As Tillmon was paid $2,500, Tee asked him if he was\n\ncarrying a gun, and Tillmon confirmed he was. Then Tee indicated he was interested in\n\ngetting a small firearm. Tillmon responded, βWhat [do] you need?β and Tee said he wanted\n\nβa thirty-eight (.38), something small, a revolver that donβt need no shells, know what I\n\nmean?β J.A. 1402. Tillmon recommended a few firearms that would meet Teeβs need to\n\nβjust walk right up on βem and keep rollingβ and βboom-boom and then throw that s[***]\n\naway and [not worry] about it no more.β J.A. 1403β04. Tee asked Tillmon to let him know\n\nif he heard of anything available, and Tillmon replied, βOkay . . . . Weβll talk.β J.A. 1404.\n\nTillmon exited Teeβs vehicle and returned to North Carolina.\n\n In April 2015, Jacobs asked Tillmon to join her again. When they arrived at the\n\nRocky Mount warehouse, the undercover agents arrested them. At the time of his arrest,\n\nTillmon had in his possession his badge, his Windsor police identification, four semi-\n\nautomatic pistols, a .223 caliber rifle, and ammunition for each of the guns. 3\n\n A grand jury indicted Tillmon and fourteen others, including Clanton and Jacobs,\n\nin a fifty-four count indictment. Tillmon was charged in ten of the counts. All other\n\ndefendants negotiated guilty pleas, but Tillmon pleaded not guilty and invoked his right to\n\na jury trial on all charges: (1) one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent\n\n\n 3\n These items, all of which belonged to Tillmon, were found on his person, in his\nbag, and in Moodyβs vehicle, in which he had come to the warehouse.\n 6\n\fto distribute controlled substances, namely heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\n\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 1); (2) one count of conspiracy to use firearms during and in\n\nrelation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(o) (Count 2); (3) three\n\ncounts of attempted possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\n\n§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(i), 846, and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2, corresponding to the three transports\n\n(August 2014, Count 28; October 2014, Count 33; and March 2015, Count 48); (4) two\n\ncounts of use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in\n\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A), corresponding to two of the transports (October\n\n2014, Count 34; and March 2015, Count 49); and (5) three counts of federal programs\n\nbribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B), corresponding to each transport (August\n\n2014, Count 32; October 2014, Count 36; and March 2015, Count 54).\n\n At trial, the Government argued that Tillmon conspired with other law enforcement\n\nofficers to use their badges and firearms to assist in transporting a substance they believed\n\nto be heroin out of North Carolina. Because the entire DTO was a sting operation that had\n\nbeen captured in video and audio recordings, the Government introduced into evidence the\n\nrecordings of the preparatory meeting in August 2014 and the interactions at the Rocky\n\nMount warehouse on each transport day.\n\n At the close of the Governmentβs evidence, Tillmon moved for a judgment of\n\nacquittal on all counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court\n\ndenied the motion on all but one count, granting the motion as to the charge of attempted\n\npossession with intent to distribute heroin based on the August 2014 transport. The district\n\ncourt reasoned that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge because it was\n\n 7\n\fbased solely on Lisaβs reference to βH,β and while she was βprobablyβ talking about\n\nheroin, there was no evidence that anyone specifically identified the substance as heroin.\n\nJ.A. 1057.\n\n Tillmonβs defense centered on his contention that he did not have the requisite intent\n\nor knowledge to commit the crimes. For example, Tillmon testified that he did not recall\n\nany discussion of his police badge or identification card at the preparatory meeting and that\n\nhe did not realize he had a job during the transports or that he would be paid for that job.\n\nHe further testified that he did not hear or misheard Lisaβs statements at the Rocky Mount\n\nwarehouse about transporting heroin. Tillmon stated that he did not have any understanding\n\nof what was happening, only that others were loading something into a vehicle to be\n\ndelivered to Maryland.\n\n During Tillmonβs cross-examination, the Government introducedβover Tillmonβs\n\nobjectionβa video recording of the conversation between Tillmon and Tee from the March\n\n2015 transport in which Tee requested Tillmonβs assistance in procuring a small-caliber\n\nfirearm. Tillmon argued that the recording was unfairly prejudicial because it implicated\n\nhim in uncharged violent crimes. The district court overruled the objection, concluding that\n\nany prejudicial effect was overridden by the fact that the video showed there was βa clear\n\nrelationship and friendshipβ between Tee and Tillmon. J.A. 1001.\n\n The jury found Tillmon guilty on the remaining nine counts. After the verdict,\n\nTillmon renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, for a new\n\ntrial. The district court denied the motions as to all but two counts, granting the motion for\n\na judgment of acquittal only with respect to the attempted possession with intent to\n\n 8\n\fdistribute heroin and corresponding firearm conviction arising from the October 2014\n\ntransport (Counts 33 and 34). 4 The district court observed that sufficient evidence\n\nsupported the juryβs decision to convict on the conspiracy charges (Counts 1 and 2),\n\nattempted possession charge (Count 48), and firearm charge (Count 49), largely based on\n\nLisaβs reference to the βmillion dollars[β] worth of heroinβ that Tillmon received payment\n\nfor accompanying to Maryland during the March 2015 transport. J.A. 1527. Further, and\n\nin relevant part, the district court concluded sufficient evidence supported the three federal\n\nprograms bribery convictions (Counts 32, 36, and 54) because the record showed Tillmon\n\nand his co-defendants collectively received more than $5,000 for each transport and he was\n\ntold he was transporting drugs valued at more than a million dollars.\n\n Tillmonβs sentencing was affected by two statutory mandatory minimums. Because\n\nthe jury attributed at least 1 kilogram of heroin to Tillmon, the two drug offenses (Counts\n\n1 and 32) carried a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsβ imprisonment. See 21\n\nU.S.C. Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i). In addition, the firearm conviction carried a mandatory minimum\n\nsentence of 60 monthsβ imprisonment that must be served consecutively to any other\n\nsentence. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)(1)(A) (stating that a term of imprisonment of βnot less than 5\n\n\n\n\n 4\n The district court explained that the Government had not introduced evidence of\nTillmonβs specific intent to transport heroin, as the indictment charged in Count 33.\nSpecifically, none of the recordings regarding the October 2014 transport referenced the\ntype of drugs supposedly being transported even though they showed the staged packages\nbeing loaded into the load vehicleβs fake compartment, and one of the undercover agents\nhad testified that she thought that substance transported during this transport was supposed\nto be cocaine. The Government has not cross-appealed the Courtβs decision and thus\nCounts 33 and 34 are not directly at issue on appeal.\n 9\n\fyearsβ for the possession offense βshallβ be imposed βin addition to the punishment\n\nprovided for such . . . drug trafficking crimeβ).\n\n Although the district court calculated Tillmonβs Guidelines range to be 188 to 235\n\nmonthsβ imprisonment for all but the firearm-possession conviction, it granted Tillmonβs\n\nrequest for a downward variance to the statutory mandatory minimums. Accordingly, the\n\ndistrict court sentenced Tillmon to 180 monthsβ imprisonment consisting of 120 monthsβ\n\nimprisonment for the conspiracy, attempted possession, and federal programs bribery\n\noffenses (Counts 1, 2, 32, 36, 48, and 54), to be served concurrently, and 60 monthsβ\n\nimprisonment for the firearm offense (Count 49), to be served consecutively to the sentence\n\non the other counts.\n\n Tillmon noted a timely appeal, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 1291.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n Tillmon appeals the denial of his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal on all\n\nseven remaining counts. First, he argues the evidence was insufficient to show his intent to\n\nengage in the drug trafficking offenses, and that if those charges are vacated, then the\n\nfirearms charges must also be vacated. Second, he contends that even if the convictions\n\nstand, the evidence was insufficient to show that the drug crimes involved more than 1\n\nkilogram of heroin, so he should not have been subjected to an enhanced sentencing range.\n\nThird, Tillmon challenges the district courtβs admission of the video evidence from the\n\nMarch 2015 transport on the basis that it was cumulative and unfairly prejudicial. Fourth\n\n 10\n\fand lastly, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support several elements of the\n\nfederal programs bribery charges. We address each argument in turn.\n\n The Court reviews de novo the district courtβs denial of a Rule 29 motion for a\n\njudgment of acquittal. United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir. 2015). A\n\ndefendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence βbears a heavy burden.β United\n\nStates v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation marks omitted).\n\nThe Court reviews whether there is βsubstantial evidence . . . to support the jury verdict,β\n\nUnited States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks\n\nomitted), meaning that, to reverse, the record must βdemonstrate[] a lack of evidence from\n\nwhich a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,β United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d\n\n849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996). Significantly, the juryβnot this Courtββweighs the credibility\n\nof the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presentedβ when such\n\ndeterminations need to be made. Id.\n\n The Court reviews the district courtβs evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion.\n\nUnited States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009). We βwill not vacate a\n\nconviction unless we find that the district court judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally in\n\nadmitting evidence.β Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n\n\n III.\n\n A. Attempted Heroin Possession in March 2015 (Count 48)\n\n Because our consideration of the attempted possession offense facilitates review of\n\nthe conspiracy and firearms convictions, we begin with it. Tillmon argues that the\n\n 11\n\fGovernment did not put forward sufficient evidence to establish the necessary mens rea to\n\nsupport his conviction.\n\n It is a federal crime to βknowingly or intentionally . . . possess with intent to . . .\n\ndistribute . . . a controlled substanceβ like heroin. 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A)(i). A\n\nconviction for an attempt to commit this offense, see 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846, βpunishes conduct\n\nthat puts in motion events that would, from the defendantβs point of view, result in the\n\ncommission of a crime but for some intervening circumstance.β United States v. Pratt, 351\n\nF.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). To convict Tillmon of the charged offense, the Government\n\nhad to prove\n\n that (1) [Tillmon] had the requisite intent to commit a crime; (2) [he]\n undertook a direct act in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his\n commission of the crime; (3) the act was substantial, in that it was strongly\n corroborative of [his] criminal purpose; and (4) the act fell short of the\n commission of the intended crime due to intervening circumstances.\n\nId.\n\n In rejecting Tillmonβs renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court\n\nconcluded the evidence was sufficient on each element. Specifically, it observed that Lisa\n\npointed to the staged packages being loaded into the vehicle and said that the team was\n\ntransporting a million dollarsβ worth of heroin. Then, Tillmon followed the load vehicle to\n\nMaryland, providing protection during the transport.\n\n Tillmon argues that this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he attempted,\n\nor aided or abetted the attempt, to possess with intent to distribute heroin in March 2015.\n\nHe argues that Lisaβs comment about the value of the heroin does not show that he heard\n\nher statement or that he believed the group was trafficking heroin. Tillmon also argues that\n\n 12\n\fthere was no evidence that he exhibited guilty knowledge because he was not shown a\n\nsubstance that looked or felt like heroin, nor was there evidence that he directly handled\n\nthe packages or saw their contents. Additionally, Tillmon asserts that he did not take a\n\nsubstantial step towards completion of the offense that strongly corroborated an intent to\n\npossess with the intent to distribute heroin. He argues that neither his presence at the\n\nwarehouse nor his driving from Rocky Mount to Maryland with the team proves a specific\n\nintent to possess with the intent to distribute heroin. Consequently, Tillmon contends, the\n\njury did not have the evidence necessary to convict him.\n\n We disagree with Tillmon. To say that he lacked intent and was βa mere passive\n\nobserver of these goings-on, would defy reason.β See United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d\n\n1284, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993). At a minimum, the following evidence shows Tillmonβs\n\nculpable intent: (1) he had basic law enforcement drug trafficking training; (2) the fake\n\nheroin was packaged in a manner commonly used to traffic controlled substances; (3) the\n\nstaged packages were in plain view of Tillmon before and while it was secreted into a\n\nhidden compartment of the load vehicle; (4) while standing about three feet from Tillmon,\n\nLisa pointed to the staged packages and said that the team was moving heroin valued at a\n\nmillion dollars; (5) two vehicles accompanied the load vehicle and each team member was\n\npaid thousands of dollars for accompanying the shipment; and (6) Tillmon not only\n\npossessed a firearm for his own use, but also loaned a team member a second firearm\n\nbecause they all had been instructed to carry firearms. From these facts, a jury could\n\nreasonably conclude that Tillmon had the requisite intent to attempt to possess heroin with\n\nthe intent to distribute it.\n\n 13\n\f We also reject Tillmonβs contention that the evidence does not show that his conduct\n\nconstituted an βattemptβ to commit the completed act of possession because he did not take\n\nat least one act calculated to culminate in the completed offense. To the contrary, Tillmon\n\ncompleted the offense and the only circumstance that prevented the Government from\n\ncharging Tillmon with actual possession of heroin was that the substance at issue involved\n\nfake heroin instead of real heroin. This was not a case in which some intervening act early\n\nin the planning prevented Tillmon and his co-conspirators from completing their intended\n\nactivity. Rather, they successfully transported the fake substance from North Carolina to\n\nMaryland. And Tillmon willingly participated in doing soβeven after Lisa commented in\n\nthe warehouse that the staged packages contained heroin and Tillmon watched the team\n\nmembers stash the packages in the load vehicle, he took his place in the vehicle caravan,\n\nescorted the packages to Maryland, and accepted payment for his part in the scheme.\n\n Tillmonβs arguments misapply the relevant appellate standards. Some of his\n\ncontentions ask the Court to assume the role of the jury and revisit credibility\n\ndeterminations to decide between competing evidence. However, the jury was not required\n\nto believe Tillmonβs defense that he did not understand what the packages were and that\n\nhe did not hear Lisaβs reference to moving heroin. E.g., Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862 (β[T]he\n\njury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any\n\nconflicts in the evidence presented, and if the evidence supports different, reasonable\n\ninterpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe.β (internal quotation marks\n\nomitted)).\n\n\n\n 14\n\f Some of Tillmonβs arguments ask us to attach only benign, if not nonsensical,\n\nmeaning to his βpresenceβ at the warehouse and in the transport. But we have previously\n\nrecognized that presence during obvious criminal activity is relevant to the analysis in a\n\npossession offense. E.g., id. at 869 (citing United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1246\n\n(11th Cir. 1983) for the proposition that βwhen the circumstances surrounding a personβs\n\npresence at the scene of conspiratorial activity are so obvious[, the] knowledge of its\n\ncharacter can fairly be attributed to himβ). Here, Tillmon participated in the transport after\n\nLisa pointed to the packages and stated that they contained a million dollars of heroin. He\n\nloaned a team member a firearm for protection during the transport and then accepted\n\n$2,500 for his βpresence.β Although Tillmon never touched the packages himself, his role\n\nin the transport was more than that of βa mere passive observer.β See McLamb, 985 F.2d\n\nat 1292. And the jury was entitled to conclude that Tillmon believed the staged packages\n\nwere heroin being transported for distribution, and that he possessed those packages\n\nthrough his role as a hired guard during the transport of those packages from North Carolina\n\nto Maryland. See Pratt, 351 F.3d at 136β37 (recognizing that a personβs criminal role in a\n\npossession with intent to distribute offense can take various forms).\n\n Lastly, to the extent that Tillmon argues that the district courtβs dismissal of the\n\nother attempted possession counts supports dismissal of this count, he ignores the specific\n\ncircumstances surrounding the district courtβs decisions. The dismissals of the other counts\n\nwere not based on a broad assessment of lack of evidence of his intent, but rather on narrow\n\nevidentiary gaps in the Governmentβs case. All three attempted possession with intent to\n\ndistribute counts alleged not just the baseline offense set out in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1), but\n\n 15\n\falso the aggravated possession with intent to distribute offense for a violation involving\n\nmore than one kilogram of heroin, see Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i). See also United States v. Collins,\n\n415 F.3d 304, 312β14 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing the difference between the baseline\n\noffense and aggravated offense); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 152 (4th Cir.\n\n2001) (en banc) (holding that, in light of Apprendi, Β§ 841(b)(1)(A) sets out elements of an\n\naggravated drug trafficking offense that must be found by a jury rather than constituting\n\nmere sentencing factors). The baseline offense does not require proof of the drug type and\n\nweight; in relevant part, it requires only that the defendant knowingly possessed a\n\ncontrolled substance of some kind. United States v. Ali, 735 F.3d 176, 186β88 (4th Cir.\n\n2013) (holding that while 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1) βrequires specific intent to distribute a\n\ncontrolled substance or to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, it does\n\nnot require that the defendant have, within that intent, specific knowledge of the controlled\n\nsubstance[.]β). To convict Tillmon of the aggravated offense, however, the Government\n\nhad to introduce proof that Tillmonβs Β§ 841(a)(1) violation involved at least one kilogram\n\nof heroin. See Β§ 841(b)(1)(A) (stating that the enhanced penalties apply if βany person . . .\n\nviolates subsection (a)β and that violation βinvolv[ed]β the type and quantity of drugs\n\nlisted). At trial, the Government urged the district court not to dismiss the attempted\n\npossession counts relating to the August and October 2014 transports because there was\n\nsufficient evidence to convict Tillmon of the aggravated charges involving heroin. For\n\nreasons not readily apparent in the record, it did not rely on the fallback position that even\n\nif the evidence did not prove the aggravated offense elements, it was nonetheless sufficient\n\nto convict Tillmon of the attempted Β§ 841(a)(1) baseline offense. The district court in turn\n\n 16\n\fdismissed the counts based on the August 2014 and December 2014 transports because of\n\ninsufficient evidence to conclude that Tillmon believed the staged packages were heroin,\n\nas opposed to some other controlled substance. By contrast, no such gap exists with respect\n\nto the March 2015 evidence. In the warehouse just prior to that transport, Lisa specifically\n\nreferred to the packages as heroin while in Tillmonβs immediate presence.\n\n For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Tillmonβs renewed motion\n\nfor a judgment of acquittal on Tillmonβs conviction for attempted possession with intent to\n\ndistribute heroin in March 2015.\n\n B. Drug Trafficking Conspiracy (Count 1)\n\n Tillmon also appeals the district courtβs denial of his renewed motion for a judgment\n\nof acquittal with respect to his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with\n\nintent to distribute controlled substances, namely heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21\n\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 1). He contends the record contains insufficient evidence\n\nof his intent.\n\n To prove conspiracy to possess drugs with an intent to distribute, the Government\n\nmust establish that: β(1) an agreement to possess cocaine [and heroin] with intent to\n\ndistribute existed between two or more persons; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy;\n\nand (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy.β Burgos,\n\n94 F.3d at 857. Due to the clandestine nature of a conspiracy, the offense is often proved\n\nby circumstantial evidence and the context in which the circumstantial evidence is adduced.\n\nId. A conspiracy βmay be inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances.β\n\nId. at 858 (internal quotation marks omitted). βCircumstantial evidence sufficient to\n\n 17\n\fsupport a conspiracy conviction need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of\n\ninnocence, provided the summation of the evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a\n\nreasonable doubt.β Id.\n\n The Government must establish proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\nId. And although the Government must satisfy its burden of proving a connection between\n\nthe defendant and the conspiracy, it need not prove the defendant βknew the particulars of\n\nthe conspiracy.β Id. Instead, it is sufficient to show that the defendant joined βwith an\n\nunderstanding of the unlawful nature thereof and willfully join[ed] in the plan on one\n\noccasion [even if] he played only a minor part.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n Tillmonβs arguments challenging his conviction on Count 1 mirror the arguments\n\nhe made regarding the attempted possession conviction. For example, he contends there\n\nwas no evidence to support that he knew about an agreement to possess with the intent to\n\ndistribute heroin, or that he agreed to join that endeavor. He asserts no one mentioned drug\n\ntrafficking at the preparatory meeting. Further, Tillmon asserts no evidence contradicts his\n\ntestimony that he did not hear Lisaβs reference to heroin during the March 2015 transport.\n\nHe points to the fact that he never saw a substance identified as heroin (because it was all\n\nin packages) and that he never touched the packages. And he points to his taking\n\nphotographs on one of the transports as proof that he lacked a criminal mindset.\n\n We disagree with Tillmon and do not need to add much to our preceding analysis\n\nrejecting his arguments regarding the attempted possession conviction. His arguments are\n\ngrounded primarily in reweighing the credibility of witnesses and choosing between\n\ndifferent interpretations of conflicting evidence, all of which is squarely in the province of\n\n 18\n\fthe jury and not reviewable on appeal. The rest of his arguments challenge minor details\n\nthat do not affect the substantial evidence recounted above showing that he knowingly and\n\nvoluntarily participated in an agreement to possess heroin and cocaine with the intent to\n\ndistribute. In sum, Tillmon met with both undercover agents and co-conspirators at the\n\npreparatory meeting; observed the Rocky Mount warehouse operations on three occasions\n\nin which staged packages of heroin or cocaine were loaded into the hidden compartment\n\nof a vehicle; was trained in drug trafficking techniques; participated in the August 2014,\n\nOctober 2014, and March 2015 transports along with other co-conspirators; heard Lisa\n\nrefer to the packages used during the March transport as βheroinβ; and received $2,000\n\n(twice) and $2,500 (once) for his services related to these transports.\n\n To accept Tillmonβs arguments, the jury would have had to believe that heβa\n\ntrained law enforcement officerβdid not know what was happening right in front of him.\n\nEven in cases involving defendants without Tillmonβs background and training, we have\n\nrecognized that jurors can find that defendants have the requisite knowledge and intent for\n\nparticipating in a drug trafficking offense based on their knowledge of circumstances that\n\nare βsurreptitious and totally distinguishable from open and normal channels of business,β\n\nsuch as drugs packaged for transport and stashed in a hidden compartment of a vehicle. See\n\nAli, 735 F.3d at 188β89. The jury had all the more reason to find Tillmon responsible for\n\nsuch knowledge given his background and training. Further, the jury would have had to\n\nbelieve that Tillmon thought he was paid a total of $6,500 to accompany his friend Jacobs\n\non three innocent drives to Maryland so that he could, on one occasion, take photographs\n\nof the harbor. This conclusion, too, defies common sense. The substantial evidence in the\n\n 19\n\frecord, including audio and video recordings of the events the witnesses described,\n\nsupported the juryβs determination of guilt.\n\n For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Tillmonβs motion for a\n\njudgment of acquittal with respect to the drug trafficking conspiracy (Count 1).\n\n C. Aggravated Offense Drug Weights (Counts 1 and 48)\n\n Tillmon argues that even if the evidence is sufficient to affirm his convictions for\n\nthe drug conspiracy and attempted possession offenses, he is at least entitled to\n\nresentencing because the evidence does not support the juryβs finding that his offenses\n\ninvolved at least one kilogram of heroin. Again, we disagree.\n\n As noted, while the baseline 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841 offense does not require the\n\nGovernment to prove the quantity of the controlled substance at issue, it does provide for\n\nincreased penalties when certain threshold amounts are established. The βspecific threshold\n\ndrug quantities [are] treated as elements of aggravated drug trafficking offenses, rather than\n\nas mere sentencing factorsβ and thus must be either admitted by the defendant or found by\n\na jury to be βreasonably foreseeable to the individual defendant.β United States v. Brooks,\n\n524 F.3d 549, 557β58 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the\n\nGovernment had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tillmon was responsible for βone\n\n(1) kilogram or more of heroin,β J.A. 118, the enhanced drug quantity charged in the\n\nindictment. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 156β57. Only then could Tillmon be properly\n\nsubjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 yearsβ imprisonment and a statutory\n\nmaximum of life. 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i).\n\n\n\n 20\n\f Tillmon argues that the evidence did not allow the jury to find him responsible for\n\nan offense involving at least 1 kilogram of heroin. Specifically, he asserts the record lacked\n\nevidence that agents ever told him how many kilograms they expected him to transport,\n\nthat they ever mentioned the word βkilogramβ or its variants, or that Tillmon knew how\n\nmuch heroin was in each package.\n\n Tillmonβs argument lacks merit. Trial evidence demonstrated the packages each\n\ncontained roughly one kilogram of fake drugs, consistent with the way drugs are commonly\n\npackaged for distribution. E.g., J.A. 544 (βAnybody who looks at one of those knows thatβs\n\na brick or a kilo.β). In addition, testimony established that Tillmon had been trained in drug\n\ninterdiction as part of his law enforcement duties. Further, the record contained evidence\n\nthat ten staged packages were positioned in plain view of Tillmon as they were loaded into\n\nthe load vehicle, and each package weighed one kilogram. All told, this evidence is a\n\nsufficient basis for the jury to have found that Tillmonβs drug offenses involved at least\n\none kilogram of heroin. Therefore, the sentencing enhancement was proper and Tillmon\n\nwas properly subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 monthsβ imprisonment\n\nand a maximum term of life for his attempted possession (Count 48) and drug trafficking\n\nconspiracy (Count 1) convictions.\n\n D. Firearms Counts (Counts 2 and 49)\n\n Tillmon also appeals the district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of\n\nacquittal with respect to his charges for conspiracy to use firearms during and in relation\n\nto a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(o) (Count 2), and use and\n\ncarry of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (attempted possession\n\n 21\n\fon March 2015), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 49). But Tillmonβs\n\nsole argument here is that because the evidence was insufficient to support the underlying\n\ndrug trafficking conspiracy (Count 1) and attempted possession with the intent to distribute\n\nheroin (Count 48) convictions, he is also entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the\n\ncorresponding firearms convictions. Put another way, Tillmon does not challenge that he\n\nconspired to use or carry a firearm as part of the drug trafficking conspiracy, or that he used\n\nor carried firearms during the March 2015 transport, only that he did not commit the\n\nunderlying drug offenses and so could not have committed the firearms offenses that\n\nrequired those predicates.\n\n Because the evidence is sufficient to affirm Tillmonβs convictions for the underlying\n\ndrug trafficking offenses, Tillmonβs argument fails. We therefore affirm his convictions\n\nfor the firearms conspiracy (Count 2) and using or carrying a firearm (Count 49).\n\n E. Admission of Video Recording\n\n Tillmon next contends that the district court committed reversible error in admitting\n\na video recording of his conversation with Tee while he was being paid for the March 2015\n\ntransport. Specifically, Tillmon asserts that the video improperly suggested that he was\n\ncomplicit in plotting a murder because Tee said he wanted a firearm to kill someone. 5 On\n\n\n 5\n Tillmon also argues the evidence was needlessly cumulative and suggests the\ndistrict courtβs decision is suspect because it had initially ruled the video inadmissible\nduring the Governmentβs case-in-chief. Even if the evidence was cumulative of other\nevidence in the record, that would not constitute reversible error on its own in this case.\nRule 403 lists cumulativeness as a reason that a district court may decide to rule evidence\ninadmissible; it does not bar evidence merely because it overlaps with prior evidence. See\nFed. R. Evid. 403.\n(Continued)\n 22\n\fthat basis, Tillmon argues the recording was unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible under\n\nFederal Rule of Evidence 403.\n\n Rule 403 states that a district βcourt may exclude relevant evidence if its probative\n\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly\n\npresenting cumulative evidence.β Fed. R. Evid. 403. βRule 403 is a rule of inclusion,\n\ngenerally favoring admissibility.β United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 264β65 (4th\n\nCir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, we have said that when\n\nconsidering whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial, βdamage to a defendantβs case is not\n\na basis for excluding probative evidence because evidence that is highly probative\n\ninvariably will be prejudicial to the defense.β Basham, 561 F.3d at 326 (internal quotation\n\nmarks omitted). Instead, β[u]nfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly\n\nrelevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof\n\nspecific to the offense charged.β Id. at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis\n\nadded).\n\n The video evidence was highly probative of Tillmonβs role in the charged conduct\n\nand it specifically rebutted Tillmonβs defense that he did not understand the criminal nature\n\n\n In addition, the record readily explains the district courtβs changed admissibility\nrulings. When the Government sought to introduce the exhibit in its case-in-chief, the court\nsustained Tillmonβs challenge to the ability of that witness to authenticate the recording.\nThe courtβs decision to sustain Tillmonβs objection related solely to the foundation for its\nintroduction, not whether the recording was admissible on other grounds. By the time the\nGovernment later attempted to introduce the recording to rebut Tillmonβs defense, the\nfoundation for its accuracy had been resolved by intervening testimony. This time,\nTillmonβs objection to the recordingβs admissibility was based on Rule 403, giving the\ndistrict court its first opportunity to rule on the admissibility of the recording on that\nground.\n 23\n\fof the underlying events and that he lacked the requisite intent to engage in criminal\n\nconduct. For instance, the recording demonstrated Tillmonβs admission to possessing a\n\nfirearm during the March 2015 transport; his receiving $2,500 for his participation in that\n\ntransport; and his familiarity and rapport with Tee, whom Tillmon believed to be part of\n\nthe DTO. All of these actions are specific to the charged offenses and directly relevant to\n\nthe juryβs determination of Tillmonβs culpability.\n\n Nor was the video unfairly prejudicial. Tillmon and Teeβs recorded conversation\n\nshowed the interactions between Tillmon and another purported member of the DTO in a\n\nway that the other evidence did not. Its probative valueβparticularly in light of Tillmonβs\n\ndefense that he lacked a culpable intent to engage in drug trafficking offensesβoutweighed\n\nany minimal prejudice that arose from the subject matter of their conversation. Moreover,\n\nbecause the jurors also knew that Tee was actually an undercover agent, they knew that his\n\nside of the conversation was role-playing rather than implicating Tillmon in any actual\n\nviolent crime.\n\n For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video\n\nevidence.\n\n F. Federal Programs Bribery (Counts 32, 36, and 54)\n\n Lastly, Tillmon appeals the district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of\n\nacquittal with respect to the three charges of federal programs bribery, in violation of 18\n\nU.S.C. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B) (Counts 32, 36, and 54).\n\n In relevant part, this statute prohibits individuals who are agents of a local\n\ngovernment agency from βaccept[ing] . . . anything of value from any person, intending to\n\n 24\n\fbe influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of\n\ntransactions of such . . . [government agency] . . . involving any thing of value of $5,000\n\nor more.β Id. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B). As a threshold to liability under this statute, the Government\n\nmust demonstrate that the local government at issue βreceive[d], in any one year period,\n\nbenefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy,\n\nloan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.β Β§ 666(b); see also id.\n\nΒ§ 666(d)(5) (defining βin any one-year periodβ).\n\n Pointing to the amount he was paid for each individual transport, Tillmon asserts\n\nthe Government failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish that his services to the\n\nfake DTO were worth at least $5,000. 6\n\n We have not previously considered Β§ 666(a)(1)(B)βs requirement that charged\n\nconduct involve βany thing of value of $5,000 or more.β But the statutory language reveals\n\nthat this element requires proof of the value of whatever was exchanged for the bribe. See\n\nΒ§ 666(a)(1)(B) (requiring that the business, transaction, or series of transactions of the\n\ngovernment agency βinvolve[d] any thing of value of $5,000 or moreβ). This has led our\n\nsister circuits to describe the requisite proof as identifying the value of the βsubject matterβ\n\nof the bribe. United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 271β76 (7th Cir. 2011).\n\n The indictment charged Tillmon with accepting cash from the undercover agents\n\nposing as members of the DTO on each of the three transports, with each count\n\ncorresponding to one of the transports, and it identified the subject matter of each of the\n\n\n 6\n Tillmon challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on two other elements of the\noffenses as well, but for the reasons discussed, we need not address those arguments.\n 25\n\fthree bribes as βprotecting shipments of purported narcotics.β J.A. 149, 153, 171. As we\n\nhave already recounted, the record depicted what that protection entailed: Tillmon was to\n\naccompany the drugs on a journey up the East Coast, drive or ride in one of the vehicles\n\ncontaining or accompanying the narcotics, and recite a cover story if the caravan was\n\nstopped. And once the drugs were delivered to another member of the DTO in Maryland,\n\nhe was paidβ$2,000 in October 2014; $2,000 in December 2014; and $2,500 in March\n\n2015.\n\n Our sister circuits have recognized that one valid method of valuing an intangible,\n\nsuch as a service provided, is the amount of the bribe. E.g., United States v. Hardin, 874\n\nF.3d 672, 676 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 12β13 (1st Cir.\n\n2013) (rejecting the value of the bribe test in favor of the value of the βtransactionβ test but\n\nacknowledging that the bribe amount βmay be relevant [evidence] in determining the value\n\nof the bribeβs objectiveβ when βthe subject matter of the bribe is a βthing of valueβ without\n\na fixed priceβ); Robinson, 663 F.3d at 271, 275 (βWithout excluding other possible\n\nmethods of valuation, we agree that the amount of the bribe may suffice as a proxy for\n\nvalue; at least it provides a floor for the valuation question.β). This approach is akin to\n\nβappraisingβ the service as an appraiser values a tangible assetββby looking at how much\n\na person in the market would be willing to pay forβ it. United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d\n\n1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1996).\n\n The Government properly recognizes that using the straightforward bribe-as-proxy\n\nmethod does not satisfy its burden in this case. The Government chose to charge Tillmon\n\nseparately for each of the three transports, meaning that the Government had the burden to\n\n 26\n\fprove that the value of his services on each of the individual transports was $5,000 or more.\n\nUnder the bribe-as-proxy method, the Governmentβs evidence is insufficient because\n\nTillmonβs aid on each transport was valued at less than $5,000 each time.\n\n Instead, the Government advances three arguments for what other evidence could\n\nhave been used to satisfy its burden: (1) that the amount of the bribes paid to the team as a\n\nwhole on each transport exceeded $5,000 (the βaggregation theoryβ); (2) that the market\n\nvalue of the drugs being trafficked on each transport exceeded $5,000 (the βmarket value\n\ntheoryβ); and (3) that the amount the Town of Windsor paid for public safety in each year\n\nat issue exceeded $5,000 (the βpublic safety theoryβ).\n\n Although the Government claims its aggregation theory is merely a variation on the\n\napproved bribes-as-proxy method, it is not the equivalent and we cannot use it here. The\n\nGovernment contends that the jury was permitted to aggregate the bribes paid to all of the\n\nteam members on a particular transport to arrive at the requisite $5,000. To be sure,\n\nemploying that method brings the dollar amount expended on each transport to more than\n\n$5,000. Fatally for the Government, however, the aggregation method does not arrive at an\n\namount that reflects the statutory obligation to produce evidence of the value of the subject\n\nmatter of the bribe charged in the indictmentβthat is, Tillmonβs βprotecting shipments of\n\npurported narcotics.β J.A. 149, 153, 171. The aggregation method conflates the value of\n\nTillmonβs services to the DTO with the value of the teamβs services to the DTO. The record\n\ndoes not permit the conclusion that Tillmon single-handedly provided services equal to the\n\namount paid to the team as a whole. And without such evidence demonstrating that\n\nTillmonβs services were worth that amount, the aggregation method is not an acceptable\n\n 27\n\fvaluation method. For these reasons, we reject the aggregation method as an appropriate\n\nvaluation method in this case.\n\n The Governmentβs proposed market value theory fares no better. As our sister\n\ncircuits have recognized, in some instances, it may be appropriate to look at the market\n\nvalue of the bribe from the perspective of the briber or an interested third party as a means\n\nof valuing the subject matter of the bribe. E.g., Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 15 (approving\n\nvaluation method for votes related to pending legislation by looking to the briberβs\n\nexpected financial gain flowing from the passage of that legislation); United States v.\n\nCurescu, 674 F.3d 735, 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2012) (approving valuation of a bribe given to\n\nfalsely certify that plumbing had been completed by a licensed plumber based on the\n\namount of money the briber did not have to pay a licensed plumber to perform the work);\n\nUnited States v. Hines, 541 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2008) (using market value theory to\n\nvalue expedited eviction orders based on the savings to the property owners in avoiding\n\nthe costs typically incurred in eviction). But even then, in addition to evidence of something\n\nhaving value to the briber or a third party, the Government also must come forward with\n\nevidence βlinkingβ that valued item to the services the defendant provided. See United\n\nStates v. Owens, 697 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 2012). To reiterate, the Governmentβs\n\nevidence must bear on the value of the subject matter of the bribe, and that obligation is\n\nnot satisfied with evidence of something βto which the subject matter of the bribe is\n\ntangentially related.β Id.\n\n In this case, the Government pointed to something of purported value to the briberβ\n\nthe market value of the narcoticsβbut it failed to put forward any evidence linking that\n\n 28\n\fvalue to Tillmonβs protection of the caravan, the subject matter of the bribe. Specifically,\n\nthe Government relies on Lisaβs statement during the March 2015 transport that the team\n\nwas shipping a million dollars of heroin and argues that because Tillmon was hired to\n\nprotect a million-dollar transport on that occasion and to protect similar package quantities\n\nduring the other two transports, his services on each transport were worth a million dollars.\n\nThe Government then contends that the Court can infer from the evidence that the other\n\ntransports involved similar drug packages and that they also thereby satisfied the $5,000\n\nrequirement. That reasoning is flawed because no evidence in the record links the purported\n\nvalue of the drugs to the value of Tillmonβs protection services. As the record stands, the\n\ntwo are merely tangentially related. The Government could have attempted to provide\n\nevidence sufficient to create the necessary linkage in several ways. For example, it could\n\nhave offered evidence that trafficking organizations typically provide protection with a cut\n\nof the profits from eventual sales. Or it could have offered evidence that the cost of\n\nlegitimate protection for drug transports involving that amount of drugs costs real DTOs\n\n$5,000 or more. But the Government offered no such evidence. In fact, it failed to introduce\n\nany evidence allowing the inference that the value of Tillmonβs services was connected to\n\nthe value of the drugs. Thus, the Governmentβs market value theory lacks any evidentiary\n\nbasis.\n\n The Governmentβs third argument, the public safety theory of valuation, can be\n\ndisposed of quickly. For the first and only time in this appeal, the Government mentions in\n\na single sentence of its Response Brief that the $5,000 value of Tillmonβs services could\n\nbe measured based on the Town of Windsorβs annual public safety budget. Setting aside\n\n 29\n\fany concerns regarding the timeliness and adequacy of the Governmentβs argument, we\n\nobserve that Windsorβs entire public safety budget is unrelated to and would vastly\n\noverstate the value of Tillmonβs services to the DTO. As such, it would be an improper\n\nmeasure of the subject matter of the bribe.\n\n In sum, the Government failed to produce evidence from which a jury could find\n\nthat Tillmonβs services to the DTO had a value of $5,000 or more. Though the Government\n\nmight have satisfied this requirement in several ways, it failed to introduce any evidence\n\nother than the amount Tillmon was paid as a bribe to establish that the value of his\n\nprotection services were worth at least $5,000. And in the absence of evidence to support\n\nthat element of the offense, Tillmonβs convictions for federal programs bribery, Counts 32,\n\n36, and 54, cannot stand and we vacate each of these convictions.\n\n\n\n IV. Conclusion\n\n For the reasons explained above, we affirm Tillmonβs convictions on the drug\n\ntrafficking and firearms offenses (Counts 1, 2, 48, and 49), but we vacate Tillmonβs\n\nconvictions for federal programs bribery (Counts 32, 36, and 54).\n\n As the parties agree, the record shows that Tillmonβs sentence cannot be affected by\n\nthe vacation of his federal programs bribery convictions. After calculating Tillmonβs\n\nGuidelines range, the district court imposed a downward variant sentence of 180 monthsβ\n\nimprisonmentβ120 months to run concurrently on Counts 1, 2, 48, 32, 36, and 54; and 60\n\nmonths to run consecutively on Count 49. Vacating Tillmonβs federal programs bribery\n\nconvictions does not change his sentence, which is still 120 monthsβ imprisonment for\n\n 30\n\fCounts 1, 2, and 48, to run concurrently with each other, and 60 monthsβ mandatory\n\nminimum imprisonment for Count 49, to run consecutively to the others. Because 120\n\nmonths is the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for the drug trafficking conspiracy\n\n(Count 1) and attempted possession (Count 48) convictions, Tillmon cannot be sentenced\n\nto a lower term of imprisonment on the part of the sentence that was running concurrently\n\nwith his sentence for the now-vacated federal programs bribery convictions. Similarly,\n\nTillmonβs consecutive sentence for Count 49 must continue to run consecutively to the\n\nother term of imprisonment. As such, we need not remand for resentencing.\n\n AFFIRMED IN PART\n AND VACATED IN PART\n\n\n\n\n 31\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Antonio Tillmon\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-26\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-4648\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nANTONIO TILLMON,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\\nElizabeth City. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (2:15-cr-00009-H-9)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 26, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore NIEMEYER, AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion,\\nin which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Diaz joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Paul K. Sun, Jr., ELLIS & WINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for\\nAppellant. Banumathi Rangarajan, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,\\nRaleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kelly Margolis Dagger, ELLIS &\\nWINTERS LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United\\nStates Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Acting First Assistant United States Attorney,\\nBarbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fAGEE, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n After being caught in a sting operation aimed at exposing corrupt law enforcement\\n\\nofficers, Antonio Tillmon was convicted by a jury on multiple counts: conspiracy to\\n\\ncommit drug trafficking, conspiracy to use firearms while drug trafficking, attempted\\n\\npossession of heroin with intent to distribute, using or carrying a firearm while drug\\n\\ntrafficking, and three counts of federal programs bribery. On appeal, Tillmon challenges\\n\\nthe district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal as to these offenses and\\n\\nits admission of a video-recorded conversation between Tillmon and an undercover agent.\\n\\nFor the reasons discussed below, we affirm the conspiracy, attempted possession and\\n\\nfirearms convictions, but vacate the federal programs bribery convictions.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Tillmonβs prosecution arose from a multi-year FBI investigation into reports of law\\n\\nenforcement corruption in the counties of Northampton and Halifax, North Carolina. 1 This\\n\\ninvestigation, βOperation Rockfish,β began in 2013 after the FBI received information that\\n\\nLann Clanton, a police officer with the Weldon, North Carolina, Police Department, was\\n\\ninvolved in criminal activity. Operation Rockfish consisted of undercover agents posing as\\n\\nmembers of a transnational drug trafficking organization (βDTOβ) that transported\\n\\nkilograms of heroin and cocaine to New York City. Part of the DTOβs strategy was\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n We recite the facts established at trial in the light most favorable to the\\nGovernment. United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).\\n 2\\n\\fβspecifically tr[ying] to recruit law enforcement officers for their ability to badge their way\\n\\nout of legitimate traffic stops by other law enforcement officers.β J.A. 406.\\n\\n The FBI established a βgeneral templateβ for the DTO, setting up a warehouse to\\n\\nprepare βcocaineβ and βheroinβ for shipment by storing those drugs in hidden\\n\\ncompartments of vehicles. J.A. 412. No real drugs were used, but a lookalike substance\\n\\nwas packaged to βlook like kilograms of illegal drugs that had been seized in other\\n\\ninvestigations.β J.A. 411. Ten one-kilogram packages were color-coded to identify the type\\n\\nof drug each package purportedly contained. Once the packages were loaded into a vehicle\\n\\nfor transport (βthe load vehicleβ), team members rode in that vehicle, a scout vehicle that\\n\\ndrove ahead of it, and a rear guard vehicle that drove behind it.\\n\\n Once the ersatz DTO was operational, the FBI used a confidential informant to let\\n\\nClanton know about its existence. Clanton then contacted the DTO, where his first\\n\\nassignment was to recruit law enforcement officers to implement the DTOβs cover strategy.\\n\\nClantonβs first recruit was Ikeisha Jacobs, another member of the Weldon Police\\n\\nDepartment. Clanton and Jacobs then enlisted other current and former law enforcement\\n\\nand correctional officers to join their teams.\\n\\n Jacobs recruited Tillmon, a former coworker, for her team. At the time he was\\n\\nrecruited to the DTO, Tillmon was a police officer with the Windsor, North Carolina,\\n\\nPolice Department. On August 19, 2014, Jacobs invited Tillmon to join her and other team\\n\\nmembers for a preparatory meeting. The gathering included Jacobs, two undercover FBI\\n\\nagents (John and Lisa), and four new recruits (Adrienne Moody, Alaina Sue-Kam-Lang,\\n\\nCrystal Pierce, and Tillmon). During the meeting, the undercover agents and Jacobs\\n\\n 3\\n\\fdescribed the plan for the next dayβs transport and explained the DTOβs reason for using\\n\\nlaw enforcement officers. They gave the team members a cover story to use if police\\n\\nstopped them during the transport: they were transporting a vehicle that had been sold out\\n\\nof state. During the meeting, one undercover agent asked whether the recruits carried guns.\\n\\nTillmon indicated that he would carry his gun. Toward the end of the meeting, the agents\\n\\ntold the recruits that they did not have to participate in the operation if they wanted out.\\n\\n The next morning (βthe August 2014 transportβ), Tillmon picked up Jacobs and Sue-\\n\\nKam-Lang before driving to a prearranged rendezvous point where they met Lisa and other\\n\\nteam members. They all then drove to a warehouse in Rocky Mount, North Carolina. Upon\\n\\narrival, Tillmon helped move a large white cooler from one area of the warehouse to the\\n\\nback of the load vehicle, a white GMC Acadia. One of the undercover agents, Paul, pulled\\n\\nout ten packages from underneath the ice and drinks in the cooler, counted them, and put\\n\\nthem on the ground. Paul handed the packages to John, another agent, who was underneath\\n\\nthe Acadia putting the packages into a hidden compartment. Tillmon never touched the\\n\\npackages, but he watched as they were loaded into the compartment in plain view of him\\n\\nand the other team members. 2 While standing behind the vehicle, Lisa explained to Tillmon\\n\\nthat they were βstarting to move H.β J.A. 591β92. Lisa testified at trial that by βHβ she\\n\\nmeant βheroin,β though she did not clarify her meaning to the team members at the time.\\n\\n After the packages were stored in the Acadia, it and two other vehicles caravanned\\n\\nto National Harbor in Maryland. Jacobs drove the load vehicle, two team members drove\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The trial evidence shows that Tillmon did not touch, handle, or assist in loading\\nthe staged packages into the vehicles during any of the events described.\\n 4\\n\\fthe scout vehicle, and Tillmon and Sue-Kam-Lang followed as the rear guard. When they\\n\\narrived at National Harbor, the team members met βTee,β another undercover agent who\\n\\nwas posing as the supervisor of that portion of the route. Tee and the team boarded an\\n\\nenclosed car of a Ferris wheel, where Tee paid each member of the group. Tillmon received\\n\\n$2,000 and then returned to North Carolina.\\n\\n In October 2014 (βthe October 2014 transportβ), Jacobs and Tillmon rode together\\n\\nto the Rocky Mount warehouse. While waiting for drugs to be loaded into the hidden\\n\\ncompartment of the load vehicle, Tillmon was shown a fake bill of sale that would back\\n\\ntheir cover story. This time, Tillmon drove the load vehicle to the parking lot of an outlet\\n\\nmall in Maryland. He then got into a large van, where Tee paid him and the other team\\n\\nmembers. Tee paid Tillmon $2,000.\\n\\n In March 2015 (βthe March 2015 transportβ), Jacobs asked Tillmon to join her a\\n\\nthird time. When Tillmon arrived at the Rocky Mount warehouse, the agents had a pickup\\n\\ntruck staged with packages of drugs laid out in plain view on the tailgate. The team\\n\\nmembers, including Tillmon, walked by the back of the truck as they entered the\\n\\nwarehouseβs office. Inside, Lisa asked everyone if they had guns; after Sue-Kam-Lang\\n\\nindicated that she did not have a gun, Tillmon gave her one of his extra guns.\\n\\n The team exited the office and went back into the main part of the warehouse. As\\n\\nthe drugs were being loaded into the hidden compartment of the vehicle, Lisa said, βyou\\n\\nguys got to be carrying from now on . . . a million dollars of heroin, you canβt f[***] around\\n\\nwith that.β Supp. J.A. 1625 at 12:47:16β47:24. She was within three feet of Tillmon as she\\n\\nspoke.\\n\\n 5\\n\\f After the drugs were loaded, the team departed, with Tillmon and Jacobs driving the\\n\\nrear guard vehicle. After the team left the load vehicle at a carport in Maryland, they met\\n\\nTee at the same outlet mall parking lot as in October. Each member entered Teeβs vehicle\\n\\nseparately, where they were paid. As Tillmon was paid $2,500, Tee asked him if he was\\n\\ncarrying a gun, and Tillmon confirmed he was. Then Tee indicated he was interested in\\n\\ngetting a small firearm. Tillmon responded, βWhat [do] you need?β and Tee said he wanted\\n\\nβa thirty-eight (.38), something small, a revolver that donβt need no shells, know what I\\n\\nmean?β J.A. 1402. Tillmon recommended a few firearms that would meet Teeβs need to\\n\\nβjust walk right up on βem and keep rollingβ and βboom-boom and then throw that s[***]\\n\\naway and [not worry] about it no more.β J.A. 1403β04. Tee asked Tillmon to let him know\\n\\nif he heard of anything available, and Tillmon replied, βOkay . . . . Weβll talk.β J.A. 1404.\\n\\nTillmon exited Teeβs vehicle and returned to North Carolina.\\n\\n In April 2015, Jacobs asked Tillmon to join her again. When they arrived at the\\n\\nRocky Mount warehouse, the undercover agents arrested them. At the time of his arrest,\\n\\nTillmon had in his possession his badge, his Windsor police identification, four semi-\\n\\nautomatic pistols, a .223 caliber rifle, and ammunition for each of the guns. 3\\n\\n A grand jury indicted Tillmon and fourteen others, including Clanton and Jacobs,\\n\\nin a fifty-four count indictment. Tillmon was charged in ten of the counts. All other\\n\\ndefendants negotiated guilty pleas, but Tillmon pleaded not guilty and invoked his right to\\n\\na jury trial on all charges: (1) one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent\\n\\n\\n 3\\n These items, all of which belonged to Tillmon, were found on his person, in his\\nbag, and in Moodyβs vehicle, in which he had come to the warehouse.\\n 6\\n\\fto distribute controlled substances, namely heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n\\n§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 1); (2) one count of conspiracy to use firearms during and in\\n\\nrelation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(o) (Count 2); (3) three\\n\\ncounts of attempted possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.\\n\\n§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(i), 846, and 18 U.S.C. Β§ 2, corresponding to the three transports\\n\\n(August 2014, Count 28; October 2014, Count 33; and March 2015, Count 48); (4) two\\n\\ncounts of use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in\\n\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A), corresponding to two of the transports (October\\n\\n2014, Count 34; and March 2015, Count 49); and (5) three counts of federal programs\\n\\nbribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B), corresponding to each transport (August\\n\\n2014, Count 32; October 2014, Count 36; and March 2015, Count 54).\\n\\n At trial, the Government argued that Tillmon conspired with other law enforcement\\n\\nofficers to use their badges and firearms to assist in transporting a substance they believed\\n\\nto be heroin out of North Carolina. Because the entire DTO was a sting operation that had\\n\\nbeen captured in video and audio recordings, the Government introduced into evidence the\\n\\nrecordings of the preparatory meeting in August 2014 and the interactions at the Rocky\\n\\nMount warehouse on each transport day.\\n\\n At the close of the Governmentβs evidence, Tillmon moved for a judgment of\\n\\nacquittal on all counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. The district court\\n\\ndenied the motion on all but one count, granting the motion as to the charge of attempted\\n\\npossession with intent to distribute heroin based on the August 2014 transport. The district\\n\\ncourt reasoned that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge because it was\\n\\n 7\\n\\fbased solely on Lisaβs reference to βH,β and while she was βprobablyβ talking about\\n\\nheroin, there was no evidence that anyone specifically identified the substance as heroin.\\n\\nJ.A. 1057.\\n\\n Tillmonβs defense centered on his contention that he did not have the requisite intent\\n\\nor knowledge to commit the crimes. For example, Tillmon testified that he did not recall\\n\\nany discussion of his police badge or identification card at the preparatory meeting and that\\n\\nhe did not realize he had a job during the transports or that he would be paid for that job.\\n\\nHe further testified that he did not hear or misheard Lisaβs statements at the Rocky Mount\\n\\nwarehouse about transporting heroin. Tillmon stated that he did not have any understanding\\n\\nof what was happening, only that others were loading something into a vehicle to be\\n\\ndelivered to Maryland.\\n\\n During Tillmonβs cross-examination, the Government introducedβover Tillmonβs\\n\\nobjectionβa video recording of the conversation between Tillmon and Tee from the March\\n\\n2015 transport in which Tee requested Tillmonβs assistance in procuring a small-caliber\\n\\nfirearm. Tillmon argued that the recording was unfairly prejudicial because it implicated\\n\\nhim in uncharged violent crimes. The district court overruled the objection, concluding that\\n\\nany prejudicial effect was overridden by the fact that the video showed there was βa clear\\n\\nrelationship and friendshipβ between Tee and Tillmon. J.A. 1001.\\n\\n The jury found Tillmon guilty on the remaining nine counts. After the verdict,\\n\\nTillmon renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, for a new\\n\\ntrial. The district court denied the motions as to all but two counts, granting the motion for\\n\\na judgment of acquittal only with respect to the attempted possession with intent to\\n\\n 8\\n\\fdistribute heroin and corresponding firearm conviction arising from the October 2014\\n\\ntransport (Counts 33 and 34). 4 The district court observed that sufficient evidence\\n\\nsupported the juryβs decision to convict on the conspiracy charges (Counts 1 and 2),\\n\\nattempted possession charge (Count 48), and firearm charge (Count 49), largely based on\\n\\nLisaβs reference to the βmillion dollars[β] worth of heroinβ that Tillmon received payment\\n\\nfor accompanying to Maryland during the March 2015 transport. J.A. 1527. Further, and\\n\\nin relevant part, the district court concluded sufficient evidence supported the three federal\\n\\nprograms bribery convictions (Counts 32, 36, and 54) because the record showed Tillmon\\n\\nand his co-defendants collectively received more than $5,000 for each transport and he was\\n\\ntold he was transporting drugs valued at more than a million dollars.\\n\\n Tillmonβs sentencing was affected by two statutory mandatory minimums. Because\\n\\nthe jury attributed at least 1 kilogram of heroin to Tillmon, the two drug offenses (Counts\\n\\n1 and 32) carried a statutory mandatory minimum of 120 monthsβ imprisonment. See 21\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i). In addition, the firearm conviction carried a mandatory minimum\\n\\nsentence of 60 monthsβ imprisonment that must be served consecutively to any other\\n\\nsentence. 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)(1)(A) (stating that a term of imprisonment of βnot less than 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n The district court explained that the Government had not introduced evidence of\\nTillmonβs specific intent to transport heroin, as the indictment charged in Count 33.\\nSpecifically, none of the recordings regarding the October 2014 transport referenced the\\ntype of drugs supposedly being transported even though they showed the staged packages\\nbeing loaded into the load vehicleβs fake compartment, and one of the undercover agents\\nhad testified that she thought that substance transported during this transport was supposed\\nto be cocaine. The Government has not cross-appealed the Courtβs decision and thus\\nCounts 33 and 34 are not directly at issue on appeal.\\n 9\\n\\fyearsβ for the possession offense βshallβ be imposed βin addition to the punishment\\n\\nprovided for such . . . drug trafficking crimeβ).\\n\\n Although the district court calculated Tillmonβs Guidelines range to be 188 to 235\\n\\nmonthsβ imprisonment for all but the firearm-possession conviction, it granted Tillmonβs\\n\\nrequest for a downward variance to the statutory mandatory minimums. Accordingly, the\\n\\ndistrict court sentenced Tillmon to 180 monthsβ imprisonment consisting of 120 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonment for the conspiracy, attempted possession, and federal programs bribery\\n\\noffenses (Counts 1, 2, 32, 36, 48, and 54), to be served concurrently, and 60 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonment for the firearm offense (Count 49), to be served consecutively to the sentence\\n\\non the other counts.\\n\\n Tillmon noted a timely appeal, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1291.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Tillmon appeals the denial of his renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal on all\\n\\nseven remaining counts. First, he argues the evidence was insufficient to show his intent to\\n\\nengage in the drug trafficking offenses, and that if those charges are vacated, then the\\n\\nfirearms charges must also be vacated. Second, he contends that even if the convictions\\n\\nstand, the evidence was insufficient to show that the drug crimes involved more than 1\\n\\nkilogram of heroin, so he should not have been subjected to an enhanced sentencing range.\\n\\nThird, Tillmon challenges the district courtβs admission of the video evidence from the\\n\\nMarch 2015 transport on the basis that it was cumulative and unfairly prejudicial. Fourth\\n\\n 10\\n\\fand lastly, he contends the evidence was insufficient to support several elements of the\\n\\nfederal programs bribery charges. We address each argument in turn.\\n\\n The Court reviews de novo the district courtβs denial of a Rule 29 motion for a\\n\\njudgment of acquittal. United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir. 2015). A\\n\\ndefendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence βbears a heavy burden.β United\\n\\nStates v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation marks omitted).\\n\\nThe Court reviews whether there is βsubstantial evidence . . . to support the jury verdict,β\\n\\nUnited States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted), meaning that, to reverse, the record must βdemonstrate[] a lack of evidence from\\n\\nwhich a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,β United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d\\n\\n849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996). Significantly, the juryβnot this Courtββweighs the credibility\\n\\nof the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presentedβ when such\\n\\ndeterminations need to be made. Id.\\n\\n The Court reviews the district courtβs evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion.\\n\\nUnited States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 325 (4th Cir. 2009). We βwill not vacate a\\n\\nconviction unless we find that the district court judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally in\\n\\nadmitting evidence.β Id. at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n A. Attempted Heroin Possession in March 2015 (Count 48)\\n\\n Because our consideration of the attempted possession offense facilitates review of\\n\\nthe conspiracy and firearms convictions, we begin with it. Tillmon argues that the\\n\\n 11\\n\\fGovernment did not put forward sufficient evidence to establish the necessary mens rea to\\n\\nsupport his conviction.\\n\\n It is a federal crime to βknowingly or intentionally . . . possess with intent to . . .\\n\\ndistribute . . . a controlled substanceβ like heroin. 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A)(i). A\\n\\nconviction for an attempt to commit this offense, see 21 U.S.C. Β§ 846, βpunishes conduct\\n\\nthat puts in motion events that would, from the defendantβs point of view, result in the\\n\\ncommission of a crime but for some intervening circumstance.β United States v. Pratt, 351\\n\\nF.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). To convict Tillmon of the charged offense, the Government\\n\\nhad to prove\\n\\n that (1) [Tillmon] had the requisite intent to commit a crime; (2) [he]\\n undertook a direct act in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his\\n commission of the crime; (3) the act was substantial, in that it was strongly\\n corroborative of [his] criminal purpose; and (4) the act fell short of the\\n commission of the intended crime due to intervening circumstances.\\n\\nId.\\n\\n In rejecting Tillmonβs renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal, the district court\\n\\nconcluded the evidence was sufficient on each element. Specifically, it observed that Lisa\\n\\npointed to the staged packages being loaded into the vehicle and said that the team was\\n\\ntransporting a million dollarsβ worth of heroin. Then, Tillmon followed the load vehicle to\\n\\nMaryland, providing protection during the transport.\\n\\n Tillmon argues that this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he attempted,\\n\\nor aided or abetted the attempt, to possess with intent to distribute heroin in March 2015.\\n\\nHe argues that Lisaβs comment about the value of the heroin does not show that he heard\\n\\nher statement or that he believed the group was trafficking heroin. Tillmon also argues that\\n\\n 12\\n\\fthere was no evidence that he exhibited guilty knowledge because he was not shown a\\n\\nsubstance that looked or felt like heroin, nor was there evidence that he directly handled\\n\\nthe packages or saw their contents. Additionally, Tillmon asserts that he did not take a\\n\\nsubstantial step towards completion of the offense that strongly corroborated an intent to\\n\\npossess with the intent to distribute heroin. He argues that neither his presence at the\\n\\nwarehouse nor his driving from Rocky Mount to Maryland with the team proves a specific\\n\\nintent to possess with the intent to distribute heroin. Consequently, Tillmon contends, the\\n\\njury did not have the evidence necessary to convict him.\\n\\n We disagree with Tillmon. To say that he lacked intent and was βa mere passive\\n\\nobserver of these goings-on, would defy reason.β See United States v. McLamb, 985 F.2d\\n\\n1284, 1292 (4th Cir. 1993). At a minimum, the following evidence shows Tillmonβs\\n\\nculpable intent: (1) he had basic law enforcement drug trafficking training; (2) the fake\\n\\nheroin was packaged in a manner commonly used to traffic controlled substances; (3) the\\n\\nstaged packages were in plain view of Tillmon before and while it was secreted into a\\n\\nhidden compartment of the load vehicle; (4) while standing about three feet from Tillmon,\\n\\nLisa pointed to the staged packages and said that the team was moving heroin valued at a\\n\\nmillion dollars; (5) two vehicles accompanied the load vehicle and each team member was\\n\\npaid thousands of dollars for accompanying the shipment; and (6) Tillmon not only\\n\\npossessed a firearm for his own use, but also loaned a team member a second firearm\\n\\nbecause they all had been instructed to carry firearms. From these facts, a jury could\\n\\nreasonably conclude that Tillmon had the requisite intent to attempt to possess heroin with\\n\\nthe intent to distribute it.\\n\\n 13\\n\\f We also reject Tillmonβs contention that the evidence does not show that his conduct\\n\\nconstituted an βattemptβ to commit the completed act of possession because he did not take\\n\\nat least one act calculated to culminate in the completed offense. To the contrary, Tillmon\\n\\ncompleted the offense and the only circumstance that prevented the Government from\\n\\ncharging Tillmon with actual possession of heroin was that the substance at issue involved\\n\\nfake heroin instead of real heroin. This was not a case in which some intervening act early\\n\\nin the planning prevented Tillmon and his co-conspirators from completing their intended\\n\\nactivity. Rather, they successfully transported the fake substance from North Carolina to\\n\\nMaryland. And Tillmon willingly participated in doing soβeven after Lisa commented in\\n\\nthe warehouse that the staged packages contained heroin and Tillmon watched the team\\n\\nmembers stash the packages in the load vehicle, he took his place in the vehicle caravan,\\n\\nescorted the packages to Maryland, and accepted payment for his part in the scheme.\\n\\n Tillmonβs arguments misapply the relevant appellate standards. Some of his\\n\\ncontentions ask the Court to assume the role of the jury and revisit credibility\\n\\ndeterminations to decide between competing evidence. However, the jury was not required\\n\\nto believe Tillmonβs defense that he did not understand what the packages were and that\\n\\nhe did not hear Lisaβs reference to moving heroin. E.g., Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862 (β[T]he\\n\\njury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any\\n\\nconflicts in the evidence presented, and if the evidence supports different, reasonable\\n\\ninterpretations, the jury decides which interpretation to believe.β (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Some of Tillmonβs arguments ask us to attach only benign, if not nonsensical,\\n\\nmeaning to his βpresenceβ at the warehouse and in the transport. But we have previously\\n\\nrecognized that presence during obvious criminal activity is relevant to the analysis in a\\n\\npossession offense. E.g., id. at 869 (citing United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1246\\n\\n(11th Cir. 1983) for the proposition that βwhen the circumstances surrounding a personβs\\n\\npresence at the scene of conspiratorial activity are so obvious[, the] knowledge of its\\n\\ncharacter can fairly be attributed to himβ). Here, Tillmon participated in the transport after\\n\\nLisa pointed to the packages and stated that they contained a million dollars of heroin. He\\n\\nloaned a team member a firearm for protection during the transport and then accepted\\n\\n$2,500 for his βpresence.β Although Tillmon never touched the packages himself, his role\\n\\nin the transport was more than that of βa mere passive observer.β See McLamb, 985 F.2d\\n\\nat 1292. And the jury was entitled to conclude that Tillmon believed the staged packages\\n\\nwere heroin being transported for distribution, and that he possessed those packages\\n\\nthrough his role as a hired guard during the transport of those packages from North Carolina\\n\\nto Maryland. See Pratt, 351 F.3d at 136β37 (recognizing that a personβs criminal role in a\\n\\npossession with intent to distribute offense can take various forms).\\n\\n Lastly, to the extent that Tillmon argues that the district courtβs dismissal of the\\n\\nother attempted possession counts supports dismissal of this count, he ignores the specific\\n\\ncircumstances surrounding the district courtβs decisions. The dismissals of the other counts\\n\\nwere not based on a broad assessment of lack of evidence of his intent, but rather on narrow\\n\\nevidentiary gaps in the Governmentβs case. All three attempted possession with intent to\\n\\ndistribute counts alleged not just the baseline offense set out in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1), but\\n\\n 15\\n\\falso the aggravated possession with intent to distribute offense for a violation involving\\n\\nmore than one kilogram of heroin, see Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i). See also United States v. Collins,\\n\\n415 F.3d 304, 312β14 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing the difference between the baseline\\n\\noffense and aggravated offense); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 152 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2001) (en banc) (holding that, in light of Apprendi, Β§ 841(b)(1)(A) sets out elements of an\\n\\naggravated drug trafficking offense that must be found by a jury rather than constituting\\n\\nmere sentencing factors). The baseline offense does not require proof of the drug type and\\n\\nweight; in relevant part, it requires only that the defendant knowingly possessed a\\n\\ncontrolled substance of some kind. United States v. Ali, 735 F.3d 176, 186β88 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2013) (holding that while 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(a)(1) βrequires specific intent to distribute a\\n\\ncontrolled substance or to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, it does\\n\\nnot require that the defendant have, within that intent, specific knowledge of the controlled\\n\\nsubstance[.]β). To convict Tillmon of the aggravated offense, however, the Government\\n\\nhad to introduce proof that Tillmonβs Β§ 841(a)(1) violation involved at least one kilogram\\n\\nof heroin. See Β§ 841(b)(1)(A) (stating that the enhanced penalties apply if βany person . . .\\n\\nviolates subsection (a)β and that violation βinvolv[ed]β the type and quantity of drugs\\n\\nlisted). At trial, the Government urged the district court not to dismiss the attempted\\n\\npossession counts relating to the August and October 2014 transports because there was\\n\\nsufficient evidence to convict Tillmon of the aggravated charges involving heroin. For\\n\\nreasons not readily apparent in the record, it did not rely on the fallback position that even\\n\\nif the evidence did not prove the aggravated offense elements, it was nonetheless sufficient\\n\\nto convict Tillmon of the attempted Β§ 841(a)(1) baseline offense. The district court in turn\\n\\n 16\\n\\fdismissed the counts based on the August 2014 and December 2014 transports because of\\n\\ninsufficient evidence to conclude that Tillmon believed the staged packages were heroin,\\n\\nas opposed to some other controlled substance. By contrast, no such gap exists with respect\\n\\nto the March 2015 evidence. In the warehouse just prior to that transport, Lisa specifically\\n\\nreferred to the packages as heroin while in Tillmonβs immediate presence.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Tillmonβs renewed motion\\n\\nfor a judgment of acquittal on Tillmonβs conviction for attempted possession with intent to\\n\\ndistribute heroin in March 2015.\\n\\n B. Drug Trafficking Conspiracy (Count 1)\\n\\n Tillmon also appeals the district courtβs denial of his renewed motion for a judgment\\n\\nof acquittal with respect to his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with\\n\\nintent to distribute controlled substances, namely heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21\\n\\nU.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 1). He contends the record contains insufficient evidence\\n\\nof his intent.\\n\\n To prove conspiracy to possess drugs with an intent to distribute, the Government\\n\\nmust establish that: β(1) an agreement to possess cocaine [and heroin] with intent to\\n\\ndistribute existed between two or more persons; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy;\\n\\nand (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy.β Burgos,\\n\\n94 F.3d at 857. Due to the clandestine nature of a conspiracy, the offense is often proved\\n\\nby circumstantial evidence and the context in which the circumstantial evidence is adduced.\\n\\nId. A conspiracy βmay be inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances.β\\n\\nId. at 858 (internal quotation marks omitted). βCircumstantial evidence sufficient to\\n\\n 17\\n\\fsupport a conspiracy conviction need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of\\n\\ninnocence, provided the summation of the evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a\\n\\nreasonable doubt.β Id.\\n\\n The Government must establish proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt.\\n\\nId. And although the Government must satisfy its burden of proving a connection between\\n\\nthe defendant and the conspiracy, it need not prove the defendant βknew the particulars of\\n\\nthe conspiracy.β Id. Instead, it is sufficient to show that the defendant joined βwith an\\n\\nunderstanding of the unlawful nature thereof and willfully join[ed] in the plan on one\\n\\noccasion [even if] he played only a minor part.β Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Tillmonβs arguments challenging his conviction on Count 1 mirror the arguments\\n\\nhe made regarding the attempted possession conviction. For example, he contends there\\n\\nwas no evidence to support that he knew about an agreement to possess with the intent to\\n\\ndistribute heroin, or that he agreed to join that endeavor. He asserts no one mentioned drug\\n\\ntrafficking at the preparatory meeting. Further, Tillmon asserts no evidence contradicts his\\n\\ntestimony that he did not hear Lisaβs reference to heroin during the March 2015 transport.\\n\\nHe points to the fact that he never saw a substance identified as heroin (because it was all\\n\\nin packages) and that he never touched the packages. And he points to his taking\\n\\nphotographs on one of the transports as proof that he lacked a criminal mindset.\\n\\n We disagree with Tillmon and do not need to add much to our preceding analysis\\n\\nrejecting his arguments regarding the attempted possession conviction. His arguments are\\n\\ngrounded primarily in reweighing the credibility of witnesses and choosing between\\n\\ndifferent interpretations of conflicting evidence, all of which is squarely in the province of\\n\\n 18\\n\\fthe jury and not reviewable on appeal. The rest of his arguments challenge minor details\\n\\nthat do not affect the substantial evidence recounted above showing that he knowingly and\\n\\nvoluntarily participated in an agreement to possess heroin and cocaine with the intent to\\n\\ndistribute. In sum, Tillmon met with both undercover agents and co-conspirators at the\\n\\npreparatory meeting; observed the Rocky Mount warehouse operations on three occasions\\n\\nin which staged packages of heroin or cocaine were loaded into the hidden compartment\\n\\nof a vehicle; was trained in drug trafficking techniques; participated in the August 2014,\\n\\nOctober 2014, and March 2015 transports along with other co-conspirators; heard Lisa\\n\\nrefer to the packages used during the March transport as βheroinβ; and received $2,000\\n\\n(twice) and $2,500 (once) for his services related to these transports.\\n\\n To accept Tillmonβs arguments, the jury would have had to believe that heβa\\n\\ntrained law enforcement officerβdid not know what was happening right in front of him.\\n\\nEven in cases involving defendants without Tillmonβs background and training, we have\\n\\nrecognized that jurors can find that defendants have the requisite knowledge and intent for\\n\\nparticipating in a drug trafficking offense based on their knowledge of circumstances that\\n\\nare βsurreptitious and totally distinguishable from open and normal channels of business,β\\n\\nsuch as drugs packaged for transport and stashed in a hidden compartment of a vehicle. See\\n\\nAli, 735 F.3d at 188β89. The jury had all the more reason to find Tillmon responsible for\\n\\nsuch knowledge given his background and training. Further, the jury would have had to\\n\\nbelieve that Tillmon thought he was paid a total of $6,500 to accompany his friend Jacobs\\n\\non three innocent drives to Maryland so that he could, on one occasion, take photographs\\n\\nof the harbor. This conclusion, too, defies common sense. The substantial evidence in the\\n\\n 19\\n\\frecord, including audio and video recordings of the events the witnesses described,\\n\\nsupported the juryβs determination of guilt.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Tillmonβs motion for a\\n\\njudgment of acquittal with respect to the drug trafficking conspiracy (Count 1).\\n\\n C. Aggravated Offense Drug Weights (Counts 1 and 48)\\n\\n Tillmon argues that even if the evidence is sufficient to affirm his convictions for\\n\\nthe drug conspiracy and attempted possession offenses, he is at least entitled to\\n\\nresentencing because the evidence does not support the juryβs finding that his offenses\\n\\ninvolved at least one kilogram of heroin. Again, we disagree.\\n\\n As noted, while the baseline 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841 offense does not require the\\n\\nGovernment to prove the quantity of the controlled substance at issue, it does provide for\\n\\nincreased penalties when certain threshold amounts are established. The βspecific threshold\\n\\ndrug quantities [are] treated as elements of aggravated drug trafficking offenses, rather than\\n\\nas mere sentencing factorsβ and thus must be either admitted by the defendant or found by\\n\\na jury to be βreasonably foreseeable to the individual defendant.β United States v. Brooks,\\n\\n524 F.3d 549, 557β58 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the\\n\\nGovernment had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tillmon was responsible for βone\\n\\n(1) kilogram or more of heroin,β J.A. 118, the enhanced drug quantity charged in the\\n\\nindictment. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 156β57. Only then could Tillmon be properly\\n\\nsubjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 yearsβ imprisonment and a statutory\\n\\nmaximum of life. 21 U.S.C. Β§ 841(b)(1)(A)(i).\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\f Tillmon argues that the evidence did not allow the jury to find him responsible for\\n\\nan offense involving at least 1 kilogram of heroin. Specifically, he asserts the record lacked\\n\\nevidence that agents ever told him how many kilograms they expected him to transport,\\n\\nthat they ever mentioned the word βkilogramβ or its variants, or that Tillmon knew how\\n\\nmuch heroin was in each package.\\n\\n Tillmonβs argument lacks merit. Trial evidence demonstrated the packages each\\n\\ncontained roughly one kilogram of fake drugs, consistent with the way drugs are commonly\\n\\npackaged for distribution. E.g., J.A. 544 (βAnybody who looks at one of those knows thatβs\\n\\na brick or a kilo.β). In addition, testimony established that Tillmon had been trained in drug\\n\\ninterdiction as part of his law enforcement duties. Further, the record contained evidence\\n\\nthat ten staged packages were positioned in plain view of Tillmon as they were loaded into\\n\\nthe load vehicle, and each package weighed one kilogram. All told, this evidence is a\\n\\nsufficient basis for the jury to have found that Tillmonβs drug offenses involved at least\\n\\none kilogram of heroin. Therefore, the sentencing enhancement was proper and Tillmon\\n\\nwas properly subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence of 120 monthsβ imprisonment\\n\\nand a maximum term of life for his attempted possession (Count 48) and drug trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy (Count 1) convictions.\\n\\n D. Firearms Counts (Counts 2 and 49)\\n\\n Tillmon also appeals the district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of\\n\\nacquittal with respect to his charges for conspiracy to use firearms during and in relation\\n\\nto a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(o) (Count 2), and use and\\n\\ncarry of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (attempted possession\\n\\n 21\\n\\fon March 2015), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 49). But Tillmonβs\\n\\nsole argument here is that because the evidence was insufficient to support the underlying\\n\\ndrug trafficking conspiracy (Count 1) and attempted possession with the intent to distribute\\n\\nheroin (Count 48) convictions, he is also entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the\\n\\ncorresponding firearms convictions. Put another way, Tillmon does not challenge that he\\n\\nconspired to use or carry a firearm as part of the drug trafficking conspiracy, or that he used\\n\\nor carried firearms during the March 2015 transport, only that he did not commit the\\n\\nunderlying drug offenses and so could not have committed the firearms offenses that\\n\\nrequired those predicates.\\n\\n Because the evidence is sufficient to affirm Tillmonβs convictions for the underlying\\n\\ndrug trafficking offenses, Tillmonβs argument fails. We therefore affirm his convictions\\n\\nfor the firearms conspiracy (Count 2) and using or carrying a firearm (Count 49).\\n\\n E. Admission of Video Recording\\n\\n Tillmon next contends that the district court committed reversible error in admitting\\n\\na video recording of his conversation with Tee while he was being paid for the March 2015\\n\\ntransport. Specifically, Tillmon asserts that the video improperly suggested that he was\\n\\ncomplicit in plotting a murder because Tee said he wanted a firearm to kill someone. 5 On\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Tillmon also argues the evidence was needlessly cumulative and suggests the\\ndistrict courtβs decision is suspect because it had initially ruled the video inadmissible\\nduring the Governmentβs case-in-chief. Even if the evidence was cumulative of other\\nevidence in the record, that would not constitute reversible error on its own in this case.\\nRule 403 lists cumulativeness as a reason that a district court may decide to rule evidence\\ninadmissible; it does not bar evidence merely because it overlaps with prior evidence. See\\nFed. R. Evid. 403.\\n(Continued)\\n 22\\n\\fthat basis, Tillmon argues the recording was unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible under\\n\\nFederal Rule of Evidence 403.\\n\\n Rule 403 states that a district βcourt may exclude relevant evidence if its probative\\n\\nvalue is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly\\n\\npresenting cumulative evidence.β Fed. R. Evid. 403. βRule 403 is a rule of inclusion,\\n\\ngenerally favoring admissibility.β United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 264β65 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, we have said that when\\n\\nconsidering whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial, βdamage to a defendantβs case is not\\n\\na basis for excluding probative evidence because evidence that is highly probative\\n\\ninvariably will be prejudicial to the defense.β Basham, 561 F.3d at 326 (internal quotation\\n\\nmarks omitted). Instead, β[u]nfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly\\n\\nrelevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof\\n\\nspecific to the offense charged.β Id. at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis\\n\\nadded).\\n\\n The video evidence was highly probative of Tillmonβs role in the charged conduct\\n\\nand it specifically rebutted Tillmonβs defense that he did not understand the criminal nature\\n\\n\\n In addition, the record readily explains the district courtβs changed admissibility\\nrulings. When the Government sought to introduce the exhibit in its case-in-chief, the court\\nsustained Tillmonβs challenge to the ability of that witness to authenticate the recording.\\nThe courtβs decision to sustain Tillmonβs objection related solely to the foundation for its\\nintroduction, not whether the recording was admissible on other grounds. By the time the\\nGovernment later attempted to introduce the recording to rebut Tillmonβs defense, the\\nfoundation for its accuracy had been resolved by intervening testimony. This time,\\nTillmonβs objection to the recordingβs admissibility was based on Rule 403, giving the\\ndistrict court its first opportunity to rule on the admissibility of the recording on that\\nground.\\n 23\\n\\fof the underlying events and that he lacked the requisite intent to engage in criminal\\n\\nconduct. For instance, the recording demonstrated Tillmonβs admission to possessing a\\n\\nfirearm during the March 2015 transport; his receiving $2,500 for his participation in that\\n\\ntransport; and his familiarity and rapport with Tee, whom Tillmon believed to be part of\\n\\nthe DTO. All of these actions are specific to the charged offenses and directly relevant to\\n\\nthe juryβs determination of Tillmonβs culpability.\\n\\n Nor was the video unfairly prejudicial. Tillmon and Teeβs recorded conversation\\n\\nshowed the interactions between Tillmon and another purported member of the DTO in a\\n\\nway that the other evidence did not. Its probative valueβparticularly in light of Tillmonβs\\n\\ndefense that he lacked a culpable intent to engage in drug trafficking offensesβoutweighed\\n\\nany minimal prejudice that arose from the subject matter of their conversation. Moreover,\\n\\nbecause the jurors also knew that Tee was actually an undercover agent, they knew that his\\n\\nside of the conversation was role-playing rather than implicating Tillmon in any actual\\n\\nviolent crime.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the video\\n\\nevidence.\\n\\n F. Federal Programs Bribery (Counts 32, 36, and 54)\\n\\n Lastly, Tillmon appeals the district courtβs denial of his motion for a judgment of\\n\\nacquittal with respect to the three charges of federal programs bribery, in violation of 18\\n\\nU.S.C. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B) (Counts 32, 36, and 54).\\n\\n In relevant part, this statute prohibits individuals who are agents of a local\\n\\ngovernment agency from βaccept[ing] . . . anything of value from any person, intending to\\n\\n 24\\n\\fbe influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of\\n\\ntransactions of such . . . [government agency] . . . involving any thing of value of $5,000\\n\\nor more.β Id. Β§ 666(a)(1)(B). As a threshold to liability under this statute, the Government\\n\\nmust demonstrate that the local government at issue βreceive[d], in any one year period,\\n\\nbenefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy,\\n\\nloan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.β Β§ 666(b); see also id.\\n\\nΒ§ 666(d)(5) (defining βin any one-year periodβ).\\n\\n Pointing to the amount he was paid for each individual transport, Tillmon asserts\\n\\nthe Government failed to proffer sufficient evidence to establish that his services to the\\n\\nfake DTO were worth at least $5,000. 6\\n\\n We have not previously considered Β§ 666(a)(1)(B)βs requirement that charged\\n\\nconduct involve βany thing of value of $5,000 or more.β But the statutory language reveals\\n\\nthat this element requires proof of the value of whatever was exchanged for the bribe. See\\n\\nΒ§ 666(a)(1)(B) (requiring that the business, transaction, or series of transactions of the\\n\\ngovernment agency βinvolve[d] any thing of value of $5,000 or moreβ). This has led our\\n\\nsister circuits to describe the requisite proof as identifying the value of the βsubject matterβ\\n\\nof the bribe. United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 271β76 (7th Cir. 2011).\\n\\n The indictment charged Tillmon with accepting cash from the undercover agents\\n\\nposing as members of the DTO on each of the three transports, with each count\\n\\ncorresponding to one of the transports, and it identified the subject matter of each of the\\n\\n\\n 6\\n Tillmon challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on two other elements of the\\noffenses as well, but for the reasons discussed, we need not address those arguments.\\n 25\\n\\fthree bribes as βprotecting shipments of purported narcotics.β J.A. 149, 153, 171. As we\\n\\nhave already recounted, the record depicted what that protection entailed: Tillmon was to\\n\\naccompany the drugs on a journey up the East Coast, drive or ride in one of the vehicles\\n\\ncontaining or accompanying the narcotics, and recite a cover story if the caravan was\\n\\nstopped. And once the drugs were delivered to another member of the DTO in Maryland,\\n\\nhe was paidβ$2,000 in October 2014; $2,000 in December 2014; and $2,500 in March\\n\\n2015.\\n\\n Our sister circuits have recognized that one valid method of valuing an intangible,\\n\\nsuch as a service provided, is the amount of the bribe. E.g., United States v. Hardin, 874\\n\\nF.3d 672, 676 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 12β13 (1st Cir.\\n\\n2013) (rejecting the value of the bribe test in favor of the value of the βtransactionβ test but\\n\\nacknowledging that the bribe amount βmay be relevant [evidence] in determining the value\\n\\nof the bribeβs objectiveβ when βthe subject matter of the bribe is a βthing of valueβ without\\n\\na fixed priceβ); Robinson, 663 F.3d at 271, 275 (βWithout excluding other possible\\n\\nmethods of valuation, we agree that the amount of the bribe may suffice as a proxy for\\n\\nvalue; at least it provides a floor for the valuation question.β). This approach is akin to\\n\\nβappraisingβ the service as an appraiser values a tangible assetββby looking at how much\\n\\na person in the market would be willing to pay forβ it. United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d\\n\\n1185, 1194 (5th Cir. 1996).\\n\\n The Government properly recognizes that using the straightforward bribe-as-proxy\\n\\nmethod does not satisfy its burden in this case. The Government chose to charge Tillmon\\n\\nseparately for each of the three transports, meaning that the Government had the burden to\\n\\n 26\\n\\fprove that the value of his services on each of the individual transports was $5,000 or more.\\n\\nUnder the bribe-as-proxy method, the Governmentβs evidence is insufficient because\\n\\nTillmonβs aid on each transport was valued at less than $5,000 each time.\\n\\n Instead, the Government advances three arguments for what other evidence could\\n\\nhave been used to satisfy its burden: (1) that the amount of the bribes paid to the team as a\\n\\nwhole on each transport exceeded $5,000 (the βaggregation theoryβ); (2) that the market\\n\\nvalue of the drugs being trafficked on each transport exceeded $5,000 (the βmarket value\\n\\ntheoryβ); and (3) that the amount the Town of Windsor paid for public safety in each year\\n\\nat issue exceeded $5,000 (the βpublic safety theoryβ).\\n\\n Although the Government claims its aggregation theory is merely a variation on the\\n\\napproved bribes-as-proxy method, it is not the equivalent and we cannot use it here. The\\n\\nGovernment contends that the jury was permitted to aggregate the bribes paid to all of the\\n\\nteam members on a particular transport to arrive at the requisite $5,000. To be sure,\\n\\nemploying that method brings the dollar amount expended on each transport to more than\\n\\n$5,000. Fatally for the Government, however, the aggregation method does not arrive at an\\n\\namount that reflects the statutory obligation to produce evidence of the value of the subject\\n\\nmatter of the bribe charged in the indictmentβthat is, Tillmonβs βprotecting shipments of\\n\\npurported narcotics.β J.A. 149, 153, 171. The aggregation method conflates the value of\\n\\nTillmonβs services to the DTO with the value of the teamβs services to the DTO. The record\\n\\ndoes not permit the conclusion that Tillmon single-handedly provided services equal to the\\n\\namount paid to the team as a whole. And without such evidence demonstrating that\\n\\nTillmonβs services were worth that amount, the aggregation method is not an acceptable\\n\\n 27\\n\\fvaluation method. For these reasons, we reject the aggregation method as an appropriate\\n\\nvaluation method in this case.\\n\\n The Governmentβs proposed market value theory fares no better. As our sister\\n\\ncircuits have recognized, in some instances, it may be appropriate to look at the market\\n\\nvalue of the bribe from the perspective of the briber or an interested third party as a means\\n\\nof valuing the subject matter of the bribe. E.g., Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 15 (approving\\n\\nvaluation method for votes related to pending legislation by looking to the briberβs\\n\\nexpected financial gain flowing from the passage of that legislation); United States v.\\n\\nCurescu, 674 F.3d 735, 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2012) (approving valuation of a bribe given to\\n\\nfalsely certify that plumbing had been completed by a licensed plumber based on the\\n\\namount of money the briber did not have to pay a licensed plumber to perform the work);\\n\\nUnited States v. Hines, 541 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2008) (using market value theory to\\n\\nvalue expedited eviction orders based on the savings to the property owners in avoiding\\n\\nthe costs typically incurred in eviction). But even then, in addition to evidence of something\\n\\nhaving value to the briber or a third party, the Government also must come forward with\\n\\nevidence βlinkingβ that valued item to the services the defendant provided. See United\\n\\nStates v. Owens, 697 F.3d 657, 661 (7th Cir. 2012). To reiterate, the Governmentβs\\n\\nevidence must bear on the value of the subject matter of the bribe, and that obligation is\\n\\nnot satisfied with evidence of something βto which the subject matter of the bribe is\\n\\ntangentially related.β Id.\\n\\n In this case, the Government pointed to something of purported value to the briberβ\\n\\nthe market value of the narcoticsβbut it failed to put forward any evidence linking that\\n\\n 28\\n\\fvalue to Tillmonβs protection of the caravan, the subject matter of the bribe. Specifically,\\n\\nthe Government relies on Lisaβs statement during the March 2015 transport that the team\\n\\nwas shipping a million dollars of heroin and argues that because Tillmon was hired to\\n\\nprotect a million-dollar transport on that occasion and to protect similar package quantities\\n\\nduring the other two transports, his services on each transport were worth a million dollars.\\n\\nThe Government then contends that the Court can infer from the evidence that the other\\n\\ntransports involved similar drug packages and that they also thereby satisfied the $5,000\\n\\nrequirement. That reasoning is flawed because no evidence in the record links the purported\\n\\nvalue of the drugs to the value of Tillmonβs protection services. As the record stands, the\\n\\ntwo are merely tangentially related. The Government could have attempted to provide\\n\\nevidence sufficient to create the necessary linkage in several ways. For example, it could\\n\\nhave offered evidence that trafficking organizations typically provide protection with a cut\\n\\nof the profits from eventual sales. Or it could have offered evidence that the cost of\\n\\nlegitimate protection for drug transports involving that amount of drugs costs real DTOs\\n\\n$5,000 or more. But the Government offered no such evidence. In fact, it failed to introduce\\n\\nany evidence allowing the inference that the value of Tillmonβs services was connected to\\n\\nthe value of the drugs. Thus, the Governmentβs market value theory lacks any evidentiary\\n\\nbasis.\\n\\n The Governmentβs third argument, the public safety theory of valuation, can be\\n\\ndisposed of quickly. For the first and only time in this appeal, the Government mentions in\\n\\na single sentence of its Response Brief that the $5,000 value of Tillmonβs services could\\n\\nbe measured based on the Town of Windsorβs annual public safety budget. Setting aside\\n\\n 29\\n\\fany concerns regarding the timeliness and adequacy of the Governmentβs argument, we\\n\\nobserve that Windsorβs entire public safety budget is unrelated to and would vastly\\n\\noverstate the value of Tillmonβs services to the DTO. As such, it would be an improper\\n\\nmeasure of the subject matter of the bribe.\\n\\n In sum, the Government failed to produce evidence from which a jury could find\\n\\nthat Tillmonβs services to the DTO had a value of $5,000 or more. Though the Government\\n\\nmight have satisfied this requirement in several ways, it failed to introduce any evidence\\n\\nother than the amount Tillmon was paid as a bribe to establish that the value of his\\n\\nprotection services were worth at least $5,000. And in the absence of evidence to support\\n\\nthat element of the offense, Tillmonβs convictions for federal programs bribery, Counts 32,\\n\\n36, and 54, cannot stand and we vacate each of these convictions.\\n\\n\\n\\n IV. Conclusion\\n\\n For the reasons explained above, we affirm Tillmonβs convictions on the drug\\n\\ntrafficking and firearms offenses (Counts 1, 2, 48, and 49), but we vacate Tillmonβs\\n\\nconvictions for federal programs bribery (Counts 32, 36, and 54).\\n\\n As the parties agree, the record shows that Tillmonβs sentence cannot be affected by\\n\\nthe vacation of his federal programs bribery convictions. After calculating Tillmonβs\\n\\nGuidelines range, the district court imposed a downward variant sentence of 180 monthsβ\\n\\nimprisonmentβ120 months to run concurrently on Counts 1, 2, 48, 32, 36, and 54; and 60\\n\\nmonths to run consecutively on Count 49. Vacating Tillmonβs federal programs bribery\\n\\nconvictions does not change his sentence, which is still 120 monthsβ imprisonment for\\n\\n 30\\n\\fCounts 1, 2, and 48, to run concurrently with each other, and 60 monthsβ mandatory\\n\\nminimum imprisonment for Count 49, to run consecutively to the others. Because 120\\n\\nmonths is the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for the drug trafficking conspiracy\\n\\n(Count 1) and attempted possession (Count 48) convictions, Tillmon cannot be sentenced\\n\\nto a lower term of imprisonment on the part of the sentence that was running concurrently\\n\\nwith his sentence for the now-vacated federal programs bribery convictions. Similarly,\\n\\nTillmonβs consecutive sentence for Count 49 must continue to run consecutively to the\\n\\nother term of imprisonment. As such, we need not remand for resentencing.\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART\\n AND VACATED IN PART\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 31\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":572,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4594567,"string":"4,594,567"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAMSON FARM, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DIVERSIFIED CROP INSURANCE SERVICES, A/K/A CGB Diversified Services, Inc., Defendant - Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Williamson Farm v. Diversified Crop Ins. Servs."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-27"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1463"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Keenan, Floyd, Thacker\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"THACKER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1463\\n\\n\\nWILLIAMSON FARM,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDIVERSIFIED CROP INSURANCE SERVICES, a/k/a CGB Diversified\\nServices, Inc.,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\\nRaleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:17-cv-00513-D; 5:16-mc-00018-D)\\n\\n\\nArgued: December 13, 2018 Decided: February 27, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore KEENAN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\\nKeenan and Judge Floyd joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Matthew William Buckmiller, STUBBS & PERDUE, P.A., Raleigh, North\\nCarolina, for Appellant. Roy Jefferson Allen, HUNT ROSS & ALLEN, Clarksdale,\\nMississippi, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Derek M. Crump, BROWN, CRUMP,\\nVANORE & TIERNEY, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In this case, Williamson Farm (βAppellantβ) challenges the district courtβs\\n\\ndecision to vacate an arbitration award that Appellant won against Diversified Crop\\n\\nInsurance (βAppelleeβ), a private insurance company that sold federal crop insurance\\n\\npolicies to Appellant. Appellant asserts that the district court erred in denying its motion\\n\\nto confirm the arbitration award and granting Appelleeβs motion to vacate on the basis\\n\\nthat the arbitrator exceeded her powers.\\n\\n Despite the strong presumption in favor of confirming arbitration awards pursuant\\n\\nto the Federal Arbitration Act (βFAAβ), we hold that Appellee met its heavy burden to\\n\\nprove that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by awarding extra-contractual damages,\\n\\ncontrary to both the policy and binding authority from the Federal Crop Insurance\\n\\nCorporation (βFCICβ). Therefore, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Background on the Federal Crop Insurance Program\\n\\n The policies at issue in this case are federal crop insurance policies, which\\n\\nAppellee sold pursuant to the Federal Crop Insurance Act (βFCIAβ), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501β\\n\\n1524, 1531, and accompanying regulations issued by the FCIC. These policies are not\\n\\ntypical private insurance agreements, so a brief discussion of the federal governmentβs\\n\\nrole in crop insurance agreements is necessary.\\n\\n The federal crop insurance program provides farmers and agricultural entities in\\n\\nthe United States with crop insurance protection, a venture that was considered too risky\\n\\n 2\\n\\ffor traditional private insurers when the FCIA was enacted in 1938. As the Supreme\\n\\nCourt explained, βthe Government engaged in crop insurance as a pioneer. Private\\n\\ninsurance companies apparently deemed all-risk crop insurance too great a commercial\\n\\nhazard.β Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 n.1 (1947).\\n\\n To provide this protection to farmers, the FCIA established the FCIC, a\\n\\ngovernment corporation within the United States Department of Agricultureβs Risk\\n\\nManagement Agency that administers the federal crop insurance program. 7 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1503. The FCIC does not directly issue crop insurance policies to farmers. Instead, it\\n\\nrelies on βapproved insurance providersβ 1 -- private insurers such as Appellee -- to issue\\n\\nfederal crop insurance policies to farmers like Appellant. 7 U.S.C. Β§ 1502(b)(2). Then,\\n\\nwhen certain eligibility conditions are met, the FCIC reinsures the approved insurance\\n\\nprovidersβ losses and reimburses their administrative and operating costs.\\n\\n In order to qualify for reinsurance through the FCIC, approved insurance providers\\n\\nmust comply with the FCIA and the accompanying regulations issued by the FCIC\\n\\ngoverning the sale, issuance, and servicing of federal crop insurance policies. 7 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 400.168; see also Felder v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 146 F.2d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 1944);\\n\\nDavis v. Producers Agric. Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly,\\n\\nβeven though the crop insurance policy is between the farmer and an approved insurance\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Pursuant to the FCIA, β[t]he term βapproved insurance providerβ means a private\\ninsurance provider that has been approved by the [FCIC] to provide insurance coverage\\nto producers participating in the Federal crop insurance program established under this\\nsubchapter.β 7 U.S.C. Β§ 1502(b)(2).\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\fprovider,β the FCIA βestablishes the terms and conditions of insurance.β Davis, 762 F.3d\\n\\nat 1284 (citation omitted).\\n\\n Indeed, all approved insurance providers issue a uniform policy drafted by the\\n\\nFCIC known as the βCommon Crop Insurance Policy,β the text for which is provided at 7\\n\\nC.F.R. Β§ 457.8. Both policies at issue in this case mirrored the Common Crop Insurance\\n\\nPolicy. Additionally, the FCIC sets premium rates for each county and crop insured,\\n\\nsubsidizes and receives premiums, and pays claims. In short, the FCIC is extensively\\n\\ninvolved in and exerts control over all aspects of the federal crop insurance program.\\n\\n The Farm Service Agency (βFSAβ), another agency within the Department of\\n\\nAgriculture, works with the Risk Management Agency and the FCIC to implement the\\n\\nfederal crop insurance program through FSAβs network of state and county field offices.\\n\\nAs relevant to this case, insureds and approved insurance providers are required to submit\\n\\nprogram eligibility, acreage reporting, and other necessary forms to their local FSA office\\n\\nin order to receive federal crop insurance coverage through the FCIC.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Appellantβs Underlying Policy Claims\\n\\n This case centers on two policies issued by Appellee to insure Appellantβs 2013\\n\\ncrops: (1) the Richmond County Policy; and (2) the Montgomery County Policy. Under\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fthe Richmond County Policy, Appellee listed Farm Number 2172. 2 Under the\\n\\nMontgomery County Policy, Appellee listed Farm Numbers 1870 and 4168.\\n\\n For many years, Appellant purchased its crop insurance through insurance agent\\n\\nLynn Saintsing, until Saintsing sold his agency to Appellee in 2012. 3 During his time as\\n\\nAppellantβs insurance agent, Saintsingβs regular practice was to help Appellant complete\\n\\nthe necessary forms and submit them to the proper FSA office to insure Appellantβs\\n\\nfarms.\\n\\n It was not unusual for a farm located in one county to be administered by an FSA\\n\\noffice in another county, based on the ownerβs preferences or if the farmβs county did not\\n\\nhave an FSA office. Such was the case with Appellantβs Farm 2172, which was located\\n\\nin Montgomery County. In 1996, the Montgomery County FSA office closed, and\\n\\nadministration of Farm 2172 shifted to Richmond County. Accordingly, since 1996,\\n\\nFarm 2172 had been listed on forms filed with the FSA office in Richmond County even\\n\\nthough it was located in Montgomery County. Saintsing was aware of this, since he\\n\\nhelped Appellant fill out the forms and prepare maps of the farms.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Farm numbers, which are assigned by the FSA, identify an insuredβs farms and\\nare used in connection with federal crop insurance policies and FSA forms.\\n 3\\n It is not clear from the record how many years Appellant purchased its crop\\ninsurance through Saintsing, but Appellantβs brief notes that it has farmed on this\\nproperty βfor decadesβ and purchased its crop insurance through Saintsing β[d]uring\\nmuch of this time.β Appellantβs Br. 3.\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Prior to Appelleeβs acquisition of Saintsingβs insurance agency, Saintsing issued\\n\\nAppellant a single policy that covered all of Appellantβs crops regardless of the county in\\n\\nwhich the farm was located.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Crop Loss Claim: Farm 2172\\n\\n The trouble began for Appellant after Saintsing sold his business to Appellee in\\n\\n2012. Unlike the single policy previously issued by Saintsing, Appellee issued Appellant\\n\\nseparate policies for each county in which a farm was geographically located, regardless\\n\\nof where the farm was administered. Saintsing -- then an agent for Appellee -- helped\\n\\nAppellant prepare the necessary forms to be submitted to the FSA. But on those forms,\\n\\nSaintsing listed Farm 2172 on the Richmond County Policy (where it was administered),\\n\\nrather than the Montgomery County Policy (where it was geographically located).\\n\\n In 2013, Appellant experienced crop loss due to deer on Farm 2172 and expected\\n\\nthis loss to be covered under its crop insurance policy. Therefore, Appellant filed a claim\\n\\nfor the loss with Appellee. However, Appellee denied the claim βon the technicality that\\n\\nFarm 2172, located in Montgomery County, was listed on [forms] filed with the FSA in\\n\\nRichmond County and was therefore listed on the wrong policy.β J.A. 13. 4 As noted,\\n\\nSaintsing had assisted Appellant in completing these forms and facilitated their filing\\n\\nwith the FSA.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f 2.\\n\\n Prevented Planting Claim: Farms 1870 and 4168\\n\\n Appellant also seeks recovery for a prevented planting claim 5 under the\\n\\nMontgomery County Policy. The summer of 2013 was excessively rainy. As a result,\\n\\nAppellant was unable to plant on Farms 1870 and 4168.\\n\\n During the period that Appellant was unable to plant, another of Appelleeβs\\n\\nagents, Jason Nifong, visited Appellantβs farmland to aid Appellant in preparing its FSA\\n\\nforms. During this visit, Nifong advised Appellant that it could file a prevented planting\\n\\nclaim as a result of the rainy weather. Following Nifongβs visit, Appellant chose to file a\\n\\nprevented planting claim and did not attempt to plant on these farms.\\n\\n However, in preparing the FSA forms, Nifong failed to note the prevented planting\\n\\nacres on the correct form, and he did not explain to Appellant that failure to report the\\n\\nacres on that specific form would bar the prevented planting claim. Ultimately, Appellee\\n\\ndenied Appellantβs claim based on this failure to report.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Arbitration\\n\\n Appellant sought arbitration pursuant to Section 20(a) of the policy based on\\n\\nAppelleeβs denials of its crop loss and prevented planting claims. See J.A. 207, Β§ 20(a)\\n\\n\\n 5\\n When certain requirements are met, a prevented planting claim allows a\\npolicyholder to recover when an insured cause of loss that is general to the surrounding\\narea, such as excessive rain, prevents the policyholder (as well as other producers in the\\narea) from planting crops on eligible acres.\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f(βIf you and we fail to agree on any determination made by us . . . the disagreement must\\n\\nbe resolved through arbitration . . . .β).\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Crop Loss Claim: Farm 2172\\n\\n As to Appellantβs crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator determined, β[t]he\\n\\nlack of coverage for Farm 2172 indisputably arose from [Appelleeβs] decision to issue\\n\\ncounty by county policies and its failure, and that of its agents who knew where these\\n\\nfarms were actually located . . . , to correctly list the farms for crop insurance purposes.β\\n\\nJ.A. 14. The arbitrator continued, βI conclude that [Appellee] failed to comply with the\\n\\nterms of [the policy] and that failure resulted in the loss to [Appellant]. [Appellee] left\\n\\n[Appellant] effectively uninsured for crop year 2013 as to Farm 2172.β Id. The\\n\\narbitrator further concluded that Appellee engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary\\n\\nduty, and constructive fraud. As a result, she awarded Appellant $97,692.39 for\\n\\nAppelleeβs βbreach of [the policy] and the failure to pay the claim,β damages which she\\n\\ntrebled because she concluded that Appellee violated the North Carolina Unfair and\\n\\nDeceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. Lastly, finding that Appellee failed to attempt to\\n\\nreasonably settle the claim, the arbitrator awarded Appellant $54,368.87 in attorneysβ\\n\\nfees pursuant to North Carolina law.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Prevented Planting Claim: Farms 1870 and 4168\\n\\n As for Appellantβs prevented planting claim for Farms 1870 and 4168, the\\n\\narbitrator similarly determined that Appelleeβs agent was at fault for failing to report the\\n\\n 8\\n\\facres on the correct FSA form, and that Appelleeβs βactions or lack of action left\\n\\n[Appellant] effectively uninsured for crop year 2013 as to Farms [1870] 6 and 4168.β J.A.\\n\\n15. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded, βI award the amount of $77,668.59 to\\n\\n[Appellant] for the breach of [the policy] and the failure to pay the claim. I also conclude\\n\\nthat [Appellee] engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud.β\\n\\nId. As with the crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator trebled damages pursuant to\\n\\nthe North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act and awarded Appellant\\n\\n$44,483.63 in attorneysβ fees pursuant to North Carolina law.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Arbitration Award\\n\\n After all was said and done, the total arbitration award to Appellant was\\n\\n$97,692.39 for the crop loss claim for Farm 2172 and $77,668.59 for the prevented\\n\\nplanting claim for Farms 1870 and 4168 (both of which were to be trebled), $98,852.50\\n\\nin attorneysβ fees, and $14,994 in reimbursement for arbitration costs and fees.\\n\\nAccording to Appellant, this amounted to a total arbitration award of $639,929.44.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n District Courtβs Decision\\n\\n On May 12, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award in the\\n\\nUnited States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. And, on June 29,\\n\\n\\n 6\\n The arbitratorβs decision occasionally refers to Farm 1870 as Farm 1872 or 1879.\\nBased on the record, these references appear to be in error.\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f2016, Appellee filed a competing motion to vacate the arbitration award, asserting that\\n\\nthe arbitrator exceeded her authority. Additionally, Appellee argued that Appellant failed\\n\\nto obtain a determination from the FCIC that Appellee failed to comply with the\\n\\ninsurance policies or FCIC procedures, which it asserted was a prerequisite for the district\\n\\ncourt to confirm the award.\\n\\n On July 12, 2016, the district court requested an amicus brief from the FCIC\\n\\naddressing whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority and whether Appellant was\\n\\nrequired to obtain an FCIC determination before the district court could confirm the\\n\\narbitration award. The FCIC filed its amicus brief on August 24, 2016, taking the\\n\\nposition that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by (1) awarding contractual damages\\n\\nnot covered by any policy; (2) awarding extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ fees;\\n\\n(3) failing to obtain and follow binding FCIC interpretations, issued in the form of Final\\n\\nAgency Determinations (βFADsβ); and (4) failing to obtain an FCIC determination prior\\n\\nto any extra-contractual damages or attorneysβ fees being awarded during judicial review.\\n\\n On March 26, 2018, the district court granted Appelleeβs motion to vacate and\\n\\ndenied Appellantβs motion to confirm the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrator\\n\\nexceeded her powers by (1) impermissibly interpreting the policy rather than obtaining an\\n\\ninterpretation from the FCIC; and (2) awarding extra-contractual damages. Appellant\\n\\ntimely appealed on April 25, 2018.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\f II.\\n\\n We review the district courtβs legal rulings regarding confirmation or vacation of\\n\\nan arbitration award de novo and the district courtβs factual findings, if any, for clear\\n\\nerror. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sprint Commcβns Co., 883 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n Pursuant to the FAA, βany judicial review of an arbitration award must be an\\n\\nextremely narrow exercise.β Long John Silverβs Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345,\\n\\n351 (4th Cir. 2008). There is a strong presumption in favor of confirming arbitration\\n\\nawards under the FAA, and any party seeking to overturn an arbitration award faces a\\n\\nβheavy burden.β Three S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2007). As we have stated, βin reviewing such an award, βa district or appellate court\\n\\nis limited to determin[ing] whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to do -- not\\n\\nwhether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether they did it.ββ Id.\\n\\n(quoting Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994)). Indeed, βan\\n\\narbitration award is enforceable even if the award resulted from a misinterpretation of\\n\\nlaw, faulty legal reasoning or erroneous legal conclusion.β Richmond, Fredericksburg &\\n\\nPotomac R.R. Co. v. Transp. Commcβns Intβl Union, 973 F.2d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 1992)\\n\\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n The FAA provides that a court may only vacate an arbitration award on one of the\\n\\nfollowing grounds:\\n\\n (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or\\n undue means;\\n\\n (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the\\n arbitrators, or either of them;\\n\\n 11\\n\\f (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in\\n refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause\\n shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material\\n to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the\\n rights of any party have been prejudiced; or\\n\\n (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so\\n imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite\\n award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.\\n\\nThree S Del., 492 F.3d at 527 (citing 9 U.S.C. Β§ 10(a)). βThe permissible common law\\n\\ngrounds for vacating such an award βinclude those circumstances where an award fails to\\n\\ndraw its essence from the contract, or the award evidences a manifest disregard of the\\n\\nlaw.ββ Id. (quoting Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2006)).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Appellant asserts that the district court erred in this case by vacating the arbitration\\n\\naward. Appellant argues that the arbitrator did not exceed her powers by awarding extra-\\n\\ncontractual damages and attorneysβ fees. In the alternative, Appellant argues that even if\\n\\nthe arbitrator exceeded her powers in part, we should nevertheless confirm the arbitration\\n\\naward of contract damages, which were within the arbitratorβs authority to award\\n\\npursuant to the policy. We address each argument in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Extra-Contractual Damages\\n\\n The district court vacated the arbitration award after determining that the arbitrator\\n\\nexceeded her powers by awarding prohibited extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\ffees. Appellant asserts that the arbitrator acted within her authority in rendering the\\n\\naward because the arbitrator concluded that Appellee breached the policy, and it was\\n\\nwithin her power to award extra-contractual damages.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Policy Interpretation\\n\\n We turn first to whether the policy unambiguously prohibits the arbitrator from\\n\\nawarding extra-contractual damages. In arguing that it does, Appellee relies primarily on\\n\\nSections 20(h) and 20(i) of the policy. These provisions state as follows:\\n\\n (h) Except as provided in section 20(i), no award or\\n settlement in mediation, arbitration, appeal, administrative\\n review or reconsideration process or judicial review can\\n exceed the amount of liability established or which should\\n have been established under the policy, except for interest\\n awarded in accordance with section 26.\\n\\n (i) In a judicial review only, you may recover attorneys fees\\n or other expenses, or any punitive, compensatory or any other\\n damages from us only if you obtain a determination from\\n FCIC that we, our agent or loss adjuster failed to comply with\\n the terms of this policy or procedures issued by FCIC and\\n such failure resulted in you receiving a payment in an amount\\n that is less than the amount to which you were entitled.\\n\\nJ.A. 209, Β§ 20(h)β(i) (emphases supplied).\\n\\n Appellee argues that these provisions unambiguously state that the arbitrator\\n\\ncannot award extra-contractual damages, and such damages may only be awarded by a\\n\\ncourt upon judicial review and after obtaining an FCIC determination that the agent or\\n\\nloss adjuster failed to comply with the terms of the policy. Making the same argument in\\n\\nits amicus brief submitted before the district court, the FCIC explained:\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f According to the clear language of the policy, any extra-\\n contractual damages, including damages arising from state\\n claims, were only available after this Court was asked to\\n review the arbitratorβs award. See 7 C.F.R. Β§ 457.8, ΒΆ 20(i).\\n As noted by FCIC, any extra-contractual claims (i.e.\\n negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud,\\n unfair and deceptive practices) and attorneysβ fees are limited\\n solely to instances where FCIC has determined the insurance\\n provider violated its policies and procedures and such\\n violation had a monetary impact on the payment of the claim.\\n See FCIC Response to Comments, 69 Fed. Reg. 48652-01,\\n 48717 (Aug. 10, 2004). Thus, the plain and unambiguous\\n terms of section 20(i) of the policy (7 C.F.R. Β§ 457.8, ΒΆ 20(i)),\\n together with the plain and unambiguous language of 7\\n C.F.R. Β§ 400.176(b) and 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.352(b)(4),\\n unequivocally dictate that a party can only be awarded extra-\\n contractual damages and attorneysβ fees upon petitioning this\\n Court for review of the arbitratorβs award and then only after\\n obtaining a determination from FCIC.\\n\\nJ.A. 232β33.\\n\\n In rendering the award, however, the arbitrator interpreted these provisions\\n\\ndifferently. The arbitrator concluded:\\n\\n Section 20(i) does not in fact state that the arbitrator may\\n not award attorneysβ fees or punitive, compensatory or other\\n damages. Instead it appears to impose a type of condition\\n precedent to the ultimate enforceability of such an award by a\\n court. Moreover, if the provision has the effect [Appellee]\\n claimed, the arbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide\\n anything. That plainly cannot be the case. Notably, the\\n Policies are silent on timing, such that the condition precedent\\n of FCIC determination could be satisfied post-award but prior\\n to enforcement in court.\\n\\n In addition, Section 20(h) does not expressly exclude any\\n theories of liability (such as fraud) or types of damages;\\n instead it says that no award can exceed the amount of\\n liability established under the policy. It does not expressly\\n exculpate insurers from their improper conduct such as fraud\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\f or breach of fiduciary duty, conduct that can trigger liability\\n beyond liability for breach of contract.\\n\\nJ.A. 10.\\n\\n But it does not matter if these policy provisions are as unambiguous as Appellee\\n\\n(and the FCIC) claims or if the arbitratorβs alternative interpretation is reasonable. This\\n\\nis because even under the arbitratorβs explanation, these provisions are ambiguous at best.\\n\\nAs the policy makes clear, the arbitrator was required to obtain and apply the FCICβs\\n\\ninterpretation of any ambiguous policy provision, and the arbitrator could not substitute\\n\\nher own interpretation for that of the FCIC.\\n\\n As the district court correctly pointed out, β[i]n cases involving federally reinsured\\n\\ncrop insurance, the insurance contract forms only one part of the agreement between the\\n\\nparties. The statutes and regulations associated with the federal crop insurance scheme\\n\\nalso limit the arbitratorβs authority.β J.A. 271 (citing Davis v. Producers Agric. Ins. Co.,\\n\\n762 F.3d 1276, 1284β85 (11th Cir. 2014)). Significantly, Section 20(a)(1) of the policy -\\n\\n- the very same section that provides for arbitration -- states that if there is a dispute that\\n\\nβin any way involves a policy or procedure interpretation,β the parties βmust obtain an\\n\\ninterpretation from FCIC.β J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). The FCICβs FADs\\n\\nare βbinding on all participants in the Federal crop insurance program,β including\\n\\narbitrators. 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.765(c); see also J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(i) (βAny interpretation\\n\\nby FCIC will be binding in any mediation or arbitration.β). Therefore, the failure to\\n\\nobtain a required FCIC interpretation βwill result in the nullification of any agreement or\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\faward.β J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(ii). In short, both the policy and FCIC regulations provide\\n\\nthat only the FCIC -- and not the arbitrator -- may interpret the policy.\\n\\n In rendering the award here, the arbitrator pushed back against this restriction by\\n\\nnoting that if the arbitrator could not interpret the meaning of policy provisions, βthe\\n\\narbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide anything.β J.A. 10. Indeed, the unusual\\n\\nworld of federal crop insurance does, in fact, appear to leave very little decision making\\n\\nauthority to the arbitrator. But as counsel for Appellee stated during oral argument in this\\n\\ncase, crop insurance βtakes everything you know about insurance and turns it on its\\n\\nhead.β Oral Argument at 19:40β49, Williamson Farm v. Diversified Crop Ins. Servs.,\\n\\nInc., No. 18-1463 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2018), http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-\\n\\nargument/listen-to-oral-arguments (hereinafter βOral Argumentβ).\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n The Distinction Between FCIC Interpretations and FCIC Determinations\\n\\n In response to Appelleeβs argument that the arbitrator was required to obtain an\\n\\nFCIC interpretation of disputed policy provisions, Appellant asserts, βif an FCIC\\n\\ndetermination is required before an arbitrator can award monies then the arbitration\\n\\nprocess is a complete waste of time with no meaning.β Appellantβs Br. 24. Appellant\\n\\nfurther asserts that, in any event, it did, in fact, seek an FCIC determination and was told\\n\\nthat the FCIC would not render an opinion until after arbitration.\\n\\n In both arguments, Appellant conflates the obligation to obtain an FCIC\\n\\ninterpretation of disputed provisions of the policy pursuant to Section 20(a)(1) -- a\\n\\nrequirement in any arbitration where the meaning or application of policy provisions are\\n\\n 16\\n\\fat issue -- with the requirement to obtain an FCIC determination that there was a failure\\n\\nto comply with the terms of the policy prior to obtaining attorneysβ fees or extra-\\n\\ncontractual damages during judicial review pursuant to Section 20(i). FCIC\\n\\ninterpretations and FCIC determinations, as these terms are described in the policy, are\\n\\nnot the same thing.\\n\\n a.\\n\\n When an FCIC Determination is Required\\n\\n As to Appellantβs first argument, an FCIC determination that there was a failure to\\n\\ncomply with the terms of the policy is not required βbefore an arbitrator can award\\n\\nmonies.β Appellantβs Br. 24. Pursuant to Section 20(i) of the policy, such\\n\\ndeterminations are only required (1) during judicial review (after arbitration is\\n\\ncompleted); and (2) only when an insured is seeking extra-contractual damages. As\\n\\ndiscussed below, binding FCIC FADs make clear that arbitrators cannot award extra-\\n\\ncontractual damages; accordingly, arbitrators do not require such an FCIC determination\\n\\nin order to render their award. 7 Arbitrators do, however, require an FCIC interpretation\\n\\nbefore rendering an award based on disputed policy language.\\n\\n\\n 7\\n In its reply brief, Appellant offers a similar argument that Appelleeβs\\ninterpretation of 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.352 -- which preempts state and local laws and\\nregulations except where the FCIC makes a determination that the agent or loss adjuster\\nfailed to comply with the policy -- βwould bar recovery of any damages without an FCIC\\ndetermination,β including compensatory damages. Appellantβs Reply Br. 2. Because the\\nFCIC has established that arbitrators cannot award damages based on state law claims\\nand FCIC determinations are only required during judicial review involving extra-\\ncontractual damages, this argument is irrelevant as to the arbitration award.\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\f b.\\n\\n Appellant Requested an FCIC Determination, Not an FCIC Interpretation\\n\\n As to Appellantβs second argument, Appellant did not request an FCIC\\n\\ninterpretation -- it requested an FCIC determination. Again, an FCIC interpretation of\\n\\nthe meaning of disputed policy provisions is a different request -- one which arises at a\\n\\ndifferent time and in a different proceeding -- than an FCIC determination that an agent\\n\\nfailed to comply with the terms of the policy. To comply with Section 20(a)(1) of the\\n\\npolicy, what Appellant (or the arbitrator) needed to request during the arbitration, but did\\n\\nnot, was an FCIC interpretation of the meaning of the disputed policy provisions.\\n\\nAppellantβs premature request for an FCIC determination that there was a failure to\\n\\ncomply with the terms of the policy, pursuant to Section 20(i), is of no consequence to\\n\\nthe arbitration award. 8\\n\\n The arbitratorβs explanation as to what specific policy provisions mean\\n\\n(particularly to the extent they were disputed issues in the arbitration) can only be viewed\\n\\nas her interpretation of the policy. See, e.g., J.A. 10 (βSection 20(i) does not in fact state\\n\\nthat the arbitrator may not award attorneysβ fees or punitive, compensatory or other\\n\\ndamages. Instead it appears to impose a type of condition precedent to the ultimate\\n\\n\\n 8\\n We note that our decision in this case does not address whether a claimant could\\nrecover purely tort damages against a private insurance company without such an FCIC\\ndetermination where misrepresentations or negligence on the part of the insurance agent\\nbefore the policy was issued left the claimant effectively uninsured under the federal crop\\ninsurance program. Here, Appellant sought contractual damages and participated in\\narbitration pursuant to the insurance policy.\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\fenforceability of such an award by a court. Moreover, if the provision has the effect\\n\\n[Appellee] claimed, the arbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide anything. That\\n\\nplainly cannot be the case.β). By not obtaining an FCIC interpretation to resolve the\\n\\nissue but instead interpreting the provisions herself, which was not in her authority to do,\\n\\nthe arbitrator exceeded her powers.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Binding FCIC Authority\\n\\n The arbitrator was obligated to follow any FADs previously issued by the FCIC.\\n\\nSee J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(i), (iii) (βAny interpretation by FCIC will be binding in any\\n\\nmediation or arbitration . . . . An interpretation by FCIC of a policy provision is\\n\\nconsidered a determination that is a matter of general applicability.β (emphasis\\n\\nsupplied)). And the FCIC has addressed whether arbitrators may award extra-contractual\\n\\ndamages more than once already. Each time, the FCIC has made clear that arbitrators do\\n\\nnot have the authority to award such damages. Rather, extra-contractual damages and\\n\\nattorneysβ fees may only be awarded by the court reviewing an arbitratorβs decision. For\\n\\ninstance, Appellant does not dispute that FAD-193, issued on October 21, 2013, states in\\n\\nrelevant part:\\n\\n [T]he reference to βjudicial review onlyβ [in Section 20(i)] is\\n to clarify that such [extra-contractual] damages can only be\\n sought during an appeal to the Courts, after an FCIC\\n determination has been obtained, and cannot be awarded in\\n arbitration. To obtain a determination that will enable the\\n insured to recoup attorney[sβ] fees, expenses, or damages\\n from the [approved insurance provider], the insured must\\n send a request for determination to the [Risk Management\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Agency] Deputy Administrator of Compliance after the\\n insured has filed an appeal for judicial review.\\n\\nJ.A. 240 (emphasis supplied); Appelleeβs Br. 12.\\n\\n Prior to this, the FCIC also addressed the issue of extra-contractual damages in\\n\\nFAD-99, issued on May 4, 2009, which states, in relevant part, βit is only in a judicial\\n\\nreview that producers can recover attorneysβ fees or other expenses, or any punitive,\\n\\ncompensatory or any other damages from insurance providers.β J.A. 241.\\n\\n Pursuant to Section 20(a)(1)(i) of the policy, these previously issued FADs -- and\\n\\nthe conclusion that arbitrators cannot award extra-contractual damages pursuant to\\n\\nSection 20(i) -- were binding upon the arbitrator in this case.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n The Arbitrator Exceeded Her Powers\\n\\n Accordingly, the arbitrator exceeded her powers by both (1) interpreting the policy\\n\\nherself without obtaining an FCIC interpretation for the disputed policy provisions; and\\n\\n(2) awarding extra-contractual damages, which the FCIC has conclusively stated in\\n\\nmultiple FADs cannot be awarded in arbitration and can only be sought through judicial\\n\\nreview. Thus, Appellee met βthe heavy burdenβ to vacate an arbitration award pursuant\\n\\nto the FAA. MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2010); see also 9 U.S.C. Β§ 10(a)(4).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\f B.\\n\\n Contractual Damages\\n\\n In the alternative, Appellant argues that even if the arbitrator exceeded her powers\\n\\nby awarding extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ fees, we should nevertheless\\n\\nconfirm the arbitration award in part based on contract damages, which were within the\\n\\narbitratorβs authority to award pursuant to Section 20 of the policy.\\n\\n Assuming that the arbitrator also awarded contractual damages, 9 it is impossible to\\n\\ntell from the arbitration award what amount may have stemmed from contractual\\n\\ndamages and what amount was extra-contractual. For example, in the award as to\\n\\nAppellantβs crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator stated:\\n\\n The lack of coverage for Farm 2172 indisputably arose\\n from [Appelleeβs conduct] . . . . The failure of [Appellee] to\\n properly handle this and advise [Appellant] breached\\n [Appelleeβs] fiduciary duty to [Appellant.]\\n\\n I conclude that [Appellee] failed to comply with the terms\\n of [the policy] and that failure resulted in the loss to\\n [Appellant.] [Appellee] left [Appellant] effectively uninsured\\n for crop year 2013 as to Farm 2172. Accordingly, I award the\\n amount of $97,692.39 to [Appellant] for the breach of [the\\n policy] and the failure to pay the claim. I conclude that\\n [Appellee] engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty\\n and constructive fraud.\\n\\n In addition, [Appellant] has established that [Appellee]\\n owed duties distinct and separate from the duties it owed\\n under the partiesβ contracts; further, [Appellant] has\\n\\n 9\\n Notably, the arbitrator concluded that Appellee βleft [Appellant] effectively\\nuninsured for crop year 2013,β J.A. 14, 15, which calls into question how Appellee could\\nbreach a contract that did not exist.\\n\\n\\n 21\\n\\f established that [Appelleeβs] breach of those duties was\\n aggravated by several factors. Accordingly, I conclude that\\n [Appellee] engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in or\\n affecting commerce . . . . The facts show recklessness and\\n wanton disregard by [Appellee], i.e., more than a mere breach\\n of contract, warranting an award of treble damages under\\n [North Carolina state law.]\\n\\nJ.A. 14.\\n\\n Although the arbitrator concluded that Appellee breached the contract, the\\n\\narbitrator also found Appellee liable for extra-contractual damages, including negligence\\n\\nand breach of fiduciary duty. Since the arbitrator only provided a single amount of\\n\\ndamages rather than a breakdown of the award by contract and noncontract claims, we\\n\\nhave no way to distinguish what amount the arbitrator may have awarded for contractual\\n\\ndamages (which were within the arbitratorβs authority to award) and what amount the\\n\\narbitrator awarded for extra-contractual damages (which, for the reasons explained above,\\n\\nthe arbitrator exceeded her authority in awarding).\\n\\n Of note, there is no support in the record for Appellantβs assertion at oral argument\\n\\nthat the arbitrator awarded $97,692.39 in contract damages for the crop loss claim while\\n\\nextra-contractual damages were awarded in the form of trebled damages and attorneysβ\\n\\nfees. See Oral Argument at 14:51β16:04. To the contrary, the structure of the arbitration\\n\\naward suggests that the arbitrator intended the award of trebled damages based on\\n\\nAppelleeβs βrecklessness and wanton disregardβ to be in addition to the contractual and\\n\\nextra-contractual damages awarded for breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary\\n\\nduty, and constructive fraud. J.A. 14 (βI conclude that [Appellee] engaged in negligence,\\n\\nbreach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. In addition, . . . [t]he facts show\\n\\n 22\\n\\frecklessness and wanton disregard by [Appellee.]β (emphasis supplied)). The same is true\\n\\nregarding the arbitration award for Appellantβs prevented planting claim for Farms 1870\\n\\nand 4168. See J.A. 15 (βI also conclude that [Appellant] has engaged in negligence,\\n\\nbreach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. In addition, as to Farms [1870] and\\n\\n4168, . . . [t]he facts show recklessness and wanton disregard by [Appellant.]β (emphasis\\n\\nsupplied)).\\n\\n Accordingly, even to the extent the arbitrator awarded damages for breach of\\n\\ncontract on either policy (as opposed to extra-contractual damages), the entire award\\n\\nmust be vacated.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371820/\", \"author_raw\": \"THACKER, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KEENAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"FLOYD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"THACKER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594567/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: WILLIAMSON FARM, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DIVERSIFIED CROP INSURANCE SERVICES, A/K/A CGB Diversified Services, Inc., Defendant - Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-27\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1463\n\n\nWILLIAMSON FARM,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nDIVERSIFIED CROP INSURANCE SERVICES, a/k/a CGB Diversified\nServices, Inc.,\n\n Defendant - Appellee.\n\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\nRaleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:17-cv-00513-D; 5:16-mc-00018-D)\n\n\nArgued: December 13, 2018 Decided: February 27, 2019\n\n\nBefore KEENAN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\nKeenan and Judge Floyd joined.\n\n\nARGUED: Matthew William Buckmiller, STUBBS & PERDUE, P.A., Raleigh, North\nCarolina, for Appellant. Roy Jefferson Allen, HUNT ROSS & ALLEN, Clarksdale,\nMississippi, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Derek M. Crump, BROWN, CRUMP,\nVANORE & TIERNEY, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.\n\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\n\n In this case, Williamson Farm (βAppellantβ) challenges the district courtβs\n\ndecision to vacate an arbitration award that Appellant won against Diversified Crop\n\nInsurance (βAppelleeβ), a private insurance company that sold federal crop insurance\n\npolicies to Appellant. Appellant asserts that the district court erred in denying its motion\n\nto confirm the arbitration award and granting Appelleeβs motion to vacate on the basis\n\nthat the arbitrator exceeded her powers.\n\n Despite the strong presumption in favor of confirming arbitration awards pursuant\n\nto the Federal Arbitration Act (βFAAβ), we hold that Appellee met its heavy burden to\n\nprove that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by awarding extra-contractual damages,\n\ncontrary to both the policy and binding authority from the Federal Crop Insurance\n\nCorporation (βFCICβ). Therefore, we affirm.\n\n I.\n\n A.\n\n Background on the Federal Crop Insurance Program\n\n The policies at issue in this case are federal crop insurance policies, which\n\nAppellee sold pursuant to the Federal Crop Insurance Act (βFCIAβ), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501β\n\n1524, 1531, and accompanying regulations issued by the FCIC. These policies are not\n\ntypical private insurance agreements, so a brief discussion of the federal governmentβs\n\nrole in crop insurance agreements is necessary.\n\n The federal crop insurance program provides farmers and agricultural entities in\n\nthe United States with crop insurance protection, a venture that was considered too risky\n\n 2\n\ffor traditional private insurers when the FCIA was enacted in 1938. As the Supreme\n\nCourt explained, βthe Government engaged in crop insurance as a pioneer. Private\n\ninsurance companies apparently deemed all-risk crop insurance too great a commercial\n\nhazard.β Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 n.1 (1947).\n\n To provide this protection to farmers, the FCIA established the FCIC, a\n\ngovernment corporation within the United States Department of Agricultureβs Risk\n\nManagement Agency that administers the federal crop insurance program. 7 U.S.C.\n\nΒ§ 1503. The FCIC does not directly issue crop insurance policies to farmers. Instead, it\n\nrelies on βapproved insurance providersβ 1 -- private insurers such as Appellee -- to issue\n\nfederal crop insurance policies to farmers like Appellant. 7 U.S.C. Β§ 1502(b)(2). Then,\n\nwhen certain eligibility conditions are met, the FCIC reinsures the approved insurance\n\nprovidersβ losses and reimburses their administrative and operating costs.\n\n In order to qualify for reinsurance through the FCIC, approved insurance providers\n\nmust comply with the FCIA and the accompanying regulations issued by the FCIC\n\ngoverning the sale, issuance, and servicing of federal crop insurance policies. 7 C.F.R.\n\nΒ§ 400.168; see also Felder v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 146 F.2d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 1944);\n\nDavis v. Producers Agric. Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly,\n\nβeven though the crop insurance policy is between the farmer and an approved insurance\n\n\n 1\n Pursuant to the FCIA, β[t]he term βapproved insurance providerβ means a private\ninsurance provider that has been approved by the [FCIC] to provide insurance coverage\nto producers participating in the Federal crop insurance program established under this\nsubchapter.β 7 U.S.C. Β§ 1502(b)(2).\n\n\n 3\n\fprovider,β the FCIA βestablishes the terms and conditions of insurance.β Davis, 762 F.3d\n\nat 1284 (citation omitted).\n\n Indeed, all approved insurance providers issue a uniform policy drafted by the\n\nFCIC known as the βCommon Crop Insurance Policy,β the text for which is provided at 7\n\nC.F.R. Β§ 457.8. Both policies at issue in this case mirrored the Common Crop Insurance\n\nPolicy. Additionally, the FCIC sets premium rates for each county and crop insured,\n\nsubsidizes and receives premiums, and pays claims. In short, the FCIC is extensively\n\ninvolved in and exerts control over all aspects of the federal crop insurance program.\n\n The Farm Service Agency (βFSAβ), another agency within the Department of\n\nAgriculture, works with the Risk Management Agency and the FCIC to implement the\n\nfederal crop insurance program through FSAβs network of state and county field offices.\n\nAs relevant to this case, insureds and approved insurance providers are required to submit\n\nprogram eligibility, acreage reporting, and other necessary forms to their local FSA office\n\nin order to receive federal crop insurance coverage through the FCIC.\n\n B.\n\n Appellantβs Underlying Policy Claims\n\n This case centers on two policies issued by Appellee to insure Appellantβs 2013\n\ncrops: (1) the Richmond County Policy; and (2) the Montgomery County Policy. Under\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\fthe Richmond County Policy, Appellee listed Farm Number 2172. 2 Under the\n\nMontgomery County Policy, Appellee listed Farm Numbers 1870 and 4168.\n\n For many years, Appellant purchased its crop insurance through insurance agent\n\nLynn Saintsing, until Saintsing sold his agency to Appellee in 2012. 3 During his time as\n\nAppellantβs insurance agent, Saintsingβs regular practice was to help Appellant complete\n\nthe necessary forms and submit them to the proper FSA office to insure Appellantβs\n\nfarms.\n\n It was not unusual for a farm located in one county to be administered by an FSA\n\noffice in another county, based on the ownerβs preferences or if the farmβs county did not\n\nhave an FSA office. Such was the case with Appellantβs Farm 2172, which was located\n\nin Montgomery County. In 1996, the Montgomery County FSA office closed, and\n\nadministration of Farm 2172 shifted to Richmond County. Accordingly, since 1996,\n\nFarm 2172 had been listed on forms filed with the FSA office in Richmond County even\n\nthough it was located in Montgomery County. Saintsing was aware of this, since he\n\nhelped Appellant fill out the forms and prepare maps of the farms.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n Farm numbers, which are assigned by the FSA, identify an insuredβs farms and\nare used in connection with federal crop insurance policies and FSA forms.\n 3\n It is not clear from the record how many years Appellant purchased its crop\ninsurance through Saintsing, but Appellantβs brief notes that it has farmed on this\nproperty βfor decadesβ and purchased its crop insurance through Saintsing β[d]uring\nmuch of this time.β Appellantβs Br. 3.\n\n\n 5\n\f Prior to Appelleeβs acquisition of Saintsingβs insurance agency, Saintsing issued\n\nAppellant a single policy that covered all of Appellantβs crops regardless of the county in\n\nwhich the farm was located.\n\n 1.\n\n Crop Loss Claim: Farm 2172\n\n The trouble began for Appellant after Saintsing sold his business to Appellee in\n\n2012. Unlike the single policy previously issued by Saintsing, Appellee issued Appellant\n\nseparate policies for each county in which a farm was geographically located, regardless\n\nof where the farm was administered. Saintsing -- then an agent for Appellee -- helped\n\nAppellant prepare the necessary forms to be submitted to the FSA. But on those forms,\n\nSaintsing listed Farm 2172 on the Richmond County Policy (where it was administered),\n\nrather than the Montgomery County Policy (where it was geographically located).\n\n In 2013, Appellant experienced crop loss due to deer on Farm 2172 and expected\n\nthis loss to be covered under its crop insurance policy. Therefore, Appellant filed a claim\n\nfor the loss with Appellee. However, Appellee denied the claim βon the technicality that\n\nFarm 2172, located in Montgomery County, was listed on [forms] filed with the FSA in\n\nRichmond County and was therefore listed on the wrong policy.β J.A. 13. 4 As noted,\n\nSaintsing had assisted Appellant in completing these forms and facilitated their filing\n\nwith the FSA.\n\n\n 4\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\nappeal.\n\n\n 6\n\f 2.\n\n Prevented Planting Claim: Farms 1870 and 4168\n\n Appellant also seeks recovery for a prevented planting claim 5 under the\n\nMontgomery County Policy. The summer of 2013 was excessively rainy. As a result,\n\nAppellant was unable to plant on Farms 1870 and 4168.\n\n During the period that Appellant was unable to plant, another of Appelleeβs\n\nagents, Jason Nifong, visited Appellantβs farmland to aid Appellant in preparing its FSA\n\nforms. During this visit, Nifong advised Appellant that it could file a prevented planting\n\nclaim as a result of the rainy weather. Following Nifongβs visit, Appellant chose to file a\n\nprevented planting claim and did not attempt to plant on these farms.\n\n However, in preparing the FSA forms, Nifong failed to note the prevented planting\n\nacres on the correct form, and he did not explain to Appellant that failure to report the\n\nacres on that specific form would bar the prevented planting claim. Ultimately, Appellee\n\ndenied Appellantβs claim based on this failure to report.\n\n C.\n\n Arbitration\n\n Appellant sought arbitration pursuant to Section 20(a) of the policy based on\n\nAppelleeβs denials of its crop loss and prevented planting claims. See J.A. 207, Β§ 20(a)\n\n\n 5\n When certain requirements are met, a prevented planting claim allows a\npolicyholder to recover when an insured cause of loss that is general to the surrounding\narea, such as excessive rain, prevents the policyholder (as well as other producers in the\narea) from planting crops on eligible acres.\n\n\n 7\n\f(βIf you and we fail to agree on any determination made by us . . . the disagreement must\n\nbe resolved through arbitration . . . .β).\n\n 1.\n\n Crop Loss Claim: Farm 2172\n\n As to Appellantβs crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator determined, β[t]he\n\nlack of coverage for Farm 2172 indisputably arose from [Appelleeβs] decision to issue\n\ncounty by county policies and its failure, and that of its agents who knew where these\n\nfarms were actually located . . . , to correctly list the farms for crop insurance purposes.β\n\nJ.A. 14. The arbitrator continued, βI conclude that [Appellee] failed to comply with the\n\nterms of [the policy] and that failure resulted in the loss to [Appellant]. [Appellee] left\n\n[Appellant] effectively uninsured for crop year 2013 as to Farm 2172.β Id. The\n\narbitrator further concluded that Appellee engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary\n\nduty, and constructive fraud. As a result, she awarded Appellant $97,692.39 for\n\nAppelleeβs βbreach of [the policy] and the failure to pay the claim,β damages which she\n\ntrebled because she concluded that Appellee violated the North Carolina Unfair and\n\nDeceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. Lastly, finding that Appellee failed to attempt to\n\nreasonably settle the claim, the arbitrator awarded Appellant $54,368.87 in attorneysβ\n\nfees pursuant to North Carolina law.\n\n 2.\n\n Prevented Planting Claim: Farms 1870 and 4168\n\n As for Appellantβs prevented planting claim for Farms 1870 and 4168, the\n\narbitrator similarly determined that Appelleeβs agent was at fault for failing to report the\n\n 8\n\facres on the correct FSA form, and that Appelleeβs βactions or lack of action left\n\n[Appellant] effectively uninsured for crop year 2013 as to Farms [1870] 6 and 4168.β J.A.\n\n15. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded, βI award the amount of $77,668.59 to\n\n[Appellant] for the breach of [the policy] and the failure to pay the claim. I also conclude\n\nthat [Appellee] engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud.β\n\nId. As with the crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator trebled damages pursuant to\n\nthe North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act and awarded Appellant\n\n$44,483.63 in attorneysβ fees pursuant to North Carolina law.\n\n 3.\n\n Arbitration Award\n\n After all was said and done, the total arbitration award to Appellant was\n\n$97,692.39 for the crop loss claim for Farm 2172 and $77,668.59 for the prevented\n\nplanting claim for Farms 1870 and 4168 (both of which were to be trebled), $98,852.50\n\nin attorneysβ fees, and $14,994 in reimbursement for arbitration costs and fees.\n\nAccording to Appellant, this amounted to a total arbitration award of $639,929.44.\n\n D.\n\n District Courtβs Decision\n\n On May 12, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award in the\n\nUnited States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. And, on June 29,\n\n\n 6\n The arbitratorβs decision occasionally refers to Farm 1870 as Farm 1872 or 1879.\nBased on the record, these references appear to be in error.\n\n\n 9\n\f2016, Appellee filed a competing motion to vacate the arbitration award, asserting that\n\nthe arbitrator exceeded her authority. Additionally, Appellee argued that Appellant failed\n\nto obtain a determination from the FCIC that Appellee failed to comply with the\n\ninsurance policies or FCIC procedures, which it asserted was a prerequisite for the district\n\ncourt to confirm the award.\n\n On July 12, 2016, the district court requested an amicus brief from the FCIC\n\naddressing whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority and whether Appellant was\n\nrequired to obtain an FCIC determination before the district court could confirm the\n\narbitration award. The FCIC filed its amicus brief on August 24, 2016, taking the\n\nposition that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by (1) awarding contractual damages\n\nnot covered by any policy; (2) awarding extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ fees;\n\n(3) failing to obtain and follow binding FCIC interpretations, issued in the form of Final\n\nAgency Determinations (βFADsβ); and (4) failing to obtain an FCIC determination prior\n\nto any extra-contractual damages or attorneysβ fees being awarded during judicial review.\n\n On March 26, 2018, the district court granted Appelleeβs motion to vacate and\n\ndenied Appellantβs motion to confirm the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrator\n\nexceeded her powers by (1) impermissibly interpreting the policy rather than obtaining an\n\ninterpretation from the FCIC; and (2) awarding extra-contractual damages. Appellant\n\ntimely appealed on April 25, 2018.\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\f II.\n\n We review the district courtβs legal rulings regarding confirmation or vacation of\n\nan arbitration award de novo and the district courtβs factual findings, if any, for clear\n\nerror. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sprint Commcβns Co., 883 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2018).\n\n Pursuant to the FAA, βany judicial review of an arbitration award must be an\n\nextremely narrow exercise.β Long John Silverβs Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345,\n\n351 (4th Cir. 2008). There is a strong presumption in favor of confirming arbitration\n\nawards under the FAA, and any party seeking to overturn an arbitration award faces a\n\nβheavy burden.β Three S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th\n\nCir. 2007). As we have stated, βin reviewing such an award, βa district or appellate court\n\nis limited to determin[ing] whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to do -- not\n\nwhether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether they did it.ββ Id.\n\n(quoting Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994)). Indeed, βan\n\narbitration award is enforceable even if the award resulted from a misinterpretation of\n\nlaw, faulty legal reasoning or erroneous legal conclusion.β Richmond, Fredericksburg &\n\nPotomac R.R. Co. v. Transp. Commcβns Intβl Union, 973 F.2d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 1992)\n\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n The FAA provides that a court may only vacate an arbitration award on one of the\n\nfollowing grounds:\n\n (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or\n undue means;\n\n (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the\n arbitrators, or either of them;\n\n 11\n\f (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in\n refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause\n shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material\n to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the\n rights of any party have been prejudiced; or\n\n (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so\n imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite\n award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.\n\nThree S Del., 492 F.3d at 527 (citing 9 U.S.C. Β§ 10(a)). βThe permissible common law\n\ngrounds for vacating such an award βinclude those circumstances where an award fails to\n\ndraw its essence from the contract, or the award evidences a manifest disregard of the\n\nlaw.ββ Id. (quoting Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir.\n\n2006)).\n\n III.\n\n Appellant asserts that the district court erred in this case by vacating the arbitration\n\naward. Appellant argues that the arbitrator did not exceed her powers by awarding extra-\n\ncontractual damages and attorneysβ fees. In the alternative, Appellant argues that even if\n\nthe arbitrator exceeded her powers in part, we should nevertheless confirm the arbitration\n\naward of contract damages, which were within the arbitratorβs authority to award\n\npursuant to the policy. We address each argument in turn.\n\n A.\n\n Extra-Contractual Damages\n\n The district court vacated the arbitration award after determining that the arbitrator\n\nexceeded her powers by awarding prohibited extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ\n\n\n 12\n\ffees. Appellant asserts that the arbitrator acted within her authority in rendering the\n\naward because the arbitrator concluded that Appellee breached the policy, and it was\n\nwithin her power to award extra-contractual damages.\n\n 1.\n\n Policy Interpretation\n\n We turn first to whether the policy unambiguously prohibits the arbitrator from\n\nawarding extra-contractual damages. In arguing that it does, Appellee relies primarily on\n\nSections 20(h) and 20(i) of the policy. These provisions state as follows:\n\n (h) Except as provided in section 20(i), no award or\n settlement in mediation, arbitration, appeal, administrative\n review or reconsideration process or judicial review can\n exceed the amount of liability established or which should\n have been established under the policy, except for interest\n awarded in accordance with section 26.\n\n (i) In a judicial review only, you may recover attorneys fees\n or other expenses, or any punitive, compensatory or any other\n damages from us only if you obtain a determination from\n FCIC that we, our agent or loss adjuster failed to comply with\n the terms of this policy or procedures issued by FCIC and\n such failure resulted in you receiving a payment in an amount\n that is less than the amount to which you were entitled.\n\nJ.A. 209, Β§ 20(h)β(i) (emphases supplied).\n\n Appellee argues that these provisions unambiguously state that the arbitrator\n\ncannot award extra-contractual damages, and such damages may only be awarded by a\n\ncourt upon judicial review and after obtaining an FCIC determination that the agent or\n\nloss adjuster failed to comply with the terms of the policy. Making the same argument in\n\nits amicus brief submitted before the district court, the FCIC explained:\n\n\n 13\n\f According to the clear language of the policy, any extra-\n contractual damages, including damages arising from state\n claims, were only available after this Court was asked to\n review the arbitratorβs award. See 7 C.F.R. Β§ 457.8, ΒΆ 20(i).\n As noted by FCIC, any extra-contractual claims (i.e.\n negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud,\n unfair and deceptive practices) and attorneysβ fees are limited\n solely to instances where FCIC has determined the insurance\n provider violated its policies and procedures and such\n violation had a monetary impact on the payment of the claim.\n See FCIC Response to Comments, 69 Fed. Reg. 48652-01,\n 48717 (Aug. 10, 2004). Thus, the plain and unambiguous\n terms of section 20(i) of the policy (7 C.F.R. Β§ 457.8, ΒΆ 20(i)),\n together with the plain and unambiguous language of 7\n C.F.R. Β§ 400.176(b) and 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.352(b)(4),\n unequivocally dictate that a party can only be awarded extra-\n contractual damages and attorneysβ fees upon petitioning this\n Court for review of the arbitratorβs award and then only after\n obtaining a determination from FCIC.\n\nJ.A. 232β33.\n\n In rendering the award, however, the arbitrator interpreted these provisions\n\ndifferently. The arbitrator concluded:\n\n Section 20(i) does not in fact state that the arbitrator may\n not award attorneysβ fees or punitive, compensatory or other\n damages. Instead it appears to impose a type of condition\n precedent to the ultimate enforceability of such an award by a\n court. Moreover, if the provision has the effect [Appellee]\n claimed, the arbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide\n anything. That plainly cannot be the case. Notably, the\n Policies are silent on timing, such that the condition precedent\n of FCIC determination could be satisfied post-award but prior\n to enforcement in court.\n\n In addition, Section 20(h) does not expressly exclude any\n theories of liability (such as fraud) or types of damages;\n instead it says that no award can exceed the amount of\n liability established under the policy. It does not expressly\n exculpate insurers from their improper conduct such as fraud\n\n\n 14\n\f or breach of fiduciary duty, conduct that can trigger liability\n beyond liability for breach of contract.\n\nJ.A. 10.\n\n But it does not matter if these policy provisions are as unambiguous as Appellee\n\n(and the FCIC) claims or if the arbitratorβs alternative interpretation is reasonable. This\n\nis because even under the arbitratorβs explanation, these provisions are ambiguous at best.\n\nAs the policy makes clear, the arbitrator was required to obtain and apply the FCICβs\n\ninterpretation of any ambiguous policy provision, and the arbitrator could not substitute\n\nher own interpretation for that of the FCIC.\n\n As the district court correctly pointed out, β[i]n cases involving federally reinsured\n\ncrop insurance, the insurance contract forms only one part of the agreement between the\n\nparties. The statutes and regulations associated with the federal crop insurance scheme\n\nalso limit the arbitratorβs authority.β J.A. 271 (citing Davis v. Producers Agric. Ins. Co.,\n\n762 F.3d 1276, 1284β85 (11th Cir. 2014)). Significantly, Section 20(a)(1) of the policy -\n\n- the very same section that provides for arbitration -- states that if there is a dispute that\n\nβin any way involves a policy or procedure interpretation,β the parties βmust obtain an\n\ninterpretation from FCIC.β J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). The FCICβs FADs\n\nare βbinding on all participants in the Federal crop insurance program,β including\n\narbitrators. 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.765(c); see also J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(i) (βAny interpretation\n\nby FCIC will be binding in any mediation or arbitration.β). Therefore, the failure to\n\nobtain a required FCIC interpretation βwill result in the nullification of any agreement or\n\n\n\n\n 15\n\faward.β J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(ii). In short, both the policy and FCIC regulations provide\n\nthat only the FCIC -- and not the arbitrator -- may interpret the policy.\n\n In rendering the award here, the arbitrator pushed back against this restriction by\n\nnoting that if the arbitrator could not interpret the meaning of policy provisions, βthe\n\narbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide anything.β J.A. 10. Indeed, the unusual\n\nworld of federal crop insurance does, in fact, appear to leave very little decision making\n\nauthority to the arbitrator. But as counsel for Appellee stated during oral argument in this\n\ncase, crop insurance βtakes everything you know about insurance and turns it on its\n\nhead.β Oral Argument at 19:40β49, Williamson Farm v. Diversified Crop Ins. Servs.,\n\nInc., No. 18-1463 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2018), http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-\n\nargument/listen-to-oral-arguments (hereinafter βOral Argumentβ).\n\n 2.\n\n The Distinction Between FCIC Interpretations and FCIC Determinations\n\n In response to Appelleeβs argument that the arbitrator was required to obtain an\n\nFCIC interpretation of disputed policy provisions, Appellant asserts, βif an FCIC\n\ndetermination is required before an arbitrator can award monies then the arbitration\n\nprocess is a complete waste of time with no meaning.β Appellantβs Br. 24. Appellant\n\nfurther asserts that, in any event, it did, in fact, seek an FCIC determination and was told\n\nthat the FCIC would not render an opinion until after arbitration.\n\n In both arguments, Appellant conflates the obligation to obtain an FCIC\n\ninterpretation of disputed provisions of the policy pursuant to Section 20(a)(1) -- a\n\nrequirement in any arbitration where the meaning or application of policy provisions are\n\n 16\n\fat issue -- with the requirement to obtain an FCIC determination that there was a failure\n\nto comply with the terms of the policy prior to obtaining attorneysβ fees or extra-\n\ncontractual damages during judicial review pursuant to Section 20(i). FCIC\n\ninterpretations and FCIC determinations, as these terms are described in the policy, are\n\nnot the same thing.\n\n a.\n\n When an FCIC Determination is Required\n\n As to Appellantβs first argument, an FCIC determination that there was a failure to\n\ncomply with the terms of the policy is not required βbefore an arbitrator can award\n\nmonies.β Appellantβs Br. 24. Pursuant to Section 20(i) of the policy, such\n\ndeterminations are only required (1) during judicial review (after arbitration is\n\ncompleted); and (2) only when an insured is seeking extra-contractual damages. As\n\ndiscussed below, binding FCIC FADs make clear that arbitrators cannot award extra-\n\ncontractual damages; accordingly, arbitrators do not require such an FCIC determination\n\nin order to render their award. 7 Arbitrators do, however, require an FCIC interpretation\n\nbefore rendering an award based on disputed policy language.\n\n\n 7\n In its reply brief, Appellant offers a similar argument that Appelleeβs\ninterpretation of 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.352 -- which preempts state and local laws and\nregulations except where the FCIC makes a determination that the agent or loss adjuster\nfailed to comply with the policy -- βwould bar recovery of any damages without an FCIC\ndetermination,β including compensatory damages. Appellantβs Reply Br. 2. Because the\nFCIC has established that arbitrators cannot award damages based on state law claims\nand FCIC determinations are only required during judicial review involving extra-\ncontractual damages, this argument is irrelevant as to the arbitration award.\n\n\n 17\n\f b.\n\n Appellant Requested an FCIC Determination, Not an FCIC Interpretation\n\n As to Appellantβs second argument, Appellant did not request an FCIC\n\ninterpretation -- it requested an FCIC determination. Again, an FCIC interpretation of\n\nthe meaning of disputed policy provisions is a different request -- one which arises at a\n\ndifferent time and in a different proceeding -- than an FCIC determination that an agent\n\nfailed to comply with the terms of the policy. To comply with Section 20(a)(1) of the\n\npolicy, what Appellant (or the arbitrator) needed to request during the arbitration, but did\n\nnot, was an FCIC interpretation of the meaning of the disputed policy provisions.\n\nAppellantβs premature request for an FCIC determination that there was a failure to\n\ncomply with the terms of the policy, pursuant to Section 20(i), is of no consequence to\n\nthe arbitration award. 8\n\n The arbitratorβs explanation as to what specific policy provisions mean\n\n(particularly to the extent they were disputed issues in the arbitration) can only be viewed\n\nas her interpretation of the policy. See, e.g., J.A. 10 (βSection 20(i) does not in fact state\n\nthat the arbitrator may not award attorneysβ fees or punitive, compensatory or other\n\ndamages. Instead it appears to impose a type of condition precedent to the ultimate\n\n\n 8\n We note that our decision in this case does not address whether a claimant could\nrecover purely tort damages against a private insurance company without such an FCIC\ndetermination where misrepresentations or negligence on the part of the insurance agent\nbefore the policy was issued left the claimant effectively uninsured under the federal crop\ninsurance program. Here, Appellant sought contractual damages and participated in\narbitration pursuant to the insurance policy.\n\n\n 18\n\fenforceability of such an award by a court. Moreover, if the provision has the effect\n\n[Appellee] claimed, the arbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide anything. That\n\nplainly cannot be the case.β). By not obtaining an FCIC interpretation to resolve the\n\nissue but instead interpreting the provisions herself, which was not in her authority to do,\n\nthe arbitrator exceeded her powers.\n\n 3.\n\n Binding FCIC Authority\n\n The arbitrator was obligated to follow any FADs previously issued by the FCIC.\n\nSee J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(i), (iii) (βAny interpretation by FCIC will be binding in any\n\nmediation or arbitration . . . . An interpretation by FCIC of a policy provision is\n\nconsidered a determination that is a matter of general applicability.β (emphasis\n\nsupplied)). And the FCIC has addressed whether arbitrators may award extra-contractual\n\ndamages more than once already. Each time, the FCIC has made clear that arbitrators do\n\nnot have the authority to award such damages. Rather, extra-contractual damages and\n\nattorneysβ fees may only be awarded by the court reviewing an arbitratorβs decision. For\n\ninstance, Appellant does not dispute that FAD-193, issued on October 21, 2013, states in\n\nrelevant part:\n\n [T]he reference to βjudicial review onlyβ [in Section 20(i)] is\n to clarify that such [extra-contractual] damages can only be\n sought during an appeal to the Courts, after an FCIC\n determination has been obtained, and cannot be awarded in\n arbitration. To obtain a determination that will enable the\n insured to recoup attorney[sβ] fees, expenses, or damages\n from the [approved insurance provider], the insured must\n send a request for determination to the [Risk Management\n\n\n 19\n\f Agency] Deputy Administrator of Compliance after the\n insured has filed an appeal for judicial review.\n\nJ.A. 240 (emphasis supplied); Appelleeβs Br. 12.\n\n Prior to this, the FCIC also addressed the issue of extra-contractual damages in\n\nFAD-99, issued on May 4, 2009, which states, in relevant part, βit is only in a judicial\n\nreview that producers can recover attorneysβ fees or other expenses, or any punitive,\n\ncompensatory or any other damages from insurance providers.β J.A. 241.\n\n Pursuant to Section 20(a)(1)(i) of the policy, these previously issued FADs -- and\n\nthe conclusion that arbitrators cannot award extra-contractual damages pursuant to\n\nSection 20(i) -- were binding upon the arbitrator in this case.\n\n 4.\n\n The Arbitrator Exceeded Her Powers\n\n Accordingly, the arbitrator exceeded her powers by both (1) interpreting the policy\n\nherself without obtaining an FCIC interpretation for the disputed policy provisions; and\n\n(2) awarding extra-contractual damages, which the FCIC has conclusively stated in\n\nmultiple FADs cannot be awarded in arbitration and can only be sought through judicial\n\nreview. Thus, Appellee met βthe heavy burdenβ to vacate an arbitration award pursuant\n\nto the FAA. MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir.\n\n2010); see also 9 U.S.C. Β§ 10(a)(4).\n\n\n\n\n 20\n\f B.\n\n Contractual Damages\n\n In the alternative, Appellant argues that even if the arbitrator exceeded her powers\n\nby awarding extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ fees, we should nevertheless\n\nconfirm the arbitration award in part based on contract damages, which were within the\n\narbitratorβs authority to award pursuant to Section 20 of the policy.\n\n Assuming that the arbitrator also awarded contractual damages, 9 it is impossible to\n\ntell from the arbitration award what amount may have stemmed from contractual\n\ndamages and what amount was extra-contractual. For example, in the award as to\n\nAppellantβs crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator stated:\n\n The lack of coverage for Farm 2172 indisputably arose\n from [Appelleeβs conduct] . . . . The failure of [Appellee] to\n properly handle this and advise [Appellant] breached\n [Appelleeβs] fiduciary duty to [Appellant.]\n\n I conclude that [Appellee] failed to comply with the terms\n of [the policy] and that failure resulted in the loss to\n [Appellant.] [Appellee] left [Appellant] effectively uninsured\n for crop year 2013 as to Farm 2172. Accordingly, I award the\n amount of $97,692.39 to [Appellant] for the breach of [the\n policy] and the failure to pay the claim. I conclude that\n [Appellee] engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty\n and constructive fraud.\n\n In addition, [Appellant] has established that [Appellee]\n owed duties distinct and separate from the duties it owed\n under the partiesβ contracts; further, [Appellant] has\n\n 9\n Notably, the arbitrator concluded that Appellee βleft [Appellant] effectively\nuninsured for crop year 2013,β J.A. 14, 15, which calls into question how Appellee could\nbreach a contract that did not exist.\n\n\n 21\n\f established that [Appelleeβs] breach of those duties was\n aggravated by several factors. Accordingly, I conclude that\n [Appellee] engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in or\n affecting commerce . . . . The facts show recklessness and\n wanton disregard by [Appellee], i.e., more than a mere breach\n of contract, warranting an award of treble damages under\n [North Carolina state law.]\n\nJ.A. 14.\n\n Although the arbitrator concluded that Appellee breached the contract, the\n\narbitrator also found Appellee liable for extra-contractual damages, including negligence\n\nand breach of fiduciary duty. Since the arbitrator only provided a single amount of\n\ndamages rather than a breakdown of the award by contract and noncontract claims, we\n\nhave no way to distinguish what amount the arbitrator may have awarded for contractual\n\ndamages (which were within the arbitratorβs authority to award) and what amount the\n\narbitrator awarded for extra-contractual damages (which, for the reasons explained above,\n\nthe arbitrator exceeded her authority in awarding).\n\n Of note, there is no support in the record for Appellantβs assertion at oral argument\n\nthat the arbitrator awarded $97,692.39 in contract damages for the crop loss claim while\n\nextra-contractual damages were awarded in the form of trebled damages and attorneysβ\n\nfees. See Oral Argument at 14:51β16:04. To the contrary, the structure of the arbitration\n\naward suggests that the arbitrator intended the award of trebled damages based on\n\nAppelleeβs βrecklessness and wanton disregardβ to be in addition to the contractual and\n\nextra-contractual damages awarded for breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary\n\nduty, and constructive fraud. J.A. 14 (βI conclude that [Appellee] engaged in negligence,\n\nbreach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. In addition, . . . [t]he facts show\n\n 22\n\frecklessness and wanton disregard by [Appellee.]β (emphasis supplied)). The same is true\n\nregarding the arbitration award for Appellantβs prevented planting claim for Farms 1870\n\nand 4168. See J.A. 15 (βI also conclude that [Appellant] has engaged in negligence,\n\nbreach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. In addition, as to Farms [1870] and\n\n4168, . . . [t]he facts show recklessness and wanton disregard by [Appellant.]β (emphasis\n\nsupplied)).\n\n Accordingly, even to the extent the arbitrator awarded damages for breach of\n\ncontract on either policy (as opposed to extra-contractual damages), the entire award\n\nmust be vacated.\n\n IV.\n\n For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is\n\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 23\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: WILLIAMSON FARM, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DIVERSIFIED CROP INSURANCE SERVICES, A/K/A CGB Diversified Services, Inc., Defendant - Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-27\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1463\\n\\n\\nWILLIAMSON FARM,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDIVERSIFIED CROP INSURANCE SERVICES, a/k/a CGB Diversified\\nServices, Inc.,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\\nRaleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:17-cv-00513-D; 5:16-mc-00018-D)\\n\\n\\nArgued: December 13, 2018 Decided: February 27, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore KEENAN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion, in which Judge\\nKeenan and Judge Floyd joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Matthew William Buckmiller, STUBBS & PERDUE, P.A., Raleigh, North\\nCarolina, for Appellant. Roy Jefferson Allen, HUNT ROSS & ALLEN, Clarksdale,\\nMississippi, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Derek M. Crump, BROWN, CRUMP,\\nVANORE & TIERNEY, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\fTHACKER, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n In this case, Williamson Farm (βAppellantβ) challenges the district courtβs\\n\\ndecision to vacate an arbitration award that Appellant won against Diversified Crop\\n\\nInsurance (βAppelleeβ), a private insurance company that sold federal crop insurance\\n\\npolicies to Appellant. Appellant asserts that the district court erred in denying its motion\\n\\nto confirm the arbitration award and granting Appelleeβs motion to vacate on the basis\\n\\nthat the arbitrator exceeded her powers.\\n\\n Despite the strong presumption in favor of confirming arbitration awards pursuant\\n\\nto the Federal Arbitration Act (βFAAβ), we hold that Appellee met its heavy burden to\\n\\nprove that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by awarding extra-contractual damages,\\n\\ncontrary to both the policy and binding authority from the Federal Crop Insurance\\n\\nCorporation (βFCICβ). Therefore, we affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Background on the Federal Crop Insurance Program\\n\\n The policies at issue in this case are federal crop insurance policies, which\\n\\nAppellee sold pursuant to the Federal Crop Insurance Act (βFCIAβ), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501β\\n\\n1524, 1531, and accompanying regulations issued by the FCIC. These policies are not\\n\\ntypical private insurance agreements, so a brief discussion of the federal governmentβs\\n\\nrole in crop insurance agreements is necessary.\\n\\n The federal crop insurance program provides farmers and agricultural entities in\\n\\nthe United States with crop insurance protection, a venture that was considered too risky\\n\\n 2\\n\\ffor traditional private insurers when the FCIA was enacted in 1938. As the Supreme\\n\\nCourt explained, βthe Government engaged in crop insurance as a pioneer. Private\\n\\ninsurance companies apparently deemed all-risk crop insurance too great a commercial\\n\\nhazard.β Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 n.1 (1947).\\n\\n To provide this protection to farmers, the FCIA established the FCIC, a\\n\\ngovernment corporation within the United States Department of Agricultureβs Risk\\n\\nManagement Agency that administers the federal crop insurance program. 7 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 1503. The FCIC does not directly issue crop insurance policies to farmers. Instead, it\\n\\nrelies on βapproved insurance providersβ 1 -- private insurers such as Appellee -- to issue\\n\\nfederal crop insurance policies to farmers like Appellant. 7 U.S.C. Β§ 1502(b)(2). Then,\\n\\nwhen certain eligibility conditions are met, the FCIC reinsures the approved insurance\\n\\nprovidersβ losses and reimburses their administrative and operating costs.\\n\\n In order to qualify for reinsurance through the FCIC, approved insurance providers\\n\\nmust comply with the FCIA and the accompanying regulations issued by the FCIC\\n\\ngoverning the sale, issuance, and servicing of federal crop insurance policies. 7 C.F.R.\\n\\nΒ§ 400.168; see also Felder v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 146 F.2d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 1944);\\n\\nDavis v. Producers Agric. Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2014). Accordingly,\\n\\nβeven though the crop insurance policy is between the farmer and an approved insurance\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Pursuant to the FCIA, β[t]he term βapproved insurance providerβ means a private\\ninsurance provider that has been approved by the [FCIC] to provide insurance coverage\\nto producers participating in the Federal crop insurance program established under this\\nsubchapter.β 7 U.S.C. Β§ 1502(b)(2).\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\fprovider,β the FCIA βestablishes the terms and conditions of insurance.β Davis, 762 F.3d\\n\\nat 1284 (citation omitted).\\n\\n Indeed, all approved insurance providers issue a uniform policy drafted by the\\n\\nFCIC known as the βCommon Crop Insurance Policy,β the text for which is provided at 7\\n\\nC.F.R. Β§ 457.8. Both policies at issue in this case mirrored the Common Crop Insurance\\n\\nPolicy. Additionally, the FCIC sets premium rates for each county and crop insured,\\n\\nsubsidizes and receives premiums, and pays claims. In short, the FCIC is extensively\\n\\ninvolved in and exerts control over all aspects of the federal crop insurance program.\\n\\n The Farm Service Agency (βFSAβ), another agency within the Department of\\n\\nAgriculture, works with the Risk Management Agency and the FCIC to implement the\\n\\nfederal crop insurance program through FSAβs network of state and county field offices.\\n\\nAs relevant to this case, insureds and approved insurance providers are required to submit\\n\\nprogram eligibility, acreage reporting, and other necessary forms to their local FSA office\\n\\nin order to receive federal crop insurance coverage through the FCIC.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Appellantβs Underlying Policy Claims\\n\\n This case centers on two policies issued by Appellee to insure Appellantβs 2013\\n\\ncrops: (1) the Richmond County Policy; and (2) the Montgomery County Policy. Under\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fthe Richmond County Policy, Appellee listed Farm Number 2172. 2 Under the\\n\\nMontgomery County Policy, Appellee listed Farm Numbers 1870 and 4168.\\n\\n For many years, Appellant purchased its crop insurance through insurance agent\\n\\nLynn Saintsing, until Saintsing sold his agency to Appellee in 2012. 3 During his time as\\n\\nAppellantβs insurance agent, Saintsingβs regular practice was to help Appellant complete\\n\\nthe necessary forms and submit them to the proper FSA office to insure Appellantβs\\n\\nfarms.\\n\\n It was not unusual for a farm located in one county to be administered by an FSA\\n\\noffice in another county, based on the ownerβs preferences or if the farmβs county did not\\n\\nhave an FSA office. Such was the case with Appellantβs Farm 2172, which was located\\n\\nin Montgomery County. In 1996, the Montgomery County FSA office closed, and\\n\\nadministration of Farm 2172 shifted to Richmond County. Accordingly, since 1996,\\n\\nFarm 2172 had been listed on forms filed with the FSA office in Richmond County even\\n\\nthough it was located in Montgomery County. Saintsing was aware of this, since he\\n\\nhelped Appellant fill out the forms and prepare maps of the farms.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Farm numbers, which are assigned by the FSA, identify an insuredβs farms and\\nare used in connection with federal crop insurance policies and FSA forms.\\n 3\\n It is not clear from the record how many years Appellant purchased its crop\\ninsurance through Saintsing, but Appellantβs brief notes that it has farmed on this\\nproperty βfor decadesβ and purchased its crop insurance through Saintsing β[d]uring\\nmuch of this time.β Appellantβs Br. 3.\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Prior to Appelleeβs acquisition of Saintsingβs insurance agency, Saintsing issued\\n\\nAppellant a single policy that covered all of Appellantβs crops regardless of the county in\\n\\nwhich the farm was located.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Crop Loss Claim: Farm 2172\\n\\n The trouble began for Appellant after Saintsing sold his business to Appellee in\\n\\n2012. Unlike the single policy previously issued by Saintsing, Appellee issued Appellant\\n\\nseparate policies for each county in which a farm was geographically located, regardless\\n\\nof where the farm was administered. Saintsing -- then an agent for Appellee -- helped\\n\\nAppellant prepare the necessary forms to be submitted to the FSA. But on those forms,\\n\\nSaintsing listed Farm 2172 on the Richmond County Policy (where it was administered),\\n\\nrather than the Montgomery County Policy (where it was geographically located).\\n\\n In 2013, Appellant experienced crop loss due to deer on Farm 2172 and expected\\n\\nthis loss to be covered under its crop insurance policy. Therefore, Appellant filed a claim\\n\\nfor the loss with Appellee. However, Appellee denied the claim βon the technicality that\\n\\nFarm 2172, located in Montgomery County, was listed on [forms] filed with the FSA in\\n\\nRichmond County and was therefore listed on the wrong policy.β J.A. 13. 4 As noted,\\n\\nSaintsing had assisted Appellant in completing these forms and facilitated their filing\\n\\nwith the FSA.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Citations to the βJ.A.β refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f 2.\\n\\n Prevented Planting Claim: Farms 1870 and 4168\\n\\n Appellant also seeks recovery for a prevented planting claim 5 under the\\n\\nMontgomery County Policy. The summer of 2013 was excessively rainy. As a result,\\n\\nAppellant was unable to plant on Farms 1870 and 4168.\\n\\n During the period that Appellant was unable to plant, another of Appelleeβs\\n\\nagents, Jason Nifong, visited Appellantβs farmland to aid Appellant in preparing its FSA\\n\\nforms. During this visit, Nifong advised Appellant that it could file a prevented planting\\n\\nclaim as a result of the rainy weather. Following Nifongβs visit, Appellant chose to file a\\n\\nprevented planting claim and did not attempt to plant on these farms.\\n\\n However, in preparing the FSA forms, Nifong failed to note the prevented planting\\n\\nacres on the correct form, and he did not explain to Appellant that failure to report the\\n\\nacres on that specific form would bar the prevented planting claim. Ultimately, Appellee\\n\\ndenied Appellantβs claim based on this failure to report.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Arbitration\\n\\n Appellant sought arbitration pursuant to Section 20(a) of the policy based on\\n\\nAppelleeβs denials of its crop loss and prevented planting claims. See J.A. 207, Β§ 20(a)\\n\\n\\n 5\\n When certain requirements are met, a prevented planting claim allows a\\npolicyholder to recover when an insured cause of loss that is general to the surrounding\\narea, such as excessive rain, prevents the policyholder (as well as other producers in the\\narea) from planting crops on eligible acres.\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f(βIf you and we fail to agree on any determination made by us . . . the disagreement must\\n\\nbe resolved through arbitration . . . .β).\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Crop Loss Claim: Farm 2172\\n\\n As to Appellantβs crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator determined, β[t]he\\n\\nlack of coverage for Farm 2172 indisputably arose from [Appelleeβs] decision to issue\\n\\ncounty by county policies and its failure, and that of its agents who knew where these\\n\\nfarms were actually located . . . , to correctly list the farms for crop insurance purposes.β\\n\\nJ.A. 14. The arbitrator continued, βI conclude that [Appellee] failed to comply with the\\n\\nterms of [the policy] and that failure resulted in the loss to [Appellant]. [Appellee] left\\n\\n[Appellant] effectively uninsured for crop year 2013 as to Farm 2172.β Id. The\\n\\narbitrator further concluded that Appellee engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary\\n\\nduty, and constructive fraud. As a result, she awarded Appellant $97,692.39 for\\n\\nAppelleeβs βbreach of [the policy] and the failure to pay the claim,β damages which she\\n\\ntrebled because she concluded that Appellee violated the North Carolina Unfair and\\n\\nDeceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. Lastly, finding that Appellee failed to attempt to\\n\\nreasonably settle the claim, the arbitrator awarded Appellant $54,368.87 in attorneysβ\\n\\nfees pursuant to North Carolina law.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Prevented Planting Claim: Farms 1870 and 4168\\n\\n As for Appellantβs prevented planting claim for Farms 1870 and 4168, the\\n\\narbitrator similarly determined that Appelleeβs agent was at fault for failing to report the\\n\\n 8\\n\\facres on the correct FSA form, and that Appelleeβs βactions or lack of action left\\n\\n[Appellant] effectively uninsured for crop year 2013 as to Farms [1870] 6 and 4168.β J.A.\\n\\n15. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded, βI award the amount of $77,668.59 to\\n\\n[Appellant] for the breach of [the policy] and the failure to pay the claim. I also conclude\\n\\nthat [Appellee] engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud.β\\n\\nId. As with the crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator trebled damages pursuant to\\n\\nthe North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act and awarded Appellant\\n\\n$44,483.63 in attorneysβ fees pursuant to North Carolina law.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Arbitration Award\\n\\n After all was said and done, the total arbitration award to Appellant was\\n\\n$97,692.39 for the crop loss claim for Farm 2172 and $77,668.59 for the prevented\\n\\nplanting claim for Farms 1870 and 4168 (both of which were to be trebled), $98,852.50\\n\\nin attorneysβ fees, and $14,994 in reimbursement for arbitration costs and fees.\\n\\nAccording to Appellant, this amounted to a total arbitration award of $639,929.44.\\n\\n D.\\n\\n District Courtβs Decision\\n\\n On May 12, 2016, Appellant filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award in the\\n\\nUnited States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. And, on June 29,\\n\\n\\n 6\\n The arbitratorβs decision occasionally refers to Farm 1870 as Farm 1872 or 1879.\\nBased on the record, these references appear to be in error.\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f2016, Appellee filed a competing motion to vacate the arbitration award, asserting that\\n\\nthe arbitrator exceeded her authority. Additionally, Appellee argued that Appellant failed\\n\\nto obtain a determination from the FCIC that Appellee failed to comply with the\\n\\ninsurance policies or FCIC procedures, which it asserted was a prerequisite for the district\\n\\ncourt to confirm the award.\\n\\n On July 12, 2016, the district court requested an amicus brief from the FCIC\\n\\naddressing whether the arbitrator exceeded her authority and whether Appellant was\\n\\nrequired to obtain an FCIC determination before the district court could confirm the\\n\\narbitration award. The FCIC filed its amicus brief on August 24, 2016, taking the\\n\\nposition that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by (1) awarding contractual damages\\n\\nnot covered by any policy; (2) awarding extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ fees;\\n\\n(3) failing to obtain and follow binding FCIC interpretations, issued in the form of Final\\n\\nAgency Determinations (βFADsβ); and (4) failing to obtain an FCIC determination prior\\n\\nto any extra-contractual damages or attorneysβ fees being awarded during judicial review.\\n\\n On March 26, 2018, the district court granted Appelleeβs motion to vacate and\\n\\ndenied Appellantβs motion to confirm the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrator\\n\\nexceeded her powers by (1) impermissibly interpreting the policy rather than obtaining an\\n\\ninterpretation from the FCIC; and (2) awarding extra-contractual damages. Appellant\\n\\ntimely appealed on April 25, 2018.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\f II.\\n\\n We review the district courtβs legal rulings regarding confirmation or vacation of\\n\\nan arbitration award de novo and the district courtβs factual findings, if any, for clear\\n\\nerror. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sprint Commcβns Co., 883 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n Pursuant to the FAA, βany judicial review of an arbitration award must be an\\n\\nextremely narrow exercise.β Long John Silverβs Restaurants, Inc. v. Cole, 514 F.3d 345,\\n\\n351 (4th Cir. 2008). There is a strong presumption in favor of confirming arbitration\\n\\nawards under the FAA, and any party seeking to overturn an arbitration award faces a\\n\\nβheavy burden.β Three S Del., Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc., 492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th\\n\\nCir. 2007). As we have stated, βin reviewing such an award, βa district or appellate court\\n\\nis limited to determin[ing] whether the arbitrators did the job they were told to do -- not\\n\\nwhether they did it well, or correctly, or reasonably, but simply whether they did it.ββ Id.\\n\\n(quoting Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994)). Indeed, βan\\n\\narbitration award is enforceable even if the award resulted from a misinterpretation of\\n\\nlaw, faulty legal reasoning or erroneous legal conclusion.β Richmond, Fredericksburg &\\n\\nPotomac R.R. Co. v. Transp. Commcβns Intβl Union, 973 F.2d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 1992)\\n\\n(internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n The FAA provides that a court may only vacate an arbitration award on one of the\\n\\nfollowing grounds:\\n\\n (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or\\n undue means;\\n\\n (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the\\n arbitrators, or either of them;\\n\\n 11\\n\\f (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in\\n refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause\\n shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material\\n to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the\\n rights of any party have been prejudiced; or\\n\\n (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so\\n imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite\\n award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.\\n\\nThree S Del., 492 F.3d at 527 (citing 9 U.S.C. Β§ 10(a)). βThe permissible common law\\n\\ngrounds for vacating such an award βinclude those circumstances where an award fails to\\n\\ndraw its essence from the contract, or the award evidences a manifest disregard of the\\n\\nlaw.ββ Id. (quoting Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2006)).\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Appellant asserts that the district court erred in this case by vacating the arbitration\\n\\naward. Appellant argues that the arbitrator did not exceed her powers by awarding extra-\\n\\ncontractual damages and attorneysβ fees. In the alternative, Appellant argues that even if\\n\\nthe arbitrator exceeded her powers in part, we should nevertheless confirm the arbitration\\n\\naward of contract damages, which were within the arbitratorβs authority to award\\n\\npursuant to the policy. We address each argument in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Extra-Contractual Damages\\n\\n The district court vacated the arbitration award after determining that the arbitrator\\n\\nexceeded her powers by awarding prohibited extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\ffees. Appellant asserts that the arbitrator acted within her authority in rendering the\\n\\naward because the arbitrator concluded that Appellee breached the policy, and it was\\n\\nwithin her power to award extra-contractual damages.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Policy Interpretation\\n\\n We turn first to whether the policy unambiguously prohibits the arbitrator from\\n\\nawarding extra-contractual damages. In arguing that it does, Appellee relies primarily on\\n\\nSections 20(h) and 20(i) of the policy. These provisions state as follows:\\n\\n (h) Except as provided in section 20(i), no award or\\n settlement in mediation, arbitration, appeal, administrative\\n review or reconsideration process or judicial review can\\n exceed the amount of liability established or which should\\n have been established under the policy, except for interest\\n awarded in accordance with section 26.\\n\\n (i) In a judicial review only, you may recover attorneys fees\\n or other expenses, or any punitive, compensatory or any other\\n damages from us only if you obtain a determination from\\n FCIC that we, our agent or loss adjuster failed to comply with\\n the terms of this policy or procedures issued by FCIC and\\n such failure resulted in you receiving a payment in an amount\\n that is less than the amount to which you were entitled.\\n\\nJ.A. 209, Β§ 20(h)β(i) (emphases supplied).\\n\\n Appellee argues that these provisions unambiguously state that the arbitrator\\n\\ncannot award extra-contractual damages, and such damages may only be awarded by a\\n\\ncourt upon judicial review and after obtaining an FCIC determination that the agent or\\n\\nloss adjuster failed to comply with the terms of the policy. Making the same argument in\\n\\nits amicus brief submitted before the district court, the FCIC explained:\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f According to the clear language of the policy, any extra-\\n contractual damages, including damages arising from state\\n claims, were only available after this Court was asked to\\n review the arbitratorβs award. See 7 C.F.R. Β§ 457.8, ΒΆ 20(i).\\n As noted by FCIC, any extra-contractual claims (i.e.\\n negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud,\\n unfair and deceptive practices) and attorneysβ fees are limited\\n solely to instances where FCIC has determined the insurance\\n provider violated its policies and procedures and such\\n violation had a monetary impact on the payment of the claim.\\n See FCIC Response to Comments, 69 Fed. Reg. 48652-01,\\n 48717 (Aug. 10, 2004). Thus, the plain and unambiguous\\n terms of section 20(i) of the policy (7 C.F.R. Β§ 457.8, ΒΆ 20(i)),\\n together with the plain and unambiguous language of 7\\n C.F.R. Β§ 400.176(b) and 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.352(b)(4),\\n unequivocally dictate that a party can only be awarded extra-\\n contractual damages and attorneysβ fees upon petitioning this\\n Court for review of the arbitratorβs award and then only after\\n obtaining a determination from FCIC.\\n\\nJ.A. 232β33.\\n\\n In rendering the award, however, the arbitrator interpreted these provisions\\n\\ndifferently. The arbitrator concluded:\\n\\n Section 20(i) does not in fact state that the arbitrator may\\n not award attorneysβ fees or punitive, compensatory or other\\n damages. Instead it appears to impose a type of condition\\n precedent to the ultimate enforceability of such an award by a\\n court. Moreover, if the provision has the effect [Appellee]\\n claimed, the arbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide\\n anything. That plainly cannot be the case. Notably, the\\n Policies are silent on timing, such that the condition precedent\\n of FCIC determination could be satisfied post-award but prior\\n to enforcement in court.\\n\\n In addition, Section 20(h) does not expressly exclude any\\n theories of liability (such as fraud) or types of damages;\\n instead it says that no award can exceed the amount of\\n liability established under the policy. It does not expressly\\n exculpate insurers from their improper conduct such as fraud\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\f or breach of fiduciary duty, conduct that can trigger liability\\n beyond liability for breach of contract.\\n\\nJ.A. 10.\\n\\n But it does not matter if these policy provisions are as unambiguous as Appellee\\n\\n(and the FCIC) claims or if the arbitratorβs alternative interpretation is reasonable. This\\n\\nis because even under the arbitratorβs explanation, these provisions are ambiguous at best.\\n\\nAs the policy makes clear, the arbitrator was required to obtain and apply the FCICβs\\n\\ninterpretation of any ambiguous policy provision, and the arbitrator could not substitute\\n\\nher own interpretation for that of the FCIC.\\n\\n As the district court correctly pointed out, β[i]n cases involving federally reinsured\\n\\ncrop insurance, the insurance contract forms only one part of the agreement between the\\n\\nparties. The statutes and regulations associated with the federal crop insurance scheme\\n\\nalso limit the arbitratorβs authority.β J.A. 271 (citing Davis v. Producers Agric. Ins. Co.,\\n\\n762 F.3d 1276, 1284β85 (11th Cir. 2014)). Significantly, Section 20(a)(1) of the policy -\\n\\n- the very same section that provides for arbitration -- states that if there is a dispute that\\n\\nβin any way involves a policy or procedure interpretation,β the parties βmust obtain an\\n\\ninterpretation from FCIC.β J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). The FCICβs FADs\\n\\nare βbinding on all participants in the Federal crop insurance program,β including\\n\\narbitrators. 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.765(c); see also J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(i) (βAny interpretation\\n\\nby FCIC will be binding in any mediation or arbitration.β). Therefore, the failure to\\n\\nobtain a required FCIC interpretation βwill result in the nullification of any agreement or\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\faward.β J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(ii). In short, both the policy and FCIC regulations provide\\n\\nthat only the FCIC -- and not the arbitrator -- may interpret the policy.\\n\\n In rendering the award here, the arbitrator pushed back against this restriction by\\n\\nnoting that if the arbitrator could not interpret the meaning of policy provisions, βthe\\n\\narbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide anything.β J.A. 10. Indeed, the unusual\\n\\nworld of federal crop insurance does, in fact, appear to leave very little decision making\\n\\nauthority to the arbitrator. But as counsel for Appellee stated during oral argument in this\\n\\ncase, crop insurance βtakes everything you know about insurance and turns it on its\\n\\nhead.β Oral Argument at 19:40β49, Williamson Farm v. Diversified Crop Ins. Servs.,\\n\\nInc., No. 18-1463 (4th Cir. Dec. 13, 2018), http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-\\n\\nargument/listen-to-oral-arguments (hereinafter βOral Argumentβ).\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n The Distinction Between FCIC Interpretations and FCIC Determinations\\n\\n In response to Appelleeβs argument that the arbitrator was required to obtain an\\n\\nFCIC interpretation of disputed policy provisions, Appellant asserts, βif an FCIC\\n\\ndetermination is required before an arbitrator can award monies then the arbitration\\n\\nprocess is a complete waste of time with no meaning.β Appellantβs Br. 24. Appellant\\n\\nfurther asserts that, in any event, it did, in fact, seek an FCIC determination and was told\\n\\nthat the FCIC would not render an opinion until after arbitration.\\n\\n In both arguments, Appellant conflates the obligation to obtain an FCIC\\n\\ninterpretation of disputed provisions of the policy pursuant to Section 20(a)(1) -- a\\n\\nrequirement in any arbitration where the meaning or application of policy provisions are\\n\\n 16\\n\\fat issue -- with the requirement to obtain an FCIC determination that there was a failure\\n\\nto comply with the terms of the policy prior to obtaining attorneysβ fees or extra-\\n\\ncontractual damages during judicial review pursuant to Section 20(i). FCIC\\n\\ninterpretations and FCIC determinations, as these terms are described in the policy, are\\n\\nnot the same thing.\\n\\n a.\\n\\n When an FCIC Determination is Required\\n\\n As to Appellantβs first argument, an FCIC determination that there was a failure to\\n\\ncomply with the terms of the policy is not required βbefore an arbitrator can award\\n\\nmonies.β Appellantβs Br. 24. Pursuant to Section 20(i) of the policy, such\\n\\ndeterminations are only required (1) during judicial review (after arbitration is\\n\\ncompleted); and (2) only when an insured is seeking extra-contractual damages. As\\n\\ndiscussed below, binding FCIC FADs make clear that arbitrators cannot award extra-\\n\\ncontractual damages; accordingly, arbitrators do not require such an FCIC determination\\n\\nin order to render their award. 7 Arbitrators do, however, require an FCIC interpretation\\n\\nbefore rendering an award based on disputed policy language.\\n\\n\\n 7\\n In its reply brief, Appellant offers a similar argument that Appelleeβs\\ninterpretation of 7 C.F.R. Β§ 400.352 -- which preempts state and local laws and\\nregulations except where the FCIC makes a determination that the agent or loss adjuster\\nfailed to comply with the policy -- βwould bar recovery of any damages without an FCIC\\ndetermination,β including compensatory damages. Appellantβs Reply Br. 2. Because the\\nFCIC has established that arbitrators cannot award damages based on state law claims\\nand FCIC determinations are only required during judicial review involving extra-\\ncontractual damages, this argument is irrelevant as to the arbitration award.\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\f b.\\n\\n Appellant Requested an FCIC Determination, Not an FCIC Interpretation\\n\\n As to Appellantβs second argument, Appellant did not request an FCIC\\n\\ninterpretation -- it requested an FCIC determination. Again, an FCIC interpretation of\\n\\nthe meaning of disputed policy provisions is a different request -- one which arises at a\\n\\ndifferent time and in a different proceeding -- than an FCIC determination that an agent\\n\\nfailed to comply with the terms of the policy. To comply with Section 20(a)(1) of the\\n\\npolicy, what Appellant (or the arbitrator) needed to request during the arbitration, but did\\n\\nnot, was an FCIC interpretation of the meaning of the disputed policy provisions.\\n\\nAppellantβs premature request for an FCIC determination that there was a failure to\\n\\ncomply with the terms of the policy, pursuant to Section 20(i), is of no consequence to\\n\\nthe arbitration award. 8\\n\\n The arbitratorβs explanation as to what specific policy provisions mean\\n\\n(particularly to the extent they were disputed issues in the arbitration) can only be viewed\\n\\nas her interpretation of the policy. See, e.g., J.A. 10 (βSection 20(i) does not in fact state\\n\\nthat the arbitrator may not award attorneysβ fees or punitive, compensatory or other\\n\\ndamages. Instead it appears to impose a type of condition precedent to the ultimate\\n\\n\\n 8\\n We note that our decision in this case does not address whether a claimant could\\nrecover purely tort damages against a private insurance company without such an FCIC\\ndetermination where misrepresentations or negligence on the part of the insurance agent\\nbefore the policy was issued left the claimant effectively uninsured under the federal crop\\ninsurance program. Here, Appellant sought contractual damages and participated in\\narbitration pursuant to the insurance policy.\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\fenforceability of such an award by a court. Moreover, if the provision has the effect\\n\\n[Appellee] claimed, the arbitrator would have little jurisdiction to decide anything. That\\n\\nplainly cannot be the case.β). By not obtaining an FCIC interpretation to resolve the\\n\\nissue but instead interpreting the provisions herself, which was not in her authority to do,\\n\\nthe arbitrator exceeded her powers.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Binding FCIC Authority\\n\\n The arbitrator was obligated to follow any FADs previously issued by the FCIC.\\n\\nSee J.A. 208, Β§ 20(a)(1)(i), (iii) (βAny interpretation by FCIC will be binding in any\\n\\nmediation or arbitration . . . . An interpretation by FCIC of a policy provision is\\n\\nconsidered a determination that is a matter of general applicability.β (emphasis\\n\\nsupplied)). And the FCIC has addressed whether arbitrators may award extra-contractual\\n\\ndamages more than once already. Each time, the FCIC has made clear that arbitrators do\\n\\nnot have the authority to award such damages. Rather, extra-contractual damages and\\n\\nattorneysβ fees may only be awarded by the court reviewing an arbitratorβs decision. For\\n\\ninstance, Appellant does not dispute that FAD-193, issued on October 21, 2013, states in\\n\\nrelevant part:\\n\\n [T]he reference to βjudicial review onlyβ [in Section 20(i)] is\\n to clarify that such [extra-contractual] damages can only be\\n sought during an appeal to the Courts, after an FCIC\\n determination has been obtained, and cannot be awarded in\\n arbitration. To obtain a determination that will enable the\\n insured to recoup attorney[sβ] fees, expenses, or damages\\n from the [approved insurance provider], the insured must\\n send a request for determination to the [Risk Management\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Agency] Deputy Administrator of Compliance after the\\n insured has filed an appeal for judicial review.\\n\\nJ.A. 240 (emphasis supplied); Appelleeβs Br. 12.\\n\\n Prior to this, the FCIC also addressed the issue of extra-contractual damages in\\n\\nFAD-99, issued on May 4, 2009, which states, in relevant part, βit is only in a judicial\\n\\nreview that producers can recover attorneysβ fees or other expenses, or any punitive,\\n\\ncompensatory or any other damages from insurance providers.β J.A. 241.\\n\\n Pursuant to Section 20(a)(1)(i) of the policy, these previously issued FADs -- and\\n\\nthe conclusion that arbitrators cannot award extra-contractual damages pursuant to\\n\\nSection 20(i) -- were binding upon the arbitrator in this case.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n The Arbitrator Exceeded Her Powers\\n\\n Accordingly, the arbitrator exceeded her powers by both (1) interpreting the policy\\n\\nherself without obtaining an FCIC interpretation for the disputed policy provisions; and\\n\\n(2) awarding extra-contractual damages, which the FCIC has conclusively stated in\\n\\nmultiple FADs cannot be awarded in arbitration and can only be sought through judicial\\n\\nreview. Thus, Appellee met βthe heavy burdenβ to vacate an arbitration award pursuant\\n\\nto the FAA. MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2010); see also 9 U.S.C. Β§ 10(a)(4).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\f B.\\n\\n Contractual Damages\\n\\n In the alternative, Appellant argues that even if the arbitrator exceeded her powers\\n\\nby awarding extra-contractual damages and attorneysβ fees, we should nevertheless\\n\\nconfirm the arbitration award in part based on contract damages, which were within the\\n\\narbitratorβs authority to award pursuant to Section 20 of the policy.\\n\\n Assuming that the arbitrator also awarded contractual damages, 9 it is impossible to\\n\\ntell from the arbitration award what amount may have stemmed from contractual\\n\\ndamages and what amount was extra-contractual. For example, in the award as to\\n\\nAppellantβs crop loss claim for Farm 2172, the arbitrator stated:\\n\\n The lack of coverage for Farm 2172 indisputably arose\\n from [Appelleeβs conduct] . . . . The failure of [Appellee] to\\n properly handle this and advise [Appellant] breached\\n [Appelleeβs] fiduciary duty to [Appellant.]\\n\\n I conclude that [Appellee] failed to comply with the terms\\n of [the policy] and that failure resulted in the loss to\\n [Appellant.] [Appellee] left [Appellant] effectively uninsured\\n for crop year 2013 as to Farm 2172. Accordingly, I award the\\n amount of $97,692.39 to [Appellant] for the breach of [the\\n policy] and the failure to pay the claim. I conclude that\\n [Appellee] engaged in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty\\n and constructive fraud.\\n\\n In addition, [Appellant] has established that [Appellee]\\n owed duties distinct and separate from the duties it owed\\n under the partiesβ contracts; further, [Appellant] has\\n\\n 9\\n Notably, the arbitrator concluded that Appellee βleft [Appellant] effectively\\nuninsured for crop year 2013,β J.A. 14, 15, which calls into question how Appellee could\\nbreach a contract that did not exist.\\n\\n\\n 21\\n\\f established that [Appelleeβs] breach of those duties was\\n aggravated by several factors. Accordingly, I conclude that\\n [Appellee] engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in or\\n affecting commerce . . . . The facts show recklessness and\\n wanton disregard by [Appellee], i.e., more than a mere breach\\n of contract, warranting an award of treble damages under\\n [North Carolina state law.]\\n\\nJ.A. 14.\\n\\n Although the arbitrator concluded that Appellee breached the contract, the\\n\\narbitrator also found Appellee liable for extra-contractual damages, including negligence\\n\\nand breach of fiduciary duty. Since the arbitrator only provided a single amount of\\n\\ndamages rather than a breakdown of the award by contract and noncontract claims, we\\n\\nhave no way to distinguish what amount the arbitrator may have awarded for contractual\\n\\ndamages (which were within the arbitratorβs authority to award) and what amount the\\n\\narbitrator awarded for extra-contractual damages (which, for the reasons explained above,\\n\\nthe arbitrator exceeded her authority in awarding).\\n\\n Of note, there is no support in the record for Appellantβs assertion at oral argument\\n\\nthat the arbitrator awarded $97,692.39 in contract damages for the crop loss claim while\\n\\nextra-contractual damages were awarded in the form of trebled damages and attorneysβ\\n\\nfees. See Oral Argument at 14:51β16:04. To the contrary, the structure of the arbitration\\n\\naward suggests that the arbitrator intended the award of trebled damages based on\\n\\nAppelleeβs βrecklessness and wanton disregardβ to be in addition to the contractual and\\n\\nextra-contractual damages awarded for breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary\\n\\nduty, and constructive fraud. J.A. 14 (βI conclude that [Appellee] engaged in negligence,\\n\\nbreach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. In addition, . . . [t]he facts show\\n\\n 22\\n\\frecklessness and wanton disregard by [Appellee.]β (emphasis supplied)). The same is true\\n\\nregarding the arbitration award for Appellantβs prevented planting claim for Farms 1870\\n\\nand 4168. See J.A. 15 (βI also conclude that [Appellant] has engaged in negligence,\\n\\nbreach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. In addition, as to Farms [1870] and\\n\\n4168, . . . [t]he facts show recklessness and wanton disregard by [Appellant.]β (emphasis\\n\\nsupplied)).\\n\\n Accordingly, even to the extent the arbitrator awarded damages for breach of\\n\\ncontract on either policy (as opposed to extra-contractual damages), the entire award\\n\\nmust be vacated.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":573,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4594571,"string":"4,594,571"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Jesmene LOCKHART, A/K/A Jesmene Laquin-Montre Lockhart, A/K/A Jasmene Lockhart, Defendant - Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jesmene Lockhart"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-27"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"16-4441"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gregory, Keenan, Floyd\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 16-4441\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJESMENE LOCKHART, a/k/a Jesmene Laquin-Montre Lockhart, a/k/a Jasmene\\nLockhart,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,\\nat Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:15-cr-00034-RJC-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 15, 2018 Decided: February 27, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion stating the judgment of\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371824/\", \"author_raw\": \"BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"the Court. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a separate opinion, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"the Court. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371824/\", \"author_raw\": \"the Court. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a separate opinion, concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"Judge Floyd wrote a separate opinion, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"Judge Floyd wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH\\nCAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,\\nOFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for\\nAppellee. ON BRIEF: Anthony Martinez, Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL\\nDEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina,\\nfor Appellant. R. Andrew Murray, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED\\n\\nSTATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\nBARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Jesmene Lockhart appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a\\n\\nconvicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1), and his mandatory minimum 15-\\n\\nyear sentence of imprisonment imposed under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.\\n\\nΒ§ 924(e) (ACCA). Lockhart contends that the magistrate judge plainly erred by failing to\\n\\nadvise him during the Rule 11 plea colloquy of his potential exposure to the 15-year\\n\\nmandatory minimum. Lockhart asserts that if he had been properly informed of his\\n\\nsentencing exposure, there is a βreasonable probabilityβ that he would not have pleaded\\n\\nguilty.\\n\\n Our holding today is restricted by this Courtβs decision in United States v.\\n\\nMassenburg, 564 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2009), which imposes an extreme burden on a\\n\\ndefendant seeking plain error review of a courtβs failure to provide correct sentencing\\n\\ninformation before accepting a guilty plea. Under Massenburg, irrespective of the extent\\n\\nof the courtβs error, a defendant on plain error review affirmatively must show a\\n\\nreasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been correctly\\n\\nadvised of his sentencing exposure. See id. at 343-46. The defendant is held to this\\n\\nstandard even though the Rule 11 error committed by the district court left him in the\\n\\ndark regarding one of the most critical considerations in the guilty plea calculus, namely,\\n\\nhis sentencing exposure. But because we are bound by the holding in Massenburg, we\\n\\nconclude that Lockhart has failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden and we affirm the\\n\\ndistrict courtβs judgment.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\n I.\\n\\n In September 2014, officers with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in\\n\\nNorth Carolina responded to a report of suspicious activity involving individuals in a\\n\\nparked car. When they arrived at the scene, an officer saw Lockhart sitting in the driverβs\\n\\nseat of the vehicle. The officer observed Lockhart use his right hand to provide his\\n\\nidentification, βwhile reaching down by his left leg with his left hand, where the officer\\n\\nsaw the butt of [a] gun with a magazine clip.β The officers recovered the loaded handgun\\n\\nand an additional magazine from the driverβs side of the car, and the authorities later\\n\\ndetermined that the firearm was stolen.\\n\\n Lockhart pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement to a single count of\\n\\npossession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1).\\n\\nDuring the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the magistrate judge asked the government to\\n\\nβsummarize the charge and the penalty.β The government responded that the βmaximum\\n\\npenaltyβ Lockhart faced was 10 yearsβ imprisonment. At no time during the plea\\n\\ncolloquy did the court or the government clarify that Lockhartβs criminal history could\\n\\nresult in a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA.\\n\\n The probation officer prepared a presentence report (PSR), and recommended\\n\\nsentencing Lockhart as an armed career criminal under the ACCA based on three prior\\n\\nconvictions for North Carolina robbery with a dangerous weapon. In the PSR, the\\n\\nprobation officer explicitly highlighted the error in the plea colloquy, noting that\\n\\nLockhart βwas informed that his statutory penalties . . . were not more than ten years[β]\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\nimprisonment,β but that βbased on [Lockhartβs] three prior convictions for violent\\n\\nfelonies, [his] statutory penalties . . . are not less than fifteen years[β] imprisonment.β\\n\\n Lockhartβs counsel objected to the proposed ACCA designation on the grounds\\n\\nthat (1) his North Carolina convictions, which were consolidated for judgment, should\\n\\ncount as a single ACCA predicate, and (2) an ACCA sentence would violate the Eighth\\n\\nAmendment. Notably, Lockhart did not assert that he previously had been unaware of his\\n\\npotential ACCA designation, nor did he seek to withdraw his guilty plea.\\n\\n After overruling the objections of Lockhartβs counsel, the district court concluded\\n\\nthat Lockhart qualified as an armed career criminal under the ACCA and imposed the\\n\\nmandatory minimum term of 15 yearsβ imprisonment. Following the courtβs imposition\\n\\nof sentence, Lockhartβs counsel conferred with the government and informed the court:\\n\\n Iβm going back to his plea colloquy. He didnβt plead to 924(e) [ACCA] it\\n was not on the Bill of Indictment. But I went over it beforehand. So I just\\n want to put it on the record that he was fully aware of that. I just thought\\n about it.\\n\\nThe government added, βWe just wanted to make a record of that.β The district court did\\n\\nnot ask counsel to elaborate on the issue, and did not confirm with Lockhart whether he\\n\\nwas aware of his potential ACCA exposure before pleading guilty. Lockhart now\\n\\nappeals, represented by new appellate counsel.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Because Lockhart did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court, we\\n\\nreview his challenge to his plea for plain error. United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358,\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\n364 (4th Cir. 2018). To succeed under plain error review, a defendant bears the burden to\\n\\nshow that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his\\n\\nsubstantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). This Court retains\\n\\nthe discretion to correct such an error but will do so βonly if the error seriously affects the\\n\\nfairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.β Massenburg, 564 F.3d at\\n\\n343 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Lockhart argues that if he had known he would be facing a 15-year minimum\\n\\nsentence under the ACCA, rather than the 10-year maximum stated at the plea hearing, he\\n\\nlikely would not have pleaded guilty. Lockhart asserts that the benefit he gained from\\n\\npleading guilty was βso small as to be virtually non-existentβ and, thus, that he would\\n\\nhave had a strong incentive to request a trial to try to avoid the 15-year ACCA sentence. 1\\n\\n In response, the government concedes that the magistrate judge committed plain\\n\\nerror in failing to advise Lockhart of his correct sentencing exposure. Nevertheless, the\\n\\ngovernment contends that Lockhart has failed to show a βreasonable probabilityβ that he\\n\\nwould not have pleaded guilty if the court had advised him of his correct sentencing\\n\\nrange. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76 (2004). Applying\\n\\nMassenburg, we agree with the government.\\n\\n 1\\n In support of this argument, Lockhart maintains that: (1) the three-level reduction\\nin his Guidelines calculation for acceptance of responsibility reduced the bottom of his\\nGuidelines range by only eight months; (2) mitigating factors in his background,\\nincluding his youth at the time of the predicate offenses, would have supported a\\ndownward variance irrespective whether he pleaded guilty; and (3) if he had not pleaded\\nguilty to the felon in possession charge, the government might have offered him a more\\nfavorable plea deal for possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(j),\\nwhich charge would not have triggered the ACCA enhancement.\\n\\n 6\\n\\n Initially, we agree with the parties that the first two prongs of plain error review\\n\\nare satisfied here. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, a district court must\\n\\nadvise a defendant of βany maximum possible penaltyβ as well as βany mandatory\\n\\nminimum penaltyβ before accepting a guilty plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H), (I). And\\n\\neven if a district court is not certain whether a defendant will qualify for an enhanced\\n\\nsentence under the ACCA, the court nevertheless must βanticipate the possibility and\\n\\nexplain to [the defendant] the sentence that would be applicable if he had prior qualifying\\n\\nconvictions.β United States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2008); see also\\n\\nMassenburg, 564 F.3d at 343 (plain error when defendant not advised of potential ACCA\\n\\nsentence before pleading guilty). As the Supreme Court has explained:\\n\\n If the judge told the defendant that the maximum possible sentence was 10\\n years and then imposed a sentence of 15 years based on ACCA, the\\n defendant would have been sorely misled and would have a ground for\\n moving to withdraw the plea.\\n\\nUnited States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 384 (2008). Accordingly, we conclude that by\\n\\nfailing to inform Lockhart of his potential eligibility for a mandatory minimum 15-year\\n\\nsentence under the ACCA, the magistrate judge committed error that was plain.\\n\\n To establish that a Rule 11 error affected his substantial rights, a defendant bears\\n\\nthe burden to show βa reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have\\n\\nentered the plea.β Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83. This standard is a demanding one,\\n\\nrequiring a defendant to βsatisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the\\n\\nentire record, that the probability of a different result is βsufficient to undermine\\n\\nconfidence in the outcomeβ of the proceeding.β Id. (citations omitted).\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\n In Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, we directly addressed this βreasonable probabilityβ\\n\\nstandard in the context of incorrect sentencing information provided at a Rule 11 plea\\n\\ncolloquy. There, in circumstances nearly identical to the case now before us, a district\\n\\ncourt failed to inform the defendant during his plea colloquy that he might receive an\\n\\nenhanced ACCA sentence, contrary to later information in the PSR that the defendantβs\\n\\nrecord qualified him to receive such a sentence. Id. at 340. We declined to impose a\\n\\npresumption of prejudice for that error, despite the significant increase in sentencing\\n\\nexposure caused by the ACCA designation. Id. at 341, 344-46. In adopting this\\n\\napproach, we emphasized that the confines of plain error review reflect the importance of\\n\\ntimely raising objections in the district court. Id. at 345-46.\\n\\n In considering whether Massenburg had shown an effect on his substantial rights\\n\\nfor purposes of plain error review, we reviewed the record in accordance with Supreme\\n\\nCourt precedent and emphasized three main considerations: (1) whether there were any\\n\\nβstatements on the record . . . suggesting that [the defendant] would not have pleaded\\n\\nguilty if the district court had properly informed him of the sentencing exposure that he\\n\\nfacedβ; (2) whether the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea after learning from\\n\\nthe PSR that he could be sentenced under the ACCA; and (3) the strength of the\\n\\ngovernmentβs case against him. Id. at 343-44. Applying those factors, we observed that\\n\\nthere was an βabsence of any evidence in the record suggesting that [Massenburg] would\\n\\nnot have entered his plea in the absence of the error,β and that the governmentβs evidence\\n\\nwas strong. Id. at 344. We therefore concluded that Massenburg had not satisfied the\\n\\nβreasonable probabilityβ standard. Id. at 339, 343-46.\\n\\n 8\\n\\n To obtain relief on plain error review, a defendant who has been given materially\\n\\nincorrect sentencing information at his plea colloquy must show that there is a reasonable\\n\\nprobability he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been correctly advised. Id. at 343\\n\\n(citing Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83). Under Massenburg, this showing must\\n\\nappear affirmatively on the record, notwithstanding that the essence of plain error review\\n\\nis the defendantβs failure to object to such error in the trial court. See id. at 343-44; Fed.\\n\\nR. Crim. P. 52(b) (βA plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even\\n\\nthough it was not brought to the courtβs attention.β (emphasis added)); see generally\\n\\nOlano, 507 U.S. at 733-34. Thus, a defendant who has been misled by the courtβs\\n\\nmisinformation regarding his sentencing exposure effectively is penalized on plain error\\n\\nreview by the very nature of the courtβs plain error.\\n\\n As a matter of simple logic, the problem created by such an error, namely, the\\n\\nentry of a guilty plea that is not knowing and voluntary, cannot be cured by contrary\\n\\ninformation later provided in a PSR. United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 404 (4th Cir.\\n\\n1995). A defendant has a right to rely on the accuracy of the information provided by the\\n\\ncourt on which his plea is based. A plea that is predicated on a defendantβs ignorance of\\n\\nhis sentencing exposure strikes at the very heart of our criminal justice system. And,\\n\\nwhile plain error review reflects the defendantβs failure to preserve his objection to the\\n\\ntrial courtβs error, Massenburg strongly suggests that to succeed on plain error review,\\n\\nthe defendant must have stated on the record in the trial court that the error affected his\\n\\nplea decision, and that he must have moved to withdraw his plea after learning of his\\n\\nactual sentencing exposure.\\n\\n 9\\n\\n Under Dominguez Benitez, a defendant is not required to make such an affirmative\\n\\nstatement on the trial record or to move to withdraw his plea after learning of his true\\n\\nsentencing exposure. Instead, under the Supreme Courtβs holding, a defendant who has\\n\\nbeen advised incorrectly by the court at his Rule 11 hearing can demonstrate an effect on\\n\\nhis substantial rights by showing based on the totality of the circumstances in the record,\\n\\nthat there is a reasonable likelihood he would have gone to trial if the court had advised\\n\\nhim correctly. See 542 U.S. at 83 (holding that a defendant must βsatisfy the judgment of\\n\\nthe reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different\\n\\nresult is βsufficient to undermine confidence in the outcomeβ of the proceedingβ (citations\\n\\nomitted)). But this Court in Massenburg has required more. 2\\n\\n Under Massenburg, we are constrained to conclude that Lockhart has not shown\\n\\nthat his substantial rights were affected by the district courtβs error. As in Massenburg,\\n\\nLockhart did not make any statement on the record indicating that he would have\\n\\nproceeded to trial if he had been given the correct sentencing information. See 564 F.3d\\n\\nat 343-44. Nor did Lockhart express surprise at the statement in the PSR of a potential\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Absent the holding in Massenburg, we would further consider whether the\\nmagnitude of the present error created a reasonable probability of a different result by\\nimpairing Lockhartβs ability to evaluate the relative risks and benefits of pleading guilty\\nversus proceeding to trial. See United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d 16, 17, 20-\\n21 (1st Cir. 2009) (vacating guilty plea on plain error review when court informed the\\ndefendant that he faced a three-year maximum term of supervised release, when he\\nactually faced a maximum term of life, because βthe erroneous information dramatically\\naltered the sentencing stakes for the defendantβ); United States v. Monie, 858 F.3d 1029,\\n1032-34 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d at 21) (vacating guilty plea\\non plain error review when defendant was not informed of ACCA exposure).\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\nACCA designation or seek to withdraw his plea on that basis. And the government\\n\\nproffered strong evidence supporting the felon in possession charge, based on recovery of\\n\\na firearm and ammunition from the driverβs side of a vehicle while Lockhart was sitting\\n\\nin the driverβs seat. Accordingly, bound by the holding of Massenburg, we conclude that\\n\\nLockhart has failed to demonstrate plain error affecting his substantial rights.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We affirm the district courtβs judgment.\\n\\n\\n\\n AFFIRMED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371824/\", \"author_raw\": \"Judge Floyd wrote a separate opinion, concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment:\\n\\n According to the record evidence, Jesmene Lockhart entered into a guilty plea\\n\\nwithout the district court properly informing him of his true sentencing exposure. In\\n\\ncontract cases involving a property interest, this Court would likely grant a party in\\n\\nLockhartβs position rescission based on unilateral mistake. Unfortunately, this is a\\n\\ncriminal case, and the liberty interests of defendants such as Lockhart are not afforded the\\n\\nsame level of relief. The majority operates under the mistaken belief that the scales of\\n\\njustice are constrained by United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2009) and\\n\\nthe circular logic it employs. Consequently, despite the majorityβs trepidation about the\\n\\ninjustice Massenburg represents, it still acquiesces to an analysis that reflexively\\n\\nprohibits defendants from obtaining a second chance to make an informed choice after\\n\\nbeing misinformed by the district court.\\n\\n Massenburg relies on the Supreme Courtβs holding in United States v. Dominguez\\n\\nBenitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004). There, the Supreme Court held βthat a defendant who seeks\\n\\nreversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court\\n\\ncommitted plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the\\n\\nerror, he would not have entered the plea. A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of\\n\\nthe reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different\\n\\nresult is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.β 542 U.S.\\n\\nat 83 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\\n\\n Applying Dominguez Benitez, this Court in Massenburg conducted a plain error\\n\\nreview of the entire record, examining (1) whether there were any βstatements on the\\n\\n 12\\n\\nrecord . . . suggesting that [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty if the district\\n\\ncourt had properly informed him of the sentencing exposure that he facedβ; (2) whether\\n\\nthe defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea after learning from the PSR that he\\n\\ncould be sentenced under the ACCA; and (3) the strength of the governmentβs case\\n\\nagainst him. 564 F.3d at 343-44.\\n\\n Upon a closer examination, the considerations used by this Circuit in Massenburg\\n\\ncreate a circular logic that prevents defendants from successfully pursuing appellate\\n\\nrelief. On the one hand, the defendantβs silence at the time of the Rule 11 proceedings\\n\\ncompels us to use the plain error standard. On the other hand, we use the defendantβs\\n\\nsilence, as evidenced by lack of statements in the record and a lack of an attempt to\\n\\nwithdraw the guilty plea, to also deny the defendant relief. It is unjust that the same\\n\\nsilence that compels this Court to use plain error review also compels us to deny relief\\n\\nunder that same standard of review. The Massenburg Court also looks at the strength of\\n\\nthe Governmentβs case against the defendant. However, Rule 11 cases always occur in\\n\\nthe context of a defendant taking a guilty plea, and defendants generally do not plead\\n\\nguilty when the case against them is weak. This is yet another example of how the\\n\\nMassenburg Court employs a nonsensical rubric against a defendant. As the majority\\n\\npoints out, defendants seeking relief under plain error review should face a higher\\n\\nburden, but Massenburg makes this burden impossible to meet.\\n\\n A proper review of the entire record in this case materially affects the outcome in\\n\\nLockhart. See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 80 (explaining that in assessing the effect\\n\\nof Rule 11 error, a reviewing court must look to the entire record, not to the plea\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\nproceedings alone). The majority notes that at the end of the sentencing hearing\\n\\nLockhartβs lawyer and the United States Attorney conferred in order to make the court\\n\\naware that Lockhart was allegedly informed of the ACCA enhancement even though the\\n\\ncourt had not informed him of it, and the Bill of Indictment did not list it. Though\\n\\nLockhartβs attorney represented to the court that he had informed Lockhart of his\\n\\nsentencing exposure, a pro se notice of appeal filed by Lockhart a mere five days later\\n\\nindicates otherwise. In that notice, Lockhart requested that the court appoint a new\\n\\nlawyer βbecause my last lawyer did not____me right.β *\\n\\n This portion of the record viewed in context indicates Lockhartβs dissatisfaction\\n\\nwith the advice of his counsel. Indeed, the attorneyβs eleventh-hour attempt to address\\n\\nthe omission of the ACCA enhancement in the Bill of Indictment strongly supports the\\n\\ninference that Lockhart was not fully or properly advised by the court or his attorney of\\n\\nthe criminal consequences of his plea. Moreover, the grievance against Lockhartβs\\n\\nattorney communicated in his pro se notice of appeal can only be related to advice and\\n\\ncommunication surrounding his guilty plea given that this case never went to trial.\\n\\n The deficiencies in communication to Lockhart, both by the court and his attorney,\\n\\nundermine the confidence this Court should have in the integrity of the sentencing courtβs\\n\\nproceedings and strongly suggests that misinformation materially impacted Lockhartβs\\n\\nsubstantial rights. This is especially true because the ACCA enhancement meant that\\n\\nLockhart faced a maximum of life imprisonment even with the guilty plea. Given that\\n\\n *\\n The electronic record obfuscates the missing word and the original record was\\ndestroyed.\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\nLockhart actually faced life imprisonment, rather than the ten years the district court\\n\\ncommunicated to him, there is a reasonable probability that but for being misinformed, he\\n\\nwould not have entered into the plea. This satisfies the contested third prong of the plain\\n\\nerror analysis and demonstrates that the error βaffect[ed] the substantial rightsβ of\\n\\nLockhart. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).\\n\\n Lockhart entered a guilty plea based on misinformation. It resulted in five\\n\\nadditional years of jail time but could have resulted in life imprisonment. This Court\\n\\nchooses to uphold the circular logic of Massenburg and further buttress a system that tells\\n\\ndefendants that our failure to inform you about your criminal liability does not impact\\n\\nyour ability to choose to enter a guilty plea or stand trial. The Massenburg Court and\\n\\nnow the Lockhart Court tells defendants that even if we misinform you, you are still\\n\\nbetter off taking a plea, a proposition that flies in the face of a criminal justice system\\n\\nwhere willful, voluntary, and informed choices are the bedrock of a system where\\n\\ntransparency and accountability are of paramount importance. Nonetheless, given our\\n\\nflawed precedent, I am constrained to concur in the judgment and deny Lockhart the\\n\\nopportunity to make a properly informed decision about whether to exercise his\\n\\nconstitutional right to stand trial. Now may be the time for this Court to remove the\\n\\ncloud of Massenburg that obscures a better understanding of the Supreme Courtβs\\n\\nholding in Dominguez Benitez so that defendants receive the protections that our\\n\\nConstitution promises them.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371824/\", \"author_raw\": \"GREGORY, Chief Judge, concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"FLOYD, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"FLOYD, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:\\n\\n Like my colleagues, I believe that the outcome of Lockhartβs appeal is constrained by\\n\\nour decision in United States v. Massenburg, 564 F. 3d 337 (4th Cir. 2009). I also\\n\\nbelieve that there are sound reasons for this Court to revisit Massenburg and limit its\\n\\nprecedential scope.\\n\\n In Massenburg, we correctly stated that in order to prevail on plain-error review, an\\n\\nappellant like Lockhart must show a βreasonable probabilityβ that he would not have\\n\\npleaded guilty if he had been correctly informed of his sentencing exposure. 564 F.3d at\\n\\n343 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)). Personally, I\\n\\nfind that rule-statement somewhat difficult to reconcile with Massenburgβs analysis.\\n\\nIndeed, if we were to go through Massenburg and replace each instance of βreasonable\\n\\nprobabilityβ with βvirtual certainty,β it seems to me that the opinion would read quite\\n\\nwell. Therein lies the problem. Although our opinion in Massenburg correctly recites\\n\\nthe rule of Dominguez Benitez, its three-factor analysis has the regrettable effect of\\n\\nsetting the bar too high for appellants in Lockhartβs position.\\n\\n Were we to apply Dominguez Benitez to this case directly, rather than filtering it\\n\\nthrough the prism of Massenburg, I cannot help but think that we would have ample\\n\\nreason to vacate Lockhartβs conviction. After all, unlike in Dominguez Benitez, it is quite\\n\\neasy to see here how the courtβs error during Lockhartβs Rule 11 hearing βcould have had\\n\\nan effect on [Lockhartβs] assessment of his strategic position.β 542 U.S. at 85. Lockhart\\n\\ntells us that from the start, he expected a sentence at the low end of the recommended\\n\\nrange. His expectation was not unreasonable, considering the relatively innocuous\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\ncircumstances of his offense. Since it was reasonable for him to expect a sentence at the\\n\\nlow end of the recommended range, it was also reasonable for him to try to shave as\\n\\nmany years off the low end of the recommended range as possible. A guilty plea would\\n\\nhave been a rational way to accomplish that goal before he knew that he would be\\n\\nsentenced as an armed career criminal, but not after.\\n\\n Consider the percentages. Taking Lockhartβs PSR and the 2016 Sentencing\\n\\nGuidelines as our benchmark, it appears likely that if Lockhart had not been sentenced as\\n\\nan armed career criminal, his guilty plea would have dropped the low end of the\\n\\nrecommended sentencing range from 5.25 years to 3.83 yearsβa 26.9% reduction. But\\n\\nbecause Lockhart was sentenced as an armed career criminal, his guilty plea had a much\\n\\nsmaller effect and made much less sense, given his goal: his plea dropped the low end of\\n\\nhis sentencing exposure from 15.67 years to 15 yearsβa mere 4.2% reduction. In\\n\\nessence, the initial rationale underlying Lockhartβs guilty plea was rendered all-but\\n\\nnonsensical by his later designation as an armed career criminal. 1\\n\\n Added to this numerical analysis is the starkly odd behavior of Lockhartβs counsel,\\n\\nand Lockhartβs apparent displeasure with same (which my colleagues have aptly\\n\\nhighlighted). These factors convince me that if we were not constrained by Massenburg,\\n\\nwe would grant relief to Lockhart. This is particularly so given that, as I understand it,\\n\\nβreasonably probableβ does not mean βmore likely than not.β See Dominguez Benitez,\\n\\n 1\\n These numbers are necessarily estimates, and I do not mean to suggest that we\\nshould use this sort of quantitative analysis to decide all cases like the one at bar. The\\npercentages referenced here are useful only insofar as they help to illustrate the logic of\\nan argument that Lockhart makes on appeal.\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\n542 U.S. at 86β87 (Scalia, J., concurring); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-\\n\\n94 (1984) (distinguishing between βreasonable probabilityβ and βmore likely than not,β\\n\\nand clarifying that the former is less demanding than the latter).\\n\\n Finally, I agree with my colleagues that holding a defendantβs silence against him in\\n\\nthese circumstances is improper. When a defendant, by his apparent silence, fails to\\n\\npreserve his objection to a mistake made during a Rule 11 hearing, the consequence is\\n\\nthat we review for plain error. Once we have entered the realm of plain-error review, it\\n\\nmakes no sense to continue to hold the defendantβs silence against him. Yet Massenburg\\n\\nurges us to do exactly that. βThe defendant failed to register any surprise or dismay on\\n\\nthe record,β we say. βTherefore, we review for plain error. In reviewing for plain error,\\n\\nwe note that the defendant expressed neither surprise nor dismay when informed of his\\n\\nactual sentencing exposure, which weighs against him now.β This is quicksand; we\\n\\nshould distance ourselves from it.\\n\\n I believe that our decision in Massenburg has had the unintended effect of chipping\\n\\naway at our ability to safeguard the legitimacy of criminal-justice proceedings. This case\\n\\npresents an excellent opportunity for us to do some mild course-correction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4371824/\", \"author_raw\": \"FLOYD, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GREGORY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KEENAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"FLOYD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":5,"string":"5"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594571/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Jesmene LOCKHART, A/K/A Jesmene Laquin-Montre Lockhart, A/K/A Jasmene Lockhart, Defendant - Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-27\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 16-4441\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v.\n\nJESMENE LOCKHART, a/k/a Jesmene Laquin-Montre Lockhart, a/k/a Jasmene\nLockhart,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,\nat Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:15-cr-00034-RJC-1)\n\n\nArgued: November 15, 2018 Decided: February 27, 2019\n\n\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion stating the judgment of\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Jesmene LOCKHART, A/K/A Jesmene Laquin-Montre Lockhart, A/K/A Jasmene Lockhart, Defendant - Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-27\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 16-4441\\n\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nJESMENE LOCKHART, a/k/a Jesmene Laquin-Montre Lockhart, a/k/a Jasmene\\nLockhart,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,\\nat Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:15-cr-00034-RJC-1)\\n\\n\\nArgued: November 15, 2018 Decided: February 27, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion stating the judgment of\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":574,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4595199,"string":"4,595,199"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"SHARP FARMS; Robert W. May ; Tucker Farms Inc.; Worthington Farms, Inc., Objectors-Appellants, v. Teresa M. SPEAKS; Toby Speaks ; Stan Smith; Eddie Brown; Robert Poindexter ; Mike Mitchell; Roy L. Cook; Alex Shugart ; H. Randle Wood; Robin Rogers; Daniel Lee Nelson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U. S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc., F/K/A Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Dan Lewis, Potential Intervenor-Appellant, v. Teresa M. Speaks; Toby Speaks ; Stan Smith; Eddie Brown; Robert Poindexter ; Mike Mitchell; Roy L. Cook; Alex Shugart ; H. Randle Wood; Robin Rogers; Daniel Lee Nelson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U. S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc., F/K/A Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Teresa Speaks v. U. S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-28"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1316; 18-1325"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Gregory, Thacker, Quattlebaum\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888078/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888079/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"Raleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1316\\n\\n\\nSHARP FARMS; ROBERT W. MAY; TUCKER FARMS INC.;\\nWORTHINGTON FARMS, Inc.,\\n\\n Objectors - Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nTERESA M. SPEAKS; TOBY SPEAKS; STAN SMITH; EDDIE BROWN;\\nROBERT POINDEXTER; MIKE MITCHELL; ROY L. COOK; ALEX SHUGART;\\nH. RANDLE WOOD; ROBIN ROGERS; DANIEL LEE NELSON,\\n\\n Plaintiffs β Appellees,\\n\\n and\\n\\nU. S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE INC., f/k/a Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative\\nStabilization Corporation,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1325\\n\\n\\nDAN LEWIS,\\n\\n Potential Intervenor - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nTERESA M. SPEAKS; TOBY SPEAKS; STAN SMITH; EDDIE BROWN;\\nROBERT POINDEXTER; MIKE MITCHELL; ROY L. COOK; ALEX SHUGART;\\nH. RANDLE WOOD; ROBIN ROGERS; DANIEL LEE NELSON,\\n\\n Plaintiffs β Appellees,\\n\\n and\\n\\nU. S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE INC., f/k/a Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative\\nStabilization Corporation,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\\nRaleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge. (5:12-cv-00729-D)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 28, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory\\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Quattlebaum joined.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4372452/\", \"author_raw\": \"Raleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"Judge Quattlebaum wrote a concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"Judge Quattlebaum wrote a concurring opinion.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: Charles Alan Runyan, RUNYAN & PLATTE, Beaufort, South Carolina, for\\nAppellants. Gary K. Shipman, SHIPMAN & WRIGHT, LLP, Wilmington, North\\nCarolina, for Appellees Teresa Speaks, et al. Derek L. Shaffer, QUINN EMANUEL\\nURQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee United States\\nTobacco Cooperative Inc. ON BRIEF: Andrew S. Platte, RUNYAN & PLATTE,\\nBeaufort, South Carolina, for Appellants Sharp Farms, Robert W. May, Tucker\\nFarms, Inc., and Worthington Farms, Inc. John L. Coble, MARSHALL, WILLIAMS\\n& GORHAM, LLP, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant Dan Lewis.\\nWilliam G. Wright, SHIPMAN & WRIGHT, LLP, Wilmington, North Carolina;\\nNamon Leo Daughtry, DAUGHTRY, WOODARD, LAWRENCE & STARLING,\\nSmithfield, North Carolina, for Appellees Teresa Speaks, et al. Lee M. Whitman,\\nTobias S. Hampson, WYRICK ROBBINS, Raleigh, North Carolina; Jonathan Cooper,\\nQUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\nUnited States Tobacco Cooperative Inc.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\nGREGORY, Chief Judge:\\n\\n This appeal of a class-action settlement concerns a longstanding dispute between\\n\\nU.S. Tobacco Cooperative, Inc., an agricultural cooperative of flue-cured tobacco\\n\\ngrowers in North Carolina, and a class of plaintiffs consisting of current and former\\n\\nCooperative members. From its inception in 1946, the Cooperative administered a\\n\\nfederal price-support program designed to stabilize tobacco prices for member growers\\n\\nthrough purchasing their unsold tobacco at a guaranteed minimum price and marketing\\n\\nthe tobacco to buyers. With a mixed record of success, the price-support program\\n\\nultimately came to an end in 2004, when Congress enacted the Fair and Equitable\\n\\nTobacco Reform Act (βFETRAβ). By this point, the Cooperative had accumulated a\\n\\ncapital reserve fund of hundreds of millions of dollars generated from the tobacco the\\n\\nmembers delivered or the fee assessments they paid to the Cooperative as members\\n\\nparticipating in the price-support program.\\n\\n On October 31, 2012, the plaintiffs (βSpeaks plaintiffsβ) filed a class-action\\n\\ncomplaint against the Cooperative, seeking a declaratory judgment, distribution of the\\n\\nreserve funds to members, and judicial dissolution of the Cooperative as an alternative\\n\\nform of relief. They argued that after Congress enacted FETRA and the price-support\\n\\nprogram ended, the Cooperativeβs primary purpose ceased to exist, and it should be\\n\\nforced to distribute the reserve funds and be judicially dissolved. The parties eventually\\n\\nmediated the case in May 2017 and moved for the district court to certify the class and\\n\\napprove their $24 million settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class\\n\\nmembers. The district court did so.\\n\\n 4\\n\\n But this is not the whole picture. At the time the Speaks plaintiffs filed their\\n\\ncomplaint in October 2012, a parallel class action against the Cooperative was making its\\n\\nway through North Carolina state court. That case was brought several years earlier, and\\n\\nit included a class of member growers (the βFisher-Lewis plaintiffsβ) who form a subset\\n\\nof the Speaks class in this appeal but whose claims to the reserve fund are arguably much\\n\\nstronger than the claims of the Speaks plaintiffs. Indeed, a North Carolina court,\\n\\nreviewing a proposed settlement for the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs in 2006, concluded that\\n\\n$76.8 million in relief was not even in the βball parkβ of being fair, reasonable, and\\n\\nadequate for class members.\\n\\n The Speaks plaintiffs filed their October 2012 complaint just as the Fisher-Lewis\\n\\nplaintiffs were gathering momentumβthey had substantially survived a motion to\\n\\ndismiss and moved for class certification before the state court. Acknowledging that the\\n\\npreexisting Fisher-Lewis proceedings could affect their case, the Speaks plaintiffs then\\n\\nstayed the case for several years while those proceedings played out. During this time,\\n\\nthe Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs met with more success, achieving class certification and\\n\\nsuccessfully defending against the Cooperativeβs appeal challenging certification. Within\\n\\ntwo weeks of the North Carolina Supreme Courtβs decision affirming class certification,\\n\\nhowever, the Speaks parties began their own settlement negotiations. They reached a\\n\\ntentative settlement for $24 million within five monthsβa settlement that included the\\n\\nFisher-Lewis certified class and extinguished its claims.\\n\\n Before this Court are the Objectors-AppellantsβFisher-Lewis class members who\\n\\nobjected to the Speaks settlementβand would-be intervenor Dan Lewis. Lewis contends\\n\\n 5\\n\\nthat the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to intervene in Speaks.\\n\\nBecause he filed his appeal with this Court far beyond the 30-day appeal deadline\\n\\nprescribed by statute, we must dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\\n\\n The Objectors claim, at bottom, that they got a raw deal. They first contend that\\n\\nthe district court abused its discretion in certifying the Speaks settlement class under\\n\\nFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), arguing that the Speaks class counsel and class\\n\\nrepresentatives cannot and did not adequately protect their interests in this case. The\\n\\nObjectors also challenge the district courtβs final approval of the $24 million settlement\\n\\nas fair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e). Finally, they argue that the district\\n\\ncourt erred in denying certain Fisher-Lewis class membersβ attempts to opt out the entire\\n\\nFisher-Lewis certified class from Speaks.\\n\\n We affirm the district courtβs denial of the attempted group opt-out. But after a\\n\\ncareful review of this recordβwhich spans nearly 15 years and 5,000 pagesβwe cannot\\n\\nagree that the Objectorsβ interests were adequately protected or that a $24 million\\n\\nsettlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for the class. For this reason, we reverse the\\n\\ndistrict courtβs order certifying the class and granting final approval of the class-action\\n\\nsettlement and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Historical Background\\n\\n Created in 1946, U.S. Tobacco Cooperative, Inc. is an agricultural cooperative of\\n\\nflue-cured tobacco growers organized under the North Carolina Cooperative Marketing\\n\\nAct. 1 N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-145 to 54-166. The Cooperativeβs purpose is to βengage in\\n\\nany activity involving or relating to the business of receiving, grading, processing,\\n\\ndrying, packing, storing, financing, marketing, selling, and/or distribution, on a\\n\\ncooperative basis, of flue-cured tobacco or products or by-products derived therefrom of\\n\\nits members.β J.A. 345.\\n\\n Under North Carolina law and the Cooperativeβs governing documents, the\\n\\nCooperative may establish a capital reserve. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Β§ 54-151(5); J.A. 366β\\n\\n67 (articles of incorporation), J.A. 3200 (1947 bylaws), J.A. 3503β04 (1967 bylaws). In\\n\\nthe 1970s, the Cooperativeβs Board of Directors established such a reserve to βprepare for\\n\\n[] rainy daysβ in the event federal subsidies ended. J.A. 3963. The plaintiffs in this\\n\\nlawsuit are a class of current and former members of the Cooperative who brought an\\n\\naction for dissolution of the Cooperative and distribution of excess capital reserves. 2 J.A.\\n\\n262β90.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Before changing its name in 2008, the Cooperative was called the Flue-Cured\\nTobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation.\\n 2\\n The price-support program was established under a series of federal laws that\\nCongress enacted to protect farmers after the Great Depression. See generally Jasper\\n(Continued)\\n 7\\n\\n To become a member of the Cooperative, a flue-cured tobacco producer βpaid five\\n\\ndollars . . . in exchange for one share of [the Cooperativeβs common] stock.β Fisher v.\\n\\nFlue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 794 S.E.2d 699, 703 (N.C. 2016)\\n\\n(βFisher-Lewisβ). According to the Cooperativeβs governing documents, this common\\n\\nstock could be βpurchased, owned or held only by producers who shall patronize the\\n\\ncorporation in accordance with uniform terms and conditions . . . and only such persons\\n\\nshall be regarded as eligible members of the corporation.β J.A. 346. If the common\\n\\nstock passed to someone ineligible for membership, that person had βno rights or\\n\\nprivileges on account of such stock,β and the Cooperative could βpurchase such stock at\\n\\nits book or par value, whichever is less.β J.A. 346β47.\\n\\n From 1946β2004, the Cooperative administered a federal price-support program\\n\\nfor flue-cured tobacco for the benefit of its member growers. Under this program,\\n\\ntobacco producers who could not sell their flue-cured tobacco delivered it to a warehouse,\\n\\nwhere the Cooperative graded the tobacco and tried to sell it at auction. Fisher-Lewis,\\n\\n794 S.E.2d at 703. βThe auction was subject to a minimum price established annually by\\n\\nthe United States Department of Agriculture, and the tobacco would not be sold for less\\n\\nthan that price.β Id. If the Cooperative could not sell the tobacco, it βwould process and\\n\\nstore it, while advancing the minimum price less an administrative fee to the tobacco\\n\\nproducer.β Id. The Cooperative paid the tobacco producers with loans from the\\n\\n\\nWomach, Cong. Research Serv., Tobacco Price Support: An Overview of the Program\\n(Dec. 31, 2005), http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/95-129.pdf\\n(saved as ECF opinion attachment; viewed 02/28/2019).\\n\\n 8\\n\\nCommodity Credit Corporation (βCCCβ), an entity owned and operated by the federal\\n\\ngovernment that assisted in administering the price-support program. Id. Any unsold\\n\\ntobacco served as collateral for the CCCβs loans. Id.\\n\\n During the lifetime of the price-support program, the Cooperative accumulated a\\n\\nreserve of hundreds of millions of dollars from three main sources: (1) the 1967β73 crop\\n\\nyears; (2) the 1982β84 crop years; and (3) the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of\\n\\n2004 (βFETRAβ), Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. See Fisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at\\n\\n704.\\n\\n First, during the 1967β73 crop years, the Cooperative βreceived and stored\\n\\ntobacco . . . and eventually sold the tobacco at a price higher than necessary to repay the\\n\\nloans from the CCC,β earning a profit on the resale. Fisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at 704.\\n\\nThe Cooperative distributed some of these profits to its members in cash and held on to\\n\\nthe remainderβabout $26.8 millionβas reserve funds. Id. The Cooperative issued\\n\\ncertificates of interest in the reserve on a pro rata basis to members whose tobacco had\\n\\ncreated the surplus during those years. Id.\\n\\n The second source of the Cooperativeβs reserve money was the 1982β84 crop\\n\\nyears. The Cooperativeβs profits from this period stem from the passage of the No Net\\n\\nCost Tobacco Program Act of 1982 (βNNC Actβ), 3 which fundamentally changed the\\n\\nstructure of the federal price-support system. See Leaf Tobacco Exporters Assβn, Inc. v.\\n\\nBlock, 749 F.2d 1106, 1109 (4th Cir. 1984). Before Congress enacted this law, the\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Pub. L. No. 97-218, 96 Stat. 197.\\n\\n 9\\n\\nCCCβs loans to the Cooperative were βnon-recourseβ because β[t]he Cooperativeβs failure\\n\\nto earn complete repayment funds [from the member growers] would result in a loss to be\\n\\nabsorbed by the CCC: the CCC could sell the collateral [i.e., the growersβ unsold\\n\\ntobacco] for its own account after the loan had matured, but it otherwise had no recourse\\n\\nagainst either the Cooperative or the individual farmers.β Id. This system changed with\\n\\npassage of the NNC Act, which applied starting with the 1982 crop year and required\\n\\nmember growers to pay an assessment to the Cooperative at the time they delivered their\\n\\ntobacco to serve as additional collateral for the CCCβs loans to the Cooperative, a\\n\\nmeasure intended to limit the federal governmentβs losses. Fisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at\\n\\n703β04. The Cooperative later used the surplus funds collected from the NNC\\n\\nassessmentsβfunds remaining after the CCC loans had been repaidβto redeem unsold\\n\\nmember tobacco from the 1982 crop year that the CCC had held as collateral. Id. The\\n\\nCooperative sold this tobacco and put in the reserve the $110 million in profit that it\\n\\nearned from the sale. The Cooperative did the same for the 1983 and 1984 crop years.\\n\\nJ.A. 3966.\\n\\n Third, the Cooperative added to its reserve fund after Congress enacted FETRA in\\n\\nOctober 2004 and ended the federal price-support program. See Fisher-Lewis, 794\\n\\nS.E.2d at 704. In implementing FETRA, the CCC called the Cooperativeβs outstanding\\n\\nloans and took title to the tobacco that had been pledged as collateral for the loans. J.A.\\n\\n4014. The CCC repaid the loans through selling some of the tobacco as well as taking\\n\\npossession of the NNC assessments and applying them to the loan balance. J.A. 3966β\\n\\n67. The CCC returned the remaining tobaccoβabout 83 million poundsβto the\\n\\n 10\\n\\nCooperative, and the Cooperative eventually sold the tobacco for $81 million, adding this\\n\\nsum to its reserve fund. J.A. 3966β67; see also Fisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at 704.\\n\\n When the price-support program ended in 2004, the Cooperative began culling its\\n\\nmembership rolls as part of an effort to develop a business plan that would enable it to\\n\\nremain financially viable and to continue providing benefits for members at a time when\\n\\nits primary functionβadministering price supportsβhad ceased to exist. J.A. 4708β09.\\n\\nThis membership reduction occurred in two phases. First, the Cooperative removed\\n\\nabout 713,072 members listed on the membership rolls who it determined were deceased,\\n\\nhad stopped farming by 1984, or had no financial relationship with the Cooperative. J.A.\\n\\n1781, 4709. Second, the Cooperative removed 89,994 of the remaining 90,840 members\\n\\nwho elected not to sign a marketing agreement with the Cooperative for 2005. J.A. 1781,\\n\\n2384. In a letter to members, the Cooperative explained that members who decided to\\n\\nwithdraw their membership by declining to sign the marketing agreement were no longer\\n\\nentitled to a share of the capital reserve.\\n\\n In 2004, the Cooperative had about 800,000 members. J.A. 4378. By the time it\\n\\nfinished culling the rolls, the Cooperative had eliminated 99% of its membership,\\n\\nreducing the number of members from 803,912 to 846. J.A. 1781. This reduction caused\\n\\nthe reserveβconsisting of more than $300 millionβto increase from $427.00 per\\n\\nmember to $365,000 per member. J.A. 1761.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Parallel Litigation\\n\\n There are two main lawsuits relevant to this appeal. First is the Fisher-Lewis\\n\\nproceeding in North Carolina state court. The secondβthis caseβis the Speaks\\n\\nproceeding in North Carolina federal court. To provide the background necessary for\\n\\ndisposing of this appeal, we trace the history of each proceeding through the district\\n\\ncourtβs final approval of the Speaks settlement in February 2018.\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Fisher-Lewis (State Court)\\n\\n In January 2005, a group of current and former Cooperative members, including\\n\\nappellant and would-be intervenor Dan Lewis, filed a putative class action in North\\n\\nCarolina Superior Court after the Cooperative cancelled their memberships and\\n\\nextinguished their accrued interest in the reserve when they failed to enter into the\\n\\nmarketing agreement with the Cooperative (βLewisβ). 4 J.A. 4451β52. The plaintiffs\\n\\nargued that the Cooperative βexpelled hundreds of thousandsβ of members and asserted\\n\\ncontrol over the reserve fund in a deliberate attempt βto create a βlast man standingβ\\n\\nscenario in which a few hundred remaining member[s] potentially have the benefit of\\n\\nhundreds of millions of dollars in assets which have been created through the efforts of\\n\\nall members[s], including [p]laintiffs.β J.A. 1827. The plaintiffs were represented by\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n See Dan Lewis et al. v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., No. 05\\nCVS 188 (N.C. Super. Ct.).\\n\\n 12\\n\\nGary K. Shipman and William G. Wright, counsel for the Speaks plaintiffs in this case.\\n\\nJ.A. 59, 4713.\\n\\n One month later, in February 2005, another group of farmers filed a similar\\n\\nlawsuit in North Carolina state court (βFisherβ). 5 These plaintiffs were represented by\\n\\nC. Alan Runyan and Philip Isley, counsel for Objectors and would-be intervenor Lewis.\\n\\nJ.A. 4713.\\n\\n In September 2005, almost nine months after Lewis was filed, the Lewis plaintiffs,\\n\\nrepresented by Shipman and Wright, entered into a preliminary settlement agreement\\n\\nwith the Cooperative for $76.8 million in cash and $212 million in book allocations. J.A.\\n\\n311. But the Fisher plaintiffs, who would be included in the settlement, objected to these\\n\\nsettlement terms, and the state court in May 2006 denied preliminary approval of the\\n\\nsettlement without prejudice on the basis that the record was insufficiently developed to\\n\\nresolve outstanding concerns and that the evidence that had been presented βdoes not\\n\\nsupport a finding or conclusion that the proposed Settlement is within the necessary βball\\n\\nparkβ of being fair, reasonable and adequate.β J.A. 311β12. Given the inadequacy of the\\n\\nrecord, the court ordered the parties to engage in additional discovery on the merits of the\\n\\nproposed settlement. J.A. 311β12. A few days later, the Cooperative filed a preliminary\\n\\nnotice of intent to terminate the proposed settlement. J.A. 4455.\\n\\n In September 2007, Shipman and Wright moved to withdraw as counsel for the\\n\\nLewis plaintiffs because of disagreements with co-counsel. J.A. 4714. The court granted\\n\\n 5\\n See Kay Fisher et al. v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., No. 05\\nCVS 1938 (N.C. Super. Ct.).\\n\\n 13\\n\\nthis motion on October 8, 2007. J.A. 4458. Also in October, the Lewis and Fisher\\n\\nplaintiffs made a settlement offer for both cases, and the parties began settlement\\n\\nnegotiations that extended through July 2008 and included at least one mediation. J.A.\\n\\n4458.\\n\\n The Fisher and Lewis cases were consolidated in May 2009 (βFisher-Lewisβ).\\n\\nJ.A. 4458. The plaintiffs at this time filed a second amended and consolidated complaint\\n\\nalleging the following fourteen claims for relief: (1) conversion; (2) breach of contract;\\n\\n(3) imposition of a constructive trust; (4) accounting; (5) distribution; (6) declaratory\\n\\njudgment; (7) fraud; (8) in the alternative, fraud in the inducement; (9) ultra vires;\\n\\n(10) breach of contract; (11) breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act;\\n\\n(12) unfair trade practices; (13) dissolution; and (14) judicial dissolution. J.A. 1837β52.\\n\\nThe Cooperative filed a motion to dismiss in July 2009.\\n\\n On March 30, 2012, the North Carolina Superior Court granted the motion to\\n\\ndismiss on three of the fourteen claims: fraud, fraud in the inducement, and breach of\\n\\ncontract accompanied by a fraudulent act. J.A. 1860β68. The court otherwise denied the\\n\\nCooperativeβs motion. On July 9, 2012, the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs filed a third amended\\n\\nand consolidated complaint, dropping the three claims that had been dismissed and\\n\\nremoving the claims for dissolution and judicial dissolution. J.A. 1918β52.\\n\\n Also on July 9, 2012, the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs filed a motion for class\\n\\ncertification under Rule 23 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. J.A. 1869β\\n\\n1916. The court granted the motion and certified the Fisher-Lewis class in February\\n\\n2014. J.A. 2463β78. The Cooperative appealed this decision, and the North Carolina\\n\\n 14\\n\\nSupreme Court affirmed the amended certification order on December 21, 2016. See\\n\\nFisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at 703. The certified Fisher-Lewis class consisted of the\\n\\nfollowing:\\n\\n All individuals, proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, or their heirs,\\n representatives, executors or assigns, and other proper entities that have\\n been members/shareholders of the Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative\\n Stabilization Corporation . . . at any time from its inception through the end\\n of crop year 2004, and any heirs, representatives, executors, successors or\\n assigns, and;\\n\\n (a) had not requested cancellation of their membership and whose\\n membership was cancelled by Stabilization without a hearing, and/or\\n\\n (b) were issued a certificate of interest in capital reserve by Stabilization for\\n any of the tobacco crop years between and including 1967β1973, and/or\\n\\n (c) delivered, consigned for sale, or sold flue-cured tobacco and paid an\\n assessment for deposit into the No Net Cost Tobacco Fund or No Net\\n Cost Tobacco Account during any tobacco crop years between and\\n including 1982β2004.\\n\\nFisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at 704 (alteration in original).\\n\\n In upholding class certification, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that\\n\\nthere were no conflicts among this class that would prevent class certification because\\n\\nβeach class memberβs share of recovery could be determined fairly based upon that\\n\\nmemberβs patronage interests in [the Cooperative]ββi.e., each memberβs profit\\n\\ncontribution to the Cooperativeβs reserve fund. Id. at 708.\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Speaks (Federal Court)\\n\\n On October 31, 2012, three months after the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffsβ motion for\\n\\nclass certification in state court, a different group of tobacco growers represented by\\n\\n 15\\n\\nShipman and Wrightβformer Lewis counsel who withdrew in 2007βfiled this lawsuit, a\\n\\nputative class action against the Cooperative in the Eastern District of North Carolina.\\n\\nJ.A. 32β70. The Speaks plaintiffs brought claims for a declaratory judgment, distribution\\n\\nto members under N.C. Gen. Stat. Β§ 55A-13-02(c), and an alternative statutory claim for\\n\\njudicial dissolution of the Cooperative under N.C. Gen. Stat. Β§ 55A-14-30. J.A. 52β59,\\n\\n4460. The proposed Speaks class encompassed the class certified in Fisher-Lewis.\\n\\n On December 5, 2012, the parties jointly moved for a temporary stay pending the\\n\\nstate courtβs decision on the class-certification motion in Fisher-Lewis. J.A. 71β73. The\\n\\ncourt granted the stay on December 17, 2012. J.A. 74β75. For the next five years, the\\n\\nSpeaks parties continually soughtβand were grantedβtemporary stays, and they\\n\\noccasionally provided the court with status reports. The Cooperative never filed an\\n\\nanswer to the complaint, and no adversarial discovery took place. J.A. 9β14. The parties\\n\\ninformed the court during this period that β[r]esolution of the class issues in [Fisher-\\n\\nLewis] continues to be relevant to [p]laintiffs in the action before this Court and, if\\n\\n[d]efendantβs anticipated appeal in [Fisher-Lewis] is rejected or class certification is\\n\\nupheld on appeal, this federal action may become moot.β J.A. 89.\\n\\n The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed class certification in Fisher-Lewis in\\n\\nlate December 2016, and about two weeks later, on January 4, 2017, the Cooperativeβs\\n\\ncounsel contacted Shipman, counsel for the Speaks plaintiffs, about scheduling a\\n\\nconference call to discuss next steps in the Speaks case given the recent decision in\\n\\nFisher-Lewis. J.A. 4464.\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\n The conference call took place on January 9, 2017, and the discussions led to an\\n\\nagreement to mediate the Speaks case. J.A. 4464. In the months following the\\n\\nconference callβwhile the Fisher-Lewis parties were developing the notice planβthe\\n\\nCooperativeβs counsel and Shipman discussed selection of a mediator and possible dates\\n\\nfor mediation, developed a list of relevant documents and exchanged them, and set a date\\n\\nto submit position papers to the mediator. J.A. 4465β68. The parties ultimately selected\\n\\nthe Honorable Frank Bullock, a retired federal judge, to mediate a session that would take\\n\\nplace on May 11β12, 2017. J.A. 4716.\\n\\n On April 20, 2017, the Cooperativeβs local counsel explained in an email to the\\n\\nSpeaks parties that he had communicated a βcourtesy βheads-upβ to Philip Isley\\n\\n[plaintiffsβ counsel in Fisher-Lewis]β that the parties had scheduled a mediation in Speaks\\n\\nfor May 11β12 with Judge Bullock. J.A. 4583. Local counsel further stated in his email\\n\\nthat β[w]e will let you know if anything gets filed by the [Fisher-Lewis] plaintiffs with\\n\\n[the Speaks court] concerning the mediation,β and he asked the parties to βplease let us\\n\\nknow if you hear from the [Fisher-Lewis] plaintiffs as well.β J.A. 4583. This courtesy\\n\\nβheads upβ was the first time the Speaks parties informed Fisher-Lewis counsel that\\n\\nSpeaks was going to be mediated.\\n\\n On May 5, 2017, Bob Cherry, counsel for the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs, wrote a\\n\\nletter to Shipman, counsel for the Speaks plaintiffs, stating that he had been informed that\\n\\na mediation had been set for May 11 and reminding Shipman that certain class\\n\\nrepresentatives in Fisher-Lewis were Shipmanβs former clients to whom he owed\\n\\ncontinuing duties under professional-conduct rules. J.A. 720. Cherry indicated that his\\n\\n 17\\n\\nletter served as βformal noticeβ that Shipmanβs former clients did not consent to his\\n\\nrepresenting the Speaks plaintiffs because such a representation βcould be materially\\n\\nadverseβ to the interests of the Fisher-Lewis class. J.A. 720β21. Shipman responded that\\n\\nthe mediation would occur as planned, that parallel stateβfederal class actions are βnot\\n\\nunique,β and that βboth the [Fisher-Lewis] case and the Speaks case are free to proceed\\n\\nuntil there is a final judgment in one of them.β J.A. 725.\\n\\n On May 10, the day before the mediation, Cooperative counsel sent an email to\\n\\nJudge Bullock noting the parallel state and federal class actions and stating that Fisher-\\n\\nLewis counsel sent a letter βvoicing some concern over the upcoming mediation,β\\n\\nconcern that Cooperative counsel and Shipman βdo not share.β J.A. 4585. Cooperative\\n\\ncounsel also provided the correspondence between Cherry and Shipman as an attachment\\n\\nto the email.\\n\\n After two days of mediation, the parties reached a settlement in principle. J.A.\\n\\n4350. The Cooperative agreed to pay $24 million in exchange for a release of all claims\\n\\nby the class, including the Fisher-Lewis claims. J.A. 204.\\n\\n On September 7, 2017, the Speaks plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class\\n\\naction and for preliminary approval of the proposed class-action settlement. J.A. 122β92.\\n\\nThe plaintiffs amended the motion on September 8, filing a stipulation and agreement of\\n\\nclass-action compromise, settlement, and release. J.A. 193β250. Five days later, on\\n\\nSeptember 13, 2017, the district court preliminarily approved the settlement and the\\n\\nnotice plan and scheduled a final fairness hearing for January 19, 2018. J.A. 251β61.\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\n In the months before the hearing, some class members objected to the settlement,\\n\\nincluding the Objectors-Appellants Sharp Farms, Robert May, Tucker Farms, and\\n\\nWorthington Farms. The Objectors are members of the Fisher-Lewis certified class who\\n\\nwere included in the proposed Speaks settlement class.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Fisher-Lewis Challenges to Speaks Settlement\\n\\n As the parties in the Speaks proceedings moved closer to a final settlement in late\\n\\n2017, the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs protested the Speaks settlement and the manner in\\n\\nwhich it was reached.\\n\\n On September 15, 2017, a week after preliminary approval in Speaks was\\n\\nrequested and two days after it was granted, Fisher-Lewis class representative Dan Lewis\\n\\nmoved to intervene in Speaks, contending that the settlement was inadequate primarily\\n\\nbecause of the earlier settlement valued at $76.8 million in cash and more than $212\\n\\nmillion in book allocations, βthree times the current settlement amountβ in Speaks. J.A.\\n\\n305. On October 2, 2017, the district court denied Lewisβs motion to intervene as\\n\\nuntimely. The court explained that Lewis had been aware of this lawsuit since at least\\n\\n2014, and that he knew about the mediation no later than May 5, 2017, but waited to\\n\\nmove to intervene until after the court preliminarily approved the settlement. J.A. 1296β\\n\\n99. Lewis subsequently opted himself out of the Speaks class as well as purported to opt\\n\\nout the entire Fisher-Lewis certified class. J.A. 1603β04.\\n\\n The Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs separately filed several motions in state court\\n\\nchallenging Speaks. On September 22, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an order to show cause\\n\\n 19\\n\\nor for sanctions, arguing that the Cooperativeβs counsel in mediating Speaks had violated\\n\\nthe courtβs case management order from April 2017, North Carolina Rule of Civil\\n\\nProcedure 23, and the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. J.A. 744β58. On\\n\\nOctober 13, the state court denied the motion but nevertheless ordered the Cooperativeβs\\n\\ncounsel to produce to Speaks counsel βall communications between it . . . and any\\n\\nmember of the class in these consolidated cases.β J.A. 1327β28. In explaining this\\n\\ndirective, the court noted that βthis action has been finally upheld as a certified class by\\n\\nthe North Carolina Supreme Court and is now proceeding to trial,β and indicated that it\\n\\nwas βconcerned that the integrity of the class and the administration of justice has been\\n\\ncalled into question given the history of the case, the unusual facts of representation of\\n\\nboth the certified action and the later filed Speaks case, in that the initial counsel in one of\\n\\nthese consolidated actions is now counsel in the Speaks case.β J.A. 1327.\\n\\n On November 28, 2017, the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs filed a motion under North\\n\\nCarolina Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) for an order finding that βthe settlement reached\\n\\nin Speaks, insofar as it attempts to bind and preclude this certified [] class, is not\\n\\napproved,β and finding that the settlement βwas reached in a collusive manner to avoid\\n\\nthe jurisdiction of th[e] court to promote an inadequate settlement.β J.A. 4499. On\\n\\nJanuary 17, 2018, two days before the final fairness hearing in the Speaks case, the\\n\\nFisher-Lewis state court issued a lengthy opinion granting in part the Rule 23(c) motion.\\n\\nJ.A. 4447β90. The court concluded that the Speaks settlement was not fair, reasonable,\\n\\nand adequate for the Fisher-Lewis class, and that counsel for both parties in Speaks had\\n\\nviolated Rules 4.1 and 4.2 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. J.A.\\n\\n 20\\n\\n4477β89. The state court found in particular βample evidence of collusion between the\\n\\nparties in Speaks to (a) exclude counsel in [Fisher-Lewis] from participation in the\\n\\nsettlement of the claims for the class members whom they represent, and [to] [b] mislead\\n\\nthe members of the [Fisher-Lewis] class as to the true facts of this matter.β J.A. 4487β89.\\n\\n 4.\\n\\n Speaks Settlement Approval\\n\\n The final fairness hearing in Speaks took place on January 19, 2018. On February\\n\\n20, the district court issued an 82-page opinion certifying the Speaks settlement class and\\n\\ngranting final approval of the class-action settlement on the basis that it was fair,\\n\\nreasonable, and adequate for class members. A week later, on February 27, the court\\n\\nissued an amended final judgment clarifying the opt-out list.\\n\\n Under the terms of the settlement, the Cooperative will pay into the settlement\\n\\nfund $24 millionβless attorneysβ fees, costs, and incentive awards, capped at $2\\n\\nmillionβover a five-year period to be held in escrow on behalf of the class. J.A. 4730.\\n\\nThe final settlement class encompasses the following:\\n\\n all individuals, proprietorships, partnerships, corporations, and other\\n entities that are or were shareholders and/or members of [the Cooperative]\\n at any time during the Class Period [i.e., June 1, 1946, through the effective\\n date of the settlement in 2018], without any exclusion, including any heirs,\\n representatives, executors, powers-of-attorney, successors, assigns, or\\n others purporting to act for or on their behalf with respect to [the\\n Cooperative] and/or the Settled Claims.\\n\\n This class definition is broader than the definition of the class certified in Fisher-\\n\\nLewis. That class included current or former members of the Cooperative from 1946β\\n\\n2004 and tied recovery to whether the class memberβs patronage resulted in a net gain for\\n\\n 21\\n\\nthe Cooperative and thus contributed to the reserve. By contrast, the Speaks settlement,\\n\\nwhich extinguishes the Fisher-Lewis class claims, entitles all current or former\\n\\nCooperative members from 1946β2018 to a portion of the Cooperativeβs reserve funds\\n\\nirrespective of whether they produced net gains for the reserve. Each memberβs share of\\n\\nthe recovery in Speaks is indeed based on two factors unrelated to the patronage concept.\\n\\nSee J.A. 4730β31 (describing βGroup 1β and βGroup 2β claims). The first factor is the\\n\\nnumber of pounds of tobacco that the member marketed to the Cooperative from 1946β\\n\\n2018 relative to the total number of pounds from all class members who submit this type\\n\\nof claim (subject to a $15,000 cap). The second factor is the number of years the member\\n\\nmarketed and sold tobacco relative to the total number of years of all class members who\\n\\nsubmit this type of claim. J.A. 4730β31. The Speaks class structure thus allows a class\\n\\nmember to share in the recovery of the reserve funds even if he contributed no profits to\\n\\nthe reserve.\\n\\n On March 21, 2018, the Objectors, represented by Fisher-Lewis counsel, appealed\\n\\nthe district courtβs final order approving the settlement and the amended final judgment\\n\\nclarifying the opt-out list. J.A. 4797β99. On the same day, Lewis appealed the district\\n\\ncourtβs order denying his motion to intervene, an order that was entered on October 2,\\n\\n2017. 6 J.A. 4801β03.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n Lewisβs notice of appeal states that the order denying his motion to intervene was\\nentered on October 20, 2017, but the docket sheet indicates that the order was in fact\\nentered on October 2, 2017. See J.A. 16.\\n\\n 22\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Analysis\\n\\n This case presents three main claims of error. First, would-be intervenor\\n\\nDan Lewis contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to\\n\\nintervene. Second, the Objectors argue that the district court abused its discretion in\\n\\ncertifying the Speaks settlement class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)\\n\\nbecause the Speaks representatives and class counsel cannot and did not adequately\\n\\nrepresent the distinct interests of the Fisher-Lewis class members. Finally, the Objectors\\n\\ncontend that the district court abused its discretion in approving the class settlement as\\n\\nfair, reasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e). We address each contention in turn.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Lewisβs Motion to Intervene\\n\\n In his appeal (No. 18-1325), would-be intervenor Lewis, a Fisher-Lewis class\\n\\nrepresentative, contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion\\n\\nto intervene in Speaks. Because Lewisβs appeal of the order denying his motion is\\n\\nuntimely, we must dismiss the appeal.\\n\\n The district courtβs denial of a motion to intervene is βtreated as a final judgment\\n\\nthat is appealable.β Bridges v. Depβt of Md. State Police, 441 F.3d 197, 207 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2006); see also Scott v. Bond, 734 F. Appβx 188, 189 n.2 (4th Cir. 2018). Once the\\n\\ndistrict court enters the order denying intervention, a party has 30 days to file a notice of\\n\\nappeal. See 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). He βmay not await final\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\njudgment in the underlying actionβ to do so. United States v. City of Milwaukee, 144\\n\\nF.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1998).\\n\\n Lewis filed his notice of appeal on March 21, 2018, about 170 days after the\\n\\ndistrict court denied his motion to intervene on October 2, 2017. As the Supreme Court\\n\\nrecently made clear, βa provision governing the time to appeal in a civil action qualifies\\n\\nas jurisdictional [] if Congress sets the time.β Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of\\n\\nChi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017); see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 211β12 (2007)\\n\\n(observing βthe jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits\\n\\nenacted by Congressβ); United States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009)\\n\\n(recognizing βthe jurisdictional nature of statutory time constraintsβ). Because Lewisβs\\n\\nappeal of the order denying his motion is governed by the 30-day time period prescribed\\n\\nin 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2107(a), we lack jurisdiction over his untimely appeal and must dismiss it.\\n\\nSee Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 17 (βFailure to comply with a jurisdictional time prescription\\n\\n. . . deprives a court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal[.]β).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Class Certification Under Rule 23(a)\\n\\n The Objectors contend that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the\\n\\nSpeaks settlement class under Rule 23(a). See Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 152\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2009) (reviewing a district courtβs decision to certify a class for abuse of\\n\\ndiscretion).\\n\\n βRule 23(a) requires that the prospective class comply with four prerequisites:\\n\\n(1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation.β\\n\\n 24\\n\\nEQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 357 (4th Cir. 2014); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The\\n\\nObjectors challenge only the adequacy of representation in this case, arguing that both\\n\\nSpeaks class counsel and the class representatives were inadequate. 1 William B.\\n\\nRubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions Β§ 3.52, at 325β26 (5th ed. 2011) (βAlthough Rule\\n\\n23(a)(4) provides that a class action may be maintained only if βthe representative parties\\n\\nwill fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,β courts have long used Rule\\n\\n23(a)(4) . . . to scrutinize the adequacy of class counsel as well as the adequacy of the\\n\\nclass representatives.β (footnote omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4))). 7 The\\n\\nObjectors also separately challenge the district courtβs denial of certain Fisher-Lewis\\n\\nclass representativesβ attempts to opt out the entire Fisher-Lewis certified class from the\\n\\nSpeaks settlement.\\n\\n For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion\\n\\nin certifying the settlement class because Speaks class counsel and the class\\n\\nrepresentatives cannot and did not adequately represent the Fisher-Lewis certified class.\\n\\nWe therefore reverse that part of the district courtβs order certifying the settlement class.\\n\\nWe hold, however, that the district court did not err in denying the attempted opt-out of\\n\\nthe entire Fisher-Lewis class, and we therefore affirm the district courtβs order in this\\n\\nrespect.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n See 1 Newberg on Class Actions Β§ 3:72, at 394 (noting that Congress in 2003\\nβadopted Rule 23(g) that creates an explicit textual mooring for the class counsel\\nanalysis[,] but most courts continue to employ the substantive standards generated under\\nRule 23(a)(4) prior to Rule 23(g)βs adoption in their analysis of counselβs adequacyβ).\\n\\n 25\\n\\n 1.\\n\\n Adequacy of Class Counsel\\n\\n First, the Objectors contend that the district court abused its discretion in\\n\\ncertifying the class because Speaks class counselβShipman and Wrightβdid not\\n\\nadequately and fairly represent the Fisher-Lewis class members who became members of\\n\\nthe Speaks settlement class. The Objectors argue in particular that the district court\\n\\nβerroneously refused to considerβ the Fisher-Lewis state courtβs findings that counsel in\\n\\nSpeaks colluded to exclude Fisher-Lewis class counsel from participating in the\\n\\nsettlement mediation and to mislead the Fisher-Lewis class members into believing that\\n\\nany Speaks settlement would not preclude the Fisher-Lewis class claims. We agree.\\n\\n In its order approving the settlement, the district court concluded that Speaks class\\n\\ncounsel βfully and adequately represents the settlement classβ primarily because βcounsel\\n\\nhas over twenty-years[β] experience litigating class actions and has expended significant\\n\\nresources investigating and pursuing the claims in this action.β J.A. 4741β42.\\n\\nAddressing the collusion argument, the court stated that the Objectors βessentially\\n\\nsuggest that Judge Bullock was too blind to see collusion at the tip of his nose during the\\n\\nmediation, or that Judge Bullock was part of the collusion,β arguments that the court\\n\\nrejected as βinsultingβ and βbaseless.β J.A. 4743. The court emphasized that\\n\\nJudge Bullock was βan experienced mediator who served with honor and distinction as a\\n\\n[district judge] for 24 years,β and that he βreviewed briefings submitted by the parties and\\n\\nfacilitated a two-day intense mediation that resulted in the proposed settlement.β J.A.\\n\\n\\n\\n 26\\n\\n4743. Judge Bullock, in sum, βwould not and did not participate in a collusive mediation\\n\\nor permit one to take place in front of him.β J.A. 4744.\\n\\n The district courtβs reasoning in rejecting the Objectorsβ collusion argument rests\\n\\non two flawed premises. First, the court appears to have regarded the allegations of\\n\\ncollusion as an attack on the mediator himself and his integrity and intelligence. See,\\n\\ne.g., J.A. 4743 (stating that β[i]f the parties were going to collude or attempt to collude,\\n\\nthe last person they would have asked to serve as a mediator is Judge Bullockβ); id.\\n\\n(asserting that βJudge Bullock is as smart and honorable as the universe is largeβ); id.\\n\\nn.18 (explaining that Judge Bullock βis one of the most highly respected lawyers, judges,\\n\\nand mediators in North Carolinaβs historyβ); see also Oral Arg. 35:45β36:05\\n\\n(Cooperative counsel stating that βthere were some traces of that, frankly,β in response to\\n\\nthis Courtβs assertion that the district court seemed to believe that βthe mediator was\\n\\nbeing accused of collusion when the mediator really didnβt have the information in front\\n\\nof himβ). The extent of the district courtβs comments defending the mediatorβs character\\n\\nsuggests that this mistaken assumption was a driving force in the courtβs rejection of the\\n\\nserious collusion allegations.\\n\\n Second, the district courtβs analysis erroneously assumes that the mediator had all\\n\\nthe relevant information on the collusion allegations at the time he presided over and\\n\\nfacilitated the mediation in May 2017. As an initial matter, and as counsel for the Speaks\\n\\nplaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument, the mediator did not have the benefit of the\\n\\nstate courtβs January 2018 order extensively documenting what it deemed counselβs\\n\\nimproper and unethical conduct, some of which allegedly occurred after the mediation,\\n\\n 27\\n\\nduring the summer and fall of 2017. See generally J.A. 4477β90; see also Oral Arg.\\n\\n24:16β24:37 (Speaks class counsel acknowledging that βthe mediation was conducted\\n\\nprior to the time of [the state courtβs] orderβ and agreeing with this Courtβs statement that\\n\\nβthe mediator was not awareβ of the violations identified in the order); id. at 35:00β35:07\\n\\n(Cooperative counsel recognizing the same). Without the state courtβs order, the\\n\\nmediator could not consider in his assessment the full extent of the collusion allegations\\n\\nand necessarily relied only on information that the parties conveyed before and during the\\n\\nmediation about events preceding the mediation. That the mediator was present during\\n\\nthe settlement negotiations thus cannot provide the sole basis on which to reject the\\n\\nObjectorsβ charges of collusion.\\n\\n Defending the district courtβs reasoning, the Cooperative emphasizes that a\\n\\nβstrong presumption against collusionβ applies β[w]hen a reputable mediator . . . oversees\\n\\nsettlement negotiations.β Coop. Br. 33 (citing Jones v. Singing River Health Servs.\\n\\nFound., 865 F.3d 285, 295β96 (5th Cir. 2017), and DβAmato v. Deutsche Bank, 236 F.3d\\n\\n78, 85 (2d Cir. 2001)). In this regard, the Cooperative asserts that β[d]uring the\\n\\nmediation, the parties discussed with Judge Bullock the propriety of proceeding in the\\n\\nface of the relevant correspondence and interplay with Fisher-Lewis, including in\\n\\nreference to that litigationβs history and the 2005 settlement offer.β Coop. Br. 16.\\n\\n Even if we could look past the fact that the mediator could not assess the extensive\\n\\nstate court findings at the time of the mediation, the record reveals little about the extent\\n\\nto which the mediator understood and evaluated the Fisher-Lewis class membersβ\\n\\nconcerns about collusion. Unlike in the cases the Cooperative cites, for example, the\\n\\n 28\\n\\nmediator did not testify by affidavit or at the fairness hearing in this case. See Jones, 865\\n\\nF.3d at 295 (affidavit); DβAmato, 236 F.3d at 85 (testimony at the fairness hearing). And\\n\\nthe primary evidence the Cooperative marshals in support of its position consists of an\\n\\nemail from May 10, the evening before the mediation, in which Cooperative counsel\\n\\nnotified the mediator of the parallel proceedings, indicated that Fisher-Lewis counsel had\\n\\nsent a letter to Speaks class counsel βvoicing some concern over the upcoming\\n\\nmediation,β and explained that neither Speaks class counsel nor Cooperative counsel\\n\\nβshare[d] those concerns.β J.A. 4585. On this record, the Cooperative cannot\\n\\nsuccessfully argue that the mediatorβs presence ensured that there was no collusion or\\n\\nother improper conduct during the settlement of this case.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court abused its discretion in rejecting the possibility\\n\\nof collusion based on the presence of the mediator and concluding that Speaks class\\n\\ncounsel was adequate under Rule 23(a)(4) without sufficiently grappling with the state\\n\\ncourtβs detailed order setting forth the allegedly collusive conduct. See In re Payment\\n\\nCard Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d 223, 234β35 (2d Cir.\\n\\n2016) (βOne aspect of the Settlement Agreement that emphatically cannot remedy the\\n\\ninadequate representation is the assistance of judges and mediators in the bargaining\\n\\nprocess.β), cert. denied sub nom. Photos Etc. Corp. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 137 S.\\n\\nCt. 1374 (2017); In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242,\\n\\n252β53 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding that βan intense, protracted, adversarial mediation,β\\n\\nwith βhighly respected and capableβ mediators, βdoes not compensate for the absence of\\n\\nindependent representationβ).\\n\\n 29\\n\\n The state courtβs order, which was before the district court at the time it approved\\n\\nthe settlement and is part of the record, found that counsel for both the Speaks plaintiffs\\n\\nand the Cooperative committed a series of violations in settling this case. Specifically,\\n\\nthe order concluded in part the following:\\n\\n β’ The Speaks parties βintentionally and deliberately negotiated a\\n settlement that was intended to resolve the claims of the [Fisher-Lewis]\\n class after specifically being advised by the only counsel authorized to\\n represent the interests of that class that the Speaks plaintiffs did not have\\n the authority to do so nor did they have permission to do so.β J.A. 4470\\n ΒΆ 71.\\n\\n β’ Counsel for the Speaks plaintiffs and the Cooperative βviolated Rules\\n 4.1 and 4.2 of the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct in their\\n communications with the [Fisher-Lewis] class members.β J.A. 4480 ΒΆ\\n 103. See N.C. Rule of Profβl Conduct 4.2(a) (providing that βa lawyer\\n shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a\\n person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the\\n matterβ); N.C. Rule of Profβl Conduct 4.1 (providing that βa lawyer\\n shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a\\n third personβ).\\n\\n β’ In drafting the class-action complaint and the amended complaint,\\n Speaks class counsel, with Cooperative counselβs knowledge, attempted\\n to βmanipulate facts in order to construct and present to the Speaks court\\n and public a false narrative as toβ the circumstances surrounding the\\n state courtβs denial of the proposed $76.8 million settlement on the basis\\n that there was insufficient evidence that the settlement was fair,\\n reasonable, and adequate. J.A. 4483 ΒΆΒΆ 110β11.\\n\\n β’ Counsel for the Speaks class, with assistance from Cooperative counsel,\\n drafted and edited βthe Long Form Notice in such a way as, at best, to\\n ambiguously state the impact of the settlement on the [Fisher-Lewis]\\n class and at worst to intentionally misrepresentβ the preclusive effect of\\n the Speaks settlement, a violation of Rule 4.1. J.A. 4484β85 ΒΆ 114.\\n\\n β’ The Speaks partiesβ actions in setting up and conducting the mediation\\n without sufficiently notifying Fisher-Lewis class counsel βdemonstrate\\n a deliberate attempt to exclude [Fisher-Lewis counsel] from having any\\n\\n\\n 30\\n\\n meaningful participation in the settlement of their clientsβ claims.β J.A.\\n 4485β86 ΒΆ 115.\\n\\n β’ β[G]iven the apparent inactivity in Speaks, even after the last of the\\n stays in Speaks, the Speaks case served as a convenient placeholder for\\n [the Cooperative], so as to be able to negotiate with someone other than\\n [Fisher-Lewis counsel]. Simply put, . . . [the Cooperativeβs] counsel has\\n engaged in attorney shopping.β J.A. 4488 ΒΆ 121.\\n\\n β’ β[T]here is ample evidence of collusion between the parties in Speaks to\\n (a) exclude counsel in [Fisher-Lewis] from participation in the\\n settlement of the claims for the class members whom they represent,\\n and [to] [b] mislead the members of the [Fisher-Lewis] class as to the\\n true facts of this matter.β J.A. 4489 ΒΆ 126.\\n\\n β’ In light of these considerations, βthe Speaks settlement is not\\n reasonable, fair and adequateβ for the Fisher-Lewis class members. J.A.\\n 4490.\\n\\n In approving the settlement, the district court acknowledged the state courtβs order\\n\\nbut did not meaningfully grapple with the courtβs extensive findings or its conclusions\\n\\nthat the Speaks parties had engaged in collusive conduct to the detriment of the Fisher-\\n\\nLewis class members and violated Rules 4.1 and 4.2. See Oral Arg. 23:46β24:10 (Speaks\\n\\nclass counsel stating that he βtotally agree[s]β that the district court did not specifically\\n\\nmention the ethical violations and conceding that βthere is no express discussion aboutβ\\n\\nthe violations in the order). Instead, the district court downplayed the state courtβs order,\\n\\nasserting that the state court βdid not have the benefit of the extensive record that this\\n\\ncourt has to assess the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed\\n\\nsettlement.β J.A. 4765. The district court also emphasized that the state courtβs order is a\\n\\nβcollateral interlocutory orderβ that is not binding, and that the order includes no\\n\\nβanalysis of the merits of the underlying federal case, which is the most important factor\\n\\n\\n 31\\n\\nin considering the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement.β\\n\\nJ.A. 4766β67. Addressing the state courtβs finding that the class notice was misleading,\\n\\nthe district court stated in a footnote that it βdisagreesβ without elaborating. J.A. 4778\\n\\nn.32.\\n\\n The district court, in failing to engage sufficiently with the merits of the state\\n\\ncourtβs findings, did not act as a fiduciary of the class and thus abused its discretion in\\n\\ncertifying the Speaks settlement class under Rule 23(a). See Kaufman v. Am. Express\\n\\nTravel Related Servs. Co., 877 F.3d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 2017) (β[W]e have repeatedly\\n\\nstated that district courts should act as the fiduciary of the class, subject to the high duty\\n\\nof care that the law requires of fiduciaries.β (citation and internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted)); Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir.\\n\\n1995) (stating that βthe district court has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that the\\n\\nsettlement is fair and not a product of collusion, and that the class membersβ interests\\n\\nwere represented adequatelyβ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 1\\n\\nNewberg on Class Actions Β§ 3:72, at 394 (explaining that βjudges provide the primary\\n\\noversight of class counsel, and they have long utilized the adequate representation\\n\\nrequirement of Rule 23(a)(4) to do soβ); 4 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class\\n\\nActions Β§ 13:40, at 427β30 (5th ed. 2014) (explaining the courtβs fiduciary duty during\\n\\nsettlement).\\n\\n In arguing that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the Cooperative\\n\\nasserts that the state courtβs findings are not dispositive on collusion. As the Objectors\\n\\npoint out, however, β[t]he issue here is not whether the district court was bound by the\\n\\n 32\\n\\nfindings of collusion by the state court . . . but whether the district court failed to require\\n\\ncloser scrutiny especially given those findingsβ and given its duty as a fiduciary to the\\n\\nabsent class members. See Kaufman, 877 F.3d at 283. The Cooperative further argues\\n\\nthat, in any event, the district court βexpressly considered the state courtβs decision,\\n\\nproperly found it both legally and factually deficient, and rightly declined to follow it.β\\n\\nCoop. Br. 36. To the contrary, the district courtβs rejection of the state courtβs order\\n\\nconsisted largely of conclusory statements and evinced little sustained evaluation of the\\n\\nserious charges of collusion.\\n\\n The Cooperative also challenges the state courtβs order on the merits, arguing that\\n\\nthe order βis misconceived in multiple respects.β None of these asserted deficiencies,\\n\\nhowever, undermines our core conclusion that the district court improperly rejected the\\n\\ncollusion argument based on the mere presence of the mediator and without adequately\\n\\naddressing the state courtβs findings.\\n\\n Under these circumstances, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in\\n\\ncertifying the Speaks settlement class under Rule 23(a). 8\\n\\n\\n 8\\n The Objectors separately argue that the North Carolina Supreme Courtβs decision\\naffirming class certification in December 2016 should have been granted full faith and\\ncreditβand thus should have barred class certification in Speaksβbecause the state court\\njudgment βis final on all issues covered by [] certification.β See App. Br. 30β31. As the\\nSupreme Court has made clear, however, β[o]rders granting or denying class certification\\n. . . are βinherently interlocutory.ββ Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1706\\n(2017) (citation omitted). Contrary to the Objectorsβ assertion, then, the district court did\\nnot err in declining to give such an interlocutory order full faith and credit in this case.\\nSee, e.g., Bryan v. BellSouth Commcβns, Inc., 492 F.3d 231, 239β40 (4th Cir. 2007)\\n(holding under North Carolina law that full faith and credit did not require a federal court\\nto give preclusive effect to a non-final and interlocutory state court order); cf. Matsushita\\n(Continued)\\n 33\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n Adequacy of Class Representation\\n\\n The Objectors also argue that the district court abused its discretion because the\\n\\nSpeaks class representatives cannot adequately represent the class given certain conflicts\\n\\nof interest between the Speaks class representatives and the Fisher-Lewis class members.\\n\\nThis argument also has merit.\\n\\n βUnder the adequacy requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), a district court may certify a\\n\\nclass only if the class representative βwill fairly and adequately protect the interests of the\\n\\nclass.ββ Ward v. Dixie Nat. Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 179 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed.\\n\\nR. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)). βThe adequacy inquiry . . . serves to uncover conflicts of interest\\n\\nbetween named parties and the class they seek to represent.β Amchem Prods., Inc. v.\\n\\nWindsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). β[A] class representative must be part of the class\\n\\nand βpossess the same interest and suffer the same injuryβ as the class members.β Id. at\\n\\n625β26 (alteration in original) (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez,\\n\\n431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)). βFor a conflict of interest to defeat the adequacy requirement,\\n\\nβthat conflict must be fundamental.ββ Ward, 595 F.3d at 180 (citation omitted). βA\\n\\nconflict is not fundamental when . . . all class members βshare common objectives and the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nElec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996) (concluding that a federal court\\nmay not βwithhold full faith and credit from a state-court judgment approving a class-\\naction settlementββa final judgment on the meritsββsimply because the settlement\\nreleases claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courtsβ).\\n\\n 34\\n\\nsame factual and legal positions [and] have the same interest in establishing the liability\\n\\nof [defendants].ββ Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).\\n\\n The Objectors first contend that conflicts of interest exist between the Speaks class\\n\\nrepresentatives and the Fisher-Lewis class members because the Fisher-Lewis membersβ\\n\\ninterest in the Cooperativeβs reserve βis tied and traceable to their patronage gainsβ while\\n\\nin the Speaks class all members are entitled to a portion of the reserve funds irrespective\\n\\nof whether they contributed to the reserve through their patronage. See Fisher-Lewis,\\n\\n794 S.E.2d at 708 (stating that βeach class memberβs share of recovery could be\\n\\ndetermined fairly based upon that memberβs patronage interests in defendantβ). The\\n\\nObjectors thus argue that a conflict exists because the legal theory in the Speaks case is\\n\\nnot tied to each memberβs patronage interest and would provide broader relief to the\\n\\nsettlement class at the expense of the Fisher-Lewis class members with identifiable\\n\\npatronage interests in the reserve. The Objectors separately argue that a conflict exists\\n\\nbecause the membersβ legal claims are different. Unlike the Fisher-Lewis class, the\\n\\nSpeaks class seeks recovery based on two weak statutory claims, and these weaknesses,\\n\\nsay the Objectors, prejudice the Fisher-Lewis class members given their much stronger\\n\\nclaims.\\n\\n We agree with the Objectors, and conclude that the district court abused its\\n\\ndiscretion in certifying the Speaks settlement class given the fundamental conflicts\\n\\nbetween the Speaks class representatives and the Fisher-Lewis class members. These\\n\\nconflicts stem from the Cooperativeβs structure, the manner in which the reserve was\\n\\n\\n\\n 35\\n\\nestablished, and the divergent legal theories in which the Fisher-Lewis class and the\\n\\nSpeaks class ground their respective claims.\\n\\n The vast reserve at the center of these lawsuits exists because of certain membersβ\\n\\npatronage during the periods of the Cooperativeβs history from 1946β2004 when the\\n\\nprice-support program was profitable. Consistent with the statutory framework for North\\n\\nCarolina agricultural cooperatives, the Cooperativeβs governing documents recognize that\\n\\nthis subset of productive members in effect created the reserve, and the Cooperative thus\\n\\nspecifically gave these members a patronage interest in the reserve through providing that\\n\\nany excess reserves would be distributed to them in recognition of their contributions.\\n\\nSee N.C. Gen. Stat. Β§ 54-130 (explaining that such associations βare not organized to\\n\\nmake profits for themselves, as such, or for their members, as such, but only for their\\n\\nmembers as producersβ); id. Β§ 54-126 (stating that the βnet earnings or losses shall be\\n\\napportioned among the members in accordance with the ratio [of] each memberβs\\n\\npatronageβ compared to total patronage and defining patronage as a memberβs βamount\\n\\nof purchases, sales, business, labor, wages or other similar criteriaβ).\\n\\n For the 1967β73 crop years, a memberβs interest in the reserves was based on a\\n\\npercentage of his gain. J.A. 2396 (acknowledging that individual member growers\\n\\ncontributed the reserves and stating that any excess shall be paid βratablyβ to patron\\n\\ncontributors); J.A. 2397 (explaining that the βcontribution to [reserves]β would be βjust\\n\\nthe same as if the total of each memberβs allocation of profit was delivered to him in cash\\n\\nand he returned the established percentage to [the Cooperative] as his pro[-]rata\\n\\ncontribution toβ the reserve). Because the Cooperative was able to sell the membersβ\\n\\n 36\\n\\ntobacco for a profit during these years, it βdistributed a portion of the net gains to the\\n\\ngrowers of these crops . . . as cash patronage distributionsβ and kept the remaining $26.8\\n\\nmillion for the reserve while issuing certificates of interest to these members for their pro\\n\\nrata portion of the undistributed net gains. J.A. 2458.\\n\\n After the No Net Cost Act became law in 1982, a memberβs interest in the reserve\\n\\nwas based on the individual NNC assessments he paid relative to the total assessments\\n\\npaid during the post-1982 period in which the Cooperative was profitable and building its\\n\\nreserve. J.A. 859. At oral argument on the proposed Fisher-Lewis settlement in 2005β\\n\\n2006, counsel for the Cooperative acknowledged that each memberβs patronage interest\\n\\nwas the driving force of this lawsuit. J.A. 1789 (βIn this cooperative, as in most\\n\\ncooperatives, any interest in the equity of the co-op, other than upon dissolution, is\\n\\ndetermined by each memberβs patronage with the co-op over time, and more importantly,\\n\\nwhether that patronage resulted in profits to the co-op.β); J.A. 4608 (Cooperative counsel\\n\\nstating in 2010 that the class membersβ βargument is that these reserves were derived\\n\\nfrom their patronage, so whether any individual grower has an interest in any particular\\n\\npot of money depends on whether the grower contributed to growing the tobacco in\\n\\nquestion that generated those proceedsβ).\\n\\n This patronage interest in the reserve fund serves as the Fisher-Lewis class\\n\\nmembersβ theory of their case. Their patronage resulted in profits for the Cooperative,\\n\\nthey contend, and their corresponding patronage interest was unlawfully extinguishedβ\\n\\nin violation of statutory cooperative legal principles as well as common law principles\\n\\nlike breach of contractβwhen the Cooperative undertook the membership purge in\\n\\n 37\\n\\n2004β2005. The membersβ patronage interests in fact provided the basis on which the\\n\\nstate court in Fisher-Lewis concluded that there were no conflicts of interest within the\\n\\nclass. See Fisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at 708 (βThe trial court did not find that conflicts of\\n\\ninterest divide the members of the class. Instead, the court concluded that each class\\n\\nmemberβs share of recovery could be determined fairly based upon that memberβs\\n\\npatronage interests . . . .β).\\n\\n The Speaks class representatives, by contrast, represent a class consisting of all\\n\\nCooperative members from 1946β2018 irrespective of whether the members produced\\n\\nany profits for the Cooperativeβand thus irrespective of whether they contributed to the\\n\\nreserve fund. The Speaks settlement indeed proposes to distribute the reserve money to\\n\\nall members based merely on the number of pounds of tobacco each member marketed to\\n\\nthe Cooperative and the number of years the member marketed and sold tobacco. But as\\n\\nthe Objectors assert, β[m]embership alone has never been the basis for any interest in\\n\\nCooperative reserves. It has always been tied pro rata to a memberβs individual interest\\n\\nin either the tobacco marketed [pre-1982] or the NNC assessment paid [post-1982].β\\n\\nReply Br. 5 (βGains have not been paid to, nor interests in the reserve created for, those\\n\\nwhose tobacco or assessments did not produce them. From [the Cooperativeβs] inception\\n\\nin 1946 through 2004, . . . participation in the reserves was restricted to those whose\\n\\ncontributions had created them.β). As the Objectorsβ expert explained, the Speaks\\n\\ndistribution plan βactually tak[es] money away from people who have contributed to net\\n\\npatronage interestβ because β[t]he only way that you give money to people who\\n\\ncontributed zero β that have zero patronage interest is by taking a dollar away from\\n\\n 38\\n\\npeople . . . who have generated [a] patronage interest,β a result the expert characterized as\\n\\nβfairly obviously inequitable.β J.A. 3834.\\n\\n The Cooperative suggests, and the district court found, that no conflict exists\\n\\nbecause both classes seek to recover βexcessβ reserves. Coop. Br. 31β32; J.A. 4737. But\\n\\nthis reasoning obscures the key distinction between the two classesβthe Fisher-Lewis\\n\\nclass members have taken the position that the Speaks class can claim no legal\\n\\nentitlement or recognized interest in any βexcessβ reserves because they have no earned\\n\\npatronage interest in the reserve based on any profit contribution. Cf. Ward, 595 F.3d at\\n\\n180 (stating that β[a] conflict is not fundamental when . . . all class members βshare\\n\\ncommon objectives and the same factual and legal positionsββ (emphasis added) (citation\\n\\nomitted)). The Fisher-Lewis class members indeed assert a fundamentally different\\n\\ninterest and a different injury from the Speaks class representatives: they claim an\\n\\ninterest in the reserve tied specifically to the profits they produced for the Cooperative,\\n\\nand an injury tied directly to the deprivation of their patronage interest as a result of the\\n\\n2004β2005 membership purge. Cf. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 (stating that a βclass\\n\\nrepresentative must be part of the class and βpossess the same interest and suffer the same\\n\\ninjuryβ as the class membersβ (citation omitted)). A settlement involving all Cooperative\\n\\nmembers would vitiate this interest through awarding to noncontributing members a\\n\\nportion of the reserve funds that the Fisher-Lewis class members created.\\n\\n That the Fisher-Lewis class members and the Speaks representatives are pursuing\\n\\ndifferent legal claims only underscores the conflict of interest between the two.\\n\\nβAdequacy does not require complete identity of claims or interests between the proposed\\n\\n 39\\n\\nrepresentative[s] and the class,β but there must be βsufficient similarity of interest such\\n\\nthat there is no affirmative antagonism between the representative[s] and the class.β 1\\n\\nNewberg on Class Actions Β§ 3:58, at 342β44. The different claims of the Speaks\\n\\nrepresentatives and the Fisher-Lewis class members reflect their different theories of the\\n\\ncase, and these theories are in tension. The Speaks class members are pursuing claims for\\n\\nvoluntary distribution or, alternatively, dissolution precisely becauseβunlike the Fisher-\\n\\nLewis class membersβthey can likely claim no legal entitlement to the reserve funds on\\n\\ncommon law and statutory theories that are grounded in the notion that membersβ\\n\\npatronage gives them an interest in all profit that the Cooperative has kept as reserves and\\n\\nthat the Cooperative has deprived them of this interest.\\n\\n For these reasons, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in certifying\\n\\nthe Speaks settlement class in this respect as well.\\n\\n 3.\\n\\n Fisher-Lewis Classwide Opt-Out\\n\\n The Objectors contend that the district court abused its discretion when it certified\\n\\nthe class after rejecting the attempts of certain Fisher-Lewis class representatives to opt\\n\\nout the entire Fisher-Lewis class from this case. Finding no merit to this argument, we\\n\\naffirm the district courtβs denial of the class opt-out.\\n\\n In holding that the Fisher-Lewis representatives could not opt out the entire class,\\n\\nthe district court first noted that its preliminary approval order βexpressly prohibited\\n\\ngroup or class-wide opt-outs.β J.A. 4740. The court then went on to explain that the Due\\n\\nProcess Clause prohibits classwide opt-outs because due process βrequires that class\\n\\n 40\\n\\nmembers be provided notice and an individual choice to proceed as a class member or to\\n\\nopt-out and avoid being bound by a judgment.β J.A. 4740. For this proposition the court\\n\\ncited several cases. See Sloan v. Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc., 25 F. Appβx 197, 198 (4th Cir.\\n\\n2002) (β[C]lass representatives cannot opt out on behalf of other putative class\\n\\nmembers.β); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998) (βThere is\\n\\nno class action rule, statute, or case that allows a putative class plaintiff or counsel to\\n\\nexercise class rights en masse, either by making a class-wide objection or by attempting\\n\\nto effect a group-wide exclusion from an existing class. Indeed, to do so would infringe\\n\\non the due process rights of the individual class members, who have the right to\\n\\nintelligently and individually choose whether to continue in a suit as class members.β);\\n\\nBerry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 412 (2d Cir. 1975) (prohibiting the\\n\\nplaintiff from opting out prospective class members in shareholder suit before they had\\n\\nbeen given an opportunity to opt out and stating that β[t]he only way to avoid such chaos\\n\\nis to require that opting out of a class action, like the decision to participate in it, must be\\n\\nan individual decisionβ), abrogated on other grounds by Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36\\n\\n(2d Cir. 1993).\\n\\n The Objectors recognize that courts have generally held that representatives of a\\n\\nputative class cannot opt out individual members on due-process grounds, but contend\\n\\nthat this rule does not apply here because the Fisher-Lewis class is no longer putative and\\n\\nhas already received notice and been certified. The Objectors argue that β[s]ince the\\n\\nmembers of the [Fisher-Lewis] class had exercised their rights and [chose] to remain in\\n\\n[Fisher-Lewis], the class representatives can act to bind those absent class membersβ and\\n\\n 41\\n\\nopt out of Speaks on their behalf. App. Br. 49β50. According to the Objectors, the class\\n\\nrepresentatives in fact had βthe fiduciary duty to represent the legal interests of [Fisher-\\n\\nLewis] absent class members once they had exercised their due process choice to be part\\n\\nof the [Fisher-Lewis] certified class.β App. Br. 46.\\n\\n The Objectors cite no authority for the proposition that the Fisher-Lewis membersβ\\n\\nstatus as a certified class creates an exception to the settled rule that the Due Process\\n\\nClause reposes only in βindividual class members . . . the right to intelligently and\\n\\nindividually choose whether to continue in a suit as class members.β Hanlon, 150 F.3d at\\n\\n1024 (emphasis added). Even though the Fisher-Lewis class is certified, the policy\\n\\nconcerns that militate against permitting group opt-outs in the putative class context are\\n\\npresent here as wellβallowing representatives to opt out a group of class members would\\n\\ndeprive those members of their due-process right to make that choice for themselves and\\n\\nwould βcompletely gut the class action mechanism as objectors could dismantle any class\\n\\naction by removing groups of plaintiffs.β 3 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class\\n\\nActions Β§ 9:49, at 555 (5th ed. 2013).\\n\\n In the absence of any authority or policy justification, we see no basis on which to\\n\\nconclude that the representatives of the Fisher-Lewis certified class can opt out of the\\n\\nSpeaks case on behalf of the absent Fisher-Lewis class members. See 3 Newberg on\\n\\nClass Actions Β§ 9:49, at 556β57 (βCourts have permitted representative opt-outs only in\\n\\nvery rare circumstances, such as when a government official or political subdivision\\n\\nrequests to opt out on behalf of its constituents.β). As the Cooperative notes, moreover,\\n\\nthe Objectorsβ position presents an unworkable scenario because four of the Fisher-Lewis\\n\\n 42\\n\\nclass representatives declined to opt out of Speaks. Compare J.A. 2463 (Fisher-Lewis\\n\\nrepresentatives), with J.A. 4794 (Speaks opt-outs). Certain Fisher-Lewis representatives\\n\\nthus attempted to opt out the entire Fisher-Lewis class from Speaks even while other\\n\\nrepresentatives elected to remain in Speaks.\\n\\n For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the\\n\\nFisher-Lewis representativesβ efforts to opt out the entire Fisher-Lewis class from this\\n\\ncase.\\n\\n C.\\n\\n Final Settlement Approval Under Rule 23(e)\\n\\n Finally, the Objectors challenge the district courtβs approval of the $24 million\\n\\nSpeaks class settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. This Court affords the district\\n\\ncourtβs decision βsubstantial deference, reversing only βupon a clear showing that the\\n\\ndistrict court abused its discretion in approving the settlement.ββ Berry v. Schulman, 807\\n\\nF.3d 600, 614 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th\\n\\nCir. 1975)). We agree with the Objectors that the district court abused its discretion\\n\\nunder these circumstances. We therefore also reverse that part of the district courtβs\\n\\norder approving the Speaks class settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.\\n\\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that β[t]he claims, issues, or\\n\\ndefenses of a certified classβor a class proposed to be certified for purposes of\\n\\nsettlementβmay be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the courtβs\\n\\napproval.β Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Before a court may approve a proposed settlement, it\\n\\nmust conclude that the settlement is βfair, reasonable, and adequate.β Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n\\n 43\\n\\n23(e)(2). In assessing the adequacy of the proposed settlement, courts consider the\\n\\nfollowing factors: β(1) the relative strength of the plaintiffsβ case on the merits, (2) the\\n\\nexistence of any difficulties of proof or strong defenses the plaintiffs are likely to\\n\\nencounter if the case goes to trial, (3) the anticipated duration and expense of additional\\n\\nlitigation, (4) the solvency of the defendants and the likelihood of recovery on a litigated\\n\\njudgment, and (5) the degree of opposition to the settlement.β In re Jiffy Lube Secs.\\n\\nLitig., 927 F.2d 155, 159 (4th Cir. 1991). The most important factors in this analysis are\\n\\nthe relative strength of the plaintiffsβ claims on the merits and the existence of any\\n\\ndifficulties of proof or strong defenses. See Berry, 807 F.3d at 614β15.\\n\\n The Objectors contend only that the district court erred when it concluded that the\\n\\nSpeaks class claims βare weak[] and the likelihood of recovery if plaintiffs litigated this\\n\\ncase to final judgment and final appeal is low.β J.A. 4748β49. Specifically, the\\n\\nObjectors argue that the district court improperly viewed the weakness of the claims and\\n\\nthe strength of the Cooperativeβs defenses by reference to the Speaks class claims without\\n\\nregard for the much stronger Fisher-Lewis class claims. Although a $24 million\\n\\nsettlement may be reasonable for the Speaks class members, the Objectors assert, this\\n\\namount is not reasonable for the Fisher-Lewis class members who form a subset of the\\n\\nSpeaks class and whose separate claims are extinguished as part of this settlement.\\n\\n A high-level comparison of the two cases provides a useful starting point for our\\n\\nanalysis. The Fisher-Lewis claims arose in 2004β2005, when the Cooperative drastically\\n\\nreduced its membership rolls by 99%βfrom 803,912 members to 846 membersβ\\n\\nthrough removing all members who did not appear on sales bills from 1984β2003 or who\\n\\n 44\\n\\ndeclined to sign a marketing agreement with the Cooperative for 2005. J.A. 1781. As the\\n\\nCooperative stated in a letter to members, anyone whose membership was cancelled lost\\n\\nall accrued interest in the reserve. See Fisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at 704. The membership\\n\\nreduction caused the reserve to increase from $427.00 per member to $365,000 for each\\n\\nof the remaining 846 members. J.A. 1761.\\n\\n Based on these events, the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs brought a consolidated suit in\\n\\nMay 2009 alleging a variety of common law and statutory claims against the\\n\\nCooperative, including breach of contract, conversion, ultra vires, and unfair trade\\n\\npractices. J.A. 1837β54. According to the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs, two related legal\\n\\ntheories undergird their claims. The first, as we have explained, relies on cooperative\\n\\nlegal principles. J.A. 1802 n.44. The plaintiffs contend that a cooperative, by its nature,\\n\\ncannot make profits for itself and must distribute all net earnings pro rata to members\\n\\nbased on their patronage, or profit contribution, to the cooperative. See N.C. Gen. Stat.\\n\\n§§ 54-126, 54-130. By retaining a reserve far in excess of what is reasonableβa reserve\\n\\nthat exists because of membersβ patronageβthe Cooperative deprives the plaintiffs of\\n\\ntheir legal interest in the excess portion of the reserve. J.A. 1802 n.44; J.A. 1956 n.7.\\n\\n The Fisher-Lewis plaintiffsβ second legal theory is tied specifically to the\\n\\nCooperativeβs 2004β2005 membership purge and its decision to expel members who\\n\\nrefused to sign the new marketing agreement. See Fisher-Lewis, 794 S.E.2d at 704. The\\n\\nplaintiffs argue that the Cooperative βsystematically disenfranchise[d] [p]laintiffs and\\n\\nother [members] by purging the membership rolls and eliminatingβ the plaintiffs as\\n\\nmembers without a hearing. J.A. 1827. Through these actions, the Cooperative\\n\\n 45\\n\\nβexpelled hundreds of thousandsβ of members and took control of the reserve in an\\n\\nattempt βto create a βlast man standingβ scenario in which a few hundred remaining\\n\\n[members] potentially have the benefit of hundreds of millions of dollars in assets which\\n\\nhave been created through the efforts of allβ members. J.A. 1827. According to the\\n\\nplaintiffs, this campaign to eliminate members deprived them of their right to participate\\n\\nin the βnet earningsβ derived from their patronage because the Cooperative took the\\n\\nposition that expelled members would lose any accrued interest they had in the reserve.\\n\\nJ.A. 1802 n.44.\\n\\n As the record shows, the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs met with considerable success\\n\\nfrom 2012β2016. The plaintiffs largely survived a motion to dismiss, achieved class\\n\\ncertification, and successfully defended against the Cooperativeβs challenge to\\n\\ncertification before the North Carolina Supreme Court. And these victories all occurred\\n\\nin the wake of the state courtβs conclusion that the record did not support a proposed\\n\\nsettlement consisting of $76.8 million in cash and $212 million in book allocations\\n\\nbecause such a settlement was not within the ball park of being fair, reasonable, and\\n\\nadequate for the Fisher-Lewis class members.\\n\\n It was only after the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs survived the motion to dismiss and\\n\\nmoved for class certification that the Speaks plaintiffs filed their complaint in October\\n\\n2012. Within two months, however, the Speaks suit was stayed in deference to the\\n\\nongoing class-certification proceedings in Fisher-Lewis, and the Speaks case remained\\n\\nstayed until the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its decision in December 2016\\n\\naffirming class certification. Shortly after this decision, the Speaks parties started\\n\\n 46\\n\\nsettlement negotiations, and they reached a tentative settlement within five months, after\\n\\nhaving conducted essentially no adversarial discovery and without the Cooperative even\\n\\nhaving filed an answer to the Speaks complaintβa stark contrast to the extensive\\n\\nmultiyear process in Fisher-Lewis, as the state court properly recognized. See J.A. 4488\\n\\n(observing that the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs filed βtwo complaints, three amended\\n\\ncomplaints, participated in class discovery, defended class discovery and merits\\n\\ndiscovery, substantially survived a motion to dismiss, obtained class certification and\\n\\nsuccessfully defended the sameβ while the Speaks plaintiffs βfiled one complaint and,\\n\\nwith the input of the [Cooperative], filed an amended complaint, obtained approximately\\n\\n8 stays of their case, submitted a number of status reports, reviewed documents\\n\\nvoluntarily provided by the [Cooperative] then mediated and settled their claimsβ). The\\n\\nSpeaks settlement amount was $24 millionβanother stark contrast with Fisher-Lewis,\\n\\nwhere a $76.8 million settlement was deemed as being not even in the ball park of fair\\n\\nand adequate.\\n\\n The Speaks case also involved claims and legal theories different fromβand\\n\\narguably weaker thanβthe claims in Fisher-Lewis. The Speaks plaintiffs contend\\n\\nprimarily that after Congress enacted FETRA in 2004 and ended the federal price-support\\n\\nprogram, the Cooperativeβs principal function ceased to exist, and it was thus\\n\\nunreasonably and unlawfully failing to distribute to members hundreds of millions of\\n\\ndollars in excess reserves that were not necessary to the Cooperativeβs continued\\n\\nfunctions and activities in a post-FETRA environment. The Speaks plaintiffs do not\\n\\n\\n\\n 47\\n\\nassert the Fisher-Lewis common law and statutory claims for relief based on the\\n\\nCooperativeβs 2004β2005 membership purge and membersβ lost patronage interest.\\n\\n Given this history and the differences between the two cases, we agree with the\\n\\nObjectors that the strength of the Fisher-Lewis case drove the Speaks settlement\\n\\nnegotiations, and that the district court erroneously relied on the weaknesses of the\\n\\nSpeaks claims to justify the $24 million settlement as reasonable for the class when that\\n\\namount is plainly inadequate for the Fisher-Lewis class members.\\n\\n In evaluating the adequacy of the $24 million settlement, the district court\\n\\nconcluded that the Speaks claims were weak for the following reasons. First, the Speaks\\n\\nplaintiffs provided no authority for the proposition that Β§ 55A-13-02(c)βa statute\\n\\nauthorizing distributionsβrequires or forces the Cooperative to make distributions to\\n\\nmembers. J.A. 4751. Second, FETRA does not provide the plaintiffs with a basis for\\n\\nrelief because the statuteβs plain language βmakes clear that the Cooperative was entitled\\n\\nto retain the proceeds from the sale of the loan tobaccoβ and because the statute does not\\n\\ncreate a private right of action. J.A. 4750β51. Third, β[w]ithout statutory or contractual\\n\\nentitlement to relief, plaintiffsβ claim concerning unreasonable reserves amounts to a\\n\\nclaim that the Cooperativeβs Board breached their fiduciary duties in failing to distribute\\n\\nreserves.β J.A. 4751β52. The plaintiffs have not shown that a fiduciary relationship\\n\\nexisted between them and the Board, the court indicated, but even if they could make\\n\\nsuch a showing, the claim would fall within North Carolinaβs business-judgment rule.\\n\\nJ.A. 4752β53. Fourth, the statutory claim for judicial dissolution under N.C. Gen. Stat.\\n\\n\\n\\n 48\\n\\nΒ§ 55A-14-30 is weak because, among other reasons, the Cooperative is still carrying out\\n\\nits statutory purpose. J.A. 4754β56.\\n\\n Despite the district courtβs thorough analysis of the claims before it, many of the\\n\\nweaknesses identified do not apply to the claims of the Fisher-Lewis class members. The\\n\\nFisher-Lewis plaintiffs did not request judicial dissolution of the Cooperative, for\\n\\nexample, nor did they seek to force distribution of the Cooperativeβs reserves under N.C.\\n\\nGen. Stat. Β§ 55A-13-02(c), which by its terms merely authorizes distributions. See N.C.\\n\\nGen. Stat. Β§ 55A-13-02(c) (providing that βa corporation . . . may make distributions to\\n\\npurchase its membershipsβ (emphasis added)). The Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs also make no\\n\\nallegation that FETRA provides a basis for relief. See Def.-Appellantβs Reply Br., Fisher\\n\\nv. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 2015 WL 275307, at *19 (N.C. filed\\n\\nJan. 9, 2015) (βPlaintiffs did not plead any claim under FETRA.β).\\n\\n The district court also reasoned in its analysis that, without a statutory or\\n\\ncontractual entitlement to relief, the Speaks plaintiffs can allege only a breach-of-\\n\\nfiduciary-duty claim, which would fall within the business-judgment rule. This\\n\\nassessment also proves problematic as applied to Fisher-Lewis. First, the Fisher-Lewis\\n\\nplaintiffs alleged several statutory and contractual claims for relief not present in Speaks,\\n\\nand these claims survived a motion to dismissβincluding a business-judgment-rule\\n\\ndefenseβand were part of the certified case. Second, the state court later ruled that the\\n\\nFisher-Lewis claims were not derivative in nature and expressly left open the question\\n\\nwhether the business-judgment rule would apply to the surviving claims. J.A. 4609, 4614\\n\\n& n.1 (granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the Cooperativeβs twelfth\\n\\n 49\\n\\naffirmative defense, which argued that βplaintiffsβ claims are barred for failure . . . to\\n\\nsatisfy the requirements of the North Carolina statutes applicable to derivative actionsβ).\\n\\nFor these reasons, the district courtβs business-judgment-rule analysis applies with\\n\\nconsiderably less force to the Fisher-Lewis claims.\\n\\n In concluding that the $24 million settlement was adequate, the district court also\\n\\nindicated that the Cooperativeβs defenses were strong, noting in particular that the\\n\\nβstatute of limitations is a substantial barrier to large swaths of plaintiffsβ claims.β J.A.\\n\\n4756. Again, this reasoning applies with less force to the Fisher-Lewis claims. Those\\n\\nplaintiffs filed suit in early 2005, shortly after being notified in late 2004 of the\\n\\nCooperativeβs plan to terminate most of its members and retain their accrued patronage\\n\\ninterests. The claims indeed arose precisely because of the Cooperativeβs 2004β2005\\n\\nmembership purgeβthe moment when the expelled members lost their interest and the\\n\\nreserve increased to an unreasonable $365,000 per memberβand the claims substantially\\n\\nsurvived a motion to dismiss. J.A. 1866β67 (dismissing only three of the 14 claims, all\\n\\ninvolving fraud allegations). In fact, the state court expressly rejected the Cooperativeβs\\n\\nlimitations defense at the motion-to-dismiss stage. J.A. 1866. As the Objectors point\\n\\nout, moreover, if anyone had a statute-of-limitations problem, it was the Speaks plaintiffs.\\n\\nThe two Speaks complaints pleaded equitable tolling based on the 2005 Fisher-Lewis\\n\\nfilings, an acknowledgment that the claims faced a limitations barrier. J.A. 49, 279.\\n\\n The district court, in approving the $24 million settlement as reasonable, also\\n\\nrelied on several faulty premises concerning the proposed $76 million settlement. First,\\n\\nthe court asserted that the state court βdid not find that the proposed settlement was\\n\\n 50\\n\\nunreasonableβ but rather denied preliminary approval βwithout prejudiceβ based on\\n\\ncertain plaintiffsβ objection that discovery on the merits of the settlement was necessary.\\n\\nJ.A. 4759β60. Although the state court did deny approval without prejudice, the court\\n\\nindicated in no uncertain terms that the record before it βd[id] not support a finding or\\n\\nconclusion that the proposed Settlement is within the necessary βball parkβ of being fair,\\n\\nreasonable and adequateβ at only $76 million. J.A. 311β12.\\n\\n Second, the district court, relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and our\\n\\ndecision in Fiberglass Insulators, Inc. v. Dupuy, 856 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1988), concluded\\n\\nthat a settlement offer does not reflect the relative strength of the plaintiffsβ claims on the\\n\\nmerits, and that such an offer cannot establish the Cooperativeβs liability at trial. J.A.\\n\\n4760. But the $76 million figure was not merely a settlement offer made in the course of\\n\\nthe partiesβ negotiations. Cf. Fiberglass Insulators, 856 F.2d at 653 (holding that Rule\\n\\n408 requires excluding βstatements made by attorneys in the course of settling prior\\n\\nrelated litigation between the same partiesβ). The figure instead was the basis on which\\n\\nthe court, after briefing and argument, denied preliminary approval for the settlement as\\n\\nnot fair, reasonable, and adequate for class members. Neither the district court nor the\\n\\nCooperative points to any authority suggesting that this Court cannot consider the state\\n\\ncourtβs denial in our review of the Speaks settlement.\\n\\n Third, the district court deemed the $76 million proposed settlement from 2005β\\n\\n2006 outdated and irrelevantβand thus an improper benchmark by which to gauge the\\n\\nreasonableness of the Speaks settlementβboth because the Cooperativeβs βbusiness\\n\\nstrategy from 2005 to 2017 has proven reasonable and beneficialβ to members and\\n\\n 51\\n\\nbecause the litigation risks βhave substantially changed in the Cooperativeβs favor since\\n\\n2005.β J.A. 4768.\\n\\n As an initial matter, even assuming the Cooperative can nowβin 2018β2019β\\n\\njustify its large pool of reserves based on an evolving business strategy undertaken over\\n\\nthe last fifteen years, the Fisher-Lewis case turns on the reasonableness of the reserve in\\n\\n2004β2005, when the Cooperative eliminated 99% of members and extinguished their\\n\\naccrued interest in the reserve. That the Cooperativeβs circumstances may have changed\\n\\nin more recent years has little relevance for the Fisher-Lewis class members and their\\n\\nclaims.\\n\\n As to the increased litigation risks for the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs, the district court\\n\\ncited the Georgia state courtβs 2014 opinion in Rigby as proof that the Speaks plaintiffs\\n\\nhave a weak case on the merits and would be unlikely to recover more than $24 million if\\n\\nthe case were litigated to judgment. See Rigby v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop.\\n\\nStabilization Corp., 755 S.E.2d 915 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014); see also Rigby v. Flue-Cured\\n\\nTobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 794 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). Rigby is\\n\\nanother case against the Cooperative, with claims similar to the claims in Fisher-Lewis,\\n\\nand the plaintiffs did not recover anything. But the district court relies heavily on Rigby\\n\\nwithout giving due regard to the Fisher-Lewis proceedings directly related to this caseβ\\n\\nthe Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs largely defeated the Cooperativeβs motion to dismiss,\\n\\nincluding challenges based on the business judgment rule and statute of limitations, the\\n\\nplaintiffs achieved class certification and beat back the Cooperativeβs challenge on\\n\\nappeal, and they secured summary judgment on the Cooperativeβs derivative defense.\\n\\n 52\\n\\nFor these reasons, the Rigby decision does not provide a valid basis on which to conclude\\n\\nthat the $24 million settlement is reasonable and that the $76 million proposed settlement\\n\\nhas no relevance in our analysis.\\n\\n In conclusion, the district court stated that although the Fisher-Lewis class asserted\\n\\nmany state law causes of action not present in Speaks, counsel has failed to explain how\\n\\nthese causes of action would enable the plaintiffs to obtain relief greater than $24 million\\n\\nβgiven that each of these claims appears to rest on the same fundamentally flawed\\n\\nallegation that the Cooperative unlawfully retained reserves.β J.A. 4768. But as we have\\n\\nexplained, the Fisher-Lewis claims do not rest on the βsame fundamentally flawed\\n\\nallegation,β and the Fisher-Lewis plaintiffs have detailed at length their separate theory of\\n\\nthe case based specifically on the events in 2004β2005.\\n\\n The Cooperative, for its part, protests that the Fisher-Lewis class members have\\n\\nfailed to identify the amount of reserves that the Cooperative may reasonably retain for\\n\\nthe membersβ benefit. But any lack of clarity in the record on the exact amount of\\n\\nreasonable reserves is hardly surprising given that this issue was not contested in Speaks\\n\\nand full merits discovery in Lewis had commenced only in April 2017, a month before\\n\\nthe Speaks parties mediated the case and arrived at the $24 million figure. J.A. 4465.\\n\\nThe Cooperative also seizes on a statement from the Objectorsβ counsel, made at the\\n\\nfairness hearing in a colloquy with the court, that the recovery could be βzeroβ if at trial\\n\\nthe Cooperativeβs entire reserve is deemed reasonable. J.A. 4674. Viewed in its proper\\n\\ncontext, this statement was nothing more than an acknowledgment from counsel that, if\\n\\nplaintiffsβ expert determined that the entire reserve was reasonable, it would follow that\\n\\n 53\\n\\nthe plaintiffs could not recover any excess reserves. As counsel made clear in the\\n\\nsubsequent exchangeβin which he argued vigorously for a robust recoveryβthis remark\\n\\nwas not a concession that the expert would find that the entire reserve was reasonable.\\n\\n Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion\\n\\nin approving the $24 million settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate.\\n\\n\\n\\n III.\\n\\n Conclusion\\n\\n To sum up, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the\\n\\nSpeaks settlement class under Rule 23(a) and in approving the final settlement as fair,\\n\\nreasonable, and adequate under Rule 23(e). We dismiss as untimely Lewisβs appeal of\\n\\nthe order denying his motion to intervene, and we affirm the district courtβs denial of the\\n\\nattempted class opt-outs.\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district courtβs order certifying the class\\n\\nand approving the final settlement and remand for further proceedings consistent with\\n\\nthis opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n AFFIRMED IN PART,\\n REVERSED AND REMANDED\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 54\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4372452/\", \"author_raw\": \"Judge Quattlebaum wrote a concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, concurring:\\n\\n Modern class actions are an important innovation in our legal system. They are a\\n\\nrare departure from βa principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence\\n\\nthat one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not\\n\\ndesignated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.β\\n\\nHansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). When properly employed, class actions\\n\\nefficiently provide consistent outcomes in resolving large numbers of disputes involving\\n\\ncommon questions of law or fact.\\n\\n As with many innovations, however, these benefits come with risks. 1 The very\\n\\nfeatures of class actions that provide efficiency and consistency at the same time present\\n\\nserious risks, including the risk of due process violations. For a plaintiff class, absent\\n\\nclass membersβ grievances are litigated not directly by the class members themselves but\\n\\nby class representatives. Defendants in those actions can be sued by a class of hundreds\\n\\nor thousands of people who are relieved of their normal responsibility to file and\\n\\nprosecute their own case. For a defendant class, concerns are arguably even greater with\\n\\nthe very real possibility that judgments can be entered against absent defendants without\\n\\nthose defendants receiving notice of the underlying action itself. See 1 Joseph M.\\n\\nMcLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions Β§ 4:46 (15th ed. 2018).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n One need not look far or long to find current events that illustrate this point.\\nRecent news coverage of social media platforms and the opioid crisis underscore the old\\ntruth that innovation can be a double-edged sword.\\n\\n 55\\n\\n Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a structural safeguard in our\\n\\nlegal system developed to provide the benefits of class actions while simultaneously\\n\\navoiding the risks associated with them. As a leading commentator on class actions\\n\\nexplains, the primary function of Rule 23 βis, through its various parts, to ensure the\\n\\nprotection of absent class membersβ rights and, hence, the justification of the binding\\n\\neffect of the resulting judgment.β 1 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions\\n\\nΒ§ 1:10 (5th ed. 2011). Thus, to appropriately strike this balance of maximizing benefits\\n\\nand minimizing risks, compliance with Rule 23 is necessary.\\n\\n In this appeal, Objectors challenge a number of the district courtβs decisions,\\n\\nincluding several findings regarding the Rule 23 requirements. Addressing those\\n\\ndecisions, the majority affirms the district courtβs denial of attempted class wide opt-outs\\n\\nand dismisses an appeal of an order denying a motion to intervene as untimely. Maj. Op.\\n\\nat 53. The majority reverses the district courtβs certification and settlement approval\\n\\ndecisions, holding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the Speaks\\n\\nsettlement class under Rule 23(a) and in approving the final settlement as fair, reasonable\\n\\nand adequate under Rule 23(e). Maj. Op. at 53. I agree that the district court erred on\\n\\nthese issues and, therefore, join with the majority in reversing the district courtβs order.\\n\\nHowever, I write separately because, although I agree with the result the majority\\n\\nreaches, I reach those results for different reasons.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n I first address the district courtβs finding regarding the adequacy of the class\\n\\nrepresentatives. Because the district court found the class representatives to be adequate\\n\\n 56\\n\\nwhen intra-class conflicts existed regarding the patronage theory of recovery, I join the\\n\\nmajority in finding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the Speaks\\n\\nclass.\\n\\n In considering the adequacy of the class representatives, we look to Rule 23(a).\\n\\nThat subsection requires adequacy of class representativesβalong with numerosity,\\n\\ntypicality and commonalityβfor a class to be certified. Although a district court is rightly\\n\\nafforded wide discretion in its adequacy determination under Rule 23(a), this discretion is\\n\\nnot absolute or unlimited. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625β28\\n\\n(1997) and its progeny make clear that a district court abuses its discretion when it finds\\n\\nclass representatives to be adequate despite the presence of intra-class conflicts. The\\n\\nconcerns about intra-class conflicts relate to the same due process concerns identified\\n\\nabove. βThe premise of a class action is that litigation by representative parties\\n\\nadjudicates the rights of all class members, so basic due process requires that named\\n\\nplaintiffs possess undivided loyalties to absent class members.β Broussard v. Meineke\\n\\nDisc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir 1998).\\n\\n Decisions from the Supreme Court and this Court provide guidance on the issue of\\n\\nintra-class conflicts. In Amchem, the Supreme Court considered whether a settlement\\n\\nclass consisting of victims of asbestos exposure satisfied the requirements of Rule 23.\\n\\n521 U.S. at 591. In considering the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4), the Court emphasized\\n\\nthe purpose of the adequacy requirement, noting β[t]he adequacy inquiry under Rule\\n\\n23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they\\n\\nseek to represent. [A] class representative must be part of the class and possess the same\\n\\n 57\\n\\ninterest and suffer the same injury as the class members.β Id. at 625β26 (citing General\\n\\nTel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157β58 n.13 (1982)) (internal citation omitted)\\n\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). The Court identified one such intra-class conflict,\\n\\nfinding that β[i]n significant respects, the interests of those within the single class are not\\n\\naligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate\\n\\npayments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an\\n\\nample, inflation-protected fund for the future.β Id. at 626. In affirming the decision to\\n\\ndecertify the class in part because of this conflict, the Court concluded β[t]he settling\\n\\nparties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair and\\n\\nadequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected.β Id. at 627.\\n\\n Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815, 856β58 (1999) affirmed the principle\\n\\nestablished by Amchem and further explained its meaning. In yet another asbestos case,\\n\\nthe Supreme Court in Ortiz considered whether a mandatory settlement class certified\\n\\nunder a limited fund theory satisfied the requirements of Rule 23. Id. at 821. In\\n\\nconsidering the fairness of the distribution of the settlement fund among class members,\\n\\nthe Supreme Court applied the adequacy principles set out in Amchem and identified two\\n\\ntypes of conflicts within the class. First, reiterating its holding in Amchem, the Court\\n\\nidentified a conflict between class members with present injuries and future injuries. Id.\\n\\nat 856. The Court noted βit is obvious after Amchem that a class divided between holders\\n\\nof present and future claims . . . requires division into homogenous subclasses under Rule\\n\\n23(c)(4)(B).β Id. Second, the Court identified a conflict between class members related to\\n\\nthe value of individual class membersβ claims. Id. at 857. Noting that some class\\n\\n 58\\n\\nmembers necessarily had βmore valuable claimsβ than others, the Court found that this\\n\\nmisalignment of interests required subclasses. Id. According to the Court, both types of\\n\\nconflict were βwell within the requirement of structural protection recognized in\\n\\nAmchem.β Id.\\n\\n After Ortiz, it is clear that Amchem extends beyond conflicts between current and\\n\\nfuture damages. Our Court, a year earlier, recognized this in Broussard v. Meineke Disc.\\n\\nMuffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir 1998). There, this Court followed Amchem in\\n\\ndetermining a nationwide class of franchise holders was improperly certified. Broussard,\\n\\n155 F.3d at 337β39. According to this Court, the putative class of franchise holders\\n\\ncontained βmanifest conflicts of interests,β largely driven by class membersβ diverging\\n\\ninterests in the amount and type of recovery. Id. at 338. This Court noted, βThe interest of\\n\\nformer franchisees in damages and of many EDP franchisees in restitution reveals an\\n\\nobvious initial schism within the putative class regarding the appropriate remedy for [the\\n\\ndefendantβs] alleged wrongdoing.β Id. In describing the prejudice caused by these\\n\\nconflicts of interests, this Court observed that the βthree distinct groups have potentially\\n\\ndivergent aimsβ and that the remedy sought by the plaintiffs βis consistent withβand only\\n\\nwithβthe aims [of one of the groups].β Id. at 339 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Broussard also suggests that intra-class conflicts infringe the due process rights\\n\\nnot only of absent plaintiff class members but also of defendants. In that case, the\\n\\npresence of intra-class conflict forced the defendant to respond to inconsistent legal\\n\\ntheories and damages claims some of which involved individualized considerations. See\\n\\nid. at 338 (β[O]ne group of [absent plaintiffs] sought to intervene below and appear as\\n\\n 59\\n\\namici on appeal, claiming their ongoing business relationship with [the defendant] and\\n\\ntheir interests in the long-term financial health of the company were imperiled by\\n\\nplaintiffβs efforts to wring a large damage award out of defendants.β). While the\\n\\ndefendant in this case did not raise these issues below or on appeal, in the parallel state\\n\\nproceeding it argued that the differences in arguably a less diverse class prevented class\\n\\ncertification. 2\\n\\n Here, the district court concluded that there were no intra-class conflicts in this\\n\\ncase that precluded certification or necessitated subclasses under Rule 23(a)(4). In\\n\\nreaching this conclusion, the district court attempted to distinguish Amchem,\\n\\ncharacterizing the differences in class members as mere differences in damages between\\n\\nclass members. Because of that, the district court concluded that the differences in class\\n\\nmembers did not create diverging interests or a fundamental conflict. The district court\\n\\nnoted β[a]ny differences between class members only arise with respect to the amount of\\n\\ndamages each member seeks to recover. Such differences do not create adverse or\\n\\ndiverging interests.β J.A. 4738 (citing In re Pet Food Products Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333,\\n\\n345β46 (3d Cir. 2010) and In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 272β73\\n\\n(3d Cir. 2009)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n In pointing out the Cooperativeβs lack of consistency, I note that this\\ncharacteristic appears to be contagious in this case. In the parallel state action, the Fisher-\\nLewis class was apparently not limited to patronage members, see definition of Fisher-\\nLewis class at Fisher v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 794 S.E.2d 699,\\n704 (N.C. 2016), but the class nevertheless argued for certification. It is hard to reconcile\\nthat position with the one it takes in this case.\\n\\n 60\\n\\n It is clear from the record that the district court gave thoughtful consideration to\\n\\nthis issue. However, the district court did not address either Ortiz or Broussard.\\n\\nMoreover, the pertinent issueβthe proper scope of Amchemβultimately is one of law. 3\\n\\nThe majority in effect concludes that the district court applied Amchem too narrowly. I\\n\\nagree. In the same way that class certification was improper in Amchem because of\\n\\ndifferences in the timing of payments, in Ortiz because of the differences in strength of\\n\\nthe class membersβ claims and in Broussard because of inconsistent claims and damages\\n\\ntheories and the individualized issues among class members, the patronage theory4\\n\\nasserted by some class members makes the class certification improper in this case. 5\\n\\n In order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a), Amchem and its progeny require\\n\\na named class representative to be not only common and typical of those of the entire\\n\\n\\n 3\\n While we should defer to the district court on matters within its discretion, an\\nappellate court need not defer to a district courtβs error of law. Berry v. Schulman, 807\\nF.3d 600, 608 (4th Cir. 2015)\\n 4\\n As described by the majority, the most glaring conflict in the class is the conflict\\nbetween class members with traceable patronage interests in the Cooperativeβs reserves\\nand those class members without such interests. Class members with patronage interests\\ncan trace their interest in the Cooperativeβs reserves to their individual contributions to\\nthe reserves over time, and class members without those patronage interests cannot.\\nPatronage interests accrued over time and largely derived from contributions made during\\nprofitable years in the Cooperativeβs history and from assessments under the No Net Cost\\nAct.\\n 5\\n While typicality and commonality are not specifically raised on appeal, the same\\nissues about which the Objectors complain in the class representative argument also\\napply to those issues. As the Supreme Court has instructed, typicality, commonality and\\nadequacy of class representative often merge into the same or similar analysis. Gen. Tel.\\nCo. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). That was in fact the case in\\nBroussard.\\n\\n 61\\n\\nclass, but also to adequately represent the interests of all. When those requirements are\\n\\nnot met, the due process rights of the absent class members, as well as defendants, are\\n\\nprejudiced and classes should not be certified.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Turning next to the district courtβs findings regarding the adequacy of class\\n\\ncounsel under Rule 23(g), I agree with the majority that the district court abused its\\n\\ndiscretion in finding class counsel to be adequate, but for a different reason. In contrast to\\n\\nthe majorityβs approach, if the issue needs to be reached at all, I would simply find that\\n\\nthe district court necessarily abused its discretion because it appointed class counsel for a\\n\\nclass that was improperly certified due to the presence of intra-class conflicts.\\n\\n Instead of relying upon the inadequacy of class representatives to conclude that\\n\\ncounsel was therefore inadequate, the majority questions the manner in which the district\\n\\ncourt evaluated the adequacy of class counsel. The majority finds that βthe district court\\n\\nimproperly rejected the collusion argument based on the mere presence of the mediatorβ\\n\\nand βdid not meaningfully grappleβ with the North Carolina courtβs findings about\\n\\ncollusion. Maj. Op. at 30, 32. Respectfully, the record does not support this conclusion,\\n\\nand affording the findings of the district court appropriate deference, I cannot agree that\\n\\nthe district court erred in its findings regarding collusion. I write separately on this issue\\n\\nto address my disagreement with the majorityβs analysis and to illustrate the ways in\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 62\\n\\nwhich the district court meaningfully grappled with the North Carolina courtβs findings of\\n\\ncollusion. 6\\n\\n As an initial matter, the district court carefully considered Objectorsβ arguments\\n\\nthat the North Carolina court orders were binding on its own analysis of the adequacy of\\n\\nclass counsel. Regarding the North Carolina courtβs certification order, the district court\\n\\ncorrectly concluded that the certification of the Fisher-Lewis class did not impact the\\n\\nSpeaks action. Likewise, the district court correctly concluded that the North Carolina\\n\\ncase management order could not limit the parties or counsel in the Speaks action. In\\n\\nreaching this decision, the district court noted that the Objectors offered no case law in\\n\\nsupport of their positions. Finally, the district court concluded that the North Carolina\\n\\ncourtβs interlocutory order dated January 17, 2018 was not binding on its own analysis.\\n\\n These decisions are not surprising since, in advancing these arguments, the\\n\\nObjectors fundamentally mischaracterized the relationship between the two parallel\\n\\nactions. It is well settled that a parallel action has no effect on a competing action until a\\n\\n 6\\n While I disagree with the majority on this issue, I in no way minimize the\\nimportance of allegations and findings about ethical violations. Compliance with the\\nRules of Professional Responsibility are fundamental to our profession. My concurrence\\nshould not be construed to suggest allegations of ethical misconduct should not be taken\\nseriously or carefully evaluated in the appropriate forum. They should. However, those\\nfindings were neither binding on the district court nor necessarily relevant to the district\\ncourtβs adequacy determination here. See, e.g., W. Morgan-E. Lawrence Water & Sewer\\nAuth. v. 3M Co., 737 F.App'x 457, 465 n.10 (11th Cir. 2018) (βAlthough state ethical\\nrules may be relevant to our determination of whether approval of the settlement was\\nappropriate, a violation of state ethical rules is neither necessary nor sufficient to\\nestablish a violation of federal Rule 23(g).β). What was and remains relevant is whether\\nthe district court considered the objections and, in doing so, made decisions for which\\nthere is legal and evidentiary support. As noted above, the district did that here.\\n\\n\\n 63\\n\\nfinal judgment is reached. See 3 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions\\n\\nΒ§10:33 (5th ed. 2011). That is even true for the certification decision. βA common\\n\\nmisunderstanding is that certification of a class in one suit somehow forestalls other\\n\\nrelated cases; in fact, only the preclusive effect of a final judgment can formally achieve\\n\\nthat end and a decision simply certifying a class is not itself a final judgment.β Id. Simply\\n\\nput, the North Carolina courtβs interlocutory decisions did not apply to the Speaks case.\\n\\n Turning now to issues raised in the majorityβs analysis, the record reveals that the\\n\\ndistrict court did not improperly reject the collusion argument based on the mere presence\\n\\nof the mediator and did meaningfully grapple with the North Carolina courtβs findings\\n\\nabout collusion. Regarding the role of the mediator, the district court admittedly viewed\\n\\nthe mediator as a factor in rejecting the collusion arguments. As the court noted, the\\n\\nSpeaks settlement was reached after a mediation led by a well-respected North Carolina\\n\\nmediator. The court correctly cited to authority that stands for the proposition that the\\n\\npresence of an unbiased mediator is some evidence against the presence of collusion. See\\n\\nJones v. Singing River Health Servs. Found., 865 F.3d 285, 295 (5th Cir. 2017), cert.\\n\\ndenied sub nom. Almond v. Singing River Health Sys., 138 S. Ct. 1000 (2018) (βThe\\n\\ninvolvement of an experienced and well-known mediator is also a strong indicator of\\n\\nprocedural fairness.β) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n However, the district courtβs decision on alleged collusion was based on more than\\n\\nthe involvement of the mediator. Despite the district courtβs conclusion about the legal\\n\\neffect of the North Carolina court orders (or lack thereof), the district court nevertheless\\n\\nconsidered issues they raised concerning the adequacy of class counsel. Specifically,\\n\\n 64\\n\\ndespite the majorityβs contention to the contrary, the district court considered at length\\n\\nissues raised by the North Carolina courtβs interlocutory order dated January 17, 2018.\\n\\nAdmittedly, the courtβs treatment of the issues raised by the North Carolina order are not\\n\\nall contained in the same part of the order. However, when the order is considered as a\\n\\nwhole, it meaningfully grappled with the North Carolina courtβs findings cited by the\\n\\nmajority on pages twenty-nine and thirty above.\\n\\n Regarding notice, the district court considered the issue of whether the Fisher-\\n\\nLewis class was adequately notified of the Speaks mediation. For the same reasons set\\n\\nforth in the preceding paragraphs, the court found that it was. Specifically, the court\\n\\nrejected βthe contention that the Fisher/Lewis class members have some interest, separate\\n\\nand apart, from the interests of the other class members in this case.β J.A. 4742.\\n\\n The district court also considered the issue of whether the notices issued in the\\n\\nSpeaks case adequately described the effect of the Speaks settlement on the Fisher-Lewis\\n\\nclaims. It reviewed the contents of the actual notices and found the short form notice, the\\n\\nsettlement website and the long form notice contained the necessary information about\\n\\nthe effect of the settlement. See J.A. 4779 (βThe long form notice also clearly details how\\n\\nthe Speaks action affects the Fisher/Lewis action . . . . The settlement website, which is\\n\\nlisted on the short form notice and the media publications, provides additional\\n\\ninformation about the settlement and the Fisher/Lewis action . . . .β).\\n\\n The district court also considered the relative inactivity in Speaks prior to the\\n\\nsettlement. It found that while admittedly there was less formal discovery in the Speaks\\n\\ncase than the Fisher-Lewis case, there was extensive information discovery and\\n\\n 65\\n\\ninformation exchange. See J.A. 4764 (βHere, the parties engaged in informal discovery\\n\\nand class counsel received numerous documents from the Cooperative . . . . The\\n\\nmediation process provided class counsel with sufficient information about the merits of\\n\\nthe case.β)\\n\\n Last, the district court considered whether the record contained evidence of\\n\\ncollusion. After reviewing the oral arguments made at two hearings and the extensive\\n\\nbriefing on this issue, the district court assessed whether actual evidence of collusion had\\n\\nbeen offered. The court concluded that there was no evidence presented of collusion\\n\\nbesides the timing of the Speaks settlement.\\n\\n In sum, the record reveals that the district court erred in appointing class counsel\\n\\nbut not in the way the majority suggests. The district court erred in appointing class\\n\\ncounsel for a settlement class that should not have been certified to begin with because\\n\\nthe class representatives were not adequate. However, its conclusions regarding\\n\\nallegations of collusion were not error. 7 On this issue, the district court applied the law\\n\\nreasonably and based its decision on the record before it.\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n Under the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court gives βsubstantial\\ndeferenceβ to a district courtβs certification and settlement decisions, βrecognizing that a\\nβdistrict court possesses greater familiarity and expertise than a court of appeals in\\nmanaging the practical problems of a class action.ββ BerryΒΈ 807 F.3d at 608 (quoting\\nWard v. Dixie Natβl. Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 179 (4th Cir. 2010)). In applying this\\nstandard, an appellate court may not substitute its own ideas of fairness for the those of\\ndistrict court. Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975). Rather, an\\nappellate court may reverse a district courtβs certification or settlement decision only\\nwhen the district court has committed an error of law or a clear error in finding of fact.\\nBerry, 807 F.3d at 608.\\n\\n 66\\n\\n III.\\n\\n I turn last to the district courtβs finding that the settlement was fair, reasonable and\\n\\nadequate. Since the class representatives in this case were not adequate, approval of the\\n\\nsettlement was not appropriate in these circumstances. The Supreme Court has found β[a]\\n\\nfairness hearing under subdivision (e) can no more swallow the preceding protective\\n\\nrequirements of Rule 23 in a subdivision (b)(1)(B) action than in one under subdivision\\n\\n(b)(3).β Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 858β59. In this limited sense, I join the majority in reversing\\n\\nthe district courtβs approval of the settlement. However, I write separately to express my\\n\\nconcerns about the majorityβs reasoning for reversing the district court.\\n\\n Like a district courtβs certification decision, a district courtβs approval of a class\\n\\naction settlement is afforded substantial deference and should be reversed only upon a\\n\\nclear showing that the district court abused its discretion. Berry, 807 F.3d at 614.\\n\\n Significantly, the majority does not find fault with the legal factors the district\\n\\ncourt considered in reaching its decision. And it does not find fault with the district court\\n\\nin determining the most important of those factors are the relative strength of the\\n\\nplaintiffsβ claims and the existence of difficulties of proof or strong defenses. It also does\\n\\nnot object to the way the district court evaluated those issues as they relate to the Speaks\\n\\nclass. Indeed, the majority describes the district courtβs analysis as thorough.\\n\\n Instead, the majority finds the district court abused its discretion because, to the\\n\\nmajority, many of the weaknesses the district court found with the Speaks class claims do\\n\\nnot apply to the Fisher-Lewis class claims or at least apply with less force. Specifically,\\n\\nthe majority contends that the statute of limitations and business judgment rule defenses\\n\\n 67\\n\\nare less compelling as to the Fisher-Lewis class claims than the district court found. The\\n\\nmajority then criticizes the district courtβs reasoning as to why the $76 million settlement\\n\\noffer from 2005 in the Fisher-Lewis action did not make the settlement here inadequate\\n\\nand as to why the failure of a case in Georgia with claims very similar to the Fisher-\\n\\nLewis class claims suggested weaknesses of the claims in this case.\\n\\n In my view, the majority here deviates from reviewing the district courtβs\\n\\ndecisions under the abuse of discretion standard. Instead, it substitutes its judgment for\\n\\nthe district courtβs. The district court evaluated each claim for relief. It considered the\\n\\ndefenses faced by the plaintiffs, including the statute of limitations and business\\n\\njudgment rule defenses. It considered and found persuasive a nearly identical action\\n\\nbrought in Georgia resulting in no recovery. It considered the $76 million settlement offer\\n\\nin the North Carolina state case in 2005, determining that offer did not mean the\\n\\nsettlement here was inadequate because, in its view, the litigation risks surrounding the\\n\\nclaims have changed significantly since 2005 in favor of the Cooperative.\\n\\n The district court also considered the differences between the Speaks class claims\\n\\nand the Fisher-Lewis class claims. Specifically, the court reasoned:\\n\\n [C]ounsel . . . failed to explain at the fairness hearing or anywhere else how\\n including these additional causes of action would provide a route for the\\n Fisher/Lewis plaintiffs to litigate that case through final judgment and final\\n appeal and recover any greater relief than $24 million, given that each of\\n these claims appears to rest on the same fundamentally flawed allegation\\n that the Cooperative unlawfully retained reserves.\\n\\nJ.A. 4768. The court then added β[a]t the fairness hearing, this court asked counsel . . . to\\n\\ndiscuss the strength of plaintiffsβ claims in Fisher/Lewis and Speaks and explain how\\n\\n\\n 68\\n\\nplaintiffs in either case could recover anything approaching $24 million if they litigated\\n\\nto final judgment and final appeal.β J.A. 4770. The district court found the absence of a\\n\\nmeaningful response significant.\\n\\n Reasonable minds could of course differ on the strengths and weaknesses of the\\n\\nSpeaks class claims. Indeed, if one hundred judges or lawyers were asked their views\\n\\nabout the strengths and weaknesses of the claims here and about an appropriate value of\\n\\nthe case, there would likely be one hundred different responses. That is why it is critical\\n\\nthat we steadfastly adhere to the applicable standard of review. Under the abuse of\\n\\ndiscretion standard, our inquiry is simply whether the district court identified and applied\\n\\nthe appropriate legal principles and whether it based its decision based on evidence in the\\n\\nrecord. Here, the district court did that. When that occurs, an appellate court should not\\n\\nsubstitute its judgment for the district courtβs.\\n\\n As noted above, I agree with the majority that the order approving the class\\n\\nsettlement should be reversed. However, my agreement is based on the adequacy of the\\n\\nclass representative issue as described above. My agreement is not based on the district\\n\\ncourtβs evaluation of the fairness and adequacy of the settlement. In my view, the district\\n\\ncourt carefully considered the appropriate legal issues and based its decision on a\\n\\nreasonable interpretation of the record.\\n\\n IV.\\n\\n In conclusion, I join the majority in affirming the district courtβs denial of\\n\\nattempted class wide opt-outs and in dismissing the appeal of the order denying the\\n\\nmotion to intervene. I also join the majority in reversing the district courtβs order\\n\\n 69\\n\\ncertifying the class and approving the final settlement. While in the end, the majority and\\n\\nI arrive at the same destination, I arrive by a different path.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 70\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4372452/\", \"author_raw\": \"QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GREGORY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"THACKER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"QUATTLEBAUM"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":5,"string":"5"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595199/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: SHARP FARMS; Robert W. May ; Tucker Farms Inc.; Worthington Farms, Inc., Objectors-Appellants, v. Teresa M. SPEAKS; Toby Speaks ; Stan Smith; Eddie Brown; Robert Poindexter ; Mike Mitchell; Roy L. Cook; Alex Shugart ; H. Randle Wood; Robin Rogers; Daniel Lee Nelson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U. S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc., F/K/A Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Dan Lewis, Potential Intervenor-Appellant, v. Teresa M. Speaks; Toby Speaks ; Stan Smith; Eddie Brown; Robert Poindexter ; Mike Mitchell; Roy L. Cook; Alex Shugart ; H. Randle Wood; Robin Rogers; Daniel Lee Nelson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U. S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc., F/K/A Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-28\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1316\n\n\nSHARP FARMS; ROBERT W. MAY; TUCKER FARMS INC.;\nWORTHINGTON FARMS, Inc.,\n\n Objectors - Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nTERESA M. SPEAKS; TOBY SPEAKS; STAN SMITH; EDDIE BROWN;\nROBERT POINDEXTER; MIKE MITCHELL; ROY L. COOK; ALEX SHUGART;\nH. RANDLE WOOD; ROBIN ROGERS; DANIEL LEE NELSON,\n\n Plaintiffs β Appellees,\n\n and\n\nU. S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE INC., f/k/a Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative\nStabilization Corporation,\n\n Defendant β Appellee.\n\n\n\n\n No. 18-1325\n\n\nDAN LEWIS,\n\n Potential Intervenor - Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nTERESA M. SPEAKS; TOBY SPEAKS; STAN SMITH; EDDIE BROWN;\nROBERT POINDEXTER; MIKE MITCHELL; ROY L. COOK; ALEX SHUGART;\nH. RANDLE WOOD; ROBIN ROGERS; DANIEL LEE NELSON,\n\n Plaintiffs β Appellees,\n\n and\n\nU. S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE INC., f/k/a Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative\nStabilization Corporation,\n\n Defendant β Appellee.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\nRaleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge. (5:12-cv-00729-D)\n\n\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 28, 2019\n\n\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Quattlebaum joined.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: SHARP FARMS; Robert W. May ; Tucker Farms Inc.; Worthington Farms, Inc., Objectors-Appellants, v. Teresa M. SPEAKS; Toby Speaks ; Stan Smith; Eddie Brown; Robert Poindexter ; Mike Mitchell; Roy L. Cook; Alex Shugart ; H. Randle Wood; Robin Rogers; Daniel Lee Nelson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U. S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc., F/K/A Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation, Defendant-Appellee. Dan Lewis, Potential Intervenor-Appellant, v. Teresa M. Speaks; Toby Speaks ; Stan Smith; Eddie Brown; Robert Poindexter ; Mike Mitchell; Roy L. Cook; Alex Shugart ; H. Randle Wood; Robin Rogers; Daniel Lee Nelson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U. S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc., F/K/A Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-28\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1316\\n\\n\\nSHARP FARMS; ROBERT W. MAY; TUCKER FARMS INC.;\\nWORTHINGTON FARMS, Inc.,\\n\\n Objectors - Appellants,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nTERESA M. SPEAKS; TOBY SPEAKS; STAN SMITH; EDDIE BROWN;\\nROBERT POINDEXTER; MIKE MITCHELL; ROY L. COOK; ALEX SHUGART;\\nH. RANDLE WOOD; ROBIN ROGERS; DANIEL LEE NELSON,\\n\\n Plaintiffs β Appellees,\\n\\n and\\n\\nU. S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE INC., f/k/a Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative\\nStabilization Corporation,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1325\\n\\n\\nDAN LEWIS,\\n\\n Potential Intervenor - Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nTERESA M. SPEAKS; TOBY SPEAKS; STAN SMITH; EDDIE BROWN;\\nROBERT POINDEXTER; MIKE MITCHELL; ROY L. COOK; ALEX SHUGART;\\nH. RANDLE WOOD; ROBIN ROGERS; DANIEL LEE NELSON,\\n\\n Plaintiffs β Appellees,\\n\\n and\\n\\nU. S. TOBACCO COOPERATIVE INC., f/k/a Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative\\nStabilization Corporation,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at\\nRaleigh. James C. Dever, III, District Judge. (5:12-cv-00729-D)\\n\\n\\nArgued: October 31, 2018 Decided: February 28, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed in part, reversed and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory\\nwrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker and Judge Quattlebaum joined.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":575,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4595213,"string":"4,595,213"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"GATEWAY RESIDENCES AT EXCHANGE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, D/B/A ACE American Insurance Company, D/B/A ACE Environmental, D/B/A ACE USA, D/B/A ACE USA Companies, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Gateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-28"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-1491"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Agee, Diaz, Harris\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"PUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1491\\n\\n\\nGATEWAY RESIDENCES AT EXCHANGE, LLC,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a ACE American Insurance\\nCompany, d/b/a ACE Environmental, d/b/a Ace USA, d/b/a ACE USA Companies,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nAlexandria. Liam OβGrady, District Judge. (1:17-cv-00629-LO-JFA)\\n\\n\\nArgued: December 12, 2018 Decided: February 28, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore AGEE, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and\\nJudge Harris joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: C. Thomas Brown, SILVER & BROWN, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant.\\nDouglas Aaron Winegardner, SANDS ANDERSON, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for\\nAppellee. ON BRIEF: Eric B. Lawson, SILVER & BROWN, Fairfax, Virginia, for\\nAppellant.\\n\\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Having been awarded more than $900,000 for a contractorβs faulty workmanship,\\n\\nGateway Residences at Exchange, LLC, sued to collect the judgment from the\\n\\ncontractorβs liability insurer, Illinois Union Insurance Company. The relevant policy,\\n\\nhowever, covered only claims reported to the insurer during the policy period, and that\\n\\npolicy expired 19 months before Illinois Union learned about Gatewayβs claim.\\n\\n That should end this case. But Gateway claims it may nonetheless recover on the\\n\\npolicy because, by Virginia statute, Illinois Union waived certain defenses by failing to\\n\\npromptly inform Gateway of its coverage denial. See Va. Code Ann. Β§ 38.2-2226. The\\n\\ndistrict court was unpersuaded and, for reasons that follow, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n This insurance dispute started with two broken generators in an Alexandria,\\n\\nVirginia, apartment complex. Gateway, the buildingβs owner, had hired a local\\n\\ncontractor, Mechanical Design Group (MDG), to provide various engineering and design\\n\\nservices. Among MDGβs jobs was to install two βlife and safety power generatorsβ in the\\n\\ngarage. J.A. 208. MDG apparently didnβt install the generators very well, though, for\\n\\nwhen they started up in August 2014, they caught fire, wrecking the generators and\\n\\ndelaying the 217-unit buildingβs opening.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Blaming MDG for the damage, Gateway demanded that its contractor βcure the\\n\\nnegligent design and installationβ of the generators. J.A. 209. But it didnβt sue MDG, at\\n\\nleast initially. And in September 2014, MDG went out of business.\\n\\n Before starting work on the Gateway project, MDG had bought liability insurance\\n\\nfrom Illinois Union. Under the policy, Illinois Union had agreed to indemnify MDG for\\n\\nlegal claims that might arise from the Gateway job. The front page of the policy advised\\n\\nthat it provided liability coverage βON A CLAIMS-MADE AND REPORTED\\n\\nBASIS,β meaning that it covered βONLY CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST THE\\n\\nINSURED AND REPORTED TO THE INSURER, IN WRITING, DURING THE\\n\\nPOLICY PERIOD.β J.A. 256 (typeface in original). To further stress the point, the\\n\\npolicy made it a βcondition precedent to coverageβ that any claim be reported to the\\n\\ninsurer during the policy period. J.A. 259. The policy period began on February 1, 2014,\\n\\nand ended one year later on February 1, 2015. 1\\n\\n MDG apparently never told Illinois Union about Gatewayβs potential claim before\\n\\nits insurance policy expired in 2015. Instead, Illinois Union first heard about the\\n\\ngenerator incident on September 6, 2016, after Gateway notified MDGβs insurers that it\\n\\nintended to sue. Ten days later, Gateway sued MDG in Virginia state court alleging\\n\\nnegligence and breach of contract.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The policy also provided a 60-day βextended reporting period,β subject to\\nvarious conditions. J.A. 269. These provisions have no bearing on this appeal.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f In early October 2016, MDG learned that Illinois Union had denied it coverage for\\n\\nGatewayβs claim. The denial letter, sent by Chubb North American Claims βon behalf\\n\\nofβ Illinois Union, 2 explained that because the claim was first reported in September\\n\\n2016 there was βno coverage for this matter as no claims were made and reported during\\n\\nthe policy period.β J.A. 294, 296. A couple of weeks later, Gatewayβs counsel received a\\n\\ncopy of Illinois Unionβs denial letter from MDGβs insurance broker. Chubb, however,\\n\\ndidnβt contact Gateway directly about its coverage denial until January 23, 2017.\\n\\n In the meantime, Gatewayβs lawsuit against MDG proceeded in state court. MDG\\n\\nnever appeared, so the court entered a default judgment awarding Gateway $910,148 in\\n\\ndamages and $22,580 in costs and attorneysβ fees.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Having obtained this judgment, Gateway filed the present lawsuit seeking to\\n\\ncollect from Illinois Union under MDGβs liability policy. Gateway first sued in Virginia\\n\\nstate court, but Illinois Union removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern\\n\\nDistrict of Virginia, invoking that courtβs diversity jurisdiction. (Gateway is a citizen of\\n\\nVirginia and Maryland, whereas Illinois Union is a citizen of Pennsylvania and Illinois.)\\n\\nGateway moved unsuccessfully to remand. See Gateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill.\\n\\nUnion Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-629, 2017 WL 7805743, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2017).\\n\\n Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Illinois\\n\\nUnion because its policy didnβt cover claims first reported after the policy period ended\\n\\n 2\\n Illinois Unionβs parent company, ACE USA, merged with Chubb in 2016.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fin February 2015. The court also rejected Gatewayβs contention that Illinois Union had\\n\\nwaived this noncoverage argument because it gave Gateway untimely notice of its denial.\\n\\nGateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-629,\\n\\n2018 WL 1629107, at *2β4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2018). This appeal followed.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Gateway challenges the district courtβs refusal to remand the case and its entry of\\n\\njudgment in Illinois Unionβs favor. We have reviewed both issues de novo and find no\\n\\nerror.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Gateway first argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and\\n\\nshould have remanded this case to Virginia state court. It contends that the present suit is\\n\\na βdirect actionβ against an insurer and that Illinois Union therefore assumes the\\n\\ncitizenship of its insured under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332(c)(1). Were that true, the court would\\n\\nlack diversity jurisdiction because both Gateway and Illinois Unionβs insured, MDG, are\\n\\ncitizens of Virginia. We disagree, however, that Gatewayβs lawsuit is a βdirect action.β\\n\\n Federal courts have original jurisdiction over suits for more than $75,000 between\\n\\nβcitizens of different States.β 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332(a)(1). For diversity jurisdiction\\n\\npurposes, a corporation is a citizen of any state in which it is incorporated, plus the state\\n\\nor foreign country βwhere it has its principal place of business.β Id. Β§ 1332(c)(1). But\\n\\nΒ§ 1332(c) has an extra citizenship rule for insurance companies. Namely:\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f [I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability\\n insurance . . . to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant,\\n such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of . . . every State and foreign state of\\n which the insured is a citizen.\\n\\nId. Β§ 1332(c)(1)(A). In other words, if a plaintiff brings a βdirect actionβ against a\\n\\nwrongdoerβs liability insurer, the insurer assumes the citizenship of the insured. Kong v.\\n\\nAllied Profβl Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n On its face, this language sweeps broadly, potentially covering any lawsuit in\\n\\nwhich a third party sues a liability insurer over its insuredβs conduct. But the unanimous\\n\\nunderstanding of our sister circuits has been that βdirect actionβ as used in Β§ 1332(c) has\\n\\na much narrower meaning. Specifically, it refers to a suit in which the plaintiff sues a\\n\\nwrongdoerβs liability insurer without joining or first obtaining a judgment against the\\n\\ninsured. Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300; accord Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.3d\\n\\n482, 484β85 (7th Cir. 2018); Rosa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 981 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1992);\\n\\nBeckham v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 691 F.2d 898, 901β02 (9th Cir. 1982); see Velez v.\\n\\nCrown Life Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 471, 473 (1st Cir. 1979); Henderson v. Selective Ins. Co.,\\n\\n369 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1966); see also 7A Couch on Insurance Β§ 107:4 (3d ed.\\n\\nupdated 2018) (collecting additional cases).\\n\\n Section 1332(c)βs legislative history strongly supports this reading. In 1964,\\n\\nCongress added language to the diversity jurisdiction statute to address βdirect actionβ\\n\\nlawsuits allowed by the laws of Louisiana and Wisconsin. See S. Rep. No. 88-1308, at\\n\\n1β2 (1964); see also Velez, 599 F.2d at 473. Under these laws, a plaintiff may sue a\\n\\ntortfeasorβs liability insurer without joining the tortfeasor as a defendant and establish\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\fboth the insuredβs liability and the insurerβs obligation in a single suit. See La. Stat. Ann.\\n\\nΒ§ 22:1269(B); Wis. Stat. Ann. Β§ 632.24. Such statutes often created federal diversity\\n\\njurisdiction when the insurerβs citizenship was different from the plaintiffβs. And as a\\n\\nresult, what were essentially tort disputes between local residents would end up in federal\\n\\ncourt. See H.R. Rep. No. 88-1229, at 1β2 (1964); cf. Lumbermenβs Mut. Cas. Co. v.\\n\\nElbert, 348 U.S. 48, 56β57 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (bemoaning βdirect\\n\\nactionβ forum-shopping). In response, Congress amended Β§ 1332(c) to provide that the\\n\\ndefendant insurer adopts the insuredβs citizenship in such cases, thereby destroying\\n\\ndiversity and ensuring that the merits of the tort claim would be resolved in state court.\\n\\n Given this provisionβs background, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that the\\n\\nβkey featureβ of a direct action is βthe plaintiffβs ability to skip suing the [tortfeasor] and\\n\\nsue directly his insurance carrier.β Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300β01 (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted). When a plaintiff must either join the local tortfeasor or first obtain a separate\\n\\njudgment against it, the lack of diverse citizenship forces the state tort claim into state\\n\\ncourt. Itβs only when the plaintiff skips this step and sues the insurer directly that the\\n\\nconcerns behind Congressβs βdirect actionβ amendments are implicated. See Kong, 750\\n\\nF.3d at 1300β01 (no direct action when plaintiff sued insurer after obtaining judgment\\n\\nfrom insured); Hyland, 885 F.3d at 485 (same).\\n\\n Under this definition, Gatewayβs lawsuit is not a direct action. Virginia doesnβt\\n\\nhave a direct action statute but instead requires a third-party claimant to first obtain a\\n\\njudgment against the insured. The claimant may then sue the insurer on the policy to\\n\\ncollect the judgment. Va. Code Ann. Β§ 38.2-2200; Richmond, Fredericksburg, &\\n\\n 7\\n\\fPotomac R.R. Co. v. Hughes-Keegan, Inc., 152 S.E.2d 28, 33β34 (Va. 1967). And that is\\n\\njust what happened here. Gateway obtained a default judgment against MDG in state\\n\\ncourt then sued to collect that judgment under Illinois Unionβs liability policy. Gateway\\n\\ndid not (and could not) skip the tortfeasor, the insured. Its present lawsuit is therefore not\\n\\na direct action within the meaning of Β§ 1332(c)(1).\\n\\n Gatewayβs arguments do not persuade otherwise. First, it notes that we have\\n\\npreviously used the words βdirect actionβ to describe, under Virginia law, a lawsuit\\n\\nagainst an insurer to enforce a judgment against its insured. See Morrel v. Nationwide\\n\\nMut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 221β22 (4th Cir. 1999). But in Morrel, we used βdirect\\n\\nactionβ in the generic sense of a lawsuit filed against an insurer. We did not consider\\n\\nwhether such a suit fits the technical meaning of Β§ 1332(c). Second, Gateway points us\\n\\nto a sprinkling of district court cases holding that suits like this one are direct actions\\n\\nbecause they essentially do βin two stepsβ what Louisianaβs and Wisconsinβs statutes βdid\\n\\nin one.β See, e.g., Sherman v. Pa. Lumbermenβs Mut. Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 543, 544β\\n\\n45 (D. Md. 1998) (quoting Prendergast v. All. Gen. Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 653, 655 (E.D.\\n\\nMo. 1996)). But these cases, as the weight of contrary circuit precedent shows, are\\n\\nplainly wrong. It is precisely the first step of suing the insured tortfeasor (or, for that\\n\\nmatter, the simultaneous step of joining it as a party) that funnels the tort suit into state\\n\\ncourt and thus eases Congressβs jurisdictional and forum-shopping concerns.\\n\\n This lawsuit, in sum, is not a direct action for purposes of Β§ 1332(c)(1), and\\n\\nIllinois Union therefore does not adopt MDGβs Virginia citizenship. Because this lawsuit\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\finstead pits a Virginia plaintiff against an Illinois defendant, the district court had\\n\\ndiversity jurisdiction and rightly refused to remand to state court.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n On the merits, the district court awarded summary judgment to Illinois Union\\n\\nbecause its policy covered only claims made and reported during the policy period and\\n\\nGatewayβs claim wasnβt reported until well after the policy had expired. Gatewayβs main\\n\\ncontention on appeal is that, under a Virginia statute, Illinois Union waived that argument\\n\\nby failing to inform Gateway of its coverage denial within 45 days of receiving the claim.\\n\\nIllinois Union, in response, says the relevant statute doesnβt apply in this case.\\n\\n Gatewayβs waiver argument invokes Virginia Code Section 38.2-2226. Under this\\n\\nstatute, an insurer that wants to defend against a third-party claimant based on its\\n\\ninsuredβs breach of the underlying policy must notify the claimant of that intention.\\n\\nSpecifically, it provides that:\\n\\n Whenever any insurer on a policy of liability insurance discovers a breach\\n of the terms or conditions of the insurance contract by the insured, the\\n insurer shall notify the claimant or the claimantβs counsel of the breach.\\n Notification shall be given within forty-five days after discovery by the\\n insurer of the breach or of the claim, whichever is later.\\n\\nVa. Code. Ann. Β§ 38.2-2226. Failure to give the required 45 daysβ notice βwill result in a\\n\\nwaiver of the defense based on such breach to the extent of the claim by operation of\\n\\nlaw.β Id.\\n\\n The statuteβs text makes two things clear: it covers denials based on the insuredβs\\n\\nβbreachβ of the terms and conditions of the policy and applies to arguments properly\\n\\ncharacterized as waivable βdefenses.β Courts have therefore rightly held that that the\\n\\n 9\\n\\fstatue (or its precursor) doesnβt apply when an insurer denies coverage because the claim\\n\\nfalls outside the scope of policy coverage. See Cheatham v. NGM Ins. Co., No.\\n\\n3:12cv263-HEH, 2013 WL 509049, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2013); Berry v. State Farm\\n\\nMut. Auto Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Va. 1972); Jackson v. Middleton, 90 Va.\\n\\nCir. 279, 2015 WL 10765161, at *3β4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2015). The argument that a claim is\\n\\noutside the scope of coverage is not about an insuredβs βbreachβ of contract. A βbreachβ\\n\\nassumes a legal duty on the insuredβs part, but the insured obviously has no legal duty to\\n\\nincur covered claims. Likewise, a denial based on scope of coverage is not a βdefense,β\\n\\nas a βdefenseβ presupposes the insurerβs existing obligation to provide coverage.\\n\\n With this understanding, we conclude that the statute doesnβt apply in this case.\\n\\nIllinois Union hasnβt denied coverage because of MDGβs breach. Rather, it assertsβ\\n\\ncorrectlyβthat the present claim is simply not covered by the policy.\\n\\n As the policyβs bold, all-caps preface makes clear, Illinois Union sold MDG a\\n\\nβclaims-made-and-reportedβ policy. This is a type of βclaims-madeβ policy, which\\n\\ndiffers from an ordinary βoccurrenceβ policy in the type of risk it insures. An occurrence\\n\\npolicy insures against a specific occurrence (say, a car accident or building fire), and\\n\\nusually doesnβt depend on when the claim itself is filed. In contrast, under a claims-made\\n\\npolicy, the making of the claim itself is the peril being insured. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v.\\n\\nContβl Cas. Co., 709 F.3d 1170, 1174 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013). Coverage usually attaches to a\\n\\nclaim made during the policy period regardless of when the events underlying the claim\\n\\ntook place. Id. See generally 7 Couch, supra, Β§ 102:22 (describing different liability\\n\\npolicies).\\n\\n 10\\n\\f Claims-made-and-reported policies, like the one Illinois Union sold MDG, are a\\n\\ndistinct brand of claims-made policies. A claims-made-and-reported policy usually\\n\\nβrequires the claim both be made against the insured and reported to the insurer during\\n\\nthe policy period.β Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 13 A.3d 1268, 1282\\n\\n(Md. 2011). If no claim is reported, no coverage is triggered, even if the events\\n\\nunderlying the claim took place during the policy period. And after the policy expires,\\n\\nβthe insurerβs potential liability ends.β T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P. Inc., 628 A.2d 223, 227\\n\\n(Md. 1993) (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 554 A.2d 404, 418 (Md.\\n\\n1989) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting)).\\n\\n We do not think Virginia Code Section 38.2-2226 applies when, as here, an\\n\\ninsurer denies coverage under a claims-made-and-reported policy because no claim was\\n\\nreported during the policy period. Illinois Unionβs potential liability under this policy\\n\\nended when it expired in February 2015, so the policy simply canβt cover a claim first\\n\\nreported to the insurer a full 19 months later in September 2016. Illinois Union is\\n\\ntherefore not raising a βdefense based on [an insuredβs] breach.β Va. Code. Ann. Β§ 38.2-\\n\\n2226. There was no βbreachβ because, after February 2015, there was no policy to be\\n\\nbreached; there is no βdefenseβ because, after February 2015, Illinois Union had no\\n\\ncoverage obligation to defend against. See T.H.E., 628 A.2d at 227, 230 (holding, under\\n\\nsimilar Maryland statute, that denial of claim made after expiry of claims-made-and-\\n\\nreported policy βresulted from the terms of coverageβ and βis not attributed to a βbreachββ\\n\\nby the insured); Minn. Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baylor & Jackson, PLLC, 531 F. Appβx\\n\\n312, 325 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J., dissenting) (βIf [the act triggering coverage]\\n\\n 11\\n\\foccurred after the expiration of the liability policy . . . there is simply no policy which the\\n\\ninsured can breach when it fails to notify the insurer of the claim.β). Because Illinois\\n\\nUnionβs argument is based on noncoverage, and not on MDGβs breach, Section 38.2-\\n\\n2226 does not apply. 3\\n\\n Besides being textually awkward, Gatewayβs reading of Section 38.2-2226 would\\n\\nhave the policy embrace claims it was never intended to cover. In a claims-made-and-\\n\\nreported policy, the condition that claims be reported during the policy period is an\\n\\nessential part of the bargain between insurer and insured. See Chas T. Main, Inc. v.\\n\\nFiremanβs Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28, 29β30 (Mass. 1990). For the insurer, claim-\\n\\ntriggering reporting allows it to βclose its books on a policy at its expiration and therefore\\n\\nattain a level of predictability unattainable under standard occurrence policies.β First\\n\\nAm., 709 F.3d at 1175 (internal quotation marks omitted). In exchange, the insurer may\\n\\naccept a lower premium from the insured than it would for an occurrence policy with\\n\\nenduring liability. Id.; Stine v. Contβl Cas. Co., 349 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Mich. 1984).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Gateway puts heavy stock in Section 38.2-2226βs use of the phrase βterms or\\nconditionsβ and language in Illinois Unionβs policy that makes reporting a claim during\\nthe policy period a βcondition precedent to coverage.β J.A. 259 (emphasis added). But\\nGatewayβs focus on this single word ignores the broader statutory language. The statute\\napplies only to βconditionsβ that can plausibly be βbreached,β and where the breach of\\nsuch conditions could rightly be understood as a βdefenseβ to coverage. That is not true\\nabout the reporting condition in a claims-made-and-reported policy. See Sherwood\\nBrands, 13 A.3d at 1288 (where notice of claim under claims-made policy occurs only\\nafter expiration, βthis non-occurrence of the condition precedent to coverage is not a\\nβbreach of the policyββ).\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Applying Section 38.2-2226 as Gateway urges, however, would expand the policy\\n\\nto confer benefits that MDG didnβt pay for and that Illinois Union never agreed to\\n\\nprovide. Though Virginiaβs legislature clearly designed Section 38.2-2226 to override\\n\\ncertain defenses, we doubt it intended the statute to effectively rewrite basic coverage\\n\\nterms of insurance contracts. Cf. Burns v. Intβl Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1424β25 (9th\\n\\nCir. 1993) (declining, for this reason, to apply a similar California rule to a claims-made\\n\\npolicy); Zuckerman v. Natβl Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 405β06 (N.J. 1985)\\n\\n(same under New Jersey law).\\n\\n Gatewayβs effort to shoehorn this dispute into Section 38.2-2226 misconstrues the\\n\\ninsurance contract at issue. Gateway says its demand on MDG in August 2014 triggered\\n\\ncoverage under the policy and obligated MDG to report that claim to its insurer. MDGβs\\n\\nfailure to make that report, Gateway says, was a βbreach of the reporting condition.β\\n\\nAppellantβs Br. at 30. But under Illinois Unionβs claims-made-and-reported policy, the\\n\\nact triggering coverage was not Gatewayβs 2014 demand, as Gateway claims, but rather\\n\\nthe communication of that claim to Illinois Union, which didnβt happen until well after\\n\\nthe policy expired.\\n\\n This case might come out quite differently had MDG reported Gatewayβs demand\\n\\nin 2014, or had MDG instead bought an occurrence policy. In those scenarios, coverage\\n\\nunder the policy would likely have been triggered, leaving Illinois Union to defend,\\n\\nperhaps, because MDG didnβt give prompt enough notice or failed to fully cooperate with\\n\\nthe insurer. In similar circumstances, courts have required notice under the statute at\\n\\nissue. See Morrel, 188 F.3d at 226β27 (insurer waived defense based on insuredβs failure\\n\\n 13\\n\\fto assist); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 448 F. Supp. 723, 725β26 (waived\\n\\ndefense based on insuredβs failure to notify βas soon as practicableβ). But those are not\\n\\nthe facts of this case. Here, MDG bought a claims-made-and-reported policy and\\n\\nreported no claim to Illinois Union during the policy period. MDG did not βbreachβ the\\n\\npolicy by not reporting Gatewayβs 2014 demand any more than one breaches a fire\\n\\ninsurance policy by incurring damage from a flood.\\n\\n Applying the text of the statute to the policy terms MDG and Illinois Union agreed\\n\\nto, we hold that Section 38.2-2226 does not apply to Illinois Unionβs denial of coverage.\\n\\nIllinois Union may therefore deny Gateway coverage despite allegedly failing to give\\n\\nnotice. And since the policy by its clear terms does not cover Gatewayβs post-\\n\\ntermination claim, summary judgment for Illinois Union was proper. 4\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We hold that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and properly\\n\\nawarded summary judgment in Illinois Unionβs favor. The judgment of the district court\\n\\nis therefore\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Given our holding, we do not decide whether Illinois Union complied with\\nVirginiaβs notice statute because Gateway received actual (though indirect) notice of the\\ndenial less than 45 days after making its claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4372466/\", \"author_raw\": \"DIAZ, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"AGEE"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DIAZ"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HARRIS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595213/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: GATEWAY RESIDENCES AT EXCHANGE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, D/B/A ACE American Insurance Company, D/B/A ACE Environmental, D/B/A ACE USA, D/B/A ACE USA Companies, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-28\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nPUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1491\n\n\nGATEWAY RESIDENCES AT EXCHANGE, LLC,\n\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\n\n v.\n\nILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a ACE American Insurance\nCompany, d/b/a ACE Environmental, d/b/a Ace USA, d/b/a ACE USA Companies,\n\n Defendant β Appellee.\n\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\nAlexandria. Liam OβGrady, District Judge. (1:17-cv-00629-LO-JFA)\n\n\nArgued: December 12, 2018 Decided: February 28, 2019\n\n\nBefore AGEE, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\n\n\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and\nJudge Harris joined.\n\n\nARGUED: C. Thomas Brown, SILVER & BROWN, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant.\nDouglas Aaron Winegardner, SANDS ANDERSON, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for\nAppellee. ON BRIEF: Eric B. Lawson, SILVER & BROWN, Fairfax, Virginia, for\nAppellant.\n\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\n\n Having been awarded more than $900,000 for a contractorβs faulty workmanship,\n\nGateway Residences at Exchange, LLC, sued to collect the judgment from the\n\ncontractorβs liability insurer, Illinois Union Insurance Company. The relevant policy,\n\nhowever, covered only claims reported to the insurer during the policy period, and that\n\npolicy expired 19 months before Illinois Union learned about Gatewayβs claim.\n\n That should end this case. But Gateway claims it may nonetheless recover on the\n\npolicy because, by Virginia statute, Illinois Union waived certain defenses by failing to\n\npromptly inform Gateway of its coverage denial. See Va. Code Ann. Β§ 38.2-2226. The\n\ndistrict court was unpersuaded and, for reasons that follow, we affirm.\n\n\n\n I.\n\n A.\n\n This insurance dispute started with two broken generators in an Alexandria,\n\nVirginia, apartment complex. Gateway, the buildingβs owner, had hired a local\n\ncontractor, Mechanical Design Group (MDG), to provide various engineering and design\n\nservices. Among MDGβs jobs was to install two βlife and safety power generatorsβ in the\n\ngarage. J.A. 208. MDG apparently didnβt install the generators very well, though, for\n\nwhen they started up in August 2014, they caught fire, wrecking the generators and\n\ndelaying the 217-unit buildingβs opening.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\f Blaming MDG for the damage, Gateway demanded that its contractor βcure the\n\nnegligent design and installationβ of the generators. J.A. 209. But it didnβt sue MDG, at\n\nleast initially. And in September 2014, MDG went out of business.\n\n Before starting work on the Gateway project, MDG had bought liability insurance\n\nfrom Illinois Union. Under the policy, Illinois Union had agreed to indemnify MDG for\n\nlegal claims that might arise from the Gateway job. The front page of the policy advised\n\nthat it provided liability coverage βON A CLAIMS-MADE AND REPORTED\n\nBASIS,β meaning that it covered βONLY CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST THE\n\nINSURED AND REPORTED TO THE INSURER, IN WRITING, DURING THE\n\nPOLICY PERIOD.β J.A. 256 (typeface in original). To further stress the point, the\n\npolicy made it a βcondition precedent to coverageβ that any claim be reported to the\n\ninsurer during the policy period. J.A. 259. The policy period began on February 1, 2014,\n\nand ended one year later on February 1, 2015. 1\n\n MDG apparently never told Illinois Union about Gatewayβs potential claim before\n\nits insurance policy expired in 2015. Instead, Illinois Union first heard about the\n\ngenerator incident on September 6, 2016, after Gateway notified MDGβs insurers that it\n\nintended to sue. Ten days later, Gateway sued MDG in Virginia state court alleging\n\nnegligence and breach of contract.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The policy also provided a 60-day βextended reporting period,β subject to\nvarious conditions. J.A. 269. These provisions have no bearing on this appeal.\n\n\n 3\n\f In early October 2016, MDG learned that Illinois Union had denied it coverage for\n\nGatewayβs claim. The denial letter, sent by Chubb North American Claims βon behalf\n\nofβ Illinois Union, 2 explained that because the claim was first reported in September\n\n2016 there was βno coverage for this matter as no claims were made and reported during\n\nthe policy period.β J.A. 294, 296. A couple of weeks later, Gatewayβs counsel received a\n\ncopy of Illinois Unionβs denial letter from MDGβs insurance broker. Chubb, however,\n\ndidnβt contact Gateway directly about its coverage denial until January 23, 2017.\n\n In the meantime, Gatewayβs lawsuit against MDG proceeded in state court. MDG\n\nnever appeared, so the court entered a default judgment awarding Gateway $910,148 in\n\ndamages and $22,580 in costs and attorneysβ fees.\n\n B.\n\n Having obtained this judgment, Gateway filed the present lawsuit seeking to\n\ncollect from Illinois Union under MDGβs liability policy. Gateway first sued in Virginia\n\nstate court, but Illinois Union removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern\n\nDistrict of Virginia, invoking that courtβs diversity jurisdiction. (Gateway is a citizen of\n\nVirginia and Maryland, whereas Illinois Union is a citizen of Pennsylvania and Illinois.)\n\nGateway moved unsuccessfully to remand. See Gateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill.\n\nUnion Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-629, 2017 WL 7805743, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2017).\n\n Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Illinois\n\nUnion because its policy didnβt cover claims first reported after the policy period ended\n\n 2\n Illinois Unionβs parent company, ACE USA, merged with Chubb in 2016.\n\n\n 4\n\fin February 2015. The court also rejected Gatewayβs contention that Illinois Union had\n\nwaived this noncoverage argument because it gave Gateway untimely notice of its denial.\n\nGateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-629,\n\n2018 WL 1629107, at *2β4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2018). This appeal followed.\n\n\n\n II.\n\n Gateway challenges the district courtβs refusal to remand the case and its entry of\n\njudgment in Illinois Unionβs favor. We have reviewed both issues de novo and find no\n\nerror.\n\n A.\n\n Gateway first argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and\n\nshould have remanded this case to Virginia state court. It contends that the present suit is\n\na βdirect actionβ against an insurer and that Illinois Union therefore assumes the\n\ncitizenship of its insured under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332(c)(1). Were that true, the court would\n\nlack diversity jurisdiction because both Gateway and Illinois Unionβs insured, MDG, are\n\ncitizens of Virginia. We disagree, however, that Gatewayβs lawsuit is a βdirect action.β\n\n Federal courts have original jurisdiction over suits for more than $75,000 between\n\nβcitizens of different States.β 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332(a)(1). For diversity jurisdiction\n\npurposes, a corporation is a citizen of any state in which it is incorporated, plus the state\n\nor foreign country βwhere it has its principal place of business.β Id. Β§ 1332(c)(1). But\n\nΒ§ 1332(c) has an extra citizenship rule for insurance companies. Namely:\n\n\n\n 5\n\f [I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability\n insurance . . . to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant,\n such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of . . . every State and foreign state of\n which the insured is a citizen.\n\nId. Β§ 1332(c)(1)(A). In other words, if a plaintiff brings a βdirect actionβ against a\n\nwrongdoerβs liability insurer, the insurer assumes the citizenship of the insured. Kong v.\n\nAllied Profβl Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014).\n\n On its face, this language sweeps broadly, potentially covering any lawsuit in\n\nwhich a third party sues a liability insurer over its insuredβs conduct. But the unanimous\n\nunderstanding of our sister circuits has been that βdirect actionβ as used in Β§ 1332(c) has\n\na much narrower meaning. Specifically, it refers to a suit in which the plaintiff sues a\n\nwrongdoerβs liability insurer without joining or first obtaining a judgment against the\n\ninsured. Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300; accord Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.3d\n\n482, 484β85 (7th Cir. 2018); Rosa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 981 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1992);\n\nBeckham v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 691 F.2d 898, 901β02 (9th Cir. 1982); see Velez v.\n\nCrown Life Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 471, 473 (1st Cir. 1979); Henderson v. Selective Ins. Co.,\n\n369 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1966); see also 7A Couch on Insurance Β§ 107:4 (3d ed.\n\nupdated 2018) (collecting additional cases).\n\n Section 1332(c)βs legislative history strongly supports this reading. In 1964,\n\nCongress added language to the diversity jurisdiction statute to address βdirect actionβ\n\nlawsuits allowed by the laws of Louisiana and Wisconsin. See S. Rep. No. 88-1308, at\n\n1β2 (1964); see also Velez, 599 F.2d at 473. Under these laws, a plaintiff may sue a\n\ntortfeasorβs liability insurer without joining the tortfeasor as a defendant and establish\n\n\n 6\n\fboth the insuredβs liability and the insurerβs obligation in a single suit. See La. Stat. Ann.\n\nΒ§ 22:1269(B); Wis. Stat. Ann. Β§ 632.24. Such statutes often created federal diversity\n\njurisdiction when the insurerβs citizenship was different from the plaintiffβs. And as a\n\nresult, what were essentially tort disputes between local residents would end up in federal\n\ncourt. See H.R. Rep. No. 88-1229, at 1β2 (1964); cf. Lumbermenβs Mut. Cas. Co. v.\n\nElbert, 348 U.S. 48, 56β57 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (bemoaning βdirect\n\nactionβ forum-shopping). In response, Congress amended Β§ 1332(c) to provide that the\n\ndefendant insurer adopts the insuredβs citizenship in such cases, thereby destroying\n\ndiversity and ensuring that the merits of the tort claim would be resolved in state court.\n\n Given this provisionβs background, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that the\n\nβkey featureβ of a direct action is βthe plaintiffβs ability to skip suing the [tortfeasor] and\n\nsue directly his insurance carrier.β Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300β01 (internal quotation marks\n\nomitted). When a plaintiff must either join the local tortfeasor or first obtain a separate\n\njudgment against it, the lack of diverse citizenship forces the state tort claim into state\n\ncourt. Itβs only when the plaintiff skips this step and sues the insurer directly that the\n\nconcerns behind Congressβs βdirect actionβ amendments are implicated. See Kong, 750\n\nF.3d at 1300β01 (no direct action when plaintiff sued insurer after obtaining judgment\n\nfrom insured); Hyland, 885 F.3d at 485 (same).\n\n Under this definition, Gatewayβs lawsuit is not a direct action. Virginia doesnβt\n\nhave a direct action statute but instead requires a third-party claimant to first obtain a\n\njudgment against the insured. The claimant may then sue the insurer on the policy to\n\ncollect the judgment. Va. Code Ann. Β§ 38.2-2200; Richmond, Fredericksburg, &\n\n 7\n\fPotomac R.R. Co. v. Hughes-Keegan, Inc., 152 S.E.2d 28, 33β34 (Va. 1967). And that is\n\njust what happened here. Gateway obtained a default judgment against MDG in state\n\ncourt then sued to collect that judgment under Illinois Unionβs liability policy. Gateway\n\ndid not (and could not) skip the tortfeasor, the insured. Its present lawsuit is therefore not\n\na direct action within the meaning of Β§ 1332(c)(1).\n\n Gatewayβs arguments do not persuade otherwise. First, it notes that we have\n\npreviously used the words βdirect actionβ to describe, under Virginia law, a lawsuit\n\nagainst an insurer to enforce a judgment against its insured. See Morrel v. Nationwide\n\nMut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 221β22 (4th Cir. 1999). But in Morrel, we used βdirect\n\nactionβ in the generic sense of a lawsuit filed against an insurer. We did not consider\n\nwhether such a suit fits the technical meaning of Β§ 1332(c). Second, Gateway points us\n\nto a sprinkling of district court cases holding that suits like this one are direct actions\n\nbecause they essentially do βin two stepsβ what Louisianaβs and Wisconsinβs statutes βdid\n\nin one.β See, e.g., Sherman v. Pa. Lumbermenβs Mut. Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 543, 544β\n\n45 (D. Md. 1998) (quoting Prendergast v. All. Gen. Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 653, 655 (E.D.\n\nMo. 1996)). But these cases, as the weight of contrary circuit precedent shows, are\n\nplainly wrong. It is precisely the first step of suing the insured tortfeasor (or, for that\n\nmatter, the simultaneous step of joining it as a party) that funnels the tort suit into state\n\ncourt and thus eases Congressβs jurisdictional and forum-shopping concerns.\n\n This lawsuit, in sum, is not a direct action for purposes of Β§ 1332(c)(1), and\n\nIllinois Union therefore does not adopt MDGβs Virginia citizenship. Because this lawsuit\n\n\n\n 8\n\finstead pits a Virginia plaintiff against an Illinois defendant, the district court had\n\ndiversity jurisdiction and rightly refused to remand to state court.\n\n B.\n\n On the merits, the district court awarded summary judgment to Illinois Union\n\nbecause its policy covered only claims made and reported during the policy period and\n\nGatewayβs claim wasnβt reported until well after the policy had expired. Gatewayβs main\n\ncontention on appeal is that, under a Virginia statute, Illinois Union waived that argument\n\nby failing to inform Gateway of its coverage denial within 45 days of receiving the claim.\n\nIllinois Union, in response, says the relevant statute doesnβt apply in this case.\n\n Gatewayβs waiver argument invokes Virginia Code Section 38.2-2226. Under this\n\nstatute, an insurer that wants to defend against a third-party claimant based on its\n\ninsuredβs breach of the underlying policy must notify the claimant of that intention.\n\nSpecifically, it provides that:\n\n Whenever any insurer on a policy of liability insurance discovers a breach\n of the terms or conditions of the insurance contract by the insured, the\n insurer shall notify the claimant or the claimantβs counsel of the breach.\n Notification shall be given within forty-five days after discovery by the\n insurer of the breach or of the claim, whichever is later.\n\nVa. Code. Ann. Β§ 38.2-2226. Failure to give the required 45 daysβ notice βwill result in a\n\nwaiver of the defense based on such breach to the extent of the claim by operation of\n\nlaw.β Id.\n\n The statuteβs text makes two things clear: it covers denials based on the insuredβs\n\nβbreachβ of the terms and conditions of the policy and applies to arguments properly\n\ncharacterized as waivable βdefenses.β Courts have therefore rightly held that that the\n\n 9\n\fstatue (or its precursor) doesnβt apply when an insurer denies coverage because the claim\n\nfalls outside the scope of policy coverage. See Cheatham v. NGM Ins. Co., No.\n\n3:12cv263-HEH, 2013 WL 509049, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2013); Berry v. State Farm\n\nMut. Auto Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Va. 1972); Jackson v. Middleton, 90 Va.\n\nCir. 279, 2015 WL 10765161, at *3β4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2015). The argument that a claim is\n\noutside the scope of coverage is not about an insuredβs βbreachβ of contract. A βbreachβ\n\nassumes a legal duty on the insuredβs part, but the insured obviously has no legal duty to\n\nincur covered claims. Likewise, a denial based on scope of coverage is not a βdefense,β\n\nas a βdefenseβ presupposes the insurerβs existing obligation to provide coverage.\n\n With this understanding, we conclude that the statute doesnβt apply in this case.\n\nIllinois Union hasnβt denied coverage because of MDGβs breach. Rather, it assertsβ\n\ncorrectlyβthat the present claim is simply not covered by the policy.\n\n As the policyβs bold, all-caps preface makes clear, Illinois Union sold MDG a\n\nβclaims-made-and-reportedβ policy. This is a type of βclaims-madeβ policy, which\n\ndiffers from an ordinary βoccurrenceβ policy in the type of risk it insures. An occurrence\n\npolicy insures against a specific occurrence (say, a car accident or building fire), and\n\nusually doesnβt depend on when the claim itself is filed. In contrast, under a claims-made\n\npolicy, the making of the claim itself is the peril being insured. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v.\n\nContβl Cas. Co., 709 F.3d 1170, 1174 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013). Coverage usually attaches to a\n\nclaim made during the policy period regardless of when the events underlying the claim\n\ntook place. Id. See generally 7 Couch, supra, Β§ 102:22 (describing different liability\n\npolicies).\n\n 10\n\f Claims-made-and-reported policies, like the one Illinois Union sold MDG, are a\n\ndistinct brand of claims-made policies. A claims-made-and-reported policy usually\n\nβrequires the claim both be made against the insured and reported to the insurer during\n\nthe policy period.β Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 13 A.3d 1268, 1282\n\n(Md. 2011). If no claim is reported, no coverage is triggered, even if the events\n\nunderlying the claim took place during the policy period. And after the policy expires,\n\nβthe insurerβs potential liability ends.β T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P. Inc., 628 A.2d 223, 227\n\n(Md. 1993) (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 554 A.2d 404, 418 (Md.\n\n1989) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting)).\n\n We do not think Virginia Code Section 38.2-2226 applies when, as here, an\n\ninsurer denies coverage under a claims-made-and-reported policy because no claim was\n\nreported during the policy period. Illinois Unionβs potential liability under this policy\n\nended when it expired in February 2015, so the policy simply canβt cover a claim first\n\nreported to the insurer a full 19 months later in September 2016. Illinois Union is\n\ntherefore not raising a βdefense based on [an insuredβs] breach.β Va. Code. Ann. Β§ 38.2-\n\n2226. There was no βbreachβ because, after February 2015, there was no policy to be\n\nbreached; there is no βdefenseβ because, after February 2015, Illinois Union had no\n\ncoverage obligation to defend against. See T.H.E., 628 A.2d at 227, 230 (holding, under\n\nsimilar Maryland statute, that denial of claim made after expiry of claims-made-and-\n\nreported policy βresulted from the terms of coverageβ and βis not attributed to a βbreachββ\n\nby the insured); Minn. Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baylor & Jackson, PLLC, 531 F. Appβx\n\n312, 325 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J., dissenting) (βIf [the act triggering coverage]\n\n 11\n\foccurred after the expiration of the liability policy . . . there is simply no policy which the\n\ninsured can breach when it fails to notify the insurer of the claim.β). Because Illinois\n\nUnionβs argument is based on noncoverage, and not on MDGβs breach, Section 38.2-\n\n2226 does not apply. 3\n\n Besides being textually awkward, Gatewayβs reading of Section 38.2-2226 would\n\nhave the policy embrace claims it was never intended to cover. In a claims-made-and-\n\nreported policy, the condition that claims be reported during the policy period is an\n\nessential part of the bargain between insurer and insured. See Chas T. Main, Inc. v.\n\nFiremanβs Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28, 29β30 (Mass. 1990). For the insurer, claim-\n\ntriggering reporting allows it to βclose its books on a policy at its expiration and therefore\n\nattain a level of predictability unattainable under standard occurrence policies.β First\n\nAm., 709 F.3d at 1175 (internal quotation marks omitted). In exchange, the insurer may\n\naccept a lower premium from the insured than it would for an occurrence policy with\n\nenduring liability. Id.; Stine v. Contβl Cas. Co., 349 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Mich. 1984).\n\n\n\n\n 3\n Gateway puts heavy stock in Section 38.2-2226βs use of the phrase βterms or\nconditionsβ and language in Illinois Unionβs policy that makes reporting a claim during\nthe policy period a βcondition precedent to coverage.β J.A. 259 (emphasis added). But\nGatewayβs focus on this single word ignores the broader statutory language. The statute\napplies only to βconditionsβ that can plausibly be βbreached,β and where the breach of\nsuch conditions could rightly be understood as a βdefenseβ to coverage. That is not true\nabout the reporting condition in a claims-made-and-reported policy. See Sherwood\nBrands, 13 A.3d at 1288 (where notice of claim under claims-made policy occurs only\nafter expiration, βthis non-occurrence of the condition precedent to coverage is not a\nβbreach of the policyββ).\n\n\n 12\n\f Applying Section 38.2-2226 as Gateway urges, however, would expand the policy\n\nto confer benefits that MDG didnβt pay for and that Illinois Union never agreed to\n\nprovide. Though Virginiaβs legislature clearly designed Section 38.2-2226 to override\n\ncertain defenses, we doubt it intended the statute to effectively rewrite basic coverage\n\nterms of insurance contracts. Cf. Burns v. Intβl Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1424β25 (9th\n\nCir. 1993) (declining, for this reason, to apply a similar California rule to a claims-made\n\npolicy); Zuckerman v. Natβl Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 405β06 (N.J. 1985)\n\n(same under New Jersey law).\n\n Gatewayβs effort to shoehorn this dispute into Section 38.2-2226 misconstrues the\n\ninsurance contract at issue. Gateway says its demand on MDG in August 2014 triggered\n\ncoverage under the policy and obligated MDG to report that claim to its insurer. MDGβs\n\nfailure to make that report, Gateway says, was a βbreach of the reporting condition.β\n\nAppellantβs Br. at 30. But under Illinois Unionβs claims-made-and-reported policy, the\n\nact triggering coverage was not Gatewayβs 2014 demand, as Gateway claims, but rather\n\nthe communication of that claim to Illinois Union, which didnβt happen until well after\n\nthe policy expired.\n\n This case might come out quite differently had MDG reported Gatewayβs demand\n\nin 2014, or had MDG instead bought an occurrence policy. In those scenarios, coverage\n\nunder the policy would likely have been triggered, leaving Illinois Union to defend,\n\nperhaps, because MDG didnβt give prompt enough notice or failed to fully cooperate with\n\nthe insurer. In similar circumstances, courts have required notice under the statute at\n\nissue. See Morrel, 188 F.3d at 226β27 (insurer waived defense based on insuredβs failure\n\n 13\n\fto assist); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 448 F. Supp. 723, 725β26 (waived\n\ndefense based on insuredβs failure to notify βas soon as practicableβ). But those are not\n\nthe facts of this case. Here, MDG bought a claims-made-and-reported policy and\n\nreported no claim to Illinois Union during the policy period. MDG did not βbreachβ the\n\npolicy by not reporting Gatewayβs 2014 demand any more than one breaches a fire\n\ninsurance policy by incurring damage from a flood.\n\n Applying the text of the statute to the policy terms MDG and Illinois Union agreed\n\nto, we hold that Section 38.2-2226 does not apply to Illinois Unionβs denial of coverage.\n\nIllinois Union may therefore deny Gateway coverage despite allegedly failing to give\n\nnotice. And since the policy by its clear terms does not cover Gatewayβs post-\n\ntermination claim, summary judgment for Illinois Union was proper. 4\n\n III.\n\n We hold that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and properly\n\nawarded summary judgment in Illinois Unionβs favor. The judgment of the district court\n\nis therefore\n\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n Given our holding, we do not decide whether Illinois Union complied with\nVirginiaβs notice statute because Gateway received actual (though indirect) notice of the\ndenial less than 45 days after making its claim.\n\n\n\n 14\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: GATEWAY RESIDENCES AT EXCHANGE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, D/B/A ACE American Insurance Company, D/B/A ACE Environmental, D/B/A ACE USA, D/B/A ACE USA Companies, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-28\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nPUBLISHED\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-1491\\n\\n\\nGATEWAY RESIDENCES AT EXCHANGE, LLC,\\n\\n Plaintiff β Appellant,\\n\\n v.\\n\\nILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a ACE American Insurance\\nCompany, d/b/a ACE Environmental, d/b/a Ace USA, d/b/a ACE USA Companies,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellee.\\n\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at\\nAlexandria. Liam OβGrady, District Judge. (1:17-cv-00629-LO-JFA)\\n\\n\\nArgued: December 12, 2018 Decided: February 28, 2019\\n\\n\\nBefore AGEE, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n\\nAffirmed by published opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee and\\nJudge Harris joined.\\n\\n\\nARGUED: C. Thomas Brown, SILVER & BROWN, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant.\\nDouglas Aaron Winegardner, SANDS ANDERSON, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for\\nAppellee. ON BRIEF: Eric B. Lawson, SILVER & BROWN, Fairfax, Virginia, for\\nAppellant.\\n\\fDIAZ, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Having been awarded more than $900,000 for a contractorβs faulty workmanship,\\n\\nGateway Residences at Exchange, LLC, sued to collect the judgment from the\\n\\ncontractorβs liability insurer, Illinois Union Insurance Company. The relevant policy,\\n\\nhowever, covered only claims reported to the insurer during the policy period, and that\\n\\npolicy expired 19 months before Illinois Union learned about Gatewayβs claim.\\n\\n That should end this case. But Gateway claims it may nonetheless recover on the\\n\\npolicy because, by Virginia statute, Illinois Union waived certain defenses by failing to\\n\\npromptly inform Gateway of its coverage denial. See Va. Code Ann. Β§ 38.2-2226. The\\n\\ndistrict court was unpersuaded and, for reasons that follow, we affirm.\\n\\n\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n This insurance dispute started with two broken generators in an Alexandria,\\n\\nVirginia, apartment complex. Gateway, the buildingβs owner, had hired a local\\n\\ncontractor, Mechanical Design Group (MDG), to provide various engineering and design\\n\\nservices. Among MDGβs jobs was to install two βlife and safety power generatorsβ in the\\n\\ngarage. J.A. 208. MDG apparently didnβt install the generators very well, though, for\\n\\nwhen they started up in August 2014, they caught fire, wrecking the generators and\\n\\ndelaying the 217-unit buildingβs opening.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Blaming MDG for the damage, Gateway demanded that its contractor βcure the\\n\\nnegligent design and installationβ of the generators. J.A. 209. But it didnβt sue MDG, at\\n\\nleast initially. And in September 2014, MDG went out of business.\\n\\n Before starting work on the Gateway project, MDG had bought liability insurance\\n\\nfrom Illinois Union. Under the policy, Illinois Union had agreed to indemnify MDG for\\n\\nlegal claims that might arise from the Gateway job. The front page of the policy advised\\n\\nthat it provided liability coverage βON A CLAIMS-MADE AND REPORTED\\n\\nBASIS,β meaning that it covered βONLY CLAIMS FIRST MADE AGAINST THE\\n\\nINSURED AND REPORTED TO THE INSURER, IN WRITING, DURING THE\\n\\nPOLICY PERIOD.β J.A. 256 (typeface in original). To further stress the point, the\\n\\npolicy made it a βcondition precedent to coverageβ that any claim be reported to the\\n\\ninsurer during the policy period. J.A. 259. The policy period began on February 1, 2014,\\n\\nand ended one year later on February 1, 2015. 1\\n\\n MDG apparently never told Illinois Union about Gatewayβs potential claim before\\n\\nits insurance policy expired in 2015. Instead, Illinois Union first heard about the\\n\\ngenerator incident on September 6, 2016, after Gateway notified MDGβs insurers that it\\n\\nintended to sue. Ten days later, Gateway sued MDG in Virginia state court alleging\\n\\nnegligence and breach of contract.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The policy also provided a 60-day βextended reporting period,β subject to\\nvarious conditions. J.A. 269. These provisions have no bearing on this appeal.\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f In early October 2016, MDG learned that Illinois Union had denied it coverage for\\n\\nGatewayβs claim. The denial letter, sent by Chubb North American Claims βon behalf\\n\\nofβ Illinois Union, 2 explained that because the claim was first reported in September\\n\\n2016 there was βno coverage for this matter as no claims were made and reported during\\n\\nthe policy period.β J.A. 294, 296. A couple of weeks later, Gatewayβs counsel received a\\n\\ncopy of Illinois Unionβs denial letter from MDGβs insurance broker. Chubb, however,\\n\\ndidnβt contact Gateway directly about its coverage denial until January 23, 2017.\\n\\n In the meantime, Gatewayβs lawsuit against MDG proceeded in state court. MDG\\n\\nnever appeared, so the court entered a default judgment awarding Gateway $910,148 in\\n\\ndamages and $22,580 in costs and attorneysβ fees.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n Having obtained this judgment, Gateway filed the present lawsuit seeking to\\n\\ncollect from Illinois Union under MDGβs liability policy. Gateway first sued in Virginia\\n\\nstate court, but Illinois Union removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern\\n\\nDistrict of Virginia, invoking that courtβs diversity jurisdiction. (Gateway is a citizen of\\n\\nVirginia and Maryland, whereas Illinois Union is a citizen of Pennsylvania and Illinois.)\\n\\nGateway moved unsuccessfully to remand. See Gateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill.\\n\\nUnion Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-629, 2017 WL 7805743, at *2 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2017).\\n\\n Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to Illinois\\n\\nUnion because its policy didnβt cover claims first reported after the policy period ended\\n\\n 2\\n Illinois Unionβs parent company, ACE USA, merged with Chubb in 2016.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\fin February 2015. The court also rejected Gatewayβs contention that Illinois Union had\\n\\nwaived this noncoverage argument because it gave Gateway untimely notice of its denial.\\n\\nGateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-629,\\n\\n2018 WL 1629107, at *2β4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2018). This appeal followed.\\n\\n\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Gateway challenges the district courtβs refusal to remand the case and its entry of\\n\\njudgment in Illinois Unionβs favor. We have reviewed both issues de novo and find no\\n\\nerror.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Gateway first argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and\\n\\nshould have remanded this case to Virginia state court. It contends that the present suit is\\n\\na βdirect actionβ against an insurer and that Illinois Union therefore assumes the\\n\\ncitizenship of its insured under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332(c)(1). Were that true, the court would\\n\\nlack diversity jurisdiction because both Gateway and Illinois Unionβs insured, MDG, are\\n\\ncitizens of Virginia. We disagree, however, that Gatewayβs lawsuit is a βdirect action.β\\n\\n Federal courts have original jurisdiction over suits for more than $75,000 between\\n\\nβcitizens of different States.β 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332(a)(1). For diversity jurisdiction\\n\\npurposes, a corporation is a citizen of any state in which it is incorporated, plus the state\\n\\nor foreign country βwhere it has its principal place of business.β Id. Β§ 1332(c)(1). But\\n\\nΒ§ 1332(c) has an extra citizenship rule for insurance companies. Namely:\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f [I]n any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability\\n insurance . . . to which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant,\\n such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of . . . every State and foreign state of\\n which the insured is a citizen.\\n\\nId. Β§ 1332(c)(1)(A). In other words, if a plaintiff brings a βdirect actionβ against a\\n\\nwrongdoerβs liability insurer, the insurer assumes the citizenship of the insured. Kong v.\\n\\nAllied Profβl Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n On its face, this language sweeps broadly, potentially covering any lawsuit in\\n\\nwhich a third party sues a liability insurer over its insuredβs conduct. But the unanimous\\n\\nunderstanding of our sister circuits has been that βdirect actionβ as used in Β§ 1332(c) has\\n\\na much narrower meaning. Specifically, it refers to a suit in which the plaintiff sues a\\n\\nwrongdoerβs liability insurer without joining or first obtaining a judgment against the\\n\\ninsured. Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300; accord Hyland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 885 F.3d\\n\\n482, 484β85 (7th Cir. 2018); Rosa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 981 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1992);\\n\\nBeckham v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 691 F.2d 898, 901β02 (9th Cir. 1982); see Velez v.\\n\\nCrown Life Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 471, 473 (1st Cir. 1979); Henderson v. Selective Ins. Co.,\\n\\n369 F.2d 143, 149 (6th Cir. 1966); see also 7A Couch on Insurance Β§ 107:4 (3d ed.\\n\\nupdated 2018) (collecting additional cases).\\n\\n Section 1332(c)βs legislative history strongly supports this reading. In 1964,\\n\\nCongress added language to the diversity jurisdiction statute to address βdirect actionβ\\n\\nlawsuits allowed by the laws of Louisiana and Wisconsin. See S. Rep. No. 88-1308, at\\n\\n1β2 (1964); see also Velez, 599 F.2d at 473. Under these laws, a plaintiff may sue a\\n\\ntortfeasorβs liability insurer without joining the tortfeasor as a defendant and establish\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\fboth the insuredβs liability and the insurerβs obligation in a single suit. See La. Stat. Ann.\\n\\nΒ§ 22:1269(B); Wis. Stat. Ann. Β§ 632.24. Such statutes often created federal diversity\\n\\njurisdiction when the insurerβs citizenship was different from the plaintiffβs. And as a\\n\\nresult, what were essentially tort disputes between local residents would end up in federal\\n\\ncourt. See H.R. Rep. No. 88-1229, at 1β2 (1964); cf. Lumbermenβs Mut. Cas. Co. v.\\n\\nElbert, 348 U.S. 48, 56β57 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (bemoaning βdirect\\n\\nactionβ forum-shopping). In response, Congress amended Β§ 1332(c) to provide that the\\n\\ndefendant insurer adopts the insuredβs citizenship in such cases, thereby destroying\\n\\ndiversity and ensuring that the merits of the tort claim would be resolved in state court.\\n\\n Given this provisionβs background, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that the\\n\\nβkey featureβ of a direct action is βthe plaintiffβs ability to skip suing the [tortfeasor] and\\n\\nsue directly his insurance carrier.β Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300β01 (internal quotation marks\\n\\nomitted). When a plaintiff must either join the local tortfeasor or first obtain a separate\\n\\njudgment against it, the lack of diverse citizenship forces the state tort claim into state\\n\\ncourt. Itβs only when the plaintiff skips this step and sues the insurer directly that the\\n\\nconcerns behind Congressβs βdirect actionβ amendments are implicated. See Kong, 750\\n\\nF.3d at 1300β01 (no direct action when plaintiff sued insurer after obtaining judgment\\n\\nfrom insured); Hyland, 885 F.3d at 485 (same).\\n\\n Under this definition, Gatewayβs lawsuit is not a direct action. Virginia doesnβt\\n\\nhave a direct action statute but instead requires a third-party claimant to first obtain a\\n\\njudgment against the insured. The claimant may then sue the insurer on the policy to\\n\\ncollect the judgment. Va. Code Ann. Β§ 38.2-2200; Richmond, Fredericksburg, &\\n\\n 7\\n\\fPotomac R.R. Co. v. Hughes-Keegan, Inc., 152 S.E.2d 28, 33β34 (Va. 1967). And that is\\n\\njust what happened here. Gateway obtained a default judgment against MDG in state\\n\\ncourt then sued to collect that judgment under Illinois Unionβs liability policy. Gateway\\n\\ndid not (and could not) skip the tortfeasor, the insured. Its present lawsuit is therefore not\\n\\na direct action within the meaning of Β§ 1332(c)(1).\\n\\n Gatewayβs arguments do not persuade otherwise. First, it notes that we have\\n\\npreviously used the words βdirect actionβ to describe, under Virginia law, a lawsuit\\n\\nagainst an insurer to enforce a judgment against its insured. See Morrel v. Nationwide\\n\\nMut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 221β22 (4th Cir. 1999). But in Morrel, we used βdirect\\n\\nactionβ in the generic sense of a lawsuit filed against an insurer. We did not consider\\n\\nwhether such a suit fits the technical meaning of Β§ 1332(c). Second, Gateway points us\\n\\nto a sprinkling of district court cases holding that suits like this one are direct actions\\n\\nbecause they essentially do βin two stepsβ what Louisianaβs and Wisconsinβs statutes βdid\\n\\nin one.β See, e.g., Sherman v. Pa. Lumbermenβs Mut. Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 543, 544β\\n\\n45 (D. Md. 1998) (quoting Prendergast v. All. Gen. Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 653, 655 (E.D.\\n\\nMo. 1996)). But these cases, as the weight of contrary circuit precedent shows, are\\n\\nplainly wrong. It is precisely the first step of suing the insured tortfeasor (or, for that\\n\\nmatter, the simultaneous step of joining it as a party) that funnels the tort suit into state\\n\\ncourt and thus eases Congressβs jurisdictional and forum-shopping concerns.\\n\\n This lawsuit, in sum, is not a direct action for purposes of Β§ 1332(c)(1), and\\n\\nIllinois Union therefore does not adopt MDGβs Virginia citizenship. Because this lawsuit\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\finstead pits a Virginia plaintiff against an Illinois defendant, the district court had\\n\\ndiversity jurisdiction and rightly refused to remand to state court.\\n\\n B.\\n\\n On the merits, the district court awarded summary judgment to Illinois Union\\n\\nbecause its policy covered only claims made and reported during the policy period and\\n\\nGatewayβs claim wasnβt reported until well after the policy had expired. Gatewayβs main\\n\\ncontention on appeal is that, under a Virginia statute, Illinois Union waived that argument\\n\\nby failing to inform Gateway of its coverage denial within 45 days of receiving the claim.\\n\\nIllinois Union, in response, says the relevant statute doesnβt apply in this case.\\n\\n Gatewayβs waiver argument invokes Virginia Code Section 38.2-2226. Under this\\n\\nstatute, an insurer that wants to defend against a third-party claimant based on its\\n\\ninsuredβs breach of the underlying policy must notify the claimant of that intention.\\n\\nSpecifically, it provides that:\\n\\n Whenever any insurer on a policy of liability insurance discovers a breach\\n of the terms or conditions of the insurance contract by the insured, the\\n insurer shall notify the claimant or the claimantβs counsel of the breach.\\n Notification shall be given within forty-five days after discovery by the\\n insurer of the breach or of the claim, whichever is later.\\n\\nVa. Code. Ann. Β§ 38.2-2226. Failure to give the required 45 daysβ notice βwill result in a\\n\\nwaiver of the defense based on such breach to the extent of the claim by operation of\\n\\nlaw.β Id.\\n\\n The statuteβs text makes two things clear: it covers denials based on the insuredβs\\n\\nβbreachβ of the terms and conditions of the policy and applies to arguments properly\\n\\ncharacterized as waivable βdefenses.β Courts have therefore rightly held that that the\\n\\n 9\\n\\fstatue (or its precursor) doesnβt apply when an insurer denies coverage because the claim\\n\\nfalls outside the scope of policy coverage. See Cheatham v. NGM Ins. Co., No.\\n\\n3:12cv263-HEH, 2013 WL 509049, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 11, 2013); Berry v. State Farm\\n\\nMut. Auto Ins. Co., 340 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Va. 1972); Jackson v. Middleton, 90 Va.\\n\\nCir. 279, 2015 WL 10765161, at *3β4 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2015). The argument that a claim is\\n\\noutside the scope of coverage is not about an insuredβs βbreachβ of contract. A βbreachβ\\n\\nassumes a legal duty on the insuredβs part, but the insured obviously has no legal duty to\\n\\nincur covered claims. Likewise, a denial based on scope of coverage is not a βdefense,β\\n\\nas a βdefenseβ presupposes the insurerβs existing obligation to provide coverage.\\n\\n With this understanding, we conclude that the statute doesnβt apply in this case.\\n\\nIllinois Union hasnβt denied coverage because of MDGβs breach. Rather, it assertsβ\\n\\ncorrectlyβthat the present claim is simply not covered by the policy.\\n\\n As the policyβs bold, all-caps preface makes clear, Illinois Union sold MDG a\\n\\nβclaims-made-and-reportedβ policy. This is a type of βclaims-madeβ policy, which\\n\\ndiffers from an ordinary βoccurrenceβ policy in the type of risk it insures. An occurrence\\n\\npolicy insures against a specific occurrence (say, a car accident or building fire), and\\n\\nusually doesnβt depend on when the claim itself is filed. In contrast, under a claims-made\\n\\npolicy, the making of the claim itself is the peril being insured. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v.\\n\\nContβl Cas. Co., 709 F.3d 1170, 1174 n.2 (5th Cir. 2013). Coverage usually attaches to a\\n\\nclaim made during the policy period regardless of when the events underlying the claim\\n\\ntook place. Id. See generally 7 Couch, supra, Β§ 102:22 (describing different liability\\n\\npolicies).\\n\\n 10\\n\\f Claims-made-and-reported policies, like the one Illinois Union sold MDG, are a\\n\\ndistinct brand of claims-made policies. A claims-made-and-reported policy usually\\n\\nβrequires the claim both be made against the insured and reported to the insurer during\\n\\nthe policy period.β Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 13 A.3d 1268, 1282\\n\\n(Md. 2011). If no claim is reported, no coverage is triggered, even if the events\\n\\nunderlying the claim took place during the policy period. And after the policy expires,\\n\\nβthe insurerβs potential liability ends.β T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. P.T.P. Inc., 628 A.2d 223, 227\\n\\n(Md. 1993) (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. House, 554 A.2d 404, 418 (Md.\\n\\n1989) (Murphy, C.J., dissenting)).\\n\\n We do not think Virginia Code Section 38.2-2226 applies when, as here, an\\n\\ninsurer denies coverage under a claims-made-and-reported policy because no claim was\\n\\nreported during the policy period. Illinois Unionβs potential liability under this policy\\n\\nended when it expired in February 2015, so the policy simply canβt cover a claim first\\n\\nreported to the insurer a full 19 months later in September 2016. Illinois Union is\\n\\ntherefore not raising a βdefense based on [an insuredβs] breach.β Va. Code. Ann. Β§ 38.2-\\n\\n2226. There was no βbreachβ because, after February 2015, there was no policy to be\\n\\nbreached; there is no βdefenseβ because, after February 2015, Illinois Union had no\\n\\ncoverage obligation to defend against. See T.H.E., 628 A.2d at 227, 230 (holding, under\\n\\nsimilar Maryland statute, that denial of claim made after expiry of claims-made-and-\\n\\nreported policy βresulted from the terms of coverageβ and βis not attributed to a βbreachββ\\n\\nby the insured); Minn. Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baylor & Jackson, PLLC, 531 F. Appβx\\n\\n312, 325 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J., dissenting) (βIf [the act triggering coverage]\\n\\n 11\\n\\foccurred after the expiration of the liability policy . . . there is simply no policy which the\\n\\ninsured can breach when it fails to notify the insurer of the claim.β). Because Illinois\\n\\nUnionβs argument is based on noncoverage, and not on MDGβs breach, Section 38.2-\\n\\n2226 does not apply. 3\\n\\n Besides being textually awkward, Gatewayβs reading of Section 38.2-2226 would\\n\\nhave the policy embrace claims it was never intended to cover. In a claims-made-and-\\n\\nreported policy, the condition that claims be reported during the policy period is an\\n\\nessential part of the bargain between insurer and insured. See Chas T. Main, Inc. v.\\n\\nFiremanβs Fund Ins. Co., 551 N.E.2d 28, 29β30 (Mass. 1990). For the insurer, claim-\\n\\ntriggering reporting allows it to βclose its books on a policy at its expiration and therefore\\n\\nattain a level of predictability unattainable under standard occurrence policies.β First\\n\\nAm., 709 F.3d at 1175 (internal quotation marks omitted). In exchange, the insurer may\\n\\naccept a lower premium from the insured than it would for an occurrence policy with\\n\\nenduring liability. Id.; Stine v. Contβl Cas. Co., 349 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Mich. 1984).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Gateway puts heavy stock in Section 38.2-2226βs use of the phrase βterms or\\nconditionsβ and language in Illinois Unionβs policy that makes reporting a claim during\\nthe policy period a βcondition precedent to coverage.β J.A. 259 (emphasis added). But\\nGatewayβs focus on this single word ignores the broader statutory language. The statute\\napplies only to βconditionsβ that can plausibly be βbreached,β and where the breach of\\nsuch conditions could rightly be understood as a βdefenseβ to coverage. That is not true\\nabout the reporting condition in a claims-made-and-reported policy. See Sherwood\\nBrands, 13 A.3d at 1288 (where notice of claim under claims-made policy occurs only\\nafter expiration, βthis non-occurrence of the condition precedent to coverage is not a\\nβbreach of the policyββ).\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Applying Section 38.2-2226 as Gateway urges, however, would expand the policy\\n\\nto confer benefits that MDG didnβt pay for and that Illinois Union never agreed to\\n\\nprovide. Though Virginiaβs legislature clearly designed Section 38.2-2226 to override\\n\\ncertain defenses, we doubt it intended the statute to effectively rewrite basic coverage\\n\\nterms of insurance contracts. Cf. Burns v. Intβl Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1424β25 (9th\\n\\nCir. 1993) (declining, for this reason, to apply a similar California rule to a claims-made\\n\\npolicy); Zuckerman v. Natβl Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395, 405β06 (N.J. 1985)\\n\\n(same under New Jersey law).\\n\\n Gatewayβs effort to shoehorn this dispute into Section 38.2-2226 misconstrues the\\n\\ninsurance contract at issue. Gateway says its demand on MDG in August 2014 triggered\\n\\ncoverage under the policy and obligated MDG to report that claim to its insurer. MDGβs\\n\\nfailure to make that report, Gateway says, was a βbreach of the reporting condition.β\\n\\nAppellantβs Br. at 30. But under Illinois Unionβs claims-made-and-reported policy, the\\n\\nact triggering coverage was not Gatewayβs 2014 demand, as Gateway claims, but rather\\n\\nthe communication of that claim to Illinois Union, which didnβt happen until well after\\n\\nthe policy expired.\\n\\n This case might come out quite differently had MDG reported Gatewayβs demand\\n\\nin 2014, or had MDG instead bought an occurrence policy. In those scenarios, coverage\\n\\nunder the policy would likely have been triggered, leaving Illinois Union to defend,\\n\\nperhaps, because MDG didnβt give prompt enough notice or failed to fully cooperate with\\n\\nthe insurer. In similar circumstances, courts have required notice under the statute at\\n\\nissue. See Morrel, 188 F.3d at 226β27 (insurer waived defense based on insuredβs failure\\n\\n 13\\n\\fto assist); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 448 F. Supp. 723, 725β26 (waived\\n\\ndefense based on insuredβs failure to notify βas soon as practicableβ). But those are not\\n\\nthe facts of this case. Here, MDG bought a claims-made-and-reported policy and\\n\\nreported no claim to Illinois Union during the policy period. MDG did not βbreachβ the\\n\\npolicy by not reporting Gatewayβs 2014 demand any more than one breaches a fire\\n\\ninsurance policy by incurring damage from a flood.\\n\\n Applying the text of the statute to the policy terms MDG and Illinois Union agreed\\n\\nto, we hold that Section 38.2-2226 does not apply to Illinois Unionβs denial of coverage.\\n\\nIllinois Union may therefore deny Gateway coverage despite allegedly failing to give\\n\\nnotice. And since the policy by its clear terms does not cover Gatewayβs post-\\n\\ntermination claim, summary judgment for Illinois Union was proper. 4\\n\\n III.\\n\\n We hold that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and properly\\n\\nawarded summary judgment in Illinois Unionβs favor. The judgment of the district court\\n\\nis therefore\\n\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Given our holding, we do not decide whether Illinois Union complied with\\nVirginiaβs notice statute because Gateway received actual (though indirect) notice of the\\ndenial less than 45 days after making its claim.\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":576,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4586728,"string":"4,586,728"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. David Hughes"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-20015"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"REVISED February 1, 2019\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20015\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, January 30, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Plaintiff β Appellee, Clerk\\n\\nv.\\n\\nDAVID THOMAS HUGHES,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\\nREAVLEY, Circuit Judge:\\n David Thomas Hughes pleaded guilty to bank burglary. He was\\nsentenced to 240 months in prison and ordered to pay $189,933.31 in\\nrestitution, with interest charged. The judgment provided that $100 was βdue\\nimmediatelyβ and provided the following payment schedule for the remaining\\namount:\\n Balance due in payments of the greater of $25 per quarter or 50%\\n of any wages earned while in prison in accordance with the Bureau\\n of Prisonsβ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Any balance\\n remaining after release from imprisonment shall be paid in equal\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\n monthly installments of $500 to commence 60 days after the\\n release to a term of supervision.\\n\\n Several years later the government discovered that Hughes had\\naccumulated $3,464.85βlargely prison wagesβin his inmate trust account.\\nPursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a), 3664(n), and 3664(k), the government moved\\nfor the immediate turnover of those funds. Hughes opposed the request and\\nfiled a cross-motion to release funds, arguing, inter alia, that the district court\\n(1) only required him to make payments in installments and (2) βspecifically\\ndeclined to order immediate payment of the entire amount.β Agreeing with the\\ngovernment, however, the district court ordered the immediate turnover of\\nβfunds up to the amount of $ 201,493.63,β with a $200 carve out for Hughesβs\\ntelephone and commissary needs. Hughes timely appealed.\\n On appeal, Hughes argues that the district court erred in granting the\\ngovernmentβs motion because his criminal judgment required the restitution\\nbalance owed beyond $100 to be paid in quarterly installments and did not\\norder that the balance be paid immediately. Because the government does not\\nallege that he defaulted on his restitution payments, Hughes argues, the\\ngovernment lacked the authority to seek immediate payment of the full\\nrestitution amount.\\n The parties do not cite, and research has not revealed, any binding\\nprecedent from this court analyzing a case to Hughesβs, in which the criminal\\njudgment included a repayment schedule that began during the term of\\nimprisonment but did not state that the full restitution amount was due\\nimmediately. Hughes, however, directs us to United States v. Martinez, in\\nwhich the Tenth Circuit confronted a structurally similar payment schedule.\\n812 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2015). The judgment in Martinez required the\\ndefendant to pay β$300 immediately,β with the βbalance dueβ in accordance\\nwith an installment schedule. Id. at 1203β04. Although the defendant had\\n 2\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\ncomplied with his payment plan, the government nevertheless sought\\ngarnishment of his retirement accounts. Id. at 1202.\\n The Tenth Circuit concluded that the government lacked the authority\\nto garnish the defendantβs retirement accounts because doing so would exceed\\nthe terms of the restitution order; it reasoned that:\\n By statute, it is the district courtβnot the governmentβthat\\n determines how a defendant is to pay restitution. See [18 U.S.C.] Β§\\n 3664(f)(2) (β[T]he court shall . . . specify in the restitution order the\\n manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the\\n restitution is to be paid . . . .β) (emphasis added)). Thus, the\\n government can enforce only what the district court has ordered\\n the defendant to pay. See Enforce, Blackβs Law Dictionary 645\\n (10th ed. 2014) (defining βenforceβ primarily as β[t]o give force or\\n effect to [a law]; to compel obedience to [a law]β).\\nId. The court rejected the governmentβs argument that it could enforce the full\\namount notwithstanding the installment schedule, construing Β§ 3572(d), which\\nprovides that β[a] person sentenced to pay . . . restitution . . . shall make such\\npayment immediately, unless, in the interest of justice, the court provides for\\npayment . . . in installments,β to imply that the full restitution amount is not\\ndue immediately when a court orders repayment pursuant to an installment-\\nbased plan. Id. at 1205.\\n We are persuaded by the Tenth Circuitβs analysis. When a restitution\\norder specifies an installment plan, unless there is language directing that the\\nfunds are also immediately due, the government cannot attempt to enforce the\\njudgment beyond its plain terms absent a modification of the restitution order\\nor default on the payment plan. See Β§ 3572(d)(1); Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1205.\\nTurning to Hughesβs order, we find no language directing that the full\\nrestitution amount was immediately due or owing, and the government does\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\nnot allege he was in default. 1 Like Martinez, Hughesβs criminal judgment\\nspecifies that a small amount ($100) was due immediately, and for the\\nremaining balance to be paid in installments. The government cannot enforce\\nrestitution payments beyond those terms unless Hughes defaults on his\\npayments or the district court modifies the payment schedule.\\n The government points to United States v. Ekong, 518 F.3d 285 (5th Cir.\\n2007) (per curiam) and United States v. Diehl, 848 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2017) in\\nsupport of its argument that Hughesβs payment schedule is of no consequence.\\nBoth are distinguishable because the judgments in those cases contained\\ndifferent language. The payment schedule in Ekong, for example, was\\nconditioned on whether a balance remained when the defendant began her\\nterm of supervised release. 2 In rejecting the defendantβs argument that the\\ngovernment was barred from seeking immediate payment βbecause the\\ncriminal judgment specified that restitution be paid in installments,β we noted\\nthat β[t]here [was] nothing in the criminal judgment to the contrary.β Ekong,\\n518 F.3d at 286. From this, we infer that the full restitution amount was\\ncollectible immediately simply because the payment schedule was never\\ntriggered. See id.; see Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1207. Ekong is thus\\ndistinguishable.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Although the government argues that it can seek payment beyond the installment\\nschedule because the judgment says that β[u]nless the court has expressly ordered\\notherwise . . . payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment,β this is a\\ndefault provision and, as explained, the court expressly ordered otherwise. See United States\\nv. Roush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (βThe negative pregnant of that default\\nprovision is that if the court has expressly ordered otherwiseβas this Court did by checking\\nbox Dβthen payment is not due during imprisonment.β).\\n 2 See Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1207 (βIf upon commencement of the term of supervised\\n\\nrelease any part of the restitution remains unpaid, the defendant shall make payments on\\nsuch unpaid balance beginning 60 days after the release from custody at the rate of $500 per\\nmonth until the restitution is paid in full.β) (quoting Judgment in a Criminal Case at\\n6, United States v. Ekong, No. 3:04βCRβ030βM (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2004), ECF No. 74).\\n 4\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\n And the judgment in Diehl did not specify a payment schedule; rather, it\\nprovided that β[i]f the defendant is unable to pay this indebtedness at this\\ntime, the defendant shall cooperate fully with the [government] to make\\npayment in full as so[o]n as possible, including during any period of\\nincarceration.β 848 F.3d at 630. The relevant issue there was whether the\\ndefendantβs participation in the BOPβs inmate financial responsibility program\\nand adherence to its payment schedule barred the government from enforcing\\nthe full restitution amount. Id. at 633. Although we agreed with the decisions\\nof other courts βdetermining that an inmateβs compliance with an IFRP\\npayment schedule does not change the fact that the Government may collect\\non a criminal monetary penalty immediately,β we noted this would only be the\\ncase βwhere the judgment does not specify a payment schedule.β Id. Indeed, we\\nheld the government could demand immediate payment in Diehl because the\\njudgment βdid not . . . specify installment payments for satisfaction of either\\nthe fine or the special assessment as required by 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3572(d) to disrupt\\nthe default rule of immediate payment.β Id. at 635. Importantly, we noted that\\nthe governmentβs βenforcement of the order against Diehlβs property, including\\nsurplus funds held in his inmate trust account, did not exceed the terms of the\\noriginal judgment.β Id. (emphasis added). As discussed, that is not the case\\nhere, as the governmentβs attempt to enforce the full restitution amount\\nconflicts with the installment-based directive in Hughesβs original judgment.\\n The government argues in the alternative that it is entitled to the funds\\nin Hughesβs trust account by virtue of Β§ 3664(n), which provides:\\n If a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a fine, receives\\n substantial resources from any source, including inheritance,\\n settlement, or other judgment, during a period of incarceration,\\n such person shall be required to apply the value of such resources\\n to any restitution or fine still owed.\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\n We do not think the gradual accumulation of prison wages constitutes\\nβsubstantial resourcesβ such that it fits within Β§ 3664(n)βs ambit; rather we\\nthink this provision refers to windfalls or sudden financial injections. 3 Indeed,\\nin United States v. Scales, we suggested that this provision contemplates\\nβunanticipated resourcesβ that become βsuddenly available.β 639 F. Appβx 233,\\n239 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also United States v. Bratton-Bey, 564 F.\\nAppβx 28, 29 (4th Cir. 2014) (βAdditionally, a defendantβs receipt of a windfall\\nduring imprisonment triggers an automatic payment requirement.β); United\\nStates v. Key, No. 3:12-CV-3026-L, 2013 WL 2322470, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 28,\\n2013) (βThere is no indication that Key has received a βwindfallβ or βsubstantial\\nresourcesβ of the type in section 3664(n).β). 4 Put simply, we think the examples\\nlisted in Β§ 3664(n)ββinheritance, settlement, or other judgmentββfit the mold\\nof βsubstantial resources,β but that prison wages do not. As a result, the\\ngovernment is not entitled to the immediate turnover of Hughesβs inmate trust\\naccount under Β§ 3664(n).\\n The governmentβs final argument arises under Β§ 3664(k), which grants a\\ndistrict court the authority to modify a payment schedule upon receiving\\nnotification of a βmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances.β\\nΒ§ 3664(k); see United States v. Franklin, 595 F. Appβx 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2014)\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Although the government urges us to follow United States v. Poff, in which the Ninth\\nCircuit concluded that veteran disability benefits deposited into an inmateβs trust account\\nconstituted βsubstantial resources,β we note the Supreme Court recently vacated and\\nremanded the judgment in that case. 727 F. Appβx 249, 251 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,\\njudgment vacated, 18-195, 2019 WL 113040 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019).\\n 4 See also United States v. French, No. 3:09-CV-1657-BF, 2010 WL 11618076, at *1\\n\\n(N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2010) (βSimilarly, a windfall during incarceration triggers an automatic\\nobligation to pay restitution.β); Roush, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (βMoreover, a\\ndefendantβs receipt of a windfall during imprisonment triggers an automatic payment\\nrequirement.β). We also note the Supreme Court recently favored a narrower reading of the\\nMVRA. See Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684, 1689 (2018) (βTo interpret the statute\\nbroadly is to invite controversy on those and other matters; our narrower construction avoids\\nit.β).\\n 6\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\n(per curiam) (βA district court may adjust a restitution-payment schedule when\\nthere has been a βmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances\\nthat might affect the defendantβs ability to pay restitution.ββ). Although it is\\ndubious whether the gradual accumulation of prison wages constitutes a\\nβmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances,β we note that the\\ndistrict courtβs turnover order was not based on Β§ 3664(k), and we find no\\nlanguage demonstrating that it intended to adjust or modify the payment\\nschedule contained in Hughesβs original judgment.\\n The district courtβs order dated November 27, 2017, is VACATED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4363981/\", \"author_raw\": \"REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"REAVLEY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ELROD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"REAVLEY\": \", Circuit\", \"ELROD\": \", Circuit\", \"WILLETT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586728/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. David Hughes\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nREVISED February 1, 2019\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-20015\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, January 30, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Plaintiff β Appellee, Clerk\n\nv.\n\nDAVID THOMAS HUGHES,\n\n Defendant β Appellant.\n\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\nREAVLEY, Circuit Judge:\n David Thomas Hughes pleaded guilty to bank burglary. He was\nsentenced to 240 months in prison and ordered to pay $189,933.31 in\nrestitution, with interest charged. The judgment provided that $100 was βdue\nimmediatelyβ and provided the following payment schedule for the remaining\namount:\n Balance due in payments of the greater of $25 per quarter or 50%\n of any wages earned while in prison in accordance with the Bureau\n of Prisonsβ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Any balance\n remaining after release from imprisonment shall be paid in equal\n\f No. 18-20015\n monthly installments of $500 to commence 60 days after the\n release to a term of supervision.\n\n Several years later the government discovered that Hughes had\naccumulated $3,464.85βlargely prison wagesβin his inmate trust account.\nPursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a), 3664(n), and 3664(k), the government moved\nfor the immediate turnover of those funds. Hughes opposed the request and\nfiled a cross-motion to release funds, arguing, inter alia, that the district court\n(1) only required him to make payments in installments and (2) βspecifically\ndeclined to order immediate payment of the entire amount.β Agreeing with the\ngovernment, however, the district court ordered the immediate turnover of\nβfunds up to the amount of $ 201,493.63,β with a $200 carve out for Hughesβs\ntelephone and commissary needs. Hughes timely appealed.\n On appeal, Hughes argues that the district court erred in granting the\ngovernmentβs motion because his criminal judgment required the restitution\nbalance owed beyond $100 to be paid in quarterly installments and did not\norder that the balance be paid immediately. Because the government does not\nallege that he defaulted on his restitution payments, Hughes argues, the\ngovernment lacked the authority to seek immediate payment of the full\nrestitution amount.\n The parties do not cite, and research has not revealed, any binding\nprecedent from this court analyzing a case to Hughesβs, in which the criminal\njudgment included a repayment schedule that began during the term of\nimprisonment but did not state that the full restitution amount was due\nimmediately. Hughes, however, directs us to United States v. Martinez, in\nwhich the Tenth Circuit confronted a structurally similar payment schedule.\n812 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2015). The judgment in Martinez required the\ndefendant to pay β$300 immediately,β with the βbalance dueβ in accordance\nwith an installment schedule. Id. at 1203β04. Although the defendant had\n 2\n\f No. 18-20015\ncomplied with his payment plan, the government nevertheless sought\ngarnishment of his retirement accounts. Id. at 1202.\n The Tenth Circuit concluded that the government lacked the authority\nto garnish the defendantβs retirement accounts because doing so would exceed\nthe terms of the restitution order; it reasoned that:\n By statute, it is the district courtβnot the governmentβthat\n determines how a defendant is to pay restitution. See [18 U.S.C.] Β§\n 3664(f)(2) (β[T]he court shall . . . specify in the restitution order the\n manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the\n restitution is to be paid . . . .β) (emphasis added)). Thus, the\n government can enforce only what the district court has ordered\n the defendant to pay. See Enforce, Blackβs Law Dictionary 645\n (10th ed. 2014) (defining βenforceβ primarily as β[t]o give force or\n effect to [a law]; to compel obedience to [a law]β).\nId. The court rejected the governmentβs argument that it could enforce the full\namount notwithstanding the installment schedule, construing Β§ 3572(d), which\nprovides that β[a] person sentenced to pay . . . restitution . . . shall make such\npayment immediately, unless, in the interest of justice, the court provides for\npayment . . . in installments,β to imply that the full restitution amount is not\ndue immediately when a court orders repayment pursuant to an installment-\nbased plan. Id. at 1205.\n We are persuaded by the Tenth Circuitβs analysis. When a restitution\norder specifies an installment plan, unless there is language directing that the\nfunds are also immediately due, the government cannot attempt to enforce the\njudgment beyond its plain terms absent a modification of the restitution order\nor default on the payment plan. See Β§ 3572(d)(1); Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1205.\nTurning to Hughesβs order, we find no language directing that the full\nrestitution amount was immediately due or owing, and the government does\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f No. 18-20015\nnot allege he was in default. 1 Like Martinez, Hughesβs criminal judgment\nspecifies that a small amount ($100) was due immediately, and for the\nremaining balance to be paid in installments. The government cannot enforce\nrestitution payments beyond those terms unless Hughes defaults on his\npayments or the district court modifies the payment schedule.\n The government points to United States v. Ekong, 518 F.3d 285 (5th Cir.\n2007) (per curiam) and United States v. Diehl, 848 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2017) in\nsupport of its argument that Hughesβs payment schedule is of no consequence.\nBoth are distinguishable because the judgments in those cases contained\ndifferent language. The payment schedule in Ekong, for example, was\nconditioned on whether a balance remained when the defendant began her\nterm of supervised release. 2 In rejecting the defendantβs argument that the\ngovernment was barred from seeking immediate payment βbecause the\ncriminal judgment specified that restitution be paid in installments,β we noted\nthat β[t]here [was] nothing in the criminal judgment to the contrary.β Ekong,\n518 F.3d at 286. From this, we infer that the full restitution amount was\ncollectible immediately simply because the payment schedule was never\ntriggered. See id.; see Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1207. Ekong is thus\ndistinguishable.\n\n\n\n\n 1 Although the government argues that it can seek payment beyond the installment\nschedule because the judgment says that β[u]nless the court has expressly ordered\notherwise . . . payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment,β this is a\ndefault provision and, as explained, the court expressly ordered otherwise. See United States\nv. Roush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (βThe negative pregnant of that default\nprovision is that if the court has expressly ordered otherwiseβas this Court did by checking\nbox Dβthen payment is not due during imprisonment.β).\n 2 See Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1207 (βIf upon commencement of the term of supervised\n\nrelease any part of the restitution remains unpaid, the defendant shall make payments on\nsuch unpaid balance beginning 60 days after the release from custody at the rate of $500 per\nmonth until the restitution is paid in full.β) (quoting Judgment in a Criminal Case at\n6, United States v. Ekong, No. 3:04βCRβ030βM (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2004), ECF No. 74).\n 4\n\f No. 18-20015\n And the judgment in Diehl did not specify a payment schedule; rather, it\nprovided that β[i]f the defendant is unable to pay this indebtedness at this\ntime, the defendant shall cooperate fully with the [government] to make\npayment in full as so[o]n as possible, including during any period of\nincarceration.β 848 F.3d at 630. The relevant issue there was whether the\ndefendantβs participation in the BOPβs inmate financial responsibility program\nand adherence to its payment schedule barred the government from enforcing\nthe full restitution amount. Id. at 633. Although we agreed with the decisions\nof other courts βdetermining that an inmateβs compliance with an IFRP\npayment schedule does not change the fact that the Government may collect\non a criminal monetary penalty immediately,β we noted this would only be the\ncase βwhere the judgment does not specify a payment schedule.β Id. Indeed, we\nheld the government could demand immediate payment in Diehl because the\njudgment βdid not . . . specify installment payments for satisfaction of either\nthe fine or the special assessment as required by 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3572(d) to disrupt\nthe default rule of immediate payment.β Id. at 635. Importantly, we noted that\nthe governmentβs βenforcement of the order against Diehlβs property, including\nsurplus funds held in his inmate trust account, did not exceed the terms of the\noriginal judgment.β Id. (emphasis added). As discussed, that is not the case\nhere, as the governmentβs attempt to enforce the full restitution amount\nconflicts with the installment-based directive in Hughesβs original judgment.\n The government argues in the alternative that it is entitled to the funds\nin Hughesβs trust account by virtue of Β§ 3664(n), which provides:\n If a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a fine, receives\n substantial resources from any source, including inheritance,\n settlement, or other judgment, during a period of incarceration,\n such person shall be required to apply the value of such resources\n to any restitution or fine still owed.\n\n\n\n 5\n\f No. 18-20015\n We do not think the gradual accumulation of prison wages constitutes\nβsubstantial resourcesβ such that it fits within Β§ 3664(n)βs ambit; rather we\nthink this provision refers to windfalls or sudden financial injections. 3 Indeed,\nin United States v. Scales, we suggested that this provision contemplates\nβunanticipated resourcesβ that become βsuddenly available.β 639 F. Appβx 233,\n239 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also United States v. Bratton-Bey, 564 F.\nAppβx 28, 29 (4th Cir. 2014) (βAdditionally, a defendantβs receipt of a windfall\nduring imprisonment triggers an automatic payment requirement.β); United\nStates v. Key, No. 3:12-CV-3026-L, 2013 WL 2322470, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 28,\n2013) (βThere is no indication that Key has received a βwindfallβ or βsubstantial\nresourcesβ of the type in section 3664(n).β). 4 Put simply, we think the examples\nlisted in Β§ 3664(n)ββinheritance, settlement, or other judgmentββfit the mold\nof βsubstantial resources,β but that prison wages do not. As a result, the\ngovernment is not entitled to the immediate turnover of Hughesβs inmate trust\naccount under Β§ 3664(n).\n The governmentβs final argument arises under Β§ 3664(k), which grants a\ndistrict court the authority to modify a payment schedule upon receiving\nnotification of a βmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances.β\nΒ§ 3664(k); see United States v. Franklin, 595 F. Appβx 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2014)\n\n\n\n 3 Although the government urges us to follow United States v. Poff, in which the Ninth\nCircuit concluded that veteran disability benefits deposited into an inmateβs trust account\nconstituted βsubstantial resources,β we note the Supreme Court recently vacated and\nremanded the judgment in that case. 727 F. Appβx 249, 251 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,\njudgment vacated, 18-195, 2019 WL 113040 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019).\n 4 See also United States v. French, No. 3:09-CV-1657-BF, 2010 WL 11618076, at *1\n\n(N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2010) (βSimilarly, a windfall during incarceration triggers an automatic\nobligation to pay restitution.β); Roush, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (βMoreover, a\ndefendantβs receipt of a windfall during imprisonment triggers an automatic payment\nrequirement.β). We also note the Supreme Court recently favored a narrower reading of the\nMVRA. See Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684, 1689 (2018) (βTo interpret the statute\nbroadly is to invite controversy on those and other matters; our narrower construction avoids\nit.β).\n 6\n\f No. 18-20015\n(per curiam) (βA district court may adjust a restitution-payment schedule when\nthere has been a βmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances\nthat might affect the defendantβs ability to pay restitution.ββ). Although it is\ndubious whether the gradual accumulation of prison wages constitutes a\nβmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances,β we note that the\ndistrict courtβs turnover order was not based on Β§ 3664(k), and we find no\nlanguage demonstrating that it intended to adjust or modify the payment\nschedule contained in Hughesβs original judgment.\n The district courtβs order dated November 27, 2017, is VACATED.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. David Hughes\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nREVISED February 1, 2019\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20015\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, January 30, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Plaintiff β Appellee, Clerk\\n\\nv.\\n\\nDAVID THOMAS HUGHES,\\n\\n Defendant β Appellant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\\nREAVLEY, Circuit Judge:\\n David Thomas Hughes pleaded guilty to bank burglary. He was\\nsentenced to 240 months in prison and ordered to pay $189,933.31 in\\nrestitution, with interest charged. The judgment provided that $100 was βdue\\nimmediatelyβ and provided the following payment schedule for the remaining\\namount:\\n Balance due in payments of the greater of $25 per quarter or 50%\\n of any wages earned while in prison in accordance with the Bureau\\n of Prisonsβ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. Any balance\\n remaining after release from imprisonment shall be paid in equal\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\n monthly installments of $500 to commence 60 days after the\\n release to a term of supervision.\\n\\n Several years later the government discovered that Hughes had\\naccumulated $3,464.85βlargely prison wagesβin his inmate trust account.\\nPursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a), 3664(n), and 3664(k), the government moved\\nfor the immediate turnover of those funds. Hughes opposed the request and\\nfiled a cross-motion to release funds, arguing, inter alia, that the district court\\n(1) only required him to make payments in installments and (2) βspecifically\\ndeclined to order immediate payment of the entire amount.β Agreeing with the\\ngovernment, however, the district court ordered the immediate turnover of\\nβfunds up to the amount of $ 201,493.63,β with a $200 carve out for Hughesβs\\ntelephone and commissary needs. Hughes timely appealed.\\n On appeal, Hughes argues that the district court erred in granting the\\ngovernmentβs motion because his criminal judgment required the restitution\\nbalance owed beyond $100 to be paid in quarterly installments and did not\\norder that the balance be paid immediately. Because the government does not\\nallege that he defaulted on his restitution payments, Hughes argues, the\\ngovernment lacked the authority to seek immediate payment of the full\\nrestitution amount.\\n The parties do not cite, and research has not revealed, any binding\\nprecedent from this court analyzing a case to Hughesβs, in which the criminal\\njudgment included a repayment schedule that began during the term of\\nimprisonment but did not state that the full restitution amount was due\\nimmediately. Hughes, however, directs us to United States v. Martinez, in\\nwhich the Tenth Circuit confronted a structurally similar payment schedule.\\n812 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2015). The judgment in Martinez required the\\ndefendant to pay β$300 immediately,β with the βbalance dueβ in accordance\\nwith an installment schedule. Id. at 1203β04. Although the defendant had\\n 2\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\ncomplied with his payment plan, the government nevertheless sought\\ngarnishment of his retirement accounts. Id. at 1202.\\n The Tenth Circuit concluded that the government lacked the authority\\nto garnish the defendantβs retirement accounts because doing so would exceed\\nthe terms of the restitution order; it reasoned that:\\n By statute, it is the district courtβnot the governmentβthat\\n determines how a defendant is to pay restitution. See [18 U.S.C.] Β§\\n 3664(f)(2) (β[T]he court shall . . . specify in the restitution order the\\n manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the\\n restitution is to be paid . . . .β) (emphasis added)). Thus, the\\n government can enforce only what the district court has ordered\\n the defendant to pay. See Enforce, Blackβs Law Dictionary 645\\n (10th ed. 2014) (defining βenforceβ primarily as β[t]o give force or\\n effect to [a law]; to compel obedience to [a law]β).\\nId. The court rejected the governmentβs argument that it could enforce the full\\namount notwithstanding the installment schedule, construing Β§ 3572(d), which\\nprovides that β[a] person sentenced to pay . . . restitution . . . shall make such\\npayment immediately, unless, in the interest of justice, the court provides for\\npayment . . . in installments,β to imply that the full restitution amount is not\\ndue immediately when a court orders repayment pursuant to an installment-\\nbased plan. Id. at 1205.\\n We are persuaded by the Tenth Circuitβs analysis. When a restitution\\norder specifies an installment plan, unless there is language directing that the\\nfunds are also immediately due, the government cannot attempt to enforce the\\njudgment beyond its plain terms absent a modification of the restitution order\\nor default on the payment plan. See Β§ 3572(d)(1); Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1205.\\nTurning to Hughesβs order, we find no language directing that the full\\nrestitution amount was immediately due or owing, and the government does\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\nnot allege he was in default. 1 Like Martinez, Hughesβs criminal judgment\\nspecifies that a small amount ($100) was due immediately, and for the\\nremaining balance to be paid in installments. The government cannot enforce\\nrestitution payments beyond those terms unless Hughes defaults on his\\npayments or the district court modifies the payment schedule.\\n The government points to United States v. Ekong, 518 F.3d 285 (5th Cir.\\n2007) (per curiam) and United States v. Diehl, 848 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2017) in\\nsupport of its argument that Hughesβs payment schedule is of no consequence.\\nBoth are distinguishable because the judgments in those cases contained\\ndifferent language. The payment schedule in Ekong, for example, was\\nconditioned on whether a balance remained when the defendant began her\\nterm of supervised release. 2 In rejecting the defendantβs argument that the\\ngovernment was barred from seeking immediate payment βbecause the\\ncriminal judgment specified that restitution be paid in installments,β we noted\\nthat β[t]here [was] nothing in the criminal judgment to the contrary.β Ekong,\\n518 F.3d at 286. From this, we infer that the full restitution amount was\\ncollectible immediately simply because the payment schedule was never\\ntriggered. See id.; see Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1207. Ekong is thus\\ndistinguishable.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Although the government argues that it can seek payment beyond the installment\\nschedule because the judgment says that β[u]nless the court has expressly ordered\\notherwise . . . payment of criminal monetary penalties is due during imprisonment,β this is a\\ndefault provision and, as explained, the court expressly ordered otherwise. See United States\\nv. Roush, 452 F. Supp. 2d 676, 681 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (βThe negative pregnant of that default\\nprovision is that if the court has expressly ordered otherwiseβas this Court did by checking\\nbox Dβthen payment is not due during imprisonment.β).\\n 2 See Martinez, 812 F.3d at 1207 (βIf upon commencement of the term of supervised\\n\\nrelease any part of the restitution remains unpaid, the defendant shall make payments on\\nsuch unpaid balance beginning 60 days after the release from custody at the rate of $500 per\\nmonth until the restitution is paid in full.β) (quoting Judgment in a Criminal Case at\\n6, United States v. Ekong, No. 3:04βCRβ030βM (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2004), ECF No. 74).\\n 4\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\n And the judgment in Diehl did not specify a payment schedule; rather, it\\nprovided that β[i]f the defendant is unable to pay this indebtedness at this\\ntime, the defendant shall cooperate fully with the [government] to make\\npayment in full as so[o]n as possible, including during any period of\\nincarceration.β 848 F.3d at 630. The relevant issue there was whether the\\ndefendantβs participation in the BOPβs inmate financial responsibility program\\nand adherence to its payment schedule barred the government from enforcing\\nthe full restitution amount. Id. at 633. Although we agreed with the decisions\\nof other courts βdetermining that an inmateβs compliance with an IFRP\\npayment schedule does not change the fact that the Government may collect\\non a criminal monetary penalty immediately,β we noted this would only be the\\ncase βwhere the judgment does not specify a payment schedule.β Id. Indeed, we\\nheld the government could demand immediate payment in Diehl because the\\njudgment βdid not . . . specify installment payments for satisfaction of either\\nthe fine or the special assessment as required by 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3572(d) to disrupt\\nthe default rule of immediate payment.β Id. at 635. Importantly, we noted that\\nthe governmentβs βenforcement of the order against Diehlβs property, including\\nsurplus funds held in his inmate trust account, did not exceed the terms of the\\noriginal judgment.β Id. (emphasis added). As discussed, that is not the case\\nhere, as the governmentβs attempt to enforce the full restitution amount\\nconflicts with the installment-based directive in Hughesβs original judgment.\\n The government argues in the alternative that it is entitled to the funds\\nin Hughesβs trust account by virtue of Β§ 3664(n), which provides:\\n If a person obligated to provide restitution, or pay a fine, receives\\n substantial resources from any source, including inheritance,\\n settlement, or other judgment, during a period of incarceration,\\n such person shall be required to apply the value of such resources\\n to any restitution or fine still owed.\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\n We do not think the gradual accumulation of prison wages constitutes\\nβsubstantial resourcesβ such that it fits within Β§ 3664(n)βs ambit; rather we\\nthink this provision refers to windfalls or sudden financial injections. 3 Indeed,\\nin United States v. Scales, we suggested that this provision contemplates\\nβunanticipated resourcesβ that become βsuddenly available.β 639 F. Appβx 233,\\n239 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also United States v. Bratton-Bey, 564 F.\\nAppβx 28, 29 (4th Cir. 2014) (βAdditionally, a defendantβs receipt of a windfall\\nduring imprisonment triggers an automatic payment requirement.β); United\\nStates v. Key, No. 3:12-CV-3026-L, 2013 WL 2322470, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 28,\\n2013) (βThere is no indication that Key has received a βwindfallβ or βsubstantial\\nresourcesβ of the type in section 3664(n).β). 4 Put simply, we think the examples\\nlisted in Β§ 3664(n)ββinheritance, settlement, or other judgmentββfit the mold\\nof βsubstantial resources,β but that prison wages do not. As a result, the\\ngovernment is not entitled to the immediate turnover of Hughesβs inmate trust\\naccount under Β§ 3664(n).\\n The governmentβs final argument arises under Β§ 3664(k), which grants a\\ndistrict court the authority to modify a payment schedule upon receiving\\nnotification of a βmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances.β\\nΒ§ 3664(k); see United States v. Franklin, 595 F. Appβx 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2014)\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Although the government urges us to follow United States v. Poff, in which the Ninth\\nCircuit concluded that veteran disability benefits deposited into an inmateβs trust account\\nconstituted βsubstantial resources,β we note the Supreme Court recently vacated and\\nremanded the judgment in that case. 727 F. Appβx 249, 251 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,\\njudgment vacated, 18-195, 2019 WL 113040 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019).\\n 4 See also United States v. French, No. 3:09-CV-1657-BF, 2010 WL 11618076, at *1\\n\\n(N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2010) (βSimilarly, a windfall during incarceration triggers an automatic\\nobligation to pay restitution.β); Roush, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (βMoreover, a\\ndefendantβs receipt of a windfall during imprisonment triggers an automatic payment\\nrequirement.β). We also note the Supreme Court recently favored a narrower reading of the\\nMVRA. See Lagos v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1684, 1689 (2018) (βTo interpret the statute\\nbroadly is to invite controversy on those and other matters; our narrower construction avoids\\nit.β).\\n 6\\n\\f No. 18-20015\\n(per curiam) (βA district court may adjust a restitution-payment schedule when\\nthere has been a βmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances\\nthat might affect the defendantβs ability to pay restitution.ββ). Although it is\\ndubious whether the gradual accumulation of prison wages constitutes a\\nβmaterial change in the defendantβs economic circumstances,β we note that the\\ndistrict courtβs turnover order was not based on Β§ 3664(k), and we find no\\nlanguage demonstrating that it intended to adjust or modify the payment\\nschedule contained in Hughesβs original judgment.\\n The district courtβs order dated November 27, 2017, is VACATED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":577,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4586730,"string":"4,586,730"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"ST. BERNARD PARISH, Through the St. Bernard Parish Government, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee, v. Richard T. Seymour; Law Office of Richard T. Seymour, P.L.L.C., Movants-Appellants."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge North America, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-30029"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Stewart, Dennis, Willett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 1, 2019\\n No. 18-30029\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\nST. BERNARD PARISH, Through the St. Bernard Parish Government,\\n\\n PlaintiffβAppellee,\\n\\nv.\\n\\nLAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED,\\n\\n DefendantβAppellee,\\n\\nv.\\n\\nRICHARD T. SEYMOUR; LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD T. SEYMOUR,\\nP.L.L.C.,\\n\\n MovantsβAppellants.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Louisiana\\n\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\\nDON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:\\n When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, a barge moored by Lafarge\\nwound up at large. According to New Orleans residents then represented by\\nRichard T. Seymour, the breakaway barge hurtled through a floodwall,\\nunleashing catastrophic flooding in the Lower 9th Ward before finally coming\\nto rest atop several homes and a yellow school bus. (It remains disputed\\nwhether the barge caused the breach or surfed through it after the floodwall\\ngave way.)\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n Seymour withdrew from the Barge Litigation in 2011. But when it\\nsettled several years later, he moved to intervene in this related case to pursue\\nhis fees and expenses. We agree with the district court that Seymourβs\\nintervention motion was untimely. As to intervention of right, we AFFIRM the\\ndistrict courtβs order. As to permissive intervention, we DISMISS Seymourβs\\nappeal for lack of jurisdiction.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\nA. Factual\\n In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina, the most destructive natural\\ndisaster in United States history, inflicted cataclysmic damage on New\\nOrleans. According to many residents of the Lower 9th Ward, a predominantly\\nAfrican-American neighborhood bordering the Industrial Canal, the damage\\nwas worsened by a barge that broke free and allided with a floodwall before\\ncrashing into the residential streets, unleashing a surge of water that ripped\\nhomes from their foundations before scattering them in splinters. 1 The\\nresidents alleged that the barge had been improperly moored at a facility\\nowned by Lafarge North America, Inc. The district court consolidated many of\\nthe resulting cases into the Barge Litigation.\\n Appellants Richard T. Seymour and the Law Office of Richard T.\\nSeymour, P.L.L.C. represented plaintiffs in the Barge Litigation. Seymour\\nperformed significant work in the consolidated cases, as noted in the order\\ngranting his motion to withdraw. This work contributed to multiple cases\\nincluding, per Seymour, this one. But Seymour never represented a party in\\nthis case because this action by St. Bernard Parish against Lafarge was not\\nconsolidated into the Barge Litigation.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 See generally St. Bernard Par. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 550 F. Appβx 184 (5th Cir.\\n2013) (earlier appeal of summary-judgment decision).\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\nB. Procedural\\n In 2011 Seymour withdrew from the Barge Litigation because of a fee\\ndispute with Baker Sanders, LLC, a firm that now represents the Parish. In\\ngranting Seymourβs motion to withdraw, the district court explicitly recognized\\nhis potential claim to fees in the Barge Litigation. The Parish filed this case on\\nAugust 23, 2011, the same day Seymour withdrew.\\n About six years later, in 2017, the Parish and Lafarge settled this case.\\nOn July 20 Parish counsel called Seymour to tell him that the parties had\\nreached a settlement. The attorney told Seymour that at most he would be\\ncompensated for only some of his expenses. On July 23 Seymour served Baker\\nSanders with a Notice of Lien for fees and expenses in this case. Undaunted,\\nthe Parish and Lafarge filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.\\n Seymour, intending to pursue his claim for fees in the district court,\\nmoved on August 9 to appear pro hac vice. The district court denied this motion\\nwithout prejudice because, before intervening in the case, Seymour would not\\nhave been representing anyone. So Seymour moved to intervene on September\\n17. Meanwhile, a Baker Sanders attorney had filed an interpleader action in\\nNew York state court that named Seymour as a defendant. The interpleader\\naction concerned the same funds that Seymour sought to pursue via\\nintervention.\\n The district court denied Seymourβs motion to intervene as untimely.\\nSeymour appealed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW\\nA. Jurisdiction\\n The district court had jurisdiction based on federal question; 2 diversity; 3\\nand the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002. 4\\n We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291 to review the denial of the\\nmotion to intervene of right. 5 And we have βprovisional jurisdictionβ to review\\nthe denial of permissive intervention. 6 This means that β[i]f the district courtβs\\ndenial of permissive intervention does not constitute an abuse of discretion, we\\nmust dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.β 7\\nB. Standard of Review\\n βA ruling denying intervention of right is reviewed de novo.β 8 But the\\ntimeliness of an intervention motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, so long\\nas the district court gave reasons for its determination. 9\\n βDenial of permissive intervention, on the other hand, is reviewed for\\nclear abuse of discretion.β 10 βUnder this standard, the Court will reverse a\\ndistrict court decision only under extraordinary circumstances.β 11\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 covers two types of intervention, one\\nmandatory (βthe court must permitβ) 12 and the other permissive (βthe court\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331.\\n 3 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332.\\n 4 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1369.\\n 5 Sommers v. Bank of Am., N.A., 835 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2016).\\n 6 Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).\\n 7 Id. (quoting Edwards, 78 F.3d at 992).\\n 8 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 995.\\n 9 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 513; Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000.\\n 10 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 995.\\n 11 Id. (quoting Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. Gulf States Utils., Inc., 940 F.2d 117, 121\\n\\n(5th Cir. 1991)).\\n 12 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\nmay permitβ). 13 While the provisions cover different situations, both prize\\npunctuality, beginning with the same three words: βOn timely motion . . . .β 14\\nA. Intervention of Right\\n Rule 24(a)(2) governs intervention of right based on an interest in the\\naction. We have distilled the rule into four elements:\\n (1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the\\n applicant must have an interest relating to the property or\\n transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant\\n must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a\\n practical matter, impair his ability to protect that interest; (4) the\\n applicantβs interest must be inadequately represented by the\\n existing parties to the suit. 15\\nβFailure to satisfy any one requirement precludes intervention of right.β 16\\nTimeliness was the only element the district court decided and is the only one\\ndisputed here. In evaluating timeliness, a district court should consider four\\nfactors:\\n (1) The length of time during which the would-be intervenor\\n actually knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in\\n the case before it petitioned for leave to intervene; (2) the extent of\\n the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer\\n as a result of the would-be intervenorβs failure to apply for\\n intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known\\n of its interest in the case; (3) the extent of the prejudice that the\\n would-be intervenor may suffer if intervention is denied; and\\n (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or\\n against a determination that the application is timely. 17\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\\n 14 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\\n 15 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512 (quoting Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th\\n\\nCir. 2015)).\\n 16 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted).\\n 17 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512β13 (quoting Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 239\\n\\n(5th Cir. 2001)).\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n 1. Length of Time Elapsed\\n Seymour says he moved to intervene less than two months after\\nreceiving notice that his claim would not be paid. But the relevant starting\\npoint is βnot when he knew or should have known that his interests would be\\nadversely affected but, instead, when he knew that he had an interest in the\\ncase.β 18 Here, Seymour knew that he had an interest in the case when he\\nwithdrew in 2011, six years before he moved to intervene.\\n Seymour counters that the βtimeliness clockβ does not begin until a\\nmovant knows or should know that his interest is no longer represented by an\\nexisting party. 19 But in 2011 he should have also known that no remaining\\nparty represented his interest. Although a plaintiff adequately represents his\\nattorneyβs interest during the attorney-client relationship, 20 no party in a case\\nrepresents the interest of a discharged attorney. 21 And in Keith v. St. George\\nPacking Co. and Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., discharged attorneys were\\npermitted to intervene when their motions came within a year of being\\ndischarged. 22 Here, much more time lapsedβsix years from withdrawal to\\nintervention. So the first timeliness factor weighs against permitting\\nintervention.\\n 2. Prejudice to Existing Parties\\n Seymour says his intervention will not prejudice other parties because it\\nwill not cause burdensome additional proceedings. He says the Parish cannot\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Id. at 513.\\n 19 See Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000.\\n 20 Valley Ranch Dev. Co. v. FDIC, 960 F.2d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 1992) (βHis interest is\\n\\nidentical to [the clientβs] until the agency relationship is broken.β).\\n 21 See Keith v. St. George Packing Co., 806 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1986) (β[N]either\\n\\nparty to the pending action is interested in representing [the attorneyβs] interests.β); Gaines\\nv. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1970) (βNeither of the existing parties is\\nconcerned with protecting the appellantβs interest.β); see also Gilbert v. Johnson, 601 F.2d\\n761, 767 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding similar facts indistinguishable from Gaines).\\n 22 Keith, 806 F.2d at 525; Gaines, 434 F.2d at 54.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\nidentify anything it would have done differently had Seymour been a party all\\nalong. And his fee is to be taken from the existing settlement pool, not from a\\nrenewed settlement negotiation.\\n Seymour is correct that opening a fee dispute between the plaintiff, its\\ncurrent counsel, and former counsel would not necessarily relitigate the\\nunderlying case. But it would at least hold up the distribution of settlement\\nfunds, which could have been avoided had Seymour intervened when his\\ninterest was no longer represented. So the second timeliness factor is neutral.\\n 3. Prejudice to Seymour\\n Seymour says he will be prejudiced absent intervention because it will\\nbe difficult to pursue his claim elsewhere. He has numerous objections to the\\nNew York interpleader action, including lack of personal jurisdiction. And he\\nsays that a federal interpleader action is unavailable. But this does not rule\\nout other possibilities, such as a state-law action against the Parish or Baker\\nSanders to recover for his services. 23 At oral argument Seymour suggested that\\nhe preferred not to bring a separate action because it would be difficult to\\nobtain discovery of a confidential settlement agreement. 24 But discovery of\\nconfidential settlement agreements is generally available under an\\nappropriate protective order. 25 So the third timeliness factor weighs against\\npermitting intervention.\\n\\n\\n\\n 23 See, e.g., Gilbert, 601 F.2d at 767 (Rubin, J., specially concurring) (stating that\\nunder Georgia law the attorney βmay, however, if discharged from the case by his client, bring\\nan action under quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services renderedβ).\\n 24 Seymour cites Ford, 242 F.3d at 240, for the proposition that the presence of a\\n\\nβconfidentiality orderβ is a consideration in granting or denying intervention. In Ford we\\ngranted a newspaperβs motion to intervene to challenge the confidentiality of a settlement.\\n242 F.3d at 241. But Ford did not address the discoverability of a confidential settlement\\nagreement in a separate private dispute.\\n 25 E.g., Cleveland Const. Inc. v. Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Pβship, No. Civ.A. 01-2666, 2004\\n\\nWL 385052, at *1β2 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2004); Perez v. State Indus., Inc., 578 So. 2d 1018, 1020\\n(La. Ct. App. 1991).\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n 4. βUnusual Circumstancesβ\\n Finally, Seymour says that the Parishβs or Baker Sandersβs attempt to\\nwithhold his fees, including filing a questionable interpleader action, are\\nspecial circumstances that favor intervention. Another special circumstance,\\nhe contends: the difficulty of intervening in the Barge Litigation as it stood in\\n2011βthat is, in multiple fragmented cases.\\n The Parish, for its part, cites precedent that moving to intervene after a\\ncase is dismissed weighs against timeliness. 26 (We note, though, that the\\ndismissal did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to grant intervention\\nor to grant the ultimate relief sought by Seymour. 27) Considering all of this,\\nthe fourth factor is neutral.\\n * * *\\n Viewing the four timeliness factors together, the district court did not\\nabuse its discretion in concluding that Seymourβs motion to intervene came too\\nlate.\\nB. Permissive Intervention\\n Like intervention of right, permissive intervention must be timely. 28 As\\nSeymourβs motion was untimely, no further analysis is needed. 29 The district\\ncourt did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention,\\nand this portion of Seymourβs appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26See Sommers, 835 F.3d at 513 (βThough the appellees are incorrect in suggesting\\nthat intervention is always improper after a case has been dismissed, they are accurate in\\nasserting that it is a factor weighing against timeliness.β).\\n 27 See id.; United States v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1966)\\n\\n(β[A] perfected charging lien of attorneys cannot be defeated by a dismissal by stipulation\\nunder Rule 41.β).\\n 28 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\\n 29 See, e.g., Lucas v. McKeithen, 102 F.3d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying\\n\\nintervention of right and dismissing permissive intervention based on timeliness).\\n 30 See Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512.\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the district courtβs decision as to intervention of right and\\nDISMISS Seymourβs appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to permissive\\nintervention.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4363983/\", \"author_raw\": \"DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"STEWART"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586730/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: ST. BERNARD PARISH, Through the St. Bernard Parish Government, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee, v. Richard T. Seymour; Law Office of Richard T. Seymour, P.L.L.C., Movants-Appellants.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n February 1, 2019\n No. 18-30029\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Clerk\nST. BERNARD PARISH, Through the St. Bernard Parish Government,\n\n PlaintiffβAppellee,\n\nv.\n\nLAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED,\n\n DefendantβAppellee,\n\nv.\n\nRICHARD T. SEYMOUR; LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD T. SEYMOUR,\nP.L.L.C.,\n\n MovantsβAppellants.\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Louisiana\n\n\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\nDON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:\n When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, a barge moored by Lafarge\nwound up at large. According to New Orleans residents then represented by\nRichard T. Seymour, the breakaway barge hurtled through a floodwall,\nunleashing catastrophic flooding in the Lower 9th Ward before finally coming\nto rest atop several homes and a yellow school bus. (It remains disputed\nwhether the barge caused the breach or surfed through it after the floodwall\ngave way.)\n\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-30029\n Seymour withdrew from the Barge Litigation in 2011. But when it\nsettled several years later, he moved to intervene in this related case to pursue\nhis fees and expenses. We agree with the district court that Seymourβs\nintervention motion was untimely. As to intervention of right, we AFFIRM the\ndistrict courtβs order. As to permissive intervention, we DISMISS Seymourβs\nappeal for lack of jurisdiction.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\nA. Factual\n In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina, the most destructive natural\ndisaster in United States history, inflicted cataclysmic damage on New\nOrleans. According to many residents of the Lower 9th Ward, a predominantly\nAfrican-American neighborhood bordering the Industrial Canal, the damage\nwas worsened by a barge that broke free and allided with a floodwall before\ncrashing into the residential streets, unleashing a surge of water that ripped\nhomes from their foundations before scattering them in splinters. 1 The\nresidents alleged that the barge had been improperly moored at a facility\nowned by Lafarge North America, Inc. The district court consolidated many of\nthe resulting cases into the Barge Litigation.\n Appellants Richard T. Seymour and the Law Office of Richard T.\nSeymour, P.L.L.C. represented plaintiffs in the Barge Litigation. Seymour\nperformed significant work in the consolidated cases, as noted in the order\ngranting his motion to withdraw. This work contributed to multiple cases\nincluding, per Seymour, this one. But Seymour never represented a party in\nthis case because this action by St. Bernard Parish against Lafarge was not\nconsolidated into the Barge Litigation.\n\n\n\n 1 See generally St. Bernard Par. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 550 F. Appβx 184 (5th Cir.\n2013) (earlier appeal of summary-judgment decision).\n 2\n\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-30029\nB. Procedural\n In 2011 Seymour withdrew from the Barge Litigation because of a fee\ndispute with Baker Sanders, LLC, a firm that now represents the Parish. In\ngranting Seymourβs motion to withdraw, the district court explicitly recognized\nhis potential claim to fees in the Barge Litigation. The Parish filed this case on\nAugust 23, 2011, the same day Seymour withdrew.\n About six years later, in 2017, the Parish and Lafarge settled this case.\nOn July 20 Parish counsel called Seymour to tell him that the parties had\nreached a settlement. The attorney told Seymour that at most he would be\ncompensated for only some of his expenses. On July 23 Seymour served Baker\nSanders with a Notice of Lien for fees and expenses in this case. Undaunted,\nthe Parish and Lafarge filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.\n Seymour, intending to pursue his claim for fees in the district court,\nmoved on August 9 to appear pro hac vice. The district court denied this motion\nwithout prejudice because, before intervening in the case, Seymour would not\nhave been representing anyone. So Seymour moved to intervene on September\n17. Meanwhile, a Baker Sanders attorney had filed an interpleader action in\nNew York state court that named Seymour as a defendant. The interpleader\naction concerned the same funds that Seymour sought to pursue via\nintervention.\n The district court denied Seymourβs motion to intervene as untimely.\nSeymour appealed.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-30029\n II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW\nA. Jurisdiction\n The district court had jurisdiction based on federal question; 2 diversity; 3\nand the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002. 4\n We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291 to review the denial of the\nmotion to intervene of right. 5 And we have βprovisional jurisdictionβ to review\nthe denial of permissive intervention. 6 This means that β[i]f the district courtβs\ndenial of permissive intervention does not constitute an abuse of discretion, we\nmust dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.β 7\nB. Standard of Review\n βA ruling denying intervention of right is reviewed de novo.β 8 But the\ntimeliness of an intervention motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, so long\nas the district court gave reasons for its determination. 9\n βDenial of permissive intervention, on the other hand, is reviewed for\nclear abuse of discretion.β 10 βUnder this standard, the Court will reverse a\ndistrict court decision only under extraordinary circumstances.β 11\n\n III. DISCUSSION\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 covers two types of intervention, one\nmandatory (βthe court must permitβ) 12 and the other permissive (βthe court\n\n\n\n\n 2 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331.\n 3 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332.\n 4 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1369.\n 5 Sommers v. Bank of Am., N.A., 835 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2016).\n 6 Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).\n 7 Id. (quoting Edwards, 78 F.3d at 992).\n 8 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 995.\n 9 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 513; Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000.\n 10 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 995.\n 11 Id. (quoting Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. Gulf States Utils., Inc., 940 F.2d 117, 121\n\n(5th Cir. 1991)).\n 12 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).\n\n 4\n\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-30029\nmay permitβ). 13 While the provisions cover different situations, both prize\npunctuality, beginning with the same three words: βOn timely motion . . . .β 14\nA. Intervention of Right\n Rule 24(a)(2) governs intervention of right based on an interest in the\naction. We have distilled the rule into four elements:\n (1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the\n applicant must have an interest relating to the property or\n transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant\n must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a\n practical matter, impair his ability to protect that interest; (4) the\n applicantβs interest must be inadequately represented by the\n existing parties to the suit. 15\nβFailure to satisfy any one requirement precludes intervention of right.β 16\nTimeliness was the only element the district court decided and is the only one\ndisputed here. In evaluating timeliness, a district court should consider four\nfactors:\n (1) The length of time during which the would-be intervenor\n actually knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in\n the case before it petitioned for leave to intervene; (2) the extent of\n the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer\n as a result of the would-be intervenorβs failure to apply for\n intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known\n of its interest in the case; (3) the extent of the prejudice that the\n would-be intervenor may suffer if intervention is denied; and\n (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or\n against a determination that the application is timely. 17\n\n\n\n\n 13 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\n 14 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\n 15 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512 (quoting Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th\n\nCir. 2015)).\n 16 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted).\n 17 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512β13 (quoting Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 239\n\n(5th Cir. 2001)).\n 5\n\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-30029\n 1. Length of Time Elapsed\n Seymour says he moved to intervene less than two months after\nreceiving notice that his claim would not be paid. But the relevant starting\npoint is βnot when he knew or should have known that his interests would be\nadversely affected but, instead, when he knew that he had an interest in the\ncase.β 18 Here, Seymour knew that he had an interest in the case when he\nwithdrew in 2011, six years before he moved to intervene.\n Seymour counters that the βtimeliness clockβ does not begin until a\nmovant knows or should know that his interest is no longer represented by an\nexisting party. 19 But in 2011 he should have also known that no remaining\nparty represented his interest. Although a plaintiff adequately represents his\nattorneyβs interest during the attorney-client relationship, 20 no party in a case\nrepresents the interest of a discharged attorney. 21 And in Keith v. St. George\nPacking Co. and Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., discharged attorneys were\npermitted to intervene when their motions came within a year of being\ndischarged. 22 Here, much more time lapsedβsix years from withdrawal to\nintervention. So the first timeliness factor weighs against permitting\nintervention.\n 2. Prejudice to Existing Parties\n Seymour says his intervention will not prejudice other parties because it\nwill not cause burdensome additional proceedings. He says the Parish cannot\n\n\n\n 18 Id. at 513.\n 19 See Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000.\n 20 Valley Ranch Dev. Co. v. FDIC, 960 F.2d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 1992) (βHis interest is\n\nidentical to [the clientβs] until the agency relationship is broken.β).\n 21 See Keith v. St. George Packing Co., 806 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1986) (β[N]either\n\nparty to the pending action is interested in representing [the attorneyβs] interests.β); Gaines\nv. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1970) (βNeither of the existing parties is\nconcerned with protecting the appellantβs interest.β); see also Gilbert v. Johnson, 601 F.2d\n761, 767 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding similar facts indistinguishable from Gaines).\n 22 Keith, 806 F.2d at 525; Gaines, 434 F.2d at 54.\n\n 6\n\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-30029\nidentify anything it would have done differently had Seymour been a party all\nalong. And his fee is to be taken from the existing settlement pool, not from a\nrenewed settlement negotiation.\n Seymour is correct that opening a fee dispute between the plaintiff, its\ncurrent counsel, and former counsel would not necessarily relitigate the\nunderlying case. But it would at least hold up the distribution of settlement\nfunds, which could have been avoided had Seymour intervened when his\ninterest was no longer represented. So the second timeliness factor is neutral.\n 3. Prejudice to Seymour\n Seymour says he will be prejudiced absent intervention because it will\nbe difficult to pursue his claim elsewhere. He has numerous objections to the\nNew York interpleader action, including lack of personal jurisdiction. And he\nsays that a federal interpleader action is unavailable. But this does not rule\nout other possibilities, such as a state-law action against the Parish or Baker\nSanders to recover for his services. 23 At oral argument Seymour suggested that\nhe preferred not to bring a separate action because it would be difficult to\nobtain discovery of a confidential settlement agreement. 24 But discovery of\nconfidential settlement agreements is generally available under an\nappropriate protective order. 25 So the third timeliness factor weighs against\npermitting intervention.\n\n\n\n 23 See, e.g., Gilbert, 601 F.2d at 767 (Rubin, J., specially concurring) (stating that\nunder Georgia law the attorney βmay, however, if discharged from the case by his client, bring\nan action under quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services renderedβ).\n 24 Seymour cites Ford, 242 F.3d at 240, for the proposition that the presence of a\n\nβconfidentiality orderβ is a consideration in granting or denying intervention. In Ford we\ngranted a newspaperβs motion to intervene to challenge the confidentiality of a settlement.\n242 F.3d at 241. But Ford did not address the discoverability of a confidential settlement\nagreement in a separate private dispute.\n 25 E.g., Cleveland Const. Inc. v. Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Pβship, No. Civ.A. 01-2666, 2004\n\nWL 385052, at *1β2 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2004); Perez v. State Indus., Inc., 578 So. 2d 1018, 1020\n(La. Ct. App. 1991).\n 7\n\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-30029\n 4. βUnusual Circumstancesβ\n Finally, Seymour says that the Parishβs or Baker Sandersβs attempt to\nwithhold his fees, including filing a questionable interpleader action, are\nspecial circumstances that favor intervention. Another special circumstance,\nhe contends: the difficulty of intervening in the Barge Litigation as it stood in\n2011βthat is, in multiple fragmented cases.\n The Parish, for its part, cites precedent that moving to intervene after a\ncase is dismissed weighs against timeliness. 26 (We note, though, that the\ndismissal did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to grant intervention\nor to grant the ultimate relief sought by Seymour. 27) Considering all of this,\nthe fourth factor is neutral.\n * * *\n Viewing the four timeliness factors together, the district court did not\nabuse its discretion in concluding that Seymourβs motion to intervene came too\nlate.\nB. Permissive Intervention\n Like intervention of right, permissive intervention must be timely. 28 As\nSeymourβs motion was untimely, no further analysis is needed. 29 The district\ncourt did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention,\nand this portion of Seymourβs appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 30\n\n\n\n\n 26See Sommers, 835 F.3d at 513 (βThough the appellees are incorrect in suggesting\nthat intervention is always improper after a case has been dismissed, they are accurate in\nasserting that it is a factor weighing against timeliness.β).\n 27 See id.; United States v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1966)\n\n(β[A] perfected charging lien of attorneys cannot be defeated by a dismissal by stipulation\nunder Rule 41.β).\n 28 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\n 29 See, e.g., Lucas v. McKeithen, 102 F.3d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying\n\nintervention of right and dismissing permissive intervention based on timeliness).\n 30 See Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512.\n\n 8\n\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-30029\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We AFFIRM the district courtβs decision as to intervention of right and\nDISMISS Seymourβs appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to permissive\nintervention.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: ST. BERNARD PARISH, Through the St. Bernard Parish Government, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee, v. Richard T. Seymour; Law Office of Richard T. Seymour, P.L.L.C., Movants-Appellants.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 1, 2019\\n No. 18-30029\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\nST. BERNARD PARISH, Through the St. Bernard Parish Government,\\n\\n PlaintiffβAppellee,\\n\\nv.\\n\\nLAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED,\\n\\n DefendantβAppellee,\\n\\nv.\\n\\nRICHARD T. SEYMOUR; LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD T. SEYMOUR,\\nP.L.L.C.,\\n\\n MovantsβAppellants.\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Louisiana\\n\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\\nDON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:\\n When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, a barge moored by Lafarge\\nwound up at large. According to New Orleans residents then represented by\\nRichard T. Seymour, the breakaway barge hurtled through a floodwall,\\nunleashing catastrophic flooding in the Lower 9th Ward before finally coming\\nto rest atop several homes and a yellow school bus. (It remains disputed\\nwhether the barge caused the breach or surfed through it after the floodwall\\ngave way.)\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n Seymour withdrew from the Barge Litigation in 2011. But when it\\nsettled several years later, he moved to intervene in this related case to pursue\\nhis fees and expenses. We agree with the district court that Seymourβs\\nintervention motion was untimely. As to intervention of right, we AFFIRM the\\ndistrict courtβs order. As to permissive intervention, we DISMISS Seymourβs\\nappeal for lack of jurisdiction.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\nA. Factual\\n In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina, the most destructive natural\\ndisaster in United States history, inflicted cataclysmic damage on New\\nOrleans. According to many residents of the Lower 9th Ward, a predominantly\\nAfrican-American neighborhood bordering the Industrial Canal, the damage\\nwas worsened by a barge that broke free and allided with a floodwall before\\ncrashing into the residential streets, unleashing a surge of water that ripped\\nhomes from their foundations before scattering them in splinters. 1 The\\nresidents alleged that the barge had been improperly moored at a facility\\nowned by Lafarge North America, Inc. The district court consolidated many of\\nthe resulting cases into the Barge Litigation.\\n Appellants Richard T. Seymour and the Law Office of Richard T.\\nSeymour, P.L.L.C. represented plaintiffs in the Barge Litigation. Seymour\\nperformed significant work in the consolidated cases, as noted in the order\\ngranting his motion to withdraw. This work contributed to multiple cases\\nincluding, per Seymour, this one. But Seymour never represented a party in\\nthis case because this action by St. Bernard Parish against Lafarge was not\\nconsolidated into the Barge Litigation.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 See generally St. Bernard Par. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 550 F. Appβx 184 (5th Cir.\\n2013) (earlier appeal of summary-judgment decision).\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\nB. Procedural\\n In 2011 Seymour withdrew from the Barge Litigation because of a fee\\ndispute with Baker Sanders, LLC, a firm that now represents the Parish. In\\ngranting Seymourβs motion to withdraw, the district court explicitly recognized\\nhis potential claim to fees in the Barge Litigation. The Parish filed this case on\\nAugust 23, 2011, the same day Seymour withdrew.\\n About six years later, in 2017, the Parish and Lafarge settled this case.\\nOn July 20 Parish counsel called Seymour to tell him that the parties had\\nreached a settlement. The attorney told Seymour that at most he would be\\ncompensated for only some of his expenses. On July 23 Seymour served Baker\\nSanders with a Notice of Lien for fees and expenses in this case. Undaunted,\\nthe Parish and Lafarge filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.\\n Seymour, intending to pursue his claim for fees in the district court,\\nmoved on August 9 to appear pro hac vice. The district court denied this motion\\nwithout prejudice because, before intervening in the case, Seymour would not\\nhave been representing anyone. So Seymour moved to intervene on September\\n17. Meanwhile, a Baker Sanders attorney had filed an interpleader action in\\nNew York state court that named Seymour as a defendant. The interpleader\\naction concerned the same funds that Seymour sought to pursue via\\nintervention.\\n The district court denied Seymourβs motion to intervene as untimely.\\nSeymour appealed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW\\nA. Jurisdiction\\n The district court had jurisdiction based on federal question; 2 diversity; 3\\nand the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002. 4\\n We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1291 to review the denial of the\\nmotion to intervene of right. 5 And we have βprovisional jurisdictionβ to review\\nthe denial of permissive intervention. 6 This means that β[i]f the district courtβs\\ndenial of permissive intervention does not constitute an abuse of discretion, we\\nmust dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.β 7\\nB. Standard of Review\\n βA ruling denying intervention of right is reviewed de novo.β 8 But the\\ntimeliness of an intervention motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, so long\\nas the district court gave reasons for its determination. 9\\n βDenial of permissive intervention, on the other hand, is reviewed for\\nclear abuse of discretion.β 10 βUnder this standard, the Court will reverse a\\ndistrict court decision only under extraordinary circumstances.β 11\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 covers two types of intervention, one\\nmandatory (βthe court must permitβ) 12 and the other permissive (βthe court\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331.\\n 3 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1332.\\n 4 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1369.\\n 5 Sommers v. Bank of Am., N.A., 835 F.3d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 2016).\\n 6 Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 992 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).\\n 7 Id. (quoting Edwards, 78 F.3d at 992).\\n 8 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 995.\\n 9 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 513; Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000.\\n 10 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 995.\\n 11 Id. (quoting Cajun Elec. Power Coop. v. Gulf States Utils., Inc., 940 F.2d 117, 121\\n\\n(5th Cir. 1991)).\\n 12 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\nmay permitβ). 13 While the provisions cover different situations, both prize\\npunctuality, beginning with the same three words: βOn timely motion . . . .β 14\\nA. Intervention of Right\\n Rule 24(a)(2) governs intervention of right based on an interest in the\\naction. We have distilled the rule into four elements:\\n (1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the\\n applicant must have an interest relating to the property or\\n transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant\\n must be so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a\\n practical matter, impair his ability to protect that interest; (4) the\\n applicantβs interest must be inadequately represented by the\\n existing parties to the suit. 15\\nβFailure to satisfy any one requirement precludes intervention of right.β 16\\nTimeliness was the only element the district court decided and is the only one\\ndisputed here. In evaluating timeliness, a district court should consider four\\nfactors:\\n (1) The length of time during which the would-be intervenor\\n actually knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in\\n the case before it petitioned for leave to intervene; (2) the extent of\\n the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer\\n as a result of the would-be intervenorβs failure to apply for\\n intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known\\n of its interest in the case; (3) the extent of the prejudice that the\\n would-be intervenor may suffer if intervention is denied; and\\n (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or\\n against a determination that the application is timely. 17\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\\n 14 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\\n 15 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512 (quoting Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th\\n\\nCir. 2015)).\\n 16 Edwards, 78 F.3d at 999 (citation omitted).\\n 17 Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512β13 (quoting Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 239\\n\\n(5th Cir. 2001)).\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n 1. Length of Time Elapsed\\n Seymour says he moved to intervene less than two months after\\nreceiving notice that his claim would not be paid. But the relevant starting\\npoint is βnot when he knew or should have known that his interests would be\\nadversely affected but, instead, when he knew that he had an interest in the\\ncase.β 18 Here, Seymour knew that he had an interest in the case when he\\nwithdrew in 2011, six years before he moved to intervene.\\n Seymour counters that the βtimeliness clockβ does not begin until a\\nmovant knows or should know that his interest is no longer represented by an\\nexisting party. 19 But in 2011 he should have also known that no remaining\\nparty represented his interest. Although a plaintiff adequately represents his\\nattorneyβs interest during the attorney-client relationship, 20 no party in a case\\nrepresents the interest of a discharged attorney. 21 And in Keith v. St. George\\nPacking Co. and Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., discharged attorneys were\\npermitted to intervene when their motions came within a year of being\\ndischarged. 22 Here, much more time lapsedβsix years from withdrawal to\\nintervention. So the first timeliness factor weighs against permitting\\nintervention.\\n 2. Prejudice to Existing Parties\\n Seymour says his intervention will not prejudice other parties because it\\nwill not cause burdensome additional proceedings. He says the Parish cannot\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Id. at 513.\\n 19 See Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000.\\n 20 Valley Ranch Dev. Co. v. FDIC, 960 F.2d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 1992) (βHis interest is\\n\\nidentical to [the clientβs] until the agency relationship is broken.β).\\n 21 See Keith v. St. George Packing Co., 806 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1986) (β[N]either\\n\\nparty to the pending action is interested in representing [the attorneyβs] interests.β); Gaines\\nv. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1970) (βNeither of the existing parties is\\nconcerned with protecting the appellantβs interest.β); see also Gilbert v. Johnson, 601 F.2d\\n761, 767 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding similar facts indistinguishable from Gaines).\\n 22 Keith, 806 F.2d at 525; Gaines, 434 F.2d at 54.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\nidentify anything it would have done differently had Seymour been a party all\\nalong. And his fee is to be taken from the existing settlement pool, not from a\\nrenewed settlement negotiation.\\n Seymour is correct that opening a fee dispute between the plaintiff, its\\ncurrent counsel, and former counsel would not necessarily relitigate the\\nunderlying case. But it would at least hold up the distribution of settlement\\nfunds, which could have been avoided had Seymour intervened when his\\ninterest was no longer represented. So the second timeliness factor is neutral.\\n 3. Prejudice to Seymour\\n Seymour says he will be prejudiced absent intervention because it will\\nbe difficult to pursue his claim elsewhere. He has numerous objections to the\\nNew York interpleader action, including lack of personal jurisdiction. And he\\nsays that a federal interpleader action is unavailable. But this does not rule\\nout other possibilities, such as a state-law action against the Parish or Baker\\nSanders to recover for his services. 23 At oral argument Seymour suggested that\\nhe preferred not to bring a separate action because it would be difficult to\\nobtain discovery of a confidential settlement agreement. 24 But discovery of\\nconfidential settlement agreements is generally available under an\\nappropriate protective order. 25 So the third timeliness factor weighs against\\npermitting intervention.\\n\\n\\n\\n 23 See, e.g., Gilbert, 601 F.2d at 767 (Rubin, J., specially concurring) (stating that\\nunder Georgia law the attorney βmay, however, if discharged from the case by his client, bring\\nan action under quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services renderedβ).\\n 24 Seymour cites Ford, 242 F.3d at 240, for the proposition that the presence of a\\n\\nβconfidentiality orderβ is a consideration in granting or denying intervention. In Ford we\\ngranted a newspaperβs motion to intervene to challenge the confidentiality of a settlement.\\n242 F.3d at 241. But Ford did not address the discoverability of a confidential settlement\\nagreement in a separate private dispute.\\n 25 E.g., Cleveland Const. Inc. v. Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Pβship, No. Civ.A. 01-2666, 2004\\n\\nWL 385052, at *1β2 (E.D. La. Feb. 25, 2004); Perez v. State Indus., Inc., 578 So. 2d 1018, 1020\\n(La. Ct. App. 1991).\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n 4. βUnusual Circumstancesβ\\n Finally, Seymour says that the Parishβs or Baker Sandersβs attempt to\\nwithhold his fees, including filing a questionable interpleader action, are\\nspecial circumstances that favor intervention. Another special circumstance,\\nhe contends: the difficulty of intervening in the Barge Litigation as it stood in\\n2011βthat is, in multiple fragmented cases.\\n The Parish, for its part, cites precedent that moving to intervene after a\\ncase is dismissed weighs against timeliness. 26 (We note, though, that the\\ndismissal did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to grant intervention\\nor to grant the ultimate relief sought by Seymour. 27) Considering all of this,\\nthe fourth factor is neutral.\\n * * *\\n Viewing the four timeliness factors together, the district court did not\\nabuse its discretion in concluding that Seymourβs motion to intervene came too\\nlate.\\nB. Permissive Intervention\\n Like intervention of right, permissive intervention must be timely. 28 As\\nSeymourβs motion was untimely, no further analysis is needed. 29 The district\\ncourt did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention,\\nand this portion of Seymourβs appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26See Sommers, 835 F.3d at 513 (βThough the appellees are incorrect in suggesting\\nthat intervention is always improper after a case has been dismissed, they are accurate in\\nasserting that it is a factor weighing against timeliness.β).\\n 27 See id.; United States v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 356 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1966)\\n\\n(β[A] perfected charging lien of attorneys cannot be defeated by a dismissal by stipulation\\nunder Rule 41.β).\\n 28 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).\\n 29 See, e.g., Lucas v. McKeithen, 102 F.3d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying\\n\\nintervention of right and dismissing permissive intervention based on timeliness).\\n 30 See Sommers, 835 F.3d at 512.\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-30029\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the district courtβs decision as to intervention of right and\\nDISMISS Seymourβs appeal for lack of jurisdiction as to permissive\\nintervention.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":578,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4586916,"string":"4,586,916"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. City of Meridian"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-60805"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805 United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 1, 2019\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Plaintiff β Appellant, Clerk\\n\\n\\nv.\\n\\nLAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; JUDGE VELDORE YOUNG-\\nGRAHAM, In her official capacity; and JUDGE LISA HOWELL, In her\\nofficial capacity,\\n\\n Defendants β Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\\n\\n\\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.\\nJENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:\\n This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. The question\\nis whether the phrase βofficials or employees of any governmental agency with\\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justice,β as it is used in 34\\nU.S.C. Β§ 12601(a), includes the judges of a county youth court. Holding that it\\ndoes not, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n I.\\n As this is a question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text\\nof the statute. In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nEnforcement Act. 1 Relevant to this case are the provisions found in Title XXI,\\nΒ§ 210401, 108 Stat. 2071, now codified at 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601. That section,\\nenacted under a title heading of βState and Local Law Enforcement,β and a\\nsubtitle heading of βPolice Pattern or Practice,β reads as follows:\\n (a) Unlawful conduct\\n It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent\\n thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental\\n authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law\\n enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\\n governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of\\n juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives\\n persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by\\n the Constitution or laws of the United States.\\n (b) Civil action by Attorney General\\n Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe\\n that a violation of paragraph (1) 2 has occurred, the Attorney\\n General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil\\n action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to\\n eliminate the pattern or practice.\\n34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).\\n\\n 2 The reference to βparagraph (1)β is presumably a scrivenerβs error that should read\\nβparagraph (a)ββas there does not appear to be a paragraph (1) in the associated statutory\\nscheme to which it could plausibly be referring, and it appears quite clear that the intended\\nreference was to paragraph (a). See also Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999)\\n(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that a scrivenerβs error in a statute may only properly be\\ncorrected by a court when the text is devoid of any plausible purpose for being written in that\\nmanner); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J.,\\ndissenting) (β[T]he sine qua non of any βscrivenerβs errorβ doctrine . . . is that the meaning\\ngenuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise we might\\nbe rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.β).\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\n II.\\n The United States Department of Justice initiated this litigation in\\nOctober 2012. In its complaint, the United States alleged, inter alia, 3 that\\nLauderdale County and its two Youth Court judges 4 operated a βschool-to-\\nprison pipelineβ and, through their administration of the juvenile justice\\nprocess, were engaged in patterns or practices that denied juveniles their\\nconstitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.\\n Before we further address the litigation underlying this appeal, it will be\\nuseful to offer some background on the Lauderdale County Youth Court, its\\njudges, and its procedures. In Mississippi, county youth courts are divisions of\\nthe county courts, and the judges of the county courts are also the judges of the\\nyouth courts. Miss. Code Ann. Β§ 43-21-107. County judges are elected for\\nterms of four years, and the Governor has authority to fill vacancies by\\nappointment. Id. §§ 9-9-5, 9-7-1, 9-1-103. Lauderdale County is authorized\\ntwo county judges. Id. Β§ 9-9-18.3. When a juvenile is charged with offenses\\nunder youth court jurisdiction, he or she is brought before an intake officer of\\nthe court who establishes jurisdiction and recommends whether informal\\nresolution or custody is warranted. Id. Β§ 43-21-357. If the juvenile is placed\\ninto custody, he or she must be brought before a youth court judge within 48\\nhoursβexcluding weekends and holidaysβfor a probable cause determination.\\nId. Β§ 43-21-301. If needed, the juvenile is appointed a guardian ad litem and/or\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 In the same complaint, the government also made allegations against the City of\\nMeridian, through the Meridian Police Department, and the state of Mississippi, through its\\nDivision of Youth Services. However, those allegations are not part of the appeal before us.\\n\\n 4 The complaint and initial litigation named Judges Frank Coleman and Veldore\\nYoung-Graham as defendants in their official capacities. During the course of this litigation,\\nJudge Coleman was replaced by Judge Lisa Howell on the Youth Court, and the parties agree\\nthat she should be substituted in as a party to this appeal. We have therefore adjusted the\\nstyle of the case to replace Judge Coleman with Judge Howell.\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\ndefense counsel. Id. §§ 43-21-121, 43-21-201. If the juvenile is held in custody,\\nan adjudicatory hearing must be held within 21 days, with a few exceptions.\\nId. Β§ 43-21-551. If the juvenile is adjudicated to be delinquent or in need of\\nsupervision, a disposition hearing must then be scheduled within 14 days. Id.\\nΒ§ 43-21-601. If the disposition requires detention, the detention cannot exceed\\n90 days. Id. Β§ 43-21-605(1)(l). To perform the work of the youth courts, the\\nyouth court judges may appoint intake officers, guardians ad litem, defense\\ncounsel, and prosecutors. Id. §§ 43-21-119 (intake officers); 43-21-117\\n(prosecutors); 43-21-121 (guardians ad litem); 43-21-201 (defense counsel).\\nThe county board of supervisors controls the funding and budget for county\\nyouth courts. Id. Β§ 43-21-123.\\n The government brought this action against Lauderdale County and its\\nYouth Court judges under 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C.\\n14141). By way of alleged constitutional violations, the government alleges\\nthat the Lauderdale County judges: delay detention hearings for longer than\\n48 hours; do not base their detention determinations on whether probable\\ncause exists; do not consistently provide defense counsel; do not clearly\\narticulate the standards for school suspensions; do not conduct hearings that\\ndetermine whether violations occurred but instead βexist solely to determine\\npunishment[;]β and do not allow juveniles sufficient access to their attorneys. 5\\n By way of relief, the complaint filed by the United States seeks: (1) a\\ndeclaration that constitutional violations are occurring; (2) an injunction\\nagainst said unconstitutional practices; (3) an order requiring the defendants\\nβto promulgate and effectuateβ policies more protective of constitutional rights;\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 This list is by no means exclusive of all the alleged constitutional violations pleaded\\nby the government in their complaint, but it summarizes the judgesβ alleged constitutional\\nviolations that were briefed by the government on appeal.\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\n(4) an order directing the creation of βalternatives to detention and juvenile\\njustice processes for children,β as well as the βreview and expungement of\\nyouth records[;]β (5) for the court to retain jurisdiction until the defendants\\nfully comply; and (6) βany such additional relief as the interests of justice\\nrequire.β Though not the basis of our decision, we share the concerns expressed\\nby the district court that the government appears to be seeking remedies that\\nwould not only exceed the authority of the Youth Court judges, but also dictate\\nhow the Youth Court judges shall perform their adjudicatory functions when\\nenforcing state law. 6 Accord ODonnell v. Harris Cty, 892 F.3d 147, 155 (5th\\nCir. 2018) (holding that the judge of a county court may be liable under 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1983 when acting as a policymaker for the county, but not when\\nβacting in his or her judicial capacity to enforce state lawβ (quoting Johnson v.\\nMoore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992))).\\n The litigation underlying this appeal was tied up in motions, discovery,\\nand settlement discussions for years. The judges first moved to dismiss this\\nlitigation on Younger abstention grounds, but that argument was rejected by\\nthe district court. The judges next moved to dismiss on the grounds of the\\nRooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity. In September 2017, the\\ndistrict court rejected the Rooker-Feldman argument, but granted the motion\\nto dismiss on the bases that the plain statutory language of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601\\ndid not encompass youth court judges, and also that the judges were entitled\\nto judicial immunity with respect to the claims raised. The government timely\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 At oral argument, the government averred that, at least as applied to the judges, it\\nis only seeking remedies that are βproceduralβ in nature. Oral Argument at 15:30, 16:10.\\nUnited States v. Lauderdale Cty, (No. 17-60805), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-\\ninformation/oral-argument-recordings. However, the government subsequently declined\\nmultiple opportunities to explain, precisely, the nature of the remedies it is seeking against\\nthe judges. See, e.g., id. at 18:30, 19:55, 21:40.\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nappeals the statutory interpretation and judicial immunity determinations. As\\nfar as we are aware, this is the firstβand thus far the onlyβSection 12601\\nclaim brought against the judges of a youth court (or any court) to be resolved\\nin the federal courts through adjudication.\\n III.\\n The government contends that the district court erred in its conclusion\\nthat 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 does not encompass the Lauderdale County Youth\\nCourt judges. 7 Boiled down to its core, the argument between the parties is\\nwhether the phrase βofficials or employees of any governmental agency with\\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justice,β when viewed in the\\ncontext of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601, should include the judges of the Youth Court. To\\nput an even finer point on the argument, the question is whether the Youth\\nCourt should be considered an βagencyβ under the statute.\\n We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Matter of\\nGlenn, 900 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 2018). βThe task of statutory interpretation\\nbegins and, if possible, ends with the language of the statute.β Trout Point\\nLodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2013). βWhen the\\nlanguage is plain, we βmust enforce the statuteβs plain meaning, unless\\nabsurd.β β Id. (quoting In re Nowlin, 576 F.3d 258, 261β62 (5th Cir. 2009)); see\\nalso BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (βThe preeminent\\ncanon of statutory interpretation requires [the court] to βpresume that [the]\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7We note that the district court framed its analysis by: first holding that the judges\\nhad judicial immunity against the claims made against them in this case; and then holding\\nthat that judicial immunity was not overcome by 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601, as that statute does not\\napply to the judges. However, the question of judicial immunity as to specific claims need\\nnot be reached if the judges are not proper defendants under the statute to begin with.\\nAccordingly, on appeal, both the government and the judges in this case correctly present the\\nquestion as: first, whether the statute applies to judges; and second, if it does, whether the\\njudges have judicial immunity against the specific claims made.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nlegislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says\\nthere.β β (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253β54 (1992))).\\n Because 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 does not define how the term βagencyβ is used\\nin the statute, we βlook first to the wordβs ordinary meaning.β Schindler\\nElevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407 (2011). The\\ngovernment enters this analysis at a disadvantage. The Supreme Court has\\nobserved that β[i]n ordinary parlance, . . . courts are not described as\\nβdepartmentsβ or βagenciesβ of the Government.β Hubbard v. United States, 514\\nU.S. 695, 699 (1995). In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that βit would be\\nstrange indeed to refer to a court as an βagency.β β Id. Even setting that\\nprecedent aside, a common sense understanding of the word βagencyβ would\\nseem to require, at least when the word is used in the ordinary sense, that\\nthere be a principal on behalf of whom the agent acts. See Agency, Blackβs Law\\nDictionary (6th ed. 1990). The government does not identify what principal\\nthe Youth Court judges would be acting as agents for.\\n The fact that the word βagencyβ is not normally understood to include\\nthe courts does not mean that Congress could not have enacted a statute that\\nincludes them in the definition. Indeed, Congress has enacted several other\\nstatutes that do just that. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. Β§ 6106(1) 8 (defining βagencyβ for\\nthe purposes of the Mansfield Fellowship Program to include βany court of the\\njudicial branchβ); 5 U.S.C. Β§ 3371(3) 9 (defining β[f]ederal agencyβ for the\\npurposes of a statute governing employee assignments between the federal and\\nstate governments to include βa court of the United Statesβ). But this fact also\\ncuts against the government here. Given that Congress, when it so chooses,\\n\\n\\n 8 Pub. L. 103-236, Β§β―257, 108 Stat. 432 (1994).\\n\\n 9 Pub. L. 91-648, Β§β―402(a), 84 Stat. 1920 (1971), amended by Pub. L. 95-454, Β§β―603(a),\\n92 Stat. 1189 (1978).\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nknows how to deviate from the ordinary usage of βagencyβ by expressly defining\\nthe term to include courts, the fact that Congress did not do so in this statute\\nweighs against deviating from the ordinary usage here. 10 Accord Whitfield v.\\nUnited States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (noting, in the context of a different\\nstatutory interpretation question, that the inclusion of an overt act\\nrequirement in other statutes clearly demonstrated Congress βknows how to\\nimpose such a requirement when it wishes to do soβ); Dole Food Co. v.\\nPatrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003) (noting that β[w]here Congress intends to\\nrefer to ownership in other than the formal sense, it knows how to do soβ). But\\nsee 5 U.S.C. Β§ 551(1)(B) 11 (defining βagencyβ for the purposes of the\\nAdministrative Procedure Act to explicitly exclude the courts).\\n Recognizing that the ordinary usage of βagencyβ will not lead to its\\ndesired outcome, the government maintains that we must view the word in the\\ncontext of the rest of the statute. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)\\n(β[W]e construe language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding\\nitβ); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (observing the\\nβfundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language\\nitself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must\\nbe drawn from the context in which it is usedβ). See also Antonin Scalia &\\nBryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 69 (2012)\\n(βWords are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meaningsβunless\\nthe context indicates that they bear a technical sense.β). So we now turn to the\\ncontext.\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 The statute now codified at 22 U.S.C. Β§ 6106(1) (expressly defining βagencyβ to\\ninclude βany courtβ for the purposes of that act) and the statute now codified at 34 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 12601 (not expressly defining βagencyβ to include courts for the purpose of that act) were\\nboth passed in 1994 by the same Congress.\\n\\n 11 Pub. L. 89β554, 80 Stat. 381 (1966).\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\n We will begin our contextual analysis by looking at the title and subtitle\\nof the statutory section enacting this text. While section headings are not\\ncontrolling, they can be used as evidence when interpreting the operative text\\nof the statute. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015)\\n(plurality op.); id. at 1089β90 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment);\\nAlmendarezβTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (βthe title of a\\nstatute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a\\ndoubt about the meaning of a statuteβ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As\\nalready noted, 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 was enacted under the title heading of βState\\nand Local Law Enforcement,β and the subtitle heading of βPolice Pattern or\\nPractice.β Pub. L. No. 103-322, Β§ 210401, 108 Stat. 2071. Those headings do\\nnot support the governmentβs argument that the statute is intended to include\\njudges. 12\\n We next address the question of superfluity. βIt is βa cardinal principle\\nof statutory constructionβ that βa statute ought, upon the whole, to be so\\nconstrued that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be\\nsuperfluous, void, or insignificant.β β TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31\\n(2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 553 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). See also Asadi v.\\nG.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2013) (βIn construing a\\n\\n\\n 12 The government argues that we should disregard those titles based on its assertion\\nthat, after the titles were written, the text was modified by an amendment whose sponsor\\nmade a single statement purportedly suggesting an intent to include juvenile court systems.\\nWe reject this argument. In construing a statute, it is our duty to evaluate the text that was\\nactually enacted into law by both houses of Congress and the President. We will not go down\\nthe rabbit hole of attempting to divine the intent of Congress as a whole based on a single\\nstatement by a single Senator. Accord Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia,\\nJ., concurring) (βI decline to participate in this process. It is neither compatible with our\\njudicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and effective application of the\\nstatutes of the United States, nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional\\nintent[.]β); Texas v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 829 F.3d 405, 422 n.27 (5th Cir. 2016)\\n(declining to consider a single comment in a House Report because β[w]e do not consider\\npassing commentary in the legislative history . . . when the statutory text itself yields a single\\nmeaningβ).\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nstatute, a court should give effect, if possible, to every word and every provision\\nCongress used.β). 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 refers to βpattern[s] or practice[s] of\\nconduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\\ngovernmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile\\njustice or the incarceration of juveniles[.]β (emphasis added). The government\\nargues in its opening brief on appeal that the second clause would be rendered\\nsuperfluous if we interpret Section 12601 to encompass only law enforcement\\npersonnel. However, that is not the only alternate reading of the statute. As\\nthe government rightly concedes in its Reply Brief, the second clause would\\nstill encompass more than law enforcement personnel even if not read to\\ninclude youth court judges. The βincarceration of juvenilesβ language would\\nclearly still include the personnel of the juvenile detention facilities, and, as\\nthe original parties to this litigation demonstrate, the βadministration of\\njuvenile justiceβ language would still include, just to name a few examples,\\nboth Lauderdale County and Mississippiβs Division of Youth Services. Thus,\\nexcluding the judges of the Youth Court from Section 12601 would not render\\nportions of the statute superfluous.\\n The judges, for their part, raise a noscitur a sociis argument. β[W]e rely\\non the principle of noscitur a sociisβa word is known by the company it\\nkeepsβto βavoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is\\ninconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to\\nthe Acts of Congress.β β Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085 (plurality op.) (quoting\\nGustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)). See also Scalia & Garner,\\nReading Law at 195 (βWhen several [words] are associated in a context\\nsuggesting that the words have something in common, they should be assigned\\na permissible meaning that makes them similar.β). The judges argue that the\\nprinciple of noscitur a sociis weighs towards interpreting the clause βconduct\\nby law enforcement officersβ as limiting the meaning of βany governmental\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nagencyβ to entities that are similar to law enforcement agencies. However, on\\nthis point the judgesβ argument holds little water. As the government correctly\\npoints out, noscitur a sociis βis invoked when a string of statutory terms raises\\nthe implication that the βwords grouped in a list should be given related\\nmeaning.β β S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006)\\n(quoting Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990)). The statutory text\\nβconduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\\ngovernmental agencyβ does not contain a string of terms; rather, it contains\\ntwo independent clauses separated by a disjunctive βor.β See Encino\\nMotorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (2018) (noting that βorβ is\\nβalmost always disjunctiveβ (quoting United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45\\n(2013))). As such, the noscitur a sociis argument does not support the judgesβ\\nargument that Section 12601 should be interpreted to exclude judgesβthough\\nits rejection does not necessarily lend weight to the governmentβs counter-\\ncontention that Section 12601 must be interpreted to include them. On net,\\nthis argument is a wash.\\n We now turn to the governmentβs argument that βgovernmental agencyβ\\nshould not be viewed in isolation, but instead should be interpreted as modified\\nby the clause βwith responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice.β\\nSee, e.g., Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (βwe construe language . . . in light of the terms\\nsurrounding itβ). See also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 167 (noting that\\nβthe judicial interpreter [must] consider the entire text, in view of its structure\\nand of the physical and logical relation of its many partsβ). The government\\nasserts that the modifying phrase βwith responsibility for the administration\\nof juvenile justiceβ should be interpreted to include juvenile courts within the\\nmeaning of βgovernmental agency.β However, this argument is weak for the\\nsame reason that the superfluity argument fails. Even though juvenile courts\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nare indeed entities with responsibility for administering juvenile justice, 13 not\\nall entities are βagencies.β There is no shortage of non-adjudicatory entities\\nwith responsibility for the administration of juvenile justiceβmost, if not all,\\nof which are more amenable to the ordinary understanding of the word\\nβagencyβ than is a court. It seems quite reasonable to infer that Congress was\\nreferring to those non-adjudicatory entities when enacting the phrase\\nβgovernmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile\\njustice[,]β and we see little support for the governmentβs argument that by\\nadding such language Congress deviated from the ordinary usage of the term\\nβagency.β As such, the governmentβs invocation of the modifying phrase βwith\\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justiceβ is weak evidence for\\nthe proposition that the word βagencyβ should be interpreted outside its\\nordinary meaning.\\n The government also makes the related argument that the phrase\\nβgovernmental agencyβ should be interpreted to include juvenile courts\\nbecause the phrase is modified by the word βany.β Specifically, the government\\nappears to argue that by using the phrase βany governmental agency,β what\\nCongress intended to say was βall governmental entities.β This argument is\\njust like the previous one, but weaker still. βEntityβ is still not a synonym for\\nβagency.β It is quite reasonable to infer that Congress, by use of the word βany,β\\nwas referring to any agency ordinarily referred to as an agency. As such, use\\nof the word βanyβ to modify βgovernmental agencyβ is also weak evidence for\\nthe proposition that the phrase should be interpreted outside its ordinary\\nmeaning.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 See Court, Blackβs Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining βcourtβ as βa body\\norganized to administer justice[.]β).\\n 12\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\n Finally, we will address the purpose argument. Congressβs stated\\npurpose in authorizing the Attorney General to bring lawsuits under Section\\n12601 was βto eliminate the pattern or practiceβ of denying juveniles their\\nconstitutional and statutory rights. 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601(b). The government\\nargues that because juvenile courts are a central part of the juvenile justice\\nsystem, interpreting Section 12601 to exclude juvenile courts would βeffectively\\nvitiateβ the purpose of the statute. See also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at\\n63 (βA textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs\\nthe documentβs purpose should be favored.β). However, βno law pursues its\\npurpose at all costs, and . . . the textual limitations upon a lawβs scope are no\\nless a part of its βpurposeβ than its substantive authorizations.β Rapanos v.\\nUnited States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 (2006) (plurality op.). 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 has\\na clear textual limitation in the form of the word βagency.β Moreover, given\\nthat the government can presumably still bring Section 12601 lawsuits against\\nmany other entities in the juvenile justice system without stretching the\\nordinary meaning of any wordsβincluding counties, city councils, mayors,\\npolice commissioners, correctional facilities, and youth servicesβwe think it\\nstrains credulity to say that Congressβs purpose in enacting the statute would\\nbe vitiated unless the word βagencyβ was interpreted outside of its ordinary\\nmeaning.\\n Therefore, we decline to interpret the word βagency,β as it is used in 34\\nU.S.C. Β§ 12601, to encompass the Youth Court. As such, the district court did\\nnot err in dismissing the Section 12601 claims brought against the Lauderdale\\nCounty Youth Court judges.\\n IV.\\n We now turn to two residual matters raised by the parties. First, we\\nconsider the question of judicial immunity. The parties dedicate considerable\\nportions of their briefs disputing whether or not the Youth Court judges should\\n 13\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nhave judicial immunity against the specific claims made against them in his\\nlawsuit. However, because we hold that the text of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 is not\\napplicable to the judges of the Youth Court, we do not reach the question of\\njudicial immunity as to any of the specific claims raised in this case. 14\\n Second, we consider the question of whether this lawsuit can continue\\nagainst Lauderdale County if the Youth Court judges are excluded. Before the\\ndistrict court, the government argued that Lauderdale County was\\nindependently liable under Section 12601 because of its budgetary authority\\nover the Youth Court and its alleged failure to provide indigent juveniles with\\nadequate representation. However, on appeal, the government changed course\\nand now only argues that dismissal of the County follows dismissal of the\\njudges, and that reversing the latter also requires reversing the former. 15\\nMoreover, at oral argument, counsel for the government conceded that it did\\nnot brief an independent basis for continuing the litigation against the County,\\nand stated that if the judges are deemed to be outside of Section 12601 then\\nthe claims against the County should also be dismissed. Oral Argument at\\n59:00. We take the government at its word.\\n Therefore, because we hold that the district court did not err in\\ndismissing the lawsuit against the judges on the basis that they are outside\\nthe scope of Section 12601, and because the government has affirmatively\\n\\n\\n 14We likewise do not consider the district courtβs determinations regarding the\\nYounger abstention and Rooker-Feldman arguments.\\n\\n 15 In a letter filed with the court after oral argument, the government argues that if\\nwe interpret Section 12601βs use of the phrase βgovernmental agencyβ to exclude the Youth\\nCourt, then we should remand to determine whether public defenders and non-judicial court\\npersonnel can be held liable under the statute. However, not only did the government fail to\\nmake that argument in its briefs, but it has also not named these persons as defendants in\\nthis litigation. As such, we decline the governmentβs invitation to remand for that purpose,\\nand leave it be addressed in future cases where the issue is squarely raised and litigated.\\nSee, e.g., Sindhi v. Raina, 905 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that issues not briefed\\nwill not be considered on appeal).\\n 14\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nwaived any other argument for continuing the lawsuit against the County, we\\naffirm the dismissal of this litigation as it pertains to Lauderdale County. See\\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 2017) (βWaiver is the\\nβintentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.β β (quoting\\nUnited States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2006))).\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364169/\", \"author_raw\": \"JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"REAVLEY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ELROD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HIGGINSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"REAVLEY\": \", Circuit\", \"ELROD\": \", Circuit\", \"HIGGINSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586916/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. City of Meridian\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-60805 United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n February 1, 2019\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Plaintiff β Appellant, Clerk\n\n\nv.\n\nLAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; JUDGE VELDORE YOUNG-\nGRAHAM, In her official capacity; and JUDGE LISA HOWELL, In her\nofficial capacity,\n\n Defendants β Appellees.\n\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\n\n\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.\nJENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:\n This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. The question\nis whether the phrase βofficials or employees of any governmental agency with\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justice,β as it is used in 34\nU.S.C. Β§ 12601(a), includes the judges of a county youth court. Holding that it\ndoes not, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\n I.\n As this is a question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text\nof the statute. In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nEnforcement Act. 1 Relevant to this case are the provisions found in Title XXI,\nΒ§ 210401, 108 Stat. 2071, now codified at 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601. That section,\nenacted under a title heading of βState and Local Law Enforcement,β and a\nsubtitle heading of βPolice Pattern or Practice,β reads as follows:\n (a) Unlawful conduct\n It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent\n thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental\n authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law\n enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\n governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of\n juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives\n persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by\n the Constitution or laws of the United States.\n (b) Civil action by Attorney General\n Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe\n that a violation of paragraph (1) 2 has occurred, the Attorney\n General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil\n action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to\n eliminate the pattern or practice.\n34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601.\n\n\n\n\n 1 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).\n\n 2 The reference to βparagraph (1)β is presumably a scrivenerβs error that should read\nβparagraph (a)ββas there does not appear to be a paragraph (1) in the associated statutory\nscheme to which it could plausibly be referring, and it appears quite clear that the intended\nreference was to paragraph (a). See also Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999)\n(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that a scrivenerβs error in a statute may only properly be\ncorrected by a court when the text is devoid of any plausible purpose for being written in that\nmanner); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J.,\ndissenting) (β[T]he sine qua non of any βscrivenerβs errorβ doctrine . . . is that the meaning\ngenuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise we might\nbe rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.β).\n\n 2\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\n II.\n The United States Department of Justice initiated this litigation in\nOctober 2012. In its complaint, the United States alleged, inter alia, 3 that\nLauderdale County and its two Youth Court judges 4 operated a βschool-to-\nprison pipelineβ and, through their administration of the juvenile justice\nprocess, were engaged in patterns or practices that denied juveniles their\nconstitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.\n Before we further address the litigation underlying this appeal, it will be\nuseful to offer some background on the Lauderdale County Youth Court, its\njudges, and its procedures. In Mississippi, county youth courts are divisions of\nthe county courts, and the judges of the county courts are also the judges of the\nyouth courts. Miss. Code Ann. Β§ 43-21-107. County judges are elected for\nterms of four years, and the Governor has authority to fill vacancies by\nappointment. Id. §§ 9-9-5, 9-7-1, 9-1-103. Lauderdale County is authorized\ntwo county judges. Id. Β§ 9-9-18.3. When a juvenile is charged with offenses\nunder youth court jurisdiction, he or she is brought before an intake officer of\nthe court who establishes jurisdiction and recommends whether informal\nresolution or custody is warranted. Id. Β§ 43-21-357. If the juvenile is placed\ninto custody, he or she must be brought before a youth court judge within 48\nhoursβexcluding weekends and holidaysβfor a probable cause determination.\nId. Β§ 43-21-301. If needed, the juvenile is appointed a guardian ad litem and/or\n\n\n\n 3 In the same complaint, the government also made allegations against the City of\nMeridian, through the Meridian Police Department, and the state of Mississippi, through its\nDivision of Youth Services. However, those allegations are not part of the appeal before us.\n\n 4 The complaint and initial litigation named Judges Frank Coleman and Veldore\nYoung-Graham as defendants in their official capacities. During the course of this litigation,\nJudge Coleman was replaced by Judge Lisa Howell on the Youth Court, and the parties agree\nthat she should be substituted in as a party to this appeal. We have therefore adjusted the\nstyle of the case to replace Judge Coleman with Judge Howell.\n 3\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\ndefense counsel. Id. §§ 43-21-121, 43-21-201. If the juvenile is held in custody,\nan adjudicatory hearing must be held within 21 days, with a few exceptions.\nId. Β§ 43-21-551. If the juvenile is adjudicated to be delinquent or in need of\nsupervision, a disposition hearing must then be scheduled within 14 days. Id.\nΒ§ 43-21-601. If the disposition requires detention, the detention cannot exceed\n90 days. Id. Β§ 43-21-605(1)(l). To perform the work of the youth courts, the\nyouth court judges may appoint intake officers, guardians ad litem, defense\ncounsel, and prosecutors. Id. §§ 43-21-119 (intake officers); 43-21-117\n(prosecutors); 43-21-121 (guardians ad litem); 43-21-201 (defense counsel).\nThe county board of supervisors controls the funding and budget for county\nyouth courts. Id. Β§ 43-21-123.\n The government brought this action against Lauderdale County and its\nYouth Court judges under 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C.\n14141). By way of alleged constitutional violations, the government alleges\nthat the Lauderdale County judges: delay detention hearings for longer than\n48 hours; do not base their detention determinations on whether probable\ncause exists; do not consistently provide defense counsel; do not clearly\narticulate the standards for school suspensions; do not conduct hearings that\ndetermine whether violations occurred but instead βexist solely to determine\npunishment[;]β and do not allow juveniles sufficient access to their attorneys. 5\n By way of relief, the complaint filed by the United States seeks: (1) a\ndeclaration that constitutional violations are occurring; (2) an injunction\nagainst said unconstitutional practices; (3) an order requiring the defendants\nβto promulgate and effectuateβ policies more protective of constitutional rights;\n\n\n\n 5 This list is by no means exclusive of all the alleged constitutional violations pleaded\nby the government in their complaint, but it summarizes the judgesβ alleged constitutional\nviolations that were briefed by the government on appeal.\n\n 4\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\n(4) an order directing the creation of βalternatives to detention and juvenile\njustice processes for children,β as well as the βreview and expungement of\nyouth records[;]β (5) for the court to retain jurisdiction until the defendants\nfully comply; and (6) βany such additional relief as the interests of justice\nrequire.β Though not the basis of our decision, we share the concerns expressed\nby the district court that the government appears to be seeking remedies that\nwould not only exceed the authority of the Youth Court judges, but also dictate\nhow the Youth Court judges shall perform their adjudicatory functions when\nenforcing state law. 6 Accord ODonnell v. Harris Cty, 892 F.3d 147, 155 (5th\nCir. 2018) (holding that the judge of a county court may be liable under 42\nU.S.C. Β§ 1983 when acting as a policymaker for the county, but not when\nβacting in his or her judicial capacity to enforce state lawβ (quoting Johnson v.\nMoore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992))).\n The litigation underlying this appeal was tied up in motions, discovery,\nand settlement discussions for years. The judges first moved to dismiss this\nlitigation on Younger abstention grounds, but that argument was rejected by\nthe district court. The judges next moved to dismiss on the grounds of the\nRooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity. In September 2017, the\ndistrict court rejected the Rooker-Feldman argument, but granted the motion\nto dismiss on the bases that the plain statutory language of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601\ndid not encompass youth court judges, and also that the judges were entitled\nto judicial immunity with respect to the claims raised. The government timely\n\n\n\n\n 6 At oral argument, the government averred that, at least as applied to the judges, it\nis only seeking remedies that are βproceduralβ in nature. Oral Argument at 15:30, 16:10.\nUnited States v. Lauderdale Cty, (No. 17-60805), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-\ninformation/oral-argument-recordings. However, the government subsequently declined\nmultiple opportunities to explain, precisely, the nature of the remedies it is seeking against\nthe judges. See, e.g., id. at 18:30, 19:55, 21:40.\n\n 5\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nappeals the statutory interpretation and judicial immunity determinations. As\nfar as we are aware, this is the firstβand thus far the onlyβSection 12601\nclaim brought against the judges of a youth court (or any court) to be resolved\nin the federal courts through adjudication.\n III.\n The government contends that the district court erred in its conclusion\nthat 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 does not encompass the Lauderdale County Youth\nCourt judges. 7 Boiled down to its core, the argument between the parties is\nwhether the phrase βofficials or employees of any governmental agency with\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justice,β when viewed in the\ncontext of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601, should include the judges of the Youth Court. To\nput an even finer point on the argument, the question is whether the Youth\nCourt should be considered an βagencyβ under the statute.\n We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Matter of\nGlenn, 900 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 2018). βThe task of statutory interpretation\nbegins and, if possible, ends with the language of the statute.β Trout Point\nLodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2013). βWhen the\nlanguage is plain, we βmust enforce the statuteβs plain meaning, unless\nabsurd.β β Id. (quoting In re Nowlin, 576 F.3d 258, 261β62 (5th Cir. 2009)); see\nalso BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (βThe preeminent\ncanon of statutory interpretation requires [the court] to βpresume that [the]\n\n\n\n\n 7We note that the district court framed its analysis by: first holding that the judges\nhad judicial immunity against the claims made against them in this case; and then holding\nthat that judicial immunity was not overcome by 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601, as that statute does not\napply to the judges. However, the question of judicial immunity as to specific claims need\nnot be reached if the judges are not proper defendants under the statute to begin with.\nAccordingly, on appeal, both the government and the judges in this case correctly present the\nquestion as: first, whether the statute applies to judges; and second, if it does, whether the\njudges have judicial immunity against the specific claims made.\n 6\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nlegislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says\nthere.β β (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253β54 (1992))).\n Because 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 does not define how the term βagencyβ is used\nin the statute, we βlook first to the wordβs ordinary meaning.β Schindler\nElevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407 (2011). The\ngovernment enters this analysis at a disadvantage. The Supreme Court has\nobserved that β[i]n ordinary parlance, . . . courts are not described as\nβdepartmentsβ or βagenciesβ of the Government.β Hubbard v. United States, 514\nU.S. 695, 699 (1995). In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that βit would be\nstrange indeed to refer to a court as an βagency.β β Id. Even setting that\nprecedent aside, a common sense understanding of the word βagencyβ would\nseem to require, at least when the word is used in the ordinary sense, that\nthere be a principal on behalf of whom the agent acts. See Agency, Blackβs Law\nDictionary (6th ed. 1990). The government does not identify what principal\nthe Youth Court judges would be acting as agents for.\n The fact that the word βagencyβ is not normally understood to include\nthe courts does not mean that Congress could not have enacted a statute that\nincludes them in the definition. Indeed, Congress has enacted several other\nstatutes that do just that. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. Β§ 6106(1) 8 (defining βagencyβ for\nthe purposes of the Mansfield Fellowship Program to include βany court of the\njudicial branchβ); 5 U.S.C. Β§ 3371(3) 9 (defining β[f]ederal agencyβ for the\npurposes of a statute governing employee assignments between the federal and\nstate governments to include βa court of the United Statesβ). But this fact also\ncuts against the government here. Given that Congress, when it so chooses,\n\n\n 8 Pub. L. 103-236, Β§β―257, 108 Stat. 432 (1994).\n\n 9 Pub. L. 91-648, Β§β―402(a), 84 Stat. 1920 (1971), amended by Pub. L. 95-454, Β§β―603(a),\n92 Stat. 1189 (1978).\n\n 7\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nknows how to deviate from the ordinary usage of βagencyβ by expressly defining\nthe term to include courts, the fact that Congress did not do so in this statute\nweighs against deviating from the ordinary usage here. 10 Accord Whitfield v.\nUnited States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (noting, in the context of a different\nstatutory interpretation question, that the inclusion of an overt act\nrequirement in other statutes clearly demonstrated Congress βknows how to\nimpose such a requirement when it wishes to do soβ); Dole Food Co. v.\nPatrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003) (noting that β[w]here Congress intends to\nrefer to ownership in other than the formal sense, it knows how to do soβ). But\nsee 5 U.S.C. Β§ 551(1)(B) 11 (defining βagencyβ for the purposes of the\nAdministrative Procedure Act to explicitly exclude the courts).\n Recognizing that the ordinary usage of βagencyβ will not lead to its\ndesired outcome, the government maintains that we must view the word in the\ncontext of the rest of the statute. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)\n(β[W]e construe language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding\nitβ); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (observing the\nβfundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language\nitself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must\nbe drawn from the context in which it is usedβ). See also Antonin Scalia &\nBryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 69 (2012)\n(βWords are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meaningsβunless\nthe context indicates that they bear a technical sense.β). So we now turn to the\ncontext.\n\n\n\n 10 The statute now codified at 22 U.S.C. Β§ 6106(1) (expressly defining βagencyβ to\ninclude βany courtβ for the purposes of that act) and the statute now codified at 34 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 12601 (not expressly defining βagencyβ to include courts for the purpose of that act) were\nboth passed in 1994 by the same Congress.\n\n 11 Pub. L. 89β554, 80 Stat. 381 (1966).\n 8\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\n We will begin our contextual analysis by looking at the title and subtitle\nof the statutory section enacting this text. While section headings are not\ncontrolling, they can be used as evidence when interpreting the operative text\nof the statute. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015)\n(plurality op.); id. at 1089β90 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment);\nAlmendarezβTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (βthe title of a\nstatute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a\ndoubt about the meaning of a statuteβ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As\nalready noted, 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 was enacted under the title heading of βState\nand Local Law Enforcement,β and the subtitle heading of βPolice Pattern or\nPractice.β Pub. L. No. 103-322, Β§ 210401, 108 Stat. 2071. Those headings do\nnot support the governmentβs argument that the statute is intended to include\njudges. 12\n We next address the question of superfluity. βIt is βa cardinal principle\nof statutory constructionβ that βa statute ought, upon the whole, to be so\nconstrued that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be\nsuperfluous, void, or insignificant.β β TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31\n(2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 553 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). See also Asadi v.\nG.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2013) (βIn construing a\n\n\n 12 The government argues that we should disregard those titles based on its assertion\nthat, after the titles were written, the text was modified by an amendment whose sponsor\nmade a single statement purportedly suggesting an intent to include juvenile court systems.\nWe reject this argument. In construing a statute, it is our duty to evaluate the text that was\nactually enacted into law by both houses of Congress and the President. We will not go down\nthe rabbit hole of attempting to divine the intent of Congress as a whole based on a single\nstatement by a single Senator. Accord Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia,\nJ., concurring) (βI decline to participate in this process. It is neither compatible with our\njudicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and effective application of the\nstatutes of the United States, nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional\nintent[.]β); Texas v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 829 F.3d 405, 422 n.27 (5th Cir. 2016)\n(declining to consider a single comment in a House Report because β[w]e do not consider\npassing commentary in the legislative history . . . when the statutory text itself yields a single\nmeaningβ).\n 9\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nstatute, a court should give effect, if possible, to every word and every provision\nCongress used.β). 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 refers to βpattern[s] or practice[s] of\nconduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\ngovernmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile\njustice or the incarceration of juveniles[.]β (emphasis added). The government\nargues in its opening brief on appeal that the second clause would be rendered\nsuperfluous if we interpret Section 12601 to encompass only law enforcement\npersonnel. However, that is not the only alternate reading of the statute. As\nthe government rightly concedes in its Reply Brief, the second clause would\nstill encompass more than law enforcement personnel even if not read to\ninclude youth court judges. The βincarceration of juvenilesβ language would\nclearly still include the personnel of the juvenile detention facilities, and, as\nthe original parties to this litigation demonstrate, the βadministration of\njuvenile justiceβ language would still include, just to name a few examples,\nboth Lauderdale County and Mississippiβs Division of Youth Services. Thus,\nexcluding the judges of the Youth Court from Section 12601 would not render\nportions of the statute superfluous.\n The judges, for their part, raise a noscitur a sociis argument. β[W]e rely\non the principle of noscitur a sociisβa word is known by the company it\nkeepsβto βavoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is\ninconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to\nthe Acts of Congress.β β Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085 (plurality op.) (quoting\nGustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)). See also Scalia & Garner,\nReading Law at 195 (βWhen several [words] are associated in a context\nsuggesting that the words have something in common, they should be assigned\na permissible meaning that makes them similar.β). The judges argue that the\nprinciple of noscitur a sociis weighs towards interpreting the clause βconduct\nby law enforcement officersβ as limiting the meaning of βany governmental\n 10\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nagencyβ to entities that are similar to law enforcement agencies. However, on\nthis point the judgesβ argument holds little water. As the government correctly\npoints out, noscitur a sociis βis invoked when a string of statutory terms raises\nthe implication that the βwords grouped in a list should be given related\nmeaning.β β S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006)\n(quoting Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990)). The statutory text\nβconduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\ngovernmental agencyβ does not contain a string of terms; rather, it contains\ntwo independent clauses separated by a disjunctive βor.β See Encino\nMotorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (2018) (noting that βorβ is\nβalmost always disjunctiveβ (quoting United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45\n(2013))). As such, the noscitur a sociis argument does not support the judgesβ\nargument that Section 12601 should be interpreted to exclude judgesβthough\nits rejection does not necessarily lend weight to the governmentβs counter-\ncontention that Section 12601 must be interpreted to include them. On net,\nthis argument is a wash.\n We now turn to the governmentβs argument that βgovernmental agencyβ\nshould not be viewed in isolation, but instead should be interpreted as modified\nby the clause βwith responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice.β\nSee, e.g., Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (βwe construe language . . . in light of the terms\nsurrounding itβ). See also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 167 (noting that\nβthe judicial interpreter [must] consider the entire text, in view of its structure\nand of the physical and logical relation of its many partsβ). The government\nasserts that the modifying phrase βwith responsibility for the administration\nof juvenile justiceβ should be interpreted to include juvenile courts within the\nmeaning of βgovernmental agency.β However, this argument is weak for the\nsame reason that the superfluity argument fails. Even though juvenile courts\n\n\n 11\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nare indeed entities with responsibility for administering juvenile justice, 13 not\nall entities are βagencies.β There is no shortage of non-adjudicatory entities\nwith responsibility for the administration of juvenile justiceβmost, if not all,\nof which are more amenable to the ordinary understanding of the word\nβagencyβ than is a court. It seems quite reasonable to infer that Congress was\nreferring to those non-adjudicatory entities when enacting the phrase\nβgovernmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile\njustice[,]β and we see little support for the governmentβs argument that by\nadding such language Congress deviated from the ordinary usage of the term\nβagency.β As such, the governmentβs invocation of the modifying phrase βwith\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justiceβ is weak evidence for\nthe proposition that the word βagencyβ should be interpreted outside its\nordinary meaning.\n The government also makes the related argument that the phrase\nβgovernmental agencyβ should be interpreted to include juvenile courts\nbecause the phrase is modified by the word βany.β Specifically, the government\nappears to argue that by using the phrase βany governmental agency,β what\nCongress intended to say was βall governmental entities.β This argument is\njust like the previous one, but weaker still. βEntityβ is still not a synonym for\nβagency.β It is quite reasonable to infer that Congress, by use of the word βany,β\nwas referring to any agency ordinarily referred to as an agency. As such, use\nof the word βanyβ to modify βgovernmental agencyβ is also weak evidence for\nthe proposition that the phrase should be interpreted outside its ordinary\nmeaning.\n\n\n\n\n 13 See Court, Blackβs Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining βcourtβ as βa body\norganized to administer justice[.]β).\n 12\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\n Finally, we will address the purpose argument. Congressβs stated\npurpose in authorizing the Attorney General to bring lawsuits under Section\n12601 was βto eliminate the pattern or practiceβ of denying juveniles their\nconstitutional and statutory rights. 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601(b). The government\nargues that because juvenile courts are a central part of the juvenile justice\nsystem, interpreting Section 12601 to exclude juvenile courts would βeffectively\nvitiateβ the purpose of the statute. See also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at\n63 (βA textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs\nthe documentβs purpose should be favored.β). However, βno law pursues its\npurpose at all costs, and . . . the textual limitations upon a lawβs scope are no\nless a part of its βpurposeβ than its substantive authorizations.β Rapanos v.\nUnited States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 (2006) (plurality op.). 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 has\na clear textual limitation in the form of the word βagency.β Moreover, given\nthat the government can presumably still bring Section 12601 lawsuits against\nmany other entities in the juvenile justice system without stretching the\nordinary meaning of any wordsβincluding counties, city councils, mayors,\npolice commissioners, correctional facilities, and youth servicesβwe think it\nstrains credulity to say that Congressβs purpose in enacting the statute would\nbe vitiated unless the word βagencyβ was interpreted outside of its ordinary\nmeaning.\n Therefore, we decline to interpret the word βagency,β as it is used in 34\nU.S.C. Β§ 12601, to encompass the Youth Court. As such, the district court did\nnot err in dismissing the Section 12601 claims brought against the Lauderdale\nCounty Youth Court judges.\n IV.\n We now turn to two residual matters raised by the parties. First, we\nconsider the question of judicial immunity. The parties dedicate considerable\nportions of their briefs disputing whether or not the Youth Court judges should\n 13\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nhave judicial immunity against the specific claims made against them in his\nlawsuit. However, because we hold that the text of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 is not\napplicable to the judges of the Youth Court, we do not reach the question of\njudicial immunity as to any of the specific claims raised in this case. 14\n Second, we consider the question of whether this lawsuit can continue\nagainst Lauderdale County if the Youth Court judges are excluded. Before the\ndistrict court, the government argued that Lauderdale County was\nindependently liable under Section 12601 because of its budgetary authority\nover the Youth Court and its alleged failure to provide indigent juveniles with\nadequate representation. However, on appeal, the government changed course\nand now only argues that dismissal of the County follows dismissal of the\njudges, and that reversing the latter also requires reversing the former. 15\nMoreover, at oral argument, counsel for the government conceded that it did\nnot brief an independent basis for continuing the litigation against the County,\nand stated that if the judges are deemed to be outside of Section 12601 then\nthe claims against the County should also be dismissed. Oral Argument at\n59:00. We take the government at its word.\n Therefore, because we hold that the district court did not err in\ndismissing the lawsuit against the judges on the basis that they are outside\nthe scope of Section 12601, and because the government has affirmatively\n\n\n 14We likewise do not consider the district courtβs determinations regarding the\nYounger abstention and Rooker-Feldman arguments.\n\n 15 In a letter filed with the court after oral argument, the government argues that if\nwe interpret Section 12601βs use of the phrase βgovernmental agencyβ to exclude the Youth\nCourt, then we should remand to determine whether public defenders and non-judicial court\npersonnel can be held liable under the statute. However, not only did the government fail to\nmake that argument in its briefs, but it has also not named these persons as defendants in\nthis litigation. As such, we decline the governmentβs invitation to remand for that purpose,\nand leave it be addressed in future cases where the issue is squarely raised and litigated.\nSee, e.g., Sindhi v. Raina, 905 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that issues not briefed\nwill not be considered on appeal).\n 14\n\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60805\nwaived any other argument for continuing the lawsuit against the County, we\naffirm the dismissal of this litigation as it pertains to Lauderdale County. See\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 2017) (βWaiver is the\nβintentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.β β (quoting\nUnited States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2006))).\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 15\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. City of Meridian\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805 United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 1, 2019\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Plaintiff β Appellant, Clerk\\n\\n\\nv.\\n\\nLAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; JUDGE VELDORE YOUNG-\\nGRAHAM, In her official capacity; and JUDGE LISA HOWELL, In her\\nofficial capacity,\\n\\n Defendants β Appellees.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\\n\\n\\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.\\nJENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:\\n This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. The question\\nis whether the phrase βofficials or employees of any governmental agency with\\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justice,β as it is used in 34\\nU.S.C. Β§ 12601(a), includes the judges of a county youth court. Holding that it\\ndoes not, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.\\n I.\\n As this is a question of statutory interpretation, we begin with the text\\nof the statute. In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nEnforcement Act. 1 Relevant to this case are the provisions found in Title XXI,\\nΒ§ 210401, 108 Stat. 2071, now codified at 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601. That section,\\nenacted under a title heading of βState and Local Law Enforcement,β and a\\nsubtitle heading of βPolice Pattern or Practice,β reads as follows:\\n (a) Unlawful conduct\\n It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent\\n thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental\\n authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law\\n enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\\n governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of\\n juvenile justice or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives\\n persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by\\n the Constitution or laws of the United States.\\n (b) Civil action by Attorney General\\n Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe\\n that a violation of paragraph (1) 2 has occurred, the Attorney\\n General, for or in the name of the United States, may in a civil\\n action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to\\n eliminate the pattern or practice.\\n34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).\\n\\n 2 The reference to βparagraph (1)β is presumably a scrivenerβs error that should read\\nβparagraph (a)ββas there does not appear to be a paragraph (1) in the associated statutory\\nscheme to which it could plausibly be referring, and it appears quite clear that the intended\\nreference was to paragraph (a). See also Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999)\\n(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that a scrivenerβs error in a statute may only properly be\\ncorrected by a court when the text is devoid of any plausible purpose for being written in that\\nmanner); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J.,\\ndissenting) (β[T]he sine qua non of any βscrivenerβs errorβ doctrine . . . is that the meaning\\ngenuinely intended but inadequately expressed must be absolutely clear; otherwise we might\\nbe rewriting the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.β).\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\n II.\\n The United States Department of Justice initiated this litigation in\\nOctober 2012. In its complaint, the United States alleged, inter alia, 3 that\\nLauderdale County and its two Youth Court judges 4 operated a βschool-to-\\nprison pipelineβ and, through their administration of the juvenile justice\\nprocess, were engaged in patterns or practices that denied juveniles their\\nconstitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.\\n Before we further address the litigation underlying this appeal, it will be\\nuseful to offer some background on the Lauderdale County Youth Court, its\\njudges, and its procedures. In Mississippi, county youth courts are divisions of\\nthe county courts, and the judges of the county courts are also the judges of the\\nyouth courts. Miss. Code Ann. Β§ 43-21-107. County judges are elected for\\nterms of four years, and the Governor has authority to fill vacancies by\\nappointment. Id. §§ 9-9-5, 9-7-1, 9-1-103. Lauderdale County is authorized\\ntwo county judges. Id. Β§ 9-9-18.3. When a juvenile is charged with offenses\\nunder youth court jurisdiction, he or she is brought before an intake officer of\\nthe court who establishes jurisdiction and recommends whether informal\\nresolution or custody is warranted. Id. Β§ 43-21-357. If the juvenile is placed\\ninto custody, he or she must be brought before a youth court judge within 48\\nhoursβexcluding weekends and holidaysβfor a probable cause determination.\\nId. Β§ 43-21-301. If needed, the juvenile is appointed a guardian ad litem and/or\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 In the same complaint, the government also made allegations against the City of\\nMeridian, through the Meridian Police Department, and the state of Mississippi, through its\\nDivision of Youth Services. However, those allegations are not part of the appeal before us.\\n\\n 4 The complaint and initial litigation named Judges Frank Coleman and Veldore\\nYoung-Graham as defendants in their official capacities. During the course of this litigation,\\nJudge Coleman was replaced by Judge Lisa Howell on the Youth Court, and the parties agree\\nthat she should be substituted in as a party to this appeal. We have therefore adjusted the\\nstyle of the case to replace Judge Coleman with Judge Howell.\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\ndefense counsel. Id. §§ 43-21-121, 43-21-201. If the juvenile is held in custody,\\nan adjudicatory hearing must be held within 21 days, with a few exceptions.\\nId. Β§ 43-21-551. If the juvenile is adjudicated to be delinquent or in need of\\nsupervision, a disposition hearing must then be scheduled within 14 days. Id.\\nΒ§ 43-21-601. If the disposition requires detention, the detention cannot exceed\\n90 days. Id. Β§ 43-21-605(1)(l). To perform the work of the youth courts, the\\nyouth court judges may appoint intake officers, guardians ad litem, defense\\ncounsel, and prosecutors. Id. §§ 43-21-119 (intake officers); 43-21-117\\n(prosecutors); 43-21-121 (guardians ad litem); 43-21-201 (defense counsel).\\nThe county board of supervisors controls the funding and budget for county\\nyouth courts. Id. Β§ 43-21-123.\\n The government brought this action against Lauderdale County and its\\nYouth Court judges under 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C.\\n14141). By way of alleged constitutional violations, the government alleges\\nthat the Lauderdale County judges: delay detention hearings for longer than\\n48 hours; do not base their detention determinations on whether probable\\ncause exists; do not consistently provide defense counsel; do not clearly\\narticulate the standards for school suspensions; do not conduct hearings that\\ndetermine whether violations occurred but instead βexist solely to determine\\npunishment[;]β and do not allow juveniles sufficient access to their attorneys. 5\\n By way of relief, the complaint filed by the United States seeks: (1) a\\ndeclaration that constitutional violations are occurring; (2) an injunction\\nagainst said unconstitutional practices; (3) an order requiring the defendants\\nβto promulgate and effectuateβ policies more protective of constitutional rights;\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 This list is by no means exclusive of all the alleged constitutional violations pleaded\\nby the government in their complaint, but it summarizes the judgesβ alleged constitutional\\nviolations that were briefed by the government on appeal.\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\n(4) an order directing the creation of βalternatives to detention and juvenile\\njustice processes for children,β as well as the βreview and expungement of\\nyouth records[;]β (5) for the court to retain jurisdiction until the defendants\\nfully comply; and (6) βany such additional relief as the interests of justice\\nrequire.β Though not the basis of our decision, we share the concerns expressed\\nby the district court that the government appears to be seeking remedies that\\nwould not only exceed the authority of the Youth Court judges, but also dictate\\nhow the Youth Court judges shall perform their adjudicatory functions when\\nenforcing state law. 6 Accord ODonnell v. Harris Cty, 892 F.3d 147, 155 (5th\\nCir. 2018) (holding that the judge of a county court may be liable under 42\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1983 when acting as a policymaker for the county, but not when\\nβacting in his or her judicial capacity to enforce state lawβ (quoting Johnson v.\\nMoore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1992))).\\n The litigation underlying this appeal was tied up in motions, discovery,\\nand settlement discussions for years. The judges first moved to dismiss this\\nlitigation on Younger abstention grounds, but that argument was rejected by\\nthe district court. The judges next moved to dismiss on the grounds of the\\nRooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity. In September 2017, the\\ndistrict court rejected the Rooker-Feldman argument, but granted the motion\\nto dismiss on the bases that the plain statutory language of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601\\ndid not encompass youth court judges, and also that the judges were entitled\\nto judicial immunity with respect to the claims raised. The government timely\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 At oral argument, the government averred that, at least as applied to the judges, it\\nis only seeking remedies that are βproceduralβ in nature. Oral Argument at 15:30, 16:10.\\nUnited States v. Lauderdale Cty, (No. 17-60805), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-\\ninformation/oral-argument-recordings. However, the government subsequently declined\\nmultiple opportunities to explain, precisely, the nature of the remedies it is seeking against\\nthe judges. See, e.g., id. at 18:30, 19:55, 21:40.\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nappeals the statutory interpretation and judicial immunity determinations. As\\nfar as we are aware, this is the firstβand thus far the onlyβSection 12601\\nclaim brought against the judges of a youth court (or any court) to be resolved\\nin the federal courts through adjudication.\\n III.\\n The government contends that the district court erred in its conclusion\\nthat 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 does not encompass the Lauderdale County Youth\\nCourt judges. 7 Boiled down to its core, the argument between the parties is\\nwhether the phrase βofficials or employees of any governmental agency with\\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justice,β when viewed in the\\ncontext of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601, should include the judges of the Youth Court. To\\nput an even finer point on the argument, the question is whether the Youth\\nCourt should be considered an βagencyβ under the statute.\\n We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Matter of\\nGlenn, 900 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir. 2018). βThe task of statutory interpretation\\nbegins and, if possible, ends with the language of the statute.β Trout Point\\nLodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2013). βWhen the\\nlanguage is plain, we βmust enforce the statuteβs plain meaning, unless\\nabsurd.β β Id. (quoting In re Nowlin, 576 F.3d 258, 261β62 (5th Cir. 2009)); see\\nalso BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (βThe preeminent\\ncanon of statutory interpretation requires [the court] to βpresume that [the]\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7We note that the district court framed its analysis by: first holding that the judges\\nhad judicial immunity against the claims made against them in this case; and then holding\\nthat that judicial immunity was not overcome by 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601, as that statute does not\\napply to the judges. However, the question of judicial immunity as to specific claims need\\nnot be reached if the judges are not proper defendants under the statute to begin with.\\nAccordingly, on appeal, both the government and the judges in this case correctly present the\\nquestion as: first, whether the statute applies to judges; and second, if it does, whether the\\njudges have judicial immunity against the specific claims made.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nlegislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says\\nthere.β β (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253β54 (1992))).\\n Because 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 does not define how the term βagencyβ is used\\nin the statute, we βlook first to the wordβs ordinary meaning.β Schindler\\nElevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407 (2011). The\\ngovernment enters this analysis at a disadvantage. The Supreme Court has\\nobserved that β[i]n ordinary parlance, . . . courts are not described as\\nβdepartmentsβ or βagenciesβ of the Government.β Hubbard v. United States, 514\\nU.S. 695, 699 (1995). In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that βit would be\\nstrange indeed to refer to a court as an βagency.β β Id. Even setting that\\nprecedent aside, a common sense understanding of the word βagencyβ would\\nseem to require, at least when the word is used in the ordinary sense, that\\nthere be a principal on behalf of whom the agent acts. See Agency, Blackβs Law\\nDictionary (6th ed. 1990). The government does not identify what principal\\nthe Youth Court judges would be acting as agents for.\\n The fact that the word βagencyβ is not normally understood to include\\nthe courts does not mean that Congress could not have enacted a statute that\\nincludes them in the definition. Indeed, Congress has enacted several other\\nstatutes that do just that. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. Β§ 6106(1) 8 (defining βagencyβ for\\nthe purposes of the Mansfield Fellowship Program to include βany court of the\\njudicial branchβ); 5 U.S.C. Β§ 3371(3) 9 (defining β[f]ederal agencyβ for the\\npurposes of a statute governing employee assignments between the federal and\\nstate governments to include βa court of the United Statesβ). But this fact also\\ncuts against the government here. Given that Congress, when it so chooses,\\n\\n\\n 8 Pub. L. 103-236, Β§β―257, 108 Stat. 432 (1994).\\n\\n 9 Pub. L. 91-648, Β§β―402(a), 84 Stat. 1920 (1971), amended by Pub. L. 95-454, Β§β―603(a),\\n92 Stat. 1189 (1978).\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nknows how to deviate from the ordinary usage of βagencyβ by expressly defining\\nthe term to include courts, the fact that Congress did not do so in this statute\\nweighs against deviating from the ordinary usage here. 10 Accord Whitfield v.\\nUnited States, 543 U.S. 209, 216 (2005) (noting, in the context of a different\\nstatutory interpretation question, that the inclusion of an overt act\\nrequirement in other statutes clearly demonstrated Congress βknows how to\\nimpose such a requirement when it wishes to do soβ); Dole Food Co. v.\\nPatrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 476 (2003) (noting that β[w]here Congress intends to\\nrefer to ownership in other than the formal sense, it knows how to do soβ). But\\nsee 5 U.S.C. Β§ 551(1)(B) 11 (defining βagencyβ for the purposes of the\\nAdministrative Procedure Act to explicitly exclude the courts).\\n Recognizing that the ordinary usage of βagencyβ will not lead to its\\ndesired outcome, the government maintains that we must view the word in the\\ncontext of the rest of the statute. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)\\n(β[W]e construe language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding\\nitβ); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (observing the\\nβfundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language\\nitself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must\\nbe drawn from the context in which it is usedβ). See also Antonin Scalia &\\nBryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 69 (2012)\\n(βWords are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meaningsβunless\\nthe context indicates that they bear a technical sense.β). So we now turn to the\\ncontext.\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 The statute now codified at 22 U.S.C. Β§ 6106(1) (expressly defining βagencyβ to\\ninclude βany courtβ for the purposes of that act) and the statute now codified at 34 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 12601 (not expressly defining βagencyβ to include courts for the purpose of that act) were\\nboth passed in 1994 by the same Congress.\\n\\n 11 Pub. L. 89β554, 80 Stat. 381 (1966).\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\n We will begin our contextual analysis by looking at the title and subtitle\\nof the statutory section enacting this text. While section headings are not\\ncontrolling, they can be used as evidence when interpreting the operative text\\nof the statute. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015)\\n(plurality op.); id. at 1089β90 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment);\\nAlmendarezβTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (βthe title of a\\nstatute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a\\ndoubt about the meaning of a statuteβ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As\\nalready noted, 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 was enacted under the title heading of βState\\nand Local Law Enforcement,β and the subtitle heading of βPolice Pattern or\\nPractice.β Pub. L. No. 103-322, Β§ 210401, 108 Stat. 2071. Those headings do\\nnot support the governmentβs argument that the statute is intended to include\\njudges. 12\\n We next address the question of superfluity. βIt is βa cardinal principle\\nof statutory constructionβ that βa statute ought, upon the whole, to be so\\nconstrued that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be\\nsuperfluous, void, or insignificant.β β TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31\\n(2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 553 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). See also Asadi v.\\nG.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2013) (βIn construing a\\n\\n\\n 12 The government argues that we should disregard those titles based on its assertion\\nthat, after the titles were written, the text was modified by an amendment whose sponsor\\nmade a single statement purportedly suggesting an intent to include juvenile court systems.\\nWe reject this argument. In construing a statute, it is our duty to evaluate the text that was\\nactually enacted into law by both houses of Congress and the President. We will not go down\\nthe rabbit hole of attempting to divine the intent of Congress as a whole based on a single\\nstatement by a single Senator. Accord Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia,\\nJ., concurring) (βI decline to participate in this process. It is neither compatible with our\\njudicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and effective application of the\\nstatutes of the United States, nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional\\nintent[.]β); Texas v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 829 F.3d 405, 422 n.27 (5th Cir. 2016)\\n(declining to consider a single comment in a House Report because β[w]e do not consider\\npassing commentary in the legislative history . . . when the statutory text itself yields a single\\nmeaningβ).\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nstatute, a court should give effect, if possible, to every word and every provision\\nCongress used.β). 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 refers to βpattern[s] or practice[s] of\\nconduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\\ngovernmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile\\njustice or the incarceration of juveniles[.]β (emphasis added). The government\\nargues in its opening brief on appeal that the second clause would be rendered\\nsuperfluous if we interpret Section 12601 to encompass only law enforcement\\npersonnel. However, that is not the only alternate reading of the statute. As\\nthe government rightly concedes in its Reply Brief, the second clause would\\nstill encompass more than law enforcement personnel even if not read to\\ninclude youth court judges. The βincarceration of juvenilesβ language would\\nclearly still include the personnel of the juvenile detention facilities, and, as\\nthe original parties to this litigation demonstrate, the βadministration of\\njuvenile justiceβ language would still include, just to name a few examples,\\nboth Lauderdale County and Mississippiβs Division of Youth Services. Thus,\\nexcluding the judges of the Youth Court from Section 12601 would not render\\nportions of the statute superfluous.\\n The judges, for their part, raise a noscitur a sociis argument. β[W]e rely\\non the principle of noscitur a sociisβa word is known by the company it\\nkeepsβto βavoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is\\ninconsistent with its accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to\\nthe Acts of Congress.β β Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085 (plurality op.) (quoting\\nGustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995)). See also Scalia & Garner,\\nReading Law at 195 (βWhen several [words] are associated in a context\\nsuggesting that the words have something in common, they should be assigned\\na permissible meaning that makes them similar.β). The judges argue that the\\nprinciple of noscitur a sociis weighs towards interpreting the clause βconduct\\nby law enforcement officersβ as limiting the meaning of βany governmental\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nagencyβ to entities that are similar to law enforcement agencies. However, on\\nthis point the judgesβ argument holds little water. As the government correctly\\npoints out, noscitur a sociis βis invoked when a string of statutory terms raises\\nthe implication that the βwords grouped in a list should be given related\\nmeaning.β β S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 378 (2006)\\n(quoting Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990)). The statutory text\\nβconduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any\\ngovernmental agencyβ does not contain a string of terms; rather, it contains\\ntwo independent clauses separated by a disjunctive βor.β See Encino\\nMotorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141 (2018) (noting that βorβ is\\nβalmost always disjunctiveβ (quoting United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 45\\n(2013))). As such, the noscitur a sociis argument does not support the judgesβ\\nargument that Section 12601 should be interpreted to exclude judgesβthough\\nits rejection does not necessarily lend weight to the governmentβs counter-\\ncontention that Section 12601 must be interpreted to include them. On net,\\nthis argument is a wash.\\n We now turn to the governmentβs argument that βgovernmental agencyβ\\nshould not be viewed in isolation, but instead should be interpreted as modified\\nby the clause βwith responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice.β\\nSee, e.g., Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (βwe construe language . . . in light of the terms\\nsurrounding itβ). See also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 167 (noting that\\nβthe judicial interpreter [must] consider the entire text, in view of its structure\\nand of the physical and logical relation of its many partsβ). The government\\nasserts that the modifying phrase βwith responsibility for the administration\\nof juvenile justiceβ should be interpreted to include juvenile courts within the\\nmeaning of βgovernmental agency.β However, this argument is weak for the\\nsame reason that the superfluity argument fails. Even though juvenile courts\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nare indeed entities with responsibility for administering juvenile justice, 13 not\\nall entities are βagencies.β There is no shortage of non-adjudicatory entities\\nwith responsibility for the administration of juvenile justiceβmost, if not all,\\nof which are more amenable to the ordinary understanding of the word\\nβagencyβ than is a court. It seems quite reasonable to infer that Congress was\\nreferring to those non-adjudicatory entities when enacting the phrase\\nβgovernmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile\\njustice[,]β and we see little support for the governmentβs argument that by\\nadding such language Congress deviated from the ordinary usage of the term\\nβagency.β As such, the governmentβs invocation of the modifying phrase βwith\\nresponsibility for the administration of juvenile justiceβ is weak evidence for\\nthe proposition that the word βagencyβ should be interpreted outside its\\nordinary meaning.\\n The government also makes the related argument that the phrase\\nβgovernmental agencyβ should be interpreted to include juvenile courts\\nbecause the phrase is modified by the word βany.β Specifically, the government\\nappears to argue that by using the phrase βany governmental agency,β what\\nCongress intended to say was βall governmental entities.β This argument is\\njust like the previous one, but weaker still. βEntityβ is still not a synonym for\\nβagency.β It is quite reasonable to infer that Congress, by use of the word βany,β\\nwas referring to any agency ordinarily referred to as an agency. As such, use\\nof the word βanyβ to modify βgovernmental agencyβ is also weak evidence for\\nthe proposition that the phrase should be interpreted outside its ordinary\\nmeaning.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 See Court, Blackβs Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining βcourtβ as βa body\\norganized to administer justice[.]β).\\n 12\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\n Finally, we will address the purpose argument. Congressβs stated\\npurpose in authorizing the Attorney General to bring lawsuits under Section\\n12601 was βto eliminate the pattern or practiceβ of denying juveniles their\\nconstitutional and statutory rights. 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601(b). The government\\nargues that because juvenile courts are a central part of the juvenile justice\\nsystem, interpreting Section 12601 to exclude juvenile courts would βeffectively\\nvitiateβ the purpose of the statute. See also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at\\n63 (βA textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs\\nthe documentβs purpose should be favored.β). However, βno law pursues its\\npurpose at all costs, and . . . the textual limitations upon a lawβs scope are no\\nless a part of its βpurposeβ than its substantive authorizations.β Rapanos v.\\nUnited States, 547 U.S. 715, 752 (2006) (plurality op.). 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 has\\na clear textual limitation in the form of the word βagency.β Moreover, given\\nthat the government can presumably still bring Section 12601 lawsuits against\\nmany other entities in the juvenile justice system without stretching the\\nordinary meaning of any wordsβincluding counties, city councils, mayors,\\npolice commissioners, correctional facilities, and youth servicesβwe think it\\nstrains credulity to say that Congressβs purpose in enacting the statute would\\nbe vitiated unless the word βagencyβ was interpreted outside of its ordinary\\nmeaning.\\n Therefore, we decline to interpret the word βagency,β as it is used in 34\\nU.S.C. Β§ 12601, to encompass the Youth Court. As such, the district court did\\nnot err in dismissing the Section 12601 claims brought against the Lauderdale\\nCounty Youth Court judges.\\n IV.\\n We now turn to two residual matters raised by the parties. First, we\\nconsider the question of judicial immunity. The parties dedicate considerable\\nportions of their briefs disputing whether or not the Youth Court judges should\\n 13\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nhave judicial immunity against the specific claims made against them in his\\nlawsuit. However, because we hold that the text of 34 U.S.C. Β§ 12601 is not\\napplicable to the judges of the Youth Court, we do not reach the question of\\njudicial immunity as to any of the specific claims raised in this case. 14\\n Second, we consider the question of whether this lawsuit can continue\\nagainst Lauderdale County if the Youth Court judges are excluded. Before the\\ndistrict court, the government argued that Lauderdale County was\\nindependently liable under Section 12601 because of its budgetary authority\\nover the Youth Court and its alleged failure to provide indigent juveniles with\\nadequate representation. However, on appeal, the government changed course\\nand now only argues that dismissal of the County follows dismissal of the\\njudges, and that reversing the latter also requires reversing the former. 15\\nMoreover, at oral argument, counsel for the government conceded that it did\\nnot brief an independent basis for continuing the litigation against the County,\\nand stated that if the judges are deemed to be outside of Section 12601 then\\nthe claims against the County should also be dismissed. Oral Argument at\\n59:00. We take the government at its word.\\n Therefore, because we hold that the district court did not err in\\ndismissing the lawsuit against the judges on the basis that they are outside\\nthe scope of Section 12601, and because the government has affirmatively\\n\\n\\n 14We likewise do not consider the district courtβs determinations regarding the\\nYounger abstention and Rooker-Feldman arguments.\\n\\n 15 In a letter filed with the court after oral argument, the government argues that if\\nwe interpret Section 12601βs use of the phrase βgovernmental agencyβ to exclude the Youth\\nCourt, then we should remand to determine whether public defenders and non-judicial court\\npersonnel can be held liable under the statute. However, not only did the government fail to\\nmake that argument in its briefs, but it has also not named these persons as defendants in\\nthis litigation. As such, we decline the governmentβs invitation to remand for that purpose,\\nand leave it be addressed in future cases where the issue is squarely raised and litigated.\\nSee, e.g., Sindhi v. Raina, 905 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2018) (noting that issues not briefed\\nwill not be considered on appeal).\\n 14\\n\\f Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60805\\nwaived any other argument for continuing the lawsuit against the County, we\\naffirm the dismissal of this litigation as it pertains to Lauderdale County. See\\nUnited States v. Young, 872 F.3d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 2017) (βWaiver is the\\nβintentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.β β (quoting\\nUnited States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2006))).\\n The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":579,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4586919,"string":"4,586,919"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Joseph Dacar v. Saybolt L.P."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"16-20751"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 1, 2019\\n No. 16-20751\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\nJOSEPH DACAR, individually and for similarly situated people; JASON\\nWHITELAW; DAVID TARDIFF, et al\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Cross-Appellees\\n\\nLYLE DEROCHE; FELTON RAVIA,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants Cross-Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nSAYBOLT, L.P.,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee Cross-Appellant\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n ______________________\\n\\n ON PETITION FOR REHEARING and\\n PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC\\n\\nBefore DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.\\nPER CURIAM:\\n The petition for panel rehearing filed by Saybolt, L.P., is DENIED, and\\nno member of this panel nor judge in regular active service on the Court having\\nrequested that the Court be polled en banc, Sayboltβs petition for rehearing en\\nbanc is also DENIED.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n\\f No. 16-20751\\n The Court, however, amends its opinion by adding the following footnote\\nat the end of the third paragraph of section IV:\\n Because this damages model has not been adequately briefed, we\\n leave for another day whether such a model, or any other damages\\n model, may be appropriate in cases in which an employer fails to\\n satisfy the requirements allowing use of the FWW method.\\n\\n\\n The Court further substitutes the last footnote of its opinion with the\\nfollowing footnote:\\n As set forth above, a plaintiff is entitled to overtime pay for any\\n week in which he worked in excess of 40 hours. To determine the\\n amount of overtime compensation due, the district court should\\n first determine a plaintiffβs regular hourly rate of pay by dividing\\n the total amount of remuneration paid in a workweek (including\\n incentive payments) by the total number of hours intended to be\\n compensated (which, in this case, is the total number of hours\\n actually worked) in that workweek. See 29 C.F.R. Β§ 778.207(b).\\n The district should then compute the overtime rate by multiplying\\n the regular rate times 1.5. The overtime rate should then be\\n multiplied by the number of overtime hours worked in the\\n workweek to arrive at the total amount of overtime compensation\\n due for that week. Finally, that total amount should be reduced\\n by the amount of overtime pay the plaintiff has already received\\n from Saybolt for that workweek. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 207(h) (describing\\n which sums may be creditable toward overtime compensation).\\n The remainder is the amount of overtime compensation due to the\\n plaintiff.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364172/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DAVIS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"JONES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HIGGINSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"DAVIS\": \", Circuit\", \"JONES\": \", Circuit\", \"HIGGINSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586919/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Joseph Dacar v. Saybolt L.P.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n February 1, 2019\n No. 16-20751\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Clerk\nJOSEPH DACAR, individually and for similarly situated people; JASON\nWHITELAW; DAVID TARDIFF, et al\n\n Plaintiffs - Cross-Appellees\n\nLYLE DEROCHE; FELTON RAVIA,\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellants Cross-Appellees\nv.\n\nSAYBOLT, L.P.,\n\n Defendant - Appellee Cross-Appellant\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n ______________________\n\n ON PETITION FOR REHEARING and\n PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC\n\nBefore DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.\nPER CURIAM:\n The petition for panel rehearing filed by Saybolt, L.P., is DENIED, and\nno member of this panel nor judge in regular active service on the Court having\nrequested that the Court be polled en banc, Sayboltβs petition for rehearing en\nbanc is also DENIED.\n\n\n\n 1\n\f No. 16-20751\n The Court, however, amends its opinion by adding the following footnote\nat the end of the third paragraph of section IV:\n Because this damages model has not been adequately briefed, we\n leave for another day whether such a model, or any other damages\n model, may be appropriate in cases in which an employer fails to\n satisfy the requirements allowing use of the FWW method.\n\n\n The Court further substitutes the last footnote of its opinion with the\nfollowing footnote:\n As set forth above, a plaintiff is entitled to overtime pay for any\n week in which he worked in excess of 40 hours. To determine the\n amount of overtime compensation due, the district court should\n first determine a plaintiffβs regular hourly rate of pay by dividing\n the total amount of remuneration paid in a workweek (including\n incentive payments) by the total number of hours intended to be\n compensated (which, in this case, is the total number of hours\n actually worked) in that workweek. See 29 C.F.R. Β§ 778.207(b).\n The district should then compute the overtime rate by multiplying\n the regular rate times 1.5. The overtime rate should then be\n multiplied by the number of overtime hours worked in the\n workweek to arrive at the total amount of overtime compensation\n due for that week. Finally, that total amount should be reduced\n by the amount of overtime pay the plaintiff has already received\n from Saybolt for that workweek. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 207(h) (describing\n which sums may be creditable toward overtime compensation).\n The remainder is the amount of overtime compensation due to the\n plaintiff.\n\n\n\n\n 2\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Joseph Dacar v. Saybolt L.P.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 1, 2019\\n No. 16-20751\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\nJOSEPH DACAR, individually and for similarly situated people; JASON\\nWHITELAW; DAVID TARDIFF, et al\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Cross-Appellees\\n\\nLYLE DEROCHE; FELTON RAVIA,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants Cross-Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nSAYBOLT, L.P.,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee Cross-Appellant\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n ______________________\\n\\n ON PETITION FOR REHEARING and\\n PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC\\n\\nBefore DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.\\nPER CURIAM:\\n The petition for panel rehearing filed by Saybolt, L.P., is DENIED, and\\nno member of this panel nor judge in regular active service on the Court having\\nrequested that the Court be polled en banc, Sayboltβs petition for rehearing en\\nbanc is also DENIED.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n\\f No. 16-20751\\n The Court, however, amends its opinion by adding the following footnote\\nat the end of the third paragraph of section IV:\\n Because this damages model has not been adequately briefed, we\\n leave for another day whether such a model, or any other damages\\n model, may be appropriate in cases in which an employer fails to\\n satisfy the requirements allowing use of the FWW method.\\n\\n\\n The Court further substitutes the last footnote of its opinion with the\\nfollowing footnote:\\n As set forth above, a plaintiff is entitled to overtime pay for any\\n week in which he worked in excess of 40 hours. To determine the\\n amount of overtime compensation due, the district court should\\n first determine a plaintiffβs regular hourly rate of pay by dividing\\n the total amount of remuneration paid in a workweek (including\\n incentive payments) by the total number of hours intended to be\\n compensated (which, in this case, is the total number of hours\\n actually worked) in that workweek. See 29 C.F.R. Β§ 778.207(b).\\n The district should then compute the overtime rate by multiplying\\n the regular rate times 1.5. The overtime rate should then be\\n multiplied by the number of overtime hours worked in the\\n workweek to arrive at the total amount of overtime compensation\\n due for that week. Finally, that total amount should be reduced\\n by the amount of overtime pay the plaintiff has already received\\n from Saybolt for that workweek. See 29 U.S.C. Β§ 207(h) (describing\\n which sums may be creditable toward overtime compensation).\\n The remainder is the amount of overtime compensation due to the\\n plaintiff.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":580,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4586920,"string":"4,586,920"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Alexandro PUGA; Norma Puga, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. RCX SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Alexandro Puga v. About Tyme Transport, Inc"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-41282"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Stewart, King, Owen\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282 United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 1, 2019\\nALEXANDRO PUGA; NORMA PUGA,\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees Clerk\\n\\n\\nv.\\n\\nRCX SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and OWEN, Circuit Judges.\\nCARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge:\\n RCX Solutions, Incorporated is a licensed motor carrier that contracted\\nwith a driver, Ronald Brown, to transport a load across Texas. During his\\ndrive, Brown crossed the median into oncoming traffic and crashed into\\nAlexandro Pugaβs truck, leaving Puga with significant injuries. The Pugas\\nsued. After a week-long trial with expert testimony, a jury found RCX liable\\nfor Brownβs negligence and awarded Mr. Puga a variety of damages and his\\nwife, Norma Puga, loss of consortium damages.\\n RCX now launches a multitude of challenges at the district courtβs\\nhandling of the case. RCX claims that the district court wrongly interpreted\\nthe Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations because it failed to take account\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nof regulatory amendments. RCX contends that this misinterpretation\\nsubjected RCX to liability where none should exist. RCX also argues that the\\ndistrict court used faulty jury instructions, improperly allowed the Pugasβ\\nexpert to testify, and upheld an excessive jury award for Mrs. Pugaβs loss of\\nconsortium. Finally, RCX claims that the district court erred in not applying\\na settlement credit to the final damages award. After reviewing the record, we\\nAFFIRM the district courtβs rulings with respect to all issues except the\\nsettlement credit. We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for the\\nsole purpose of calculating the appropriate settlement credit amount and\\nmodifying its final judgment accordingly.\\n I.\\n Sunset Transportation entered into a brokerage account with LβOreal.\\nIn its role as a broker, Sunset was responsible for choosing a motor carrier for\\nindividual LβOreal shipments on a load-by-load basis. Sunset chose RCX to\\ntransport the LβOreal load involved in the accident. RCX did not have a\\ncontract with LβOreal.\\n When it came time for RCX to transport LβOrealβs load, RCX ran into\\nequipment problems. So RCX contacted Ronald Brown to transport the load.\\nConveniently, Brown already had an RCX trailer in his possession. RCX had\\nleased the trailer from another company, Xtra Lease, and RCX assumed\\nresponsibility for the trailerβs operation under the lease agreement. The bill of\\nlading listed RCX as the carrier for the load. Brown also signed the bill of\\nlading, apparently on behalf of RCX. 1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 RCX claims, however, that Brown was employed by About Tyme, another carrier.\\nRCX had a trailer interchange agreement with About Tyme, under which they could use the\\nother companyβs trailers. And About Tymeβs logo was also on the trailer when the accident\\noccurred. Brown had also listed About Tyme in his logbook.\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n While transporting the load, Brown swerved across the median into\\noncoming traffic, hitting Alexandro Pugaβs truck. Brown did not survive the\\naccident. Mr. Puga suffered a variety of injuries, including burns on large\\nparts of his body and fractures in his spine, legs, pelvis, and fingers. Mr. Puga\\nwas still undergoing treatment and surgeries two-and-a-half years after the\\naccident.\\n Following the accident, Mr. Puga and his wife, Norma, sued RCX, About\\nTyme, and Xtra Lease, claiming that Brownβs negligent driving caused Mr.\\nPugaβs injuries. Prior to trial, RCX filed a motion under Rule 50(a) of the\\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting the court to enter judgment as a\\nmatter of law because the Pugas lacked sufficient evidence for a jury to find\\nthat (1) Brown was employed by RCX and (2) Brown acted negligently when\\nthe crash occurred. The district court denied the motion.\\n At trial, the Pugas designated Trooper Andrew Smith as an expert\\nwitness. Smith was the first responder to the accident and saw the explosion\\nfrom the accident from afar. RCX sought to exclude Smithβs testimony\\nregarding the cause of the accident. The district court denied RCXβs motion.\\n The trial concluded with a jury verdict in favor of the Pugas. The jury\\ndetermined that RCX was βusing motor vehicle(s) it did not own to transport\\nproperty under an arrangement with Ronald Brown.β As a result, the jury\\nawarded the Pugas a variety of damages. The jury specifically awarded Mrs.\\nPuga damages for loss of consortium, $1.6 million for past loss of consortium\\nand $1.8 million for future loss of consortium.\\n After the trial, RCX filed a renewed Rule 50(b) motion, again requesting\\njudgment as a matter of law, this time because amendments to Federal Motor\\nCarrier Regulations precluded the jury from finding for the Pugas. The district\\ncourt again denied the motion and entered judgment in favor of the Pugas.\\nRCX now appeals.\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n II.\\n RCX first argues that federal law does not allow courts to hold motor\\ncarriers liable for the acts of independent contractors, a concept both parties\\nrefer to as the statutory-employee doctrine. RCX raised this argument for the\\nfirst time in its post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion.\\n Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move\\nfor judgment as a matter of law at trial before the jury renders its verdict.\\nUnder Rule 50(a), the movant must βspecify the judgment sought and the law\\nand facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.β Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). If\\nthe pre-verdict motion is denied, then the party can renew its motion under\\nRule 50(b). But the renewed Rule 50(b) is βtechnically only a renewal of the\\n[Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law].β Mozingo v. Correct Mfg.\\nCorp., 752 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citation\\nomitted). As a result, courts prohibit parties from using a Rule 50(b) motion\\nto βassert a ground that was not included in the [original] motion.β Id.; see also\\nIn re Isbell Records, Inc., 774 F.3d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 2014) (βBy not raising this\\nargument at trial or in its Rule 50(a) motion, [the appellant] has waived its\\nright to bring a Rule 50(b) motion on this ground.β); Arsement v. Spinnaker\\nExpl. Co., 400 F.3d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 2005) (βIf a party fails to raise an issue\\nin its Rule 50(a)(1) motions at trial, it may not do so in its post-trial Rule 50(b)\\nmotion.β) (citation omitted); 9B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur K. Miller,\\nFederal Practice and Procedure Β§ 2537 (3d ed. 2018) (β[T]he district court only\\ncan grant the Rule 50(b) motion on the grounds advanced in the preverdict\\nmotion, because the former is conceived of as only a renewal of the latter.β).\\n This rule makes sense in light of Rule 50(b)βs purposes. Rule 50(b) is\\ndesigned to prevent a litigant from ambushing both the district court and\\nopposing counsel after trial. See Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Intβl. Inc.,\\n679 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1982) (βThe rationale for the rule that a [Rule 50(b)\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nmotion] cannot assert a ground not included in a motion for directed verdict is\\nobviously to avoid βambushingβ the trial court and opposing counsel.β) (internal\\nquotation marks and citation omitted); Quinn v. Sw. Wood Prods., Inc., 597\\nF.2d 1018, 1025 (5th Cir. 1979) (βWhen a claimed deficiency in the evidence is\\ncalled to the attention of the trial judge and of counsel before the jury has\\ncommenced deliberations, counsel still may do whatever can be done to mend\\nhis case. But if the court and counsel learn of such a claim for the first time\\nafter verdict, both are ambushed and nothing can be done except by way of a\\ncomplete new trial. It is contrary to the spirit of our procedures to permit\\ncounsel to be sandbagged by such tactics or the trial court to be so put in\\nerror.β). By requiring a litigant to raise all arguments in its initial Rule 50(a)\\nmotion, the trial court is able to βre-examine the question of evidentiary\\ninsufficiency as a matter of law if the jury returns a verdict contrary to the\\nmovant,β and opposing counsel is alerted to any βinsufficiency before the case\\nis submitted to the jury,β giving the opposing party a chance to cure any defects\\nin its legal theories or proof should the motion have merit. Scottish Heritable\\nTr., PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal\\nquotation marks and citation omitted).\\n Here, RCX did not argue that the statutory-employee doctrine was\\noverruled in its Rule 50(a) motion, precluding it from raising the argument in\\nits Rule 50(b) motion. In its oral Rule 50(a) motion, RCX argued that judgment\\nas a matter of law was appropriate because the record contained insufficient\\nevidence to determine that (1) Brown was a statutory employee of RCX and (2)\\nBrown acted negligently when the accident occurred. Even in its earlier\\nsummary judgment briefing, RCX only attacked the evidentiary bases for\\ndetermining that Brown was an employee of RCX. At no time prior to its Rule\\n50(b) motion did RCX argue that the entire statutory-employee doctrine is now\\ndefunct. By failing to raise this argument in its initial Rule 50(a) motion, RCX\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nwaived it. 2 See McCann v. Tex. City Ref., Inc., 984 F.2d 667, 672-73 (5th Cir.\\n1993) (denying a post-judgment challenge when the partyβs argument differed\\nfrom its 50(a) motion); Allied Bank-West., N.A. v. Stein, 996 F.2d 111, 115 (5th\\nCir. 1993) (overturning grant of judgment as a matter of law on different\\nground than that in the initial directed verdict); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co.,\\n515 F.2d 835, 846 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that plaintiff could not receive post-\\njudgment relief on claims it did not raise at trial or in its original Rule 50\\nmotion).\\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to deny RCXβs Rule\\n50(b) motion.\\n III.\\n RCX next argues that the district court used improper jury instructions.\\nMore specifically, RCX argues that the district courtβs jury instructions were\\nincorrect because they did not require the jury to find that RCX met the\\ndefinition of βmotor carrier.β\\n This court reviews jury instructions under a two-prong standard of\\nreview. βFirst, the challenger must demonstrate that the charge as a whole\\ncreates substantial and ineradicable doubt whetherβ the instructions βproperly\\nguidedβ the jury βin its deliberations.β Pelt v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat. Assβn, 359\\nF.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1315\\n(5th Cir. 1997)). Second, even if the court finds that the jury instructions were\\n\\n\\n 2 RCX argues that it can raise and appeal a purely legal issue in a Rule 50(b) motion\\neven though it did not raise that issue in its original Rule 50(a) motion. But RCX provides\\nno support for this proposition. In fact, the case it cites cuts the opposite direction. In Feld\\nMotor Sports, this court held that it could only review an appeal of a district courtβs purely\\nlegal conclusions if the challenging party βsufficiently preserved [it objections] in a Rule 50\\nmotion.β Feld Motor Sports, Inc. v. Traxxas, L.P., 861 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 2017). The\\ncourt later reaffirmed the rule that a party only βsufficiently preserve[s]β an argument using\\nRule 50 when it raises the argument in a Rule 50(a) and then renews it in a Rule 50(b) motion.\\nId. Here, as detailed above, RCX did not sufficiently preserve its statutory-employee\\narguments.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nerroneous, it will not reverse if it determines, βbased upon the entire record,\\nthat the challenged instruction could not have affected the outcome of the\\ncase.β Id. (quoting Sawyer, 120 F.3d at 1315).\\n RCXβs arguments do not raise any doubt about the district courtβs jury\\ninstructions. 3 The district court instructed the jury to determine whether RCX\\nwas βusing motor vehicle(s) it did not own to transport property under an\\narrangement with Ronald Brown.β RCX correctly points out that this\\ninstruction does not follow the federal definition of motor carrier. The federal\\ndefinition of a motor carrier is βa person providing motor vehicle transportation\\nfor compensation.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(14). But this definition of motor carrier\\nis overbroad for this case because it does not distinguish between (1) a motor\\ncarrier using its own equipment and (2) a motor carrier using leased\\nequipment. That distinction matters.\\n The relevant federal regulations only apply to motor carriers who use\\nleased equipment. As Section 14102 makes clear, the Secretary of\\nTransportation can only issue regulations requiring a motor carrier to βhave\\n\\n\\n\\n 3There are three main statutes at issue here. First, the definition of motor carrier:\\nβThe term βmotor carrierβ means a person providing motor vehicle transportation for\\ncompensation.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(14). Second, the definition of broker:\\n\\n The term βbrokerβ means a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee\\n or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale,\\n negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise\\n as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for\\n compensation.\\n\\n49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(2).\\n\\n Third, the statute giving the Secretary of Transportation the power to regulate motor\\ncarriers who lease trucking equipment: βThe Secretary may require a motor carrier providing\\ntransportation subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135 that uses motor\\nvehicles not owned by it to transport property under an arrangement with another party.β\\n49 U.S.C. Β§ 14102(a).\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\ncontrol of and be responsible forβ how employees operate equipment if the\\nmotor carrier βuses motor vehicles not owned by it to transport property under\\nan arrangement with another party.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 14102(a) (emphasis added).\\nThe district court rightly based its jury instructions on this section because it\\nexcludes carriers using their own trucking equipment. Without a finding that\\nthe motor carrier used a leased vehicle, the regulations would not apply.\\n RCXβs arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. RCX first argues\\nthat the instructions did not require the jury to find that RCX was acting as a\\nmotor carrier. Second, and relatedly, RCX argues that the instructions are so\\nbroad that they wrap in brokers, as well as motor carriers. We disagree. The\\nmain difference between a motor carrier and a broker is the actual operation\\nof the leased equipment. This difference stands out when looking at the\\ndefinitions of motor carrier and broker in the Act. While a broker is responsible\\nfor βproviding, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier,β 49 U.S.C. Β§\\n13102(2), a motor carrier provides βmotor vehicle transportation,β 49 U.S.C. Β§\\n13102(14). Put briefly, a motor carrier transports, and a broker provides a\\nmotor carrier. Because the jury here determined that RCX used motor vehicles\\nto transport property, it necessarily determined that RCX was a motor carrier.\\nConsequently, the jury also necessarily determined that RCX did not act as a\\nbroker who merely provided access to a motor carrier.\\n In sum, the district court did not err. On the contrary, the district court\\nclosely examined the statute, avoided the obvious, overbroad definition of\\nmotor carrier, and picked out the correct, limited definition. We AFFIRM the\\ndistrict courtβs jury instructions.\\n IV.\\n RCX next challenges the district courtβs decision to admit State Trooper\\nSmith as an expert witness on accident investigation. According to RCX,\\nSmithβs opinion was irrelevant because he testified that he (1) could not find\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nany defects on the road, (2) could not find any skid marks on the road, (3) did\\nnot determine how fast Brown was driving, and (4) did not know the weight of\\nthe trailer or its contents. 4\\n A trial courtβs decision to admit expert evidence is reviewed for abuse of\\ndiscretion. Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir.\\n2007) (citation omitted). The trial judge has βwide latitude in determining the\\nadmissibility of expert testimony, and the discretion of the trial judge and his\\nor her decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous.β\\nWatkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation\\nmarks and citation omitted); see also Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Pβship v. Commβr,\\n615 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2010). A manifest error is one that βis plain and\\nindisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.β\\nGuy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal\\nquotation marks and citation omitted); see also SEC v. Life Partners Holdings,\\nInc., 854 F.3d 765, 775 (5th Cir. 2017).\\n Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of\\nexpert testimony and reports. When evaluating expert testimony, the\\noverarching concern is generally whether the testimony is relevant and\\nreliable. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).\\nTo be reliable, expert testimony must βbe grounded in the methods and\\nprocedures of science and . . . be more than unsupported speculation or\\nsubjective belief.β 5 Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2012)\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Both parties implicitly assume that an accident investigator can serve as an expert\\nwitness. Because RCX merely attacks Smithβs opinion and does not challenge the idea that\\nan accident investigator can serve as an expert at all, we reserve that more fundamental\\nquestion for a later date.\\n 5 Courts also look to Dabuertβs list of non-exclusive factors when determining whether\\n\\ntestimony is reliable:\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n(internal citation omitted). To be relevant, the expertβs βreasoning or\\nmethodology [must] be properly applied to the facts in issue.β Id. (internal\\ncitation omitted).\\n When performing this analysis, the courtβs main focus should be on\\ndetermining whether the expertβs opinion will assist the trier of fact. See Peters\\nv. Five Star Marine Serv., 898 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Fed. R. Evid.\\n702 advisory committeeβs notes (1972)). Assisting the trier of fact means βthe\\ntrial judge ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the jury more than\\nthe lawyers can offer in argument.β Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th\\nCir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As this court has\\nnoted, however, the βhelpfulness threshold is low: it is principally . . . a matter\\nof relevance.β E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 459 n.14 (5th\\nCir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\\n As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an\\nexpertβs opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its\\nadmissibility. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). Particularly in a\\njury trial setting, the courtβs role under Rule 702 is not to weigh the expert\\ntestimony to the point of supplanting the juryβs fact-finding roleβthe courtβs\\nrole is limited to ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently\\nreliable and relevant to the issue so that it is appropriate for the juryβs\\nconsideration. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92\\n(Fed. Cir. 2003). At no point should the trial court replace βthe adversary\\n\\n\\n\\n (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested; (2) whether the\\n theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the\\n known or potential rate of error of the method used and the existence and\\n maintenance of standards controlling the techniqueβs operation; and (4)\\n whether the theory or method has been generally accepted by the scientific\\n community.\\n\\n Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d at 459.\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nsystem.β Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002). As\\nthe Supreme Court explained, β[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of\\ncontrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the\\ntraditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible\\nevidence.β Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; see also Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d\\n448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002). While the district court must act as a gatekeeper to\\nexclude all irrelevant and unreliable expert testimony, βthe rejection of expert\\ntestimony is the exception rather than the rule.β Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory\\ncommitteeβs notes (2000) (internal citations omitted).\\n Here, RCX only challenges the relevance of Smithβs opinion. 6 But its\\narguments are not persuasive. The district court did not abuse its discretion\\nin allowing Smith to offer an expert opinion on the cause of the accidentβ\\nSmith considered an appropriate amount of physical evidence at the scene of\\nthe crime to offer his opinion, and RCX had ample opportunity to show the jury\\nany flaws in his opinion.\\n No Fifth Circuit case applies Rule 702 and Daubert to an accident\\ninvestigator. 7 But the majority of in-circuit district courts choose to admit\\n\\n\\n\\n 6RCX does not challenge Smithβs qualifications. Officer Smith has worked on accident\\ninvestigations since he became a Texas State Trooper in 2010. He received training on\\naccident investigation when he became a trooper. He also took an advanced course on\\naccident investigation. He has investigated β[o]ver a hundredβ accidents.\\n\\n 7 Smith offered testimony as an accident investigator, not an accident recreator, which\\nrequires additional training and attention to detail. Accident investigation merely consists\\nof βresponding to the scene, looking at the evidence, taking statements from witnesses,\\nmaking a preliminary determination about what may have been a contributing factor to the\\ncrash, [and] writing [and] submitting the initial crash report.β Stevens Transp., Inc. v. Glob.\\nTransp., LLC, No. 6:15-CV-552-MHS-JDL, 2016 WL 9244669, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2016)\\n(internal citations omitted).\\n\\n While this court has held that an investigating officer may not offer lay testimony on\\ncausation, Duhon v. Marceaux, 33 F. Appβx 703 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished), lay opinions\\nare analyzed differently than expert opinions. See generally Smith v. Progressive Cty. Mut.\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\naccident investigators as experts. 8 District courts use a contextual analysis\\nwhen making this determination, looking to see if the investigating officer\\nbases his opinion on a sufficient amount of physical evidence from the accident.\\n For example, in Stevens, the district court allowed an officer to testify\\nbased on βthe position of Defendantsβ trailer after the accident, the tire marks\\nvisible at the scene, and his conversation at the scene with . . . the driver of\\nPlaintiffsβ tractor-trailer.β Stevens, 2016 WL 9244669, at *4. Another court\\nallowed an expert to testify based on his βhis accident report, some photographs\\nand his notes.β Vigil, 2007 WL 2778233, at *4. Yet another court allowed an\\ninvestigating officer to testify as an expert because, even though he βdid not\\ntake any measurements or photographs, or speak to any witnesses to the\\naccident, he did personally survey the accident scene, talk to the other officers\\non the scene, and subsequently reviewed photographs of the scene.β Main,\\n2011 WL 11027844, at *4. The only case to exclude an expert involved\\nmarkedly different facts. In that case, the officer could not determine which\\nlane the driver was in, expressed doubts about his qualifications, and could not\\n\\n\\n\\nIns. Co., No. 11-CV-872, 2012 WL 702061, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2012) (discussing the\\ndifferences between lay and expert opinion testimony for investigating officers).\\n\\n 8 See, e.g., Stevens Transport, 2016 WL 9244669, at *2-4 (permitting DPS lead\\ninvestigator to offer expert opinion on the cause of the accident); Cartwright v. Am. Honda\\nMotor Co., Inc., No. 9:09-CV-2015, 2011 WL 3648565, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2011)\\n(permitting investigating officer to offer an expert opinion regarding the cause of the\\naccident); Vigil v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., No. EP-05-CV-001-KC, 2007 WL 2778233, at *4\\n(W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2007) (permitting the investigating officer to offer expert opinion on the\\ncause of the accident); Martin v. Pride Offshore Co., No. 97-CV-3754, 1999 WL 4921, at *1\\n(E.D. La. Jan. 6, 1999) (permitting an investigating officer to offer expert testimony on the\\ncause of the accident), affβd, 198 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1999); Main v. Eichorn, No. W-10-CV-158,\\n2011 WL 11027844, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2011) (allowing an investigating officer to\\ntestify as an expert); but see Koenig v. Beekmans, No. 5:15-CV-00822-RCL-RBF, 2018 WL\\n358307, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2018) (excluding an accident investigator who admitted that\\nhe was simply βspeculating as to who was in whose lane.β).\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nsay with any certainty whether the defendant caused the accident. Koenig,\\n2018 WL 358307, at *5.\\n Here, Smith considered numerous facts and did not state that he was\\nspeculating about the cause of the accident. Smith was driving some distance\\nbehind Brown when the accident occurred and saw it happen from afar. He\\nfound wet, dark conditions. He determined which lane Brown was using. He\\ndetermined that Brown was talking on his cell phone. He examined marks in\\nthe median showing the path of Brownβs truck. He took photographs of the\\nscene. He spoke to witnesses. He determined that Brown hydroplaned based\\non skid marks. He determined based on experience and training that Brown\\nmust have been driving too fast or used faulty evasive maneuvers to cross the\\nmedian and end up on the other side of the road. He also relied on an accident\\nreconstruction put together by another expert. Smith also admitted on cross-\\nexamination that he did not examine Brownβs truck, the brakes, the weight of\\nthe truck, or attempt to estimate his speed. But he stuck to his opinion that\\nBrown must have been driving too fast for the conditions or taken a faulty\\nevasive maneuver.\\n In sum, Smithβs opinion was based on a multitude of facts. It did not\\ntake into account every possible explanation for the accident, and some\\nmeasurements were missing. But he was the closest to the scene when the\\naccident happened, observed the conditions on the road, knew Brown was\\ntalking on the phone, and looked at various tire markings in the median and\\non the pavement. Numerous district courts have allowed an investigating\\nofficer to testify as an expert based on less. If Smith missed any important\\nfacts, the oversight should go to the weight of his opinion, not its admissibility.\\nWe AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to allow Smith to testify as an expert\\nwitness on causation.\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n V.\\n Next, RCX argues that the district court erroneously affirmed the juryβs\\naward of consortium damages to Mrs. Puga.\\n This court reviews the district courtβs decision to deny a motion for a new\\ntrial or remittitur for abuse of discretion. 9 Salinas v. OβNeill, 286 F.3d 827,\\n830 (5th Cir. 2002) (βWe review denial of remittitur for abuse of discretionβ);\\nEiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995) (βThe\\ndecision to grant or deny a motion for new trial or remittitur rests in the sound\\ndiscretion of the trial judge; that exercise of discretion can be set aside only\\nupon a clear showing of abuseβ); Brooks v. Great Lakes Dredge-Dock Co., 754\\nF.2d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1985) (βThe standard of review of the denial of such a\\nmotion is whether the district court abused its discretion.β).\\n The Supreme Court of Texas defines loss of consortium as the loss of\\ncompanionship, emotional support, love, felicity, and sexual relations\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 This court has not spoken definitively about the appropriate standard of review for\\noverturning a juryβs award of damages. There are three that stand out in the case law. See\\ngenerally Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 504 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing the three different\\nstandards). The first is abuse of discretion. Salinas, 286 F.3d at 830 (βWe review denial of\\nremittitur for abuse of discretion.β) (internal citation omitted); see also Foradori, 523 F.3d at\\n503 (reviewing other cases). The second is the βstrongest showingβ standard. Lebron v.\\nUnited States, 279 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see also Enter.\\nRef. Co. v. Sector Ref. Inc., 781 F.2d 1116, 1118 (5th Cir. 1986); Dixon v. Intβl Harvester Co.,\\n754 F.2d 573, 590 (5th Cir. 1985); Caldarera v. E. Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir.\\n1983); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 1982); Bridges v.\\nGroendyke Transp., Inc., 553 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1977); Wackman v. Rubasmen, 602 F.3d\\n391, 405 (5th Cir. 2010); Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th\\nCir. 1992). The third standard is the βshocks the conscienceβ standard. Caldarera, 705 F.2d\\nat 784 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Wackman, 602 F.3d at 404-\\n05; Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 1980); Bridges, 553 F.2d at 880);\\nWilliams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Caldarera, 705\\nF.2d at 784); see also Industrias Magromer Cueros y Pieles S.A. v. La. Bayou Furs Inc., 293\\nF.3d 912, 924 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784).\\n\\n Because RCX challenges the district courtβs decision to affirm the juryβs award, as\\nopposed to directly challenging the juryβs award, we apply the abuse of discretion standard.\\nMcCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Tex.), N.A., 788 F.3d 463, 482 (5th Cir. 2015).\\n 14\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nnecessary to a successful marriage. Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d\\n1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666\\n(Tex. 1978)). Damages for loss of consortium are non-pecuniary damages,\\nwhich βdo not require certainty of actual monetized loss.β Waste Mgmt. of Tex.,\\nInc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 153 (Tex. 2014). They\\nare, instead, βmeasured by an amount that a reasonable person could possibly\\nestimate as fair compensation.β Id. (internal quotation marks and citation\\nomitted).\\n While βtranslating the subjective nature of this loss into monetary\\ntermsβ is difficult, Texas courts trust βthe ability of the jury to calculate an\\nappropriate award based on the evidence.β Id. at 1089 (citing P.T. & E. Co. v.\\nBeasley, 698 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. App.βBeaumont 1985)); Whittlesey, 572\\nS.W.2d at 667 (β[T]he issue generally must be resolved by the impartial\\nconscience and judgment of jurors who may be expected to act reasonably,\\nintelligently and in harmony with the evidence.β (internal quotation marks and\\ncitation omitted)). Even so, this trust is limitedβjuries cannot simply pull a\\nnumber out of a hat. All damages must be tied to some evidence. Enright v.\\nGoodman Distrib., Inc., 330 S.W.3d 392, 403 (Tex. App.βHouston [14th Dist.]\\n2010) (citing First State Bank v. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 930 (Tex. App.β\\nAustin 1993, writ denied)). Direct evidence, however, is not required. A jury\\ncan infer loss of consortium damages βfrom [indirect] evidence showing the\\nnature and extent of a spouseβs injuries.β Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1090. 10 When\\nconsidering indirect evidence, juries can rely on β(1) the nature of the marital\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 See also Elizondo v. Krist, 338 S.W.3d 17, 29 (Tex. App.βHouston [14th Dist.] 2010),\\naffβd, 415 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. 2013) (β[T]estimony that the primary victimβs injuries interfere\\nwith family activities is sufficient.β); WalβMart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 328\\n(Tex. 1993) (holding that testimony that, as a result of wifeβs injuries, couple no longer\\nengages in their former outdoor activities and that travel has become difficult is βat least\\nsome evidenceβ of loss-of-consortium damages).\\n 15\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nrelationship prior to the spouseβs injury, (2) the deterioration of the marital\\nrelationship following the injury, and (3) the extent and duration of the\\nspouseβs injuries.β Id. (citing Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667; Monsanto Co. v.\\nJohnson, 675 S.W.2d 305, 312 (Tex. App.βHouston [1st Dist.] 1984)).\\n When determining the excessiveness of a jury verdict, courts βmust\\nreview each case on its own facts.β Moore v. M/V ANGELA, 353 F.3d 376, 384\\n(5th Cir. 2003) (citing Winbourne v. E. Airlines, Inc., 758 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th\\nCir. 1984)). Past verdicts can βprovide an objective frame of reference, but they\\ndo not control our assessment of individual circumstances.β Wheat v. United\\nStates, 860 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1988). If an award βexceeds the bounds\\nof any reasonable recovery, we must suggest a remittitur ourselves or direct\\nthe district court to do so.β Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784 (internal citation\\nomitted).\\n This court uses the βmaximum recovery ruleβ to determine whether an\\naward is excessive. Under the maximum recovery rule, this court βwill decline\\nto reduce damages where the amount awarded is not disproportionate to at\\nleast one factually similar case from the relevant jurisdiction.β Lebron, 279\\nF.3d at 326 (internal citations and quotations omitted). We measure\\ndisproportionality by applying a percentage enhancement to past similar\\nawards. This enhancement is 50% for jury trials. See Salinas, 286 F.3d at 831\\n& n.6 (noting 50% enhancement has been applied only in jury trials); see also\\nMoore, 353 F.3d at 384. Refusing to overturn jury awards that are within 150%\\nof the highest comparable award prevents the court from substituting its own\\nopinion for that of a jury. The relevant jurisdiction for purposes of the\\nmaximum recovery rule βis the state providing the substantive law for the\\nclaim.β Vogler, 352 F.3d at 156. Here, the relevant jurisdiction consists of\\nTexas loss of consortium cases and βFifth Circuit cases applying Texas [loss of\\nconsortium] law.β Id.\\n 16\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n The jury awarded Mrs. Puga $1.8 million for her future loss of\\nconsortium and $1.6 million for her past loss of consortium. Applying the\\nmaximum recovery rule, neither award is clearly excessive.\\n The award for future loss of consortium falls within this courtβs 50%\\nmultiplier. The highest decision we found awarded a wife $1 million for loss of\\nfuture consortium in a case where the husband did not die. 11 Reeder v. Allport,\\n218 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. App.βBeaumont 2007) (affirming a juryβs award of\\nβ$1,000,000 for future loss of consortium.β); accord Lebron v. United States, 279\\nF.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2002) (basing a maximum recovery rule finding in a\\nloss-of-consortium case on the βthe highest awardβ the court could find). That\\nverdict was rendered in 2007 dollars. Accounting for inflation, that award is\\nover $1.2 million in 2018 dollars. 12 Cf. Ledet v. Smith Marine Towing Corp.,\\n455 F. Appβx 417, 423 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (accounting for inflation\\nwhen applying the maximum recovery rule to a prior jury verdict). The juryβs\\n$1.8 million verdict falls within 150% of the prior award over $1.2 million.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 We found other verdicts that were higher, but we do not rely on these verdicts\\nbecause a higher court reversed them. The higher courts did not reverse because the jury\\nawards were excessiveβthey reversed for other reasons. See, e.g., U-Haul Intβl, Inc. v.\\nWaldrip, 322 S.W.3d 821, 857 (Tex. App.βDallas 2010) (affirming the juryβs award of a $1.6\\nmillion future consortium loss), affβd in part, revβd in part on other grounds, 380 S.W.3d 118\\n(Tex. 2012); Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Tex. App.βDallas 2007) (reversing\\na juryβs $2 million loss of consortium claim, but on other grounds). While this court on one\\nother occasion relied on a partially reversed jury verdict, we specifically affirmed the lower\\ncourtβs loss of spousal consortium ruling, which makes it distinguishable from the cases\\nabove. See Vogler, 352 F.3d at 157 (relying on the juryβs award in Douglass v. Delta Air Lines,\\nInc., 709 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Tex. 1989), affβd in part, revβd in part, 897 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir.\\n1990)).\\n\\n 12We performed this conversion using the Bureau of Labor Statisticsβs CPI Inflation\\nCalculator, available at https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. See Ledet, 455 F. Appβx at 423\\nn.1 (using the Bureau of Labor Statisticsβs CPI Inflation Calculator).\\n\\n 17\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n The parties did not point us to a factually similar case that specifically\\ngranted past loss of consortium damages. 13 See Vogler, 352 F.3d at 156-57, 157\\nn.7 (finding that prior cases were not factually similar when they did not\\ndistinguish between past and future loss of consortium). In our own research,\\nhowever, we found a case in which the plaintiff-husband, like here, survived\\nan accident but suffered physically and emotionally from his injuries. See W.\\nStar Transp., Inc. v. Robison, 457 S.W.3d 178, 189 (Tex. App.βAmarillo 2015)\\n(upholding a past loss of consortium award of $250,000 where the husband\\nsuffered a traumatic brain injury that would βsignificantly affect him for the\\nremainder of his lifeβ). In Robison, the jury awarded the plaintiffβs wife\\n$250,000 for past loss of consortium on January 18, 2013. Adjusting for\\ninflation, that award translates to roughly $272,750.00. And adding our 150%\\nmultiplier to that number, the maximum recovery rule limits Mrs. Pugaβs\\nrecovery to $409,125.00.\\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to affirm the juryβs\\naward of future consortium damages. However, we REVERSE the district\\ncourtβs decision to affirm the juryβs award of past consortium damages and\\nREMAND for the exact calculation of Mrs. Pugaβs maximum recovery in light\\nof West Star Transportation, Inc. v. Robison, 457 S.W.3d 178.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 The largest award we found for loss of past consortium was $300,000. Douglass,\\n709 F. Supp. at 763 (W.D. Tex. 1989). That award was rendered in 1989. Converted to 2018\\ndollars, $300,000 translates to roughly $625,000. Douglass, however, is not factually similar.\\n\\n The most important reference point for determining factual similarity is whether the\\nprimary victim lived or died. For example, in Lebron, this court merely looked to see whether\\nthe child in past cases had died or lived when determining the correct comparison point for\\nparental loss of consortium. Lebron, 279 F.3d at 327; see also Moore, 353 F.3d at 384\\n(βPoignant factual distinctions are that Plaintiff herein lost no other family member from this\\naccidentβ). The facts here do not mirror Douglass. In Douglass, the father died in a plane\\ncrash. Mr. Puga lived. The difference between life and death makes the cases meaningfully\\ndifferent.\\n 18\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n VI.\\n Finally, RCX argues that it is entitled to a settlement credit under Texas\\nlawβan issue the district court did not consider. The Pugas agree that RCX\\nis entitled to a settlement credit. See RSR Corp. v. Intβl Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851,\\n862 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying a settlement credit in a Texas law diversity case).\\n We, therefore, REVERSE the district courtβs decision not to apply a\\nsettlement credit and REMAND for the district court to calculate the\\nappropriate settlement credit amount and modify the final judgment\\naccordingly.\\n VII.\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district courtβs choice of jury\\ninstructions; we AFFIRM that Trooper Smith was properly admitted to testify\\nas an expert on accident investigation; and we AFFIRM the district courtβs\\ndecision to uphold the juryβs award for past and future loss of consortium. We\\nalso REMAND to the district court so that it can calculate the settlement credit\\nto which RCX is entitled and modify its final judgment accordingly.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 19\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364173/\", \"author_raw\": \"CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"STEWART"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"OWEN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586920/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Alexandro PUGA; Norma Puga, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. RCX SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-41282 United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n February 1, 2019\nALEXANDRO PUGA; NORMA PUGA,\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Plaintiffs - Appellees Clerk\n\n\nv.\n\nRCX SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED,\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and OWEN, Circuit Judges.\nCARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge:\n RCX Solutions, Incorporated is a licensed motor carrier that contracted\nwith a driver, Ronald Brown, to transport a load across Texas. During his\ndrive, Brown crossed the median into oncoming traffic and crashed into\nAlexandro Pugaβs truck, leaving Puga with significant injuries. The Pugas\nsued. After a week-long trial with expert testimony, a jury found RCX liable\nfor Brownβs negligence and awarded Mr. Puga a variety of damages and his\nwife, Norma Puga, loss of consortium damages.\n RCX now launches a multitude of challenges at the district courtβs\nhandling of the case. RCX claims that the district court wrongly interpreted\nthe Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations because it failed to take account\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nof regulatory amendments. RCX contends that this misinterpretation\nsubjected RCX to liability where none should exist. RCX also argues that the\ndistrict court used faulty jury instructions, improperly allowed the Pugasβ\nexpert to testify, and upheld an excessive jury award for Mrs. Pugaβs loss of\nconsortium. Finally, RCX claims that the district court erred in not applying\na settlement credit to the final damages award. After reviewing the record, we\nAFFIRM the district courtβs rulings with respect to all issues except the\nsettlement credit. We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for the\nsole purpose of calculating the appropriate settlement credit amount and\nmodifying its final judgment accordingly.\n I.\n Sunset Transportation entered into a brokerage account with LβOreal.\nIn its role as a broker, Sunset was responsible for choosing a motor carrier for\nindividual LβOreal shipments on a load-by-load basis. Sunset chose RCX to\ntransport the LβOreal load involved in the accident. RCX did not have a\ncontract with LβOreal.\n When it came time for RCX to transport LβOrealβs load, RCX ran into\nequipment problems. So RCX contacted Ronald Brown to transport the load.\nConveniently, Brown already had an RCX trailer in his possession. RCX had\nleased the trailer from another company, Xtra Lease, and RCX assumed\nresponsibility for the trailerβs operation under the lease agreement. The bill of\nlading listed RCX as the carrier for the load. Brown also signed the bill of\nlading, apparently on behalf of RCX. 1\n\n\n\n\n 1 RCX claims, however, that Brown was employed by About Tyme, another carrier.\nRCX had a trailer interchange agreement with About Tyme, under which they could use the\nother companyβs trailers. And About Tymeβs logo was also on the trailer when the accident\noccurred. Brown had also listed About Tyme in his logbook.\n 2\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\n While transporting the load, Brown swerved across the median into\noncoming traffic, hitting Alexandro Pugaβs truck. Brown did not survive the\naccident. Mr. Puga suffered a variety of injuries, including burns on large\nparts of his body and fractures in his spine, legs, pelvis, and fingers. Mr. Puga\nwas still undergoing treatment and surgeries two-and-a-half years after the\naccident.\n Following the accident, Mr. Puga and his wife, Norma, sued RCX, About\nTyme, and Xtra Lease, claiming that Brownβs negligent driving caused Mr.\nPugaβs injuries. Prior to trial, RCX filed a motion under Rule 50(a) of the\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting the court to enter judgment as a\nmatter of law because the Pugas lacked sufficient evidence for a jury to find\nthat (1) Brown was employed by RCX and (2) Brown acted negligently when\nthe crash occurred. The district court denied the motion.\n At trial, the Pugas designated Trooper Andrew Smith as an expert\nwitness. Smith was the first responder to the accident and saw the explosion\nfrom the accident from afar. RCX sought to exclude Smithβs testimony\nregarding the cause of the accident. The district court denied RCXβs motion.\n The trial concluded with a jury verdict in favor of the Pugas. The jury\ndetermined that RCX was βusing motor vehicle(s) it did not own to transport\nproperty under an arrangement with Ronald Brown.β As a result, the jury\nawarded the Pugas a variety of damages. The jury specifically awarded Mrs.\nPuga damages for loss of consortium, $1.6 million for past loss of consortium\nand $1.8 million for future loss of consortium.\n After the trial, RCX filed a renewed Rule 50(b) motion, again requesting\njudgment as a matter of law, this time because amendments to Federal Motor\nCarrier Regulations precluded the jury from finding for the Pugas. The district\ncourt again denied the motion and entered judgment in favor of the Pugas.\nRCX now appeals.\n 3\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\n II.\n RCX first argues that federal law does not allow courts to hold motor\ncarriers liable for the acts of independent contractors, a concept both parties\nrefer to as the statutory-employee doctrine. RCX raised this argument for the\nfirst time in its post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion.\n Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move\nfor judgment as a matter of law at trial before the jury renders its verdict.\nUnder Rule 50(a), the movant must βspecify the judgment sought and the law\nand facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.β Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). If\nthe pre-verdict motion is denied, then the party can renew its motion under\nRule 50(b). But the renewed Rule 50(b) is βtechnically only a renewal of the\n[Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law].β Mozingo v. Correct Mfg.\nCorp., 752 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citation\nomitted). As a result, courts prohibit parties from using a Rule 50(b) motion\nto βassert a ground that was not included in the [original] motion.β Id.; see also\nIn re Isbell Records, Inc., 774 F.3d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 2014) (βBy not raising this\nargument at trial or in its Rule 50(a) motion, [the appellant] has waived its\nright to bring a Rule 50(b) motion on this ground.β); Arsement v. Spinnaker\nExpl. Co., 400 F.3d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 2005) (βIf a party fails to raise an issue\nin its Rule 50(a)(1) motions at trial, it may not do so in its post-trial Rule 50(b)\nmotion.β) (citation omitted); 9B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur K. Miller,\nFederal Practice and Procedure Β§ 2537 (3d ed. 2018) (β[T]he district court only\ncan grant the Rule 50(b) motion on the grounds advanced in the preverdict\nmotion, because the former is conceived of as only a renewal of the latter.β).\n This rule makes sense in light of Rule 50(b)βs purposes. Rule 50(b) is\ndesigned to prevent a litigant from ambushing both the district court and\nopposing counsel after trial. See Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Intβl. Inc.,\n679 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1982) (βThe rationale for the rule that a [Rule 50(b)\n 4\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nmotion] cannot assert a ground not included in a motion for directed verdict is\nobviously to avoid βambushingβ the trial court and opposing counsel.β) (internal\nquotation marks and citation omitted); Quinn v. Sw. Wood Prods., Inc., 597\nF.2d 1018, 1025 (5th Cir. 1979) (βWhen a claimed deficiency in the evidence is\ncalled to the attention of the trial judge and of counsel before the jury has\ncommenced deliberations, counsel still may do whatever can be done to mend\nhis case. But if the court and counsel learn of such a claim for the first time\nafter verdict, both are ambushed and nothing can be done except by way of a\ncomplete new trial. It is contrary to the spirit of our procedures to permit\ncounsel to be sandbagged by such tactics or the trial court to be so put in\nerror.β). By requiring a litigant to raise all arguments in its initial Rule 50(a)\nmotion, the trial court is able to βre-examine the question of evidentiary\ninsufficiency as a matter of law if the jury returns a verdict contrary to the\nmovant,β and opposing counsel is alerted to any βinsufficiency before the case\nis submitted to the jury,β giving the opposing party a chance to cure any defects\nin its legal theories or proof should the motion have merit. Scottish Heritable\nTr., PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal\nquotation marks and citation omitted).\n Here, RCX did not argue that the statutory-employee doctrine was\noverruled in its Rule 50(a) motion, precluding it from raising the argument in\nits Rule 50(b) motion. In its oral Rule 50(a) motion, RCX argued that judgment\nas a matter of law was appropriate because the record contained insufficient\nevidence to determine that (1) Brown was a statutory employee of RCX and (2)\nBrown acted negligently when the accident occurred. Even in its earlier\nsummary judgment briefing, RCX only attacked the evidentiary bases for\ndetermining that Brown was an employee of RCX. At no time prior to its Rule\n50(b) motion did RCX argue that the entire statutory-employee doctrine is now\ndefunct. By failing to raise this argument in its initial Rule 50(a) motion, RCX\n 5\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nwaived it. 2 See McCann v. Tex. City Ref., Inc., 984 F.2d 667, 672-73 (5th Cir.\n1993) (denying a post-judgment challenge when the partyβs argument differed\nfrom its 50(a) motion); Allied Bank-West., N.A. v. Stein, 996 F.2d 111, 115 (5th\nCir. 1993) (overturning grant of judgment as a matter of law on different\nground than that in the initial directed verdict); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co.,\n515 F.2d 835, 846 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that plaintiff could not receive post-\njudgment relief on claims it did not raise at trial or in its original Rule 50\nmotion).\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to deny RCXβs Rule\n50(b) motion.\n III.\n RCX next argues that the district court used improper jury instructions.\nMore specifically, RCX argues that the district courtβs jury instructions were\nincorrect because they did not require the jury to find that RCX met the\ndefinition of βmotor carrier.β\n This court reviews jury instructions under a two-prong standard of\nreview. βFirst, the challenger must demonstrate that the charge as a whole\ncreates substantial and ineradicable doubt whetherβ the instructions βproperly\nguidedβ the jury βin its deliberations.β Pelt v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat. Assβn, 359\nF.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1315\n(5th Cir. 1997)). Second, even if the court finds that the jury instructions were\n\n\n 2 RCX argues that it can raise and appeal a purely legal issue in a Rule 50(b) motion\neven though it did not raise that issue in its original Rule 50(a) motion. But RCX provides\nno support for this proposition. In fact, the case it cites cuts the opposite direction. In Feld\nMotor Sports, this court held that it could only review an appeal of a district courtβs purely\nlegal conclusions if the challenging party βsufficiently preserved [it objections] in a Rule 50\nmotion.β Feld Motor Sports, Inc. v. Traxxas, L.P., 861 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 2017). The\ncourt later reaffirmed the rule that a party only βsufficiently preserve[s]β an argument using\nRule 50 when it raises the argument in a Rule 50(a) and then renews it in a Rule 50(b) motion.\nId. Here, as detailed above, RCX did not sufficiently preserve its statutory-employee\narguments.\n 6\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nerroneous, it will not reverse if it determines, βbased upon the entire record,\nthat the challenged instruction could not have affected the outcome of the\ncase.β Id. (quoting Sawyer, 120 F.3d at 1315).\n RCXβs arguments do not raise any doubt about the district courtβs jury\ninstructions. 3 The district court instructed the jury to determine whether RCX\nwas βusing motor vehicle(s) it did not own to transport property under an\narrangement with Ronald Brown.β RCX correctly points out that this\ninstruction does not follow the federal definition of motor carrier. The federal\ndefinition of a motor carrier is βa person providing motor vehicle transportation\nfor compensation.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(14). But this definition of motor carrier\nis overbroad for this case because it does not distinguish between (1) a motor\ncarrier using its own equipment and (2) a motor carrier using leased\nequipment. That distinction matters.\n The relevant federal regulations only apply to motor carriers who use\nleased equipment. As Section 14102 makes clear, the Secretary of\nTransportation can only issue regulations requiring a motor carrier to βhave\n\n\n\n 3There are three main statutes at issue here. First, the definition of motor carrier:\nβThe term βmotor carrierβ means a person providing motor vehicle transportation for\ncompensation.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(14). Second, the definition of broker:\n\n The term βbrokerβ means a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee\n or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale,\n negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise\n as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for\n compensation.\n\n49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(2).\n\n Third, the statute giving the Secretary of Transportation the power to regulate motor\ncarriers who lease trucking equipment: βThe Secretary may require a motor carrier providing\ntransportation subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135 that uses motor\nvehicles not owned by it to transport property under an arrangement with another party.β\n49 U.S.C. Β§ 14102(a).\n\n 7\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\ncontrol of and be responsible forβ how employees operate equipment if the\nmotor carrier βuses motor vehicles not owned by it to transport property under\nan arrangement with another party.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 14102(a) (emphasis added).\nThe district court rightly based its jury instructions on this section because it\nexcludes carriers using their own trucking equipment. Without a finding that\nthe motor carrier used a leased vehicle, the regulations would not apply.\n RCXβs arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. RCX first argues\nthat the instructions did not require the jury to find that RCX was acting as a\nmotor carrier. Second, and relatedly, RCX argues that the instructions are so\nbroad that they wrap in brokers, as well as motor carriers. We disagree. The\nmain difference between a motor carrier and a broker is the actual operation\nof the leased equipment. This difference stands out when looking at the\ndefinitions of motor carrier and broker in the Act. While a broker is responsible\nfor βproviding, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier,β 49 U.S.C. Β§\n13102(2), a motor carrier provides βmotor vehicle transportation,β 49 U.S.C. Β§\n13102(14). Put briefly, a motor carrier transports, and a broker provides a\nmotor carrier. Because the jury here determined that RCX used motor vehicles\nto transport property, it necessarily determined that RCX was a motor carrier.\nConsequently, the jury also necessarily determined that RCX did not act as a\nbroker who merely provided access to a motor carrier.\n In sum, the district court did not err. On the contrary, the district court\nclosely examined the statute, avoided the obvious, overbroad definition of\nmotor carrier, and picked out the correct, limited definition. We AFFIRM the\ndistrict courtβs jury instructions.\n IV.\n RCX next challenges the district courtβs decision to admit State Trooper\nSmith as an expert witness on accident investigation. According to RCX,\nSmithβs opinion was irrelevant because he testified that he (1) could not find\n 8\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nany defects on the road, (2) could not find any skid marks on the road, (3) did\nnot determine how fast Brown was driving, and (4) did not know the weight of\nthe trailer or its contents. 4\n A trial courtβs decision to admit expert evidence is reviewed for abuse of\ndiscretion. Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir.\n2007) (citation omitted). The trial judge has βwide latitude in determining the\nadmissibility of expert testimony, and the discretion of the trial judge and his\nor her decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous.β\nWatkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation\nmarks and citation omitted); see also Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Pβship v. Commβr,\n615 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2010). A manifest error is one that βis plain and\nindisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.β\nGuy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal\nquotation marks and citation omitted); see also SEC v. Life Partners Holdings,\nInc., 854 F.3d 765, 775 (5th Cir. 2017).\n Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of\nexpert testimony and reports. When evaluating expert testimony, the\noverarching concern is generally whether the testimony is relevant and\nreliable. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).\nTo be reliable, expert testimony must βbe grounded in the methods and\nprocedures of science and . . . be more than unsupported speculation or\nsubjective belief.β 5 Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2012)\n\n\n\n\n 4 Both parties implicitly assume that an accident investigator can serve as an expert\nwitness. Because RCX merely attacks Smithβs opinion and does not challenge the idea that\nan accident investigator can serve as an expert at all, we reserve that more fundamental\nquestion for a later date.\n 5 Courts also look to Dabuertβs list of non-exclusive factors when determining whether\n\ntestimony is reliable:\n\n 9\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\n(internal citation omitted). To be relevant, the expertβs βreasoning or\nmethodology [must] be properly applied to the facts in issue.β Id. (internal\ncitation omitted).\n When performing this analysis, the courtβs main focus should be on\ndetermining whether the expertβs opinion will assist the trier of fact. See Peters\nv. Five Star Marine Serv., 898 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Fed. R. Evid.\n702 advisory committeeβs notes (1972)). Assisting the trier of fact means βthe\ntrial judge ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the jury more than\nthe lawyers can offer in argument.β Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th\nCir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As this court has\nnoted, however, the βhelpfulness threshold is low: it is principally . . . a matter\nof relevance.β E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 459 n.14 (5th\nCir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\n As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an\nexpertβs opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its\nadmissibility. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). Particularly in a\njury trial setting, the courtβs role under Rule 702 is not to weigh the expert\ntestimony to the point of supplanting the juryβs fact-finding roleβthe courtβs\nrole is limited to ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently\nreliable and relevant to the issue so that it is appropriate for the juryβs\nconsideration. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92\n(Fed. Cir. 2003). At no point should the trial court replace βthe adversary\n\n\n\n (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested; (2) whether the\n theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the\n known or potential rate of error of the method used and the existence and\n maintenance of standards controlling the techniqueβs operation; and (4)\n whether the theory or method has been generally accepted by the scientific\n community.\n\n Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d at 459.\n 10\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nsystem.β Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002). As\nthe Supreme Court explained, β[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of\ncontrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the\ntraditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible\nevidence.β Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; see also Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d\n448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002). While the district court must act as a gatekeeper to\nexclude all irrelevant and unreliable expert testimony, βthe rejection of expert\ntestimony is the exception rather than the rule.β Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory\ncommitteeβs notes (2000) (internal citations omitted).\n Here, RCX only challenges the relevance of Smithβs opinion. 6 But its\narguments are not persuasive. The district court did not abuse its discretion\nin allowing Smith to offer an expert opinion on the cause of the accidentβ\nSmith considered an appropriate amount of physical evidence at the scene of\nthe crime to offer his opinion, and RCX had ample opportunity to show the jury\nany flaws in his opinion.\n No Fifth Circuit case applies Rule 702 and Daubert to an accident\ninvestigator. 7 But the majority of in-circuit district courts choose to admit\n\n\n\n 6RCX does not challenge Smithβs qualifications. Officer Smith has worked on accident\ninvestigations since he became a Texas State Trooper in 2010. He received training on\naccident investigation when he became a trooper. He also took an advanced course on\naccident investigation. He has investigated β[o]ver a hundredβ accidents.\n\n 7 Smith offered testimony as an accident investigator, not an accident recreator, which\nrequires additional training and attention to detail. Accident investigation merely consists\nof βresponding to the scene, looking at the evidence, taking statements from witnesses,\nmaking a preliminary determination about what may have been a contributing factor to the\ncrash, [and] writing [and] submitting the initial crash report.β Stevens Transp., Inc. v. Glob.\nTransp., LLC, No. 6:15-CV-552-MHS-JDL, 2016 WL 9244669, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2016)\n(internal citations omitted).\n\n While this court has held that an investigating officer may not offer lay testimony on\ncausation, Duhon v. Marceaux, 33 F. Appβx 703 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished), lay opinions\nare analyzed differently than expert opinions. See generally Smith v. Progressive Cty. Mut.\n 11\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\naccident investigators as experts. 8 District courts use a contextual analysis\nwhen making this determination, looking to see if the investigating officer\nbases his opinion on a sufficient amount of physical evidence from the accident.\n For example, in Stevens, the district court allowed an officer to testify\nbased on βthe position of Defendantsβ trailer after the accident, the tire marks\nvisible at the scene, and his conversation at the scene with . . . the driver of\nPlaintiffsβ tractor-trailer.β Stevens, 2016 WL 9244669, at *4. Another court\nallowed an expert to testify based on his βhis accident report, some photographs\nand his notes.β Vigil, 2007 WL 2778233, at *4. Yet another court allowed an\ninvestigating officer to testify as an expert because, even though he βdid not\ntake any measurements or photographs, or speak to any witnesses to the\naccident, he did personally survey the accident scene, talk to the other officers\non the scene, and subsequently reviewed photographs of the scene.β Main,\n2011 WL 11027844, at *4. The only case to exclude an expert involved\nmarkedly different facts. In that case, the officer could not determine which\nlane the driver was in, expressed doubts about his qualifications, and could not\n\n\n\nIns. Co., No. 11-CV-872, 2012 WL 702061, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2012) (discussing the\ndifferences between lay and expert opinion testimony for investigating officers).\n\n 8 See, e.g., Stevens Transport, 2016 WL 9244669, at *2-4 (permitting DPS lead\ninvestigator to offer expert opinion on the cause of the accident); Cartwright v. Am. Honda\nMotor Co., Inc., No. 9:09-CV-2015, 2011 WL 3648565, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2011)\n(permitting investigating officer to offer an expert opinion regarding the cause of the\naccident); Vigil v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., No. EP-05-CV-001-KC, 2007 WL 2778233, at *4\n(W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2007) (permitting the investigating officer to offer expert opinion on the\ncause of the accident); Martin v. Pride Offshore Co., No. 97-CV-3754, 1999 WL 4921, at *1\n(E.D. La. Jan. 6, 1999) (permitting an investigating officer to offer expert testimony on the\ncause of the accident), affβd, 198 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1999); Main v. Eichorn, No. W-10-CV-158,\n2011 WL 11027844, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2011) (allowing an investigating officer to\ntestify as an expert); but see Koenig v. Beekmans, No. 5:15-CV-00822-RCL-RBF, 2018 WL\n358307, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2018) (excluding an accident investigator who admitted that\nhe was simply βspeculating as to who was in whose lane.β).\n\n\n 12\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nsay with any certainty whether the defendant caused the accident. Koenig,\n2018 WL 358307, at *5.\n Here, Smith considered numerous facts and did not state that he was\nspeculating about the cause of the accident. Smith was driving some distance\nbehind Brown when the accident occurred and saw it happen from afar. He\nfound wet, dark conditions. He determined which lane Brown was using. He\ndetermined that Brown was talking on his cell phone. He examined marks in\nthe median showing the path of Brownβs truck. He took photographs of the\nscene. He spoke to witnesses. He determined that Brown hydroplaned based\non skid marks. He determined based on experience and training that Brown\nmust have been driving too fast or used faulty evasive maneuvers to cross the\nmedian and end up on the other side of the road. He also relied on an accident\nreconstruction put together by another expert. Smith also admitted on cross-\nexamination that he did not examine Brownβs truck, the brakes, the weight of\nthe truck, or attempt to estimate his speed. But he stuck to his opinion that\nBrown must have been driving too fast for the conditions or taken a faulty\nevasive maneuver.\n In sum, Smithβs opinion was based on a multitude of facts. It did not\ntake into account every possible explanation for the accident, and some\nmeasurements were missing. But he was the closest to the scene when the\naccident happened, observed the conditions on the road, knew Brown was\ntalking on the phone, and looked at various tire markings in the median and\non the pavement. Numerous district courts have allowed an investigating\nofficer to testify as an expert based on less. If Smith missed any important\nfacts, the oversight should go to the weight of his opinion, not its admissibility.\nWe AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to allow Smith to testify as an expert\nwitness on causation.\n\n\n 13\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\n V.\n Next, RCX argues that the district court erroneously affirmed the juryβs\naward of consortium damages to Mrs. Puga.\n This court reviews the district courtβs decision to deny a motion for a new\ntrial or remittitur for abuse of discretion. 9 Salinas v. OβNeill, 286 F.3d 827,\n830 (5th Cir. 2002) (βWe review denial of remittitur for abuse of discretionβ);\nEiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995) (βThe\ndecision to grant or deny a motion for new trial or remittitur rests in the sound\ndiscretion of the trial judge; that exercise of discretion can be set aside only\nupon a clear showing of abuseβ); Brooks v. Great Lakes Dredge-Dock Co., 754\nF.2d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1985) (βThe standard of review of the denial of such a\nmotion is whether the district court abused its discretion.β).\n The Supreme Court of Texas defines loss of consortium as the loss of\ncompanionship, emotional support, love, felicity, and sexual relations\n\n\n\n 9 This court has not spoken definitively about the appropriate standard of review for\noverturning a juryβs award of damages. There are three that stand out in the case law. See\ngenerally Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 504 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing the three different\nstandards). The first is abuse of discretion. Salinas, 286 F.3d at 830 (βWe review denial of\nremittitur for abuse of discretion.β) (internal citation omitted); see also Foradori, 523 F.3d at\n503 (reviewing other cases). The second is the βstrongest showingβ standard. Lebron v.\nUnited States, 279 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see also Enter.\nRef. Co. v. Sector Ref. Inc., 781 F.2d 1116, 1118 (5th Cir. 1986); Dixon v. Intβl Harvester Co.,\n754 F.2d 573, 590 (5th Cir. 1985); Caldarera v. E. Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir.\n1983); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 1982); Bridges v.\nGroendyke Transp., Inc., 553 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1977); Wackman v. Rubasmen, 602 F.3d\n391, 405 (5th Cir. 2010); Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th\nCir. 1992). The third standard is the βshocks the conscienceβ standard. Caldarera, 705 F.2d\nat 784 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Wackman, 602 F.3d at 404-\n05; Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 1980); Bridges, 553 F.2d at 880);\nWilliams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Caldarera, 705\nF.2d at 784); see also Industrias Magromer Cueros y Pieles S.A. v. La. Bayou Furs Inc., 293\nF.3d 912, 924 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784).\n\n Because RCX challenges the district courtβs decision to affirm the juryβs award, as\nopposed to directly challenging the juryβs award, we apply the abuse of discretion standard.\nMcCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Tex.), N.A., 788 F.3d 463, 482 (5th Cir. 2015).\n 14\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nnecessary to a successful marriage. Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d\n1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666\n(Tex. 1978)). Damages for loss of consortium are non-pecuniary damages,\nwhich βdo not require certainty of actual monetized loss.β Waste Mgmt. of Tex.,\nInc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 153 (Tex. 2014). They\nare, instead, βmeasured by an amount that a reasonable person could possibly\nestimate as fair compensation.β Id. (internal quotation marks and citation\nomitted).\n While βtranslating the subjective nature of this loss into monetary\ntermsβ is difficult, Texas courts trust βthe ability of the jury to calculate an\nappropriate award based on the evidence.β Id. at 1089 (citing P.T. & E. Co. v.\nBeasley, 698 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. App.βBeaumont 1985)); Whittlesey, 572\nS.W.2d at 667 (β[T]he issue generally must be resolved by the impartial\nconscience and judgment of jurors who may be expected to act reasonably,\nintelligently and in harmony with the evidence.β (internal quotation marks and\ncitation omitted)). Even so, this trust is limitedβjuries cannot simply pull a\nnumber out of a hat. All damages must be tied to some evidence. Enright v.\nGoodman Distrib., Inc., 330 S.W.3d 392, 403 (Tex. App.βHouston [14th Dist.]\n2010) (citing First State Bank v. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 930 (Tex. App.β\nAustin 1993, writ denied)). Direct evidence, however, is not required. A jury\ncan infer loss of consortium damages βfrom [indirect] evidence showing the\nnature and extent of a spouseβs injuries.β Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1090. 10 When\nconsidering indirect evidence, juries can rely on β(1) the nature of the marital\n\n\n\n 10 See also Elizondo v. Krist, 338 S.W.3d 17, 29 (Tex. App.βHouston [14th Dist.] 2010),\naffβd, 415 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. 2013) (β[T]estimony that the primary victimβs injuries interfere\nwith family activities is sufficient.β); WalβMart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 328\n(Tex. 1993) (holding that testimony that, as a result of wifeβs injuries, couple no longer\nengages in their former outdoor activities and that travel has become difficult is βat least\nsome evidenceβ of loss-of-consortium damages).\n 15\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\nrelationship prior to the spouseβs injury, (2) the deterioration of the marital\nrelationship following the injury, and (3) the extent and duration of the\nspouseβs injuries.β Id. (citing Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667; Monsanto Co. v.\nJohnson, 675 S.W.2d 305, 312 (Tex. App.βHouston [1st Dist.] 1984)).\n When determining the excessiveness of a jury verdict, courts βmust\nreview each case on its own facts.β Moore v. M/V ANGELA, 353 F.3d 376, 384\n(5th Cir. 2003) (citing Winbourne v. E. Airlines, Inc., 758 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th\nCir. 1984)). Past verdicts can βprovide an objective frame of reference, but they\ndo not control our assessment of individual circumstances.β Wheat v. United\nStates, 860 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1988). If an award βexceeds the bounds\nof any reasonable recovery, we must suggest a remittitur ourselves or direct\nthe district court to do so.β Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784 (internal citation\nomitted).\n This court uses the βmaximum recovery ruleβ to determine whether an\naward is excessive. Under the maximum recovery rule, this court βwill decline\nto reduce damages where the amount awarded is not disproportionate to at\nleast one factually similar case from the relevant jurisdiction.β Lebron, 279\nF.3d at 326 (internal citations and quotations omitted). We measure\ndisproportionality by applying a percentage enhancement to past similar\nawards. This enhancement is 50% for jury trials. See Salinas, 286 F.3d at 831\n& n.6 (noting 50% enhancement has been applied only in jury trials); see also\nMoore, 353 F.3d at 384. Refusing to overturn jury awards that are within 150%\nof the highest comparable award prevents the court from substituting its own\nopinion for that of a jury. The relevant jurisdiction for purposes of the\nmaximum recovery rule βis the state providing the substantive law for the\nclaim.β Vogler, 352 F.3d at 156. Here, the relevant jurisdiction consists of\nTexas loss of consortium cases and βFifth Circuit cases applying Texas [loss of\nconsortium] law.β Id.\n 16\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\n The jury awarded Mrs. Puga $1.8 million for her future loss of\nconsortium and $1.6 million for her past loss of consortium. Applying the\nmaximum recovery rule, neither award is clearly excessive.\n The award for future loss of consortium falls within this courtβs 50%\nmultiplier. The highest decision we found awarded a wife $1 million for loss of\nfuture consortium in a case where the husband did not die. 11 Reeder v. Allport,\n218 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. App.βBeaumont 2007) (affirming a juryβs award of\nβ$1,000,000 for future loss of consortium.β); accord Lebron v. United States, 279\nF.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2002) (basing a maximum recovery rule finding in a\nloss-of-consortium case on the βthe highest awardβ the court could find). That\nverdict was rendered in 2007 dollars. Accounting for inflation, that award is\nover $1.2 million in 2018 dollars. 12 Cf. Ledet v. Smith Marine Towing Corp.,\n455 F. Appβx 417, 423 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (accounting for inflation\nwhen applying the maximum recovery rule to a prior jury verdict). The juryβs\n$1.8 million verdict falls within 150% of the prior award over $1.2 million.\n\n\n\n\n 11 We found other verdicts that were higher, but we do not rely on these verdicts\nbecause a higher court reversed them. The higher courts did not reverse because the jury\nawards were excessiveβthey reversed for other reasons. See, e.g., U-Haul Intβl, Inc. v.\nWaldrip, 322 S.W.3d 821, 857 (Tex. App.βDallas 2010) (affirming the juryβs award of a $1.6\nmillion future consortium loss), affβd in part, revβd in part on other grounds, 380 S.W.3d 118\n(Tex. 2012); Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Tex. App.βDallas 2007) (reversing\na juryβs $2 million loss of consortium claim, but on other grounds). While this court on one\nother occasion relied on a partially reversed jury verdict, we specifically affirmed the lower\ncourtβs loss of spousal consortium ruling, which makes it distinguishable from the cases\nabove. See Vogler, 352 F.3d at 157 (relying on the juryβs award in Douglass v. Delta Air Lines,\nInc., 709 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Tex. 1989), affβd in part, revβd in part, 897 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir.\n1990)).\n\n 12We performed this conversion using the Bureau of Labor Statisticsβs CPI Inflation\nCalculator, available at https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. See Ledet, 455 F. Appβx at 423\nn.1 (using the Bureau of Labor Statisticsβs CPI Inflation Calculator).\n\n 17\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\n The parties did not point us to a factually similar case that specifically\ngranted past loss of consortium damages. 13 See Vogler, 352 F.3d at 156-57, 157\nn.7 (finding that prior cases were not factually similar when they did not\ndistinguish between past and future loss of consortium). In our own research,\nhowever, we found a case in which the plaintiff-husband, like here, survived\nan accident but suffered physically and emotionally from his injuries. See W.\nStar Transp., Inc. v. Robison, 457 S.W.3d 178, 189 (Tex. App.βAmarillo 2015)\n(upholding a past loss of consortium award of $250,000 where the husband\nsuffered a traumatic brain injury that would βsignificantly affect him for the\nremainder of his lifeβ). In Robison, the jury awarded the plaintiffβs wife\n$250,000 for past loss of consortium on January 18, 2013. Adjusting for\ninflation, that award translates to roughly $272,750.00. And adding our 150%\nmultiplier to that number, the maximum recovery rule limits Mrs. Pugaβs\nrecovery to $409,125.00.\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to affirm the juryβs\naward of future consortium damages. However, we REVERSE the district\ncourtβs decision to affirm the juryβs award of past consortium damages and\nREMAND for the exact calculation of Mrs. Pugaβs maximum recovery in light\nof West Star Transportation, Inc. v. Robison, 457 S.W.3d 178.\n\n\n\n\n 13 The largest award we found for loss of past consortium was $300,000. Douglass,\n709 F. Supp. at 763 (W.D. Tex. 1989). That award was rendered in 1989. Converted to 2018\ndollars, $300,000 translates to roughly $625,000. Douglass, however, is not factually similar.\n\n The most important reference point for determining factual similarity is whether the\nprimary victim lived or died. For example, in Lebron, this court merely looked to see whether\nthe child in past cases had died or lived when determining the correct comparison point for\nparental loss of consortium. Lebron, 279 F.3d at 327; see also Moore, 353 F.3d at 384\n(βPoignant factual distinctions are that Plaintiff herein lost no other family member from this\naccidentβ). The facts here do not mirror Douglass. In Douglass, the father died in a plane\ncrash. Mr. Puga lived. The difference between life and death makes the cases meaningfully\ndifferent.\n 18\n\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-41282\n VI.\n Finally, RCX argues that it is entitled to a settlement credit under Texas\nlawβan issue the district court did not consider. The Pugas agree that RCX\nis entitled to a settlement credit. See RSR Corp. v. Intβl Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851,\n862 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying a settlement credit in a Texas law diversity case).\n We, therefore, REVERSE the district courtβs decision not to apply a\nsettlement credit and REMAND for the district court to calculate the\nappropriate settlement credit amount and modify the final judgment\naccordingly.\n VII.\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district courtβs choice of jury\ninstructions; we AFFIRM that Trooper Smith was properly admitted to testify\nas an expert on accident investigation; and we AFFIRM the district courtβs\ndecision to uphold the juryβs award for past and future loss of consortium. We\nalso REMAND to the district court so that it can calculate the settlement credit\nto which RCX is entitled and modify its final judgment accordingly.\n\n\n\n\n 19\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Alexandro PUGA; Norma Puga, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. RCX SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282 United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 1, 2019\\nALEXANDRO PUGA; NORMA PUGA,\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees Clerk\\n\\n\\nv.\\n\\nRCX SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, and KING and OWEN, Circuit Judges.\\nCARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge:\\n RCX Solutions, Incorporated is a licensed motor carrier that contracted\\nwith a driver, Ronald Brown, to transport a load across Texas. During his\\ndrive, Brown crossed the median into oncoming traffic and crashed into\\nAlexandro Pugaβs truck, leaving Puga with significant injuries. The Pugas\\nsued. After a week-long trial with expert testimony, a jury found RCX liable\\nfor Brownβs negligence and awarded Mr. Puga a variety of damages and his\\nwife, Norma Puga, loss of consortium damages.\\n RCX now launches a multitude of challenges at the district courtβs\\nhandling of the case. RCX claims that the district court wrongly interpreted\\nthe Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations because it failed to take account\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nof regulatory amendments. RCX contends that this misinterpretation\\nsubjected RCX to liability where none should exist. RCX also argues that the\\ndistrict court used faulty jury instructions, improperly allowed the Pugasβ\\nexpert to testify, and upheld an excessive jury award for Mrs. Pugaβs loss of\\nconsortium. Finally, RCX claims that the district court erred in not applying\\na settlement credit to the final damages award. After reviewing the record, we\\nAFFIRM the district courtβs rulings with respect to all issues except the\\nsettlement credit. We REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for the\\nsole purpose of calculating the appropriate settlement credit amount and\\nmodifying its final judgment accordingly.\\n I.\\n Sunset Transportation entered into a brokerage account with LβOreal.\\nIn its role as a broker, Sunset was responsible for choosing a motor carrier for\\nindividual LβOreal shipments on a load-by-load basis. Sunset chose RCX to\\ntransport the LβOreal load involved in the accident. RCX did not have a\\ncontract with LβOreal.\\n When it came time for RCX to transport LβOrealβs load, RCX ran into\\nequipment problems. So RCX contacted Ronald Brown to transport the load.\\nConveniently, Brown already had an RCX trailer in his possession. RCX had\\nleased the trailer from another company, Xtra Lease, and RCX assumed\\nresponsibility for the trailerβs operation under the lease agreement. The bill of\\nlading listed RCX as the carrier for the load. Brown also signed the bill of\\nlading, apparently on behalf of RCX. 1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 RCX claims, however, that Brown was employed by About Tyme, another carrier.\\nRCX had a trailer interchange agreement with About Tyme, under which they could use the\\nother companyβs trailers. And About Tymeβs logo was also on the trailer when the accident\\noccurred. Brown had also listed About Tyme in his logbook.\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n While transporting the load, Brown swerved across the median into\\noncoming traffic, hitting Alexandro Pugaβs truck. Brown did not survive the\\naccident. Mr. Puga suffered a variety of injuries, including burns on large\\nparts of his body and fractures in his spine, legs, pelvis, and fingers. Mr. Puga\\nwas still undergoing treatment and surgeries two-and-a-half years after the\\naccident.\\n Following the accident, Mr. Puga and his wife, Norma, sued RCX, About\\nTyme, and Xtra Lease, claiming that Brownβs negligent driving caused Mr.\\nPugaβs injuries. Prior to trial, RCX filed a motion under Rule 50(a) of the\\nFederal Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting the court to enter judgment as a\\nmatter of law because the Pugas lacked sufficient evidence for a jury to find\\nthat (1) Brown was employed by RCX and (2) Brown acted negligently when\\nthe crash occurred. The district court denied the motion.\\n At trial, the Pugas designated Trooper Andrew Smith as an expert\\nwitness. Smith was the first responder to the accident and saw the explosion\\nfrom the accident from afar. RCX sought to exclude Smithβs testimony\\nregarding the cause of the accident. The district court denied RCXβs motion.\\n The trial concluded with a jury verdict in favor of the Pugas. The jury\\ndetermined that RCX was βusing motor vehicle(s) it did not own to transport\\nproperty under an arrangement with Ronald Brown.β As a result, the jury\\nawarded the Pugas a variety of damages. The jury specifically awarded Mrs.\\nPuga damages for loss of consortium, $1.6 million for past loss of consortium\\nand $1.8 million for future loss of consortium.\\n After the trial, RCX filed a renewed Rule 50(b) motion, again requesting\\njudgment as a matter of law, this time because amendments to Federal Motor\\nCarrier Regulations precluded the jury from finding for the Pugas. The district\\ncourt again denied the motion and entered judgment in favor of the Pugas.\\nRCX now appeals.\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n II.\\n RCX first argues that federal law does not allow courts to hold motor\\ncarriers liable for the acts of independent contractors, a concept both parties\\nrefer to as the statutory-employee doctrine. RCX raised this argument for the\\nfirst time in its post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion.\\n Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move\\nfor judgment as a matter of law at trial before the jury renders its verdict.\\nUnder Rule 50(a), the movant must βspecify the judgment sought and the law\\nand facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.β Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). If\\nthe pre-verdict motion is denied, then the party can renew its motion under\\nRule 50(b). But the renewed Rule 50(b) is βtechnically only a renewal of the\\n[Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law].β Mozingo v. Correct Mfg.\\nCorp., 752 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks and citation\\nomitted). As a result, courts prohibit parties from using a Rule 50(b) motion\\nto βassert a ground that was not included in the [original] motion.β Id.; see also\\nIn re Isbell Records, Inc., 774 F.3d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 2014) (βBy not raising this\\nargument at trial or in its Rule 50(a) motion, [the appellant] has waived its\\nright to bring a Rule 50(b) motion on this ground.β); Arsement v. Spinnaker\\nExpl. Co., 400 F.3d 238, 247 (5th Cir. 2005) (βIf a party fails to raise an issue\\nin its Rule 50(a)(1) motions at trial, it may not do so in its post-trial Rule 50(b)\\nmotion.β) (citation omitted); 9B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur K. Miller,\\nFederal Practice and Procedure Β§ 2537 (3d ed. 2018) (β[T]he district court only\\ncan grant the Rule 50(b) motion on the grounds advanced in the preverdict\\nmotion, because the former is conceived of as only a renewal of the latter.β).\\n This rule makes sense in light of Rule 50(b)βs purposes. Rule 50(b) is\\ndesigned to prevent a litigant from ambushing both the district court and\\nopposing counsel after trial. See Dimmitt Agri Indus., Inc. v. CPC Intβl. Inc.,\\n679 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir. 1982) (βThe rationale for the rule that a [Rule 50(b)\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nmotion] cannot assert a ground not included in a motion for directed verdict is\\nobviously to avoid βambushingβ the trial court and opposing counsel.β) (internal\\nquotation marks and citation omitted); Quinn v. Sw. Wood Prods., Inc., 597\\nF.2d 1018, 1025 (5th Cir. 1979) (βWhen a claimed deficiency in the evidence is\\ncalled to the attention of the trial judge and of counsel before the jury has\\ncommenced deliberations, counsel still may do whatever can be done to mend\\nhis case. But if the court and counsel learn of such a claim for the first time\\nafter verdict, both are ambushed and nothing can be done except by way of a\\ncomplete new trial. It is contrary to the spirit of our procedures to permit\\ncounsel to be sandbagged by such tactics or the trial court to be so put in\\nerror.β). By requiring a litigant to raise all arguments in its initial Rule 50(a)\\nmotion, the trial court is able to βre-examine the question of evidentiary\\ninsufficiency as a matter of law if the jury returns a verdict contrary to the\\nmovant,β and opposing counsel is alerted to any βinsufficiency before the case\\nis submitted to the jury,β giving the opposing party a chance to cure any defects\\nin its legal theories or proof should the motion have merit. Scottish Heritable\\nTr., PLC v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 81 F.3d 606, 610 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal\\nquotation marks and citation omitted).\\n Here, RCX did not argue that the statutory-employee doctrine was\\noverruled in its Rule 50(a) motion, precluding it from raising the argument in\\nits Rule 50(b) motion. In its oral Rule 50(a) motion, RCX argued that judgment\\nas a matter of law was appropriate because the record contained insufficient\\nevidence to determine that (1) Brown was a statutory employee of RCX and (2)\\nBrown acted negligently when the accident occurred. Even in its earlier\\nsummary judgment briefing, RCX only attacked the evidentiary bases for\\ndetermining that Brown was an employee of RCX. At no time prior to its Rule\\n50(b) motion did RCX argue that the entire statutory-employee doctrine is now\\ndefunct. By failing to raise this argument in its initial Rule 50(a) motion, RCX\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nwaived it. 2 See McCann v. Tex. City Ref., Inc., 984 F.2d 667, 672-73 (5th Cir.\\n1993) (denying a post-judgment challenge when the partyβs argument differed\\nfrom its 50(a) motion); Allied Bank-West., N.A. v. Stein, 996 F.2d 111, 115 (5th\\nCir. 1993) (overturning grant of judgment as a matter of law on different\\nground than that in the initial directed verdict); Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co.,\\n515 F.2d 835, 846 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that plaintiff could not receive post-\\njudgment relief on claims it did not raise at trial or in its original Rule 50\\nmotion).\\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to deny RCXβs Rule\\n50(b) motion.\\n III.\\n RCX next argues that the district court used improper jury instructions.\\nMore specifically, RCX argues that the district courtβs jury instructions were\\nincorrect because they did not require the jury to find that RCX met the\\ndefinition of βmotor carrier.β\\n This court reviews jury instructions under a two-prong standard of\\nreview. βFirst, the challenger must demonstrate that the charge as a whole\\ncreates substantial and ineradicable doubt whetherβ the instructions βproperly\\nguidedβ the jury βin its deliberations.β Pelt v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat. Assβn, 359\\nF.3d 764, 767 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1315\\n(5th Cir. 1997)). Second, even if the court finds that the jury instructions were\\n\\n\\n 2 RCX argues that it can raise and appeal a purely legal issue in a Rule 50(b) motion\\neven though it did not raise that issue in its original Rule 50(a) motion. But RCX provides\\nno support for this proposition. In fact, the case it cites cuts the opposite direction. In Feld\\nMotor Sports, this court held that it could only review an appeal of a district courtβs purely\\nlegal conclusions if the challenging party βsufficiently preserved [it objections] in a Rule 50\\nmotion.β Feld Motor Sports, Inc. v. Traxxas, L.P., 861 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 2017). The\\ncourt later reaffirmed the rule that a party only βsufficiently preserve[s]β an argument using\\nRule 50 when it raises the argument in a Rule 50(a) and then renews it in a Rule 50(b) motion.\\nId. Here, as detailed above, RCX did not sufficiently preserve its statutory-employee\\narguments.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nerroneous, it will not reverse if it determines, βbased upon the entire record,\\nthat the challenged instruction could not have affected the outcome of the\\ncase.β Id. (quoting Sawyer, 120 F.3d at 1315).\\n RCXβs arguments do not raise any doubt about the district courtβs jury\\ninstructions. 3 The district court instructed the jury to determine whether RCX\\nwas βusing motor vehicle(s) it did not own to transport property under an\\narrangement with Ronald Brown.β RCX correctly points out that this\\ninstruction does not follow the federal definition of motor carrier. The federal\\ndefinition of a motor carrier is βa person providing motor vehicle transportation\\nfor compensation.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(14). But this definition of motor carrier\\nis overbroad for this case because it does not distinguish between (1) a motor\\ncarrier using its own equipment and (2) a motor carrier using leased\\nequipment. That distinction matters.\\n The relevant federal regulations only apply to motor carriers who use\\nleased equipment. As Section 14102 makes clear, the Secretary of\\nTransportation can only issue regulations requiring a motor carrier to βhave\\n\\n\\n\\n 3There are three main statutes at issue here. First, the definition of motor carrier:\\nβThe term βmotor carrierβ means a person providing motor vehicle transportation for\\ncompensation.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(14). Second, the definition of broker:\\n\\n The term βbrokerβ means a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee\\n or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale,\\n negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise\\n as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for\\n compensation.\\n\\n49 U.S.C. Β§ 13102(2).\\n\\n Third, the statute giving the Secretary of Transportation the power to regulate motor\\ncarriers who lease trucking equipment: βThe Secretary may require a motor carrier providing\\ntransportation subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I of chapter 135 that uses motor\\nvehicles not owned by it to transport property under an arrangement with another party.β\\n49 U.S.C. Β§ 14102(a).\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\ncontrol of and be responsible forβ how employees operate equipment if the\\nmotor carrier βuses motor vehicles not owned by it to transport property under\\nan arrangement with another party.β 49 U.S.C. Β§ 14102(a) (emphasis added).\\nThe district court rightly based its jury instructions on this section because it\\nexcludes carriers using their own trucking equipment. Without a finding that\\nthe motor carrier used a leased vehicle, the regulations would not apply.\\n RCXβs arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. RCX first argues\\nthat the instructions did not require the jury to find that RCX was acting as a\\nmotor carrier. Second, and relatedly, RCX argues that the instructions are so\\nbroad that they wrap in brokers, as well as motor carriers. We disagree. The\\nmain difference between a motor carrier and a broker is the actual operation\\nof the leased equipment. This difference stands out when looking at the\\ndefinitions of motor carrier and broker in the Act. While a broker is responsible\\nfor βproviding, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier,β 49 U.S.C. Β§\\n13102(2), a motor carrier provides βmotor vehicle transportation,β 49 U.S.C. Β§\\n13102(14). Put briefly, a motor carrier transports, and a broker provides a\\nmotor carrier. Because the jury here determined that RCX used motor vehicles\\nto transport property, it necessarily determined that RCX was a motor carrier.\\nConsequently, the jury also necessarily determined that RCX did not act as a\\nbroker who merely provided access to a motor carrier.\\n In sum, the district court did not err. On the contrary, the district court\\nclosely examined the statute, avoided the obvious, overbroad definition of\\nmotor carrier, and picked out the correct, limited definition. We AFFIRM the\\ndistrict courtβs jury instructions.\\n IV.\\n RCX next challenges the district courtβs decision to admit State Trooper\\nSmith as an expert witness on accident investigation. According to RCX,\\nSmithβs opinion was irrelevant because he testified that he (1) could not find\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nany defects on the road, (2) could not find any skid marks on the road, (3) did\\nnot determine how fast Brown was driving, and (4) did not know the weight of\\nthe trailer or its contents. 4\\n A trial courtβs decision to admit expert evidence is reviewed for abuse of\\ndiscretion. Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir.\\n2007) (citation omitted). The trial judge has βwide latitude in determining the\\nadmissibility of expert testimony, and the discretion of the trial judge and his\\nor her decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly erroneous.β\\nWatkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation\\nmarks and citation omitted); see also Whitehouse Hotel Ltd. Pβship v. Commβr,\\n615 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2010). A manifest error is one that βis plain and\\nindisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.β\\nGuy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal\\nquotation marks and citation omitted); see also SEC v. Life Partners Holdings,\\nInc., 854 F.3d 765, 775 (5th Cir. 2017).\\n Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of\\nexpert testimony and reports. When evaluating expert testimony, the\\noverarching concern is generally whether the testimony is relevant and\\nreliable. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).\\nTo be reliable, expert testimony must βbe grounded in the methods and\\nprocedures of science and . . . be more than unsupported speculation or\\nsubjective belief.β 5 Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir. 2012)\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Both parties implicitly assume that an accident investigator can serve as an expert\\nwitness. Because RCX merely attacks Smithβs opinion and does not challenge the idea that\\nan accident investigator can serve as an expert at all, we reserve that more fundamental\\nquestion for a later date.\\n 5 Courts also look to Dabuertβs list of non-exclusive factors when determining whether\\n\\ntestimony is reliable:\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n(internal citation omitted). To be relevant, the expertβs βreasoning or\\nmethodology [must] be properly applied to the facts in issue.β Id. (internal\\ncitation omitted).\\n When performing this analysis, the courtβs main focus should be on\\ndetermining whether the expertβs opinion will assist the trier of fact. See Peters\\nv. Five Star Marine Serv., 898 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Fed. R. Evid.\\n702 advisory committeeβs notes (1972)). Assisting the trier of fact means βthe\\ntrial judge ought to insist that a proffered expert bring to the jury more than\\nthe lawyers can offer in argument.β Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 305 (5th\\nCir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As this court has\\nnoted, however, the βhelpfulness threshold is low: it is principally . . . a matter\\nof relevance.β E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 459 n.14 (5th\\nCir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\\n As a general rule, questions relating to the bases and sources of an\\nexpertβs opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its\\nadmissibility. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987). Particularly in a\\njury trial setting, the courtβs role under Rule 702 is not to weigh the expert\\ntestimony to the point of supplanting the juryβs fact-finding roleβthe courtβs\\nrole is limited to ensuring that the evidence in dispute is at least sufficiently\\nreliable and relevant to the issue so that it is appropriate for the juryβs\\nconsideration. See Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391-92\\n(Fed. Cir. 2003). At no point should the trial court replace βthe adversary\\n\\n\\n\\n (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested; (2) whether the\\n theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the\\n known or potential rate of error of the method used and the existence and\\n maintenance of standards controlling the techniqueβs operation; and (4)\\n whether the theory or method has been generally accepted by the scientific\\n community.\\n\\n Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d at 459.\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nsystem.β Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2002). As\\nthe Supreme Court explained, β[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of\\ncontrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the\\ntraditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible\\nevidence.β Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596; see also Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d\\n448, 461 (5th Cir. 2002). While the district court must act as a gatekeeper to\\nexclude all irrelevant and unreliable expert testimony, βthe rejection of expert\\ntestimony is the exception rather than the rule.β Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory\\ncommitteeβs notes (2000) (internal citations omitted).\\n Here, RCX only challenges the relevance of Smithβs opinion. 6 But its\\narguments are not persuasive. The district court did not abuse its discretion\\nin allowing Smith to offer an expert opinion on the cause of the accidentβ\\nSmith considered an appropriate amount of physical evidence at the scene of\\nthe crime to offer his opinion, and RCX had ample opportunity to show the jury\\nany flaws in his opinion.\\n No Fifth Circuit case applies Rule 702 and Daubert to an accident\\ninvestigator. 7 But the majority of in-circuit district courts choose to admit\\n\\n\\n\\n 6RCX does not challenge Smithβs qualifications. Officer Smith has worked on accident\\ninvestigations since he became a Texas State Trooper in 2010. He received training on\\naccident investigation when he became a trooper. He also took an advanced course on\\naccident investigation. He has investigated β[o]ver a hundredβ accidents.\\n\\n 7 Smith offered testimony as an accident investigator, not an accident recreator, which\\nrequires additional training and attention to detail. Accident investigation merely consists\\nof βresponding to the scene, looking at the evidence, taking statements from witnesses,\\nmaking a preliminary determination about what may have been a contributing factor to the\\ncrash, [and] writing [and] submitting the initial crash report.β Stevens Transp., Inc. v. Glob.\\nTransp., LLC, No. 6:15-CV-552-MHS-JDL, 2016 WL 9244669, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 24, 2016)\\n(internal citations omitted).\\n\\n While this court has held that an investigating officer may not offer lay testimony on\\ncausation, Duhon v. Marceaux, 33 F. Appβx 703 (5th Cir. 2002) (unpublished), lay opinions\\nare analyzed differently than expert opinions. See generally Smith v. Progressive Cty. Mut.\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\naccident investigators as experts. 8 District courts use a contextual analysis\\nwhen making this determination, looking to see if the investigating officer\\nbases his opinion on a sufficient amount of physical evidence from the accident.\\n For example, in Stevens, the district court allowed an officer to testify\\nbased on βthe position of Defendantsβ trailer after the accident, the tire marks\\nvisible at the scene, and his conversation at the scene with . . . the driver of\\nPlaintiffsβ tractor-trailer.β Stevens, 2016 WL 9244669, at *4. Another court\\nallowed an expert to testify based on his βhis accident report, some photographs\\nand his notes.β Vigil, 2007 WL 2778233, at *4. Yet another court allowed an\\ninvestigating officer to testify as an expert because, even though he βdid not\\ntake any measurements or photographs, or speak to any witnesses to the\\naccident, he did personally survey the accident scene, talk to the other officers\\non the scene, and subsequently reviewed photographs of the scene.β Main,\\n2011 WL 11027844, at *4. The only case to exclude an expert involved\\nmarkedly different facts. In that case, the officer could not determine which\\nlane the driver was in, expressed doubts about his qualifications, and could not\\n\\n\\n\\nIns. Co., No. 11-CV-872, 2012 WL 702061, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 1, 2012) (discussing the\\ndifferences between lay and expert opinion testimony for investigating officers).\\n\\n 8 See, e.g., Stevens Transport, 2016 WL 9244669, at *2-4 (permitting DPS lead\\ninvestigator to offer expert opinion on the cause of the accident); Cartwright v. Am. Honda\\nMotor Co., Inc., No. 9:09-CV-2015, 2011 WL 3648565, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2011)\\n(permitting investigating officer to offer an expert opinion regarding the cause of the\\naccident); Vigil v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., No. EP-05-CV-001-KC, 2007 WL 2778233, at *4\\n(W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2007) (permitting the investigating officer to offer expert opinion on the\\ncause of the accident); Martin v. Pride Offshore Co., No. 97-CV-3754, 1999 WL 4921, at *1\\n(E.D. La. Jan. 6, 1999) (permitting an investigating officer to offer expert testimony on the\\ncause of the accident), affβd, 198 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1999); Main v. Eichorn, No. W-10-CV-158,\\n2011 WL 11027844, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2011) (allowing an investigating officer to\\ntestify as an expert); but see Koenig v. Beekmans, No. 5:15-CV-00822-RCL-RBF, 2018 WL\\n358307, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2018) (excluding an accident investigator who admitted that\\nhe was simply βspeculating as to who was in whose lane.β).\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nsay with any certainty whether the defendant caused the accident. Koenig,\\n2018 WL 358307, at *5.\\n Here, Smith considered numerous facts and did not state that he was\\nspeculating about the cause of the accident. Smith was driving some distance\\nbehind Brown when the accident occurred and saw it happen from afar. He\\nfound wet, dark conditions. He determined which lane Brown was using. He\\ndetermined that Brown was talking on his cell phone. He examined marks in\\nthe median showing the path of Brownβs truck. He took photographs of the\\nscene. He spoke to witnesses. He determined that Brown hydroplaned based\\non skid marks. He determined based on experience and training that Brown\\nmust have been driving too fast or used faulty evasive maneuvers to cross the\\nmedian and end up on the other side of the road. He also relied on an accident\\nreconstruction put together by another expert. Smith also admitted on cross-\\nexamination that he did not examine Brownβs truck, the brakes, the weight of\\nthe truck, or attempt to estimate his speed. But he stuck to his opinion that\\nBrown must have been driving too fast for the conditions or taken a faulty\\nevasive maneuver.\\n In sum, Smithβs opinion was based on a multitude of facts. It did not\\ntake into account every possible explanation for the accident, and some\\nmeasurements were missing. But he was the closest to the scene when the\\naccident happened, observed the conditions on the road, knew Brown was\\ntalking on the phone, and looked at various tire markings in the median and\\non the pavement. Numerous district courts have allowed an investigating\\nofficer to testify as an expert based on less. If Smith missed any important\\nfacts, the oversight should go to the weight of his opinion, not its admissibility.\\nWe AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to allow Smith to testify as an expert\\nwitness on causation.\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n V.\\n Next, RCX argues that the district court erroneously affirmed the juryβs\\naward of consortium damages to Mrs. Puga.\\n This court reviews the district courtβs decision to deny a motion for a new\\ntrial or remittitur for abuse of discretion. 9 Salinas v. OβNeill, 286 F.3d 827,\\n830 (5th Cir. 2002) (βWe review denial of remittitur for abuse of discretionβ);\\nEiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995) (βThe\\ndecision to grant or deny a motion for new trial or remittitur rests in the sound\\ndiscretion of the trial judge; that exercise of discretion can be set aside only\\nupon a clear showing of abuseβ); Brooks v. Great Lakes Dredge-Dock Co., 754\\nF.2d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 1985) (βThe standard of review of the denial of such a\\nmotion is whether the district court abused its discretion.β).\\n The Supreme Court of Texas defines loss of consortium as the loss of\\ncompanionship, emotional support, love, felicity, and sexual relations\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 This court has not spoken definitively about the appropriate standard of review for\\noverturning a juryβs award of damages. There are three that stand out in the case law. See\\ngenerally Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 504 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing the three different\\nstandards). The first is abuse of discretion. Salinas, 286 F.3d at 830 (βWe review denial of\\nremittitur for abuse of discretion.β) (internal citation omitted); see also Foradori, 523 F.3d at\\n503 (reviewing other cases). The second is the βstrongest showingβ standard. Lebron v.\\nUnited States, 279 F.3d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted); see also Enter.\\nRef. Co. v. Sector Ref. Inc., 781 F.2d 1116, 1118 (5th Cir. 1986); Dixon v. Intβl Harvester Co.,\\n754 F.2d 573, 590 (5th Cir. 1985); Caldarera v. E. Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir.\\n1983); Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 1982); Bridges v.\\nGroendyke Transp., Inc., 553 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1977); Wackman v. Rubasmen, 602 F.3d\\n391, 405 (5th Cir. 2010); Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th\\nCir. 1992). The third standard is the βshocks the conscienceβ standard. Caldarera, 705 F.2d\\nat 784 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Wackman, 602 F.3d at 404-\\n05; Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 1980); Bridges, 553 F.2d at 880);\\nWilliams v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Caldarera, 705\\nF.2d at 784); see also Industrias Magromer Cueros y Pieles S.A. v. La. Bayou Furs Inc., 293\\nF.3d 912, 924 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784).\\n\\n Because RCX challenges the district courtβs decision to affirm the juryβs award, as\\nopposed to directly challenging the juryβs award, we apply the abuse of discretion standard.\\nMcCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Tex.), N.A., 788 F.3d 463, 482 (5th Cir. 2015).\\n 14\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nnecessary to a successful marriage. Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., 946 F.2d\\n1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 666\\n(Tex. 1978)). Damages for loss of consortium are non-pecuniary damages,\\nwhich βdo not require certainty of actual monetized loss.β Waste Mgmt. of Tex.,\\nInc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 153 (Tex. 2014). They\\nare, instead, βmeasured by an amount that a reasonable person could possibly\\nestimate as fair compensation.β Id. (internal quotation marks and citation\\nomitted).\\n While βtranslating the subjective nature of this loss into monetary\\ntermsβ is difficult, Texas courts trust βthe ability of the jury to calculate an\\nappropriate award based on the evidence.β Id. at 1089 (citing P.T. & E. Co. v.\\nBeasley, 698 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. App.βBeaumont 1985)); Whittlesey, 572\\nS.W.2d at 667 (β[T]he issue generally must be resolved by the impartial\\nconscience and judgment of jurors who may be expected to act reasonably,\\nintelligently and in harmony with the evidence.β (internal quotation marks and\\ncitation omitted)). Even so, this trust is limitedβjuries cannot simply pull a\\nnumber out of a hat. All damages must be tied to some evidence. Enright v.\\nGoodman Distrib., Inc., 330 S.W.3d 392, 403 (Tex. App.βHouston [14th Dist.]\\n2010) (citing First State Bank v. Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 930 (Tex. App.β\\nAustin 1993, writ denied)). Direct evidence, however, is not required. A jury\\ncan infer loss of consortium damages βfrom [indirect] evidence showing the\\nnature and extent of a spouseβs injuries.β Glasscock, 946 F.2d at 1090. 10 When\\nconsidering indirect evidence, juries can rely on β(1) the nature of the marital\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 See also Elizondo v. Krist, 338 S.W.3d 17, 29 (Tex. App.βHouston [14th Dist.] 2010),\\naffβd, 415 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. 2013) (β[T]estimony that the primary victimβs injuries interfere\\nwith family activities is sufficient.β); WalβMart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 328\\n(Tex. 1993) (holding that testimony that, as a result of wifeβs injuries, couple no longer\\nengages in their former outdoor activities and that travel has become difficult is βat least\\nsome evidenceβ of loss-of-consortium damages).\\n 15\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\nrelationship prior to the spouseβs injury, (2) the deterioration of the marital\\nrelationship following the injury, and (3) the extent and duration of the\\nspouseβs injuries.β Id. (citing Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667; Monsanto Co. v.\\nJohnson, 675 S.W.2d 305, 312 (Tex. App.βHouston [1st Dist.] 1984)).\\n When determining the excessiveness of a jury verdict, courts βmust\\nreview each case on its own facts.β Moore v. M/V ANGELA, 353 F.3d 376, 384\\n(5th Cir. 2003) (citing Winbourne v. E. Airlines, Inc., 758 F.2d 1016, 1018 (5th\\nCir. 1984)). Past verdicts can βprovide an objective frame of reference, but they\\ndo not control our assessment of individual circumstances.β Wheat v. United\\nStates, 860 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (5th Cir. 1988). If an award βexceeds the bounds\\nof any reasonable recovery, we must suggest a remittitur ourselves or direct\\nthe district court to do so.β Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 784 (internal citation\\nomitted).\\n This court uses the βmaximum recovery ruleβ to determine whether an\\naward is excessive. Under the maximum recovery rule, this court βwill decline\\nto reduce damages where the amount awarded is not disproportionate to at\\nleast one factually similar case from the relevant jurisdiction.β Lebron, 279\\nF.3d at 326 (internal citations and quotations omitted). We measure\\ndisproportionality by applying a percentage enhancement to past similar\\nawards. This enhancement is 50% for jury trials. See Salinas, 286 F.3d at 831\\n& n.6 (noting 50% enhancement has been applied only in jury trials); see also\\nMoore, 353 F.3d at 384. Refusing to overturn jury awards that are within 150%\\nof the highest comparable award prevents the court from substituting its own\\nopinion for that of a jury. The relevant jurisdiction for purposes of the\\nmaximum recovery rule βis the state providing the substantive law for the\\nclaim.β Vogler, 352 F.3d at 156. Here, the relevant jurisdiction consists of\\nTexas loss of consortium cases and βFifth Circuit cases applying Texas [loss of\\nconsortium] law.β Id.\\n 16\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n The jury awarded Mrs. Puga $1.8 million for her future loss of\\nconsortium and $1.6 million for her past loss of consortium. Applying the\\nmaximum recovery rule, neither award is clearly excessive.\\n The award for future loss of consortium falls within this courtβs 50%\\nmultiplier. The highest decision we found awarded a wife $1 million for loss of\\nfuture consortium in a case where the husband did not die. 11 Reeder v. Allport,\\n218 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. App.βBeaumont 2007) (affirming a juryβs award of\\nβ$1,000,000 for future loss of consortium.β); accord Lebron v. United States, 279\\nF.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2002) (basing a maximum recovery rule finding in a\\nloss-of-consortium case on the βthe highest awardβ the court could find). That\\nverdict was rendered in 2007 dollars. Accounting for inflation, that award is\\nover $1.2 million in 2018 dollars. 12 Cf. Ledet v. Smith Marine Towing Corp.,\\n455 F. Appβx 417, 423 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (accounting for inflation\\nwhen applying the maximum recovery rule to a prior jury verdict). The juryβs\\n$1.8 million verdict falls within 150% of the prior award over $1.2 million.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11 We found other verdicts that were higher, but we do not rely on these verdicts\\nbecause a higher court reversed them. The higher courts did not reverse because the jury\\nawards were excessiveβthey reversed for other reasons. See, e.g., U-Haul Intβl, Inc. v.\\nWaldrip, 322 S.W.3d 821, 857 (Tex. App.βDallas 2010) (affirming the juryβs award of a $1.6\\nmillion future consortium loss), affβd in part, revβd in part on other grounds, 380 S.W.3d 118\\n(Tex. 2012); Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Tex. App.βDallas 2007) (reversing\\na juryβs $2 million loss of consortium claim, but on other grounds). While this court on one\\nother occasion relied on a partially reversed jury verdict, we specifically affirmed the lower\\ncourtβs loss of spousal consortium ruling, which makes it distinguishable from the cases\\nabove. See Vogler, 352 F.3d at 157 (relying on the juryβs award in Douglass v. Delta Air Lines,\\nInc., 709 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Tex. 1989), affβd in part, revβd in part, 897 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir.\\n1990)).\\n\\n 12We performed this conversion using the Bureau of Labor Statisticsβs CPI Inflation\\nCalculator, available at https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. See Ledet, 455 F. Appβx at 423\\nn.1 (using the Bureau of Labor Statisticsβs CPI Inflation Calculator).\\n\\n 17\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n The parties did not point us to a factually similar case that specifically\\ngranted past loss of consortium damages. 13 See Vogler, 352 F.3d at 156-57, 157\\nn.7 (finding that prior cases were not factually similar when they did not\\ndistinguish between past and future loss of consortium). In our own research,\\nhowever, we found a case in which the plaintiff-husband, like here, survived\\nan accident but suffered physically and emotionally from his injuries. See W.\\nStar Transp., Inc. v. Robison, 457 S.W.3d 178, 189 (Tex. App.βAmarillo 2015)\\n(upholding a past loss of consortium award of $250,000 where the husband\\nsuffered a traumatic brain injury that would βsignificantly affect him for the\\nremainder of his lifeβ). In Robison, the jury awarded the plaintiffβs wife\\n$250,000 for past loss of consortium on January 18, 2013. Adjusting for\\ninflation, that award translates to roughly $272,750.00. And adding our 150%\\nmultiplier to that number, the maximum recovery rule limits Mrs. Pugaβs\\nrecovery to $409,125.00.\\n Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district courtβs decision to affirm the juryβs\\naward of future consortium damages. However, we REVERSE the district\\ncourtβs decision to affirm the juryβs award of past consortium damages and\\nREMAND for the exact calculation of Mrs. Pugaβs maximum recovery in light\\nof West Star Transportation, Inc. v. Robison, 457 S.W.3d 178.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13 The largest award we found for loss of past consortium was $300,000. Douglass,\\n709 F. Supp. at 763 (W.D. Tex. 1989). That award was rendered in 1989. Converted to 2018\\ndollars, $300,000 translates to roughly $625,000. Douglass, however, is not factually similar.\\n\\n The most important reference point for determining factual similarity is whether the\\nprimary victim lived or died. For example, in Lebron, this court merely looked to see whether\\nthe child in past cases had died or lived when determining the correct comparison point for\\nparental loss of consortium. Lebron, 279 F.3d at 327; see also Moore, 353 F.3d at 384\\n(βPoignant factual distinctions are that Plaintiff herein lost no other family member from this\\naccidentβ). The facts here do not mirror Douglass. In Douglass, the father died in a plane\\ncrash. Mr. Puga lived. The difference between life and death makes the cases meaningfully\\ndifferent.\\n 18\\n\\f Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-41282\\n VI.\\n Finally, RCX argues that it is entitled to a settlement credit under Texas\\nlawβan issue the district court did not consider. The Pugas agree that RCX\\nis entitled to a settlement credit. See RSR Corp. v. Intβl Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851,\\n862 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying a settlement credit in a Texas law diversity case).\\n We, therefore, REVERSE the district courtβs decision not to apply a\\nsettlement credit and REMAND for the district court to calculate the\\nappropriate settlement credit amount and modify the final judgment\\naccordingly.\\n VII.\\n For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district courtβs choice of jury\\ninstructions; we AFFIRM that Trooper Smith was properly admitted to testify\\nas an expert on accident investigation; and we AFFIRM the district courtβs\\ndecision to uphold the juryβs award for past and future loss of consortium. We\\nalso REMAND to the district court so that it can calculate the settlement credit\\nto which RCX is entitled and modify its final judgment accordingly.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 19\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":581,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8619565,"string":"8,619,565"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI Judge Veldore Young-Graham, in Her Official Capacity and Judge Lisa Howell, in Her Official Capacity"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Lauderdale Cnty."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 17-60805"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Elrod, Higginson, Reavley\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8598815/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ELROD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HIGGINSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"REAVLEY"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8619565/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI Judge Veldore Young-Graham, in Her Official Capacity and Judge Lisa Howell, in Her Official Capacity\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI Judge Veldore Young-Graham, in Her Official Capacity and Judge Lisa Howell, in Her Official Capacity\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":582,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4587291,"string":"4,587,291"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In the MATTER OF: ONDOVA LIMITED COMPANY, Debtor Jeffrey Baron, Appellant v. Daniel J. Sherman ; Munsch, Hardt, Kopf & Harr, P.C.; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Baron v. Sherman (In Re Ondova Ltd. Co.)"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-10182"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Reavley, Elrod, Willett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182 United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 4, 2019\\nIn the Matter of: ONDOVA LIMITED COMPANY\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Debtor Clerk\\n\\n\\n-----------------------------------------------\\n\\nJEFFREY BARON,\\n\\n Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nDANIEL J. SHERMAN; MUNSCH, HARDT, KOPF & HARR, P.C.; LIBERTY\\nMUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n\\n Appellees\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\\nPER CURIAM:\\n Jeffrey Baron appeals the district courtβs dismissal under Federal Rule\\nof Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of his bankruptcy βadversary proceedingβ against\\nDaniel J. Sherman, the trustee responsible for administering the bankruptcy\\n\\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182\\nestate of Ondova Limited Company. Baron also appeals the denial of his\\nmotion for leave to amend. We review both de novo. 1\\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts\\nto state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. 2 And while we must accept\\na plaintiff's factual allegations as true, we are not bound to accept as true βa\\nlegal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.β 3\\n The district court considered and adopted Bankruptcy Judge Jerniganβs\\nmeticulous and well-reasoned 55-page Report and Recommendation. The\\ndistrict court granted Trustee Shermanβs motion to dismiss becauseβas the\\ncourt-appointed trustee and an arm of the courtβSherman was entitled to\\nabsolute immunity for all actions taken pursuant to a court order, and entitled\\nto qualified immunity for all other acts within the scope of his trustee duties.\\nBaronβs claims against Trustee Shermanβs attorneys (the law firm Munsch\\nHardt Kopf & Harr, P.C.) also failed because the attorneys were covered by\\nboth derivative trustee immunity and independent attorney immunity.\\nBaronβs claim that Trustee Sherman breached his fiduciary duty also failed\\nbecause he did not plausibly plead gross negligence. Finally, the district court\\ndenied Baronβs motion to amend his complaint on futility grounds.\\n We agree with the district courtβs analysis of Trustee Shermanβs\\nimmunity. Trustees are entitled to absolute immunity for all actions taken\\npursuant to a court order. 4 And while this circuit does not have controlling\\nprecedent on the issue, numerous sister circuits have held that trustees have\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 While a denial of leave to amend is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion,\\nbecause the district court based its denial for leave to amend solely on futility, review is de\\nnovo. City of Clinton v. Pilgrimβs Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010) (βThe βde novo\\nstandard of review [is] identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal\\nunder Rule 12(b)(6).β).\\n 2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).\\n 3 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).\\n 4 Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981).\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182\\nqualified immunity for personal harms caused by actions taken within the\\nscope of their official duties. 5 Only ultra vires actionsβactions that fall outside\\nthe scope of their duties as trusteesβare not entitled to immunity. There is no\\ncompelling reason to depart from our sister circuitsβ sensible approach. We\\nthus hold that bankruptcy trustees in the Fifth Circuit are entitled to qualified\\nimmunity for personal harms caused by actions that, while not pursuant to a\\ncourt order, fall within the scope of their official duties.\\n Here, Baron has not plausibly alleged any actions not covered by\\nabsolute or qualified immunity, either in his original complaint or in his\\nproposed amended complaint. His factual allegations on appeal are limited to\\nShermanβs decision to seek a receivership over him, alleged falsehoods or\\nmisrepresentations during the receivership process, and subsequent use of the\\nreceivership to liquidate assets. Howeverβas acknowledged by Bankruptcy\\nJudge Jerniganβall property seizures that Baron complains of were done\\nunder the Receivership Order and were actions taken by the receiver rather\\nthan the trustee. As Judge Jernigan also notes, between the date Sherman was\\nappointed trustee and the date Baron filed his adversary proceeding, the\\nbankruptcy court entered approximately 147 orders in the Ondova Bankruptcy\\nCase. Trustee Sherman was acting βunder the supervision and subject to the\\norder of the bankruptcy judgeββand thus entitled to absolute immunity 6βfor\\nvirtually all of his tenure as trustee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 See, e.g., Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, PC v. Banks (In re McKenzie), 716 F.3d 404,\\n413 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 444 (2013); Sierra v. Seeber, 966 F.2d 1444 (4th Cir.\\n1992); Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC v. Swope (In re J & S Props., LLC), 545 B.R. 91,\\n104 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015) (βWhen not acting pursuant to an order of court, a bankruptcy\\ntrustee is generally afforded qualified immunity.β), affβd, 554 B.R. 747 (W.D. Pa. 2016), affβd,\\n872 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2017).\\n 6 Boullion, 639 F.2d at 213\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182\\n Even when Trustee Sherman was not acting pursuant to a court order,\\nhe was still entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken within the scope\\nof his official duties. Seeking a receivership is sometimes a necessary step in\\nadministering the estate. And we have previously weighed in on this very\\nreceivership. 7 While we found that the receivership was without jurisdiction,\\nwe also held that it was pursued without malice. 8 And we have already\\nawarded a remedy. 9 Baron disagrees with Trustee Shermanβs decision to\\npursue a receivership and alleges that Sherman made misleading statements\\nduring the receivership process, but these allegationsβeven when assumed to\\nbe trueβcannot transform them into ultra vires actions that remove Trustee\\nShermanβs qualified immunity.\\n Second, we agree with the district court that this immunity extends to\\nTrustee Shermanβs attorneys under both a derivative theory of judicial\\nimmunity 10 and under the separate doctrine of attorney immunity 11 for\\nessentially the same reasons articulated by the district court.\\n Third, we agree with the district courtβs analysis of Baronβs claims for\\nbreach of fiduciary duty. Baron fails to plausibly allege facts sufficient to\\nsupport a finding of gross negligence, either in his original complaint or in his\\nproposed amended complaint.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2012).\\n 8 Id. at 313 (β[W]e hold . . . that in creating the receivership βthere was no malice nor\\nwrongful purpose, and only an effort to conserve property in which [the court] believedβ it was\\ninterested in maintaining for unpaid attorney fees and to control Baron's vexatious litigation\\ntactics.β (alteration in original) (quoting W.F. Potts Son & Co. v. Cochrane, 59 F.2d 375, 377β\\n78 (5th Cir. 1932))).\\n 9 Id. at 313β14.\\n 10 See In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir. 1993).\\n 11 See Troice v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 816 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that\\n\\nattorneys are entitled to immunity under Texas law from suit by non-clients, unless the\\nattorneyβs conduct βd[oes] not involve the provision of legal servicesβ or is βentirely foreign to\\nthe duties of any attorneyβ).\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182\\n Finally, while we review de novo the denial of a motion to amend, Baron\\nhas failed to raise the new causes of action contained within his proposed\\namended complaint in his briefs or argue that the district court erred in finding\\nthese claims unsuccessful. βIt is a well worn principle that the failure to raise\\nan issue on appeal constitutes waiver of that argument.β 12 Baron has thus\\nwaived the issue, and we will not disturb the district courtβs finding of futility.\\n\\n * * *\\n We AFFIRM both the district courtβs dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and\\nthe denial of leave to file an amended complaint.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n United States v. Griffith, 522 F.3d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.\\n 12\\n\\nThibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000)).\\n 5\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364544/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"REAVLEY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ELROD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587291/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: ONDOVA LIMITED COMPANY, Debtor Jeffrey Baron, Appellant v. Daniel J. Sherman ; Munsch, Hardt, Kopf & Harr, P.C.; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-10182 United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n February 4, 2019\nIn the Matter of: ONDOVA LIMITED COMPANY\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Debtor Clerk\n\n\n-----------------------------------------------\n\nJEFFREY BARON,\n\n Appellant\n\nv.\n\nDANIEL J. SHERMAN; MUNSCH, HARDT, KOPF & HARR, P.C.; LIBERTY\nMUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\n\n Appellees\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\nPER CURIAM:\n Jeffrey Baron appeals the district courtβs dismissal under Federal Rule\nof Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of his bankruptcy βadversary proceedingβ against\nDaniel J. Sherman, the trustee responsible for administering the bankruptcy\n\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-10182\nestate of Ondova Limited Company. Baron also appeals the denial of his\nmotion for leave to amend. We review both de novo. 1\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts\nto state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. 2 And while we must accept\na plaintiff's factual allegations as true, we are not bound to accept as true βa\nlegal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.β 3\n The district court considered and adopted Bankruptcy Judge Jerniganβs\nmeticulous and well-reasoned 55-page Report and Recommendation. The\ndistrict court granted Trustee Shermanβs motion to dismiss becauseβas the\ncourt-appointed trustee and an arm of the courtβSherman was entitled to\nabsolute immunity for all actions taken pursuant to a court order, and entitled\nto qualified immunity for all other acts within the scope of his trustee duties.\nBaronβs claims against Trustee Shermanβs attorneys (the law firm Munsch\nHardt Kopf & Harr, P.C.) also failed because the attorneys were covered by\nboth derivative trustee immunity and independent attorney immunity.\nBaronβs claim that Trustee Sherman breached his fiduciary duty also failed\nbecause he did not plausibly plead gross negligence. Finally, the district court\ndenied Baronβs motion to amend his complaint on futility grounds.\n We agree with the district courtβs analysis of Trustee Shermanβs\nimmunity. Trustees are entitled to absolute immunity for all actions taken\npursuant to a court order. 4 And while this circuit does not have controlling\nprecedent on the issue, numerous sister circuits have held that trustees have\n\n\n\n 1 While a denial of leave to amend is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion,\nbecause the district court based its denial for leave to amend solely on futility, review is de\nnovo. City of Clinton v. Pilgrimβs Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010) (βThe βde novo\nstandard of review [is] identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal\nunder Rule 12(b)(6).β).\n 2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).\n 3 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).\n 4 Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981).\n\n 2\n\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-10182\nqualified immunity for personal harms caused by actions taken within the\nscope of their official duties. 5 Only ultra vires actionsβactions that fall outside\nthe scope of their duties as trusteesβare not entitled to immunity. There is no\ncompelling reason to depart from our sister circuitsβ sensible approach. We\nthus hold that bankruptcy trustees in the Fifth Circuit are entitled to qualified\nimmunity for personal harms caused by actions that, while not pursuant to a\ncourt order, fall within the scope of their official duties.\n Here, Baron has not plausibly alleged any actions not covered by\nabsolute or qualified immunity, either in his original complaint or in his\nproposed amended complaint. His factual allegations on appeal are limited to\nShermanβs decision to seek a receivership over him, alleged falsehoods or\nmisrepresentations during the receivership process, and subsequent use of the\nreceivership to liquidate assets. Howeverβas acknowledged by Bankruptcy\nJudge Jerniganβall property seizures that Baron complains of were done\nunder the Receivership Order and were actions taken by the receiver rather\nthan the trustee. As Judge Jernigan also notes, between the date Sherman was\nappointed trustee and the date Baron filed his adversary proceeding, the\nbankruptcy court entered approximately 147 orders in the Ondova Bankruptcy\nCase. Trustee Sherman was acting βunder the supervision and subject to the\norder of the bankruptcy judgeββand thus entitled to absolute immunity 6βfor\nvirtually all of his tenure as trustee.\n\n\n\n\n 5 See, e.g., Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, PC v. Banks (In re McKenzie), 716 F.3d 404,\n413 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 444 (2013); Sierra v. Seeber, 966 F.2d 1444 (4th Cir.\n1992); Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC v. Swope (In re J & S Props., LLC), 545 B.R. 91,\n104 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015) (βWhen not acting pursuant to an order of court, a bankruptcy\ntrustee is generally afforded qualified immunity.β), affβd, 554 B.R. 747 (W.D. Pa. 2016), affβd,\n872 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2017).\n 6 Boullion, 639 F.2d at 213\n\n\n 3\n\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-10182\n Even when Trustee Sherman was not acting pursuant to a court order,\nhe was still entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken within the scope\nof his official duties. Seeking a receivership is sometimes a necessary step in\nadministering the estate. And we have previously weighed in on this very\nreceivership. 7 While we found that the receivership was without jurisdiction,\nwe also held that it was pursued without malice. 8 And we have already\nawarded a remedy. 9 Baron disagrees with Trustee Shermanβs decision to\npursue a receivership and alleges that Sherman made misleading statements\nduring the receivership process, but these allegationsβeven when assumed to\nbe trueβcannot transform them into ultra vires actions that remove Trustee\nShermanβs qualified immunity.\n Second, we agree with the district court that this immunity extends to\nTrustee Shermanβs attorneys under both a derivative theory of judicial\nimmunity 10 and under the separate doctrine of attorney immunity 11 for\nessentially the same reasons articulated by the district court.\n Third, we agree with the district courtβs analysis of Baronβs claims for\nbreach of fiduciary duty. Baron fails to plausibly allege facts sufficient to\nsupport a finding of gross negligence, either in his original complaint or in his\nproposed amended complaint.\n\n\n\n\n 7 Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2012).\n 8 Id. at 313 (β[W]e hold . . . that in creating the receivership βthere was no malice nor\nwrongful purpose, and only an effort to conserve property in which [the court] believedβ it was\ninterested in maintaining for unpaid attorney fees and to control Baron's vexatious litigation\ntactics.β (alteration in original) (quoting W.F. Potts Son & Co. v. Cochrane, 59 F.2d 375, 377β\n78 (5th Cir. 1932))).\n 9 Id. at 313β14.\n 10 See In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir. 1993).\n 11 See Troice v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 816 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that\n\nattorneys are entitled to immunity under Texas law from suit by non-clients, unless the\nattorneyβs conduct βd[oes] not involve the provision of legal servicesβ or is βentirely foreign to\nthe duties of any attorneyβ).\n 4\n\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-10182\n Finally, while we review de novo the denial of a motion to amend, Baron\nhas failed to raise the new causes of action contained within his proposed\namended complaint in his briefs or argue that the district court erred in finding\nthese claims unsuccessful. βIt is a well worn principle that the failure to raise\nan issue on appeal constitutes waiver of that argument.β 12 Baron has thus\nwaived the issue, and we will not disturb the district courtβs finding of futility.\n\n * * *\n We AFFIRM both the district courtβs dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and\nthe denial of leave to file an amended complaint.\n\n\n\n\n United States v. Griffith, 522 F.3d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.\n 12\n\nThibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000)).\n 5\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: ONDOVA LIMITED COMPANY, Debtor Jeffrey Baron, Appellant v. Daniel J. Sherman ; Munsch, Hardt, Kopf & Harr, P.C.; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182 United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 4, 2019\\nIn the Matter of: ONDOVA LIMITED COMPANY\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Debtor Clerk\\n\\n\\n-----------------------------------------------\\n\\nJEFFREY BARON,\\n\\n Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nDANIEL J. SHERMAN; MUNSCH, HARDT, KOPF & HARR, P.C.; LIBERTY\\nMUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n\\n Appellees\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.\\nPER CURIAM:\\n Jeffrey Baron appeals the district courtβs dismissal under Federal Rule\\nof Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of his bankruptcy βadversary proceedingβ against\\nDaniel J. Sherman, the trustee responsible for administering the bankruptcy\\n\\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182\\nestate of Ondova Limited Company. Baron also appeals the denial of his\\nmotion for leave to amend. We review both de novo. 1\\n To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts\\nto state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. 2 And while we must accept\\na plaintiff's factual allegations as true, we are not bound to accept as true βa\\nlegal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.β 3\\n The district court considered and adopted Bankruptcy Judge Jerniganβs\\nmeticulous and well-reasoned 55-page Report and Recommendation. The\\ndistrict court granted Trustee Shermanβs motion to dismiss becauseβas the\\ncourt-appointed trustee and an arm of the courtβSherman was entitled to\\nabsolute immunity for all actions taken pursuant to a court order, and entitled\\nto qualified immunity for all other acts within the scope of his trustee duties.\\nBaronβs claims against Trustee Shermanβs attorneys (the law firm Munsch\\nHardt Kopf & Harr, P.C.) also failed because the attorneys were covered by\\nboth derivative trustee immunity and independent attorney immunity.\\nBaronβs claim that Trustee Sherman breached his fiduciary duty also failed\\nbecause he did not plausibly plead gross negligence. Finally, the district court\\ndenied Baronβs motion to amend his complaint on futility grounds.\\n We agree with the district courtβs analysis of Trustee Shermanβs\\nimmunity. Trustees are entitled to absolute immunity for all actions taken\\npursuant to a court order. 4 And while this circuit does not have controlling\\nprecedent on the issue, numerous sister circuits have held that trustees have\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 While a denial of leave to amend is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion,\\nbecause the district court based its denial for leave to amend solely on futility, review is de\\nnovo. City of Clinton v. Pilgrimβs Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010) (βThe βde novo\\nstandard of review [is] identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal\\nunder Rule 12(b)(6).β).\\n 2 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).\\n 3 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).\\n 4 Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981).\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182\\nqualified immunity for personal harms caused by actions taken within the\\nscope of their official duties. 5 Only ultra vires actionsβactions that fall outside\\nthe scope of their duties as trusteesβare not entitled to immunity. There is no\\ncompelling reason to depart from our sister circuitsβ sensible approach. We\\nthus hold that bankruptcy trustees in the Fifth Circuit are entitled to qualified\\nimmunity for personal harms caused by actions that, while not pursuant to a\\ncourt order, fall within the scope of their official duties.\\n Here, Baron has not plausibly alleged any actions not covered by\\nabsolute or qualified immunity, either in his original complaint or in his\\nproposed amended complaint. His factual allegations on appeal are limited to\\nShermanβs decision to seek a receivership over him, alleged falsehoods or\\nmisrepresentations during the receivership process, and subsequent use of the\\nreceivership to liquidate assets. Howeverβas acknowledged by Bankruptcy\\nJudge Jerniganβall property seizures that Baron complains of were done\\nunder the Receivership Order and were actions taken by the receiver rather\\nthan the trustee. As Judge Jernigan also notes, between the date Sherman was\\nappointed trustee and the date Baron filed his adversary proceeding, the\\nbankruptcy court entered approximately 147 orders in the Ondova Bankruptcy\\nCase. Trustee Sherman was acting βunder the supervision and subject to the\\norder of the bankruptcy judgeββand thus entitled to absolute immunity 6βfor\\nvirtually all of his tenure as trustee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 See, e.g., Grant, Konvalinka & Harrison, PC v. Banks (In re McKenzie), 716 F.3d 404,\\n413 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 444 (2013); Sierra v. Seeber, 966 F.2d 1444 (4th Cir.\\n1992); Phoenician Mediterranean Villa, LLC v. Swope (In re J & S Props., LLC), 545 B.R. 91,\\n104 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2015) (βWhen not acting pursuant to an order of court, a bankruptcy\\ntrustee is generally afforded qualified immunity.β), affβd, 554 B.R. 747 (W.D. Pa. 2016), affβd,\\n872 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2017).\\n 6 Boullion, 639 F.2d at 213\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182\\n Even when Trustee Sherman was not acting pursuant to a court order,\\nhe was still entitled to qualified immunity for actions taken within the scope\\nof his official duties. Seeking a receivership is sometimes a necessary step in\\nadministering the estate. And we have previously weighed in on this very\\nreceivership. 7 While we found that the receivership was without jurisdiction,\\nwe also held that it was pursued without malice. 8 And we have already\\nawarded a remedy. 9 Baron disagrees with Trustee Shermanβs decision to\\npursue a receivership and alleges that Sherman made misleading statements\\nduring the receivership process, but these allegationsβeven when assumed to\\nbe trueβcannot transform them into ultra vires actions that remove Trustee\\nShermanβs qualified immunity.\\n Second, we agree with the district court that this immunity extends to\\nTrustee Shermanβs attorneys under both a derivative theory of judicial\\nimmunity 10 and under the separate doctrine of attorney immunity 11 for\\nessentially the same reasons articulated by the district court.\\n Third, we agree with the district courtβs analysis of Baronβs claims for\\nbreach of fiduciary duty. Baron fails to plausibly allege facts sufficient to\\nsupport a finding of gross negligence, either in his original complaint or in his\\nproposed amended complaint.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2012).\\n 8 Id. at 313 (β[W]e hold . . . that in creating the receivership βthere was no malice nor\\nwrongful purpose, and only an effort to conserve property in which [the court] believedβ it was\\ninterested in maintaining for unpaid attorney fees and to control Baron's vexatious litigation\\ntactics.β (alteration in original) (quoting W.F. Potts Son & Co. v. Cochrane, 59 F.2d 375, 377β\\n78 (5th Cir. 1932))).\\n 9 Id. at 313β14.\\n 10 See In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d 1236, 1241 (6th Cir. 1993).\\n 11 See Troice v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 816 F.3d 341, 349 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that\\n\\nattorneys are entitled to immunity under Texas law from suit by non-clients, unless the\\nattorneyβs conduct βd[oes] not involve the provision of legal servicesβ or is βentirely foreign to\\nthe duties of any attorneyβ).\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-10182\\n Finally, while we review de novo the denial of a motion to amend, Baron\\nhas failed to raise the new causes of action contained within his proposed\\namended complaint in his briefs or argue that the district court erred in finding\\nthese claims unsuccessful. βIt is a well worn principle that the failure to raise\\nan issue on appeal constitutes waiver of that argument.β 12 Baron has thus\\nwaived the issue, and we will not disturb the district courtβs finding of futility.\\n\\n * * *\\n We AFFIRM both the district courtβs dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and\\nthe denial of leave to file an amended complaint.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n United States v. Griffith, 522 F.3d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v.\\n 12\\n\\nThibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910, 912 (5th Cir. 2000)).\\n 5\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":583,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443865,"string":"8,443,865"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING AND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC. Planned Parenthood San Antonio Planned Parenthood Cameron County Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc Planned Parenthood South Texas Surgical Center Jane Doe 1 Jane Doe 2 Jane Doe 4 Jane Doe 7 Jane Doe 9 Jane Doe 10 Jane Doe 11 v. Charles SMITH, in His Official Capacity as Executive Commissioner of HHSC Sylvia Hernandez Kauffman, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Inspector General of HHSC"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Family Planning & Preventative Health Servs., Inc. v. Smith"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 17-50282"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415292/\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443865/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING AND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC. Planned Parenthood San Antonio Planned Parenthood Cameron County Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc Planned Parenthood South Texas Surgical Center Jane Doe 1 Jane Doe 2 Jane Doe 4 Jane Doe 7 Jane Doe 9 Jane Doe 10 Jane Doe 11 v. Charles SMITH, in His Official Capacity as Executive Commissioner of HHSC Sylvia Hernandez Kauffman, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Inspector General of HHSC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING AND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC. Planned Parenthood San Antonio Planned Parenthood Cameron County Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc Planned Parenthood South Texas Surgical Center Jane Doe 1 Jane Doe 2 Jane Doe 4 Jane Doe 7 Jane Doe 9 Jane Doe 10 Jane Doe 11 v. Charles SMITH, in His Official Capacity as Executive Commissioner of HHSC Sylvia Hernandez Kauffman, in Her Official Capacity as Acting Inspector General of HHSC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":584,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4587545,"string":"4,587,545"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-50282"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, CLEMENT, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n _____________________ FILED\\n February 4, 2019\\n No. 17-50282\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n _____________________ Clerk\\n\\n\\nPLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING\\nAND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC; PLANNED\\nPARENTHOOD SAN ANTONIO; PLANNED PARENTHOOD CAMERON\\nCOUNTY; PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC; PLANNED\\nPARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER; JANE DOE #1;\\nJANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #7;\\nJANE DOE #9; JANE DOE #10; JANE DOE #11,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nCHARLES SMITH, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner of\\nHHSC; SYLVIA HERNANDEZ KAUFFMAN, in her official capacity as\\nActing Inspector General of HHSC,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellants\\n\\n __________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Texas\\n __________________________\\n\\n (Opinion January 17, 2019, 5 Cir., 2019, ___ F.3d ___)\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, CLEMENT,\\nOWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON,\\nCOSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision.\\n\\fBY THE COURT:\\n\\n A majority of the circuit judges in regular active service and not\\ndisqualified having voted in favor, on the Courtβs own motion, to rehear this\\ncase en banc,\\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364798/\", \"author_raw\": \"Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"STEWART"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"JONES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS; CLEMENT; OWEN; ELROD; SOUTHWICK; HAYNES; GRAVES; HIGGINSON; COSTA; WILLETT; HO; DUNCAN; ENGELHARDT"},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"STEWART\": \", Chief\", \"JONES\": \", Circuit\", \"SMITH\": \", Circuit\", \"DENNIS\": \", Circuit\", \"CLEMENT\": \", Circuit\", \"OWEN\": \", Circuit\", \"ELROD\": \", Circuit\", \"SOUTHWICK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAYNES\": \", Circuit\", \"GRAVES\": \", Circuit\", \"HIGGINSON\": \", Circuit\", \"COSTA\": \", Circuit\", \"WILLETT\": \", Circuit\", \"HO\": \", Circuit\", \"DUNCAN\": \", Circuit\", \"ENGELHARDT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587545/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n _____________________ FILED\n February 4, 2019\n No. 17-50282\n Lyle W. Cayce\n _____________________ Clerk\n\n\nPLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING\nAND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC; PLANNED\nPARENTHOOD SAN ANTONIO; PLANNED PARENTHOOD CAMERON\nCOUNTY; PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC; PLANNED\nPARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER; JANE DOE #1;\nJANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #7;\nJANE DOE #9; JANE DOE #10; JANE DOE #11,\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\n\nCHARLES SMITH, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner of\nHHSC; SYLVIA HERNANDEZ KAUFFMAN, in her official capacity as\nActing Inspector General of HHSC,\n\n Defendants - Appellants\n\n __________________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Texas\n __________________________\n\n (Opinion January 17, 2019, 5 Cir., 2019, ___ F.3d ___)\n\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, CLEMENT,\nOWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON,\nCOSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 1\n\n\n\n\n 1 Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision.\n\fBY THE COURT:\n\n A majority of the circuit judges in regular active service and not\ndisqualified having voted in favor, on the Courtβs own motion, to rehear this\ncase en banc,\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n _____________________ FILED\\n February 4, 2019\\n No. 17-50282\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n _____________________ Clerk\\n\\n\\nPLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING\\nAND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC; PLANNED\\nPARENTHOOD SAN ANTONIO; PLANNED PARENTHOOD CAMERON\\nCOUNTY; PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC; PLANNED\\nPARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER; JANE DOE #1;\\nJANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #7;\\nJANE DOE #9; JANE DOE #10; JANE DOE #11,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nCHARLES SMITH, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner of\\nHHSC; SYLVIA HERNANDEZ KAUFFMAN, in her official capacity as\\nActing Inspector General of HHSC,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellants\\n\\n __________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Texas\\n __________________________\\n\\n (Opinion January 17, 2019, 5 Cir., 2019, ___ F.3d ___)\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, CLEMENT,\\nOWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON,\\nCOSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision.\\n\\fBY THE COURT:\\n\\n A majority of the circuit judges in regular active service and not\\ndisqualified having voted in favor, on the Courtβs own motion, to rehear this\\ncase en banc,\\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":585,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4587638,"string":"4,587,638"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Milo EADEN, Defendant-Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Milo Eaden"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-50379"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Jolly, Jones, Dennis\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n No. 18-50379 FILED\\n February 5, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\nv.\\n\\nMILO EADEN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore JOLLY, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.\\nE. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:\\n The question of first impression presented in this sentencing appeal\\nconcerns the effect of a defendantβs possession of ammunition alone, as opposed\\nto a firearm, during a drug trafficking offense. Milo Eaden appeals his four-\\nlevel sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) for using\\nor possessing ammunition in connection with another felony offense. Eaden\\nargues that he did not possess the ammunition βin connection withβ his felony\\ndrug trafficking activities. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the district\\ncourt clearly erred in imposing the enhancement under these facts. We\\ntherefore vacate Mr. Eadenβs sentence and remand for resentencing.\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\n I.\\n Police officers executed a search warrant of Eadenβs home after making\\na controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Eaden at his residence. During\\ntheir search, the officers found 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and 19 rounds of\\nammunition. No firearm was found on Eadenβs person or in his home. The\\nammunition was βeasily accessible and stored in close proximity toβ the\\ncocaine. These words are the only description of how the ammunition was\\nconnected to the drug transaction. The record certainly does not indicate that\\nthe ammunition was in plain sight during the controlled purchase. Eaden\\nactually claimed that he found the ammunition in the dumpster behind his\\nhouse months earlier and brought it home. Eaden had previously been\\nconvicted, in 2003, of delivering cocaine in violation of Texas law and had been\\nsentenced to ten years in Texas prison for this felony offense. As to the present\\noffense, Eaden was charged in federal court with possession of ammunition as\\na felon and he pleaded guilty to this charge. We are now only concerned with\\nhis sentence as enhanced by his possession of the ammunition.\\n The Presentence Report (PSR) assigned a base offense level of fourteen,\\nadded a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) 1 for\\nusing or possessing the ammunition in connection with another felony offense,\\nand reduced by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, bringing his total\\noffense level to fifteen. Eaden objected to the four-level enhancement, arguing\\nthat his possession of ammunition was not connected with his drug trafficking\\nbecause the ammunition did not facilitate or have the potential to facilitate the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) reads in relevant part: βIf the defendant . . . used or\\npossessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; . . . increase\\nby 4 levels.β\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\ndrug trafficking offense nor was the possession of the ammunition and drug\\ntrafficking part of a common scheme or plan.\\n Noting the lack of Fifth Circuit precedent on this point, the PSR rejected\\nEadenβs objections by relying on the text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), the provisionβs\\napplication note, and the Sixth Circuitβs opinion in United States v. Coleman,\\n627 F.3d 205 (6th Cir. 2010). Following Coleman, the PSR extended the Sixth\\nCircuitβs βfortress theoryββwhich traditionally applies only to firearmsβto\\nsituations where only ammunition is present. Thus, the PSR found that,\\nbecause the ammunition βpotentially emboldened Eaden in the knowledge that\\nhe was one step closer to having a fully-loaded firearm to protect himself and\\nhis illegal drugs, and the ammunition potentially served as notice to potential\\nbuyers that he was one step closer to having a fully-loaded firearm,β the\\npossession alone was connected with the drug trafficking offense.\\n The PSR maintained its recommended final offense level of fifteen which,\\ncoupled with Eadenβs criminal history category of II, resulted in an advisory\\nguidelines range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months of imprisonment. Had\\nthe PSR sustained Eadenβs objection to the four-level enhancement, his total\\noffense level would have been eleven, carrying a guidelines range of ten to\\nsixteen months.\\n At his sentencing hearing, Eaden objected to the PSRβs imposition of the\\nfour-level enhancement for substantially the same reasonsβpossessing\\nammunition alone does not facilitate drug trafficking absent possession of a\\nfirearm. The government responded by resting on the PSRβs reasoning and\\nhad βno additional information it can provide.β The district court overruled\\nEadenβs objection because it found that his possession of the ammunition was\\nβpart of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the\\ndefendantβs possession of the ammunition facilitated or had the potential to\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\nfacilitate his drug trafficking crime offense.β Eaden now appeals the district\\ncourtβs application of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement.\\n II.\\n On appeal, Eaden argues that the district court erred in holding that his\\npossession of ammunition was βin connection withβ his drug trafficking\\nactivities. Although the application notes to the Guidelines provide for a\\npresumption of facilitation when a firearm is possessed in close proximity to a\\ndrug trafficking offense, Eaden contends that the presumption should not\\napply here because his possession of ammunition alone does not have the\\npotential to facilitate trafficking activities. The government argues that we\\nshould adopt the Sixth Circuitβs conclusion in Coleman and effectively hold\\nthat the possession of ammunition alone creates a presumption that it\\nfacilitates or potentially facilitates felony drug trafficking. The government\\nargues that the ammunition brought Eaden βone step closer to possessing a\\nfully-loaded firearm.β The government also argues that the ammunition\\nfacilitated the drug trafficking by serving to intimidate potential threats to his\\ntrafficking operation. Both parties acknowledge that we are presented with a\\nquestion of first impression in this circuit.\\n III.\\n This court reviews a district courtβs interpretation or application of the\\nguidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v.\\nCisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). The district courtβs\\ndetermination of the relationship between ammunition and another offense is\\nmost usually a factual finding. See United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699,\\n708 (5th Cir. 2010). βA factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing\\ncourt on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a\\nmistake has been committed.β Id.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\n This appeal presents three questions that we must address. First,\\nwhether possession of ammunition alone can facilitate drug trafficking for\\npurposes of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), a question of first impression in this\\ncircuit. Second, whether there is a presumption that the possession of\\nammunition alone facilitates a drug trafficking offense for purposes of U.S.S.G.\\nΒ§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), again, a question of first impression in this circuit. Third, in\\nthe light of our answer to the first two questions, whether the four-level\\nenhancement was properly applied to Eaden.\\n A.\\n We first determine if U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement\\ncan be applied to a defendant who possessed only ammunition. Section\\n2k2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level enhancement if the defendant βused or\\npossessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony\\noffense.β Application Note 14(A) provides that the term βin connection withβ\\nmandates that βthe firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of\\nfacilitating, another felony offense.β\\n We hold that possession of ammunition alone, under appropriate\\ncircumstances not present in this case, certainly may be sufficient for the four-\\nlevel enhancement. By using the disjunctive βor,β the guidelines plainly read\\nto allow for the enhancement when the defendant possesses a loaded gun, an\\nunloaded gun, or ammunition alone. That much is clear: ammunition alone\\ncan facilitate a drug offense. The more nuanced question will be under what\\ncircumstances and, absent a presumption, this question necessarily must be\\ndecided on a case by case basis.\\n B.\\n We now turn to the second question of first impression for this court:\\nwhether, as is true with a firearm, there is a presumption of facilitation when\\nammunition alone is present at the time of the drug trafficking offense; or\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\nwhether the district court must make an affirmative finding that Eadenβs\\nammunition facilitated his drug trafficking offense. 2\\n In the context of drug offenses, facilitation can be presumed when (1) a\\nfirearm was possessed (2) in close proximity to contraband during a drug\\ntrafficking offense. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 358 (5th\\nCir. 2009) (βWhen a loaded firearm is found in close physical proximity to\\nnarcotics, readily available to the defendant, a connection will usually be\\nfound.β). However, this presumption is only available when both conditions\\nare presentβa firearm and a trafficking offense. This common sense rule is\\nsupported by the text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), its Application Note, and our holding\\nin United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2009).\\n The text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) states that the enhancement applies when\\nthe defendant (1) βused or possessed any firearm or ammunitionβ (2) βin\\nconnection with another felony offense.β As noted above, Application Note\\n14(A) clarifies that βin connection withβ means βfacilitated, or had the potential\\nof facilitating.β Therefore, for the enhancement to apply, the government must\\nshow evidence of both (1) possession of a firearm or ammunition and (2) that\\nthe firearm or ammunition facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the\\nother offense. Application Note 14(B) instructs us, however, that βin the case\\nof a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to\\ndrugs . . . application of subsection[] (b)(6)(B) is warranted because the\\npresence of a firearm has the potential of facilitating another felony offense.β\\nApplication Note 14(B)βaddressed specifically to the drug trafficking\\n\\n\\n 2 In this circuit, there is a presumption of facilitation when the defendant possesses a\\nfirearm during a drug trafficking offense and no presumption of facilitation when the\\ndefendant possesses a firearm along with only user amounts of narcotics. See United States\\nv. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 692β93 (5th Cir. 2009). Here we address a third situationβwhen\\nthe defendant possesses ammunition and no gun during a drug trafficking offenseβand hold\\nthat there is no presumption.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\ncontextβstates only that βthe presence of the firearmβ inherently βhas the\\npotential of facilitatingβ and makes no reference to ammunition. 3 We see no\\nreason in the text of the Guideline, or its explanatory notes, to expand this\\npresumption beyond possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense.\\n The correctness of this holding is illustrated by our reasoning in Jeffries.\\nThere we considered whether the enhancement presumptively applied to a\\ndefendant who possessed a firearm during a drug possession offense. We noted\\nthat Application Note 14(B) instructs courts to apply the enhancement\\nβautomaticallyβ when a βfirearm is found in close proximity to drugsβ during a\\ntrafficking offense but when drug trafficking is not present, βno presumption\\nis made.β 587 F.3d at 692β93. Therefore, the Jeffries court declined to extend\\nApplication Note 14(B)βs presumption of facilitation to a nontrafficking offense.\\nSee id. at 694 (β[T]he nexus cannot simply be presumed, as appears to have\\nbeen the case here.β). Here, similarly, we see no rationale to extend the\\npresumption of facilitation to situations in which there is a drug transaction\\nbut no firearmβonly ammunition. The text of Application Note 14(B) is\\nlimitedβit only applies when both trafficking and a firearm are present.\\nEaden did not possess a firearm during his drug trafficking offense and, as in\\nJeffries, we see no reason to judicially expand the scope of Application Note\\n14(B)βs presumption of facilitation.\\n C.\\n Thus far we have held, first, that the possession of ammunition alone\\nmay be connected with a drug trafficking offense, qualifying a defendant for\\nthe four-level sentencing enhancement; and second, that there is no\\n\\n\\n 3 The omission of the term βammunitionβ is particularly important considering that\\nApplication Note 14(A)βdirectly preceding Note 14(B) and containing no presumptionβuses\\nthe term βfirearm or ammunition,β indicating that the drafters purposefully excluded\\nammunition from Note 14(B)βs presumption of facilitation.\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\npresumption of facilitation regarding the possession of only ammunition. Now\\nwe apply these principles to this case.\\n Stripped of a presumption of facilitation, the government must present\\nfacts or circumstances demonstrating that the possession of ammunition\\nfacilitated or had the potential to facilitate the other offense. 4 See Jeffries, 587\\nF.3d at 692, 694β95 & n.9 (the βspecific facts of th[e] caseβ must demonstrate\\nthat the firearm or ammunition in question βemboldenedβ the offense or served\\nto βprotectβ contraband to satisfy the βcritical stepβ of establishing a βnexus\\nbetween the firearm possession and the drug possessionβ). 5 Ammunition has\\nthe potential to facilitate a trafficking operation when it is displayed or\\nbrandished in a manner that has the potential to embolden the trafficker and\\nprotect his operation by implying that he has a gun, thereby deterring buyers,\\nco-conspirators, or competitors from taking adverse action.\\n For ammunition to have such a deterrent effect to potential threats, it\\nwould, inter alia, be necessary that it be in plain sight to purchasers or others\\n\\n\\n 4 Indeed, in its brief, the government purports to agree in principle, saying:\\n When the defendant possesses a firearm in close proximity to drugs,\\n there is a presumption that the firearm has the potential to facilitate\\n his drug trafficking offense. USSG Β§ 2K2.1 (n.14(B)). This presumption\\n likely does not apply when the defendant possesses only ammunition,\\n in which case the district court must make an affirmative finding that\\n the ammunition facilitated the drug trafficking offense. See United\\n States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2009).\\n 5 Despite conceding that there is no presumption of facilitation for ammunition alone,\\nthe government spends much of its brief arguing that this court should adopt the Sixth\\nCircuitβs rationale in United States v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205 (6th Cir. 2010). There, the court\\nheld that possession of ammunition alone facilitated a drug trafficking offense because the\\nammunition βemboldenedβ the defendant βin the knowledge that he was one step closer to\\nhaving a fully-loaded firearm to protect himself and his illegal drugs.β Id. at 212. This\\nrationale establishes the functional equivalent of the presumption we have rejected above\\nand we respectfully decline to import it into this circuitβs jurisprudence. See id. at 216\\n(Gillman, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (βMany things could in theory put a\\nperson βone step closerβ to having a firearm, such as applying for a firearms permit, having a\\nholster, possessing a laser scope, or earning money to be able to purchase a weapon.β).\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\ninvolved in the trafficking. Turning to the facts of the present case, the PSR\\nindicates that its only item of evidence to show facilitation is that the\\nammunition was βeasily accessible and stored in close proximity to the illegal\\ndrugs.β The record does not demonstrate that the ammunition was kept in\\nplain sight, either during the controlled purchase or at any other time. In\\nshort, the government has pointed to no facts or circumstances that indicate\\nthat Eaden possessed the ammunition βin connection withβ his drug trafficking\\noffense.\\n IV.\\n To sum up: we have held that possession of ammunition alone may,\\nunder appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to show facilitation for purposes\\nof Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement. But we have further held that\\npossession of ammunition alone does not enjoy a presumption that it was\\nconnected with a drug trafficking offense. In this context, to demonstrate\\nfacilitation, the government must adduce facts tending to show that the\\nammunition facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the drug trafficking\\noffense. We have respectfully declined to adopt the Sixth Circuitβs path to\\nshowing facilitation set out in Coleman for the reasons stated above. Because\\nwe find that the record here shows that the government produced no facts\\ntending to show that Eadenβs mere possession of ammunition alone was\\nconnected with his drug trafficking activities, the application of\\nΒ§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement was clear error. Accordingly, we\\nVACATE the district courtβs sentence and REMAND for resentencing not\\ninconsistent with this opinion.\\n VACATED AND REMANDED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364891/\", \"author_raw\": \"E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JOLLY"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"JONES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587638/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Milo EADEN, Defendant-Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n No. 18-50379 FILED\n February 5, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\nv.\n\nMILO EADEN,\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Texas\n\n\nBefore JOLLY, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.\nE. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:\n The question of first impression presented in this sentencing appeal\nconcerns the effect of a defendantβs possession of ammunition alone, as opposed\nto a firearm, during a drug trafficking offense. Milo Eaden appeals his four-\nlevel sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) for using\nor possessing ammunition in connection with another felony offense. Eaden\nargues that he did not possess the ammunition βin connection withβ his felony\ndrug trafficking activities. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the district\ncourt clearly erred in imposing the enhancement under these facts. We\ntherefore vacate Mr. Eadenβs sentence and remand for resentencing.\n\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-50379\n I.\n Police officers executed a search warrant of Eadenβs home after making\na controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Eaden at his residence. During\ntheir search, the officers found 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and 19 rounds of\nammunition. No firearm was found on Eadenβs person or in his home. The\nammunition was βeasily accessible and stored in close proximity toβ the\ncocaine. These words are the only description of how the ammunition was\nconnected to the drug transaction. The record certainly does not indicate that\nthe ammunition was in plain sight during the controlled purchase. Eaden\nactually claimed that he found the ammunition in the dumpster behind his\nhouse months earlier and brought it home. Eaden had previously been\nconvicted, in 2003, of delivering cocaine in violation of Texas law and had been\nsentenced to ten years in Texas prison for this felony offense. As to the present\noffense, Eaden was charged in federal court with possession of ammunition as\na felon and he pleaded guilty to this charge. We are now only concerned with\nhis sentence as enhanced by his possession of the ammunition.\n The Presentence Report (PSR) assigned a base offense level of fourteen,\nadded a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) 1 for\nusing or possessing the ammunition in connection with another felony offense,\nand reduced by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, bringing his total\noffense level to fifteen. Eaden objected to the four-level enhancement, arguing\nthat his possession of ammunition was not connected with his drug trafficking\nbecause the ammunition did not facilitate or have the potential to facilitate the\n\n\n\n\n 1 U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) reads in relevant part: βIf the defendant . . . used or\npossessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; . . . increase\nby 4 levels.β\n\n 2\n\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-50379\ndrug trafficking offense nor was the possession of the ammunition and drug\ntrafficking part of a common scheme or plan.\n Noting the lack of Fifth Circuit precedent on this point, the PSR rejected\nEadenβs objections by relying on the text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), the provisionβs\napplication note, and the Sixth Circuitβs opinion in United States v. Coleman,\n627 F.3d 205 (6th Cir. 2010). Following Coleman, the PSR extended the Sixth\nCircuitβs βfortress theoryββwhich traditionally applies only to firearmsβto\nsituations where only ammunition is present. Thus, the PSR found that,\nbecause the ammunition βpotentially emboldened Eaden in the knowledge that\nhe was one step closer to having a fully-loaded firearm to protect himself and\nhis illegal drugs, and the ammunition potentially served as notice to potential\nbuyers that he was one step closer to having a fully-loaded firearm,β the\npossession alone was connected with the drug trafficking offense.\n The PSR maintained its recommended final offense level of fifteen which,\ncoupled with Eadenβs criminal history category of II, resulted in an advisory\nguidelines range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months of imprisonment. Had\nthe PSR sustained Eadenβs objection to the four-level enhancement, his total\noffense level would have been eleven, carrying a guidelines range of ten to\nsixteen months.\n At his sentencing hearing, Eaden objected to the PSRβs imposition of the\nfour-level enhancement for substantially the same reasonsβpossessing\nammunition alone does not facilitate drug trafficking absent possession of a\nfirearm. The government responded by resting on the PSRβs reasoning and\nhad βno additional information it can provide.β The district court overruled\nEadenβs objection because it found that his possession of the ammunition was\nβpart of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the\ndefendantβs possession of the ammunition facilitated or had the potential to\n\n\n 3\n\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-50379\nfacilitate his drug trafficking crime offense.β Eaden now appeals the district\ncourtβs application of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement.\n II.\n On appeal, Eaden argues that the district court erred in holding that his\npossession of ammunition was βin connection withβ his drug trafficking\nactivities. Although the application notes to the Guidelines provide for a\npresumption of facilitation when a firearm is possessed in close proximity to a\ndrug trafficking offense, Eaden contends that the presumption should not\napply here because his possession of ammunition alone does not have the\npotential to facilitate trafficking activities. The government argues that we\nshould adopt the Sixth Circuitβs conclusion in Coleman and effectively hold\nthat the possession of ammunition alone creates a presumption that it\nfacilitates or potentially facilitates felony drug trafficking. The government\nargues that the ammunition brought Eaden βone step closer to possessing a\nfully-loaded firearm.β The government also argues that the ammunition\nfacilitated the drug trafficking by serving to intimidate potential threats to his\ntrafficking operation. Both parties acknowledge that we are presented with a\nquestion of first impression in this circuit.\n III.\n This court reviews a district courtβs interpretation or application of the\nguidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v.\nCisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). The district courtβs\ndetermination of the relationship between ammunition and another offense is\nmost usually a factual finding. See United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699,\n708 (5th Cir. 2010). βA factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing\ncourt on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a\nmistake has been committed.β Id.\n\n\n 4\n\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-50379\n This appeal presents three questions that we must address. First,\nwhether possession of ammunition alone can facilitate drug trafficking for\npurposes of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), a question of first impression in this\ncircuit. Second, whether there is a presumption that the possession of\nammunition alone facilitates a drug trafficking offense for purposes of U.S.S.G.\nΒ§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), again, a question of first impression in this circuit. Third, in\nthe light of our answer to the first two questions, whether the four-level\nenhancement was properly applied to Eaden.\n A.\n We first determine if U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement\ncan be applied to a defendant who possessed only ammunition. Section\n2k2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level enhancement if the defendant βused or\npossessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony\noffense.β Application Note 14(A) provides that the term βin connection withβ\nmandates that βthe firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of\nfacilitating, another felony offense.β\n We hold that possession of ammunition alone, under appropriate\ncircumstances not present in this case, certainly may be sufficient for the four-\nlevel enhancement. By using the disjunctive βor,β the guidelines plainly read\nto allow for the enhancement when the defendant possesses a loaded gun, an\nunloaded gun, or ammunition alone. That much is clear: ammunition alone\ncan facilitate a drug offense. The more nuanced question will be under what\ncircumstances and, absent a presumption, this question necessarily must be\ndecided on a case by case basis.\n B.\n We now turn to the second question of first impression for this court:\nwhether, as is true with a firearm, there is a presumption of facilitation when\nammunition alone is present at the time of the drug trafficking offense; or\n 5\n\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-50379\nwhether the district court must make an affirmative finding that Eadenβs\nammunition facilitated his drug trafficking offense. 2\n In the context of drug offenses, facilitation can be presumed when (1) a\nfirearm was possessed (2) in close proximity to contraband during a drug\ntrafficking offense. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 358 (5th\nCir. 2009) (βWhen a loaded firearm is found in close physical proximity to\nnarcotics, readily available to the defendant, a connection will usually be\nfound.β). However, this presumption is only available when both conditions\nare presentβa firearm and a trafficking offense. This common sense rule is\nsupported by the text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), its Application Note, and our holding\nin United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2009).\n The text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) states that the enhancement applies when\nthe defendant (1) βused or possessed any firearm or ammunitionβ (2) βin\nconnection with another felony offense.β As noted above, Application Note\n14(A) clarifies that βin connection withβ means βfacilitated, or had the potential\nof facilitating.β Therefore, for the enhancement to apply, the government must\nshow evidence of both (1) possession of a firearm or ammunition and (2) that\nthe firearm or ammunition facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the\nother offense. Application Note 14(B) instructs us, however, that βin the case\nof a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to\ndrugs . . . application of subsection[] (b)(6)(B) is warranted because the\npresence of a firearm has the potential of facilitating another felony offense.β\nApplication Note 14(B)βaddressed specifically to the drug trafficking\n\n\n 2 In this circuit, there is a presumption of facilitation when the defendant possesses a\nfirearm during a drug trafficking offense and no presumption of facilitation when the\ndefendant possesses a firearm along with only user amounts of narcotics. See United States\nv. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 692β93 (5th Cir. 2009). Here we address a third situationβwhen\nthe defendant possesses ammunition and no gun during a drug trafficking offenseβand hold\nthat there is no presumption.\n\n 6\n\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-50379\ncontextβstates only that βthe presence of the firearmβ inherently βhas the\npotential of facilitatingβ and makes no reference to ammunition. 3 We see no\nreason in the text of the Guideline, or its explanatory notes, to expand this\npresumption beyond possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense.\n The correctness of this holding is illustrated by our reasoning in Jeffries.\nThere we considered whether the enhancement presumptively applied to a\ndefendant who possessed a firearm during a drug possession offense. We noted\nthat Application Note 14(B) instructs courts to apply the enhancement\nβautomaticallyβ when a βfirearm is found in close proximity to drugsβ during a\ntrafficking offense but when drug trafficking is not present, βno presumption\nis made.β 587 F.3d at 692β93. Therefore, the Jeffries court declined to extend\nApplication Note 14(B)βs presumption of facilitation to a nontrafficking offense.\nSee id. at 694 (β[T]he nexus cannot simply be presumed, as appears to have\nbeen the case here.β). Here, similarly, we see no rationale to extend the\npresumption of facilitation to situations in which there is a drug transaction\nbut no firearmβonly ammunition. The text of Application Note 14(B) is\nlimitedβit only applies when both trafficking and a firearm are present.\nEaden did not possess a firearm during his drug trafficking offense and, as in\nJeffries, we see no reason to judicially expand the scope of Application Note\n14(B)βs presumption of facilitation.\n C.\n Thus far we have held, first, that the possession of ammunition alone\nmay be connected with a drug trafficking offense, qualifying a defendant for\nthe four-level sentencing enhancement; and second, that there is no\n\n\n 3 The omission of the term βammunitionβ is particularly important considering that\nApplication Note 14(A)βdirectly preceding Note 14(B) and containing no presumptionβuses\nthe term βfirearm or ammunition,β indicating that the drafters purposefully excluded\nammunition from Note 14(B)βs presumption of facilitation.\n\n 7\n\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-50379\npresumption of facilitation regarding the possession of only ammunition. Now\nwe apply these principles to this case.\n Stripped of a presumption of facilitation, the government must present\nfacts or circumstances demonstrating that the possession of ammunition\nfacilitated or had the potential to facilitate the other offense. 4 See Jeffries, 587\nF.3d at 692, 694β95 & n.9 (the βspecific facts of th[e] caseβ must demonstrate\nthat the firearm or ammunition in question βemboldenedβ the offense or served\nto βprotectβ contraband to satisfy the βcritical stepβ of establishing a βnexus\nbetween the firearm possession and the drug possessionβ). 5 Ammunition has\nthe potential to facilitate a trafficking operation when it is displayed or\nbrandished in a manner that has the potential to embolden the trafficker and\nprotect his operation by implying that he has a gun, thereby deterring buyers,\nco-conspirators, or competitors from taking adverse action.\n For ammunition to have such a deterrent effect to potential threats, it\nwould, inter alia, be necessary that it be in plain sight to purchasers or others\n\n\n 4 Indeed, in its brief, the government purports to agree in principle, saying:\n When the defendant possesses a firearm in close proximity to drugs,\n there is a presumption that the firearm has the potential to facilitate\n his drug trafficking offense. USSG Β§ 2K2.1 (n.14(B)). This presumption\n likely does not apply when the defendant possesses only ammunition,\n in which case the district court must make an affirmative finding that\n the ammunition facilitated the drug trafficking offense. See United\n States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2009).\n 5 Despite conceding that there is no presumption of facilitation for ammunition alone,\nthe government spends much of its brief arguing that this court should adopt the Sixth\nCircuitβs rationale in United States v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205 (6th Cir. 2010). There, the court\nheld that possession of ammunition alone facilitated a drug trafficking offense because the\nammunition βemboldenedβ the defendant βin the knowledge that he was one step closer to\nhaving a fully-loaded firearm to protect himself and his illegal drugs.β Id. at 212. This\nrationale establishes the functional equivalent of the presumption we have rejected above\nand we respectfully decline to import it into this circuitβs jurisprudence. See id. at 216\n(Gillman, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (βMany things could in theory put a\nperson βone step closerβ to having a firearm, such as applying for a firearms permit, having a\nholster, possessing a laser scope, or earning money to be able to purchase a weapon.β).\n\n 8\n\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-50379\ninvolved in the trafficking. Turning to the facts of the present case, the PSR\nindicates that its only item of evidence to show facilitation is that the\nammunition was βeasily accessible and stored in close proximity to the illegal\ndrugs.β The record does not demonstrate that the ammunition was kept in\nplain sight, either during the controlled purchase or at any other time. In\nshort, the government has pointed to no facts or circumstances that indicate\nthat Eaden possessed the ammunition βin connection withβ his drug trafficking\noffense.\n IV.\n To sum up: we have held that possession of ammunition alone may,\nunder appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to show facilitation for purposes\nof Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement. But we have further held that\npossession of ammunition alone does not enjoy a presumption that it was\nconnected with a drug trafficking offense. In this context, to demonstrate\nfacilitation, the government must adduce facts tending to show that the\nammunition facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the drug trafficking\noffense. We have respectfully declined to adopt the Sixth Circuitβs path to\nshowing facilitation set out in Coleman for the reasons stated above. Because\nwe find that the record here shows that the government produced no facts\ntending to show that Eadenβs mere possession of ammunition alone was\nconnected with his drug trafficking activities, the application of\nΒ§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement was clear error. Accordingly, we\nVACATE the district courtβs sentence and REMAND for resentencing not\ninconsistent with this opinion.\n VACATED AND REMANDED.\n\n\n\n\n 9\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Milo EADEN, Defendant-Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n No. 18-50379 FILED\\n February 5, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\nv.\\n\\nMILO EADEN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore JOLLY, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.\\nE. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:\\n The question of first impression presented in this sentencing appeal\\nconcerns the effect of a defendantβs possession of ammunition alone, as opposed\\nto a firearm, during a drug trafficking offense. Milo Eaden appeals his four-\\nlevel sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) for using\\nor possessing ammunition in connection with another felony offense. Eaden\\nargues that he did not possess the ammunition βin connection withβ his felony\\ndrug trafficking activities. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the district\\ncourt clearly erred in imposing the enhancement under these facts. We\\ntherefore vacate Mr. Eadenβs sentence and remand for resentencing.\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\n I.\\n Police officers executed a search warrant of Eadenβs home after making\\na controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Eaden at his residence. During\\ntheir search, the officers found 5.5 grams of crack cocaine and 19 rounds of\\nammunition. No firearm was found on Eadenβs person or in his home. The\\nammunition was βeasily accessible and stored in close proximity toβ the\\ncocaine. These words are the only description of how the ammunition was\\nconnected to the drug transaction. The record certainly does not indicate that\\nthe ammunition was in plain sight during the controlled purchase. Eaden\\nactually claimed that he found the ammunition in the dumpster behind his\\nhouse months earlier and brought it home. Eaden had previously been\\nconvicted, in 2003, of delivering cocaine in violation of Texas law and had been\\nsentenced to ten years in Texas prison for this felony offense. As to the present\\noffense, Eaden was charged in federal court with possession of ammunition as\\na felon and he pleaded guilty to this charge. We are now only concerned with\\nhis sentence as enhanced by his possession of the ammunition.\\n The Presentence Report (PSR) assigned a base offense level of fourteen,\\nadded a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) 1 for\\nusing or possessing the ammunition in connection with another felony offense,\\nand reduced by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, bringing his total\\noffense level to fifteen. Eaden objected to the four-level enhancement, arguing\\nthat his possession of ammunition was not connected with his drug trafficking\\nbecause the ammunition did not facilitate or have the potential to facilitate the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) reads in relevant part: βIf the defendant . . . used or\\npossessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; . . . increase\\nby 4 levels.β\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\ndrug trafficking offense nor was the possession of the ammunition and drug\\ntrafficking part of a common scheme or plan.\\n Noting the lack of Fifth Circuit precedent on this point, the PSR rejected\\nEadenβs objections by relying on the text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), the provisionβs\\napplication note, and the Sixth Circuitβs opinion in United States v. Coleman,\\n627 F.3d 205 (6th Cir. 2010). Following Coleman, the PSR extended the Sixth\\nCircuitβs βfortress theoryββwhich traditionally applies only to firearmsβto\\nsituations where only ammunition is present. Thus, the PSR found that,\\nbecause the ammunition βpotentially emboldened Eaden in the knowledge that\\nhe was one step closer to having a fully-loaded firearm to protect himself and\\nhis illegal drugs, and the ammunition potentially served as notice to potential\\nbuyers that he was one step closer to having a fully-loaded firearm,β the\\npossession alone was connected with the drug trafficking offense.\\n The PSR maintained its recommended final offense level of fifteen which,\\ncoupled with Eadenβs criminal history category of II, resulted in an advisory\\nguidelines range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months of imprisonment. Had\\nthe PSR sustained Eadenβs objection to the four-level enhancement, his total\\noffense level would have been eleven, carrying a guidelines range of ten to\\nsixteen months.\\n At his sentencing hearing, Eaden objected to the PSRβs imposition of the\\nfour-level enhancement for substantially the same reasonsβpossessing\\nammunition alone does not facilitate drug trafficking absent possession of a\\nfirearm. The government responded by resting on the PSRβs reasoning and\\nhad βno additional information it can provide.β The district court overruled\\nEadenβs objection because it found that his possession of the ammunition was\\nβpart of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the\\ndefendantβs possession of the ammunition facilitated or had the potential to\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\nfacilitate his drug trafficking crime offense.β Eaden now appeals the district\\ncourtβs application of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement.\\n II.\\n On appeal, Eaden argues that the district court erred in holding that his\\npossession of ammunition was βin connection withβ his drug trafficking\\nactivities. Although the application notes to the Guidelines provide for a\\npresumption of facilitation when a firearm is possessed in close proximity to a\\ndrug trafficking offense, Eaden contends that the presumption should not\\napply here because his possession of ammunition alone does not have the\\npotential to facilitate trafficking activities. The government argues that we\\nshould adopt the Sixth Circuitβs conclusion in Coleman and effectively hold\\nthat the possession of ammunition alone creates a presumption that it\\nfacilitates or potentially facilitates felony drug trafficking. The government\\nargues that the ammunition brought Eaden βone step closer to possessing a\\nfully-loaded firearm.β The government also argues that the ammunition\\nfacilitated the drug trafficking by serving to intimidate potential threats to his\\ntrafficking operation. Both parties acknowledge that we are presented with a\\nquestion of first impression in this circuit.\\n III.\\n This court reviews a district courtβs interpretation or application of the\\nguidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v.\\nCisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008). The district courtβs\\ndetermination of the relationship between ammunition and another offense is\\nmost usually a factual finding. See United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699,\\n708 (5th Cir. 2010). βA factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing\\ncourt on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a\\nmistake has been committed.β Id.\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\n This appeal presents three questions that we must address. First,\\nwhether possession of ammunition alone can facilitate drug trafficking for\\npurposes of U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), a question of first impression in this\\ncircuit. Second, whether there is a presumption that the possession of\\nammunition alone facilitates a drug trafficking offense for purposes of U.S.S.G.\\nΒ§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), again, a question of first impression in this circuit. Third, in\\nthe light of our answer to the first two questions, whether the four-level\\nenhancement was properly applied to Eaden.\\n A.\\n We first determine if U.S.S.G. Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement\\ncan be applied to a defendant who possessed only ammunition. Section\\n2k2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level enhancement if the defendant βused or\\npossessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony\\noffense.β Application Note 14(A) provides that the term βin connection withβ\\nmandates that βthe firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of\\nfacilitating, another felony offense.β\\n We hold that possession of ammunition alone, under appropriate\\ncircumstances not present in this case, certainly may be sufficient for the four-\\nlevel enhancement. By using the disjunctive βor,β the guidelines plainly read\\nto allow for the enhancement when the defendant possesses a loaded gun, an\\nunloaded gun, or ammunition alone. That much is clear: ammunition alone\\ncan facilitate a drug offense. The more nuanced question will be under what\\ncircumstances and, absent a presumption, this question necessarily must be\\ndecided on a case by case basis.\\n B.\\n We now turn to the second question of first impression for this court:\\nwhether, as is true with a firearm, there is a presumption of facilitation when\\nammunition alone is present at the time of the drug trafficking offense; or\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\nwhether the district court must make an affirmative finding that Eadenβs\\nammunition facilitated his drug trafficking offense. 2\\n In the context of drug offenses, facilitation can be presumed when (1) a\\nfirearm was possessed (2) in close proximity to contraband during a drug\\ntrafficking offense. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 358 (5th\\nCir. 2009) (βWhen a loaded firearm is found in close physical proximity to\\nnarcotics, readily available to the defendant, a connection will usually be\\nfound.β). However, this presumption is only available when both conditions\\nare presentβa firearm and a trafficking offense. This common sense rule is\\nsupported by the text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B), its Application Note, and our holding\\nin United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 2009).\\n The text of Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B) states that the enhancement applies when\\nthe defendant (1) βused or possessed any firearm or ammunitionβ (2) βin\\nconnection with another felony offense.β As noted above, Application Note\\n14(A) clarifies that βin connection withβ means βfacilitated, or had the potential\\nof facilitating.β Therefore, for the enhancement to apply, the government must\\nshow evidence of both (1) possession of a firearm or ammunition and (2) that\\nthe firearm or ammunition facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the\\nother offense. Application Note 14(B) instructs us, however, that βin the case\\nof a drug trafficking offense in which a firearm is found in close proximity to\\ndrugs . . . application of subsection[] (b)(6)(B) is warranted because the\\npresence of a firearm has the potential of facilitating another felony offense.β\\nApplication Note 14(B)βaddressed specifically to the drug trafficking\\n\\n\\n 2 In this circuit, there is a presumption of facilitation when the defendant possesses a\\nfirearm during a drug trafficking offense and no presumption of facilitation when the\\ndefendant possesses a firearm along with only user amounts of narcotics. See United States\\nv. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 692β93 (5th Cir. 2009). Here we address a third situationβwhen\\nthe defendant possesses ammunition and no gun during a drug trafficking offenseβand hold\\nthat there is no presumption.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\ncontextβstates only that βthe presence of the firearmβ inherently βhas the\\npotential of facilitatingβ and makes no reference to ammunition. 3 We see no\\nreason in the text of the Guideline, or its explanatory notes, to expand this\\npresumption beyond possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense.\\n The correctness of this holding is illustrated by our reasoning in Jeffries.\\nThere we considered whether the enhancement presumptively applied to a\\ndefendant who possessed a firearm during a drug possession offense. We noted\\nthat Application Note 14(B) instructs courts to apply the enhancement\\nβautomaticallyβ when a βfirearm is found in close proximity to drugsβ during a\\ntrafficking offense but when drug trafficking is not present, βno presumption\\nis made.β 587 F.3d at 692β93. Therefore, the Jeffries court declined to extend\\nApplication Note 14(B)βs presumption of facilitation to a nontrafficking offense.\\nSee id. at 694 (β[T]he nexus cannot simply be presumed, as appears to have\\nbeen the case here.β). Here, similarly, we see no rationale to extend the\\npresumption of facilitation to situations in which there is a drug transaction\\nbut no firearmβonly ammunition. The text of Application Note 14(B) is\\nlimitedβit only applies when both trafficking and a firearm are present.\\nEaden did not possess a firearm during his drug trafficking offense and, as in\\nJeffries, we see no reason to judicially expand the scope of Application Note\\n14(B)βs presumption of facilitation.\\n C.\\n Thus far we have held, first, that the possession of ammunition alone\\nmay be connected with a drug trafficking offense, qualifying a defendant for\\nthe four-level sentencing enhancement; and second, that there is no\\n\\n\\n 3 The omission of the term βammunitionβ is particularly important considering that\\nApplication Note 14(A)βdirectly preceding Note 14(B) and containing no presumptionβuses\\nthe term βfirearm or ammunition,β indicating that the drafters purposefully excluded\\nammunition from Note 14(B)βs presumption of facilitation.\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\npresumption of facilitation regarding the possession of only ammunition. Now\\nwe apply these principles to this case.\\n Stripped of a presumption of facilitation, the government must present\\nfacts or circumstances demonstrating that the possession of ammunition\\nfacilitated or had the potential to facilitate the other offense. 4 See Jeffries, 587\\nF.3d at 692, 694β95 & n.9 (the βspecific facts of th[e] caseβ must demonstrate\\nthat the firearm or ammunition in question βemboldenedβ the offense or served\\nto βprotectβ contraband to satisfy the βcritical stepβ of establishing a βnexus\\nbetween the firearm possession and the drug possessionβ). 5 Ammunition has\\nthe potential to facilitate a trafficking operation when it is displayed or\\nbrandished in a manner that has the potential to embolden the trafficker and\\nprotect his operation by implying that he has a gun, thereby deterring buyers,\\nco-conspirators, or competitors from taking adverse action.\\n For ammunition to have such a deterrent effect to potential threats, it\\nwould, inter alia, be necessary that it be in plain sight to purchasers or others\\n\\n\\n 4 Indeed, in its brief, the government purports to agree in principle, saying:\\n When the defendant possesses a firearm in close proximity to drugs,\\n there is a presumption that the firearm has the potential to facilitate\\n his drug trafficking offense. USSG Β§ 2K2.1 (n.14(B)). This presumption\\n likely does not apply when the defendant possesses only ammunition,\\n in which case the district court must make an affirmative finding that\\n the ammunition facilitated the drug trafficking offense. See United\\n States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2009).\\n 5 Despite conceding that there is no presumption of facilitation for ammunition alone,\\nthe government spends much of its brief arguing that this court should adopt the Sixth\\nCircuitβs rationale in United States v. Coleman, 627 F.3d 205 (6th Cir. 2010). There, the court\\nheld that possession of ammunition alone facilitated a drug trafficking offense because the\\nammunition βemboldenedβ the defendant βin the knowledge that he was one step closer to\\nhaving a fully-loaded firearm to protect himself and his illegal drugs.β Id. at 212. This\\nrationale establishes the functional equivalent of the presumption we have rejected above\\nand we respectfully decline to import it into this circuitβs jurisprudence. See id. at 216\\n(Gillman, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (βMany things could in theory put a\\nperson βone step closerβ to having a firearm, such as applying for a firearms permit, having a\\nholster, possessing a laser scope, or earning money to be able to purchase a weapon.β).\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-50379\\ninvolved in the trafficking. Turning to the facts of the present case, the PSR\\nindicates that its only item of evidence to show facilitation is that the\\nammunition was βeasily accessible and stored in close proximity to the illegal\\ndrugs.β The record does not demonstrate that the ammunition was kept in\\nplain sight, either during the controlled purchase or at any other time. In\\nshort, the government has pointed to no facts or circumstances that indicate\\nthat Eaden possessed the ammunition βin connection withβ his drug trafficking\\noffense.\\n IV.\\n To sum up: we have held that possession of ammunition alone may,\\nunder appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to show facilitation for purposes\\nof Β§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement. But we have further held that\\npossession of ammunition alone does not enjoy a presumption that it was\\nconnected with a drug trafficking offense. In this context, to demonstrate\\nfacilitation, the government must adduce facts tending to show that the\\nammunition facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the drug trafficking\\noffense. We have respectfully declined to adopt the Sixth Circuitβs path to\\nshowing facilitation set out in Coleman for the reasons stated above. Because\\nwe find that the record here shows that the government produced no facts\\ntending to show that Eadenβs mere possession of ammunition alone was\\nconnected with his drug trafficking activities, the application of\\nΒ§ 2k2.1(b)(6)(B)βs four-level enhancement was clear error. Accordingly, we\\nVACATE the district courtβs sentence and REMAND for resentencing not\\ninconsistent with this opinion.\\n VACATED AND REMANDED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":586,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4587643,"string":"4,587,643"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Steve Vic PARKER, Also Known as Jerry Wilson, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Steve Parker v. Lorie Davis, Director"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"15-20451"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"King, Higginson, Costa\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 15-20451 February 5, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nSTEVE VIC PARKER, also known as Jerry Wilson, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Petitioner - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nLORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL\\nJUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,\\n\\n Respondent - Appellee\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\\nPER CURIAM:\\n Steve Vic Parker appeals the district courtβs dismissal of his habeas\\npetition as successive. Because we find that Parkerβs previous habeas petition\\nchallenged a judgment distinct from the one he challenges in the present\\nhabeas petition, we REVERSE and REMAND.\\n I.\\n In 1991, Steve Vic Parker 1 was convicted in a Texas state court of\\nunauthorized use of a motor vehicle (βUUMVβ) and sentenced to 20 years in\\n\\n\\n 1 Parker has in various proceedings been referred to as βJerry Wilson,β his alias.\\nBecause it does not affect the issues on appeal, we use the name βParkerβ throughout this\\nopinion.\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\nthe custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (βTDCJβ) with a\\nmaximum discharge date of March 17, 2016. In the years that followed, Parker\\nwas released to mandatory supervision and returned to prison several times,\\nalthough the record does not reflect that he was convicted of any crimes during\\nthis time period. That is, until 2010, when, while on mandatory supervision,\\nParker was convicted of two counts of theft of less than $1,500, for which he\\nreceived two seven-year sentences to run consecutively with the 20-year\\nUUMV sentence. 2 Following his 2010 conviction, his mandatory supervision on\\nhis 1991 UUMV conviction and sentence was revoked and he returned to\\nprison.\\n In April 2013, Parker filed a 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2254 application (β2013 habeas\\npetitionβ) arguing that he had accumulated enough time on his 20-year\\nsentence for it to expire and his new seven-year sentence to begin. 3 He also\\nargued that the State violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by refusing to release\\nhim from custody for the 20-year sentence. The district court, considering only\\nParkerβs Ex Post Facto argument, concluded that TDCJβs calculation of his\\nsentence did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. It therefore dismissed the\\npetition with prejudice and denied a certificate of appealability (βCOAβ). This\\ncourt dismissed Parkerβs untimely appeal.\\n Shortly after Parker filed his 2013 habeas petition, TDCJ incorrectly\\nrecalculated Parkerβs sentence to reflect the seven-year sentences as running\\nconcurrently with the 20-year sentence, rather than consecutively, and\\nreleased Parker to mandatory supervision. Roughly three months later, TDCJ\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although not entirely clear from the record, it appears that the two seven-year\\nsentences were to run concurrently with one another.\\n 3 The parties dispute the precise judgment or judgments challenged by Parkerβs 2013\\n\\nhabeas petition. We discuss the matter in detail below.\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\ncorrected this error and returned Parker to TDCJ custody via an erroneous-\\nrelease warrant.\\n In 2015, Parker filed the instant habeas petition. The main thrust of\\nParkerβs argument was that (1) his two seven-year sentences should have\\nstarted as soon as he returned to prison in 2010 and (for reasons unclear) both\\nhis seven-year sentences had ceased to operate or were otherwise void under\\nvarious clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) his rearrest and reprocessing\\nin 2013, as well as the circumstances surrounding them, violated his right to\\ndue process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon TDCJβs motion for\\nsummary judgment, the district court determined that Parkerβs petition was\\nsuccessive and thus required authorization from this court to proceed. The\\ncourt therefore granted TDCJβs motion for summary judgment and dismissed\\nParkerβs petition without prejudice. It also denied a COA. This court thereafter\\ngranted a COA on the issue of βwhether Parkerβs Β§ 2254 application was\\nsuccessive as to the judgments underlying the seven-year theft sentences.β\\nAfter the COA had been granted and briefing submitted in this appeal, this\\ncourt discovered, and TDCJ confirmed, that Parker had been released to\\nmandatory supervision on his 2010 theft convictions and sentences.\\n II.\\n The district court dismissed Parkerβs challenge to his seven-year\\nsentences because it determined that his petition was successive. The\\nAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (βAEDPAβ) requires\\nauthorization from the court of appeals before a habeas petitioner may file an\\napplication that is βsecond or successive.β 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2244(b)(3). If a second or\\nsuccessive application is filed in a district court without authorization by the\\ncourt of appeals, the district court must dismiss the application. Magwood v.\\nPatterson, 561 U.S. 320, 331 (2010). An application βis not second or successive\\nsimply because it follows an earlier federal petition.β Crone v. Cockrell, 324\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\nF.3d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.\\n1998)). The Supreme Court has explained that βthe phrase βsecond or\\nsuccessiveβ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged,β\\nrather than the stretch of confinement being served by the petitioner.\\nMagwood, 561 U.S. at 332-33.\\n The parties do not dispute that Parkerβs current petition challenges his\\ntwo seven-year sentences. The State argues that the current petition is\\nsuccessive because Parkerβs 2013 petition challenged both his 20-year sentence\\nand his two seven-year sentences. Specifically, the State characterizes Parkerβs\\n2013 petition as challenging βthe stacking order in his seven-year theft\\nsentences.β As the State acknowledges, this analysis is somewhat complicated\\nby the convoluted nature of Parkerβs pleadings. Opaque as his pleadings may\\nbe though, the Stateβs characterization of Parkerβs 2013 petition misses the\\nmark. Parkerβs 2013 petition contended that his 20-year sentence had expired\\nby the time he filed the petition. 4 Although Parker acknowledges the existence\\nof the 2010 convictions in this 2013 petition, nowhere therein can we discern\\nanything resembling a challenge to the validity of those convictions or the\\nstacking order making the seven-year sentences run consecutively with the 20-\\nyear sentence. Moreover, since we are bound to accord pro se habeas petitions\\nliberal treatment, we will not strain to find a stray pleading of Parkerβs to use\\nagainst him. See, e.g., Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988).\\nAccordingly, we understand Parkerβs 2013 petition to challenge only his 20-\\nyear sentence; his current petition challenging his seven-year sentences\\nconcerns a new judgment and is therefore not successive.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 In relevant part, his 2013 petition states: βThe appl. has surpassed the maximum\\nterm of his (20) twenty year sentence under this cause that he is currently serving. In direct\\nviolation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and Due Process of Law.β\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\n This conclusion is not altered by the fact that, as the district court noted,\\nParker βknew the facts necessary to challenge the administration of his\\nconsecutive sentences before he filed his previous federal petition in 2013.β We\\nhave previously considered, and rejected, this approach to successiveness\\nwhere separate judgments are challenged. In Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516\\nF.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2008), the petitioner had been charged in separate\\nindictments of one count of sexual assault of a child and two counts of\\naggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 273. He was convicted on all three\\ncounts and given separate sentences for each. Id. In his first federal petition,\\nHardemon challenged his conviction for sexual assault of a child, which the\\ndistrict court rejected on the merits. Id. at 274. In his second petition, he\\nchallenged his conviction of one of the counts of aggravated sexual assault of a\\nchildβundisputedly a separate judgment. Id. The district court rejected the\\npetition as successive and Hardemon appealed. Id.\\n On appeal, we framed the question presented as βwhether the\\nprohibition against successive Β§ 2254 petitions requires a prisoner to challenge\\nall judgments from a single court in a single habeas petition.β Id. at 273. Prior\\nto that case, we had held that a habeas petitionerβs second petition was\\nsuccessive because he βknew of all of the facts necessary to raise [the claim\\nraised in his second petition] before he filed his initial federal petition.β Crone,\\n324 F.3d at 837. Seizing on this language, the State in Hardemon argued on\\nappeal that Hardemonβs petition was similarly successive because he knew the\\nfacts necessary to challenge his conviction of aggravated sexual assault of a\\nchild at the time he filed his first petition. 516 F.3d at 275. We rejected this\\nargument, finding that the principle espoused in Crone was inapplicable to\\nHardemonβs case because Crone involved separate petitions challenging the\\nsame judgment. Id. We then concluded that βHardemon was permitted, but not\\nrequired, to challenge his separate convictions in a single Β§ 2254 petition.β Id.\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\nat 276. Here, as discussed, Parkerβs current petition and his 2013 petition\\nchallenge different judgments. The district court therefore erred in concluding\\nthat Parkerβs challenge to his 2010 sentence was successive.\\n The remainder of Parkerβs claims relate to events that took place after\\nhis 2013 release and rearrest. The district court did not consider these claims\\nin its dismissal of Parkerβs petition. Roughly speaking, Parker argues that he\\nwas owed a hearing following his rearrest and that the denial of such a hearing\\nviolated his due-process rights. The State argues that these claims are now\\nmoot because βthe only remedy for [such] claims is re-release to mandatory\\nsupervisionββi.e., putting Parker in precisely the position he is in right now.\\n We need not reach the question of mootness, however, for our jurisdiction\\nis otherwise lacking. A COA in this case was granted only as to the\\nsuccessiveness of Parkerβs challenge to his seven-year sentence, not his due-\\nprocess challenge related to the circumstances surrounding his rearrest. This\\ncourt has jurisdiction to consider only the issues specified in a COA. See 28\\nU.S.C. Β§ 2253(c)(1)(A); Sixta v. Thaler, 615 F.3d 569, 573 (5th Cir. 2010).\\nParker has not asked this court to expand the scope of the already-granted\\nCOA, and in his prior request to this court for a COA, Parker did not in any\\nway allude to the due-process issues he now raises in his briefing. He has\\ntherefore waived any request for a COA on that issue, and we are without\\njurisdiction to consider his remaining claims. Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607,\\n613 (5th Cir. 1999) (βIssues not raised in the brief filed in support of [a] COA\\napplication are waivedβ).\\n III.\\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district\\ncourt and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364896/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HIGGINSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COSTA"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587643/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Steve Vic PARKER, Also Known as Jerry Wilson, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n No. 15-20451 February 5, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nSTEVE VIC PARKER, also known as Jerry Wilson, Clerk\n\n\n Petitioner - Appellant\n\nv.\n\nLORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL\nJUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,\n\n Respondent - Appellee\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore KING, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\nPER CURIAM:\n Steve Vic Parker appeals the district courtβs dismissal of his habeas\npetition as successive. Because we find that Parkerβs previous habeas petition\nchallenged a judgment distinct from the one he challenges in the present\nhabeas petition, we REVERSE and REMAND.\n I.\n In 1991, Steve Vic Parker 1 was convicted in a Texas state court of\nunauthorized use of a motor vehicle (βUUMVβ) and sentenced to 20 years in\n\n\n 1 Parker has in various proceedings been referred to as βJerry Wilson,β his alias.\nBecause it does not affect the issues on appeal, we use the name βParkerβ throughout this\nopinion.\n\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 15-20451\nthe custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (βTDCJβ) with a\nmaximum discharge date of March 17, 2016. In the years that followed, Parker\nwas released to mandatory supervision and returned to prison several times,\nalthough the record does not reflect that he was convicted of any crimes during\nthis time period. That is, until 2010, when, while on mandatory supervision,\nParker was convicted of two counts of theft of less than $1,500, for which he\nreceived two seven-year sentences to run consecutively with the 20-year\nUUMV sentence. 2 Following his 2010 conviction, his mandatory supervision on\nhis 1991 UUMV conviction and sentence was revoked and he returned to\nprison.\n In April 2013, Parker filed a 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2254 application (β2013 habeas\npetitionβ) arguing that he had accumulated enough time on his 20-year\nsentence for it to expire and his new seven-year sentence to begin. 3 He also\nargued that the State violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by refusing to release\nhim from custody for the 20-year sentence. The district court, considering only\nParkerβs Ex Post Facto argument, concluded that TDCJβs calculation of his\nsentence did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. It therefore dismissed the\npetition with prejudice and denied a certificate of appealability (βCOAβ). This\ncourt dismissed Parkerβs untimely appeal.\n Shortly after Parker filed his 2013 habeas petition, TDCJ incorrectly\nrecalculated Parkerβs sentence to reflect the seven-year sentences as running\nconcurrently with the 20-year sentence, rather than consecutively, and\nreleased Parker to mandatory supervision. Roughly three months later, TDCJ\n\n\n\n\n 2 Although not entirely clear from the record, it appears that the two seven-year\nsentences were to run concurrently with one another.\n 3 The parties dispute the precise judgment or judgments challenged by Parkerβs 2013\n\nhabeas petition. We discuss the matter in detail below.\n 2\n\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 15-20451\ncorrected this error and returned Parker to TDCJ custody via an erroneous-\nrelease warrant.\n In 2015, Parker filed the instant habeas petition. The main thrust of\nParkerβs argument was that (1) his two seven-year sentences should have\nstarted as soon as he returned to prison in 2010 and (for reasons unclear) both\nhis seven-year sentences had ceased to operate or were otherwise void under\nvarious clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) his rearrest and reprocessing\nin 2013, as well as the circumstances surrounding them, violated his right to\ndue process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon TDCJβs motion for\nsummary judgment, the district court determined that Parkerβs petition was\nsuccessive and thus required authorization from this court to proceed. The\ncourt therefore granted TDCJβs motion for summary judgment and dismissed\nParkerβs petition without prejudice. It also denied a COA. This court thereafter\ngranted a COA on the issue of βwhether Parkerβs Β§ 2254 application was\nsuccessive as to the judgments underlying the seven-year theft sentences.β\nAfter the COA had been granted and briefing submitted in this appeal, this\ncourt discovered, and TDCJ confirmed, that Parker had been released to\nmandatory supervision on his 2010 theft convictions and sentences.\n II.\n The district court dismissed Parkerβs challenge to his seven-year\nsentences because it determined that his petition was successive. The\nAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (βAEDPAβ) requires\nauthorization from the court of appeals before a habeas petitioner may file an\napplication that is βsecond or successive.β 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2244(b)(3). If a second or\nsuccessive application is filed in a district court without authorization by the\ncourt of appeals, the district court must dismiss the application. Magwood v.\nPatterson, 561 U.S. 320, 331 (2010). An application βis not second or successive\nsimply because it follows an earlier federal petition.β Crone v. Cockrell, 324\n 3\n\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 15-20451\nF.3d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.\n1998)). The Supreme Court has explained that βthe phrase βsecond or\nsuccessiveβ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged,β\nrather than the stretch of confinement being served by the petitioner.\nMagwood, 561 U.S. at 332-33.\n The parties do not dispute that Parkerβs current petition challenges his\ntwo seven-year sentences. The State argues that the current petition is\nsuccessive because Parkerβs 2013 petition challenged both his 20-year sentence\nand his two seven-year sentences. Specifically, the State characterizes Parkerβs\n2013 petition as challenging βthe stacking order in his seven-year theft\nsentences.β As the State acknowledges, this analysis is somewhat complicated\nby the convoluted nature of Parkerβs pleadings. Opaque as his pleadings may\nbe though, the Stateβs characterization of Parkerβs 2013 petition misses the\nmark. Parkerβs 2013 petition contended that his 20-year sentence had expired\nby the time he filed the petition. 4 Although Parker acknowledges the existence\nof the 2010 convictions in this 2013 petition, nowhere therein can we discern\nanything resembling a challenge to the validity of those convictions or the\nstacking order making the seven-year sentences run consecutively with the 20-\nyear sentence. Moreover, since we are bound to accord pro se habeas petitions\nliberal treatment, we will not strain to find a stray pleading of Parkerβs to use\nagainst him. See, e.g., Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988).\nAccordingly, we understand Parkerβs 2013 petition to challenge only his 20-\nyear sentence; his current petition challenging his seven-year sentences\nconcerns a new judgment and is therefore not successive.\n\n\n\n\n 4 In relevant part, his 2013 petition states: βThe appl. has surpassed the maximum\nterm of his (20) twenty year sentence under this cause that he is currently serving. In direct\nviolation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and Due Process of Law.β\n 4\n\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 15-20451\n This conclusion is not altered by the fact that, as the district court noted,\nParker βknew the facts necessary to challenge the administration of his\nconsecutive sentences before he filed his previous federal petition in 2013.β We\nhave previously considered, and rejected, this approach to successiveness\nwhere separate judgments are challenged. In Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516\nF.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2008), the petitioner had been charged in separate\nindictments of one count of sexual assault of a child and two counts of\naggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 273. He was convicted on all three\ncounts and given separate sentences for each. Id. In his first federal petition,\nHardemon challenged his conviction for sexual assault of a child, which the\ndistrict court rejected on the merits. Id. at 274. In his second petition, he\nchallenged his conviction of one of the counts of aggravated sexual assault of a\nchildβundisputedly a separate judgment. Id. The district court rejected the\npetition as successive and Hardemon appealed. Id.\n On appeal, we framed the question presented as βwhether the\nprohibition against successive Β§ 2254 petitions requires a prisoner to challenge\nall judgments from a single court in a single habeas petition.β Id. at 273. Prior\nto that case, we had held that a habeas petitionerβs second petition was\nsuccessive because he βknew of all of the facts necessary to raise [the claim\nraised in his second petition] before he filed his initial federal petition.β Crone,\n324 F.3d at 837. Seizing on this language, the State in Hardemon argued on\nappeal that Hardemonβs petition was similarly successive because he knew the\nfacts necessary to challenge his conviction of aggravated sexual assault of a\nchild at the time he filed his first petition. 516 F.3d at 275. We rejected this\nargument, finding that the principle espoused in Crone was inapplicable to\nHardemonβs case because Crone involved separate petitions challenging the\nsame judgment. Id. We then concluded that βHardemon was permitted, but not\nrequired, to challenge his separate convictions in a single Β§ 2254 petition.β Id.\n 5\n\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 15-20451\nat 276. Here, as discussed, Parkerβs current petition and his 2013 petition\nchallenge different judgments. The district court therefore erred in concluding\nthat Parkerβs challenge to his 2010 sentence was successive.\n The remainder of Parkerβs claims relate to events that took place after\nhis 2013 release and rearrest. The district court did not consider these claims\nin its dismissal of Parkerβs petition. Roughly speaking, Parker argues that he\nwas owed a hearing following his rearrest and that the denial of such a hearing\nviolated his due-process rights. The State argues that these claims are now\nmoot because βthe only remedy for [such] claims is re-release to mandatory\nsupervisionββi.e., putting Parker in precisely the position he is in right now.\n We need not reach the question of mootness, however, for our jurisdiction\nis otherwise lacking. A COA in this case was granted only as to the\nsuccessiveness of Parkerβs challenge to his seven-year sentence, not his due-\nprocess challenge related to the circumstances surrounding his rearrest. This\ncourt has jurisdiction to consider only the issues specified in a COA. See 28\nU.S.C. Β§ 2253(c)(1)(A); Sixta v. Thaler, 615 F.3d 569, 573 (5th Cir. 2010).\nParker has not asked this court to expand the scope of the already-granted\nCOA, and in his prior request to this court for a COA, Parker did not in any\nway allude to the due-process issues he now raises in his briefing. He has\ntherefore waived any request for a COA on that issue, and we are without\njurisdiction to consider his remaining claims. Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607,\n613 (5th Cir. 1999) (βIssues not raised in the brief filed in support of [a] COA\napplication are waivedβ).\n III.\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district\ncourt and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n\n\n\n 6\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Steve Vic PARKER, Also Known as Jerry Wilson, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 15-20451 February 5, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nSTEVE VIC PARKER, also known as Jerry Wilson, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Petitioner - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nLORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL\\nJUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,\\n\\n Respondent - Appellee\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\\nPER CURIAM:\\n Steve Vic Parker appeals the district courtβs dismissal of his habeas\\npetition as successive. Because we find that Parkerβs previous habeas petition\\nchallenged a judgment distinct from the one he challenges in the present\\nhabeas petition, we REVERSE and REMAND.\\n I.\\n In 1991, Steve Vic Parker 1 was convicted in a Texas state court of\\nunauthorized use of a motor vehicle (βUUMVβ) and sentenced to 20 years in\\n\\n\\n 1 Parker has in various proceedings been referred to as βJerry Wilson,β his alias.\\nBecause it does not affect the issues on appeal, we use the name βParkerβ throughout this\\nopinion.\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\nthe custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (βTDCJβ) with a\\nmaximum discharge date of March 17, 2016. In the years that followed, Parker\\nwas released to mandatory supervision and returned to prison several times,\\nalthough the record does not reflect that he was convicted of any crimes during\\nthis time period. That is, until 2010, when, while on mandatory supervision,\\nParker was convicted of two counts of theft of less than $1,500, for which he\\nreceived two seven-year sentences to run consecutively with the 20-year\\nUUMV sentence. 2 Following his 2010 conviction, his mandatory supervision on\\nhis 1991 UUMV conviction and sentence was revoked and he returned to\\nprison.\\n In April 2013, Parker filed a 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2254 application (β2013 habeas\\npetitionβ) arguing that he had accumulated enough time on his 20-year\\nsentence for it to expire and his new seven-year sentence to begin. 3 He also\\nargued that the State violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by refusing to release\\nhim from custody for the 20-year sentence. The district court, considering only\\nParkerβs Ex Post Facto argument, concluded that TDCJβs calculation of his\\nsentence did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. It therefore dismissed the\\npetition with prejudice and denied a certificate of appealability (βCOAβ). This\\ncourt dismissed Parkerβs untimely appeal.\\n Shortly after Parker filed his 2013 habeas petition, TDCJ incorrectly\\nrecalculated Parkerβs sentence to reflect the seven-year sentences as running\\nconcurrently with the 20-year sentence, rather than consecutively, and\\nreleased Parker to mandatory supervision. Roughly three months later, TDCJ\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although not entirely clear from the record, it appears that the two seven-year\\nsentences were to run concurrently with one another.\\n 3 The parties dispute the precise judgment or judgments challenged by Parkerβs 2013\\n\\nhabeas petition. We discuss the matter in detail below.\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\ncorrected this error and returned Parker to TDCJ custody via an erroneous-\\nrelease warrant.\\n In 2015, Parker filed the instant habeas petition. The main thrust of\\nParkerβs argument was that (1) his two seven-year sentences should have\\nstarted as soon as he returned to prison in 2010 and (for reasons unclear) both\\nhis seven-year sentences had ceased to operate or were otherwise void under\\nvarious clauses of the U.S. Constitution; and (2) his rearrest and reprocessing\\nin 2013, as well as the circumstances surrounding them, violated his right to\\ndue process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon TDCJβs motion for\\nsummary judgment, the district court determined that Parkerβs petition was\\nsuccessive and thus required authorization from this court to proceed. The\\ncourt therefore granted TDCJβs motion for summary judgment and dismissed\\nParkerβs petition without prejudice. It also denied a COA. This court thereafter\\ngranted a COA on the issue of βwhether Parkerβs Β§ 2254 application was\\nsuccessive as to the judgments underlying the seven-year theft sentences.β\\nAfter the COA had been granted and briefing submitted in this appeal, this\\ncourt discovered, and TDCJ confirmed, that Parker had been released to\\nmandatory supervision on his 2010 theft convictions and sentences.\\n II.\\n The district court dismissed Parkerβs challenge to his seven-year\\nsentences because it determined that his petition was successive. The\\nAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (βAEDPAβ) requires\\nauthorization from the court of appeals before a habeas petitioner may file an\\napplication that is βsecond or successive.β 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2244(b)(3). If a second or\\nsuccessive application is filed in a district court without authorization by the\\ncourt of appeals, the district court must dismiss the application. Magwood v.\\nPatterson, 561 U.S. 320, 331 (2010). An application βis not second or successive\\nsimply because it follows an earlier federal petition.β Crone v. Cockrell, 324\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\nF.3d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.\\n1998)). The Supreme Court has explained that βthe phrase βsecond or\\nsuccessiveβ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged,β\\nrather than the stretch of confinement being served by the petitioner.\\nMagwood, 561 U.S. at 332-33.\\n The parties do not dispute that Parkerβs current petition challenges his\\ntwo seven-year sentences. The State argues that the current petition is\\nsuccessive because Parkerβs 2013 petition challenged both his 20-year sentence\\nand his two seven-year sentences. Specifically, the State characterizes Parkerβs\\n2013 petition as challenging βthe stacking order in his seven-year theft\\nsentences.β As the State acknowledges, this analysis is somewhat complicated\\nby the convoluted nature of Parkerβs pleadings. Opaque as his pleadings may\\nbe though, the Stateβs characterization of Parkerβs 2013 petition misses the\\nmark. Parkerβs 2013 petition contended that his 20-year sentence had expired\\nby the time he filed the petition. 4 Although Parker acknowledges the existence\\nof the 2010 convictions in this 2013 petition, nowhere therein can we discern\\nanything resembling a challenge to the validity of those convictions or the\\nstacking order making the seven-year sentences run consecutively with the 20-\\nyear sentence. Moreover, since we are bound to accord pro se habeas petitions\\nliberal treatment, we will not strain to find a stray pleading of Parkerβs to use\\nagainst him. See, e.g., Guidroz v. Lynaugh, 852 F.2d 832, 834 (5th Cir. 1988).\\nAccordingly, we understand Parkerβs 2013 petition to challenge only his 20-\\nyear sentence; his current petition challenging his seven-year sentences\\nconcerns a new judgment and is therefore not successive.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 In relevant part, his 2013 petition states: βThe appl. has surpassed the maximum\\nterm of his (20) twenty year sentence under this cause that he is currently serving. In direct\\nviolation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and Due Process of Law.β\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\n This conclusion is not altered by the fact that, as the district court noted,\\nParker βknew the facts necessary to challenge the administration of his\\nconsecutive sentences before he filed his previous federal petition in 2013.β We\\nhave previously considered, and rejected, this approach to successiveness\\nwhere separate judgments are challenged. In Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516\\nF.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2008), the petitioner had been charged in separate\\nindictments of one count of sexual assault of a child and two counts of\\naggravated sexual assault of a child. Id. at 273. He was convicted on all three\\ncounts and given separate sentences for each. Id. In his first federal petition,\\nHardemon challenged his conviction for sexual assault of a child, which the\\ndistrict court rejected on the merits. Id. at 274. In his second petition, he\\nchallenged his conviction of one of the counts of aggravated sexual assault of a\\nchildβundisputedly a separate judgment. Id. The district court rejected the\\npetition as successive and Hardemon appealed. Id.\\n On appeal, we framed the question presented as βwhether the\\nprohibition against successive Β§ 2254 petitions requires a prisoner to challenge\\nall judgments from a single court in a single habeas petition.β Id. at 273. Prior\\nto that case, we had held that a habeas petitionerβs second petition was\\nsuccessive because he βknew of all of the facts necessary to raise [the claim\\nraised in his second petition] before he filed his initial federal petition.β Crone,\\n324 F.3d at 837. Seizing on this language, the State in Hardemon argued on\\nappeal that Hardemonβs petition was similarly successive because he knew the\\nfacts necessary to challenge his conviction of aggravated sexual assault of a\\nchild at the time he filed his first petition. 516 F.3d at 275. We rejected this\\nargument, finding that the principle espoused in Crone was inapplicable to\\nHardemonβs case because Crone involved separate petitions challenging the\\nsame judgment. Id. We then concluded that βHardemon was permitted, but not\\nrequired, to challenge his separate convictions in a single Β§ 2254 petition.β Id.\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 15-20451\\nat 276. Here, as discussed, Parkerβs current petition and his 2013 petition\\nchallenge different judgments. The district court therefore erred in concluding\\nthat Parkerβs challenge to his 2010 sentence was successive.\\n The remainder of Parkerβs claims relate to events that took place after\\nhis 2013 release and rearrest. The district court did not consider these claims\\nin its dismissal of Parkerβs petition. Roughly speaking, Parker argues that he\\nwas owed a hearing following his rearrest and that the denial of such a hearing\\nviolated his due-process rights. The State argues that these claims are now\\nmoot because βthe only remedy for [such] claims is re-release to mandatory\\nsupervisionββi.e., putting Parker in precisely the position he is in right now.\\n We need not reach the question of mootness, however, for our jurisdiction\\nis otherwise lacking. A COA in this case was granted only as to the\\nsuccessiveness of Parkerβs challenge to his seven-year sentence, not his due-\\nprocess challenge related to the circumstances surrounding his rearrest. This\\ncourt has jurisdiction to consider only the issues specified in a COA. See 28\\nU.S.C. Β§ 2253(c)(1)(A); Sixta v. Thaler, 615 F.3d 569, 573 (5th Cir. 2010).\\nParker has not asked this court to expand the scope of the already-granted\\nCOA, and in his prior request to this court for a COA, Parker did not in any\\nway allude to the due-process issues he now raises in his briefing. He has\\ntherefore waived any request for a COA on that issue, and we are without\\njurisdiction to consider his remaining claims. Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607,\\n613 (5th Cir. 1999) (βIssues not raised in the brief filed in support of [a] COA\\napplication are waivedβ).\\n III.\\n For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district\\ncourt and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":587,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4587644,"string":"4,587,644"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-50282"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\\n\\n _____________________\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 4, 2019\\n No. 17-50282\\n _____________________ Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\n\\n\\nPLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING\\nAND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC; PLANNED\\nPARENTHOOD SAN ANTONIO; PLANNED PARENTHOOD CAMERON\\nCOUNTY; PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC; PLANNED\\nPARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER; JANE DOE #1;\\nJANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #7;\\nJANE DOE #9; JANE DOE #10; JANE DOE #11,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nCHARLES SMITH, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner of\\nHHSC; SYLVIA HERNANDEZ KAUFFMAN, in her official capacity as\\nActing Inspector General of HHSC,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellants\\n\\n __________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Texas\\n __________________________\\n\\n (Opinion January 17, 2019, 5 Cir., 2019, ___ F.3d ___)\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN,\\nELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA,\\nWILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision.\\n\\fBY THE COURT:\\n\\n A majority of the circuit judges in regular active service and not\\ndisqualified having voted in favor, on the Courtβs own motion, to rehear this\\ncase en banc,\\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364897/\", \"author_raw\": \"Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"STEWART"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"JONES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS; OWEN; ELROD; SOUTHWICK; HAYNES; GRAVES; HIGGINSON; COSTA; WILLETT; HO; DUNCAN; ENGELHARDT"},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"STEWART\": \", Chief\", \"JONES\": \", Circuit\", \"SMITH\": \", Circuit\", \"DENNIS\": \", Circuit\", \"OWEN\": \", Circuit\", \"ELROD\": \", Circuit\", \"SOUTHWICK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAYNES\": \", Circuit\", \"GRAVES\": \", Circuit\", \"HIGGINSON\": \", Circuit\", \"COSTA\": \", Circuit\", \"WILLETT\": \", Circuit\", \"HO\": \", Circuit\", \"DUNCAN\": \", Circuit\", \"ENGELHARDT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587644/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\n\n _____________________\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n February 4, 2019\n No. 17-50282\n _____________________ Lyle W. Cayce\n Clerk\n\n\nPLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING\nAND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC; PLANNED\nPARENTHOOD SAN ANTONIO; PLANNED PARENTHOOD CAMERON\nCOUNTY; PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC; PLANNED\nPARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER; JANE DOE #1;\nJANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #7;\nJANE DOE #9; JANE DOE #10; JANE DOE #11,\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\n\nCHARLES SMITH, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner of\nHHSC; SYLVIA HERNANDEZ KAUFFMAN, in her official capacity as\nActing Inspector General of HHSC,\n\n Defendants - Appellants\n\n __________________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\n Western District of Texas\n __________________________\n\n (Opinion January 17, 2019, 5 Cir., 2019, ___ F.3d ___)\n\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN,\nELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA,\nWILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 1\n\n\n\n\n 1 Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision.\n\fBY THE COURT:\n\n A majority of the circuit judges in regular active service and not\ndisqualified having voted in favor, on the Courtβs own motion, to rehear this\ncase en banc,\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\\n\\n _____________________\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 4, 2019\\n No. 17-50282\\n _____________________ Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\n\\n\\nPLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING\\nAND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC; PLANNED\\nPARENTHOOD SAN ANTONIO; PLANNED PARENTHOOD CAMERON\\nCOUNTY; PLANNED PARENTHOOD GULF COAST, INC; PLANNED\\nPARENTHOOD SOUTH TEXAS SURGICAL CENTER; JANE DOE #1;\\nJANE DOE #2; JANE DOE #4; JANE DOE #7;\\nJANE DOE #9; JANE DOE #10; JANE DOE #11,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nCHARLES SMITH, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner of\\nHHSC; SYLVIA HERNANDEZ KAUFFMAN, in her official capacity as\\nActing Inspector General of HHSC,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellants\\n\\n __________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court for the\\n Western District of Texas\\n __________________________\\n\\n (Opinion January 17, 2019, 5 Cir., 2019, ___ F.3d ___)\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN,\\nELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA,\\nWILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 1\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision.\\n\\fBY THE COURT:\\n\\n A majority of the circuit judges in regular active service and not\\ndisqualified having voted in favor, on the Courtβs own motion, to rehear this\\ncase en banc,\\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":588,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4587645,"string":"4,587,645"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In the MATTER OF: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Debtor New Industries, Incorporated, Appellant v. Allison D. Byman, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding, Incorporated; Estate of Martin M. Sneed, Sr., Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"New Indus., Inc. v. Byman (In Re Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc.)"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-40350"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KING, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 18-40350 February 5, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nIn The Matter of: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Debtor\\n\\n\\nNEW INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,\\n\\n Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nALLISON D. BYMAN, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding,\\nIncorporated; ESTATE OF MARTIN M. SNEED, SR.,\\n\\n Appellees\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\\n In bankruptcy, the right to appeal must sometimes give way to a\\nheightened interest in finality. Perhaps the most prominent example is\\nequitable mootness, a judicially created doctrine preventing appeals that\\nthreaten to unravel a particularly interrelated confirmation plan. See In re\\nManges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1038β39 (5th Cir. 1994). Bars on appeals can also be\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\nfound in the Bankruptcy Code, such as the statute that prevents βreversal or\\nmodification on appeal of an authorization . . . of a sale or lease of [estate]\\npropertyβ unless that order was stayed pending appeal. 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m);\\nsee also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (βSeveral\\nprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provide that courts should keep\\ntheir hands off consummated transactions.β).\\n The bankruptcy trustee in this case invokes both equitable and statutory\\nmootness to try and block an appeal of a bankruptcy courtβs approval of a sale\\nof key estate assets, including a settlement necessary to facilitate the\\ntransaction. Equitable mootness is inappropriate here, but we conclude that\\nsection 363(m) made the bankruptcy courtβs approval the final word on the\\nsubject when the objector did not obtain a stay of that ruling.\\n I.\\n Sneed Shipbuilding owned two shipyards in Texas, including one in\\nChannelview. It filed for bankruptcy in 2016 and, after reorganizing turned\\ntumultuous, the court appointed a trustee. The trustee then filed a complaint\\nagainst the probate estate of Sneed Shipbuildingβs longtime principal Martin\\nSneed and several other Sneed family members. The complaint alleged that\\nMartin attempted to fraudulently transfer ownership of the Channelview\\nshipyard to himself, among other fraudulent activities. It sought to avoid\\n(bankruptcy-speak for βundoβ) those transactions and have the court declare\\nthat Sneed Shipbuilding was the true titleholder to the Channelview shipyard.\\n While the bankruptcy progressed slowly, operations at the Channelview\\nshipyard ground to a halt as a barebones staff serviced the one remaining\\ncustomer. Conversion to Chapter 7 and liquidation loomed as a real and\\nunpleasant possibility, so the trustee tried to sell the shipyard. San Jac Marine\\nwas interested in purchasing it, but only if the bankruptcy estate and Martinβs\\nprobate estate resolved their dispute over the title. To get clean title, the\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\ntrustee had two undesirable options: years of litigation against the probate\\nestate, during which the shipyard would lose much of its value, or settlement\\nwith the probate estate on unfavorable terms. She chose the latter.\\n The sale to San Jac Marine was made conditional on bankruptcy\\napproval of the settlement. The parties structured the settlement and sale\\ntogether along these lines: San Jac Marine paid Sneed Shipbuilding nearly $15\\nmillion and the trustee used those funds to ensure that the title it transferred\\nwas clean; encumbrances from a secured creditor, the debtor-in-possessionβs\\nlender, and property taxes were all paid off. In addition, Martinβs probate\\nestate gave up both its claim to the Channelview property and any other claims\\nin the bankruptcy for about $8 million and the trusteeβs agreement to release\\nany other avoidance actions. All told the settlement and sale looked something\\nlike this:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\n The bankruptcy court approved the settlement and sale in a single\\norder, finding its provisions βnon-severable and mutually dependent.β New\\nIndustries, an unsecured creditor which claimed that Sneed Shipbuilding owed\\nit $550,000 from a construction contract, unsuccessfully objected to the\\ndisbursement of funds to the probate estate. It did not seek a stay of the courtβs\\napproval of the transaction.\\n New Industries appealed. The trustee asked the district court to dismiss\\nthe appeal, citing both equitable mootness and 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m). The district\\ncourt dismissed the appeal as moot without identifying whether it was\\napplying equitable or statutory mootness.\\n II.\\n The parties focus on whether equitable mootness applies. This doctrine\\nallows courts to abstain from appeals of plan confirmation orders, allowing the\\ninterrelated web of parties to rely on a final decision. See In re Pacific Lumber\\nCo., 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009). As many courts have noted, equitable\\nmootness is not constitutional mootness. In a sense, the bankruptcy doctrine\\npresents the opposite concern of Article III mootness. A case is not equitably\\nmoot because an appellate reversal would have no effect; it is equitably moot\\nwhen a reversal might have too much effect. See Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at\\n240; In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 569 (3rd Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,\\ndissenting). Without an express basis in the Bankruptcy Code, equitable\\nmootness is controversial. Compare In re One2One Communications, LLC, 805\\nF.3d 428, 441 (3rd Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring); In re Continental\\nAirlines, 91 F.3d at 569 (Alito, J., dissenting), with In re Tribune Media Co.,\\n799 F.3d 272, 287β88 (3rd Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring); see also UNR, 20\\nF.3d at 769 (rejecting the βequitable mootnessβ label as misleading, but\\nagreeing that βa plan of reorganization, once implemented, should be disturbed\\nonly for compelling reasonsβ).\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\n We are more hesitant to invoke equitable mootness than many circuits,\\ntreating it as a βscalpel rather than an axe.β Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 240;\\nsee also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ΒΆ 1129.09 (16th ed. 2018) (referring to this\\ncircuitβs βwillingness to tolerate the possibility that reversal will disrupt the\\nplanβ as a βdeep divideβ between us and other circuits). Equitable mootness\\ntypically requires a reorganization plan that is at least βsubstantially\\nconsummated.β In re Hilal, 534 F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 2008); see also In re\\nSan Patricio Cnty. Cmty. Action Agency, 575 F.3d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 2009)\\n(declining to find dispute over settlement agreement equitably moot, without\\ndeciding as a categorical matter whether the doctrine could apply in a Chapter\\n7 liquidation). That end stage of the Chapter 11 process must be reached\\nbecause the concern of equitable mootness is that appellate reversal might\\nundermine the plan and the partiesβ reliance on it. In re SI Restructuring, Inc.,\\n542 F.3d 131, 135β36 (5th Cir. 2008). But Sneed Shipbuildingβs bankruptcy\\ncase has never reached that stage because no plan has been proposed.\\n We recognize that some courts outside our circuit have employed\\nequitable mootness when reviewing settlement agreements, not just plan\\nconfirmations, in particularly messy cases. See, e.g., In re Delta Airlines, Inc.,\\n374 B.R. 516, 522β525 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). But that just highlights the second\\nreason why equitable mootness should not apply to the order that New\\nIndustries appeals: this settlement and sale were not sufficiently complex.\\nEquitable mootness is aimed at limiting review of complex plans whose\\nimplementation has substantial secondary effects. See, e.g., Tribune, 799 F.3d\\nat 274, 281 (finding moot an appeal of $7.5 billion reorganization involving 243\\ndifferent classes of creditors). Appellate intervention into reorganization plans\\nof such complexity may affect many innocent third parties. See Manges, 29\\nF.3d at 1042β43. Our ability to produce a single graphic to illustrate the\\nChannelview transaction demonstrates that this case does not rise to that level\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\nof complexity. Reversal on appeal would only affect a few third parties, all of\\nwhom participated in the bankruptcy court. This does not appear to be the\\ncase to expand equitable mootness into new frontiers.\\n III.\\n That is especially so because the trustee also raised the possibility of\\nmootness under section 363(m). The statute limits the ability of appellate\\ncourts to review the sale of estate property when the order approving the\\ntransaction is not stayed. 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m); see also In re Ginther Trusts,\\n238 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that section 363(m) even prevented\\nappeals to determine whether the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction). A\\ndifferent motivation than complexity motivates section 363(m) mootness: the\\nneed to encourage parties to bid for estate property. See In re Bleaufontaine,\\nInc., 634 F.2d 1383, 1389 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981) (βIf deference were not paid to\\nthe policy of speedy and final bankruptcy sales, potential buyers would not\\neven consider purchasing any bankruptβs property.β). The statute assures\\npurchasers that once the bankruptcy court approves the sale and it is\\nconsummated (that is, the order is not stayed), then no appellate court can\\nlater second-guess the deal. The cost, of course, is disposing of the full judicial\\nreview for legal accuracy that typically follows a trial courtβs ruling. But\\nCongress thought that trade was worth making to encourage buyers to come\\nto the table ready to revitalize useful assets, as those buyers might otherwise\\nstay away when a transaction remains shrouded in legal uncertainty. The\\nBankruptcy Code thus entrusts review of a sale solely to the bankruptcy courtβs\\nin-the-moment judgment unless a stay is obtained that prevents the sale from\\nclosing prior to appellate review.\\n Recognizing this role of section 363(m), New Industries says it does not\\nchallenge the sale of the property but only challenges the disbursement of cash\\nto the probate estate. But it does not cite any authority that would allow us to\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\nperform this isolated analysis. Paying off the probate estate was an essential\\nfeature of the sale. And when creditors have tried to cut off part of a sale and\\nchallenge it elsewhere, courts have found their appeals moot. See In re Trism,\\nInc., 328 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003) (challenge to release of avoidance action\\nthat was essential to sale of estate assets); In re Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 464\\nB.R. 120 (D. Del. 2012) (dispute over creation of litigation trust with funds from\\nsale of estate assets). Without the more than $8 million payment, the probate\\nestate would not have released its claim that it owned the Channelview\\nshipyard. And without that release, San Jac Marine likely would have walked\\naway from the deal. As the bankruptcy court noted, there is no way to sever\\nthe settlement from the sale; they are mutually dependent. Congress has\\nordered us not to review such decisions by the bankruptcy court when they are\\nnot stayed. This case is moot.\\n ***\\n We AFFIRM the district courtβs dismissal of the appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4364898/\", \"author_raw\": \"GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HIGGINSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COSTA"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KING\": \", Circuit\", \"HIGGINSON\": \", Circuit\", \"COSTA\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587645/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Debtor New Industries, Incorporated, Appellant v. Allison D. Byman, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding, Incorporated; Estate of Martin M. Sneed, Sr., Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n No. 18-40350 February 5, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nIn The Matter of: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Clerk\n\n\n Debtor\n\n\nNEW INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,\n\n Appellant\n\nv.\n\nALLISON D. BYMAN, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding,\nIncorporated; ESTATE OF MARTIN M. SNEED, SR.,\n\n Appellees\n\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore KING, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\n In bankruptcy, the right to appeal must sometimes give way to a\nheightened interest in finality. Perhaps the most prominent example is\nequitable mootness, a judicially created doctrine preventing appeals that\nthreaten to unravel a particularly interrelated confirmation plan. See In re\nManges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1038β39 (5th Cir. 1994). Bars on appeals can also be\n\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-40350\nfound in the Bankruptcy Code, such as the statute that prevents βreversal or\nmodification on appeal of an authorization . . . of a sale or lease of [estate]\npropertyβ unless that order was stayed pending appeal. 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m);\nsee also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (βSeveral\nprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provide that courts should keep\ntheir hands off consummated transactions.β).\n The bankruptcy trustee in this case invokes both equitable and statutory\nmootness to try and block an appeal of a bankruptcy courtβs approval of a sale\nof key estate assets, including a settlement necessary to facilitate the\ntransaction. Equitable mootness is inappropriate here, but we conclude that\nsection 363(m) made the bankruptcy courtβs approval the final word on the\nsubject when the objector did not obtain a stay of that ruling.\n I.\n Sneed Shipbuilding owned two shipyards in Texas, including one in\nChannelview. It filed for bankruptcy in 2016 and, after reorganizing turned\ntumultuous, the court appointed a trustee. The trustee then filed a complaint\nagainst the probate estate of Sneed Shipbuildingβs longtime principal Martin\nSneed and several other Sneed family members. The complaint alleged that\nMartin attempted to fraudulently transfer ownership of the Channelview\nshipyard to himself, among other fraudulent activities. It sought to avoid\n(bankruptcy-speak for βundoβ) those transactions and have the court declare\nthat Sneed Shipbuilding was the true titleholder to the Channelview shipyard.\n While the bankruptcy progressed slowly, operations at the Channelview\nshipyard ground to a halt as a barebones staff serviced the one remaining\ncustomer. Conversion to Chapter 7 and liquidation loomed as a real and\nunpleasant possibility, so the trustee tried to sell the shipyard. San Jac Marine\nwas interested in purchasing it, but only if the bankruptcy estate and Martinβs\nprobate estate resolved their dispute over the title. To get clean title, the\n 2\n\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-40350\ntrustee had two undesirable options: years of litigation against the probate\nestate, during which the shipyard would lose much of its value, or settlement\nwith the probate estate on unfavorable terms. She chose the latter.\n The sale to San Jac Marine was made conditional on bankruptcy\napproval of the settlement. The parties structured the settlement and sale\ntogether along these lines: San Jac Marine paid Sneed Shipbuilding nearly $15\nmillion and the trustee used those funds to ensure that the title it transferred\nwas clean; encumbrances from a secured creditor, the debtor-in-possessionβs\nlender, and property taxes were all paid off. In addition, Martinβs probate\nestate gave up both its claim to the Channelview property and any other claims\nin the bankruptcy for about $8 million and the trusteeβs agreement to release\nany other avoidance actions. All told the settlement and sale looked something\nlike this:\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-40350\n The bankruptcy court approved the settlement and sale in a single\norder, finding its provisions βnon-severable and mutually dependent.β New\nIndustries, an unsecured creditor which claimed that Sneed Shipbuilding owed\nit $550,000 from a construction contract, unsuccessfully objected to the\ndisbursement of funds to the probate estate. It did not seek a stay of the courtβs\napproval of the transaction.\n New Industries appealed. The trustee asked the district court to dismiss\nthe appeal, citing both equitable mootness and 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m). The district\ncourt dismissed the appeal as moot without identifying whether it was\napplying equitable or statutory mootness.\n II.\n The parties focus on whether equitable mootness applies. This doctrine\nallows courts to abstain from appeals of plan confirmation orders, allowing the\ninterrelated web of parties to rely on a final decision. See In re Pacific Lumber\nCo., 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009). As many courts have noted, equitable\nmootness is not constitutional mootness. In a sense, the bankruptcy doctrine\npresents the opposite concern of Article III mootness. A case is not equitably\nmoot because an appellate reversal would have no effect; it is equitably moot\nwhen a reversal might have too much effect. See Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at\n240; In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 569 (3rd Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,\ndissenting). Without an express basis in the Bankruptcy Code, equitable\nmootness is controversial. Compare In re One2One Communications, LLC, 805\nF.3d 428, 441 (3rd Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring); In re Continental\nAirlines, 91 F.3d at 569 (Alito, J., dissenting), with In re Tribune Media Co.,\n799 F.3d 272, 287β88 (3rd Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring); see also UNR, 20\nF.3d at 769 (rejecting the βequitable mootnessβ label as misleading, but\nagreeing that βa plan of reorganization, once implemented, should be disturbed\nonly for compelling reasonsβ).\n 4\n\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-40350\n We are more hesitant to invoke equitable mootness than many circuits,\ntreating it as a βscalpel rather than an axe.β Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 240;\nsee also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ΒΆ 1129.09 (16th ed. 2018) (referring to this\ncircuitβs βwillingness to tolerate the possibility that reversal will disrupt the\nplanβ as a βdeep divideβ between us and other circuits). Equitable mootness\ntypically requires a reorganization plan that is at least βsubstantially\nconsummated.β In re Hilal, 534 F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 2008); see also In re\nSan Patricio Cnty. Cmty. Action Agency, 575 F.3d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 2009)\n(declining to find dispute over settlement agreement equitably moot, without\ndeciding as a categorical matter whether the doctrine could apply in a Chapter\n7 liquidation). That end stage of the Chapter 11 process must be reached\nbecause the concern of equitable mootness is that appellate reversal might\nundermine the plan and the partiesβ reliance on it. In re SI Restructuring, Inc.,\n542 F.3d 131, 135β36 (5th Cir. 2008). But Sneed Shipbuildingβs bankruptcy\ncase has never reached that stage because no plan has been proposed.\n We recognize that some courts outside our circuit have employed\nequitable mootness when reviewing settlement agreements, not just plan\nconfirmations, in particularly messy cases. See, e.g., In re Delta Airlines, Inc.,\n374 B.R. 516, 522β525 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). But that just highlights the second\nreason why equitable mootness should not apply to the order that New\nIndustries appeals: this settlement and sale were not sufficiently complex.\nEquitable mootness is aimed at limiting review of complex plans whose\nimplementation has substantial secondary effects. See, e.g., Tribune, 799 F.3d\nat 274, 281 (finding moot an appeal of $7.5 billion reorganization involving 243\ndifferent classes of creditors). Appellate intervention into reorganization plans\nof such complexity may affect many innocent third parties. See Manges, 29\nF.3d at 1042β43. Our ability to produce a single graphic to illustrate the\nChannelview transaction demonstrates that this case does not rise to that level\n 5\n\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-40350\nof complexity. Reversal on appeal would only affect a few third parties, all of\nwhom participated in the bankruptcy court. This does not appear to be the\ncase to expand equitable mootness into new frontiers.\n III.\n That is especially so because the trustee also raised the possibility of\nmootness under section 363(m). The statute limits the ability of appellate\ncourts to review the sale of estate property when the order approving the\ntransaction is not stayed. 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m); see also In re Ginther Trusts,\n238 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that section 363(m) even prevented\nappeals to determine whether the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction). A\ndifferent motivation than complexity motivates section 363(m) mootness: the\nneed to encourage parties to bid for estate property. See In re Bleaufontaine,\nInc., 634 F.2d 1383, 1389 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981) (βIf deference were not paid to\nthe policy of speedy and final bankruptcy sales, potential buyers would not\neven consider purchasing any bankruptβs property.β). The statute assures\npurchasers that once the bankruptcy court approves the sale and it is\nconsummated (that is, the order is not stayed), then no appellate court can\nlater second-guess the deal. The cost, of course, is disposing of the full judicial\nreview for legal accuracy that typically follows a trial courtβs ruling. But\nCongress thought that trade was worth making to encourage buyers to come\nto the table ready to revitalize useful assets, as those buyers might otherwise\nstay away when a transaction remains shrouded in legal uncertainty. The\nBankruptcy Code thus entrusts review of a sale solely to the bankruptcy courtβs\nin-the-moment judgment unless a stay is obtained that prevents the sale from\nclosing prior to appellate review.\n Recognizing this role of section 363(m), New Industries says it does not\nchallenge the sale of the property but only challenges the disbursement of cash\nto the probate estate. But it does not cite any authority that would allow us to\n 6\n\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-40350\nperform this isolated analysis. Paying off the probate estate was an essential\nfeature of the sale. And when creditors have tried to cut off part of a sale and\nchallenge it elsewhere, courts have found their appeals moot. See In re Trism,\nInc., 328 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003) (challenge to release of avoidance action\nthat was essential to sale of estate assets); In re Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 464\nB.R. 120 (D. Del. 2012) (dispute over creation of litigation trust with funds from\nsale of estate assets). Without the more than $8 million payment, the probate\nestate would not have released its claim that it owned the Channelview\nshipyard. And without that release, San Jac Marine likely would have walked\naway from the deal. As the bankruptcy court noted, there is no way to sever\nthe settlement from the sale; they are mutually dependent. Congress has\nordered us not to review such decisions by the bankruptcy court when they are\nnot stayed. This case is moot.\n ***\n We AFFIRM the district courtβs dismissal of the appeal.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Debtor New Industries, Incorporated, Appellant v. Allison D. Byman, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding, Incorporated; Estate of Martin M. Sneed, Sr., Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 18-40350 February 5, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nIn The Matter of: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Debtor\\n\\n\\nNEW INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED,\\n\\n Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nALLISON D. BYMAN, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding,\\nIncorporated; ESTATE OF MARTIN M. SNEED, SR.,\\n\\n Appellees\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\\n In bankruptcy, the right to appeal must sometimes give way to a\\nheightened interest in finality. Perhaps the most prominent example is\\nequitable mootness, a judicially created doctrine preventing appeals that\\nthreaten to unravel a particularly interrelated confirmation plan. See In re\\nManges, 29 F.3d 1034, 1038β39 (5th Cir. 1994). Bars on appeals can also be\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\nfound in the Bankruptcy Code, such as the statute that prevents βreversal or\\nmodification on appeal of an authorization . . . of a sale or lease of [estate]\\npropertyβ unless that order was stayed pending appeal. 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m);\\nsee also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994) (βSeveral\\nprovisions of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provide that courts should keep\\ntheir hands off consummated transactions.β).\\n The bankruptcy trustee in this case invokes both equitable and statutory\\nmootness to try and block an appeal of a bankruptcy courtβs approval of a sale\\nof key estate assets, including a settlement necessary to facilitate the\\ntransaction. Equitable mootness is inappropriate here, but we conclude that\\nsection 363(m) made the bankruptcy courtβs approval the final word on the\\nsubject when the objector did not obtain a stay of that ruling.\\n I.\\n Sneed Shipbuilding owned two shipyards in Texas, including one in\\nChannelview. It filed for bankruptcy in 2016 and, after reorganizing turned\\ntumultuous, the court appointed a trustee. The trustee then filed a complaint\\nagainst the probate estate of Sneed Shipbuildingβs longtime principal Martin\\nSneed and several other Sneed family members. The complaint alleged that\\nMartin attempted to fraudulently transfer ownership of the Channelview\\nshipyard to himself, among other fraudulent activities. It sought to avoid\\n(bankruptcy-speak for βundoβ) those transactions and have the court declare\\nthat Sneed Shipbuilding was the true titleholder to the Channelview shipyard.\\n While the bankruptcy progressed slowly, operations at the Channelview\\nshipyard ground to a halt as a barebones staff serviced the one remaining\\ncustomer. Conversion to Chapter 7 and liquidation loomed as a real and\\nunpleasant possibility, so the trustee tried to sell the shipyard. San Jac Marine\\nwas interested in purchasing it, but only if the bankruptcy estate and Martinβs\\nprobate estate resolved their dispute over the title. To get clean title, the\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\ntrustee had two undesirable options: years of litigation against the probate\\nestate, during which the shipyard would lose much of its value, or settlement\\nwith the probate estate on unfavorable terms. She chose the latter.\\n The sale to San Jac Marine was made conditional on bankruptcy\\napproval of the settlement. The parties structured the settlement and sale\\ntogether along these lines: San Jac Marine paid Sneed Shipbuilding nearly $15\\nmillion and the trustee used those funds to ensure that the title it transferred\\nwas clean; encumbrances from a secured creditor, the debtor-in-possessionβs\\nlender, and property taxes were all paid off. In addition, Martinβs probate\\nestate gave up both its claim to the Channelview property and any other claims\\nin the bankruptcy for about $8 million and the trusteeβs agreement to release\\nany other avoidance actions. All told the settlement and sale looked something\\nlike this:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\n The bankruptcy court approved the settlement and sale in a single\\norder, finding its provisions βnon-severable and mutually dependent.β New\\nIndustries, an unsecured creditor which claimed that Sneed Shipbuilding owed\\nit $550,000 from a construction contract, unsuccessfully objected to the\\ndisbursement of funds to the probate estate. It did not seek a stay of the courtβs\\napproval of the transaction.\\n New Industries appealed. The trustee asked the district court to dismiss\\nthe appeal, citing both equitable mootness and 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m). The district\\ncourt dismissed the appeal as moot without identifying whether it was\\napplying equitable or statutory mootness.\\n II.\\n The parties focus on whether equitable mootness applies. This doctrine\\nallows courts to abstain from appeals of plan confirmation orders, allowing the\\ninterrelated web of parties to rely on a final decision. See In re Pacific Lumber\\nCo., 584 F.3d 229, 240 (5th Cir. 2009). As many courts have noted, equitable\\nmootness is not constitutional mootness. In a sense, the bankruptcy doctrine\\npresents the opposite concern of Article III mootness. A case is not equitably\\nmoot because an appellate reversal would have no effect; it is equitably moot\\nwhen a reversal might have too much effect. See Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at\\n240; In re Continental Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 569 (3rd Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,\\ndissenting). Without an express basis in the Bankruptcy Code, equitable\\nmootness is controversial. Compare In re One2One Communications, LLC, 805\\nF.3d 428, 441 (3rd Cir. 2015) (Krause, J., concurring); In re Continental\\nAirlines, 91 F.3d at 569 (Alito, J., dissenting), with In re Tribune Media Co.,\\n799 F.3d 272, 287β88 (3rd Cir. 2015) (Ambro, J., concurring); see also UNR, 20\\nF.3d at 769 (rejecting the βequitable mootnessβ label as misleading, but\\nagreeing that βa plan of reorganization, once implemented, should be disturbed\\nonly for compelling reasonsβ).\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\n We are more hesitant to invoke equitable mootness than many circuits,\\ntreating it as a βscalpel rather than an axe.β Pacific Lumber, 584 F.3d at 240;\\nsee also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ΒΆ 1129.09 (16th ed. 2018) (referring to this\\ncircuitβs βwillingness to tolerate the possibility that reversal will disrupt the\\nplanβ as a βdeep divideβ between us and other circuits). Equitable mootness\\ntypically requires a reorganization plan that is at least βsubstantially\\nconsummated.β In re Hilal, 534 F.3d 498, 500 (5th Cir. 2008); see also In re\\nSan Patricio Cnty. Cmty. Action Agency, 575 F.3d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 2009)\\n(declining to find dispute over settlement agreement equitably moot, without\\ndeciding as a categorical matter whether the doctrine could apply in a Chapter\\n7 liquidation). That end stage of the Chapter 11 process must be reached\\nbecause the concern of equitable mootness is that appellate reversal might\\nundermine the plan and the partiesβ reliance on it. In re SI Restructuring, Inc.,\\n542 F.3d 131, 135β36 (5th Cir. 2008). But Sneed Shipbuildingβs bankruptcy\\ncase has never reached that stage because no plan has been proposed.\\n We recognize that some courts outside our circuit have employed\\nequitable mootness when reviewing settlement agreements, not just plan\\nconfirmations, in particularly messy cases. See, e.g., In re Delta Airlines, Inc.,\\n374 B.R. 516, 522β525 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). But that just highlights the second\\nreason why equitable mootness should not apply to the order that New\\nIndustries appeals: this settlement and sale were not sufficiently complex.\\nEquitable mootness is aimed at limiting review of complex plans whose\\nimplementation has substantial secondary effects. See, e.g., Tribune, 799 F.3d\\nat 274, 281 (finding moot an appeal of $7.5 billion reorganization involving 243\\ndifferent classes of creditors). Appellate intervention into reorganization plans\\nof such complexity may affect many innocent third parties. See Manges, 29\\nF.3d at 1042β43. Our ability to produce a single graphic to illustrate the\\nChannelview transaction demonstrates that this case does not rise to that level\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\nof complexity. Reversal on appeal would only affect a few third parties, all of\\nwhom participated in the bankruptcy court. This does not appear to be the\\ncase to expand equitable mootness into new frontiers.\\n III.\\n That is especially so because the trustee also raised the possibility of\\nmootness under section 363(m). The statute limits the ability of appellate\\ncourts to review the sale of estate property when the order approving the\\ntransaction is not stayed. 11 U.S.C. Β§ 363(m); see also In re Ginther Trusts,\\n238 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that section 363(m) even prevented\\nappeals to determine whether the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction). A\\ndifferent motivation than complexity motivates section 363(m) mootness: the\\nneed to encourage parties to bid for estate property. See In re Bleaufontaine,\\nInc., 634 F.2d 1383, 1389 n.10 (5th Cir. 1981) (βIf deference were not paid to\\nthe policy of speedy and final bankruptcy sales, potential buyers would not\\neven consider purchasing any bankruptβs property.β). The statute assures\\npurchasers that once the bankruptcy court approves the sale and it is\\nconsummated (that is, the order is not stayed), then no appellate court can\\nlater second-guess the deal. The cost, of course, is disposing of the full judicial\\nreview for legal accuracy that typically follows a trial courtβs ruling. But\\nCongress thought that trade was worth making to encourage buyers to come\\nto the table ready to revitalize useful assets, as those buyers might otherwise\\nstay away when a transaction remains shrouded in legal uncertainty. The\\nBankruptcy Code thus entrusts review of a sale solely to the bankruptcy courtβs\\nin-the-moment judgment unless a stay is obtained that prevents the sale from\\nclosing prior to appellate review.\\n Recognizing this role of section 363(m), New Industries says it does not\\nchallenge the sale of the property but only challenges the disbursement of cash\\nto the probate estate. But it does not cite any authority that would allow us to\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-40350\\nperform this isolated analysis. Paying off the probate estate was an essential\\nfeature of the sale. And when creditors have tried to cut off part of a sale and\\nchallenge it elsewhere, courts have found their appeals moot. See In re Trism,\\nInc., 328 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003) (challenge to release of avoidance action\\nthat was essential to sale of estate assets); In re Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc., 464\\nB.R. 120 (D. Del. 2012) (dispute over creation of litigation trust with funds from\\nsale of estate assets). Without the more than $8 million payment, the probate\\nestate would not have released its claim that it owned the Channelview\\nshipyard. And without that release, San Jac Marine likely would have walked\\naway from the deal. As the bankruptcy court noted, there is no way to sever\\nthe settlement from the sale; they are mutually dependent. Congress has\\nordered us not to review such decisions by the bankruptcy court when they are\\nnot stayed. This case is moot.\\n ***\\n We AFFIRM the district courtβs dismissal of the appeal.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":589,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443890,"string":"8,443,890"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"In the MATTER OF: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Debtor New Industries, Incorporated v. Allison D. Byman, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding, Incorporated Estate of Martin M. Sneed, Sr."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"New Indus., Inc. v. Byman (In re Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc.)"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 18-40350"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Costa, Higginson, King\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415320/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"COSTA"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HIGGINSON"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443890/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Debtor New Industries, Incorporated v. Allison D. Byman, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding, Incorporated Estate of Martin M. Sneed, Sr.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In the MATTER OF: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Debtor New Industries, Incorporated v. Allison D. Byman, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding, Incorporated Estate of Martin M. Sneed, Sr.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":590,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588150,"string":"4,588,150"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Nicole C. WITTMER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Nicole Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"18-20251"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"James, Higginbotham, Elrod\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887973/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"030concurrence\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887974/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}, {\"author\": \"JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 18-20251 February 6, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nNICOLE C. WITTMER, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nPHILLIPS 66 COMPANY,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and HO, Circuit Judges.\\nJAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:\\n Over the past two years, three circuits have construed Title VII of the\\nCivil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis\\nof either sexual orientation or transgender status. See Zarda v. Altitude\\nExpress, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R.\\nHarris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018); Hively v. Ivy Tech\\nCmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).\\n The district court here examined these recent out-of-circuit rulings,\\nfound them βpersuasive,β and thus βassume[d]β that Title VII prohibits\\ntransgender discrimination, in a published opinion. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co.,\\n304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2018). In doing so, the district court\\nexpressly stated that βthe Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue.β Id.\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n But we have addressed the issue. In Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d\\n936 (5th Cir. 1979), we expressly held that Title VII does not prohibit\\ndiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Yet the district court did not\\nmention, let alone distinguish, Blum. Most notably, it did not contend that\\nTitle VII applies to transgender status but not sexual orientation. To the\\ncontrary, the court concluded that the βsameβ analysis applies to transgender\\nstatus and sexual orientation alike. Wittmer, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 634.\\n Blum remains binding precedent in this circuit to this day. Our sister\\ncircuitsβincluding those favorably quoted in the district courtβs published\\nopinionβrecognize Blum as our precedent. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 107β8\\n(recognizing historic βconsensus among our sister circuitsβ foreclosing sexual\\norientation claims under Title VII, including Blum); Hively, 853 F.3d at 341β\\n42 (βrecognizing . . . Fifth Circuitβs precedent in Blumβ); see also Evans v. Ga.\\nRegβl Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (Blum is βbinding precedentβ\\nthat βforeclosesβ sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII).\\n Other district courts within the Fifth Circuit have likewise repeatedly\\nacknowledged that Blum is binding circuit precedent. See, e.g., OβDaniel v.\\nIndus. Serv. Solutions, 2018 WL 265585, *7 (M.D. La. Jan. 2, 2018) (βThe Fifth\\nCircuit has specifically held that discharge based upon sexual orientation is\\nnot prohibited by Title VII . . . . Blum is binding precedentβ); Berghorn v. Texas\\nWorkforce Commβn, 2017 WL 5479592, *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2017) (βThe\\ncourt . . . is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, not Seventh Circuit precedent.β).\\n We nevertheless affirm the district court on other grounds. The district\\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment for the employer, because the\\nemployee failed to present sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of\\ndiscrimination, and because the employee failed to present a genuine issue of\\nmaterial fact concerning pretext.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n I.\\n Nicole Wittmer, a transgender woman, applied for an Instrument and\\nReliability Engineer position with Phillips 66 in 2015. Phillips 66 conducted\\nfour interviews, including an in-person interview on August 3.\\n During these interviews, Phillips 66 asked about Wittmerβs current\\nemployment with Agrium. They discussed on-going projects at Agrium that\\nwould require significant future travel to Canada as the reason Wittmer was\\nlooking for a new job. On August 10, Phillips 66 offered Wittmer the job,\\ncontingent on passing certain background checks.\\n On September 2, Ellen Fulton, Phillips 66βs Human Resources Manager,\\ninformed Wittmer that the background check uncovered a discrepancy:\\nAgrium terminated Wittmer on July 28, with pay continuing through\\nAugust 2.\\n In response, Wittmer acknowledged the discrepancy, but did not think\\nβit was that big of a deal.β Wittmer sent Fulton the July 28 termination letter\\nfrom Agrium, clearly stating that their employment relationship ended on July\\n28.\\n Fulton and several other Phillips 66 executives conferred on\\nSeptember 8. Everyone at the meeting agreed that the offer of employment\\nshould be rescinded due to Wittmerβs misrepresentations.\\n On September 10, Wittmer sent an unsolicited email to Fulton and\\nanother Phillips 66 employee, accusing them of transgender discrimination.\\nFulton responded that Phillips 66 was unaware of Wittmerβs transgender\\nstatus prior to the email, and that in any event, the information would not\\naffect Phillips 66βs decision.\\n On September 14, Fulton formally rescinded the offer of employment.\\nFulton explained that it was due to the discrepancies revealed during the\\nbackground check after the initial conditional offer.\\n 3\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n A year later, in October 2016, Wittmer filed a charge of discrimination\\nwith the EEOC against Phillips 66. Wittmer claimed that Phillips 66 rescinded\\nits offer because of transgender discrimination. The EEOC issued a right-to-\\nsue letter.\\n II.\\n Wittmer sued Phillips 66 under Title VII for discrimination on the basis\\nof transgender status. Without distinguishing or even mentioning Blum,\\nWittmer claimed that Title VII prohibits transgender discrimination.\\n Phillips 66 took no position on whether Title VII prohibits transgender\\ndiscrimination. Instead, Phillips 66 moved for summary judgment on the\\ngrounds that (1) Wittmer failed to state a prima face case of discrimination on\\nthe basis of transgender status, and (2) Wittmer failed to present a genuine\\nissue of material fact that the non-discriminatory reason offered by Phillips 66\\nwas pretextual.\\n The district court granted summary judgment to Phillips 66 on both\\ngrounds. Wittmer appealed.\\n On appeal, Phillips 66 continues to take no position on whether Title VII\\nprohibits discrimination on the basis of transgender status. It instead seeks\\naffirmance on the specific evidentiary grounds on which it prevailed in the\\ndistrict court.\\n This appeal nevertheless attracted substantial amicus attention on the\\nquestion of whether Title VII prohibits transgender discrimination. The EEOC\\nfiled an amicus brief that took no position whether the judgment below should\\nbe affirmed or reversed. The EEOC simply asked this court to hold that Title\\nVII does indeed prohibit discrimination on the basis of transgender status.\\nSimilarly, various organizations, led by the National Center for Lesbian\\nRights, filed an amicus brief that, like EEOC, concluded that Title VII\\nprohibits transgender discrimination, and took no position on the judgment.\\n 4\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n The EEOC requested the opportunity to participate in oral argument.\\nWe granted the request. In addition, we appointed Adam Mortara as amicus\\ncuriae to brief and argue the contrary interpretation of Title VIIβjust as the\\nSecond Circuit did in Zarda. The EEOC subsequently withdrew its request to\\nparticipate in oral argument, due to the government shutdown. So the\\nNational Center amici asked us if they could take the EEOCβs place at the\\npodium. We granted that request as well. 1\\n III.\\n Summary judgment is appropriate βif the movant shows that there is no\\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment\\nas a matter of law.β FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).\\n Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against βany individual\\n. . . because of such individualβs . . . sex.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000e-2(a)(1). To\\nestablish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must either present\\ndirect evidence of discrimination or, in the absence of direct evidence, rely on\\ncircumstantial evidence using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting\\nanalysis. Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff carries the burden to prove\\nthat (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for\\nthe position; (3) he was rejected despite being qualified; and (4) others similarly\\nqualified but outside the protected class were treated more favorably.\\nMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also Willis v.\\nCoca Cola Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2006).\\n If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the\\nemployer to show it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rescinding\\n\\n\\n\\n 1We thank Mr. Mortara for his public service in accepting the courtβs appointment.\\nWe also thank the National Center amici for participating in oral argument under these\\nunusual circumstances. All of the amici provided the court with excellent legal analysis and\\nadvocacy.\\n 5\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nthe offer. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer can show a\\nlegitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, the\\npresumption of discrimination disappears, and the burden shifts back to the\\nplaintiff to show either that the proffered reason was a pretext for\\ndiscrimination, or that the plaintiffβs protected status was another motivating\\nfactor for the decision. Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir.\\n2007). To overcome a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination,\\nthe plaintiff must show something beyond disagreement with the employerβs\\ndecision. Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005)\\n(βDisparate treatment of similarly situated employees is one way to\\ndemonstrate unlawful discrimination and retaliation.β).\\n Wittmerβs claim fails at both steps. To begin with, Wittmer failed to\\nestablish a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, Wittmer did not\\npresent evidence that any non-transgender applicants were treated better, as\\nrequired under the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas. See Rogers v. Pearland\\nIndep. Sch. Dist., 827 F.3d 403, 408β09 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding summary\\njudgment for failing the fourth prong of the prima facie case).\\n In addition, Phillips 66 identified a legitimate, non-discriminatory\\nreason for rescinding the offerβnamely, Wittmerβs misrepresentations.\\nWittmerβs own deposition testimony confirms the misrepresentations about\\nmaintaining an on-going employment relationship with Agrium, and\\nvoluntarily departing Agrium to avoid substantial travel to Canada. And\\nPhillips 66 offered evidence that it decided to rescind the offer due to the\\ndiscrepancies uncovered in the background checkβand that it did so two days\\nbefore anyone at the company ever learned of Wittmerβs transgender status.\\n So Wittmerβs claim fails for two reasons, separate and apart from our\\nholding in Blum. First, Wittmer failed to satisfy the plaintiffβs burden to\\npresent a prima facie case under the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas. And\\n 6\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nsecond, Wittmer did not present a genuine issue of material fact that the non-\\ndiscriminatory reason offered by Phillips 66 was pretextual. The district court\\nwas therefore correct to enter summary judgment for Phillips 66.\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4365403/\", \"author_raw\": \"JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, concurring:\\n\\n I concur fully in the dismissal of Wittmerβs Title VII claim on the grounds\\nstated in the majority opinion. Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir.\\n1979), was decided decades before Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),\\ninvalidated laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct, and we have never\\nsince relied on Blum for its holding that Title VII does not cover sexual\\norientation discrimination. Neither party, in the district court or this court,\\nrelied on or questioned Blumβs continued vitalityβso, wisely I think, we do not\\nreach here to resolve Blumβs endurance or the question of whether Title VII\\ntoday proscribes discrimination against someone because of sexual orientation\\nor transgender status. We do not because we cannot, even with elegant asides.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4365403/\", \"author_raw\": \"PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge, concurring:\\n\\n For four decades, it has been the uniform law of the land, affirmed in\\neleven circuits, that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits sex\\ndiscriminationβnot sexual orientation or transgender discrimination.\\n But that uniformity no longer exists today. Three circuits to date have\\nconstrued Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation or transgender\\ndiscrimination. And now a district court in our circuit has issued a published\\nopinion declaring those rulings βpersuasiveββand thus the βassume[d]β law of\\nour circuitβwithout mentioning our own circuit precedent to the contrary.\\nWittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2018).\\n The majority opinion makes plain what should go without sayingβthat\\nour precedent remains binding in this circuit. I write separately to explain\\nwhy our precedent is also correct as a matter of faithful legal interpretation.\\nOnly the Supreme Court can resolve this circuit split, of course. But because\\nthe EEOC has asked us to address this issueβand because the district court\\nputs the law of our circuit into questionβfurther discussion is warranted.\\n I.\\n Since 1964, Title VII has prohibited employers from βdiscriminat[ing]β\\nagainst any individual with respect to employment βbecause of such\\nindividualβs . . . sex.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000e-2(a)(1).\\n Whether this language applies to sexual orientation or transgender\\ndiscrimination is a question of statutory interpretation that has deeply divided\\nrespected jurists in other circuits in recent years. Compare, e.g., Hively v. Ivy\\nTech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); id. at 352\\n(Posner, J., concurring); id. at 357 (Flaum, J., concurring); Zarda v. Altitude\\nExpress, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc); id. at 132 (Jacobs, J.,\\nconcurring); id. at 135 (Cabranes, J., concurring); id. at 135 (Sack, J.,\\nconcurring); id. at 136 (Lohier, J., concurring); with Hively, 853 F.3d at 359\\n 9\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n(Sykes, J., dissenting); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 137 (Lynch, J., dissenting); id. at\\n167 (Livingston, J., dissenting); id. at 169 (Raggi, J., dissenting).\\n As a matter of ordinary usage, the term βsex,β of course, does not mean\\nβsexual orientationβ or βtransgender status.β βIn common, ordinary usage in\\n1964βand now, for that matterβthe word βsexβ means biologically male or\\nfemale . . . . To a fluent speaker of the English languageβthen and nowβthe\\nordinary meaning of the word βsexβ does not fairly include the concept of βsexual\\norientation.β The two terms are never used interchangeably, and the latter is\\nnot subsumed within the former; there is no overlap in meaning.β Hively, 853\\nF.3d at 362β63 (citations omitted) (Sykes, J., dissenting).\\n But what does it mean to βdiscriminate because of sexβ? There are two\\ncompeting schools of thought. Under the longstanding view, universally\\naccepted by federal circuits for forty years, Title VII prohibits employers from\\nfavoring men over women, or vice versa. By contrast, under the approach\\nrecently adopted in three circuits, Title VII does more than prohibit favoritism\\ntoward men or womenβit requires employers to be entirely blind to a personβs\\nsex. See, e.g., Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (β[H]olding all other things constant and\\nchanging only her sex, [would] she [] have been treated the same way?β).\\n A brief example will illustrate the meaningful difference between these\\ntwo visions. Separate bathrooms for men and women are of course ubiquitous\\nin our society. They are prevalent not because they favor one sex over another,\\nbut because they protect the privacy of both sexes. So separate bathrooms are\\npermitted under the anti-favoritism theory of Title VII. But they are unlawful\\nunder the blindness approach to Title VII, because separate bathrooms are\\nobviously not blind to sex.\\n These competing visions of Title VII similarly diverge on the issue of\\ntransgender and sexual orientation discrimination. Imagine that a company\\ndiscriminates against transgender women. Is that βdiscrimination because of\\n 10\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nsexβ? The anti-favoritism theory would say no, not if the company also\\ndiscriminates against transgender men. After all, that would not be favoring\\nmen over women, or women over menβit would be favoring non-transgender\\npersons over transgender persons. So too as to sexual orientation: A company\\nthat refuses to hire either gay men or lesbian women is not favoring men over\\nwomen, or vice versaβit is favoring straight men and women over gay men\\nand lesbian women. The blindness theory, by contrast, would hold that Title\\nVII prohibits both transgender and sexual orientation discrimination. Because\\nunder that theory, it would not matter that the company isnβt favoring men\\nover women, or women over men. All that matters is that company policy\\ntreats people differently based on their sex: Because only women, not men,\\nmay identify as womenβand only women, not men, may marry menβjust as\\nonly women, not men, may use womenβs bathrooms.\\n Neither of these competing theories appears to be foreclosed under the\\nliteral terms of Title VII. How, then, should a dutiful textualist proceed? When\\nstatutory text permits two very different interpretations, how do you decide?\\nFor a number of reasons, the traditional interpretation should prevail.\\n A.\\n Although judges in other circuits are divided over their interpretation of\\nTitle VII, they are united as to the original public meaning of Title VII.\\n No one seriously contends that, at the time of enactment, the public\\nmeaning and understanding of Title VII included sexual orientation or\\ntransgender discrimination. To the contrary, there is a judicial consensus that\\nthe public meaning of Title VII in 1964 did not include sexual orientation or\\ntransgender discrimination. See, e.g., Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (adopting\\ninterpretation of Title VII that βthe Congress that enacted the Civil Rights Act\\nin 1964 . . . may not have realized or understoodβ); id. at 355 (Posner, J.,\\nconcurring) (βA broader understanding of the word βsexβ in Title VII than the\\n 11\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\noriginal understanding is thus required in order to be able to classify the\\ndiscrimination of which Hively complains as a form of sex discrimination.β); id.\\nat 362 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (βIs it even remotely plausible that in 1964, when\\nTitle VII was adopted, a reasonable person competent in the English language\\nwould have understood that a law banning employment discrimination\\nβbecause of sexβ also banned discrimination because of sexual orientation? The\\nanswer is no, of course not.β); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 137 (Lynch, J., dissenting)\\n(βOf course, todayβs majority does not contend that Congress literally\\nprohibited sexual orientation discrimination in 1964. . . . [A]ny such contention\\nwould be indefensible.β). 1\\n This consensus about the original understanding of Title VII is further\\nbolstered by four decades of case law. During that time, every federal circuit\\nto address the issueβincluding the First through Eleventh Circuitsβrejected\\nattempts to construe Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of either\\nsexual orientation or transgender status. See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d\\n403, *4 (6th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table) (βThe circuits are unanimous in\\nholding that Title VII does not proscribe discrimination based on sexual\\nactivities or orientation.β); Hively, 853 F.3d at 361 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (βThis\\ninterpretation has been stable for many decades and is broadly accepted; all\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Original public meaning is not to be confused with the subjective intent of legislators.\\nOpponents of the traditional view of Title VII point out that members of Congress in 1964\\nwould not have expected it to prohibit sexual harassment, including same-sex sexual\\nharassmentβyet that is how courts have construed it today. See Oncale v. Sundowner\\nOffshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). But for originalists, the point is not whether\\nmembers of Congress subjectively intended that resultβrather, the point is whether they\\nshould have expected it, in light of the words of the statute as they were generally understood\\nat the time. In short, our lodestar is original public meaning, not original intent. It should\\nsurprise no one that a statute drafted to eradicate sex discrimination in the workplace would\\nlater be unanimously construed by the Supreme Court to reach workplace conduct that\\npressures members of one sex out of the workplace, but not the other. See Meritor Sav. Bank,\\nFSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). That of course says nothing about whether Title VII also\\nforbids sexual orientation and transgender discrimination.\\n 12\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\ncircuits agree that sexual-orientation discrimination is a distinct form of\\ndiscrimination and is not synonymous with sex discrimination.β). 2\\n It was not until 40 years after Congress enacted Title VII that a federal\\ncourt of appeals first construed it to prohibit transgender discrimination\\n(Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004))βand 53 years after\\nenactment that a federal court of appeals first construed it to prohibit sexual\\norientation discrimination (Hively, 853 F.3d 339).\\n If the first forty years of uniform circuit precedent nationwide somehow\\ngot the original understanding of Title VII wrong, no one has explained how.\\n B.\\n The traditional understanding of Title VII is further bolstered by other\\nestablished principles of statutory interpretation.\\n\\n\\n 2 See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)\\n(ββ[W]e regard it as settled law that . . . Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply\\nbecause of sexual orientation.ββ); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2nd Cir. 2000) (ββThe\\nlaw is well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the question that . . . Title\\nVII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.β); Bibby v.\\nPhila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3rd Cir. 2001) (βIt is clear . . . that Title VII\\ndoes not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.β); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of\\nAm., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (ββTitle VII does not afford a cause of action for\\ndiscrimination based upon sexual orientation.ββ), abrogated on other grounds by Oncale, 523\\nU.S. 75; Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (βDischarge for\\nhomosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.β); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,\\n762 (6th Cir. 2006) (ββ[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts\\nunder Title VII.ββ); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (βWhile\\nwe recognize distinctions among homosexuals, transvestites, and transsexuals, we believe\\nthat the same reasons for holding that the first two groups do not enjoy Title VII coverage\\napply with equal force to deny protection for transsexuals.β); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards &\\nSons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (ββTitle VII does not prohibit discrimination against\\nhomosexuals.ββ); Sommers v. Budget Mktg, Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982)\\n(β[D]iscrimination based on oneβs transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview\\nof [Title VII].β); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329β30 (9th Cir. 1979) (βTitle\\nVIIβs prohibition of βsexβ discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender\\nand should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality.β);\\nHolloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977) (βTitle VII does not\\nembrace transsexual discrimination.β); Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135\\n(10th Cir. 2005) (ββTitle VIIβs protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a personβs\\nsexuality.β); Evans v. Ga. Regβl Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (following Blum).\\n 13\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, Congress βdoes not alter\\nthe fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague or ancillary\\nprovisionsβit does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.β\\nWhitman v. Am. Trucking Assβn, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). See also, e.g.,\\nGonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (same).\\n The Court typically invokes the βelephantsβ canon when it is asked to\\nconstrue an ambiguous statute to reach a matter of great policy consequence.\\nAs the Court explained, Congress at times drafts statutes that are βsusceptible\\nto more precise definition and open to varying constructions, and thus\\nambiguous in the relevant sense.β Id. at 258. When faced with such ambiguous\\nprovisions, βour inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken to the\\nprecise question at issue is shaped, at least in some measure, by the nature of\\nthe question presented.β FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.\\n120, 159 (2000) (emphasis added). βCongress is more likely to have focused\\nupon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to\\nanswer themselves in the course of the statuteβs daily administration.β Id.\\n For example, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court rejected an interpretation\\nof the Controlled Substances Act that would have given the Attorney General\\nthe power to regulate drugs used in physician-assisted suicide. The Court\\nnoted that β[t]he importance of the issue of physician-assisted suicide, which\\nhas been the subject of an βearnest and profound debateβ across the country,\\nmakes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.β 546\\nU.S. at 267 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997)).\\n Similarly, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Court rejected a reading\\nof the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that would have given the FDA the power\\nto regulate tobacco. The Court said that βwe are confident that Congress could\\nnot have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political\\nsignificance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.β 529 U.S. at 160. See also\\n 14\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nMCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (βIt is highly unlikely that Congress\\nwould leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even\\nsubstantially, rate-regulated to agency discretionβand even more unlikely\\nthat it would achieve that through such a subtle device as permission to\\nβmodifyβ rate-filing requirements.β); Brannan v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451, 463 (1952)\\n(βWe do not think it likely that Congress, in fashioning this intricate . . .\\nmachinery, would thus hang one of the main gears on the tail pipe.β).\\n The elephants canon easily applies here. No one could seriously dispute\\nthe importance of the issues presented in this case, as reflected by the amicus\\nand en banc attention these issues have attracted in other circuits.\\n Whatβs more, this case is about more than sexual orientation or\\ntransgender discrimination. If we accept the blindness theory of Title VII,\\nwhat else are employers prohibited from doing?\\n As I noted earlier, employers would also be forbidden from maintaining\\nseparate bathrooms and changing rooms for men and womenβeven though the\\npurpose of separate bathrooms and changing rooms is not favoritism toward\\neither sex, but respect for the privacy of employees and customers of both sexes.\\nNo one to my knowledge has suggested how the blindness theory of Title VII\\ncould prohibit transgender and sexual orientation discrimination, while still\\nallowing employers to maintain separate bathrooms for men and women. That\\nis presumably because no such limiting principle exists.\\n In Zarda, for example, Judge Lynch stated that surely βTitle VII . . . does\\nnot prohibit an employer from having separate menβs and womenβs toilet\\nfacilities.β 883 F.3d at 150 (Lynch, J., dissenting). Indeed, it was precisely for\\nthat reason that he rejected the blindness view of Title VII. See id. at 151 (βit\\nis not the case that any employment practice that can only be applied by\\nidentifying an employeeβs sex is prohibited,β including separate bathrooms).\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n Notably, the majority in Zarda responded to Judge Lynch by conceding\\nthat, under their view of Title VII, βemployer policies regarding sex-segregated\\nbathroomsβ would indeed βdiscriminate[] because of sex.β Id. at 118. The\\nmajority tried to avoid employer liability for separate bathrooms by suggesting\\nthat bathroom assignments are not significant enough to constitute terms and\\nconditions of employment protected under Title VII. Id. at 118β19. But that\\nonly begs the question: What if an employee is fired for using the wrong\\nbathroom or changing room? The majority does not say.\\n To their credit, the National Center amici conceded during oral\\nargument that, under their theory of Title VII, employers would indeed be\\nforbidden from maintaining separate bathrooms and changing rooms for men\\nand women. Oral Arg. 27:40β28:17.\\n So this case does not simply concern sexual orientation and transgender\\ndiscrimination. It affects every American who uses the restroom at any\\nrestaurant, buys clothes at any department store, or exercises at any gym.\\nWhatβs more, because federal statutes governing educational institutions\\nemploy language indistinguishable from Title VII, this debate also affects\\nvirtually every school, college, dormitory, athletic activity, and locker room in\\nAmerica. See, e.g., Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20\\nU.S.C. Β§ 1681(a) (βNo person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be\\nexcluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to\\ndiscrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal\\nfinancial assistance.β).\\n Under the elephants canon, significant policy issues must be decided by\\nthe people, through their elected representatives in Congress, using clearly\\nunderstood textβnot by judges, using βoblique,β βcryptic,β or βsubtleβ statutory\\nparsing. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 267; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160;\\nMCI, 512 U.S. at 231. That principle surely applies here, considering the\\n 16\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nrevolutionary social change that would be brought about under the blindness\\napproach to Title VII.\\n C.\\n The traditional interpretation of Title VII is also the only reading that\\ncomports with common usage.\\n When construing statutes, courts presume that lawmakers use words in\\nlight of their natural and ordinary meaning, rather than resort to more cryptic\\nformulations. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)\\n(βWhen a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with\\nits ordinary or natural meaning.β).\\n If Congress had meant to prohibit sexual orientation or transgender\\ndiscrimination, surely the most straightforward way to do so would have been\\nto say soβto add βsexual orientationβ or βtransgender statusβ or βgender\\nidentityβ to the list of classifications protected under Title VII. It would defy\\ncommon sense to imagine that lawmakers labored to assemble a majority\\ncoalition to eradicate sexual orientation and transgender discrimination from\\nthe workplaceβonly to select the most oblique formulation they could think of\\n(βbecause of sexβ) and then hope for the best that courts would understand\\nwhat they meant.\\n By the same token, any legitimate theory of interpretation must account\\nfor the possibility that lawmakers might ultimately decide to prohibit sex\\ndiscrimination, but not sexual orientation or transgender discrimination. And\\nthe most obvious way to implement that policy judgment is to do exactly what\\nCongress did in 1964: prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, without the\\nneed for an exemption for, or any other reference to, sexual orientation or\\ntransgender status.\\n This is not just common usage in 1964βit is common usage today.\\nCounsel for the National Center amici acknowledged as much during oral\\n 17\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nargument. When asked about a hypothetical company that hires equally\\nbetween men and women, but refuses to hire any transgender men or women,\\ncounsel agreed that, as a matter of common parlance, we would call that\\ncompany today transphobic, not sexist. Oral Arg. 25:10β25:35.\\n Similarly, both Congress and various state legislatures have expressly\\nprohibited sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by using the\\nterms βsexual orientationβ and βgender identity,β as Judge Sykes cataloged in\\nHively. 853 F.3d at 363β64 (Sykes, J., dissenting). βThis uniformity of usage\\nis powerful objective evidence that sexual-orientation discrimination is broadly\\nrecognized as an independent category of discrimination and is not\\nsynonymous with sex discrimination.β Id. at 364β65. 3\\n II.\\n Opponents of the traditional approach to Title VII nevertheless contend\\nthat their position is compelled by the Supreme Courtβs decision in Price\\nWaterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). See, e.g., Hively, 853 F.3d at 342.\\n Under this theory, sex stereotyping is per se unlawful under Price\\nWaterhouse, regardless of whether it is ultimately used to favor one sex over\\nanother. Accordingly, transgender discrimination must now be treated as per\\nse unlawful under Title VII as well. After all, transgender discrimination\\ntargets transgender men and women precisely because they do not conform\\nwith sex stereotypes as to how they should identify themselves. And so too\\nwith sexual orientation discrimination, which likewise targets gay men and\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. Β§ 2291(b)(13)(A) (prohibits federally\\nfunded programs and activities from discriminating βon the basis of actual or perceived race,\\ncolor, religion, national origin, sex, gender identity, . . . sexual orientation, or disabilityβ);\\nMatthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. Β§ 249(a)(2)(A)\\n(imposes heightened punishment for causing or attempting to cause bodily injury βto any\\nperson, because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,\\ngender identity, or disability of any personβ).\\n 18\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nlesbian women because they do not conform with sex stereotypes. See, e.g., id.\\n(β[A]ll gay, lesbian and bisexual persons fail to comply with the sine qua non\\nof gender stereotypesβthat all men should form intimate relationships only\\nwith women, and all women should form intimate relationships only with\\nmen.β).\\n But hereβs the problem with this theory: Price Waterhouse doesnβt make\\nsex stereotyping per se unlawful under Title VII. To the contrary, under Price\\nWaterhouse, sex stereotyping is actionable only to the extent it provides\\nevidence of favoritism of one sex over the other.\\n The plurality opinion of Justice Brennan, for example, spoke of\\nprohibiting not all sex stereotypes per se, but only βdisparate treatment of men\\nand women resulting from sex stereotypes.β Id. at 251 (emphasis added). See\\nalso id. (βAn employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose\\npositions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible\\ncatch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not.\\nTitle VII lifts women out of this bind.β) (citations and quotations omitted).\\n Similarly, the concurring opinion of Justice OβConnor observed that sex\\nis a βhuman characteristic[] of which decisionmakers are aware and about\\nwhich they may comment in a perfectly neutral and nondiscriminatory\\nfashion.β Id. at 277 (emphasis added). βWhat is required is . . . direct evidence\\nthat decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate\\ncriterion in reaching their decision.β Id.\\n And Justice Kennedy noted on behalf of three dissenting justices that\\nβTitle VII creates no independent cause of action for sex stereotyping.\\nEvidence of use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite\\nrelevant to the question of discriminatory intent. The ultimate question,\\nhowever, is whether discrimination caused the plaintiffβs harm.β Id. at 294.\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 20 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n III.\\n Opponents of the traditional view of Title VII also claim their position is\\ncompelled by an analogy to race, and specifically, to interracial marriage.\\n Put simply, their point is this: Title VII requires blindness to raceβso\\nwhy doesnβt it also require blindness to sex? For example, courts have\\nconstrued Title VII to forbid employers from discriminating against employees\\nfor being in an interracial marriage. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona College, 521\\nF.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 2008); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d\\n888 (11th Cir. 1986). Why, then, doesnβt Title VII also require employers to be\\nblind to sex as wellβwhich would prohibit discrimination on the basis of same-\\nsex marriage, sexual orientation, and transgender status? See, e.g., Hively,\\n853 F.3d at 342 (alleging βsharp tensionβ between lack of Title VII protection\\nfor sexual orientation and legal protection for interracial marriage).\\n But the analogy fails for one simple reason: The Supreme Court has\\nanalyzed interracial marriage differently from same sex marriage.\\n The Court has condemned laws against interracial marriage, not only\\nbecause of our constitutional commitment to color blindness, but because\\nprohibitions on interracial marriage are racist, pure and simple. As the Court\\nput it, β[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of\\ninvidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.β Loving v.\\nVirginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (emphasis added). See also Hively, 853 F.3d at\\n348 (β[M]iscegenation laws . . . are (and always were) inherently racist.β); id.\\nat 368 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (β[M]iscegenation laws are inherently racist.β).\\n By contrast, the Court did not establish a right to same-sex marriage\\nbased on sex discrimination at all, let alone based on blindness to sex. To be\\nsure, the plaintiffs in Obergefell made the argumentβindeed, they devoted an\\nentire subsection of their brief to the argument that traditional marriage laws\\nare not blind to sex. Brief for Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584\\n 20\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 21 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n(2015), available at 2015 WL 860738, *48. Yet not a single justice endorsed\\nthat theory. Instead, the Supreme Court held that traditional marriage laws\\ndiscriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, not sex. As Judge Sykes put it\\nin Hively, βfar from collapsing the well-understood distinction between sex\\ndiscrimination and sexual-orientation discrimination, the Court actually\\npreserved it.β 853 F.3d at 372 (Sykes, J., dissenting).\\n IV.\\n It took an act of Congress to prohibit race and sex discrimination in\\nprivate employment nationwideβa landmark achievement in our nationβs\\nhistory. So too it will take an act of Congress if the people wish to prohibit\\ntransgender and sexual orientation discrimination across the country as well.\\nSee, e.g., Zarda, 883 F.3d at 166 (Lynch, J., dissenting) (β[I]t is the prerogative\\nof Congress or a state legislature to decide whether private employers may\\n[discriminate].β).\\n Running the gauntlet of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution is arduous\\nwork, to be sure. But it is necessary for the people to ensure that the\\nprotections sought in this case are not just legitimate, but lasting.\\n Moreover, it is worth remembering what Congress has already achieved\\nby enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act. As the court-appointed amici reminds\\nus: Title VII protects every American, regardless of sexual orientation or\\ntransgender status. It simply requires proof of sex discrimination, as distinct\\nfrom sexual orientation or transgender discrimination. If you can demonstrate\\nthat your employer will hire transgender men but not transgender women, or\\ngay men but not lesbian women, or vice versa, you may well have a claim of\\nsex discrimination.\\n In sum, Title VII prohibits sex discrimination, full stop. And it applies\\nthe same rules to everyone, without regard to sexual orientation or\\ntransgender status. For example, in OβDaniel v. Industrial Service Solutions,\\n 21\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 22 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n2018 WL 265585, *7 (M.D. La. Jan. 2, 2018) (appeal pending), the district court\\nheld that a straight employee has no Title VII claim for sexual orientation\\ndiscrimination by a lesbian supervisor. See also Medina, 413 F.3d at 1133β35\\n(same). The same rules apply to Bonnie OβDaniel as to Nicole Wittmer.\\n ***\\n Under our Constitution, contentious policy disputes are resolved by the\\npeople, through their elected representatives in Congress. And when a\\nparticular policy position garners enough support to leap the hurdles of Article\\nI, Section 7, it becomes the law of the land.\\n For our system to work, however, we must share a common language.\\nWhen the American people come to a consensus, there must be a way to reduce\\nthe agreement to words that we can all understand and acceptβboth today\\nand in the years to come. We must have confidence that our words will be\\nfaithfully construed in the future, consistent with our common understanding.\\n That confidence is lost if the people undertake to debate difficult issues,\\naccept the daunting task of forging compromise, and then reduce that\\ncompromise to legislationβonly to have courts surprise the people with rulings\\nthat bear no resemblance to our common language. I agree with Judge Lynch\\nthat βwe need to respect the choices made by Congress about which social\\nproblems to address, and how to address them.β Zarda, 883 F.3d at 166\\n(Lynch, J., dissenting). We should not βimpos[e] on a half-century-old statute\\na meaning of βsex discriminationβ that the Congress that enacted it would not\\nhave accepted.β Hively, 853 F.3d at 357 (Posner, J., concurring).\\n I join in the decision to affirm the district court. But I do so with concern\\nthat the people are losing faith in their institutionsβand that our courts are\\ngiving the people reason to do so.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4365403/\", \"author_raw\": \"JAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JAMES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"HIGGINBOTHAM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ELROD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":5,"string":"5"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588150/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Nicole C. WITTMER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n No. 18-20251 February 6, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nNICOLE C. WITTMER, Clerk\n\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\nv.\n\nPHILLIPS 66 COMPANY,\n\n Defendant - Appellee\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and HO, Circuit Judges.\nJAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:\n Over the past two years, three circuits have construed Title VII of the\nCivil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis\nof either sexual orientation or transgender status. See Zarda v. Altitude\nExpress, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R.\nHarris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018); Hively v. Ivy Tech\nCmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).\n The district court here examined these recent out-of-circuit rulings,\nfound them βpersuasive,β and thus βassume[d]β that Title VII prohibits\ntransgender discrimination, in a published opinion. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co.,\n304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2018). In doing so, the district court\nexpressly stated that βthe Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue.β Id.\n\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-20251\n But we have addressed the issue. In Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d\n936 (5th Cir. 1979), we expressly held that Title VII does not prohibit\ndiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Yet the district court did not\nmention, let alone distinguish, Blum. Most notably, it did not contend that\nTitle VII applies to transgender status but not sexual orientation. To the\ncontrary, the court concluded that the βsameβ analysis applies to transgender\nstatus and sexual orientation alike. Wittmer, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 634.\n Blum remains binding precedent in this circuit to this day. Our sister\ncircuitsβincluding those favorably quoted in the district courtβs published\nopinionβrecognize Blum as our precedent. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 107β8\n(recognizing historic βconsensus among our sister circuitsβ foreclosing sexual\norientation claims under Title VII, including Blum); Hively, 853 F.3d at 341β\n42 (βrecognizing . . . Fifth Circuitβs precedent in Blumβ); see also Evans v. Ga.\nRegβl Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (Blum is βbinding precedentβ\nthat βforeclosesβ sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII).\n Other district courts within the Fifth Circuit have likewise repeatedly\nacknowledged that Blum is binding circuit precedent. See, e.g., OβDaniel v.\nIndus. Serv. Solutions, 2018 WL 265585, *7 (M.D. La. Jan. 2, 2018) (βThe Fifth\nCircuit has specifically held that discharge based upon sexual orientation is\nnot prohibited by Title VII . . . . Blum is binding precedentβ); Berghorn v. Texas\nWorkforce Commβn, 2017 WL 5479592, *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2017) (βThe\ncourt . . . is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, not Seventh Circuit precedent.β).\n We nevertheless affirm the district court on other grounds. The district\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment for the employer, because the\nemployee failed to present sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of\ndiscrimination, and because the employee failed to present a genuine issue of\nmaterial fact concerning pretext.\n\n\n 2\n\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-20251\n I.\n Nicole Wittmer, a transgender woman, applied for an Instrument and\nReliability Engineer position with Phillips 66 in 2015. Phillips 66 conducted\nfour interviews, including an in-person interview on August 3.\n During these interviews, Phillips 66 asked about Wittmerβs current\nemployment with Agrium. They discussed on-going projects at Agrium that\nwould require significant future travel to Canada as the reason Wittmer was\nlooking for a new job. On August 10, Phillips 66 offered Wittmer the job,\ncontingent on passing certain background checks.\n On September 2, Ellen Fulton, Phillips 66βs Human Resources Manager,\ninformed Wittmer that the background check uncovered a discrepancy:\nAgrium terminated Wittmer on July 28, with pay continuing through\nAugust 2.\n In response, Wittmer acknowledged the discrepancy, but did not think\nβit was that big of a deal.β Wittmer sent Fulton the July 28 termination letter\nfrom Agrium, clearly stating that their employment relationship ended on July\n28.\n Fulton and several other Phillips 66 executives conferred on\nSeptember 8. Everyone at the meeting agreed that the offer of employment\nshould be rescinded due to Wittmerβs misrepresentations.\n On September 10, Wittmer sent an unsolicited email to Fulton and\nanother Phillips 66 employee, accusing them of transgender discrimination.\nFulton responded that Phillips 66 was unaware of Wittmerβs transgender\nstatus prior to the email, and that in any event, the information would not\naffect Phillips 66βs decision.\n On September 14, Fulton formally rescinded the offer of employment.\nFulton explained that it was due to the discrepancies revealed during the\nbackground check after the initial conditional offer.\n 3\n\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-20251\n A year later, in October 2016, Wittmer filed a charge of discrimination\nwith the EEOC against Phillips 66. Wittmer claimed that Phillips 66 rescinded\nits offer because of transgender discrimination. The EEOC issued a right-to-\nsue letter.\n II.\n Wittmer sued Phillips 66 under Title VII for discrimination on the basis\nof transgender status. Without distinguishing or even mentioning Blum,\nWittmer claimed that Title VII prohibits transgender discrimination.\n Phillips 66 took no position on whether Title VII prohibits transgender\ndiscrimination. Instead, Phillips 66 moved for summary judgment on the\ngrounds that (1) Wittmer failed to state a prima face case of discrimination on\nthe basis of transgender status, and (2) Wittmer failed to present a genuine\nissue of material fact that the non-discriminatory reason offered by Phillips 66\nwas pretextual.\n The district court granted summary judgment to Phillips 66 on both\ngrounds. Wittmer appealed.\n On appeal, Phillips 66 continues to take no position on whether Title VII\nprohibits discrimination on the basis of transgender status. It instead seeks\naffirmance on the specific evidentiary grounds on which it prevailed in the\ndistrict court.\n This appeal nevertheless attracted substantial amicus attention on the\nquestion of whether Title VII prohibits transgender discrimination. The EEOC\nfiled an amicus brief that took no position whether the judgment below should\nbe affirmed or reversed. The EEOC simply asked this court to hold that Title\nVII does indeed prohibit discrimination on the basis of transgender status.\nSimilarly, various organizations, led by the National Center for Lesbian\nRights, filed an amicus brief that, like EEOC, concluded that Title VII\nprohibits transgender discrimination, and took no position on the judgment.\n 4\n\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-20251\n The EEOC requested the opportunity to participate in oral argument.\nWe granted the request. In addition, we appointed Adam Mortara as amicus\ncuriae to brief and argue the contrary interpretation of Title VIIβjust as the\nSecond Circuit did in Zarda. The EEOC subsequently withdrew its request to\nparticipate in oral argument, due to the government shutdown. So the\nNational Center amici asked us if they could take the EEOCβs place at the\npodium. We granted that request as well. 1\n III.\n Summary judgment is appropriate βif the movant shows that there is no\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment\nas a matter of law.β FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).\n Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against βany individual\n. . . because of such individualβs . . . sex.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000e-2(a)(1). To\nestablish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must either present\ndirect evidence of discrimination or, in the absence of direct evidence, rely on\ncircumstantial evidence using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting\nanalysis. Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff carries the burden to prove\nthat (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for\nthe position; (3) he was rejected despite being qualified; and (4) others similarly\nqualified but outside the protected class were treated more favorably.\nMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also Willis v.\nCoca Cola Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2006).\n If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the\nemployer to show it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rescinding\n\n\n\n 1We thank Mr. Mortara for his public service in accepting the courtβs appointment.\nWe also thank the National Center amici for participating in oral argument under these\nunusual circumstances. All of the amici provided the court with excellent legal analysis and\nadvocacy.\n 5\n\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-20251\nthe offer. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer can show a\nlegitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, the\npresumption of discrimination disappears, and the burden shifts back to the\nplaintiff to show either that the proffered reason was a pretext for\ndiscrimination, or that the plaintiffβs protected status was another motivating\nfactor for the decision. Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir.\n2007). To overcome a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination,\nthe plaintiff must show something beyond disagreement with the employerβs\ndecision. Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005)\n(βDisparate treatment of similarly situated employees is one way to\ndemonstrate unlawful discrimination and retaliation.β).\n Wittmerβs claim fails at both steps. To begin with, Wittmer failed to\nestablish a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, Wittmer did not\npresent evidence that any non-transgender applicants were treated better, as\nrequired under the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas. See Rogers v. Pearland\nIndep. Sch. Dist., 827 F.3d 403, 408β09 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding summary\njudgment for failing the fourth prong of the prima facie case).\n In addition, Phillips 66 identified a legitimate, non-discriminatory\nreason for rescinding the offerβnamely, Wittmerβs misrepresentations.\nWittmerβs own deposition testimony confirms the misrepresentations about\nmaintaining an on-going employment relationship with Agrium, and\nvoluntarily departing Agrium to avoid substantial travel to Canada. And\nPhillips 66 offered evidence that it decided to rescind the offer due to the\ndiscrepancies uncovered in the background checkβand that it did so two days\nbefore anyone at the company ever learned of Wittmerβs transgender status.\n So Wittmerβs claim fails for two reasons, separate and apart from our\nholding in Blum. First, Wittmer failed to satisfy the plaintiffβs burden to\npresent a prima facie case under the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas. And\n 6\n\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-20251\nsecond, Wittmer did not present a genuine issue of material fact that the non-\ndiscriminatory reason offered by Phillips 66 was pretextual. The district court\nwas therefore correct to enter summary judgment for Phillips 66.\n The judgment is affirmed.\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 18-20251\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Nicole C. WITTMER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 18-20251 February 6, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nNICOLE C. WITTMER, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nPHILLIPS 66 COMPANY,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and HO, Circuit Judges.\\nJAMES C. HO, Circuit Judge:\\n Over the past two years, three circuits have construed Title VII of the\\nCivil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis\\nof either sexual orientation or transgender status. See Zarda v. Altitude\\nExpress, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R.\\nHarris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018); Hively v. Ivy Tech\\nCmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).\\n The district court here examined these recent out-of-circuit rulings,\\nfound them βpersuasive,β and thus βassume[d]β that Title VII prohibits\\ntransgender discrimination, in a published opinion. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co.,\\n304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2018). In doing so, the district court\\nexpressly stated that βthe Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue.β Id.\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n But we have addressed the issue. In Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d\\n936 (5th Cir. 1979), we expressly held that Title VII does not prohibit\\ndiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Yet the district court did not\\nmention, let alone distinguish, Blum. Most notably, it did not contend that\\nTitle VII applies to transgender status but not sexual orientation. To the\\ncontrary, the court concluded that the βsameβ analysis applies to transgender\\nstatus and sexual orientation alike. Wittmer, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 634.\\n Blum remains binding precedent in this circuit to this day. Our sister\\ncircuitsβincluding those favorably quoted in the district courtβs published\\nopinionβrecognize Blum as our precedent. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 107β8\\n(recognizing historic βconsensus among our sister circuitsβ foreclosing sexual\\norientation claims under Title VII, including Blum); Hively, 853 F.3d at 341β\\n42 (βrecognizing . . . Fifth Circuitβs precedent in Blumβ); see also Evans v. Ga.\\nRegβl Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (Blum is βbinding precedentβ\\nthat βforeclosesβ sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII).\\n Other district courts within the Fifth Circuit have likewise repeatedly\\nacknowledged that Blum is binding circuit precedent. See, e.g., OβDaniel v.\\nIndus. Serv. Solutions, 2018 WL 265585, *7 (M.D. La. Jan. 2, 2018) (βThe Fifth\\nCircuit has specifically held that discharge based upon sexual orientation is\\nnot prohibited by Title VII . . . . Blum is binding precedentβ); Berghorn v. Texas\\nWorkforce Commβn, 2017 WL 5479592, *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2017) (βThe\\ncourt . . . is bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, not Seventh Circuit precedent.β).\\n We nevertheless affirm the district court on other grounds. The district\\ncourt correctly granted summary judgment for the employer, because the\\nemployee failed to present sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of\\ndiscrimination, and because the employee failed to present a genuine issue of\\nmaterial fact concerning pretext.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n I.\\n Nicole Wittmer, a transgender woman, applied for an Instrument and\\nReliability Engineer position with Phillips 66 in 2015. Phillips 66 conducted\\nfour interviews, including an in-person interview on August 3.\\n During these interviews, Phillips 66 asked about Wittmerβs current\\nemployment with Agrium. They discussed on-going projects at Agrium that\\nwould require significant future travel to Canada as the reason Wittmer was\\nlooking for a new job. On August 10, Phillips 66 offered Wittmer the job,\\ncontingent on passing certain background checks.\\n On September 2, Ellen Fulton, Phillips 66βs Human Resources Manager,\\ninformed Wittmer that the background check uncovered a discrepancy:\\nAgrium terminated Wittmer on July 28, with pay continuing through\\nAugust 2.\\n In response, Wittmer acknowledged the discrepancy, but did not think\\nβit was that big of a deal.β Wittmer sent Fulton the July 28 termination letter\\nfrom Agrium, clearly stating that their employment relationship ended on July\\n28.\\n Fulton and several other Phillips 66 executives conferred on\\nSeptember 8. Everyone at the meeting agreed that the offer of employment\\nshould be rescinded due to Wittmerβs misrepresentations.\\n On September 10, Wittmer sent an unsolicited email to Fulton and\\nanother Phillips 66 employee, accusing them of transgender discrimination.\\nFulton responded that Phillips 66 was unaware of Wittmerβs transgender\\nstatus prior to the email, and that in any event, the information would not\\naffect Phillips 66βs decision.\\n On September 14, Fulton formally rescinded the offer of employment.\\nFulton explained that it was due to the discrepancies revealed during the\\nbackground check after the initial conditional offer.\\n 3\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n A year later, in October 2016, Wittmer filed a charge of discrimination\\nwith the EEOC against Phillips 66. Wittmer claimed that Phillips 66 rescinded\\nits offer because of transgender discrimination. The EEOC issued a right-to-\\nsue letter.\\n II.\\n Wittmer sued Phillips 66 under Title VII for discrimination on the basis\\nof transgender status. Without distinguishing or even mentioning Blum,\\nWittmer claimed that Title VII prohibits transgender discrimination.\\n Phillips 66 took no position on whether Title VII prohibits transgender\\ndiscrimination. Instead, Phillips 66 moved for summary judgment on the\\ngrounds that (1) Wittmer failed to state a prima face case of discrimination on\\nthe basis of transgender status, and (2) Wittmer failed to present a genuine\\nissue of material fact that the non-discriminatory reason offered by Phillips 66\\nwas pretextual.\\n The district court granted summary judgment to Phillips 66 on both\\ngrounds. Wittmer appealed.\\n On appeal, Phillips 66 continues to take no position on whether Title VII\\nprohibits discrimination on the basis of transgender status. It instead seeks\\naffirmance on the specific evidentiary grounds on which it prevailed in the\\ndistrict court.\\n This appeal nevertheless attracted substantial amicus attention on the\\nquestion of whether Title VII prohibits transgender discrimination. The EEOC\\nfiled an amicus brief that took no position whether the judgment below should\\nbe affirmed or reversed. The EEOC simply asked this court to hold that Title\\nVII does indeed prohibit discrimination on the basis of transgender status.\\nSimilarly, various organizations, led by the National Center for Lesbian\\nRights, filed an amicus brief that, like EEOC, concluded that Title VII\\nprohibits transgender discrimination, and took no position on the judgment.\\n 4\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n The EEOC requested the opportunity to participate in oral argument.\\nWe granted the request. In addition, we appointed Adam Mortara as amicus\\ncuriae to brief and argue the contrary interpretation of Title VIIβjust as the\\nSecond Circuit did in Zarda. The EEOC subsequently withdrew its request to\\nparticipate in oral argument, due to the government shutdown. So the\\nNational Center amici asked us if they could take the EEOCβs place at the\\npodium. We granted that request as well. 1\\n III.\\n Summary judgment is appropriate βif the movant shows that there is no\\ngenuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment\\nas a matter of law.β FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).\\n Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against βany individual\\n. . . because of such individualβs . . . sex.β 42 U.S.C. Β§ 2000e-2(a)(1). To\\nestablish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must either present\\ndirect evidence of discrimination or, in the absence of direct evidence, rely on\\ncircumstantial evidence using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting\\nanalysis. Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff carries the burden to prove\\nthat (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for\\nthe position; (3) he was rejected despite being qualified; and (4) others similarly\\nqualified but outside the protected class were treated more favorably.\\nMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See also Willis v.\\nCoca Cola Enters., Inc., 445 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2006).\\n If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the\\nemployer to show it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rescinding\\n\\n\\n\\n 1We thank Mr. Mortara for his public service in accepting the courtβs appointment.\\nWe also thank the National Center amici for participating in oral argument under these\\nunusual circumstances. All of the amici provided the court with excellent legal analysis and\\nadvocacy.\\n 5\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nthe offer. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer can show a\\nlegitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, the\\npresumption of discrimination disappears, and the burden shifts back to the\\nplaintiff to show either that the proffered reason was a pretext for\\ndiscrimination, or that the plaintiffβs protected status was another motivating\\nfactor for the decision. Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir.\\n2007). To overcome a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination,\\nthe plaintiff must show something beyond disagreement with the employerβs\\ndecision. Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005)\\n(βDisparate treatment of similarly situated employees is one way to\\ndemonstrate unlawful discrimination and retaliation.β).\\n Wittmerβs claim fails at both steps. To begin with, Wittmer failed to\\nestablish a prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, Wittmer did not\\npresent evidence that any non-transgender applicants were treated better, as\\nrequired under the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas. See Rogers v. Pearland\\nIndep. Sch. Dist., 827 F.3d 403, 408β09 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding summary\\njudgment for failing the fourth prong of the prima facie case).\\n In addition, Phillips 66 identified a legitimate, non-discriminatory\\nreason for rescinding the offerβnamely, Wittmerβs misrepresentations.\\nWittmerβs own deposition testimony confirms the misrepresentations about\\nmaintaining an on-going employment relationship with Agrium, and\\nvoluntarily departing Agrium to avoid substantial travel to Canada. And\\nPhillips 66 offered evidence that it decided to rescind the offer due to the\\ndiscrepancies uncovered in the background checkβand that it did so two days\\nbefore anyone at the company ever learned of Wittmerβs transgender status.\\n So Wittmerβs claim fails for two reasons, separate and apart from our\\nholding in Blum. First, Wittmer failed to satisfy the plaintiffβs burden to\\npresent a prima facie case under the fourth prong of McDonnell Douglas. And\\n 6\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\nsecond, Wittmer did not present a genuine issue of material fact that the non-\\ndiscriminatory reason offered by Phillips 66 was pretextual. The district court\\nwas therefore correct to enter summary judgment for Phillips 66.\\n The judgment is affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\n Case: 18-20251 Document: 00514825287 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 18-20251\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":591,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588151,"string":"4,588,151"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Kymberli GARDNER, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., Doing Business as Plaza Community Living Center, Defendant - Appellee"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Kymberli Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-06"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-60072"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"King, Dennis, Costa\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 17-60072 February 6, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nKYMBERLI GARDNER, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nCLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., doing business as Plaza Community Living\\nCenter,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\\n The opinion previously issued in this case is withdrawn, and the\\nfollowing opinion is substituted in its place.\\n Claims of sexual harassment typically involve the behavior of fellow\\nemployees. But not always. Because the ultimate focus of Title VII liability is\\non the employerβs conductβunless a supervisor is the harasser, a plaintiff\\nneeds to show that the employer knew or should have known about the hostile\\nwork environment yet allowed it to persist, see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570\\nU.S. 421, 427 (2013) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n(1998)) 1βnonemployees can be the source of the harassment. See 29 C.F.R.\\nΒ§ 1604.11(e) (βAn employer may . . . be responsible for the acts of non-\\nemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,\\nwhere the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should\\nhave known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate\\ncorrective action.β).\\n Customers are one example of third-party harassers. See generally Lori\\nA. Tetreault, Liability of Employer, Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964\\n(42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) for Sexual Harassment of Employee by Customer,\\nClient, or Patron, 163 A.L.R. FED. 445 (2000). A leading case on third-party\\nharassment addressed whether Pizza Hut could be liable for customersβ\\nharassment of a waitress. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1067,\\n1072 (10th Cir. 1998). Casinos seem especially susceptible to these claims, as\\none case addresses a high rollerβs harassment of a cocktail waitress and\\nanother a card playerβs harassment of a blackjack dealer. See generally Oliver\\nv. Sheraton Tunica Corp., 2000 WL 303444 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 8, 2000) (former);\\nPowell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992) (latter).\\n This case presents one of the more challenging situations in which to\\napply this principle that an employer can be liable for a hostile work\\nenvironment created by nonemployees: a nurse alleges that an assisted living\\nfacility allowed such an environment to continue by not preventing a residentβs\\n\\n\\n 1 Even when a supervisor is the harasser, liability flows from agency principles that\\nrender the employer liable. Vance, 570 U.S. at 428β29. One of those situations is when a\\nsupervisorβs harassing behavior resulted in an adverse βtangible employment decision.β Id.\\nLiability attaches in that situation because that injury βrequires an official act of the\\nenterpriseβ that will usually be βdocumented in official company recordsβ and often βsubject\\nto review by higher level supervisors.β Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761β\\n62 (1998). Absent that type of employment consequence, the company will be liable for a\\nsupervisorβs harassment only βif the employer is unable to establish an affirmative defenseβ\\nthat considers whether the employer took preventative or corrective measures to combat the\\nharassment. Vance, 570 U.S. at 429β30 (citing Ellerth and Faragher).\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nrepetitive harassment. The unique nature of that workplace is an important\\nconsideration. As we and other courts have recognized, the diminished\\ncapacity of patients influences whether the harassment should be perceived as\\naffecting the terms and conditions of employment. We must decide when the\\nallegations of harassment nonetheless become so severe or pervasive that fact\\nissues exist requiring a jury to decide the question.\\n I.\\n Kymberli Gardner worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant at an\\nassisted living facility operated by CLC of Pascagoula, d/b/a Plaza Community\\nLiving Center, from 2012 until she was fired in 2015. 2 Gardner is an\\nexperienced health aide. Before working for CLC, she was a caregiver for\\nseveral facilities and in-home care providers, two of which specialized in care\\nfor the mentally disabled. Gardner was trained in defensive and de-escalation\\ntactics for aggressive patients. As one might expect, during her years as a\\ncaregiver she often worked with patients who were βeither physically\\ncombative or sexually aggressive.β\\n But what she experienced with one patient at the CLC facility rose to a\\nnew level. J.S. was an elderly resident who lived at Plaza between 2006 and\\n2014. He had a reputation for groping female employees and becoming\\nphysically aggressive when reprimanded. J.S. had been diagnosed with a\\nvariety of physical and mental illnesses including dementia, traumatic brain\\ninjury, personality disorder with aggressive behavior, and Parkinsonβs\\nDisease. J.S.βs long history of violent and sexual behavior toward both patients\\nand staff included the following:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In light of the summary judgment posture, we recite these facts taking competing\\n 2\\n\\nevidence in the light most favorable to Gardner.\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n β’ J.S. had to be transferred from his initial residence wing because he\\n had become βcombativeβ and had physically assaulted his bedridden\\n roommate during a dispute over a television.\\n β’ J.S. was much more aggressive and sexually inappropriate towards\\n his female caregivers than even other problematic nursing home\\n residents; he would sexually assault them by grabbing their\\n βbreast[s], butts, thighs, and try[ing] to grab [their] private areas.β\\n β’ J.S. asked for explicit sexual acts on a regular basis and made lewd\\n sexual comments toward female staff. He asked female employees to\\n engage in sexual activity with him β[a]ll the time.β\\n Gardner, who became responsible for J.S.βs care, experienced these types\\nof inappropriate behavior from J.S. β[e]very day.β Gardner reported that J.S.\\nwould physically grab her and make repeated sexual comments and requests.\\nShe and other CLC employees documented J.S.βs behavior by routinely\\nrecording it on his chart and making complaints to supervisors.\\n As a result, J.S.βs behavior was not a secret to those who ran the assisted\\nliving facility. Brandy Gregg, Gardnerβs former supervisor and now the\\ndirector of nursing, had witnessed J.S.βs behaving in a sexually inappropriate\\nmanner and also received complaints from nurses to that effect. These\\nconcerns led administrators to transfer J.S. to a new wing. But they were not\\nalways responsive to the complaints. They declined, for example, to have him\\nundergo a psychiatric evaluation after he assaulted his roommate. J.S. later\\nassaulted a CLC employee and was sent for evaluation, but subsequently\\nreturned to CLC. And when Gardner attempted to discuss her concerns about\\nJ.S.βs behavior, Gregg laughed, and Administrator Teri Reynolds told Gardner\\nto βput [her] big girl panties on and go back to work.β\\n So Gardner continued to care for J.S., which ultimately resulted in the\\nincident that led to her termination. It began when Gardner was trying to help\\nJ.S. attend a therapy session. As she was assisting J.S. out of bed, he began\\ntrying βto gropeβ her and then tried to touch Gardnerβs left breast while she\\nwas bent over. When she tried to move out of the way, J.S. punched her on the\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nside of her breast. Gardner then laid him down on the bed and left the room\\nto get help. Janice Watkins, another nursing assistant, joined Gardner and\\nthe two again attempted to help J.S. out of bed and into a chair. At this point\\nJ.S. punched Gardner a second time. Gardner removed herself from J.Sβs\\nimmediate area at which point he began to grab Watkinsβ βprivate area.β\\nGardner sought help from the nurse on duty, Judy Toche. Gardner, Toche, and\\nWatkins were able to get J.S. into his wheelchair. Gardner then moved to\\nmake the bed, but J.S. punched her a third time.\\n What Gardner did in response is disputed. Greggβs typed summary of\\nevents, as well as the deposition testimony of Toche, and Tocheβs βnurseβs\\nnotesβ from the day of the incident claim that Gardner βswung her own fist\\nover [J.S.βs] headβ and that her arm βbrushed the top of his head.β Watkins,\\non the other hand, asserts in both her deposition and her written witness\\ninterview statement that Gardner β[went] up with her hand as if she was going\\nto hit [patient]β but βdidnβt hit [patient] at all.β Gardner says she did not swing\\nat J.S. during the incident. Gardner also reportedly made two statements as\\nshe was leaving J.S.βs room. Watkins testifies Gardner said, βI am not doing\\nshit else for [patient] at all.β Gardner also reportedly said, βI guess Iβm not the\\nright color,β presumably because Toche, a white nurse, was able to calm J.S.\\nwhereas Gardner, a black nursing assistant, could not. After the incident,\\nGardner spoke with both Toche and Teri Reynolds, then the facility\\nadministrator, about her assignment to care for J.S. Gardner refused to care\\nfor him due to the continued harassment and asked to be reassigned. Her\\nrequest was denied.\\n Gardner then left work and went to the emergency room that evening\\ndue to injuries she sustained. She did not return to work for three months\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nduring which time she received workersβ compensation. 3 Shortly after\\nreturning from leave, Gardner was fired. Gregg, Gardnerβs supervisor at the\\ntime, says Gardner was fired for three reasons: (1) insubordination (refusing\\nto care for J.S.); (2) violating J.S.βs resident rights (by swearing in front of him\\nand making a βracist type statement[],β apparently the one about her not being\\nthe βright colorβ); and (3) attacking J.S. (swinging over his head).\\n As for J.S., nothing happened to him immediately after the incident with\\nGardner. But another altercation later that same day with a resident resulted\\nin his being sent for a psychiatric evaluation and then moved to an all-male\\nβlockdownβ unit in nearby Biloxi.\\n Gardner sued, asserting multiple claims under Title VII. CLC moved for\\nsummary judgment and to strike certain affidavit testimony. Gardner also\\nmoved to strike portions of affidavit and deposition testimony. The district\\ncourt denied Gardnerβs motion to strike, and denied in part and granted in part\\nCLCβs motion to strike. 4 The lower court then granted summary judgment in\\nfavor of CLC on all claims. Gardnerβs appeal pursues only her claims of hostile\\nwork environment and retaliation. 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Gregg and the contemporaneous incident report say that Gardner had been\\nsuspended. But the report from CLCβs internal investigation contradicts that claim as it says\\nthat Gardnerβs βseparation from her employment was held pending her completion of her\\nworkmenβs compensation.β Gardnerβs affidavit also asserts she was never informed she had\\nbeen suspended. We assume for purposes of summary judgment that Gardner was not\\nsuspended and was on workersβ compensation during her three-month absence.\\n 4 Gardner appeals some of those evidentiary rulings. We conclude that the district\\n\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion striking portions of her affidavit as speculative. And we\\nneed not decide whether the district court erred in considering Greggβs testimony about the\\nreasons for the termination as that issue does not affect our ruling.\\n 5 While Gardner purports to appeal her sex discrimination claim based on disparate\\n\\ntreatment in addition to the one alleging hostile work environment, she has not sufficiently\\nbriefed that claim.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n II.\\n The district court concluded that a hostile workplace did not exist. It\\nexplained that it was βnot clear to the Court that the harassing comments and\\nattempts to grope and hit are beyond what a person in Gardnerβs position\\nshould expect of patients in a nursing home.β CLC defends the grant of\\nsummary judgment on that ground as well as on one the district court did not\\nreach: whether the company knew about the harassment and failed to take\\nremedial action. The other elements of a Title VII hostile work environment\\nclaimβthat Gardner is a member of a protected class who was subject to some\\nharassment on the basis of her sexβare not disputed. Royal v. CCC & R Tres\\nArboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2013).\\n A.\\n Our de novo review of the grant of summary judgment leads us to a\\ndifferent conclusion given that all inferences must be viewed in Gardnerβs favor\\nat this stage. See Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015);\\nBurnett Ranches, Ltd. v. United States, 753 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2014). To\\nget past summary judgment, Gardner need not make it βclearβ that she was\\nsubject to actionable harassment; she of course only needs to show that a jury\\ncould reach that conclusion based on its view of the evidence.\\n Title VII does not prohibit all harassment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.\\nVinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). It makes harassing conduct unlawful when it\\nresults in the employer βdiscriminat[ing] against any individual with respect\\nto his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of\\nsuch individualβs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2000eβ2(a)(1); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21β23 (1993); Meritor,\\n477 U.S. at 64β67. This statutory language βis not limited to βeconomicβ or\\nβtangibleβ discrimination.β Id. at 64. Instead, βthe phrase βterms, conditions,\\nor privileges of employmentβ evinces a congressional intent βto strike at the\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nentire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and womenβ in employment,\\nwhich includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive\\nenvironment.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). Title\\nVII is violated βwhen the workplace is permeated with βdiscriminatory\\nintimidation, ridicule, and insult,β . . . that is βsufficiently severe or pervasive\\nto alter the conditions of the victimβs employment and create an abusive\\nworking environment. Id.; Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d\\n871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court set the βsevere or pervasiveβ\\nstandard as a βmiddle path between making actionable any conduct that is\\nmerely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological\\ninjury.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. A plaintiff βmust subjectively perceive the\\nharassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive, and this subjective perception\\nmust be objectively reasonable.β Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 138 (5th\\nCir. 2003).\\n As a starting point, the multiple years of unwanted sexual grabbing and\\nexplicit comments Gardner endured could certainly be deemed severe and\\npervasive harassmentβonly one of those is necessary, Lauderdale v. Tex. Depβt\\nof Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007)βif the harasser were\\nsomeone without any mental impairments. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668\\nF.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 2012) (hostile work environment when plaintiff was\\nsubject to multiple months of unwanted sexual grabbing and explicit\\ncomments); Harvill, v. Westward Commcβns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir.\\n2005) (finding severe or pervasive harassment when, over seven months, a\\ncoworker grabbed a female employee, fondled her breasts and patted her\\nbuttocks βnumerous times,β and rubbed his body against the plaintiff).\\n The complication is the one we have already mentioned: the source of the\\nharassment is the resident of an assisted living facility who suffers from\\ndementia. We have twice confronted hostile work environment claims based\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\non the behavior of patients towards caregivers. The first case involved home\\nhealth services. We held that the verbal harassment, which included the\\npatient repeatedly propositioning the plaintiff for sex and calling her\\ndisparaging names, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Cain v. Blackwell,\\n246 F.3d 758, 760β61 (5th Cir. 2001). We reached the same conclusion in the\\nnext case when a nursing home patient repeatedly directed racial slurs at a\\nnurseβs assistant. E.E.O.C. v. Nexion Health at Broadway, Inc., 199 F. Appβx\\n351, 353 (5th Cir. 2006). 6 Although the verbal harassment was βquite\\noffensive,β the comments did not rise to the level of actionable conduct because\\nthey were not βphysically threatening or humiliatingβ and did not βpervade the\\nwork experience of a reasonable nursing home employee, especially\\nconsidering their source.β Id. at 353β54. We recognized, however, that there\\nis not a categorical bar on hostile environment claims arising from harassment\\nby patients. See id. at 353 (βCain does not establish a bright-line rule that\\nemployees who care for disabled, elderly patients can never succeed on a Title\\nVII claim.β). 7 The βspecific circumstancesβ of such claims βmust be judged to\\ndetermine whether a reasonable person would find the work environment\\nhostile or abusiveβ taking due account of the βunique circumstances involved\\nin caring for mentally diseased elderly patients.β Id.\\n Other circuits have found triable hostile work environment claims when\\npatients engaged in the physical harassment absent in Nexion and Cain. The\\n\\n\\n 6 Although Nexion is not binding, we address it because the district court relied on it\\nin granting summary judgment, and it illustrates the range of conduct courts have considered\\nin this area.\\n 7 The district court thought Nexion βindicates that the default is no viable Title VII\\n\\nclaim in such situations.β Nexion did not create a default presumption against Title VII\\nliability when the harasser is suffering from mental disability. Its statement that there is no\\nβbright-line ruleβ does the opposite of setting any hard and fast rule. The Nexion language\\nemphasizes what is true of most areas of the lawβthe outcome will depend on the facts of\\nindividual cases. So while a diminished mental condition of the harasser is an important\\nconsideration, it does not preclude liability.\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nEighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment when a mentally\\nhandicapped, teenage resident of a care facility βpushed [a female caregiver]\\nagainst a door, forced her right hand above her head, pulled open her jeans and\\nher blouse, grabbed her left breast, and pushed his weight and erect penis\\nagainst her stomach.β Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1108 (8th Cir.\\n1997). The Tenth Circuit also rejected a district courtβs granting judgment as\\na matter of law for the hospital when a patient βknocked [a psychologist] to the\\nground, undressed her and digitally penetrated her, bit and choked her, and\\nrepeatedly threatened to kill her.β Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d\\n1238, 1242β43 (10th Cir. 2001).\\n J.S.βs conduct is more severe than the nonphysical harassment held to\\nbe insufficient in Cain and Nexion 8 but not as severe as the potentially life-\\nthreatening sexual assaults in Crist or Turnbull. But the latter situation does\\nnot set a floor for actionable conduct. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (explaining that\\nTitle VII does not require harassment to βseriously affect employeesβ\\npsychological well-beingβ). So the question remains whether the conduct here,\\nwhich falls in the middle of this continuum, is enough. And that, as we have\\nsaid, involves the difficult line-drawing problem of what separates legally\\nactionable harassment from conduct that one should reasonably expect when\\nassisting people suffering from dementia.\\n We conclude that the evidence of persistent and often physical\\nharassment by J.S. is enough to allow a jury to decide whether a reasonable\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 It is also more severe and pervasive than the conduct in an Illinois federal case the\\ndistrict court relied on. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 2008 WL 719224, at *4 (N.D.\\nIll. Mar. 14, 2008), affβd, 610 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2010). Pickett considered conduct from a\\nresident that happened three times over eight months. More importantly, Pickett refrained\\nfrom deciding whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, and instead granted summary\\njudgment in favor of the defendant because it took several steps to mitigate the harassing\\nbehavior. Id. at *5. As will be discussed, CLC did not take those measures.\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\ncaregiver on the receiving end of the harassment would have viewed it as\\nsufficiently severe or pervasive even considering the medical condition of the\\nharasser. The frequency and nature of the conduct, along with its effect on\\nGardnerβs employment, would allow (but not require) that finding. Id. at 23\\n(finding that βthe frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;\\nwhether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive\\nutterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employeeβs work\\nperformanceβ are factors that influence whether harassment can be described\\nas βhostileβ or βabusiveβ); see also Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476\\nF.3d 337, 347β48 (5th Cir. 2007). J.S.βs inappropriate conduct occurred daily.\\nHis conduct was far more severe than other residentsβ and consisted of physical\\nsexual assault and violent outbursts. J.S.βs physical assault on Gardner took\\nhis behavior outside the realm of a βmere offensive utterance.β And his actions\\ninterfered with her work performance, leaving Gardner unable to work for\\nthree months. A jury could conclude that an objectively reasonable caregiver\\nwould not expect a patient to grope her daily, injure her so badly she could not\\nwork for three months, and have her complaints met with laughter and\\ndismissal by the administration. Cf. Aguiar v. Bartlesville Care Ctr., 2011 WL\\n1461541, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 2011) (finding sufficient severity when a\\npatient repeatedly engaged in unwanted touching of a nurse assistant,\\nβinterfered with her work, and eventually assaulted herβ with a medicine cart).\\n It is important to note that a finding that a patientβs harassment rises to\\na level of severity or pervasiveness that affects the terms and conditions of\\nemployment does not alone render the nursing home liable. As we mentioned\\nat the outset, liability when such a claim is based on the behavior of someone\\nother than a supervisor requires showing that the employer knew or should\\nhave known of the hostile work environment but failed to take reasonable\\nmeasures to try and stop it. Royal, 736 F.3d at 401. CLC did not argue in its\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nsummary judgment motion that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law\\non this element of Gardnerβs claim. We thus have no occasion to consider it.\\n We reverse the entry of summary judgment on Gardnerβs harassment\\nclaim.\\n III.\\n Gardner also appeals the grant of summary judgment on her retaliation\\nclaim. It requires her to show that β(1) she engaged in activity protected under\\nTitle VII, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there was a\\ncausal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment\\ndecision.β Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992).\\n The district court analyzed the retaliation issue under the McDonnell-\\nDouglas burden shifting framework used for cases relying on circumstantial\\nevidence. Gardner does not contest that ruling, so it is affirmed.\\n Her position all along, however, has been that she can prove retaliation\\nvia direct evidence. As the district court did not consider her argument based\\non direct evidence, we will allow it to consider that argument in the first\\ninstance on remand.\\n * * *\\n\\n REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, and REMANDED for\\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4365404/\", \"author_raw\": \"GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COSTA"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588151/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Kymberli GARDNER, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., Doing Business as Plaza Community Living Center, Defendant - Appellee\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-06\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n No. 17-60072 February 6, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nKYMBERLI GARDNER, Clerk\n\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\nv.\n\nCLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., doing business as Plaza Community Living\nCenter,\n\n Defendant - Appellee\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\n\n\nBefore KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\n The opinion previously issued in this case is withdrawn, and the\nfollowing opinion is substituted in its place.\n Claims of sexual harassment typically involve the behavior of fellow\nemployees. But not always. Because the ultimate focus of Title VII liability is\non the employerβs conductβunless a supervisor is the harasser, a plaintiff\nneeds to show that the employer knew or should have known about the hostile\nwork environment yet allowed it to persist, see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570\nU.S. 421, 427 (2013) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\n(1998)) 1βnonemployees can be the source of the harassment. See 29 C.F.R.\nΒ§ 1604.11(e) (βAn employer may . . . be responsible for the acts of non-\nemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,\nwhere the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should\nhave known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate\ncorrective action.β).\n Customers are one example of third-party harassers. See generally Lori\nA. Tetreault, Liability of Employer, Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964\n(42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) for Sexual Harassment of Employee by Customer,\nClient, or Patron, 163 A.L.R. FED. 445 (2000). A leading case on third-party\nharassment addressed whether Pizza Hut could be liable for customersβ\nharassment of a waitress. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1067,\n1072 (10th Cir. 1998). Casinos seem especially susceptible to these claims, as\none case addresses a high rollerβs harassment of a cocktail waitress and\nanother a card playerβs harassment of a blackjack dealer. See generally Oliver\nv. Sheraton Tunica Corp., 2000 WL 303444 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 8, 2000) (former);\nPowell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992) (latter).\n This case presents one of the more challenging situations in which to\napply this principle that an employer can be liable for a hostile work\nenvironment created by nonemployees: a nurse alleges that an assisted living\nfacility allowed such an environment to continue by not preventing a residentβs\n\n\n 1 Even when a supervisor is the harasser, liability flows from agency principles that\nrender the employer liable. Vance, 570 U.S. at 428β29. One of those situations is when a\nsupervisorβs harassing behavior resulted in an adverse βtangible employment decision.β Id.\nLiability attaches in that situation because that injury βrequires an official act of the\nenterpriseβ that will usually be βdocumented in official company recordsβ and often βsubject\nto review by higher level supervisors.β Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761β\n62 (1998). Absent that type of employment consequence, the company will be liable for a\nsupervisorβs harassment only βif the employer is unable to establish an affirmative defenseβ\nthat considers whether the employer took preventative or corrective measures to combat the\nharassment. Vance, 570 U.S. at 429β30 (citing Ellerth and Faragher).\n 2\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nrepetitive harassment. The unique nature of that workplace is an important\nconsideration. As we and other courts have recognized, the diminished\ncapacity of patients influences whether the harassment should be perceived as\naffecting the terms and conditions of employment. We must decide when the\nallegations of harassment nonetheless become so severe or pervasive that fact\nissues exist requiring a jury to decide the question.\n I.\n Kymberli Gardner worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant at an\nassisted living facility operated by CLC of Pascagoula, d/b/a Plaza Community\nLiving Center, from 2012 until she was fired in 2015. 2 Gardner is an\nexperienced health aide. Before working for CLC, she was a caregiver for\nseveral facilities and in-home care providers, two of which specialized in care\nfor the mentally disabled. Gardner was trained in defensive and de-escalation\ntactics for aggressive patients. As one might expect, during her years as a\ncaregiver she often worked with patients who were βeither physically\ncombative or sexually aggressive.β\n But what she experienced with one patient at the CLC facility rose to a\nnew level. J.S. was an elderly resident who lived at Plaza between 2006 and\n2014. He had a reputation for groping female employees and becoming\nphysically aggressive when reprimanded. J.S. had been diagnosed with a\nvariety of physical and mental illnesses including dementia, traumatic brain\ninjury, personality disorder with aggressive behavior, and Parkinsonβs\nDisease. J.S.βs long history of violent and sexual behavior toward both patients\nand staff included the following:\n\n\n\n\n In light of the summary judgment posture, we recite these facts taking competing\n 2\n\nevidence in the light most favorable to Gardner.\n 3\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\n β’ J.S. had to be transferred from his initial residence wing because he\n had become βcombativeβ and had physically assaulted his bedridden\n roommate during a dispute over a television.\n β’ J.S. was much more aggressive and sexually inappropriate towards\n his female caregivers than even other problematic nursing home\n residents; he would sexually assault them by grabbing their\n βbreast[s], butts, thighs, and try[ing] to grab [their] private areas.β\n β’ J.S. asked for explicit sexual acts on a regular basis and made lewd\n sexual comments toward female staff. He asked female employees to\n engage in sexual activity with him β[a]ll the time.β\n Gardner, who became responsible for J.S.βs care, experienced these types\nof inappropriate behavior from J.S. β[e]very day.β Gardner reported that J.S.\nwould physically grab her and make repeated sexual comments and requests.\nShe and other CLC employees documented J.S.βs behavior by routinely\nrecording it on his chart and making complaints to supervisors.\n As a result, J.S.βs behavior was not a secret to those who ran the assisted\nliving facility. Brandy Gregg, Gardnerβs former supervisor and now the\ndirector of nursing, had witnessed J.S.βs behaving in a sexually inappropriate\nmanner and also received complaints from nurses to that effect. These\nconcerns led administrators to transfer J.S. to a new wing. But they were not\nalways responsive to the complaints. They declined, for example, to have him\nundergo a psychiatric evaluation after he assaulted his roommate. J.S. later\nassaulted a CLC employee and was sent for evaluation, but subsequently\nreturned to CLC. And when Gardner attempted to discuss her concerns about\nJ.S.βs behavior, Gregg laughed, and Administrator Teri Reynolds told Gardner\nto βput [her] big girl panties on and go back to work.β\n So Gardner continued to care for J.S., which ultimately resulted in the\nincident that led to her termination. It began when Gardner was trying to help\nJ.S. attend a therapy session. As she was assisting J.S. out of bed, he began\ntrying βto gropeβ her and then tried to touch Gardnerβs left breast while she\nwas bent over. When she tried to move out of the way, J.S. punched her on the\n 4\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nside of her breast. Gardner then laid him down on the bed and left the room\nto get help. Janice Watkins, another nursing assistant, joined Gardner and\nthe two again attempted to help J.S. out of bed and into a chair. At this point\nJ.S. punched Gardner a second time. Gardner removed herself from J.Sβs\nimmediate area at which point he began to grab Watkinsβ βprivate area.β\nGardner sought help from the nurse on duty, Judy Toche. Gardner, Toche, and\nWatkins were able to get J.S. into his wheelchair. Gardner then moved to\nmake the bed, but J.S. punched her a third time.\n What Gardner did in response is disputed. Greggβs typed summary of\nevents, as well as the deposition testimony of Toche, and Tocheβs βnurseβs\nnotesβ from the day of the incident claim that Gardner βswung her own fist\nover [J.S.βs] headβ and that her arm βbrushed the top of his head.β Watkins,\non the other hand, asserts in both her deposition and her written witness\ninterview statement that Gardner β[went] up with her hand as if she was going\nto hit [patient]β but βdidnβt hit [patient] at all.β Gardner says she did not swing\nat J.S. during the incident. Gardner also reportedly made two statements as\nshe was leaving J.S.βs room. Watkins testifies Gardner said, βI am not doing\nshit else for [patient] at all.β Gardner also reportedly said, βI guess Iβm not the\nright color,β presumably because Toche, a white nurse, was able to calm J.S.\nwhereas Gardner, a black nursing assistant, could not. After the incident,\nGardner spoke with both Toche and Teri Reynolds, then the facility\nadministrator, about her assignment to care for J.S. Gardner refused to care\nfor him due to the continued harassment and asked to be reassigned. Her\nrequest was denied.\n Gardner then left work and went to the emergency room that evening\ndue to injuries she sustained. She did not return to work for three months\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nduring which time she received workersβ compensation. 3 Shortly after\nreturning from leave, Gardner was fired. Gregg, Gardnerβs supervisor at the\ntime, says Gardner was fired for three reasons: (1) insubordination (refusing\nto care for J.S.); (2) violating J.S.βs resident rights (by swearing in front of him\nand making a βracist type statement[],β apparently the one about her not being\nthe βright colorβ); and (3) attacking J.S. (swinging over his head).\n As for J.S., nothing happened to him immediately after the incident with\nGardner. But another altercation later that same day with a resident resulted\nin his being sent for a psychiatric evaluation and then moved to an all-male\nβlockdownβ unit in nearby Biloxi.\n Gardner sued, asserting multiple claims under Title VII. CLC moved for\nsummary judgment and to strike certain affidavit testimony. Gardner also\nmoved to strike portions of affidavit and deposition testimony. The district\ncourt denied Gardnerβs motion to strike, and denied in part and granted in part\nCLCβs motion to strike. 4 The lower court then granted summary judgment in\nfavor of CLC on all claims. Gardnerβs appeal pursues only her claims of hostile\nwork environment and retaliation. 5\n\n\n\n\n 3 Gregg and the contemporaneous incident report say that Gardner had been\nsuspended. But the report from CLCβs internal investigation contradicts that claim as it says\nthat Gardnerβs βseparation from her employment was held pending her completion of her\nworkmenβs compensation.β Gardnerβs affidavit also asserts she was never informed she had\nbeen suspended. We assume for purposes of summary judgment that Gardner was not\nsuspended and was on workersβ compensation during her three-month absence.\n 4 Gardner appeals some of those evidentiary rulings. We conclude that the district\n\ncourt did not abuse its discretion striking portions of her affidavit as speculative. And we\nneed not decide whether the district court erred in considering Greggβs testimony about the\nreasons for the termination as that issue does not affect our ruling.\n 5 While Gardner purports to appeal her sex discrimination claim based on disparate\n\ntreatment in addition to the one alleging hostile work environment, she has not sufficiently\nbriefed that claim.\n 6\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\n II.\n The district court concluded that a hostile workplace did not exist. It\nexplained that it was βnot clear to the Court that the harassing comments and\nattempts to grope and hit are beyond what a person in Gardnerβs position\nshould expect of patients in a nursing home.β CLC defends the grant of\nsummary judgment on that ground as well as on one the district court did not\nreach: whether the company knew about the harassment and failed to take\nremedial action. The other elements of a Title VII hostile work environment\nclaimβthat Gardner is a member of a protected class who was subject to some\nharassment on the basis of her sexβare not disputed. Royal v. CCC & R Tres\nArboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2013).\n A.\n Our de novo review of the grant of summary judgment leads us to a\ndifferent conclusion given that all inferences must be viewed in Gardnerβs favor\nat this stage. See Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015);\nBurnett Ranches, Ltd. v. United States, 753 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2014). To\nget past summary judgment, Gardner need not make it βclearβ that she was\nsubject to actionable harassment; she of course only needs to show that a jury\ncould reach that conclusion based on its view of the evidence.\n Title VII does not prohibit all harassment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.\nVinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). It makes harassing conduct unlawful when it\nresults in the employer βdiscriminat[ing] against any individual with respect\nto his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of\nsuch individualβs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.β 42 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 2000eβ2(a)(1); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21β23 (1993); Meritor,\n477 U.S. at 64β67. This statutory language βis not limited to βeconomicβ or\nβtangibleβ discrimination.β Id. at 64. Instead, βthe phrase βterms, conditions,\nor privileges of employmentβ evinces a congressional intent βto strike at the\n 7\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nentire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and womenβ in employment,\nwhich includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive\nenvironment.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). Title\nVII is violated βwhen the workplace is permeated with βdiscriminatory\nintimidation, ridicule, and insult,β . . . that is βsufficiently severe or pervasive\nto alter the conditions of the victimβs employment and create an abusive\nworking environment. Id.; Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d\n871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court set the βsevere or pervasiveβ\nstandard as a βmiddle path between making actionable any conduct that is\nmerely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological\ninjury.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. A plaintiff βmust subjectively perceive the\nharassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive, and this subjective perception\nmust be objectively reasonable.β Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 138 (5th\nCir. 2003).\n As a starting point, the multiple years of unwanted sexual grabbing and\nexplicit comments Gardner endured could certainly be deemed severe and\npervasive harassmentβonly one of those is necessary, Lauderdale v. Tex. Depβt\nof Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007)βif the harasser were\nsomeone without any mental impairments. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668\nF.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 2012) (hostile work environment when plaintiff was\nsubject to multiple months of unwanted sexual grabbing and explicit\ncomments); Harvill, v. Westward Commcβns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir.\n2005) (finding severe or pervasive harassment when, over seven months, a\ncoworker grabbed a female employee, fondled her breasts and patted her\nbuttocks βnumerous times,β and rubbed his body against the plaintiff).\n The complication is the one we have already mentioned: the source of the\nharassment is the resident of an assisted living facility who suffers from\ndementia. We have twice confronted hostile work environment claims based\n 8\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\non the behavior of patients towards caregivers. The first case involved home\nhealth services. We held that the verbal harassment, which included the\npatient repeatedly propositioning the plaintiff for sex and calling her\ndisparaging names, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Cain v. Blackwell,\n246 F.3d 758, 760β61 (5th Cir. 2001). We reached the same conclusion in the\nnext case when a nursing home patient repeatedly directed racial slurs at a\nnurseβs assistant. E.E.O.C. v. Nexion Health at Broadway, Inc., 199 F. Appβx\n351, 353 (5th Cir. 2006). 6 Although the verbal harassment was βquite\noffensive,β the comments did not rise to the level of actionable conduct because\nthey were not βphysically threatening or humiliatingβ and did not βpervade the\nwork experience of a reasonable nursing home employee, especially\nconsidering their source.β Id. at 353β54. We recognized, however, that there\nis not a categorical bar on hostile environment claims arising from harassment\nby patients. See id. at 353 (βCain does not establish a bright-line rule that\nemployees who care for disabled, elderly patients can never succeed on a Title\nVII claim.β). 7 The βspecific circumstancesβ of such claims βmust be judged to\ndetermine whether a reasonable person would find the work environment\nhostile or abusiveβ taking due account of the βunique circumstances involved\nin caring for mentally diseased elderly patients.β Id.\n Other circuits have found triable hostile work environment claims when\npatients engaged in the physical harassment absent in Nexion and Cain. The\n\n\n 6 Although Nexion is not binding, we address it because the district court relied on it\nin granting summary judgment, and it illustrates the range of conduct courts have considered\nin this area.\n 7 The district court thought Nexion βindicates that the default is no viable Title VII\n\nclaim in such situations.β Nexion did not create a default presumption against Title VII\nliability when the harasser is suffering from mental disability. Its statement that there is no\nβbright-line ruleβ does the opposite of setting any hard and fast rule. The Nexion language\nemphasizes what is true of most areas of the lawβthe outcome will depend on the facts of\nindividual cases. So while a diminished mental condition of the harasser is an important\nconsideration, it does not preclude liability.\n 9\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nEighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment when a mentally\nhandicapped, teenage resident of a care facility βpushed [a female caregiver]\nagainst a door, forced her right hand above her head, pulled open her jeans and\nher blouse, grabbed her left breast, and pushed his weight and erect penis\nagainst her stomach.β Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1108 (8th Cir.\n1997). The Tenth Circuit also rejected a district courtβs granting judgment as\na matter of law for the hospital when a patient βknocked [a psychologist] to the\nground, undressed her and digitally penetrated her, bit and choked her, and\nrepeatedly threatened to kill her.β Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d\n1238, 1242β43 (10th Cir. 2001).\n J.S.βs conduct is more severe than the nonphysical harassment held to\nbe insufficient in Cain and Nexion 8 but not as severe as the potentially life-\nthreatening sexual assaults in Crist or Turnbull. But the latter situation does\nnot set a floor for actionable conduct. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (explaining that\nTitle VII does not require harassment to βseriously affect employeesβ\npsychological well-beingβ). So the question remains whether the conduct here,\nwhich falls in the middle of this continuum, is enough. And that, as we have\nsaid, involves the difficult line-drawing problem of what separates legally\nactionable harassment from conduct that one should reasonably expect when\nassisting people suffering from dementia.\n We conclude that the evidence of persistent and often physical\nharassment by J.S. is enough to allow a jury to decide whether a reasonable\n\n\n\n\n 8 It is also more severe and pervasive than the conduct in an Illinois federal case the\ndistrict court relied on. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 2008 WL 719224, at *4 (N.D.\nIll. Mar. 14, 2008), affβd, 610 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2010). Pickett considered conduct from a\nresident that happened three times over eight months. More importantly, Pickett refrained\nfrom deciding whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, and instead granted summary\njudgment in favor of the defendant because it took several steps to mitigate the harassing\nbehavior. Id. at *5. As will be discussed, CLC did not take those measures.\n 10\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\ncaregiver on the receiving end of the harassment would have viewed it as\nsufficiently severe or pervasive even considering the medical condition of the\nharasser. The frequency and nature of the conduct, along with its effect on\nGardnerβs employment, would allow (but not require) that finding. Id. at 23\n(finding that βthe frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;\nwhether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive\nutterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employeeβs work\nperformanceβ are factors that influence whether harassment can be described\nas βhostileβ or βabusiveβ); see also Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476\nF.3d 337, 347β48 (5th Cir. 2007). J.S.βs inappropriate conduct occurred daily.\nHis conduct was far more severe than other residentsβ and consisted of physical\nsexual assault and violent outbursts. J.S.βs physical assault on Gardner took\nhis behavior outside the realm of a βmere offensive utterance.β And his actions\ninterfered with her work performance, leaving Gardner unable to work for\nthree months. A jury could conclude that an objectively reasonable caregiver\nwould not expect a patient to grope her daily, injure her so badly she could not\nwork for three months, and have her complaints met with laughter and\ndismissal by the administration. Cf. Aguiar v. Bartlesville Care Ctr., 2011 WL\n1461541, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 2011) (finding sufficient severity when a\npatient repeatedly engaged in unwanted touching of a nurse assistant,\nβinterfered with her work, and eventually assaulted herβ with a medicine cart).\n It is important to note that a finding that a patientβs harassment rises to\na level of severity or pervasiveness that affects the terms and conditions of\nemployment does not alone render the nursing home liable. As we mentioned\nat the outset, liability when such a claim is based on the behavior of someone\nother than a supervisor requires showing that the employer knew or should\nhave known of the hostile work environment but failed to take reasonable\nmeasures to try and stop it. Royal, 736 F.3d at 401. CLC did not argue in its\n 11\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nsummary judgment motion that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law\non this element of Gardnerβs claim. We thus have no occasion to consider it.\n We reverse the entry of summary judgment on Gardnerβs harassment\nclaim.\n III.\n Gardner also appeals the grant of summary judgment on her retaliation\nclaim. It requires her to show that β(1) she engaged in activity protected under\nTitle VII, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there was a\ncausal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment\ndecision.β Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992).\n The district court analyzed the retaliation issue under the McDonnell-\nDouglas burden shifting framework used for cases relying on circumstantial\nevidence. Gardner does not contest that ruling, so it is affirmed.\n Her position all along, however, has been that she can prove retaliation\nvia direct evidence. As the district court did not consider her argument based\non direct evidence, we will allow it to consider that argument in the first\ninstance on remand.\n * * *\n\n REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, and REMANDED for\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n\n\n\n 12\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Kymberli GARDNER, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., Doing Business as Plaza Community Living Center, Defendant - Appellee\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-06\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 17-60072 February 6, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nKYMBERLI GARDNER, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nCLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., doing business as Plaza Community Living\\nCenter,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\\n The opinion previously issued in this case is withdrawn, and the\\nfollowing opinion is substituted in its place.\\n Claims of sexual harassment typically involve the behavior of fellow\\nemployees. But not always. Because the ultimate focus of Title VII liability is\\non the employerβs conductβunless a supervisor is the harasser, a plaintiff\\nneeds to show that the employer knew or should have known about the hostile\\nwork environment yet allowed it to persist, see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570\\nU.S. 421, 427 (2013) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n(1998)) 1βnonemployees can be the source of the harassment. See 29 C.F.R.\\nΒ§ 1604.11(e) (βAn employer may . . . be responsible for the acts of non-\\nemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,\\nwhere the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should\\nhave known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate\\ncorrective action.β).\\n Customers are one example of third-party harassers. See generally Lori\\nA. Tetreault, Liability of Employer, Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964\\n(42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) for Sexual Harassment of Employee by Customer,\\nClient, or Patron, 163 A.L.R. FED. 445 (2000). A leading case on third-party\\nharassment addressed whether Pizza Hut could be liable for customersβ\\nharassment of a waitress. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1067,\\n1072 (10th Cir. 1998). Casinos seem especially susceptible to these claims, as\\none case addresses a high rollerβs harassment of a cocktail waitress and\\nanother a card playerβs harassment of a blackjack dealer. See generally Oliver\\nv. Sheraton Tunica Corp., 2000 WL 303444 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 8, 2000) (former);\\nPowell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992) (latter).\\n This case presents one of the more challenging situations in which to\\napply this principle that an employer can be liable for a hostile work\\nenvironment created by nonemployees: a nurse alleges that an assisted living\\nfacility allowed such an environment to continue by not preventing a residentβs\\n\\n\\n 1 Even when a supervisor is the harasser, liability flows from agency principles that\\nrender the employer liable. Vance, 570 U.S. at 428β29. One of those situations is when a\\nsupervisorβs harassing behavior resulted in an adverse βtangible employment decision.β Id.\\nLiability attaches in that situation because that injury βrequires an official act of the\\nenterpriseβ that will usually be βdocumented in official company recordsβ and often βsubject\\nto review by higher level supervisors.β Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761β\\n62 (1998). Absent that type of employment consequence, the company will be liable for a\\nsupervisorβs harassment only βif the employer is unable to establish an affirmative defenseβ\\nthat considers whether the employer took preventative or corrective measures to combat the\\nharassment. Vance, 570 U.S. at 429β30 (citing Ellerth and Faragher).\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nrepetitive harassment. The unique nature of that workplace is an important\\nconsideration. As we and other courts have recognized, the diminished\\ncapacity of patients influences whether the harassment should be perceived as\\naffecting the terms and conditions of employment. We must decide when the\\nallegations of harassment nonetheless become so severe or pervasive that fact\\nissues exist requiring a jury to decide the question.\\n I.\\n Kymberli Gardner worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant at an\\nassisted living facility operated by CLC of Pascagoula, d/b/a Plaza Community\\nLiving Center, from 2012 until she was fired in 2015. 2 Gardner is an\\nexperienced health aide. Before working for CLC, she was a caregiver for\\nseveral facilities and in-home care providers, two of which specialized in care\\nfor the mentally disabled. Gardner was trained in defensive and de-escalation\\ntactics for aggressive patients. As one might expect, during her years as a\\ncaregiver she often worked with patients who were βeither physically\\ncombative or sexually aggressive.β\\n But what she experienced with one patient at the CLC facility rose to a\\nnew level. J.S. was an elderly resident who lived at Plaza between 2006 and\\n2014. He had a reputation for groping female employees and becoming\\nphysically aggressive when reprimanded. J.S. had been diagnosed with a\\nvariety of physical and mental illnesses including dementia, traumatic brain\\ninjury, personality disorder with aggressive behavior, and Parkinsonβs\\nDisease. J.S.βs long history of violent and sexual behavior toward both patients\\nand staff included the following:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In light of the summary judgment posture, we recite these facts taking competing\\n 2\\n\\nevidence in the light most favorable to Gardner.\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n β’ J.S. had to be transferred from his initial residence wing because he\\n had become βcombativeβ and had physically assaulted his bedridden\\n roommate during a dispute over a television.\\n β’ J.S. was much more aggressive and sexually inappropriate towards\\n his female caregivers than even other problematic nursing home\\n residents; he would sexually assault them by grabbing their\\n βbreast[s], butts, thighs, and try[ing] to grab [their] private areas.β\\n β’ J.S. asked for explicit sexual acts on a regular basis and made lewd\\n sexual comments toward female staff. He asked female employees to\\n engage in sexual activity with him β[a]ll the time.β\\n Gardner, who became responsible for J.S.βs care, experienced these types\\nof inappropriate behavior from J.S. β[e]very day.β Gardner reported that J.S.\\nwould physically grab her and make repeated sexual comments and requests.\\nShe and other CLC employees documented J.S.βs behavior by routinely\\nrecording it on his chart and making complaints to supervisors.\\n As a result, J.S.βs behavior was not a secret to those who ran the assisted\\nliving facility. Brandy Gregg, Gardnerβs former supervisor and now the\\ndirector of nursing, had witnessed J.S.βs behaving in a sexually inappropriate\\nmanner and also received complaints from nurses to that effect. These\\nconcerns led administrators to transfer J.S. to a new wing. But they were not\\nalways responsive to the complaints. They declined, for example, to have him\\nundergo a psychiatric evaluation after he assaulted his roommate. J.S. later\\nassaulted a CLC employee and was sent for evaluation, but subsequently\\nreturned to CLC. And when Gardner attempted to discuss her concerns about\\nJ.S.βs behavior, Gregg laughed, and Administrator Teri Reynolds told Gardner\\nto βput [her] big girl panties on and go back to work.β\\n So Gardner continued to care for J.S., which ultimately resulted in the\\nincident that led to her termination. It began when Gardner was trying to help\\nJ.S. attend a therapy session. As she was assisting J.S. out of bed, he began\\ntrying βto gropeβ her and then tried to touch Gardnerβs left breast while she\\nwas bent over. When she tried to move out of the way, J.S. punched her on the\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nside of her breast. Gardner then laid him down on the bed and left the room\\nto get help. Janice Watkins, another nursing assistant, joined Gardner and\\nthe two again attempted to help J.S. out of bed and into a chair. At this point\\nJ.S. punched Gardner a second time. Gardner removed herself from J.Sβs\\nimmediate area at which point he began to grab Watkinsβ βprivate area.β\\nGardner sought help from the nurse on duty, Judy Toche. Gardner, Toche, and\\nWatkins were able to get J.S. into his wheelchair. Gardner then moved to\\nmake the bed, but J.S. punched her a third time.\\n What Gardner did in response is disputed. Greggβs typed summary of\\nevents, as well as the deposition testimony of Toche, and Tocheβs βnurseβs\\nnotesβ from the day of the incident claim that Gardner βswung her own fist\\nover [J.S.βs] headβ and that her arm βbrushed the top of his head.β Watkins,\\non the other hand, asserts in both her deposition and her written witness\\ninterview statement that Gardner β[went] up with her hand as if she was going\\nto hit [patient]β but βdidnβt hit [patient] at all.β Gardner says she did not swing\\nat J.S. during the incident. Gardner also reportedly made two statements as\\nshe was leaving J.S.βs room. Watkins testifies Gardner said, βI am not doing\\nshit else for [patient] at all.β Gardner also reportedly said, βI guess Iβm not the\\nright color,β presumably because Toche, a white nurse, was able to calm J.S.\\nwhereas Gardner, a black nursing assistant, could not. After the incident,\\nGardner spoke with both Toche and Teri Reynolds, then the facility\\nadministrator, about her assignment to care for J.S. Gardner refused to care\\nfor him due to the continued harassment and asked to be reassigned. Her\\nrequest was denied.\\n Gardner then left work and went to the emergency room that evening\\ndue to injuries she sustained. She did not return to work for three months\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nduring which time she received workersβ compensation. 3 Shortly after\\nreturning from leave, Gardner was fired. Gregg, Gardnerβs supervisor at the\\ntime, says Gardner was fired for three reasons: (1) insubordination (refusing\\nto care for J.S.); (2) violating J.S.βs resident rights (by swearing in front of him\\nand making a βracist type statement[],β apparently the one about her not being\\nthe βright colorβ); and (3) attacking J.S. (swinging over his head).\\n As for J.S., nothing happened to him immediately after the incident with\\nGardner. But another altercation later that same day with a resident resulted\\nin his being sent for a psychiatric evaluation and then moved to an all-male\\nβlockdownβ unit in nearby Biloxi.\\n Gardner sued, asserting multiple claims under Title VII. CLC moved for\\nsummary judgment and to strike certain affidavit testimony. Gardner also\\nmoved to strike portions of affidavit and deposition testimony. The district\\ncourt denied Gardnerβs motion to strike, and denied in part and granted in part\\nCLCβs motion to strike. 4 The lower court then granted summary judgment in\\nfavor of CLC on all claims. Gardnerβs appeal pursues only her claims of hostile\\nwork environment and retaliation. 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Gregg and the contemporaneous incident report say that Gardner had been\\nsuspended. But the report from CLCβs internal investigation contradicts that claim as it says\\nthat Gardnerβs βseparation from her employment was held pending her completion of her\\nworkmenβs compensation.β Gardnerβs affidavit also asserts she was never informed she had\\nbeen suspended. We assume for purposes of summary judgment that Gardner was not\\nsuspended and was on workersβ compensation during her three-month absence.\\n 4 Gardner appeals some of those evidentiary rulings. We conclude that the district\\n\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion striking portions of her affidavit as speculative. And we\\nneed not decide whether the district court erred in considering Greggβs testimony about the\\nreasons for the termination as that issue does not affect our ruling.\\n 5 While Gardner purports to appeal her sex discrimination claim based on disparate\\n\\ntreatment in addition to the one alleging hostile work environment, she has not sufficiently\\nbriefed that claim.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n II.\\n The district court concluded that a hostile workplace did not exist. It\\nexplained that it was βnot clear to the Court that the harassing comments and\\nattempts to grope and hit are beyond what a person in Gardnerβs position\\nshould expect of patients in a nursing home.β CLC defends the grant of\\nsummary judgment on that ground as well as on one the district court did not\\nreach: whether the company knew about the harassment and failed to take\\nremedial action. The other elements of a Title VII hostile work environment\\nclaimβthat Gardner is a member of a protected class who was subject to some\\nharassment on the basis of her sexβare not disputed. Royal v. CCC & R Tres\\nArboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2013).\\n A.\\n Our de novo review of the grant of summary judgment leads us to a\\ndifferent conclusion given that all inferences must be viewed in Gardnerβs favor\\nat this stage. See Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015);\\nBurnett Ranches, Ltd. v. United States, 753 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2014). To\\nget past summary judgment, Gardner need not make it βclearβ that she was\\nsubject to actionable harassment; she of course only needs to show that a jury\\ncould reach that conclusion based on its view of the evidence.\\n Title VII does not prohibit all harassment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.\\nVinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). It makes harassing conduct unlawful when it\\nresults in the employer βdiscriminat[ing] against any individual with respect\\nto his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of\\nsuch individualβs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2000eβ2(a)(1); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21β23 (1993); Meritor,\\n477 U.S. at 64β67. This statutory language βis not limited to βeconomicβ or\\nβtangibleβ discrimination.β Id. at 64. Instead, βthe phrase βterms, conditions,\\nor privileges of employmentβ evinces a congressional intent βto strike at the\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nentire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and womenβ in employment,\\nwhich includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive\\nenvironment.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). Title\\nVII is violated βwhen the workplace is permeated with βdiscriminatory\\nintimidation, ridicule, and insult,β . . . that is βsufficiently severe or pervasive\\nto alter the conditions of the victimβs employment and create an abusive\\nworking environment. Id.; Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d\\n871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court set the βsevere or pervasiveβ\\nstandard as a βmiddle path between making actionable any conduct that is\\nmerely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological\\ninjury.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. A plaintiff βmust subjectively perceive the\\nharassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive, and this subjective perception\\nmust be objectively reasonable.β Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 138 (5th\\nCir. 2003).\\n As a starting point, the multiple years of unwanted sexual grabbing and\\nexplicit comments Gardner endured could certainly be deemed severe and\\npervasive harassmentβonly one of those is necessary, Lauderdale v. Tex. Depβt\\nof Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007)βif the harasser were\\nsomeone without any mental impairments. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668\\nF.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 2012) (hostile work environment when plaintiff was\\nsubject to multiple months of unwanted sexual grabbing and explicit\\ncomments); Harvill, v. Westward Commcβns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir.\\n2005) (finding severe or pervasive harassment when, over seven months, a\\ncoworker grabbed a female employee, fondled her breasts and patted her\\nbuttocks βnumerous times,β and rubbed his body against the plaintiff).\\n The complication is the one we have already mentioned: the source of the\\nharassment is the resident of an assisted living facility who suffers from\\ndementia. We have twice confronted hostile work environment claims based\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\non the behavior of patients towards caregivers. The first case involved home\\nhealth services. We held that the verbal harassment, which included the\\npatient repeatedly propositioning the plaintiff for sex and calling her\\ndisparaging names, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Cain v. Blackwell,\\n246 F.3d 758, 760β61 (5th Cir. 2001). We reached the same conclusion in the\\nnext case when a nursing home patient repeatedly directed racial slurs at a\\nnurseβs assistant. E.E.O.C. v. Nexion Health at Broadway, Inc., 199 F. Appβx\\n351, 353 (5th Cir. 2006). 6 Although the verbal harassment was βquite\\noffensive,β the comments did not rise to the level of actionable conduct because\\nthey were not βphysically threatening or humiliatingβ and did not βpervade the\\nwork experience of a reasonable nursing home employee, especially\\nconsidering their source.β Id. at 353β54. We recognized, however, that there\\nis not a categorical bar on hostile environment claims arising from harassment\\nby patients. See id. at 353 (βCain does not establish a bright-line rule that\\nemployees who care for disabled, elderly patients can never succeed on a Title\\nVII claim.β). 7 The βspecific circumstancesβ of such claims βmust be judged to\\ndetermine whether a reasonable person would find the work environment\\nhostile or abusiveβ taking due account of the βunique circumstances involved\\nin caring for mentally diseased elderly patients.β Id.\\n Other circuits have found triable hostile work environment claims when\\npatients engaged in the physical harassment absent in Nexion and Cain. The\\n\\n\\n 6 Although Nexion is not binding, we address it because the district court relied on it\\nin granting summary judgment, and it illustrates the range of conduct courts have considered\\nin this area.\\n 7 The district court thought Nexion βindicates that the default is no viable Title VII\\n\\nclaim in such situations.β Nexion did not create a default presumption against Title VII\\nliability when the harasser is suffering from mental disability. Its statement that there is no\\nβbright-line ruleβ does the opposite of setting any hard and fast rule. The Nexion language\\nemphasizes what is true of most areas of the lawβthe outcome will depend on the facts of\\nindividual cases. So while a diminished mental condition of the harasser is an important\\nconsideration, it does not preclude liability.\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nEighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment when a mentally\\nhandicapped, teenage resident of a care facility βpushed [a female caregiver]\\nagainst a door, forced her right hand above her head, pulled open her jeans and\\nher blouse, grabbed her left breast, and pushed his weight and erect penis\\nagainst her stomach.β Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1108 (8th Cir.\\n1997). The Tenth Circuit also rejected a district courtβs granting judgment as\\na matter of law for the hospital when a patient βknocked [a psychologist] to the\\nground, undressed her and digitally penetrated her, bit and choked her, and\\nrepeatedly threatened to kill her.β Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d\\n1238, 1242β43 (10th Cir. 2001).\\n J.S.βs conduct is more severe than the nonphysical harassment held to\\nbe insufficient in Cain and Nexion 8 but not as severe as the potentially life-\\nthreatening sexual assaults in Crist or Turnbull. But the latter situation does\\nnot set a floor for actionable conduct. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (explaining that\\nTitle VII does not require harassment to βseriously affect employeesβ\\npsychological well-beingβ). So the question remains whether the conduct here,\\nwhich falls in the middle of this continuum, is enough. And that, as we have\\nsaid, involves the difficult line-drawing problem of what separates legally\\nactionable harassment from conduct that one should reasonably expect when\\nassisting people suffering from dementia.\\n We conclude that the evidence of persistent and often physical\\nharassment by J.S. is enough to allow a jury to decide whether a reasonable\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 It is also more severe and pervasive than the conduct in an Illinois federal case the\\ndistrict court relied on. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 2008 WL 719224, at *4 (N.D.\\nIll. Mar. 14, 2008), affβd, 610 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2010). Pickett considered conduct from a\\nresident that happened three times over eight months. More importantly, Pickett refrained\\nfrom deciding whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, and instead granted summary\\njudgment in favor of the defendant because it took several steps to mitigate the harassing\\nbehavior. Id. at *5. As will be discussed, CLC did not take those measures.\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\ncaregiver on the receiving end of the harassment would have viewed it as\\nsufficiently severe or pervasive even considering the medical condition of the\\nharasser. The frequency and nature of the conduct, along with its effect on\\nGardnerβs employment, would allow (but not require) that finding. Id. at 23\\n(finding that βthe frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;\\nwhether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive\\nutterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employeeβs work\\nperformanceβ are factors that influence whether harassment can be described\\nas βhostileβ or βabusiveβ); see also Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476\\nF.3d 337, 347β48 (5th Cir. 2007). J.S.βs inappropriate conduct occurred daily.\\nHis conduct was far more severe than other residentsβ and consisted of physical\\nsexual assault and violent outbursts. J.S.βs physical assault on Gardner took\\nhis behavior outside the realm of a βmere offensive utterance.β And his actions\\ninterfered with her work performance, leaving Gardner unable to work for\\nthree months. A jury could conclude that an objectively reasonable caregiver\\nwould not expect a patient to grope her daily, injure her so badly she could not\\nwork for three months, and have her complaints met with laughter and\\ndismissal by the administration. Cf. Aguiar v. Bartlesville Care Ctr., 2011 WL\\n1461541, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 2011) (finding sufficient severity when a\\npatient repeatedly engaged in unwanted touching of a nurse assistant,\\nβinterfered with her work, and eventually assaulted herβ with a medicine cart).\\n It is important to note that a finding that a patientβs harassment rises to\\na level of severity or pervasiveness that affects the terms and conditions of\\nemployment does not alone render the nursing home liable. As we mentioned\\nat the outset, liability when such a claim is based on the behavior of someone\\nother than a supervisor requires showing that the employer knew or should\\nhave known of the hostile work environment but failed to take reasonable\\nmeasures to try and stop it. Royal, 736 F.3d at 401. CLC did not argue in its\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nsummary judgment motion that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law\\non this element of Gardnerβs claim. We thus have no occasion to consider it.\\n We reverse the entry of summary judgment on Gardnerβs harassment\\nclaim.\\n III.\\n Gardner also appeals the grant of summary judgment on her retaliation\\nclaim. It requires her to show that β(1) she engaged in activity protected under\\nTitle VII, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there was a\\ncausal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment\\ndecision.β Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992).\\n The district court analyzed the retaliation issue under the McDonnell-\\nDouglas burden shifting framework used for cases relying on circumstantial\\nevidence. Gardner does not contest that ruling, so it is affirmed.\\n Her position all along, however, has been that she can prove retaliation\\nvia direct evidence. As the district court did not consider her argument based\\non direct evidence, we will allow it to consider that argument in the first\\ninstance on remand.\\n * * *\\n\\n REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, and REMANDED for\\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":592,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588549,"string":"4,588,549"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Lonnie Kade WELSH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CORRECT CARE, L.L.C. ; Marsha McLane, TCCO Executive Director; Michael Searcy; Bill Vanier; Janie Salazar ; Mary Leaks; Brian Thomas, in His Individual Capacity as Director of TCCC; Amy Goldstein, in Her Individual Capacity as Head of Clinical Operations at TCCC; Christopher Woods, in His Individual Capacity as Security Director at TCCC, Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lonnie Welsh v. Correct Care. L.L.C."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-07"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-11522"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Davis, Dennis, Jones\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522 FILED\\n February 7, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nLONNIE KADE WELSH, Clerk\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nCORRECT CARE. L.L.C.; MARSHA MCLANE, TCCO Executive Director;\\nMICHAEL SEARCY; BILL VANIER; JANIE SALAZAR; MARY LEAKS;\\nBRIAN THOMAS, in his Individual Capacity as Director of TCCC; AMY\\nGOLDSTEIN, in her Individual Capacity as Head of Clinical Operations at\\nTCCC; CHRISTOPHER WOODS, in his Individual Capacity as Security\\nDirector at TCCC,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.\\nJAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\\n Lonnie Kade Welsh appeals from an order dismissing his case with\\nprejudice after his attempt to dismiss unilaterally without prejudice. Because\\nthe dismissal with prejudice was erroneous, we VACATE and REMAND.\\n I.\\n Welsh filed a state court action against Correct Care, L.L.C., Marsha\\nMcLane, Michael Searcy, and others, in which he alleged constitutional\\nviolations and other wrongs inflicted on him while he was in the custody of the\\n\\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522\\n\\nTexas Civil Commitment Office. After removing the case to federal court,\\ndefendants McLane and Searcy filed a partial motion to dismiss. McLane also\\nfiled an answer. Welsh then filed an amended complaint, which no defendant\\nanswered.\\n Months later, Welsh moved to dismiss his action without prejudice.\\nAfter a clerical error, the court entered a nunc pro tunc 1 order dismissing the\\ncase βwith prejudiceβ on the ground that at least one defendantβMcLaneβ\\nhad answered. Welsh appeals, arguing that he was entitled to voluntary\\ndismissal without prejudice and without a court order.\\n II.\\n A plaintiff may unilaterally dismiss his action without prejudice by filing\\na βnotice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a\\nmotion for summary judgment.β FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). If the defendant\\nhas filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment, however, Rule 41(a)(2)\\npermits dismissal at the plaintiffβs request βonly by court order, on terms that\\nthe court considers proper.β Id. 41(a)(2). Unless otherwise stated in the order,\\na dismissal under either subsection is without prejudice. Id. 41(a)(1)(B),\\n41(a)(2). We review the district courtβs decision for abuse of discretion. See\\nElbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002).\\n A.\\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) grants Welsh an absolute\\nright to dismiss his lawsuit before the defendant has filed an answer or a\\nsummary judgment motion. Defendant McLane filed an answer to Welshβs\\nearlier complaint, 2 but he did not answer Welshβs later-filed amended\\n\\n 1 βNunc pro tuncβ translates literally to βnow for thenβ and βdenotes an order having\\nretroactive legal effect through a courtβs inherent power.β 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders Β§ 52,\\nat 61 (2012).\\n 2 Welsh filed an original petition and an amended petition in state court. McLane\\n\\nanswered the amended petition, which will be referred to as the βearlier complaint.β\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522\\n\\ncomplaint. We must, therefore, determine whether filing an answer to the\\nearlier complaint, but not to the amended complaint, is sufficient to preclude\\nthe plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing his claim as a matter of right under\\nRule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).\\n The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Armstrong v. Frostie Co. and\\ndetermined that a plaintiff was barred from unilaterally dismissing his\\ncomplaint under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) where a defendant filed an answer to the\\nplaintiffβs original complaint but not to his amended complaint. 453 F.2d 914,\\n916 (4th Cir. 1971). The court reasoned that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) βis designed to\\npermit a disengagement of the parties at the behest of the plaintiff only in the\\nearly stages of a suit, before the defendant has expended time and effort in the\\npreparation of his caseβ and the filing of an amended complaint βincreased\\nrather than nullified [the defendantβs] burden.β Id. Others have agreed. See\\nUniversidad Cent. Del Caribe, Inc. v. Liaison Comm. on Med. Educ., 760 F.2d\\n14, 18 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that Armstrong stands for the proposition that βa\\nplaintiff cannot supersede the cutting off of its right to give notice of voluntary\\ndismissal by filing an amended complaint after an answer or motion for\\nsummary judgment has been filed by the defendantβ); Baiul v. NBC Sports,\\n708 F. Appβx 710, 713 (2d Cir. 2017) (β[N]o new right of dismissal is created by\\nthe filing of an amended complaint, even one with substantially new\\nallegations.β); see also 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND\\nPROCEDURE Β§ 2363, at 122 (3d ed. Supp. 2018) (βMultiple courts have held that\\nan answer to the plaintiffβs original complaint is sufficient to preclude\\ndismissal by notice even though the defendant has not submitted an answer to\\nthe plaintiffβs amended complaint.β); cf. Van-S-Aviation Corp. v. Piper Aircraft\\nCorp., 551 F.2d 213, 220 (8th Cir. 1977) (βThe purpose of Rule 41(a)(1)[(A)](i)\\nis to fix the point at which the resources of the court and the defendant are so\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522\\n\\ncommitted that dismissal without preclusive consequences can no longer be\\nhad as of right.β).\\n We agree with the Fourth Circuitβs reasoning and hold that the filing of\\nan amended complaint does not revive the plaintiffβs absolute right to dismissal\\nunder Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). See Armstrong, 453 F.2d at 916. Because McLane\\nfiled an answer to Welshβs earlier complaint, Welsh cannot utilize Rule\\n41(a)(1)(A)(i)βs voluntary dismissal without a court order as to that defendant.\\nHowever, the Rules permit voluntary dismissal by notice and without a court\\norder of any defendant who has not served an answer, which in this case is all\\ndefendants except McLane. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(a)(i); Plains Growers\\nBy & Through Floristsβ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d\\n250, 255 (5th Cir. 1973). Therefore, Welsh is entitled to dismissal by notice\\nunder Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) without prejudice and without a court order against\\nall defendants other than McLane.\\n B.\\n Because McLane filed an answer, the district courtβs dismissal of Welshβs\\nclaim against him falls under Rule 41(a)(2), which allows the court to impose\\nconditions on the dismissal. The district court dismissed Welshβs claim with\\nprejudice. A plaintiff typically βhas the option to refuse a Rule 41(a)(2)\\nvoluntary dismissal and to proceed with its case if the conditions imposed by\\nthe court are too onerous.β Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Richard Carlyon Co.,\\n904 F.2d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, βbefore requiring a Rule 41(a)(2)\\ndismissal to be with prejudice, a court must allow a plaintiff the opportunity\\nto retract his motion to dismissβ rather than accept the dismissal with\\nprejudice. Bell v. Keystone RV Co., 628 F.3d 157, 163 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010).\\nWhere, as here, the plaintiff was not given the chance to withdraw the motion\\nand reject the condition of dismissal with prejudice, a remand is in order. See\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522\\n\\nMortgage Guar., 904 F.2d at 301 (citing Lau v. Glendora Unified School\\nDistrict, 792 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, we find that the district\\ncourt abused its discretion when it dismissed Welshβs case with prejudice\\nwithout giving him the chance to reject or accept the dismissal. See id.\\n ***\\n To summarize, as to all non-answering defendants, Welsh is entitled to\\nunconditional dismissal by notice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) without prejudice\\nand without a court order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i); Plains Growers,\\n474 F.2d at 255. As to defendant McLane, Welsh is entitled to dismissal by\\nmotion under Rule 41(a)(2) βon terms that the court considers properβ with the\\nopportunity to retract his motion to dismiss if he finds the courtβs conditions\\ntoo onerous. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2); Mortgage Guar., 904 F.2d at 301.\\nAccordingly, we VACATE the district courtβs order and REMAND for further\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4365802/\", \"author_raw\": \"JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DAVIS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"JONES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588549/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Lonnie Kade WELSH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CORRECT CARE, L.L.C. ; Marsha McLane, TCCO Executive Director; Michael Searcy; Bill Vanier; Janie Salazar ; Mary Leaks; Brian Thomas, in His Individual Capacity as Director of TCCC; Amy Goldstein, in Her Individual Capacity as Head of Clinical Operations at TCCC; Christopher Woods, in His Individual Capacity as Security Director at TCCC, Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-07\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n\n No. 17-11522 FILED\n February 7, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nLONNIE KADE WELSH, Clerk\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\nv.\n\nCORRECT CARE. L.L.C.; MARSHA MCLANE, TCCO Executive Director;\nMICHAEL SEARCY; BILL VANIER; JANIE SALAZAR; MARY LEAKS;\nBRIAN THOMAS, in his Individual Capacity as Director of TCCC; AMY\nGOLDSTEIN, in her Individual Capacity as Head of Clinical Operations at\nTCCC; CHRISTOPHER WOODS, in his Individual Capacity as Security\nDirector at TCCC,\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.\nJAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\n Lonnie Kade Welsh appeals from an order dismissing his case with\nprejudice after his attempt to dismiss unilaterally without prejudice. Because\nthe dismissal with prejudice was erroneous, we VACATE and REMAND.\n I.\n Welsh filed a state court action against Correct Care, L.L.C., Marsha\nMcLane, Michael Searcy, and others, in which he alleged constitutional\nviolations and other wrongs inflicted on him while he was in the custody of the\n\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n No. 17-11522\n\nTexas Civil Commitment Office. After removing the case to federal court,\ndefendants McLane and Searcy filed a partial motion to dismiss. McLane also\nfiled an answer. Welsh then filed an amended complaint, which no defendant\nanswered.\n Months later, Welsh moved to dismiss his action without prejudice.\nAfter a clerical error, the court entered a nunc pro tunc 1 order dismissing the\ncase βwith prejudiceβ on the ground that at least one defendantβMcLaneβ\nhad answered. Welsh appeals, arguing that he was entitled to voluntary\ndismissal without prejudice and without a court order.\n II.\n A plaintiff may unilaterally dismiss his action without prejudice by filing\na βnotice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a\nmotion for summary judgment.β FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). If the defendant\nhas filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment, however, Rule 41(a)(2)\npermits dismissal at the plaintiffβs request βonly by court order, on terms that\nthe court considers proper.β Id. 41(a)(2). Unless otherwise stated in the order,\na dismissal under either subsection is without prejudice. Id. 41(a)(1)(B),\n41(a)(2). We review the district courtβs decision for abuse of discretion. See\nElbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002).\n A.\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) grants Welsh an absolute\nright to dismiss his lawsuit before the defendant has filed an answer or a\nsummary judgment motion. Defendant McLane filed an answer to Welshβs\nearlier complaint, 2 but he did not answer Welshβs later-filed amended\n\n 1 βNunc pro tuncβ translates literally to βnow for thenβ and βdenotes an order having\nretroactive legal effect through a courtβs inherent power.β 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders Β§ 52,\nat 61 (2012).\n 2 Welsh filed an original petition and an amended petition in state court. McLane\n\nanswered the amended petition, which will be referred to as the βearlier complaint.β\n\n\n 2\n\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n No. 17-11522\n\ncomplaint. We must, therefore, determine whether filing an answer to the\nearlier complaint, but not to the amended complaint, is sufficient to preclude\nthe plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing his claim as a matter of right under\nRule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).\n The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Armstrong v. Frostie Co. and\ndetermined that a plaintiff was barred from unilaterally dismissing his\ncomplaint under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) where a defendant filed an answer to the\nplaintiffβs original complaint but not to his amended complaint. 453 F.2d 914,\n916 (4th Cir. 1971). The court reasoned that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) βis designed to\npermit a disengagement of the parties at the behest of the plaintiff only in the\nearly stages of a suit, before the defendant has expended time and effort in the\npreparation of his caseβ and the filing of an amended complaint βincreased\nrather than nullified [the defendantβs] burden.β Id. Others have agreed. See\nUniversidad Cent. Del Caribe, Inc. v. Liaison Comm. on Med. Educ., 760 F.2d\n14, 18 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that Armstrong stands for the proposition that βa\nplaintiff cannot supersede the cutting off of its right to give notice of voluntary\ndismissal by filing an amended complaint after an answer or motion for\nsummary judgment has been filed by the defendantβ); Baiul v. NBC Sports,\n708 F. Appβx 710, 713 (2d Cir. 2017) (β[N]o new right of dismissal is created by\nthe filing of an amended complaint, even one with substantially new\nallegations.β); see also 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND\nPROCEDURE Β§ 2363, at 122 (3d ed. Supp. 2018) (βMultiple courts have held that\nan answer to the plaintiffβs original complaint is sufficient to preclude\ndismissal by notice even though the defendant has not submitted an answer to\nthe plaintiffβs amended complaint.β); cf. Van-S-Aviation Corp. v. Piper Aircraft\nCorp., 551 F.2d 213, 220 (8th Cir. 1977) (βThe purpose of Rule 41(a)(1)[(A)](i)\nis to fix the point at which the resources of the court and the defendant are so\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n No. 17-11522\n\ncommitted that dismissal without preclusive consequences can no longer be\nhad as of right.β).\n We agree with the Fourth Circuitβs reasoning and hold that the filing of\nan amended complaint does not revive the plaintiffβs absolute right to dismissal\nunder Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). See Armstrong, 453 F.2d at 916. Because McLane\nfiled an answer to Welshβs earlier complaint, Welsh cannot utilize Rule\n41(a)(1)(A)(i)βs voluntary dismissal without a court order as to that defendant.\nHowever, the Rules permit voluntary dismissal by notice and without a court\norder of any defendant who has not served an answer, which in this case is all\ndefendants except McLane. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(a)(i); Plains Growers\nBy & Through Floristsβ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d\n250, 255 (5th Cir. 1973). Therefore, Welsh is entitled to dismissal by notice\nunder Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) without prejudice and without a court order against\nall defendants other than McLane.\n B.\n Because McLane filed an answer, the district courtβs dismissal of Welshβs\nclaim against him falls under Rule 41(a)(2), which allows the court to impose\nconditions on the dismissal. The district court dismissed Welshβs claim with\nprejudice. A plaintiff typically βhas the option to refuse a Rule 41(a)(2)\nvoluntary dismissal and to proceed with its case if the conditions imposed by\nthe court are too onerous.β Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Richard Carlyon Co.,\n904 F.2d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, βbefore requiring a Rule 41(a)(2)\ndismissal to be with prejudice, a court must allow a plaintiff the opportunity\nto retract his motion to dismissβ rather than accept the dismissal with\nprejudice. Bell v. Keystone RV Co., 628 F.3d 157, 163 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010).\nWhere, as here, the plaintiff was not given the chance to withdraw the motion\nand reject the condition of dismissal with prejudice, a remand is in order. See\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n No. 17-11522\n\nMortgage Guar., 904 F.2d at 301 (citing Lau v. Glendora Unified School\nDistrict, 792 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, we find that the district\ncourt abused its discretion when it dismissed Welshβs case with prejudice\nwithout giving him the chance to reject or accept the dismissal. See id.\n ***\n To summarize, as to all non-answering defendants, Welsh is entitled to\nunconditional dismissal by notice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) without prejudice\nand without a court order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i); Plains Growers,\n474 F.2d at 255. As to defendant McLane, Welsh is entitled to dismissal by\nmotion under Rule 41(a)(2) βon terms that the court considers properβ with the\nopportunity to retract his motion to dismiss if he finds the courtβs conditions\ntoo onerous. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2); Mortgage Guar., 904 F.2d at 301.\nAccordingly, we VACATE the district courtβs order and REMAND for further\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n\n\n\n 5\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Lonnie Kade WELSH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CORRECT CARE, L.L.C. ; Marsha McLane, TCCO Executive Director; Michael Searcy; Bill Vanier; Janie Salazar ; Mary Leaks; Brian Thomas, in His Individual Capacity as Director of TCCC; Amy Goldstein, in Her Individual Capacity as Head of Clinical Operations at TCCC; Christopher Woods, in His Individual Capacity as Security Director at TCCC, Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-07\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522 FILED\\n February 7, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nLONNIE KADE WELSH, Clerk\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nCORRECT CARE. L.L.C.; MARSHA MCLANE, TCCO Executive Director;\\nMICHAEL SEARCY; BILL VANIER; JANIE SALAZAR; MARY LEAKS;\\nBRIAN THOMAS, in his Individual Capacity as Director of TCCC; AMY\\nGOLDSTEIN, in her Individual Capacity as Head of Clinical Operations at\\nTCCC; CHRISTOPHER WOODS, in his Individual Capacity as Security\\nDirector at TCCC,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.\\nJAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\\n Lonnie Kade Welsh appeals from an order dismissing his case with\\nprejudice after his attempt to dismiss unilaterally without prejudice. Because\\nthe dismissal with prejudice was erroneous, we VACATE and REMAND.\\n I.\\n Welsh filed a state court action against Correct Care, L.L.C., Marsha\\nMcLane, Michael Searcy, and others, in which he alleged constitutional\\nviolations and other wrongs inflicted on him while he was in the custody of the\\n\\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522\\n\\nTexas Civil Commitment Office. After removing the case to federal court,\\ndefendants McLane and Searcy filed a partial motion to dismiss. McLane also\\nfiled an answer. Welsh then filed an amended complaint, which no defendant\\nanswered.\\n Months later, Welsh moved to dismiss his action without prejudice.\\nAfter a clerical error, the court entered a nunc pro tunc 1 order dismissing the\\ncase βwith prejudiceβ on the ground that at least one defendantβMcLaneβ\\nhad answered. Welsh appeals, arguing that he was entitled to voluntary\\ndismissal without prejudice and without a court order.\\n II.\\n A plaintiff may unilaterally dismiss his action without prejudice by filing\\na βnotice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a\\nmotion for summary judgment.β FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). If the defendant\\nhas filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment, however, Rule 41(a)(2)\\npermits dismissal at the plaintiffβs request βonly by court order, on terms that\\nthe court considers proper.β Id. 41(a)(2). Unless otherwise stated in the order,\\na dismissal under either subsection is without prejudice. Id. 41(a)(1)(B),\\n41(a)(2). We review the district courtβs decision for abuse of discretion. See\\nElbaor v. Tripath Imaging, Inc., 279 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2002).\\n A.\\n Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i) grants Welsh an absolute\\nright to dismiss his lawsuit before the defendant has filed an answer or a\\nsummary judgment motion. Defendant McLane filed an answer to Welshβs\\nearlier complaint, 2 but he did not answer Welshβs later-filed amended\\n\\n 1 βNunc pro tuncβ translates literally to βnow for thenβ and βdenotes an order having\\nretroactive legal effect through a courtβs inherent power.β 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders Β§ 52,\\nat 61 (2012).\\n 2 Welsh filed an original petition and an amended petition in state court. McLane\\n\\nanswered the amended petition, which will be referred to as the βearlier complaint.β\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522\\n\\ncomplaint. We must, therefore, determine whether filing an answer to the\\nearlier complaint, but not to the amended complaint, is sufficient to preclude\\nthe plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing his claim as a matter of right under\\nRule 41(a)(1)(A)(i).\\n The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Armstrong v. Frostie Co. and\\ndetermined that a plaintiff was barred from unilaterally dismissing his\\ncomplaint under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) where a defendant filed an answer to the\\nplaintiffβs original complaint but not to his amended complaint. 453 F.2d 914,\\n916 (4th Cir. 1971). The court reasoned that Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) βis designed to\\npermit a disengagement of the parties at the behest of the plaintiff only in the\\nearly stages of a suit, before the defendant has expended time and effort in the\\npreparation of his caseβ and the filing of an amended complaint βincreased\\nrather than nullified [the defendantβs] burden.β Id. Others have agreed. See\\nUniversidad Cent. Del Caribe, Inc. v. Liaison Comm. on Med. Educ., 760 F.2d\\n14, 18 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that Armstrong stands for the proposition that βa\\nplaintiff cannot supersede the cutting off of its right to give notice of voluntary\\ndismissal by filing an amended complaint after an answer or motion for\\nsummary judgment has been filed by the defendantβ); Baiul v. NBC Sports,\\n708 F. Appβx 710, 713 (2d Cir. 2017) (β[N]o new right of dismissal is created by\\nthe filing of an amended complaint, even one with substantially new\\nallegations.β); see also 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND\\nPROCEDURE Β§ 2363, at 122 (3d ed. Supp. 2018) (βMultiple courts have held that\\nan answer to the plaintiffβs original complaint is sufficient to preclude\\ndismissal by notice even though the defendant has not submitted an answer to\\nthe plaintiffβs amended complaint.β); cf. Van-S-Aviation Corp. v. Piper Aircraft\\nCorp., 551 F.2d 213, 220 (8th Cir. 1977) (βThe purpose of Rule 41(a)(1)[(A)](i)\\nis to fix the point at which the resources of the court and the defendant are so\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522\\n\\ncommitted that dismissal without preclusive consequences can no longer be\\nhad as of right.β).\\n We agree with the Fourth Circuitβs reasoning and hold that the filing of\\nan amended complaint does not revive the plaintiffβs absolute right to dismissal\\nunder Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). See Armstrong, 453 F.2d at 916. Because McLane\\nfiled an answer to Welshβs earlier complaint, Welsh cannot utilize Rule\\n41(a)(1)(A)(i)βs voluntary dismissal without a court order as to that defendant.\\nHowever, the Rules permit voluntary dismissal by notice and without a court\\norder of any defendant who has not served an answer, which in this case is all\\ndefendants except McLane. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(a)(i); Plains Growers\\nBy & Through Floristsβ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc., 474 F.2d\\n250, 255 (5th Cir. 1973). Therefore, Welsh is entitled to dismissal by notice\\nunder Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) without prejudice and without a court order against\\nall defendants other than McLane.\\n B.\\n Because McLane filed an answer, the district courtβs dismissal of Welshβs\\nclaim against him falls under Rule 41(a)(2), which allows the court to impose\\nconditions on the dismissal. The district court dismissed Welshβs claim with\\nprejudice. A plaintiff typically βhas the option to refuse a Rule 41(a)(2)\\nvoluntary dismissal and to proceed with its case if the conditions imposed by\\nthe court are too onerous.β Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Richard Carlyon Co.,\\n904 F.2d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, βbefore requiring a Rule 41(a)(2)\\ndismissal to be with prejudice, a court must allow a plaintiff the opportunity\\nto retract his motion to dismissβ rather than accept the dismissal with\\nprejudice. Bell v. Keystone RV Co., 628 F.3d 157, 163 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010).\\nWhere, as here, the plaintiff was not given the chance to withdraw the motion\\nand reject the condition of dismissal with prejudice, a remand is in order. See\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n No. 17-11522\\n\\nMortgage Guar., 904 F.2d at 301 (citing Lau v. Glendora Unified School\\nDistrict, 792 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, we find that the district\\ncourt abused its discretion when it dismissed Welshβs case with prejudice\\nwithout giving him the chance to reject or accept the dismissal. See id.\\n ***\\n To summarize, as to all non-answering defendants, Welsh is entitled to\\nunconditional dismissal by notice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) without prejudice\\nand without a court order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i); Plains Growers,\\n474 F.2d at 255. As to defendant McLane, Welsh is entitled to dismissal by\\nmotion under Rule 41(a)(2) βon terms that the court considers properβ with the\\nopportunity to retract his motion to dismiss if he finds the courtβs conditions\\ntoo onerous. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2); Mortgage Guar., 904 F.2d at 301.\\nAccordingly, we VACATE the district courtβs order and REMAND for further\\nproceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":593,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588550,"string":"4,588,550"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Kymberli Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-07"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-60072"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n REVISED February 7, 2019\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n No. 17-60072 FILED\\n February 6, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nKYMBERLI GARDNER, Clerk\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nCLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., doing business as Plaza Community Living\\nCenter,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\\n The opinion previously issued in this case is withdrawn, and the\\nfollowing opinion is substituted in its place.\\n Claims of sexual harassment typically involve the behavior of fellow\\nemployees. But not always. Because the ultimate focus of Title VII liability is\\non the employerβs conductβunless a supervisor is the harasser, a plaintiff\\nneeds to show that the employer knew or should have known about the hostile\\nwork environment yet allowed it to persist, see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570\\nU.S. 421, 427 (2013) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n(1998)) 1βnonemployees can be the source of the harassment. See 29 C.F.R.\\nΒ§ 1604.11(e) (βAn employer may . . . be responsible for the acts of non-\\nemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,\\nwhere the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should\\nhave known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate\\ncorrective action.β).\\n Customers are one example of third-party harassers. See generally Lori\\nA. Tetreault, Liability of Employer, Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964\\n(42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) for Sexual Harassment of Employee by Customer,\\nClient, or Patron, 163 A.L.R. FED. 445 (2000). A leading case on third-party\\nharassment addressed whether Pizza Hut could be liable for customersβ\\nharassment of a waitress. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1067,\\n1072 (10th Cir. 1998). Casinos seem especially susceptible to these claims, as\\none case addresses a high rollerβs harassment of a cocktail waitress and\\nanother a card playerβs harassment of a blackjack dealer. See generally Oliver\\nv. Sheraton Tunica Corp., 2000 WL 303444 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 8, 2000) (former);\\nPowell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992) (latter).\\n This case presents one of the more challenging situations in which to\\napply this principle that an employer can be liable for a hostile work\\nenvironment created by nonemployees: a nurse alleges that an assisted living\\nfacility allowed such an environment to continue by not preventing a residentβs\\n\\n\\n 1 Even when a supervisor is the harasser, liability flows from agency principles that\\nrender the employer liable. Vance, 570 U.S. at 428β29. One of those situations is when a\\nsupervisorβs harassing behavior resulted in an adverse βtangible employment decision.β Id.\\nLiability attaches in that situation because that injury βrequires an official act of the\\nenterpriseβ that will usually be βdocumented in official company recordsβ and often βsubject\\nto review by higher level supervisors.β Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761β\\n62 (1998). Absent that type of employment consequence, the company will be liable for a\\nsupervisorβs harassment only βif the employer is unable to establish an affirmative defenseβ\\nthat considers whether the employer took preventative or corrective measures to combat the\\nharassment. Vance, 570 U.S. at 429β30 (citing Ellerth and Faragher).\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nrepetitive harassment. The unique nature of that workplace is an important\\nconsideration. As we and other courts have recognized, the diminished\\ncapacity of patients influences whether the harassment should be perceived as\\naffecting the terms and conditions of employment. We must decide when the\\nallegations of harassment nonetheless become so severe or pervasive that fact\\nissues exist requiring a jury to decide the question.\\n I.\\n Kymberli Gardner worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant at an\\nassisted living facility operated by CLC of Pascagoula, d/b/a Plaza Community\\nLiving Center, from 2012 until she was fired in 2015. 2 Gardner is an\\nexperienced health aide. Before working for CLC, she was a caregiver for\\nseveral facilities and in-home care providers, two of which specialized in care\\nfor the mentally disabled. Gardner was trained in defensive and de-escalation\\ntactics for aggressive patients. As one might expect, during her years as a\\ncaregiver she often worked with patients who were βeither physically\\ncombative or sexually aggressive.β\\n But what she experienced with one patient at the CLC facility rose to a\\nnew level. J.S. was an elderly resident who lived at Plaza between 2006 and\\n2014. He had a reputation for groping female employees and becoming\\nphysically aggressive when reprimanded. J.S. had been diagnosed with a\\nvariety of physical and mental illnesses including dementia, traumatic brain\\ninjury, personality disorder with aggressive behavior, and Parkinsonβs\\nDisease. J.S.βs long history of violent and sexual behavior toward both patients\\nand staff included the following:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In light of the summary judgment posture, we recite these facts taking competing\\n 2\\n\\nevidence in the light most favorable to Gardner.\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n β’ J.S. had to be transferred from his initial residence wing because he\\n had become βcombativeβ and had physically assaulted his bedridden\\n roommate during a dispute over a television.\\n β’ J.S. was much more aggressive and sexually inappropriate towards\\n his female caregivers than even other problematic nursing home\\n residents; he would sexually assault them by grabbing their\\n βbreast[s], butts, thighs, and try[ing] to grab [their] private areas.β\\n β’ J.S. asked for explicit sexual acts on a regular basis and made lewd\\n sexual comments toward female staff. He asked female employees to\\n engage in sexual activity with him β[a]ll the time.β\\n Gardner, who became responsible for J.S.βs care, experienced these types\\nof inappropriate behavior from J.S. β[e]very day.β Gardner reported that J.S.\\nwould physically grab her and make repeated sexual comments and requests.\\nShe and other CLC employees documented J.S.βs behavior by routinely\\nrecording it on his chart and making complaints to supervisors.\\n As a result, J.S.βs behavior was not a secret to those who ran the assisted\\nliving facility. Brandy Gregg, Gardnerβs former supervisor and now the\\ndirector of nursing, had witnessed J.S.βs behaving in a sexually inappropriate\\nmanner and also received complaints from nurses to that effect. These\\nconcerns led administrators to transfer J.S. to a new wing. But they were not\\nalways responsive to the complaints. They declined, for example, to have him\\nundergo a psychiatric evaluation after he assaulted his roommate. J.S. later\\nassaulted a CLC employee and was sent for evaluation, but subsequently\\nreturned to CLC. And when Gardner attempted to discuss her concerns about\\nJ.S.βs behavior, Gregg laughed, and Administrator Teri Reynolds told Gardner\\nto βput [her] big girl panties on and go back to work.β\\n So Gardner continued to care for J.S., which ultimately resulted in the\\nincident that led to her termination. It began when Gardner was trying to help\\nJ.S. attend a therapy session. As she was assisting J.S. out of bed, he began\\ntrying βto gropeβ her and then tried to touch Gardnerβs left breast while she\\nwas bent over. When she tried to move out of the way, J.S. punched her on the\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nside of her breast. Gardner then laid him down on the bed and left the room\\nto get help. Janice Watkins, another nursing assistant, joined Gardner and\\nthe two again attempted to help J.S. out of bed and into a chair. At this point\\nJ.S. punched Gardner a second time. Gardner removed herself from J.Sβs\\nimmediate area at which point he began to grab Watkinsβ βprivate area.β\\nGardner sought help from the nurse on duty, Judy Toche. Gardner, Toche, and\\nWatkins were able to get J.S. into his wheelchair. Gardner then moved to\\nmake the bed, but J.S. punched her a third time.\\n What Gardner did in response is disputed. Greggβs typed summary of\\nevents, as well as the deposition testimony of Toche, and Tocheβs βnurseβs\\nnotesβ from the day of the incident claim that Gardner βswung her own fist\\nover [J.S.βs] headβ and that her arm βbrushed the top of his head.β Watkins,\\non the other hand, asserts in both her deposition and her written witness\\ninterview statement that Gardner β[went] up with her hand as if she was going\\nto hit [patient]β but βdidnβt hit [patient] at all.β Gardner says she did not swing\\nat J.S. during the incident. Gardner also reportedly made two statements as\\nshe was leaving J.S.βs room. Watkins testifies Gardner said, βI am not doing\\nshit else for [patient] at all.β Gardner also reportedly said, βI guess Iβm not the\\nright color,β presumably because Toche, a white nurse, was able to calm J.S.\\nwhereas Gardner, a black nursing assistant, could not. After the incident,\\nGardner spoke with both Toche and Teri Reynolds, then the facility\\nadministrator, about her assignment to care for J.S. Gardner refused to care\\nfor him due to the continued harassment and asked to be reassigned. Her\\nrequest was denied.\\n Gardner then left work and went to the emergency room that evening\\ndue to injuries she sustained. She did not return to work for three months\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nduring which time she received workersβ compensation. 3 Shortly after\\nreturning from leave, Gardner was fired. Gregg, Gardnerβs supervisor at the\\ntime, says Gardner was fired for three reasons: (1) insubordination (refusing\\nto care for J.S.); (2) violating J.S.βs resident rights (by swearing in front of him\\nand making a βracist type statement[],β apparently the one about her not being\\nthe βright colorβ); and (3) attacking J.S. (swinging over his head).\\n As for J.S., nothing happened to him immediately after the incident with\\nGardner. But another altercation later that same day with a resident resulted\\nin his being sent for a psychiatric evaluation and then moved to an all-male\\nβlockdownβ unit in nearby Biloxi.\\n Gardner sued, asserting multiple claims under Title VII. CLC moved for\\nsummary judgment and to strike certain affidavit testimony. Gardner also\\nmoved to strike portions of affidavit and deposition testimony. The district\\ncourt denied Gardnerβs motion to strike, and denied in part and granted in part\\nCLCβs motion to strike. 4 The lower court then granted summary judgment in\\nfavor of CLC on all claims. Gardnerβs appeal pursues only her claims of hostile\\nwork environment and retaliation. 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Gregg and the contemporaneous incident report say that Gardner had been\\nsuspended. But the report from CLCβs internal investigation contradicts that claim as it says\\nthat Gardnerβs βseparation from her employment was held pending her completion of her\\nworkmenβs compensation.β Gardnerβs affidavit also asserts she was never informed she had\\nbeen suspended. We assume for purposes of summary judgment that Gardner was not\\nsuspended and was on workersβ compensation during her three-month absence.\\n 4 Gardner appeals some of those evidentiary rulings. We conclude that the district\\n\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion striking portions of her affidavit as speculative. And we\\nneed not decide whether the district court erred in considering Greggβs testimony about the\\nreasons for the termination as that issue does not affect our ruling.\\n 5 While Gardner purports to appeal her sex discrimination claim based on disparate\\n\\ntreatment in addition to the one alleging hostile work environment, she has not sufficiently\\nbriefed that claim.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n II.\\n The district court concluded that a hostile workplace did not exist. It\\nexplained that it was βnot clear to the Court that the harassing comments and\\nattempts to grope and hit are beyond what a person in Gardnerβs position\\nshould expect of patients in a nursing home.β CLC defends the grant of\\nsummary judgment on that ground as well as on one the district court did not\\nreach: whether the company knew about the harassment and failed to take\\nremedial action. The other elements of a Title VII hostile work environment\\nclaimβthat Gardner is a member of a protected class who was subject to some\\nharassment on the basis of her sexβare not disputed. Royal v. CCC & R Tres\\nArboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2013).\\n A.\\n Our de novo review of the grant of summary judgment leads us to a\\ndifferent conclusion given that all inferences must be viewed in Gardnerβs favor\\nat this stage. See Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015);\\nBurnett Ranches, Ltd. v. United States, 753 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2014). To\\nget past summary judgment, Gardner need not make it βclearβ that she was\\nsubject to actionable harassment; she of course only needs to show that a jury\\ncould reach that conclusion based on its view of the evidence.\\n Title VII does not prohibit all harassment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.\\nVinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). It makes harassing conduct unlawful when it\\nresults in the employer βdiscriminat[ing] against any individual with respect\\nto his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of\\nsuch individualβs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2000eβ2(a)(1); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21β23 (1993); Meritor,\\n477 U.S. at 64β67. This statutory language βis not limited to βeconomicβ or\\nβtangibleβ discrimination.β Id. at 64. Instead, βthe phrase βterms, conditions,\\nor privileges of employmentβ evinces a congressional intent βto strike at the\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nentire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and womenβ in employment,\\nwhich includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive\\nenvironment.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). Title\\nVII is violated βwhen the workplace is permeated with βdiscriminatory\\nintimidation, ridicule, and insult,β . . . that is βsufficiently severe or pervasive\\nto alter the conditions of the victimβs employment and create an abusive\\nworking environment. Id.; Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d\\n871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court set the βsevere or pervasiveβ\\nstandard as a βmiddle path between making actionable any conduct that is\\nmerely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological\\ninjury.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. A plaintiff βmust subjectively perceive the\\nharassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive, and this subjective perception\\nmust be objectively reasonable.β Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 138 (5th\\nCir. 2003).\\n As a starting point, the multiple years of unwanted sexual grabbing and\\nexplicit comments Gardner endured could certainly be deemed severe and\\npervasive harassmentβonly one of those is necessary, Lauderdale v. Tex. Depβt\\nof Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007)βif the harasser were\\nsomeone without any mental impairments. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668\\nF.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 2012) (hostile work environment when plaintiff was\\nsubject to multiple months of unwanted sexual grabbing and explicit\\ncomments); Harvill, v. Westward Commcβns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir.\\n2005) (finding severe or pervasive harassment when, over seven months, a\\ncoworker grabbed a female employee, fondled her breasts and patted her\\nbuttocks βnumerous times,β and rubbed his body against the plaintiff).\\n The complication is the one we have already mentioned: the source of the\\nharassment is the resident of an assisted living facility who suffers from\\ndementia. We have twice confronted hostile work environment claims based\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\non the behavior of patients towards caregivers. The first case involved home\\nhealth services. We held that the verbal harassment, which included the\\npatient repeatedly propositioning the plaintiff for sex and calling her\\ndisparaging names, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Cain v. Blackwell,\\n246 F.3d 758, 760β61 (5th Cir. 2001). We reached the same conclusion in the\\nnext case when a nursing home patient repeatedly directed racial slurs at a\\nnurseβs assistant. E.E.O.C. v. Nexion Health at Broadway, Inc., 199 F. Appβx\\n351, 353 (5th Cir. 2006). 6 Although the verbal harassment was βquite\\noffensive,β the comments did not rise to the level of actionable conduct because\\nthey were not βphysically threatening or humiliatingβ and did not βpervade the\\nwork experience of a reasonable nursing home employee, especially\\nconsidering their source.β Id. at 353β54. We recognized, however, that there\\nis not a categorical bar on hostile environment claims arising from harassment\\nby patients. See id. at 353 (βCain does not establish a bright-line rule that\\nemployees who care for disabled, elderly patients can never succeed on a Title\\nVII claim.β). 7 The βspecific circumstancesβ of such claims βmust be judged to\\ndetermine whether a reasonable person would find the work environment\\nhostile or abusiveβ taking due account of the βunique circumstances involved\\nin caring for mentally diseased elderly patients.β Id.\\n Other circuits have found triable hostile work environment claims when\\npatients engaged in the physical harassment absent in Nexion and Cain. The\\n\\n\\n 6 Although Nexion is not binding, we address it because the district court relied on it\\nin granting summary judgment, and it illustrates the range of conduct courts have considered\\nin this area.\\n 7 The district court thought Nexion βindicates that the default is no viable Title VII\\n\\nclaim in such situations.β Nexion did not create a default presumption against Title VII\\nliability when the harasser is suffering from mental disability. Its statement that there is no\\nβbright-line ruleβ does the opposite of setting any hard and fast rule. The Nexion language\\nemphasizes what is true of most areas of the lawβthe outcome will depend on the facts of\\nindividual cases. So while a diminished mental condition of the harasser is an important\\nconsideration, it does not preclude liability.\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nEighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment when a mentally\\nhandicapped, teenage resident of a care facility βpushed [a female caregiver]\\nagainst a door, forced her right hand above her head, pulled open her jeans and\\nher blouse, grabbed her left breast, and pushed his weight and erect penis\\nagainst her stomach.β Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1108 (8th Cir.\\n1997). The Tenth Circuit also rejected a district courtβs granting judgment as\\na matter of law for the hospital when a patient βknocked [a psychologist] to the\\nground, undressed her and digitally penetrated her, bit and choked her, and\\nrepeatedly threatened to kill her.β Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d\\n1238, 1242β43 (10th Cir. 2001).\\n J.S.βs conduct is more severe than the nonphysical harassment held to\\nbe insufficient in Cain and Nexion 8 but not as severe as the potentially life-\\nthreatening sexual assaults in Crist or Turnbull. But the latter situation does\\nnot set a floor for actionable conduct. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (explaining that\\nTitle VII does not require harassment to βseriously affect employeesβ\\npsychological well-beingβ). So the question remains whether the conduct here,\\nwhich falls in the middle of this continuum, is enough. And that, as we have\\nsaid, involves the difficult line-drawing problem of what separates legally\\nactionable harassment from conduct that one should reasonably expect when\\nassisting people suffering from dementia.\\n We conclude that the evidence of persistent and often physical\\nharassment by J.S. is enough to allow a jury to decide whether a reasonable\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 It is also more severe and pervasive than the conduct in an Illinois federal case the\\ndistrict court relied on. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 2008 WL 719224, at *4 (N.D.\\nIll. Mar. 14, 2008), affβd, 610 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2010). Pickett considered conduct from a\\nresident that happened three times over eight months. More importantly, Pickett refrained\\nfrom deciding whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, and instead granted summary\\njudgment in favor of the defendant because it took several steps to mitigate the harassing\\nbehavior. Id. at *5.\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\ncaregiver on the receiving end of the harassment would have viewed it as\\nsufficiently severe or pervasive even considering the medical condition of the\\nharasser. The frequency and nature of the conduct, along with its effect on\\nGardnerβs employment, would allow (but not require) that finding. Id. at 23\\n(finding that βthe frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;\\nwhether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive\\nutterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employeeβs work\\nperformanceβ are factors that influence whether harassment can be described\\nas βhostileβ or βabusiveβ); see also Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476\\nF.3d 337, 347β48 (5th Cir. 2007). J.S.βs inappropriate conduct occurred daily.\\nHis conduct was far more severe than other residentsβ and consisted of physical\\nsexual assault and violent outbursts. J.S.βs physical assault on Gardner took\\nhis behavior outside the realm of a βmere offensive utterance.β And his actions\\ninterfered with her work performance, leaving Gardner unable to work for\\nthree months. A jury could conclude that an objectively reasonable caregiver\\nwould not expect a patient to grope her daily, injure her so badly she could not\\nwork for three months, and have her complaints met with laughter and\\ndismissal by the administration. Cf. Aguiar v. Bartlesville Care Ctr., 2011 WL\\n1461541, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 2011) (finding sufficient severity when a\\npatient repeatedly engaged in unwanted touching of a nurse assistant,\\nβinterfered with her work, and eventually assaulted herβ with a medicine cart).\\n It is important to note that a finding that a patientβs harassment rises to\\na level of severity or pervasiveness that affects the terms and conditions of\\nemployment does not alone render the nursing home liable. As we mentioned\\nat the outset, liability when such a claim is based on the behavior of someone\\nother than a supervisor requires showing that the employer knew or should\\nhave known of the hostile work environment but failed to take reasonable\\nmeasures to try and stop it. Royal, 736 F.3d at 401. CLC did not argue in its\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nsummary judgment motion that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law\\non this element of Gardnerβs claim. We thus have no occasion to consider it.\\n We reverse the entry of summary judgment on Gardnerβs harassment\\nclaim.\\n III.\\n Gardner also appeals the grant of summary judgment on her retaliation\\nclaim. It requires her to show that β(1) she engaged in activity protected under\\nTitle VII, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there was a\\ncausal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment\\ndecision.β Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992).\\n The district court analyzed the retaliation issue under the McDonnell-\\nDouglas burden shifting framework used for cases relying on circumstantial\\nevidence. Gardner does not contest that ruling, so it is affirmed.\\n Her position all along, however, has been that she can prove retaliation\\nvia direct evidence. As the district court did not consider her argument based\\non direct evidence, we will allow it to consider that argument in the first\\ninstance on remand.\\n * * *\\n\\n REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, and REMANDED for\\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4365803/\", \"author_raw\": \"GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KING"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"COSTA"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KING\": \", Circuit\", \"DENNIS\": \", Circuit\", \"COSTA\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588550/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Kymberli Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-07\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED February 7, 2019\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n No. 17-60072 FILED\n February 6, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nKYMBERLI GARDNER, Clerk\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\nv.\n\nCLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., doing business as Plaza Community Living\nCenter,\n\n Defendant - Appellee\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\n\n\nBefore KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\n The opinion previously issued in this case is withdrawn, and the\nfollowing opinion is substituted in its place.\n Claims of sexual harassment typically involve the behavior of fellow\nemployees. But not always. Because the ultimate focus of Title VII liability is\non the employerβs conductβunless a supervisor is the harasser, a plaintiff\nneeds to show that the employer knew or should have known about the hostile\nwork environment yet allowed it to persist, see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570\nU.S. 421, 427 (2013) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\n(1998)) 1βnonemployees can be the source of the harassment. See 29 C.F.R.\nΒ§ 1604.11(e) (βAn employer may . . . be responsible for the acts of non-\nemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,\nwhere the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should\nhave known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate\ncorrective action.β).\n Customers are one example of third-party harassers. See generally Lori\nA. Tetreault, Liability of Employer, Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964\n(42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) for Sexual Harassment of Employee by Customer,\nClient, or Patron, 163 A.L.R. FED. 445 (2000). A leading case on third-party\nharassment addressed whether Pizza Hut could be liable for customersβ\nharassment of a waitress. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1067,\n1072 (10th Cir. 1998). Casinos seem especially susceptible to these claims, as\none case addresses a high rollerβs harassment of a cocktail waitress and\nanother a card playerβs harassment of a blackjack dealer. See generally Oliver\nv. Sheraton Tunica Corp., 2000 WL 303444 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 8, 2000) (former);\nPowell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992) (latter).\n This case presents one of the more challenging situations in which to\napply this principle that an employer can be liable for a hostile work\nenvironment created by nonemployees: a nurse alleges that an assisted living\nfacility allowed such an environment to continue by not preventing a residentβs\n\n\n 1 Even when a supervisor is the harasser, liability flows from agency principles that\nrender the employer liable. Vance, 570 U.S. at 428β29. One of those situations is when a\nsupervisorβs harassing behavior resulted in an adverse βtangible employment decision.β Id.\nLiability attaches in that situation because that injury βrequires an official act of the\nenterpriseβ that will usually be βdocumented in official company recordsβ and often βsubject\nto review by higher level supervisors.β Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761β\n62 (1998). Absent that type of employment consequence, the company will be liable for a\nsupervisorβs harassment only βif the employer is unable to establish an affirmative defenseβ\nthat considers whether the employer took preventative or corrective measures to combat the\nharassment. Vance, 570 U.S. at 429β30 (citing Ellerth and Faragher).\n 2\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nrepetitive harassment. The unique nature of that workplace is an important\nconsideration. As we and other courts have recognized, the diminished\ncapacity of patients influences whether the harassment should be perceived as\naffecting the terms and conditions of employment. We must decide when the\nallegations of harassment nonetheless become so severe or pervasive that fact\nissues exist requiring a jury to decide the question.\n I.\n Kymberli Gardner worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant at an\nassisted living facility operated by CLC of Pascagoula, d/b/a Plaza Community\nLiving Center, from 2012 until she was fired in 2015. 2 Gardner is an\nexperienced health aide. Before working for CLC, she was a caregiver for\nseveral facilities and in-home care providers, two of which specialized in care\nfor the mentally disabled. Gardner was trained in defensive and de-escalation\ntactics for aggressive patients. As one might expect, during her years as a\ncaregiver she often worked with patients who were βeither physically\ncombative or sexually aggressive.β\n But what she experienced with one patient at the CLC facility rose to a\nnew level. J.S. was an elderly resident who lived at Plaza between 2006 and\n2014. He had a reputation for groping female employees and becoming\nphysically aggressive when reprimanded. J.S. had been diagnosed with a\nvariety of physical and mental illnesses including dementia, traumatic brain\ninjury, personality disorder with aggressive behavior, and Parkinsonβs\nDisease. J.S.βs long history of violent and sexual behavior toward both patients\nand staff included the following:\n\n\n\n\n In light of the summary judgment posture, we recite these facts taking competing\n 2\n\nevidence in the light most favorable to Gardner.\n 3\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\n β’ J.S. had to be transferred from his initial residence wing because he\n had become βcombativeβ and had physically assaulted his bedridden\n roommate during a dispute over a television.\n β’ J.S. was much more aggressive and sexually inappropriate towards\n his female caregivers than even other problematic nursing home\n residents; he would sexually assault them by grabbing their\n βbreast[s], butts, thighs, and try[ing] to grab [their] private areas.β\n β’ J.S. asked for explicit sexual acts on a regular basis and made lewd\n sexual comments toward female staff. He asked female employees to\n engage in sexual activity with him β[a]ll the time.β\n Gardner, who became responsible for J.S.βs care, experienced these types\nof inappropriate behavior from J.S. β[e]very day.β Gardner reported that J.S.\nwould physically grab her and make repeated sexual comments and requests.\nShe and other CLC employees documented J.S.βs behavior by routinely\nrecording it on his chart and making complaints to supervisors.\n As a result, J.S.βs behavior was not a secret to those who ran the assisted\nliving facility. Brandy Gregg, Gardnerβs former supervisor and now the\ndirector of nursing, had witnessed J.S.βs behaving in a sexually inappropriate\nmanner and also received complaints from nurses to that effect. These\nconcerns led administrators to transfer J.S. to a new wing. But they were not\nalways responsive to the complaints. They declined, for example, to have him\nundergo a psychiatric evaluation after he assaulted his roommate. J.S. later\nassaulted a CLC employee and was sent for evaluation, but subsequently\nreturned to CLC. And when Gardner attempted to discuss her concerns about\nJ.S.βs behavior, Gregg laughed, and Administrator Teri Reynolds told Gardner\nto βput [her] big girl panties on and go back to work.β\n So Gardner continued to care for J.S., which ultimately resulted in the\nincident that led to her termination. It began when Gardner was trying to help\nJ.S. attend a therapy session. As she was assisting J.S. out of bed, he began\ntrying βto gropeβ her and then tried to touch Gardnerβs left breast while she\nwas bent over. When she tried to move out of the way, J.S. punched her on the\n 4\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nside of her breast. Gardner then laid him down on the bed and left the room\nto get help. Janice Watkins, another nursing assistant, joined Gardner and\nthe two again attempted to help J.S. out of bed and into a chair. At this point\nJ.S. punched Gardner a second time. Gardner removed herself from J.Sβs\nimmediate area at which point he began to grab Watkinsβ βprivate area.β\nGardner sought help from the nurse on duty, Judy Toche. Gardner, Toche, and\nWatkins were able to get J.S. into his wheelchair. Gardner then moved to\nmake the bed, but J.S. punched her a third time.\n What Gardner did in response is disputed. Greggβs typed summary of\nevents, as well as the deposition testimony of Toche, and Tocheβs βnurseβs\nnotesβ from the day of the incident claim that Gardner βswung her own fist\nover [J.S.βs] headβ and that her arm βbrushed the top of his head.β Watkins,\non the other hand, asserts in both her deposition and her written witness\ninterview statement that Gardner β[went] up with her hand as if she was going\nto hit [patient]β but βdidnβt hit [patient] at all.β Gardner says she did not swing\nat J.S. during the incident. Gardner also reportedly made two statements as\nshe was leaving J.S.βs room. Watkins testifies Gardner said, βI am not doing\nshit else for [patient] at all.β Gardner also reportedly said, βI guess Iβm not the\nright color,β presumably because Toche, a white nurse, was able to calm J.S.\nwhereas Gardner, a black nursing assistant, could not. After the incident,\nGardner spoke with both Toche and Teri Reynolds, then the facility\nadministrator, about her assignment to care for J.S. Gardner refused to care\nfor him due to the continued harassment and asked to be reassigned. Her\nrequest was denied.\n Gardner then left work and went to the emergency room that evening\ndue to injuries she sustained. She did not return to work for three months\n\n\n\n\n 5\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nduring which time she received workersβ compensation. 3 Shortly after\nreturning from leave, Gardner was fired. Gregg, Gardnerβs supervisor at the\ntime, says Gardner was fired for three reasons: (1) insubordination (refusing\nto care for J.S.); (2) violating J.S.βs resident rights (by swearing in front of him\nand making a βracist type statement[],β apparently the one about her not being\nthe βright colorβ); and (3) attacking J.S. (swinging over his head).\n As for J.S., nothing happened to him immediately after the incident with\nGardner. But another altercation later that same day with a resident resulted\nin his being sent for a psychiatric evaluation and then moved to an all-male\nβlockdownβ unit in nearby Biloxi.\n Gardner sued, asserting multiple claims under Title VII. CLC moved for\nsummary judgment and to strike certain affidavit testimony. Gardner also\nmoved to strike portions of affidavit and deposition testimony. The district\ncourt denied Gardnerβs motion to strike, and denied in part and granted in part\nCLCβs motion to strike. 4 The lower court then granted summary judgment in\nfavor of CLC on all claims. Gardnerβs appeal pursues only her claims of hostile\nwork environment and retaliation. 5\n\n\n\n\n 3 Gregg and the contemporaneous incident report say that Gardner had been\nsuspended. But the report from CLCβs internal investigation contradicts that claim as it says\nthat Gardnerβs βseparation from her employment was held pending her completion of her\nworkmenβs compensation.β Gardnerβs affidavit also asserts she was never informed she had\nbeen suspended. We assume for purposes of summary judgment that Gardner was not\nsuspended and was on workersβ compensation during her three-month absence.\n 4 Gardner appeals some of those evidentiary rulings. We conclude that the district\n\ncourt did not abuse its discretion striking portions of her affidavit as speculative. And we\nneed not decide whether the district court erred in considering Greggβs testimony about the\nreasons for the termination as that issue does not affect our ruling.\n 5 While Gardner purports to appeal her sex discrimination claim based on disparate\n\ntreatment in addition to the one alleging hostile work environment, she has not sufficiently\nbriefed that claim.\n 6\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\n II.\n The district court concluded that a hostile workplace did not exist. It\nexplained that it was βnot clear to the Court that the harassing comments and\nattempts to grope and hit are beyond what a person in Gardnerβs position\nshould expect of patients in a nursing home.β CLC defends the grant of\nsummary judgment on that ground as well as on one the district court did not\nreach: whether the company knew about the harassment and failed to take\nremedial action. The other elements of a Title VII hostile work environment\nclaimβthat Gardner is a member of a protected class who was subject to some\nharassment on the basis of her sexβare not disputed. Royal v. CCC & R Tres\nArboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2013).\n A.\n Our de novo review of the grant of summary judgment leads us to a\ndifferent conclusion given that all inferences must be viewed in Gardnerβs favor\nat this stage. See Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015);\nBurnett Ranches, Ltd. v. United States, 753 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2014). To\nget past summary judgment, Gardner need not make it βclearβ that she was\nsubject to actionable harassment; she of course only needs to show that a jury\ncould reach that conclusion based on its view of the evidence.\n Title VII does not prohibit all harassment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.\nVinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). It makes harassing conduct unlawful when it\nresults in the employer βdiscriminat[ing] against any individual with respect\nto his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of\nsuch individualβs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.β 42 U.S.C.\nΒ§ 2000eβ2(a)(1); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21β23 (1993); Meritor,\n477 U.S. at 64β67. This statutory language βis not limited to βeconomicβ or\nβtangibleβ discrimination.β Id. at 64. Instead, βthe phrase βterms, conditions,\nor privileges of employmentβ evinces a congressional intent βto strike at the\n 7\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nentire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and womenβ in employment,\nwhich includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive\nenvironment.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). Title\nVII is violated βwhen the workplace is permeated with βdiscriminatory\nintimidation, ridicule, and insult,β . . . that is βsufficiently severe or pervasive\nto alter the conditions of the victimβs employment and create an abusive\nworking environment. Id.; Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d\n871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court set the βsevere or pervasiveβ\nstandard as a βmiddle path between making actionable any conduct that is\nmerely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological\ninjury.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. A plaintiff βmust subjectively perceive the\nharassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive, and this subjective perception\nmust be objectively reasonable.β Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 138 (5th\nCir. 2003).\n As a starting point, the multiple years of unwanted sexual grabbing and\nexplicit comments Gardner endured could certainly be deemed severe and\npervasive harassmentβonly one of those is necessary, Lauderdale v. Tex. Depβt\nof Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007)βif the harasser were\nsomeone without any mental impairments. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668\nF.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 2012) (hostile work environment when plaintiff was\nsubject to multiple months of unwanted sexual grabbing and explicit\ncomments); Harvill, v. Westward Commcβns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir.\n2005) (finding severe or pervasive harassment when, over seven months, a\ncoworker grabbed a female employee, fondled her breasts and patted her\nbuttocks βnumerous times,β and rubbed his body against the plaintiff).\n The complication is the one we have already mentioned: the source of the\nharassment is the resident of an assisted living facility who suffers from\ndementia. We have twice confronted hostile work environment claims based\n 8\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\non the behavior of patients towards caregivers. The first case involved home\nhealth services. We held that the verbal harassment, which included the\npatient repeatedly propositioning the plaintiff for sex and calling her\ndisparaging names, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Cain v. Blackwell,\n246 F.3d 758, 760β61 (5th Cir. 2001). We reached the same conclusion in the\nnext case when a nursing home patient repeatedly directed racial slurs at a\nnurseβs assistant. E.E.O.C. v. Nexion Health at Broadway, Inc., 199 F. Appβx\n351, 353 (5th Cir. 2006). 6 Although the verbal harassment was βquite\noffensive,β the comments did not rise to the level of actionable conduct because\nthey were not βphysically threatening or humiliatingβ and did not βpervade the\nwork experience of a reasonable nursing home employee, especially\nconsidering their source.β Id. at 353β54. We recognized, however, that there\nis not a categorical bar on hostile environment claims arising from harassment\nby patients. See id. at 353 (βCain does not establish a bright-line rule that\nemployees who care for disabled, elderly patients can never succeed on a Title\nVII claim.β). 7 The βspecific circumstancesβ of such claims βmust be judged to\ndetermine whether a reasonable person would find the work environment\nhostile or abusiveβ taking due account of the βunique circumstances involved\nin caring for mentally diseased elderly patients.β Id.\n Other circuits have found triable hostile work environment claims when\npatients engaged in the physical harassment absent in Nexion and Cain. The\n\n\n 6 Although Nexion is not binding, we address it because the district court relied on it\nin granting summary judgment, and it illustrates the range of conduct courts have considered\nin this area.\n 7 The district court thought Nexion βindicates that the default is no viable Title VII\n\nclaim in such situations.β Nexion did not create a default presumption against Title VII\nliability when the harasser is suffering from mental disability. Its statement that there is no\nβbright-line ruleβ does the opposite of setting any hard and fast rule. The Nexion language\nemphasizes what is true of most areas of the lawβthe outcome will depend on the facts of\nindividual cases. So while a diminished mental condition of the harasser is an important\nconsideration, it does not preclude liability.\n 9\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nEighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment when a mentally\nhandicapped, teenage resident of a care facility βpushed [a female caregiver]\nagainst a door, forced her right hand above her head, pulled open her jeans and\nher blouse, grabbed her left breast, and pushed his weight and erect penis\nagainst her stomach.β Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1108 (8th Cir.\n1997). The Tenth Circuit also rejected a district courtβs granting judgment as\na matter of law for the hospital when a patient βknocked [a psychologist] to the\nground, undressed her and digitally penetrated her, bit and choked her, and\nrepeatedly threatened to kill her.β Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d\n1238, 1242β43 (10th Cir. 2001).\n J.S.βs conduct is more severe than the nonphysical harassment held to\nbe insufficient in Cain and Nexion 8 but not as severe as the potentially life-\nthreatening sexual assaults in Crist or Turnbull. But the latter situation does\nnot set a floor for actionable conduct. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (explaining that\nTitle VII does not require harassment to βseriously affect employeesβ\npsychological well-beingβ). So the question remains whether the conduct here,\nwhich falls in the middle of this continuum, is enough. And that, as we have\nsaid, involves the difficult line-drawing problem of what separates legally\nactionable harassment from conduct that one should reasonably expect when\nassisting people suffering from dementia.\n We conclude that the evidence of persistent and often physical\nharassment by J.S. is enough to allow a jury to decide whether a reasonable\n\n\n\n\n 8 It is also more severe and pervasive than the conduct in an Illinois federal case the\ndistrict court relied on. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 2008 WL 719224, at *4 (N.D.\nIll. Mar. 14, 2008), affβd, 610 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2010). Pickett considered conduct from a\nresident that happened three times over eight months. More importantly, Pickett refrained\nfrom deciding whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, and instead granted summary\njudgment in favor of the defendant because it took several steps to mitigate the harassing\nbehavior. Id. at *5.\n 10\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\ncaregiver on the receiving end of the harassment would have viewed it as\nsufficiently severe or pervasive even considering the medical condition of the\nharasser. The frequency and nature of the conduct, along with its effect on\nGardnerβs employment, would allow (but not require) that finding. Id. at 23\n(finding that βthe frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;\nwhether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive\nutterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employeeβs work\nperformanceβ are factors that influence whether harassment can be described\nas βhostileβ or βabusiveβ); see also Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476\nF.3d 337, 347β48 (5th Cir. 2007). J.S.βs inappropriate conduct occurred daily.\nHis conduct was far more severe than other residentsβ and consisted of physical\nsexual assault and violent outbursts. J.S.βs physical assault on Gardner took\nhis behavior outside the realm of a βmere offensive utterance.β And his actions\ninterfered with her work performance, leaving Gardner unable to work for\nthree months. A jury could conclude that an objectively reasonable caregiver\nwould not expect a patient to grope her daily, injure her so badly she could not\nwork for three months, and have her complaints met with laughter and\ndismissal by the administration. Cf. Aguiar v. Bartlesville Care Ctr., 2011 WL\n1461541, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 2011) (finding sufficient severity when a\npatient repeatedly engaged in unwanted touching of a nurse assistant,\nβinterfered with her work, and eventually assaulted herβ with a medicine cart).\n It is important to note that a finding that a patientβs harassment rises to\na level of severity or pervasiveness that affects the terms and conditions of\nemployment does not alone render the nursing home liable. As we mentioned\nat the outset, liability when such a claim is based on the behavior of someone\nother than a supervisor requires showing that the employer knew or should\nhave known of the hostile work environment but failed to take reasonable\nmeasures to try and stop it. Royal, 736 F.3d at 401. CLC did not argue in its\n 11\n\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60072\nsummary judgment motion that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law\non this element of Gardnerβs claim. We thus have no occasion to consider it.\n We reverse the entry of summary judgment on Gardnerβs harassment\nclaim.\n III.\n Gardner also appeals the grant of summary judgment on her retaliation\nclaim. It requires her to show that β(1) she engaged in activity protected under\nTitle VII, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there was a\ncausal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment\ndecision.β Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992).\n The district court analyzed the retaliation issue under the McDonnell-\nDouglas burden shifting framework used for cases relying on circumstantial\nevidence. Gardner does not contest that ruling, so it is affirmed.\n Her position all along, however, has been that she can prove retaliation\nvia direct evidence. As the district court did not consider her argument based\non direct evidence, we will allow it to consider that argument in the first\ninstance on remand.\n * * *\n\n REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, and REMANDED for\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n\n\n\n\n 12\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Kymberli Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-07\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n REVISED February 7, 2019\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n No. 17-60072 FILED\\n February 6, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nKYMBERLI GARDNER, Clerk\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nCLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., doing business as Plaza Community Living\\nCenter,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Mississippi\\n\\n\\nBefore KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.\\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\\n The opinion previously issued in this case is withdrawn, and the\\nfollowing opinion is substituted in its place.\\n Claims of sexual harassment typically involve the behavior of fellow\\nemployees. But not always. Because the ultimate focus of Title VII liability is\\non the employerβs conductβunless a supervisor is the harasser, a plaintiff\\nneeds to show that the employer knew or should have known about the hostile\\nwork environment yet allowed it to persist, see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570\\nU.S. 421, 427 (2013) (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n(1998)) 1βnonemployees can be the source of the harassment. See 29 C.F.R.\\nΒ§ 1604.11(e) (βAn employer may . . . be responsible for the acts of non-\\nemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace,\\nwhere the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should\\nhave known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate\\ncorrective action.β).\\n Customers are one example of third-party harassers. See generally Lori\\nA. Tetreault, Liability of Employer, Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964\\n(42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) for Sexual Harassment of Employee by Customer,\\nClient, or Patron, 163 A.L.R. FED. 445 (2000). A leading case on third-party\\nharassment addressed whether Pizza Hut could be liable for customersβ\\nharassment of a waitress. Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1067,\\n1072 (10th Cir. 1998). Casinos seem especially susceptible to these claims, as\\none case addresses a high rollerβs harassment of a cocktail waitress and\\nanother a card playerβs harassment of a blackjack dealer. See generally Oliver\\nv. Sheraton Tunica Corp., 2000 WL 303444 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 8, 2000) (former);\\nPowell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992) (latter).\\n This case presents one of the more challenging situations in which to\\napply this principle that an employer can be liable for a hostile work\\nenvironment created by nonemployees: a nurse alleges that an assisted living\\nfacility allowed such an environment to continue by not preventing a residentβs\\n\\n\\n 1 Even when a supervisor is the harasser, liability flows from agency principles that\\nrender the employer liable. Vance, 570 U.S. at 428β29. One of those situations is when a\\nsupervisorβs harassing behavior resulted in an adverse βtangible employment decision.β Id.\\nLiability attaches in that situation because that injury βrequires an official act of the\\nenterpriseβ that will usually be βdocumented in official company recordsβ and often βsubject\\nto review by higher level supervisors.β Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761β\\n62 (1998). Absent that type of employment consequence, the company will be liable for a\\nsupervisorβs harassment only βif the employer is unable to establish an affirmative defenseβ\\nthat considers whether the employer took preventative or corrective measures to combat the\\nharassment. Vance, 570 U.S. at 429β30 (citing Ellerth and Faragher).\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nrepetitive harassment. The unique nature of that workplace is an important\\nconsideration. As we and other courts have recognized, the diminished\\ncapacity of patients influences whether the harassment should be perceived as\\naffecting the terms and conditions of employment. We must decide when the\\nallegations of harassment nonetheless become so severe or pervasive that fact\\nissues exist requiring a jury to decide the question.\\n I.\\n Kymberli Gardner worked as a Certified Nursing Assistant at an\\nassisted living facility operated by CLC of Pascagoula, d/b/a Plaza Community\\nLiving Center, from 2012 until she was fired in 2015. 2 Gardner is an\\nexperienced health aide. Before working for CLC, she was a caregiver for\\nseveral facilities and in-home care providers, two of which specialized in care\\nfor the mentally disabled. Gardner was trained in defensive and de-escalation\\ntactics for aggressive patients. As one might expect, during her years as a\\ncaregiver she often worked with patients who were βeither physically\\ncombative or sexually aggressive.β\\n But what she experienced with one patient at the CLC facility rose to a\\nnew level. J.S. was an elderly resident who lived at Plaza between 2006 and\\n2014. He had a reputation for groping female employees and becoming\\nphysically aggressive when reprimanded. J.S. had been diagnosed with a\\nvariety of physical and mental illnesses including dementia, traumatic brain\\ninjury, personality disorder with aggressive behavior, and Parkinsonβs\\nDisease. J.S.βs long history of violent and sexual behavior toward both patients\\nand staff included the following:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n In light of the summary judgment posture, we recite these facts taking competing\\n 2\\n\\nevidence in the light most favorable to Gardner.\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n β’ J.S. had to be transferred from his initial residence wing because he\\n had become βcombativeβ and had physically assaulted his bedridden\\n roommate during a dispute over a television.\\n β’ J.S. was much more aggressive and sexually inappropriate towards\\n his female caregivers than even other problematic nursing home\\n residents; he would sexually assault them by grabbing their\\n βbreast[s], butts, thighs, and try[ing] to grab [their] private areas.β\\n β’ J.S. asked for explicit sexual acts on a regular basis and made lewd\\n sexual comments toward female staff. He asked female employees to\\n engage in sexual activity with him β[a]ll the time.β\\n Gardner, who became responsible for J.S.βs care, experienced these types\\nof inappropriate behavior from J.S. β[e]very day.β Gardner reported that J.S.\\nwould physically grab her and make repeated sexual comments and requests.\\nShe and other CLC employees documented J.S.βs behavior by routinely\\nrecording it on his chart and making complaints to supervisors.\\n As a result, J.S.βs behavior was not a secret to those who ran the assisted\\nliving facility. Brandy Gregg, Gardnerβs former supervisor and now the\\ndirector of nursing, had witnessed J.S.βs behaving in a sexually inappropriate\\nmanner and also received complaints from nurses to that effect. These\\nconcerns led administrators to transfer J.S. to a new wing. But they were not\\nalways responsive to the complaints. They declined, for example, to have him\\nundergo a psychiatric evaluation after he assaulted his roommate. J.S. later\\nassaulted a CLC employee and was sent for evaluation, but subsequently\\nreturned to CLC. And when Gardner attempted to discuss her concerns about\\nJ.S.βs behavior, Gregg laughed, and Administrator Teri Reynolds told Gardner\\nto βput [her] big girl panties on and go back to work.β\\n So Gardner continued to care for J.S., which ultimately resulted in the\\nincident that led to her termination. It began when Gardner was trying to help\\nJ.S. attend a therapy session. As she was assisting J.S. out of bed, he began\\ntrying βto gropeβ her and then tried to touch Gardnerβs left breast while she\\nwas bent over. When she tried to move out of the way, J.S. punched her on the\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nside of her breast. Gardner then laid him down on the bed and left the room\\nto get help. Janice Watkins, another nursing assistant, joined Gardner and\\nthe two again attempted to help J.S. out of bed and into a chair. At this point\\nJ.S. punched Gardner a second time. Gardner removed herself from J.Sβs\\nimmediate area at which point he began to grab Watkinsβ βprivate area.β\\nGardner sought help from the nurse on duty, Judy Toche. Gardner, Toche, and\\nWatkins were able to get J.S. into his wheelchair. Gardner then moved to\\nmake the bed, but J.S. punched her a third time.\\n What Gardner did in response is disputed. Greggβs typed summary of\\nevents, as well as the deposition testimony of Toche, and Tocheβs βnurseβs\\nnotesβ from the day of the incident claim that Gardner βswung her own fist\\nover [J.S.βs] headβ and that her arm βbrushed the top of his head.β Watkins,\\non the other hand, asserts in both her deposition and her written witness\\ninterview statement that Gardner β[went] up with her hand as if she was going\\nto hit [patient]β but βdidnβt hit [patient] at all.β Gardner says she did not swing\\nat J.S. during the incident. Gardner also reportedly made two statements as\\nshe was leaving J.S.βs room. Watkins testifies Gardner said, βI am not doing\\nshit else for [patient] at all.β Gardner also reportedly said, βI guess Iβm not the\\nright color,β presumably because Toche, a white nurse, was able to calm J.S.\\nwhereas Gardner, a black nursing assistant, could not. After the incident,\\nGardner spoke with both Toche and Teri Reynolds, then the facility\\nadministrator, about her assignment to care for J.S. Gardner refused to care\\nfor him due to the continued harassment and asked to be reassigned. Her\\nrequest was denied.\\n Gardner then left work and went to the emergency room that evening\\ndue to injuries she sustained. She did not return to work for three months\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nduring which time she received workersβ compensation. 3 Shortly after\\nreturning from leave, Gardner was fired. Gregg, Gardnerβs supervisor at the\\ntime, says Gardner was fired for three reasons: (1) insubordination (refusing\\nto care for J.S.); (2) violating J.S.βs resident rights (by swearing in front of him\\nand making a βracist type statement[],β apparently the one about her not being\\nthe βright colorβ); and (3) attacking J.S. (swinging over his head).\\n As for J.S., nothing happened to him immediately after the incident with\\nGardner. But another altercation later that same day with a resident resulted\\nin his being sent for a psychiatric evaluation and then moved to an all-male\\nβlockdownβ unit in nearby Biloxi.\\n Gardner sued, asserting multiple claims under Title VII. CLC moved for\\nsummary judgment and to strike certain affidavit testimony. Gardner also\\nmoved to strike portions of affidavit and deposition testimony. The district\\ncourt denied Gardnerβs motion to strike, and denied in part and granted in part\\nCLCβs motion to strike. 4 The lower court then granted summary judgment in\\nfavor of CLC on all claims. Gardnerβs appeal pursues only her claims of hostile\\nwork environment and retaliation. 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Gregg and the contemporaneous incident report say that Gardner had been\\nsuspended. But the report from CLCβs internal investigation contradicts that claim as it says\\nthat Gardnerβs βseparation from her employment was held pending her completion of her\\nworkmenβs compensation.β Gardnerβs affidavit also asserts she was never informed she had\\nbeen suspended. We assume for purposes of summary judgment that Gardner was not\\nsuspended and was on workersβ compensation during her three-month absence.\\n 4 Gardner appeals some of those evidentiary rulings. We conclude that the district\\n\\ncourt did not abuse its discretion striking portions of her affidavit as speculative. And we\\nneed not decide whether the district court erred in considering Greggβs testimony about the\\nreasons for the termination as that issue does not affect our ruling.\\n 5 While Gardner purports to appeal her sex discrimination claim based on disparate\\n\\ntreatment in addition to the one alleging hostile work environment, she has not sufficiently\\nbriefed that claim.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\n II.\\n The district court concluded that a hostile workplace did not exist. It\\nexplained that it was βnot clear to the Court that the harassing comments and\\nattempts to grope and hit are beyond what a person in Gardnerβs position\\nshould expect of patients in a nursing home.β CLC defends the grant of\\nsummary judgment on that ground as well as on one the district court did not\\nreach: whether the company knew about the harassment and failed to take\\nremedial action. The other elements of a Title VII hostile work environment\\nclaimβthat Gardner is a member of a protected class who was subject to some\\nharassment on the basis of her sexβare not disputed. Royal v. CCC & R Tres\\nArboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2013).\\n A.\\n Our de novo review of the grant of summary judgment leads us to a\\ndifferent conclusion given that all inferences must be viewed in Gardnerβs favor\\nat this stage. See Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276, 282 (5th Cir. 2015);\\nBurnett Ranches, Ltd. v. United States, 753 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2014). To\\nget past summary judgment, Gardner need not make it βclearβ that she was\\nsubject to actionable harassment; she of course only needs to show that a jury\\ncould reach that conclusion based on its view of the evidence.\\n Title VII does not prohibit all harassment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.\\nVinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). It makes harassing conduct unlawful when it\\nresults in the employer βdiscriminat[ing] against any individual with respect\\nto his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of\\nsuch individualβs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.β 42 U.S.C.\\nΒ§ 2000eβ2(a)(1); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21β23 (1993); Meritor,\\n477 U.S. at 64β67. This statutory language βis not limited to βeconomicβ or\\nβtangibleβ discrimination.β Id. at 64. Instead, βthe phrase βterms, conditions,\\nor privileges of employmentβ evinces a congressional intent βto strike at the\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nentire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and womenβ in employment,\\nwhich includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive\\nenvironment.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). Title\\nVII is violated βwhen the workplace is permeated with βdiscriminatory\\nintimidation, ridicule, and insult,β . . . that is βsufficiently severe or pervasive\\nto alter the conditions of the victimβs employment and create an abusive\\nworking environment. Id.; Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d\\n871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court set the βsevere or pervasiveβ\\nstandard as a βmiddle path between making actionable any conduct that is\\nmerely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological\\ninjury.β Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. A plaintiff βmust subjectively perceive the\\nharassment as sufficiently severe or pervasive, and this subjective perception\\nmust be objectively reasonable.β Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 138 (5th\\nCir. 2003).\\n As a starting point, the multiple years of unwanted sexual grabbing and\\nexplicit comments Gardner endured could certainly be deemed severe and\\npervasive harassmentβonly one of those is necessary, Lauderdale v. Tex. Depβt\\nof Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2007)βif the harasser were\\nsomeone without any mental impairments. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668\\nF.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 2012) (hostile work environment when plaintiff was\\nsubject to multiple months of unwanted sexual grabbing and explicit\\ncomments); Harvill, v. Westward Commcβns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 435 (5th Cir.\\n2005) (finding severe or pervasive harassment when, over seven months, a\\ncoworker grabbed a female employee, fondled her breasts and patted her\\nbuttocks βnumerous times,β and rubbed his body against the plaintiff).\\n The complication is the one we have already mentioned: the source of the\\nharassment is the resident of an assisted living facility who suffers from\\ndementia. We have twice confronted hostile work environment claims based\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\non the behavior of patients towards caregivers. The first case involved home\\nhealth services. We held that the verbal harassment, which included the\\npatient repeatedly propositioning the plaintiff for sex and calling her\\ndisparaging names, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Cain v. Blackwell,\\n246 F.3d 758, 760β61 (5th Cir. 2001). We reached the same conclusion in the\\nnext case when a nursing home patient repeatedly directed racial slurs at a\\nnurseβs assistant. E.E.O.C. v. Nexion Health at Broadway, Inc., 199 F. Appβx\\n351, 353 (5th Cir. 2006). 6 Although the verbal harassment was βquite\\noffensive,β the comments did not rise to the level of actionable conduct because\\nthey were not βphysically threatening or humiliatingβ and did not βpervade the\\nwork experience of a reasonable nursing home employee, especially\\nconsidering their source.β Id. at 353β54. We recognized, however, that there\\nis not a categorical bar on hostile environment claims arising from harassment\\nby patients. See id. at 353 (βCain does not establish a bright-line rule that\\nemployees who care for disabled, elderly patients can never succeed on a Title\\nVII claim.β). 7 The βspecific circumstancesβ of such claims βmust be judged to\\ndetermine whether a reasonable person would find the work environment\\nhostile or abusiveβ taking due account of the βunique circumstances involved\\nin caring for mentally diseased elderly patients.β Id.\\n Other circuits have found triable hostile work environment claims when\\npatients engaged in the physical harassment absent in Nexion and Cain. The\\n\\n\\n 6 Although Nexion is not binding, we address it because the district court relied on it\\nin granting summary judgment, and it illustrates the range of conduct courts have considered\\nin this area.\\n 7 The district court thought Nexion βindicates that the default is no viable Title VII\\n\\nclaim in such situations.β Nexion did not create a default presumption against Title VII\\nliability when the harasser is suffering from mental disability. Its statement that there is no\\nβbright-line ruleβ does the opposite of setting any hard and fast rule. The Nexion language\\nemphasizes what is true of most areas of the lawβthe outcome will depend on the facts of\\nindividual cases. So while a diminished mental condition of the harasser is an important\\nconsideration, it does not preclude liability.\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nEighth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment when a mentally\\nhandicapped, teenage resident of a care facility βpushed [a female caregiver]\\nagainst a door, forced her right hand above her head, pulled open her jeans and\\nher blouse, grabbed her left breast, and pushed his weight and erect penis\\nagainst her stomach.β Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107, 1108 (8th Cir.\\n1997). The Tenth Circuit also rejected a district courtβs granting judgment as\\na matter of law for the hospital when a patient βknocked [a psychologist] to the\\nground, undressed her and digitally penetrated her, bit and choked her, and\\nrepeatedly threatened to kill her.β Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d\\n1238, 1242β43 (10th Cir. 2001).\\n J.S.βs conduct is more severe than the nonphysical harassment held to\\nbe insufficient in Cain and Nexion 8 but not as severe as the potentially life-\\nthreatening sexual assaults in Crist or Turnbull. But the latter situation does\\nnot set a floor for actionable conduct. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (explaining that\\nTitle VII does not require harassment to βseriously affect employeesβ\\npsychological well-beingβ). So the question remains whether the conduct here,\\nwhich falls in the middle of this continuum, is enough. And that, as we have\\nsaid, involves the difficult line-drawing problem of what separates legally\\nactionable harassment from conduct that one should reasonably expect when\\nassisting people suffering from dementia.\\n We conclude that the evidence of persistent and often physical\\nharassment by J.S. is enough to allow a jury to decide whether a reasonable\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 It is also more severe and pervasive than the conduct in an Illinois federal case the\\ndistrict court relied on. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 2008 WL 719224, at *4 (N.D.\\nIll. Mar. 14, 2008), affβd, 610 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2010). Pickett considered conduct from a\\nresident that happened three times over eight months. More importantly, Pickett refrained\\nfrom deciding whether the conduct was severe or pervasive, and instead granted summary\\njudgment in favor of the defendant because it took several steps to mitigate the harassing\\nbehavior. Id. at *5.\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\ncaregiver on the receiving end of the harassment would have viewed it as\\nsufficiently severe or pervasive even considering the medical condition of the\\nharasser. The frequency and nature of the conduct, along with its effect on\\nGardnerβs employment, would allow (but not require) that finding. Id. at 23\\n(finding that βthe frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;\\nwhether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive\\nutterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employeeβs work\\nperformanceβ are factors that influence whether harassment can be described\\nas βhostileβ or βabusiveβ); see also Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476\\nF.3d 337, 347β48 (5th Cir. 2007). J.S.βs inappropriate conduct occurred daily.\\nHis conduct was far more severe than other residentsβ and consisted of physical\\nsexual assault and violent outbursts. J.S.βs physical assault on Gardner took\\nhis behavior outside the realm of a βmere offensive utterance.β And his actions\\ninterfered with her work performance, leaving Gardner unable to work for\\nthree months. A jury could conclude that an objectively reasonable caregiver\\nwould not expect a patient to grope her daily, injure her so badly she could not\\nwork for three months, and have her complaints met with laughter and\\ndismissal by the administration. Cf. Aguiar v. Bartlesville Care Ctr., 2011 WL\\n1461541, at *5 (10th Cir. Apr. 18, 2011) (finding sufficient severity when a\\npatient repeatedly engaged in unwanted touching of a nurse assistant,\\nβinterfered with her work, and eventually assaulted herβ with a medicine cart).\\n It is important to note that a finding that a patientβs harassment rises to\\na level of severity or pervasiveness that affects the terms and conditions of\\nemployment does not alone render the nursing home liable. As we mentioned\\nat the outset, liability when such a claim is based on the behavior of someone\\nother than a supervisor requires showing that the employer knew or should\\nhave known of the hostile work environment but failed to take reasonable\\nmeasures to try and stop it. Royal, 736 F.3d at 401. CLC did not argue in its\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60072\\nsummary judgment motion that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law\\non this element of Gardnerβs claim. We thus have no occasion to consider it.\\n We reverse the entry of summary judgment on Gardnerβs harassment\\nclaim.\\n III.\\n Gardner also appeals the grant of summary judgment on her retaliation\\nclaim. It requires her to show that β(1) she engaged in activity protected under\\nTitle VII, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there was a\\ncausal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment\\ndecision.β Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 42 (5th Cir. 1992).\\n The district court analyzed the retaliation issue under the McDonnell-\\nDouglas burden shifting framework used for cases relying on circumstantial\\nevidence. Gardner does not contest that ruling, so it is affirmed.\\n Her position all along, however, has been that she can prove retaliation\\nvia direct evidence. As the district court did not consider her argument based\\non direct evidence, we will allow it to consider that argument in the first\\ninstance on remand.\\n * * *\\n\\n REVERSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, and REMANDED for\\nfurther proceedings consistent with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":594,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588552,"string":"4,588,552"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff - Appellant v. FLOTEK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; John W. Chisholm ; H. Richard Walton; Robert M. Schmitz, Defendants - Appellees"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flotek Indus., Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-07"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-20308"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Dennis, Clement, Engelhardt\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n FILED\\n February 7, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, Lead Plaintiff, Clerk\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nFLOTEK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; JOHN W. CHISHOLM; H.\\nRICHARD WALTON; ROBERT M. SCHMITZ,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore DENNIS, CLEMENT, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\\nJAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\\n This appeal arises out of a putative class action filed on behalf of\\npurchasers of Flotek Industries, Inc. common stock. Plaintiffs allege that\\ndefendants, Flotek and three of its officers, exaggerated the usefulness of its\\nproducts. They allege misrepresentations relating to a proprietary software\\nFlotek developed to help market these products. The district court dismissed\\nthe complaint, holding that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts giving rise to a\\nstrong inference of fraudulent scienter. We AFFIRM.\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n I\\n Plaintiffs filed this putative securities class action on behalf of investors\\nwho purchased Flotek common stock between October 23, 2014, and November\\n9, 2015. Defendants are Flotek Industries, Inc. and three of its officers: Chief\\nExecutive Officer (CEO) and President John W. Chisholm and Chief Financial\\nOfficers H. Richard Walton and Robert M. Schmitz. Flotek sells oilfield\\nproducts called βComplex nano-Fluid technologiesβ (CnF), which are supposed\\nto improve the productivity of oil and gas wells. According to the complaint,\\nCnF is Flotekβs βhallmarkβ product, and β[b]y the beginning of the Class Period,\\nthe Energy Chemistry Technologies segment [of Flotek] represented over 50%\\nof the Companyβs revenue due to sales of its CnF products.β This lawsuit\\nconcerns representations made about a software application Flotek developed\\nto help market CnF to exploration and production companies. The software,\\ncalled βFracMax,β analyzes and presents data concerning hydraulically\\nfractured wells to allow comparison of the productivity of oil and gas wells that\\nuse CnF with those that do not.\\n Flotek introduced FracMax to investors at a June 2014 investor\\nconference. Over the next sixteen months, β[D]efendants attended at least 21\\nconferences, including Flotekβs earning conference calls, analyst-hosted\\nconferences and [c]ompany-hosted investor conferences, where they focused on\\nand praised FracMax and its ability to conclusively validate the efficacy and\\neconomic benefits of Flotekβs CnF products.β Defendants promoted FracMax\\nas an integral component of Flotekβs sales strategy and as βkey to βmaterially\\nbroaden[ing] the reach of Flotekβs marketing effortsβ for its CnF products.β\\nβ[D]efendants reported that the FracMax database included production data\\nfrom 80,000 wells across key U.S. basins and that based on this data, Flotekβs\\nsales force could demonstrate to potential customers that the use of Flotek CnF\\nchemistries added at least an estimated $8 billion in aggregate value for\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\noperators when compared to those operators that had not adopted Flotekβs CnF\\nproducts.β In a 2015 press release, Chisholm, Flotekβs President and CEO,\\nstated, βOur FracMax software technology provides conclusive evidence that\\nour [CnF] suite of completion chemistries provides compelling economic\\nbenefits to production companies.β Flotek also represented in a quarterly\\nearnings press release that sales of CnFs increased substantially because of\\nFracMax.\\n Although their complaint largely refers to Defendants generically,\\nPlaintiffsβ references to specific representations, to the extent they specify,\\nprimarily relate to statements made by Chisholm, who at various times\\nemphasized FracMaxβs empirical validity. During several conference calls\\nwith investors, Chisholm explained that FracMax used publicly available data\\nthat companies self-reported to state agencies to compare production from\\nwells that used CnF and wells that did not, suggesting this made FracMaxβs\\noutput more reliable. In September 2015, Chisholm gave a presentation at an\\ninvestor conference in which he explained that FracMax used data reported to\\nthe Texas Railroad Commission, a state agency, and he suggested that the data\\nwas βback check[ed] and validate[d].β In his PowerPoint presentation,\\nChisholm presented an βAbout FracMaxβ slide stating that the data was\\nβsourced from operator-provided completion data.β This slide further stated\\nthat the data was βun-adjusted, providing for comparison and analysis of\\noperatorsβ self-reported data sets.β Chisholm also presented images of the\\nFracMax interface in order to compare the productivity of four Texas wells, one\\nthat used CnF and three that did not, again emphasizing the difference in\\nproduction levels.\\n On November 9, 2015, online financial publication Bronte Capital\\nreleased a blog post (the Bronte Report) contending that the data in Chisholmβs\\npresentation was wrong and suggesting that the data had been intentionally\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\naltered to make CnF look significantly more effective. Specifically, the Bronte\\nReport alleged that, as compared with the numbers reported by the Texas\\nRailroad Commission, βFlotek had reduced the production data for the [three]\\nnon-CnF wells by 40% to 50% . . . , while leaving the production data for the\\nCnF well unchanged.β After release of the Bronte Report, Flotek shares\\ndeclined.\\n The next day, Flotek issued a press release conceding that Bronte\\nCapitalβs analysis was correct, 1 and ascribing the error to data provided by a\\nthird party, Drillinginfo, that βcaused FracMax to identify the three non-CnF\\nwells as contained in units with multiple wells (as opposed to single well units),\\nwhich required FracMax to incorrectly apply an allocation algorithm to the\\nproduction for the non-CnF wells.β According to Flotek, because Texas reports\\noil and gas production by lease, rather than by well, FracMax used an\\nalgorithm to apportion production within multiple-well lease units, leading to\\nunwarranted adjustments of the non-CnF wells discussed at the September\\nconference. Flotek also held a conference call, during which βChisholm\\nadmitted that the Companyβs internal controls βdid not catchββ the errors, and\\nβthat the Company had no internal controls in place to check the accuracy of\\nthe third-party data from Drillinginfo.β He explained that they did not cross-\\nreference the third-party data against the underlying state-agency data and\\nthat the company βhad, several months ago, evolved to a different allocation\\nprogramβ that would provide greater accuracy.\\n According to Plaintiffs, a report issued by Iberia Capital Partners that\\nsame day βstated that the four wells presented at the September 11, 2015\\ninvestor conference were designated by Drillinginfo as being single well leases,\\nnot multiple leases, therefore the Texas Railroad Commission data for those\\n\\n\\n 1 Earlier, Flotek had denied the allegations contained in the Bronte Report.\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nwells did not require adjustment,β and Flotek shares fell further as a result.\\nContrary to its earlier statements following the Bronte Report, Flotek then\\nreported that an internal investigation concluded that the error originated in\\nthe software, not the data set, as Chisholm had stated earlier, and βmost likely\\nresulted from the accidental inclusion of test code by the third-party software\\ndeveloper . . . . who was hired to write code for FracMax.β\\n Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the\\nSecurities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Β§ 78j(b); Securities and Exchange\\nCommission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Β§ 240.10b-5; and control person liability for\\nthe individual defendants under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,\\n15 U.S.C. Β§ 78t. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure\\nto state a claim. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that\\nPlaintiffs had failed to sufficiently plead scienter. Plaintiffs timely appealed.\\n II\\n This court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint de novo. Ind. Elec.\\nWorkersβ Pension Tr. Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 533 (5th\\nCir. 2008). Plaintiffsβ βwell-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true and viewed\\nin the light most favorable to [them].β Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing,\\nInc., 836 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 2016). β[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted\\ndeductions, or legal conclusionsβ are not βwell-pleaded factsβ for purposes of\\nevaluating a complaint. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365\\nF.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004). Where fraud is alleged, Federal βRule [of Civil\\nProcedure] 9(b) creates a heightened pleading requirement that βthe\\ncircumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with\\nparticularity.ββ U.S. ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Contβl Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869,\\n872 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). A class-action complaint\\nalleging a violation of Section 10(b) must allege fraud in accordance with the\\nRule 9(b) heightened-pleading standard. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 362.\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n To state a viable securities-fraud claim under Section 10(b) and Rule\\n10b-5, Plaintiffs must allege that (1) Defendants made a misrepresentation or\\nomission relating to the purchase or sale of a security, (2) such representation\\nor omission related to a material fact, (3) the representation or omission was\\nmade with scienter, (4) Plaintiffs acted in reliance on Defendantsβ\\nrepresentation or omission, and (5) the representation or omission proximately\\ncaused Plaintiffsβ losses. Neiman v. Bulmahn, 854 F.3d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2017)\\n(quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 406β07 (5th Cir. 2001)). At\\nissue in this appeal is whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded scienter.\\n III\\n A\\n The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) specifically\\nrequires that a complaint in a securities case support allegations of scienter\\nwith βfacts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the\\nrequired state of mind.β 15 U.S.C. Β§ 78u-4(b)(2)(A). ββScienterβ is βa mental\\nstate embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.ββ Goldstein v. MCI\\nWorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 245 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.\\nHochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976)). For purposes of 10(b) liability, a\\ndefendant must have acted with, at minimum, severe recklessness. Warren v.\\nReserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 1984). βSevere recklessness,β\\nis βlimited to those highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that\\ninvolve not merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme\\ndeparture from the standards of ordinary care.β Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,\\n332 F.3d 854, 866 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). The\\nomissions or misrepresentations at issue must also βpresent a danger of\\nmisleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so\\nobvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.β Id. (quoting\\nNathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). Though not in themselves sufficient to support a\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nstrong inference of scienter, β[a]ppropriate motive and opportunity allegations\\nmay . . . βmeaningfully enhance the strength of the inference of scienter.ββ\\nShaw, 537 F.3d at 533 (quoting Southland, 365 F.3d at 368).\\n To evaluate scienter in a securities-fraud case, a court must (1) take the\\nwell-pleaded allegations as true; (2) evaluate the facts collectively, including\\nfacts contained in βdocuments incorporated in the complaint by reference and\\nmatters subject to judicial notice,β βto determine whether a strong inference of\\nscienter has been pledβ; and (3) βtake into account plausible inferences\\nopposing as well as supporting a strong inference of scienter.β Id. To\\nwithstand a motion to dismiss, βan inference of scienter must be more than\\nmerely plausible or reasonableβit must be cogent and at least as compelling\\nas any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.β Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor\\nIssues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).\\n Scienter must be alleged with respect to βthe individual corporate official\\nor officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its\\nmaking or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion\\ntherein, or the like) rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all the\\ncorporationβs officers and employees acquired in the course of their\\nemployment.β Southland, 365 F.3d at 366; see also Shaw, 537 F.3d at 533\\n(β[T]his court has rejected the group pleading approach to scienter and instead\\nlooks to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or officials.β).\\nFurthermore, such allegations ordinarily must be based on more than an\\nindividualβs position within the company, absent special circumstances.\\nNeiman, 854 F.3d at 749.\\n B\\n Plaintiffs identify several alleged misrepresentations they argue give\\nrise to a sufficient inference of scienter, both because Defendants were severely\\nreckless in making statements counter to information that should have been\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nobvious to them, and because, after learning of that contrary information, they\\ncontinued to make those statements. The alleged misrepresentations are: (1)\\nDefendantsβ repeated use of the term βconclusiveβ in describing FracMaxβs\\neffect, which Plaintiffs characterize as tantamount to assuring that FracMaxβs\\ndata was irrefutable; (2) Defendantsβ reference to FracMax data as βun-\\nadjustedβ when, in fact, FracMax used an algorithm to adjust certain data; (3)\\nDefendant Chisholmβs presentation at the September 11, 2015, conference of\\ndirect comparisons between several wells that used CnF versus several that\\ndid not, which Defendants concede relied on incorrect data for the non-CnF\\nwells; and (4) Chisholmβs representation at this same conference that this data\\nwas βback check[ed] and validate[d],β when Defendants later admitted that\\nβFlotek had no internal controls in place to ensure the integrity of the FracMax\\ndatabase.β The district court determined that these representations failed to\\ngenerate a strong inference of scienter. We consider each representation in\\nturn, and ultimately agree with the district courtβs conclusion that each fails\\nto raise a strong inference of scienter. 2\\n 1. Description of FracMax as βConclusiveβ\\n Plaintiffs suggest that Defendantsβ use of the term βconclusiveβ to\\ndescribe FracMax was obviously misleading because Flotek employed βno\\ninternal controlsβ over the information used for FracMax provided by third-\\nparty Drillinginfo, yet the term βconclusiveβ suggests the data is infallible.\\nHowever, in context, Chisholmβs use of the term βconclusiveβ may have had\\ninnocent intentions and may not have been inconsistent with a lack of internal\\ncontrols. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 538 (statements subject to βmany\\ninterpretations, including innocent ones,β do not βcontribute to a strong\\n\\n\\n 2Because we conclude that the alleged misrepresentations here do not reflect scienter\\non the part of any Defendant, we need not reach Plaintiffsβ argument that FracMaxβs\\nimportance to the company permits an inference that Defendants had a motive to mislead.\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\ninference of scienterβ (cleaned up)). For example, Chisholm stated in a press\\nrelease that the βFracMax software technology provides conclusive evidence\\nthat our [CnF] suite of completion chemistries provides compelling economic\\nbenefits to production companies.β Plaintiffs do not allege that CnF products\\nprovide no economic benefit whatsoever, but instead allege the benefit was\\noverstated. Therefore, Chisholmβs generalized endorsement of FracMax as\\nevidencing the βcompelling economic benefitsβ of CnF products is not\\nunreasonable, given that CnF products undisputedly provided some economic\\nbenefit. At the very least, such statements are not βhighly unreasonable\\nomissions or misrepresentations . . . involv[ing] . . . an extreme departure from\\nthe standards of ordinary care.β Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866 (quoting\\nNathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). Plaintiffs argue that Flotekβs lack of internal\\ncontrols should have made it obvious to Defendants that using the term\\nβconclusiveβ was misleading. That argument also fails. Plaintiffs do not allege\\nthat Defendants should have known the Drillinginfo data was unreliable.\\nWhile it was perhaps unwise to rely completely on third-party data while\\nreferring to the product using it as βconclusive,β it was not reckless to do so.\\nSee MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d at 254 (holding complaint presenting βwhat could\\nbest be described as allegations of mismanagement,β or even βgross\\nmismanagement,β failed to allege severe recklessness of any individual). At\\nbottom, Plaintiffsβ allegations concerning Defendantsβ characterization of\\nFracMax data as conclusive fail to generate an inference of scienter that is βat\\nleast as compelling as . . . opposing inference[s] of nonfraudulent intent.β\\nTellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.\\n 2. Characterization of FracMax-Provided Information as βUn-\\n Adjustedβ\\n Plaintiffs also contend that a slide show Chisholm presented at least\\nonce, which stated that FracMax βdata is un-adjusted,β was misleading and\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nChisholm should have known it was incorrect, because FracMax used an\\nallocation algorithm that necessarily made adjustments to Texas production\\ndata. In response to the fallout from the Bronte Report, Flotek disclosed that\\nit used an βallocation algorithmβ for Texas data, because data provided by the\\nTexas Railroad Commission was not broken down by well, but instead by lease,\\nand a lease might contain multiple wells. Therefore, according to Plaintiffs,\\nany statement positing that the data was not adjusted was patently false,\\nsupporting an inference of scienter. However, there is no specific allegation\\nthat Chisholm knew at the time he made the statement at issue that FracMax\\nutilized an algorithm. Moreover, as the district court correctly pointed out, the\\nuse of an algorithm does not make the claim that the data was βun-adjustedβ\\nmisleading. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866 (danger of misleading buyers or\\nsellers must be βeither known to the defendant or is so obvious that the\\ndefendant must have been aware of itβ (cleaned up)).\\n 3. Presentation of Incorrect Well Data\\n The starkest example of Flotekβs provision of false information is that\\nChisholm presented demonstrably false information at the September 2015\\nconference in the form of incorrect well data. However, even these statements\\nfail to support a strong inference of scienter, because Plaintiffs fail to plead\\nthat any Defendant knew of these errors at the time, and the misstatements\\nwere not sufficiently obvious that Defendants were severely reckless in\\npresenting the information. As the district court pointed out, although\\nPlaintiffs pleaded that the three non-CnF wells used in the September 2015\\npresentation were downwardly adjusted, they βfailed to plead facts\\nestablishing this discrepancy is true throughout FracMaxβs 80,000 well\\ndatabase,β and βa trend as to six wells out of 80,000 is not sufficient on its own\\nto establish a strong inference of scienter.β Plaintiffs contend that the fact that\\nthe discrepancies inured to Flotekβs benefit weighs in favor of a finding of\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nscienter, as it suggests that Chisholm made intentional misrepresentations\\nrather than mistakes. But the mere fact that an error favors the defendant is\\ninsufficient to support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Shaw, 537 F.3d at\\n543 (characterizing allegations that defendants would benefit from\\nrepresentations as supporting an inference of motive rather than going directly\\nto severe recklessness, and noting that motive alone is insufficient for scienter).\\n It does appear that it would have been very easy to check if this data was\\ncorrectβFlotek verified the alleged errors and responded to the Bronte Report\\nwithin a day. However, while this suggests negligence, there is no indication\\nthat Defendants had reason to know of any deficiencies in quality control\\nproblems before the data was made public. Cf. Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc.,\\n292 F.3d 424, 432 (5th Cir. 2002) (βPlaintiffs point to no allegations that the\\ndefendants knew about the internal control problems, only that they should\\nhave known or that their lack of knowledge based on their corporate positions\\ndemonstrates recklessness.β). Plaintiffs rely on the fact that Flotek revised its\\nallocation algorithm, which they claim implies that there was an issue with\\nthe previous algorithm. However, we have previously declined to draw a\\nsimilar inference, concluding in Abrams that β[t]he fact that Baker Hughes was\\noverhauling its accounting system . . . does not command an inference that\\ncompany officials should have anticipated finding a problem or assumed that\\nfinancial data reported under [the] old system was inaccurate.β Abrams, 292\\nF.3d at 433. Thus, Chisholmβs use of incorrect data at the September 2015\\nconference also fails to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.\\n 4. Statement that Data Was Back-Checked and Validated\\n Finally, Plaintiffs claim that Chisholm represented that the data\\npresented at the September 2015 conference was βback check[ed] and\\nvalidate[d].β Plaintiffs allege that this was false, as βFlotek had no internal\\ncontrols in place to ensure the integrity of the FracMax database.β Indeed, as\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nChisholm admitted, there was a failure in quality control, because Flotek did\\nnot cross-reference β[the Drillinginfo data] with the [Texas] Railroad\\nCommission data.β Despite Chisholmβs subsequent recognition that Flotek\\nβshould have had the quality control in place that could have validated [the\\nDrillinginfo data] and it wasnβt,β Plaintiffs nonetheless fail to allege that\\nChisholm knew of this lack of quality control at the time he made the\\nstatement, or that it would have been so obvious that he should have known.\\nCf. Abrams, 292 F.3d at 432 (βPlaintiffs point to no allegations that the\\ndefendants knew about the internal control problems, only that they should\\nhave known or that their lack of knowledge based on their corporate\\npositions demonstrates recklessness.β). Further, the statement is ambiguous\\nbecause Chisholm does not say whether Flotek itself back checks and validates\\nthe data, or instead relies on a third party to do so, which Chisholm may well\\nhave believed was a part of the process. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 538 (analyzing\\nβmore likely, nonculpable inference, absent any other detailsβ about the\\nrepresentation). Accordingly, this allegation also fails to give rise to a strong\\ninference of scienter.\\n C\\n In the absence of specific allegations that any Defendant knew of the\\nfalsity of any of the statements discussed above at the time they were made or\\nwere severely reckless with respect to the statementsβ truth, Plaintiffs invoke\\nChisholmβs position as an inventor of the FracMax technology as sufficient to\\nβpermit a plaintiff to plead scienter.β 3 Neiman, 854 F.3d at 749. Our case law\\n\\n\\n\\n 3Plaintiffsβ complaint repeatedly refers to Chisholm as βone of FracMaxβs inventors\\nand President and CEO of Flotek,β but does not specify what role Chisholm played in\\ninventing FracMax. Although conceivable that Chisholm knew the intricacies of the software\\ncode underpinning FracMax, the Plaintiffs have made no specific allegations from which we\\ncould conclude such an inference is as likely as an opposing inference that Chisholm merely\\nthought of the concept while others implemented it. The lack of specific facts leading to an\\n 12\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nprovides that an inference of scienter may be drawn solely from βa defendantβs\\nposition in the companyβ only if certain βspecial circumstancesβ are alleged. Id.\\nWe have stated these βspecial circumstancesβ as follows: (1) βthe smaller the\\ncompany the more likely it is that corporate executives would be familiar with\\nthe intricacies of day to day operationsβ; (2) βthe transaction at issue may have\\nbeen critical to the companyβs continued vitalityβ; (3) βthe misrepresented or\\nomitted information at issue would have been readily apparent to the speakerβ;\\nand (4) βthe defendantβs statements were internally inconsistent with one\\nanother.β Id. at 749β50 (quoting Local 731 I.B. of T. Excavators & Pavers\\nPension Tr. Fund v. Diodes, Inc., 810 F.3d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 2016)).\\n Our βspecial circumstancesβ doctrine does not apply here, and therefore\\nour analysis regarding the alleged misrepresentations, supra Part III.B, holds.\\nPlaintiffs concede that they βdo[] not contend Flotek is a small company,β and\\ninstead ask us to find special circumstances based on Defendantsβ knowledge\\nof the FracMax product. However, we have never found special circumstances\\npermitting an inference of scienter based solely on a defendantβs position when\\nthe company was large. Compare Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d\\n333, 342β43 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding special circumstances where defendant\\ncompany had no employees itself and was managed by company with only eight\\nemployees) and Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 425 (inference warranted where\\ncompany had roughly thirty-five employees), with Neiman, 854 F.3d at 750\\n(β[W]ith over 60 employees, [defendant] was approximately twice as large as\\nthe companies in the cases where this court has found a βspecial\\ncircumstance.ββ).\\n\\n\\n\\ninference of knowledge or severe recklessness of FracMaxβs flaws leaves only the possibility\\nthat Chisholmβs title as βone of FracMaxβs inventors and President and CEO of Flotekβ might\\nresult in such an inference, a possibility which we conclude also fails under our βspecial\\ncircumstancesβ test.\\n 13\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n The other special circumstances factors also cut against applying that\\ndoctrine here. Although FracMax was important to Flotekβs sales of CnF, it\\ncannot be said to be critical to its βcontinued vitality,β as required. 4 See Diodes,\\n810 F.3d at 959 (finding omissions regarding a labor shortage not sufficiently\\nimportant where the plaintiff did not allege that the labor shortage\\nβjeopardized the companyβs existenceβ). Nor would it have been βreadily\\napparent to the speakerββprimarily, Chisholmβthat the statements were\\nincorrect, as discussed above in analyzing each statement individually. See\\nsupra Part III.B. Finally, despite Plaintiffsβ contrary contention, no internal\\ninconsistency exists between the statements that well data was un-altered and\\nthat FracMax data was conclusive, on the one hand, and the later revelations\\nabout the accuracy of that data and the lack of internal controls, on the other.\\nThe earlier statements do not directly contradict that later information. As\\ndiscussed, the context of the use of these terms reveals that the term\\nβconclusiveβ was used to tout the economic benefits of CnF products, and the\\nterm βun-adjustedβ was used in conjunction with references to FracMax as an\\nβanalytical model.β As such, these statements do not conflict with later\\nrevelations that flaws existed in the data and that Flotek relied on a third\\nparty to provide accurate information. See supra Part III.B.1β2.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 We have concluded that, in order to constitute a special circumstance, the required\\nlevel of importance to the company must be such that the companyβs continued existence\\ndepends on, or the company would be completely transformed by, the success of a product or\\nbusiness line. See Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 342 (defendant company βwas essentially a one-trick\\nponyβ); Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., Etc., 407 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2005) (defendant βwas a\\nstruggling company that announced to the public that it had reached agreements . . . that\\nwould bring them multimillion dollar revenues, which would amount to a thirty-fold\\nincreaseβ in revenue); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 425 (βZonagen was essentially a one product\\ncompanyβ).\\n 14\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n D\\n Finally, we review the complaint holistically, as the district court did, to\\ndetermine βwhether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a\\nstrong inference of scienter,β Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323. The district court\\ncorrectly pointed out that βPlaintiffs ask this Court to assume scienter based\\nsolely on the importance of FracMax to Flotekβs business, Defendantsβ positions\\nwithin the company, and the fact that the alleged βmistakeβ happened in a way\\nthat made Flotekβs core product, CnF, look more profitable.β We agree that\\nsuch allegations are insufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter and, at\\nmost, indicate βsimple or even inexcusable negligence,β a lesser showing than\\nis required here. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866. This conclusion is further\\nbuttressed by Plaintiffsβ pervasive use of group pleadingβreferring generally\\nto βDefendantsβ rather than specific individualsβa practice this court has\\nexpressly rejected. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 533 (β[T]his court has rejected the\\ngroup pleading approach to scienter and instead looks to the state of mind of\\nthe individual corporate official or officials.β). For these reasons, the district\\ncourtβs holistic analysis was also correct.\\n IV\\n Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by dismissing their\\nSection 20(a) claims against the individual defendants for control-person\\nliability. βControl person liability is secondary only and cannot exist in the\\nabsence of a primary violation.β Southland, 365 F.3d at 383. Because Plaintiffs\\nhave not established a primary violation, their Section 20(a) claims fail.\\n ***\\n For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4365805/\", \"author_raw\": \"JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"CLEMENT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ENGELHARDT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588552/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff - Appellant v. FLOTEK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; John W. Chisholm ; H. Richard Walton; Robert M. Schmitz, Defendants - Appellees\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-07\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n\n No. 17-20308\n FILED\n February 7, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, Lead Plaintiff, Clerk\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant\n\nv.\n\nFLOTEK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; JOHN W. CHISHOLM; H.\nRICHARD WALTON; ROBERT M. SCHMITZ,\n\n Defendants - Appellees\n\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore DENNIS, CLEMENT, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\nJAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\n This appeal arises out of a putative class action filed on behalf of\npurchasers of Flotek Industries, Inc. common stock. Plaintiffs allege that\ndefendants, Flotek and three of its officers, exaggerated the usefulness of its\nproducts. They allege misrepresentations relating to a proprietary software\nFlotek developed to help market these products. The district court dismissed\nthe complaint, holding that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts giving rise to a\nstrong inference of fraudulent scienter. We AFFIRM.\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\n I\n Plaintiffs filed this putative securities class action on behalf of investors\nwho purchased Flotek common stock between October 23, 2014, and November\n9, 2015. Defendants are Flotek Industries, Inc. and three of its officers: Chief\nExecutive Officer (CEO) and President John W. Chisholm and Chief Financial\nOfficers H. Richard Walton and Robert M. Schmitz. Flotek sells oilfield\nproducts called βComplex nano-Fluid technologiesβ (CnF), which are supposed\nto improve the productivity of oil and gas wells. According to the complaint,\nCnF is Flotekβs βhallmarkβ product, and β[b]y the beginning of the Class Period,\nthe Energy Chemistry Technologies segment [of Flotek] represented over 50%\nof the Companyβs revenue due to sales of its CnF products.β This lawsuit\nconcerns representations made about a software application Flotek developed\nto help market CnF to exploration and production companies. The software,\ncalled βFracMax,β analyzes and presents data concerning hydraulically\nfractured wells to allow comparison of the productivity of oil and gas wells that\nuse CnF with those that do not.\n Flotek introduced FracMax to investors at a June 2014 investor\nconference. Over the next sixteen months, β[D]efendants attended at least 21\nconferences, including Flotekβs earning conference calls, analyst-hosted\nconferences and [c]ompany-hosted investor conferences, where they focused on\nand praised FracMax and its ability to conclusively validate the efficacy and\neconomic benefits of Flotekβs CnF products.β Defendants promoted FracMax\nas an integral component of Flotekβs sales strategy and as βkey to βmaterially\nbroaden[ing] the reach of Flotekβs marketing effortsβ for its CnF products.β\nβ[D]efendants reported that the FracMax database included production data\nfrom 80,000 wells across key U.S. basins and that based on this data, Flotekβs\nsales force could demonstrate to potential customers that the use of Flotek CnF\nchemistries added at least an estimated $8 billion in aggregate value for\n 2\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\noperators when compared to those operators that had not adopted Flotekβs CnF\nproducts.β In a 2015 press release, Chisholm, Flotekβs President and CEO,\nstated, βOur FracMax software technology provides conclusive evidence that\nour [CnF] suite of completion chemistries provides compelling economic\nbenefits to production companies.β Flotek also represented in a quarterly\nearnings press release that sales of CnFs increased substantially because of\nFracMax.\n Although their complaint largely refers to Defendants generically,\nPlaintiffsβ references to specific representations, to the extent they specify,\nprimarily relate to statements made by Chisholm, who at various times\nemphasized FracMaxβs empirical validity. During several conference calls\nwith investors, Chisholm explained that FracMax used publicly available data\nthat companies self-reported to state agencies to compare production from\nwells that used CnF and wells that did not, suggesting this made FracMaxβs\noutput more reliable. In September 2015, Chisholm gave a presentation at an\ninvestor conference in which he explained that FracMax used data reported to\nthe Texas Railroad Commission, a state agency, and he suggested that the data\nwas βback check[ed] and validate[d].β In his PowerPoint presentation,\nChisholm presented an βAbout FracMaxβ slide stating that the data was\nβsourced from operator-provided completion data.β This slide further stated\nthat the data was βun-adjusted, providing for comparison and analysis of\noperatorsβ self-reported data sets.β Chisholm also presented images of the\nFracMax interface in order to compare the productivity of four Texas wells, one\nthat used CnF and three that did not, again emphasizing the difference in\nproduction levels.\n On November 9, 2015, online financial publication Bronte Capital\nreleased a blog post (the Bronte Report) contending that the data in Chisholmβs\npresentation was wrong and suggesting that the data had been intentionally\n 3\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\naltered to make CnF look significantly more effective. Specifically, the Bronte\nReport alleged that, as compared with the numbers reported by the Texas\nRailroad Commission, βFlotek had reduced the production data for the [three]\nnon-CnF wells by 40% to 50% . . . , while leaving the production data for the\nCnF well unchanged.β After release of the Bronte Report, Flotek shares\ndeclined.\n The next day, Flotek issued a press release conceding that Bronte\nCapitalβs analysis was correct, 1 and ascribing the error to data provided by a\nthird party, Drillinginfo, that βcaused FracMax to identify the three non-CnF\nwells as contained in units with multiple wells (as opposed to single well units),\nwhich required FracMax to incorrectly apply an allocation algorithm to the\nproduction for the non-CnF wells.β According to Flotek, because Texas reports\noil and gas production by lease, rather than by well, FracMax used an\nalgorithm to apportion production within multiple-well lease units, leading to\nunwarranted adjustments of the non-CnF wells discussed at the September\nconference. Flotek also held a conference call, during which βChisholm\nadmitted that the Companyβs internal controls βdid not catchββ the errors, and\nβthat the Company had no internal controls in place to check the accuracy of\nthe third-party data from Drillinginfo.β He explained that they did not cross-\nreference the third-party data against the underlying state-agency data and\nthat the company βhad, several months ago, evolved to a different allocation\nprogramβ that would provide greater accuracy.\n According to Plaintiffs, a report issued by Iberia Capital Partners that\nsame day βstated that the four wells presented at the September 11, 2015\ninvestor conference were designated by Drillinginfo as being single well leases,\nnot multiple leases, therefore the Texas Railroad Commission data for those\n\n\n 1 Earlier, Flotek had denied the allegations contained in the Bronte Report.\n 4\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\nwells did not require adjustment,β and Flotek shares fell further as a result.\nContrary to its earlier statements following the Bronte Report, Flotek then\nreported that an internal investigation concluded that the error originated in\nthe software, not the data set, as Chisholm had stated earlier, and βmost likely\nresulted from the accidental inclusion of test code by the third-party software\ndeveloper . . . . who was hired to write code for FracMax.β\n Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the\nSecurities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Β§ 78j(b); Securities and Exchange\nCommission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Β§ 240.10b-5; and control person liability for\nthe individual defendants under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,\n15 U.S.C. Β§ 78t. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure\nto state a claim. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that\nPlaintiffs had failed to sufficiently plead scienter. Plaintiffs timely appealed.\n II\n This court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint de novo. Ind. Elec.\nWorkersβ Pension Tr. Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 533 (5th\nCir. 2008). Plaintiffsβ βwell-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true and viewed\nin the light most favorable to [them].β Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing,\nInc., 836 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 2016). β[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted\ndeductions, or legal conclusionsβ are not βwell-pleaded factsβ for purposes of\nevaluating a complaint. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365\nF.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004). Where fraud is alleged, Federal βRule [of Civil\nProcedure] 9(b) creates a heightened pleading requirement that βthe\ncircumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with\nparticularity.ββ U.S. ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Contβl Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869,\n872 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). A class-action complaint\nalleging a violation of Section 10(b) must allege fraud in accordance with the\nRule 9(b) heightened-pleading standard. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 362.\n 5\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\n To state a viable securities-fraud claim under Section 10(b) and Rule\n10b-5, Plaintiffs must allege that (1) Defendants made a misrepresentation or\nomission relating to the purchase or sale of a security, (2) such representation\nor omission related to a material fact, (3) the representation or omission was\nmade with scienter, (4) Plaintiffs acted in reliance on Defendantsβ\nrepresentation or omission, and (5) the representation or omission proximately\ncaused Plaintiffsβ losses. Neiman v. Bulmahn, 854 F.3d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2017)\n(quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 406β07 (5th Cir. 2001)). At\nissue in this appeal is whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded scienter.\n III\n A\n The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) specifically\nrequires that a complaint in a securities case support allegations of scienter\nwith βfacts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the\nrequired state of mind.β 15 U.S.C. Β§ 78u-4(b)(2)(A). ββScienterβ is βa mental\nstate embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.ββ Goldstein v. MCI\nWorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 245 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.\nHochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976)). For purposes of 10(b) liability, a\ndefendant must have acted with, at minimum, severe recklessness. Warren v.\nReserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 1984). βSevere recklessness,β\nis βlimited to those highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that\ninvolve not merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme\ndeparture from the standards of ordinary care.β Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,\n332 F.3d 854, 866 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). The\nomissions or misrepresentations at issue must also βpresent a danger of\nmisleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so\nobvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.β Id. (quoting\nNathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). Though not in themselves sufficient to support a\n 6\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\nstrong inference of scienter, β[a]ppropriate motive and opportunity allegations\nmay . . . βmeaningfully enhance the strength of the inference of scienter.ββ\nShaw, 537 F.3d at 533 (quoting Southland, 365 F.3d at 368).\n To evaluate scienter in a securities-fraud case, a court must (1) take the\nwell-pleaded allegations as true; (2) evaluate the facts collectively, including\nfacts contained in βdocuments incorporated in the complaint by reference and\nmatters subject to judicial notice,β βto determine whether a strong inference of\nscienter has been pledβ; and (3) βtake into account plausible inferences\nopposing as well as supporting a strong inference of scienter.β Id. To\nwithstand a motion to dismiss, βan inference of scienter must be more than\nmerely plausible or reasonableβit must be cogent and at least as compelling\nas any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.β Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor\nIssues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).\n Scienter must be alleged with respect to βthe individual corporate official\nor officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its\nmaking or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion\ntherein, or the like) rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all the\ncorporationβs officers and employees acquired in the course of their\nemployment.β Southland, 365 F.3d at 366; see also Shaw, 537 F.3d at 533\n(β[T]his court has rejected the group pleading approach to scienter and instead\nlooks to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or officials.β).\nFurthermore, such allegations ordinarily must be based on more than an\nindividualβs position within the company, absent special circumstances.\nNeiman, 854 F.3d at 749.\n B\n Plaintiffs identify several alleged misrepresentations they argue give\nrise to a sufficient inference of scienter, both because Defendants were severely\nreckless in making statements counter to information that should have been\n 7\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\nobvious to them, and because, after learning of that contrary information, they\ncontinued to make those statements. The alleged misrepresentations are: (1)\nDefendantsβ repeated use of the term βconclusiveβ in describing FracMaxβs\neffect, which Plaintiffs characterize as tantamount to assuring that FracMaxβs\ndata was irrefutable; (2) Defendantsβ reference to FracMax data as βun-\nadjustedβ when, in fact, FracMax used an algorithm to adjust certain data; (3)\nDefendant Chisholmβs presentation at the September 11, 2015, conference of\ndirect comparisons between several wells that used CnF versus several that\ndid not, which Defendants concede relied on incorrect data for the non-CnF\nwells; and (4) Chisholmβs representation at this same conference that this data\nwas βback check[ed] and validate[d],β when Defendants later admitted that\nβFlotek had no internal controls in place to ensure the integrity of the FracMax\ndatabase.β The district court determined that these representations failed to\ngenerate a strong inference of scienter. We consider each representation in\nturn, and ultimately agree with the district courtβs conclusion that each fails\nto raise a strong inference of scienter. 2\n 1. Description of FracMax as βConclusiveβ\n Plaintiffs suggest that Defendantsβ use of the term βconclusiveβ to\ndescribe FracMax was obviously misleading because Flotek employed βno\ninternal controlsβ over the information used for FracMax provided by third-\nparty Drillinginfo, yet the term βconclusiveβ suggests the data is infallible.\nHowever, in context, Chisholmβs use of the term βconclusiveβ may have had\ninnocent intentions and may not have been inconsistent with a lack of internal\ncontrols. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 538 (statements subject to βmany\ninterpretations, including innocent ones,β do not βcontribute to a strong\n\n\n 2Because we conclude that the alleged misrepresentations here do not reflect scienter\non the part of any Defendant, we need not reach Plaintiffsβ argument that FracMaxβs\nimportance to the company permits an inference that Defendants had a motive to mislead.\n 8\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\ninference of scienterβ (cleaned up)). For example, Chisholm stated in a press\nrelease that the βFracMax software technology provides conclusive evidence\nthat our [CnF] suite of completion chemistries provides compelling economic\nbenefits to production companies.β Plaintiffs do not allege that CnF products\nprovide no economic benefit whatsoever, but instead allege the benefit was\noverstated. Therefore, Chisholmβs generalized endorsement of FracMax as\nevidencing the βcompelling economic benefitsβ of CnF products is not\nunreasonable, given that CnF products undisputedly provided some economic\nbenefit. At the very least, such statements are not βhighly unreasonable\nomissions or misrepresentations . . . involv[ing] . . . an extreme departure from\nthe standards of ordinary care.β Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866 (quoting\nNathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). Plaintiffs argue that Flotekβs lack of internal\ncontrols should have made it obvious to Defendants that using the term\nβconclusiveβ was misleading. That argument also fails. Plaintiffs do not allege\nthat Defendants should have known the Drillinginfo data was unreliable.\nWhile it was perhaps unwise to rely completely on third-party data while\nreferring to the product using it as βconclusive,β it was not reckless to do so.\nSee MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d at 254 (holding complaint presenting βwhat could\nbest be described as allegations of mismanagement,β or even βgross\nmismanagement,β failed to allege severe recklessness of any individual). At\nbottom, Plaintiffsβ allegations concerning Defendantsβ characterization of\nFracMax data as conclusive fail to generate an inference of scienter that is βat\nleast as compelling as . . . opposing inference[s] of nonfraudulent intent.β\nTellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.\n 2. Characterization of FracMax-Provided Information as βUn-\n Adjustedβ\n Plaintiffs also contend that a slide show Chisholm presented at least\nonce, which stated that FracMax βdata is un-adjusted,β was misleading and\n\n 9\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\nChisholm should have known it was incorrect, because FracMax used an\nallocation algorithm that necessarily made adjustments to Texas production\ndata. In response to the fallout from the Bronte Report, Flotek disclosed that\nit used an βallocation algorithmβ for Texas data, because data provided by the\nTexas Railroad Commission was not broken down by well, but instead by lease,\nand a lease might contain multiple wells. Therefore, according to Plaintiffs,\nany statement positing that the data was not adjusted was patently false,\nsupporting an inference of scienter. However, there is no specific allegation\nthat Chisholm knew at the time he made the statement at issue that FracMax\nutilized an algorithm. Moreover, as the district court correctly pointed out, the\nuse of an algorithm does not make the claim that the data was βun-adjustedβ\nmisleading. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866 (danger of misleading buyers or\nsellers must be βeither known to the defendant or is so obvious that the\ndefendant must have been aware of itβ (cleaned up)).\n 3. Presentation of Incorrect Well Data\n The starkest example of Flotekβs provision of false information is that\nChisholm presented demonstrably false information at the September 2015\nconference in the form of incorrect well data. However, even these statements\nfail to support a strong inference of scienter, because Plaintiffs fail to plead\nthat any Defendant knew of these errors at the time, and the misstatements\nwere not sufficiently obvious that Defendants were severely reckless in\npresenting the information. As the district court pointed out, although\nPlaintiffs pleaded that the three non-CnF wells used in the September 2015\npresentation were downwardly adjusted, they βfailed to plead facts\nestablishing this discrepancy is true throughout FracMaxβs 80,000 well\ndatabase,β and βa trend as to six wells out of 80,000 is not sufficient on its own\nto establish a strong inference of scienter.β Plaintiffs contend that the fact that\nthe discrepancies inured to Flotekβs benefit weighs in favor of a finding of\n 10\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\nscienter, as it suggests that Chisholm made intentional misrepresentations\nrather than mistakes. But the mere fact that an error favors the defendant is\ninsufficient to support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Shaw, 537 F.3d at\n543 (characterizing allegations that defendants would benefit from\nrepresentations as supporting an inference of motive rather than going directly\nto severe recklessness, and noting that motive alone is insufficient for scienter).\n It does appear that it would have been very easy to check if this data was\ncorrectβFlotek verified the alleged errors and responded to the Bronte Report\nwithin a day. However, while this suggests negligence, there is no indication\nthat Defendants had reason to know of any deficiencies in quality control\nproblems before the data was made public. Cf. Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc.,\n292 F.3d 424, 432 (5th Cir. 2002) (βPlaintiffs point to no allegations that the\ndefendants knew about the internal control problems, only that they should\nhave known or that their lack of knowledge based on their corporate positions\ndemonstrates recklessness.β). Plaintiffs rely on the fact that Flotek revised its\nallocation algorithm, which they claim implies that there was an issue with\nthe previous algorithm. However, we have previously declined to draw a\nsimilar inference, concluding in Abrams that β[t]he fact that Baker Hughes was\noverhauling its accounting system . . . does not command an inference that\ncompany officials should have anticipated finding a problem or assumed that\nfinancial data reported under [the] old system was inaccurate.β Abrams, 292\nF.3d at 433. Thus, Chisholmβs use of incorrect data at the September 2015\nconference also fails to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.\n 4. Statement that Data Was Back-Checked and Validated\n Finally, Plaintiffs claim that Chisholm represented that the data\npresented at the September 2015 conference was βback check[ed] and\nvalidate[d].β Plaintiffs allege that this was false, as βFlotek had no internal\ncontrols in place to ensure the integrity of the FracMax database.β Indeed, as\n 11\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\nChisholm admitted, there was a failure in quality control, because Flotek did\nnot cross-reference β[the Drillinginfo data] with the [Texas] Railroad\nCommission data.β Despite Chisholmβs subsequent recognition that Flotek\nβshould have had the quality control in place that could have validated [the\nDrillinginfo data] and it wasnβt,β Plaintiffs nonetheless fail to allege that\nChisholm knew of this lack of quality control at the time he made the\nstatement, or that it would have been so obvious that he should have known.\nCf. Abrams, 292 F.3d at 432 (βPlaintiffs point to no allegations that the\ndefendants knew about the internal control problems, only that they should\nhave known or that their lack of knowledge based on their corporate\npositions demonstrates recklessness.β). Further, the statement is ambiguous\nbecause Chisholm does not say whether Flotek itself back checks and validates\nthe data, or instead relies on a third party to do so, which Chisholm may well\nhave believed was a part of the process. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 538 (analyzing\nβmore likely, nonculpable inference, absent any other detailsβ about the\nrepresentation). Accordingly, this allegation also fails to give rise to a strong\ninference of scienter.\n C\n In the absence of specific allegations that any Defendant knew of the\nfalsity of any of the statements discussed above at the time they were made or\nwere severely reckless with respect to the statementsβ truth, Plaintiffs invoke\nChisholmβs position as an inventor of the FracMax technology as sufficient to\nβpermit a plaintiff to plead scienter.β 3 Neiman, 854 F.3d at 749. Our case law\n\n\n\n 3Plaintiffsβ complaint repeatedly refers to Chisholm as βone of FracMaxβs inventors\nand President and CEO of Flotek,β but does not specify what role Chisholm played in\ninventing FracMax. Although conceivable that Chisholm knew the intricacies of the software\ncode underpinning FracMax, the Plaintiffs have made no specific allegations from which we\ncould conclude such an inference is as likely as an opposing inference that Chisholm merely\nthought of the concept while others implemented it. The lack of specific facts leading to an\n 12\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\nprovides that an inference of scienter may be drawn solely from βa defendantβs\nposition in the companyβ only if certain βspecial circumstancesβ are alleged. Id.\nWe have stated these βspecial circumstancesβ as follows: (1) βthe smaller the\ncompany the more likely it is that corporate executives would be familiar with\nthe intricacies of day to day operationsβ; (2) βthe transaction at issue may have\nbeen critical to the companyβs continued vitalityβ; (3) βthe misrepresented or\nomitted information at issue would have been readily apparent to the speakerβ;\nand (4) βthe defendantβs statements were internally inconsistent with one\nanother.β Id. at 749β50 (quoting Local 731 I.B. of T. Excavators & Pavers\nPension Tr. Fund v. Diodes, Inc., 810 F.3d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 2016)).\n Our βspecial circumstancesβ doctrine does not apply here, and therefore\nour analysis regarding the alleged misrepresentations, supra Part III.B, holds.\nPlaintiffs concede that they βdo[] not contend Flotek is a small company,β and\ninstead ask us to find special circumstances based on Defendantsβ knowledge\nof the FracMax product. However, we have never found special circumstances\npermitting an inference of scienter based solely on a defendantβs position when\nthe company was large. Compare Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d\n333, 342β43 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding special circumstances where defendant\ncompany had no employees itself and was managed by company with only eight\nemployees) and Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 425 (inference warranted where\ncompany had roughly thirty-five employees), with Neiman, 854 F.3d at 750\n(β[W]ith over 60 employees, [defendant] was approximately twice as large as\nthe companies in the cases where this court has found a βspecial\ncircumstance.ββ).\n\n\n\ninference of knowledge or severe recklessness of FracMaxβs flaws leaves only the possibility\nthat Chisholmβs title as βone of FracMaxβs inventors and President and CEO of Flotekβ might\nresult in such an inference, a possibility which we conclude also fails under our βspecial\ncircumstancesβ test.\n 13\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\n The other special circumstances factors also cut against applying that\ndoctrine here. Although FracMax was important to Flotekβs sales of CnF, it\ncannot be said to be critical to its βcontinued vitality,β as required. 4 See Diodes,\n810 F.3d at 959 (finding omissions regarding a labor shortage not sufficiently\nimportant where the plaintiff did not allege that the labor shortage\nβjeopardized the companyβs existenceβ). Nor would it have been βreadily\napparent to the speakerββprimarily, Chisholmβthat the statements were\nincorrect, as discussed above in analyzing each statement individually. See\nsupra Part III.B. Finally, despite Plaintiffsβ contrary contention, no internal\ninconsistency exists between the statements that well data was un-altered and\nthat FracMax data was conclusive, on the one hand, and the later revelations\nabout the accuracy of that data and the lack of internal controls, on the other.\nThe earlier statements do not directly contradict that later information. As\ndiscussed, the context of the use of these terms reveals that the term\nβconclusiveβ was used to tout the economic benefits of CnF products, and the\nterm βun-adjustedβ was used in conjunction with references to FracMax as an\nβanalytical model.β As such, these statements do not conflict with later\nrevelations that flaws existed in the data and that Flotek relied on a third\nparty to provide accurate information. See supra Part III.B.1β2.\n\n\n\n\n 4 We have concluded that, in order to constitute a special circumstance, the required\nlevel of importance to the company must be such that the companyβs continued existence\ndepends on, or the company would be completely transformed by, the success of a product or\nbusiness line. See Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 342 (defendant company βwas essentially a one-trick\nponyβ); Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., Etc., 407 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2005) (defendant βwas a\nstruggling company that announced to the public that it had reached agreements . . . that\nwould bring them multimillion dollar revenues, which would amount to a thirty-fold\nincreaseβ in revenue); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 425 (βZonagen was essentially a one product\ncompanyβ).\n 14\n\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-20308\n D\n Finally, we review the complaint holistically, as the district court did, to\ndetermine βwhether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a\nstrong inference of scienter,β Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323. The district court\ncorrectly pointed out that βPlaintiffs ask this Court to assume scienter based\nsolely on the importance of FracMax to Flotekβs business, Defendantsβ positions\nwithin the company, and the fact that the alleged βmistakeβ happened in a way\nthat made Flotekβs core product, CnF, look more profitable.β We agree that\nsuch allegations are insufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter and, at\nmost, indicate βsimple or even inexcusable negligence,β a lesser showing than\nis required here. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866. This conclusion is further\nbuttressed by Plaintiffsβ pervasive use of group pleadingβreferring generally\nto βDefendantsβ rather than specific individualsβa practice this court has\nexpressly rejected. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 533 (β[T]his court has rejected the\ngroup pleading approach to scienter and instead looks to the state of mind of\nthe individual corporate official or officials.β). For these reasons, the district\ncourtβs holistic analysis was also correct.\n IV\n Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by dismissing their\nSection 20(a) claims against the individual defendants for control-person\nliability. βControl person liability is secondary only and cannot exist in the\nabsence of a primary violation.β Southland, 365 F.3d at 383. Because Plaintiffs\nhave not established a primary violation, their Section 20(a) claims fail.\n ***\n For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 15\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff - Appellant v. FLOTEK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; John W. Chisholm ; H. Richard Walton; Robert M. Schmitz, Defendants - Appellees\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-07\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n FILED\\n February 7, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, Lead Plaintiff, Clerk\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant\\n\\nv.\\n\\nFLOTEK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; JOHN W. CHISHOLM; H.\\nRICHARD WALTON; ROBERT M. SCHMITZ,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore DENNIS, CLEMENT, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\\nJAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:\\n This appeal arises out of a putative class action filed on behalf of\\npurchasers of Flotek Industries, Inc. common stock. Plaintiffs allege that\\ndefendants, Flotek and three of its officers, exaggerated the usefulness of its\\nproducts. They allege misrepresentations relating to a proprietary software\\nFlotek developed to help market these products. The district court dismissed\\nthe complaint, holding that plaintiffs had failed to plead facts giving rise to a\\nstrong inference of fraudulent scienter. We AFFIRM.\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n I\\n Plaintiffs filed this putative securities class action on behalf of investors\\nwho purchased Flotek common stock between October 23, 2014, and November\\n9, 2015. Defendants are Flotek Industries, Inc. and three of its officers: Chief\\nExecutive Officer (CEO) and President John W. Chisholm and Chief Financial\\nOfficers H. Richard Walton and Robert M. Schmitz. Flotek sells oilfield\\nproducts called βComplex nano-Fluid technologiesβ (CnF), which are supposed\\nto improve the productivity of oil and gas wells. According to the complaint,\\nCnF is Flotekβs βhallmarkβ product, and β[b]y the beginning of the Class Period,\\nthe Energy Chemistry Technologies segment [of Flotek] represented over 50%\\nof the Companyβs revenue due to sales of its CnF products.β This lawsuit\\nconcerns representations made about a software application Flotek developed\\nto help market CnF to exploration and production companies. The software,\\ncalled βFracMax,β analyzes and presents data concerning hydraulically\\nfractured wells to allow comparison of the productivity of oil and gas wells that\\nuse CnF with those that do not.\\n Flotek introduced FracMax to investors at a June 2014 investor\\nconference. Over the next sixteen months, β[D]efendants attended at least 21\\nconferences, including Flotekβs earning conference calls, analyst-hosted\\nconferences and [c]ompany-hosted investor conferences, where they focused on\\nand praised FracMax and its ability to conclusively validate the efficacy and\\neconomic benefits of Flotekβs CnF products.β Defendants promoted FracMax\\nas an integral component of Flotekβs sales strategy and as βkey to βmaterially\\nbroaden[ing] the reach of Flotekβs marketing effortsβ for its CnF products.β\\nβ[D]efendants reported that the FracMax database included production data\\nfrom 80,000 wells across key U.S. basins and that based on this data, Flotekβs\\nsales force could demonstrate to potential customers that the use of Flotek CnF\\nchemistries added at least an estimated $8 billion in aggregate value for\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\noperators when compared to those operators that had not adopted Flotekβs CnF\\nproducts.β In a 2015 press release, Chisholm, Flotekβs President and CEO,\\nstated, βOur FracMax software technology provides conclusive evidence that\\nour [CnF] suite of completion chemistries provides compelling economic\\nbenefits to production companies.β Flotek also represented in a quarterly\\nearnings press release that sales of CnFs increased substantially because of\\nFracMax.\\n Although their complaint largely refers to Defendants generically,\\nPlaintiffsβ references to specific representations, to the extent they specify,\\nprimarily relate to statements made by Chisholm, who at various times\\nemphasized FracMaxβs empirical validity. During several conference calls\\nwith investors, Chisholm explained that FracMax used publicly available data\\nthat companies self-reported to state agencies to compare production from\\nwells that used CnF and wells that did not, suggesting this made FracMaxβs\\noutput more reliable. In September 2015, Chisholm gave a presentation at an\\ninvestor conference in which he explained that FracMax used data reported to\\nthe Texas Railroad Commission, a state agency, and he suggested that the data\\nwas βback check[ed] and validate[d].β In his PowerPoint presentation,\\nChisholm presented an βAbout FracMaxβ slide stating that the data was\\nβsourced from operator-provided completion data.β This slide further stated\\nthat the data was βun-adjusted, providing for comparison and analysis of\\noperatorsβ self-reported data sets.β Chisholm also presented images of the\\nFracMax interface in order to compare the productivity of four Texas wells, one\\nthat used CnF and three that did not, again emphasizing the difference in\\nproduction levels.\\n On November 9, 2015, online financial publication Bronte Capital\\nreleased a blog post (the Bronte Report) contending that the data in Chisholmβs\\npresentation was wrong and suggesting that the data had been intentionally\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\naltered to make CnF look significantly more effective. Specifically, the Bronte\\nReport alleged that, as compared with the numbers reported by the Texas\\nRailroad Commission, βFlotek had reduced the production data for the [three]\\nnon-CnF wells by 40% to 50% . . . , while leaving the production data for the\\nCnF well unchanged.β After release of the Bronte Report, Flotek shares\\ndeclined.\\n The next day, Flotek issued a press release conceding that Bronte\\nCapitalβs analysis was correct, 1 and ascribing the error to data provided by a\\nthird party, Drillinginfo, that βcaused FracMax to identify the three non-CnF\\nwells as contained in units with multiple wells (as opposed to single well units),\\nwhich required FracMax to incorrectly apply an allocation algorithm to the\\nproduction for the non-CnF wells.β According to Flotek, because Texas reports\\noil and gas production by lease, rather than by well, FracMax used an\\nalgorithm to apportion production within multiple-well lease units, leading to\\nunwarranted adjustments of the non-CnF wells discussed at the September\\nconference. Flotek also held a conference call, during which βChisholm\\nadmitted that the Companyβs internal controls βdid not catchββ the errors, and\\nβthat the Company had no internal controls in place to check the accuracy of\\nthe third-party data from Drillinginfo.β He explained that they did not cross-\\nreference the third-party data against the underlying state-agency data and\\nthat the company βhad, several months ago, evolved to a different allocation\\nprogramβ that would provide greater accuracy.\\n According to Plaintiffs, a report issued by Iberia Capital Partners that\\nsame day βstated that the four wells presented at the September 11, 2015\\ninvestor conference were designated by Drillinginfo as being single well leases,\\nnot multiple leases, therefore the Texas Railroad Commission data for those\\n\\n\\n 1 Earlier, Flotek had denied the allegations contained in the Bronte Report.\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nwells did not require adjustment,β and Flotek shares fell further as a result.\\nContrary to its earlier statements following the Bronte Report, Flotek then\\nreported that an internal investigation concluded that the error originated in\\nthe software, not the data set, as Chisholm had stated earlier, and βmost likely\\nresulted from the accidental inclusion of test code by the third-party software\\ndeveloper . . . . who was hired to write code for FracMax.β\\n Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the\\nSecurities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. Β§ 78j(b); Securities and Exchange\\nCommission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. Β§ 240.10b-5; and control person liability for\\nthe individual defendants under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,\\n15 U.S.C. Β§ 78t. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure\\nto state a claim. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that\\nPlaintiffs had failed to sufficiently plead scienter. Plaintiffs timely appealed.\\n II\\n This court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint de novo. Ind. Elec.\\nWorkersβ Pension Tr. Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 533 (5th\\nCir. 2008). Plaintiffsβ βwell-pleaded facts are to be accepted as true and viewed\\nin the light most favorable to [them].β Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing,\\nInc., 836 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 2016). β[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted\\ndeductions, or legal conclusionsβ are not βwell-pleaded factsβ for purposes of\\nevaluating a complaint. Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365\\nF.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2004). Where fraud is alleged, Federal βRule [of Civil\\nProcedure] 9(b) creates a heightened pleading requirement that βthe\\ncircumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with\\nparticularity.ββ U.S. ex rel. Rafizadeh v. Contβl Common, Inc., 553 F.3d 869,\\n872 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)). A class-action complaint\\nalleging a violation of Section 10(b) must allege fraud in accordance with the\\nRule 9(b) heightened-pleading standard. See Southland, 365 F.3d at 362.\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n To state a viable securities-fraud claim under Section 10(b) and Rule\\n10b-5, Plaintiffs must allege that (1) Defendants made a misrepresentation or\\nomission relating to the purchase or sale of a security, (2) such representation\\nor omission related to a material fact, (3) the representation or omission was\\nmade with scienter, (4) Plaintiffs acted in reliance on Defendantsβ\\nrepresentation or omission, and (5) the representation or omission proximately\\ncaused Plaintiffsβ losses. Neiman v. Bulmahn, 854 F.3d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2017)\\n(quoting Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 406β07 (5th Cir. 2001)). At\\nissue in this appeal is whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded scienter.\\n III\\n A\\n The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) specifically\\nrequires that a complaint in a securities case support allegations of scienter\\nwith βfacts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the\\nrequired state of mind.β 15 U.S.C. Β§ 78u-4(b)(2)(A). ββScienterβ is βa mental\\nstate embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.ββ Goldstein v. MCI\\nWorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 245 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.\\nHochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976)). For purposes of 10(b) liability, a\\ndefendant must have acted with, at minimum, severe recklessness. Warren v.\\nReserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 1984). βSevere recklessness,β\\nis βlimited to those highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that\\ninvolve not merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme\\ndeparture from the standards of ordinary care.β Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,\\n332 F.3d 854, 866 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). The\\nomissions or misrepresentations at issue must also βpresent a danger of\\nmisleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the defendant or is so\\nobvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.β Id. (quoting\\nNathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). Though not in themselves sufficient to support a\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nstrong inference of scienter, β[a]ppropriate motive and opportunity allegations\\nmay . . . βmeaningfully enhance the strength of the inference of scienter.ββ\\nShaw, 537 F.3d at 533 (quoting Southland, 365 F.3d at 368).\\n To evaluate scienter in a securities-fraud case, a court must (1) take the\\nwell-pleaded allegations as true; (2) evaluate the facts collectively, including\\nfacts contained in βdocuments incorporated in the complaint by reference and\\nmatters subject to judicial notice,β βto determine whether a strong inference of\\nscienter has been pledβ; and (3) βtake into account plausible inferences\\nopposing as well as supporting a strong inference of scienter.β Id. To\\nwithstand a motion to dismiss, βan inference of scienter must be more than\\nmerely plausible or reasonableβit must be cogent and at least as compelling\\nas any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.β Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor\\nIssues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).\\n Scienter must be alleged with respect to βthe individual corporate official\\nor officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or its\\nmaking or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion\\ntherein, or the like) rather than generally to the collective knowledge of all the\\ncorporationβs officers and employees acquired in the course of their\\nemployment.β Southland, 365 F.3d at 366; see also Shaw, 537 F.3d at 533\\n(β[T]his court has rejected the group pleading approach to scienter and instead\\nlooks to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or officials.β).\\nFurthermore, such allegations ordinarily must be based on more than an\\nindividualβs position within the company, absent special circumstances.\\nNeiman, 854 F.3d at 749.\\n B\\n Plaintiffs identify several alleged misrepresentations they argue give\\nrise to a sufficient inference of scienter, both because Defendants were severely\\nreckless in making statements counter to information that should have been\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nobvious to them, and because, after learning of that contrary information, they\\ncontinued to make those statements. The alleged misrepresentations are: (1)\\nDefendantsβ repeated use of the term βconclusiveβ in describing FracMaxβs\\neffect, which Plaintiffs characterize as tantamount to assuring that FracMaxβs\\ndata was irrefutable; (2) Defendantsβ reference to FracMax data as βun-\\nadjustedβ when, in fact, FracMax used an algorithm to adjust certain data; (3)\\nDefendant Chisholmβs presentation at the September 11, 2015, conference of\\ndirect comparisons between several wells that used CnF versus several that\\ndid not, which Defendants concede relied on incorrect data for the non-CnF\\nwells; and (4) Chisholmβs representation at this same conference that this data\\nwas βback check[ed] and validate[d],β when Defendants later admitted that\\nβFlotek had no internal controls in place to ensure the integrity of the FracMax\\ndatabase.β The district court determined that these representations failed to\\ngenerate a strong inference of scienter. We consider each representation in\\nturn, and ultimately agree with the district courtβs conclusion that each fails\\nto raise a strong inference of scienter. 2\\n 1. Description of FracMax as βConclusiveβ\\n Plaintiffs suggest that Defendantsβ use of the term βconclusiveβ to\\ndescribe FracMax was obviously misleading because Flotek employed βno\\ninternal controlsβ over the information used for FracMax provided by third-\\nparty Drillinginfo, yet the term βconclusiveβ suggests the data is infallible.\\nHowever, in context, Chisholmβs use of the term βconclusiveβ may have had\\ninnocent intentions and may not have been inconsistent with a lack of internal\\ncontrols. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 538 (statements subject to βmany\\ninterpretations, including innocent ones,β do not βcontribute to a strong\\n\\n\\n 2Because we conclude that the alleged misrepresentations here do not reflect scienter\\non the part of any Defendant, we need not reach Plaintiffsβ argument that FracMaxβs\\nimportance to the company permits an inference that Defendants had a motive to mislead.\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\ninference of scienterβ (cleaned up)). For example, Chisholm stated in a press\\nrelease that the βFracMax software technology provides conclusive evidence\\nthat our [CnF] suite of completion chemistries provides compelling economic\\nbenefits to production companies.β Plaintiffs do not allege that CnF products\\nprovide no economic benefit whatsoever, but instead allege the benefit was\\noverstated. Therefore, Chisholmβs generalized endorsement of FracMax as\\nevidencing the βcompelling economic benefitsβ of CnF products is not\\nunreasonable, given that CnF products undisputedly provided some economic\\nbenefit. At the very least, such statements are not βhighly unreasonable\\nomissions or misrepresentations . . . involv[ing] . . . an extreme departure from\\nthe standards of ordinary care.β Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866 (quoting\\nNathenson, 267 F.3d at 408). Plaintiffs argue that Flotekβs lack of internal\\ncontrols should have made it obvious to Defendants that using the term\\nβconclusiveβ was misleading. That argument also fails. Plaintiffs do not allege\\nthat Defendants should have known the Drillinginfo data was unreliable.\\nWhile it was perhaps unwise to rely completely on third-party data while\\nreferring to the product using it as βconclusive,β it was not reckless to do so.\\nSee MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d at 254 (holding complaint presenting βwhat could\\nbest be described as allegations of mismanagement,β or even βgross\\nmismanagement,β failed to allege severe recklessness of any individual). At\\nbottom, Plaintiffsβ allegations concerning Defendantsβ characterization of\\nFracMax data as conclusive fail to generate an inference of scienter that is βat\\nleast as compelling as . . . opposing inference[s] of nonfraudulent intent.β\\nTellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.\\n 2. Characterization of FracMax-Provided Information as βUn-\\n Adjustedβ\\n Plaintiffs also contend that a slide show Chisholm presented at least\\nonce, which stated that FracMax βdata is un-adjusted,β was misleading and\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nChisholm should have known it was incorrect, because FracMax used an\\nallocation algorithm that necessarily made adjustments to Texas production\\ndata. In response to the fallout from the Bronte Report, Flotek disclosed that\\nit used an βallocation algorithmβ for Texas data, because data provided by the\\nTexas Railroad Commission was not broken down by well, but instead by lease,\\nand a lease might contain multiple wells. Therefore, according to Plaintiffs,\\nany statement positing that the data was not adjusted was patently false,\\nsupporting an inference of scienter. However, there is no specific allegation\\nthat Chisholm knew at the time he made the statement at issue that FracMax\\nutilized an algorithm. Moreover, as the district court correctly pointed out, the\\nuse of an algorithm does not make the claim that the data was βun-adjustedβ\\nmisleading. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866 (danger of misleading buyers or\\nsellers must be βeither known to the defendant or is so obvious that the\\ndefendant must have been aware of itβ (cleaned up)).\\n 3. Presentation of Incorrect Well Data\\n The starkest example of Flotekβs provision of false information is that\\nChisholm presented demonstrably false information at the September 2015\\nconference in the form of incorrect well data. However, even these statements\\nfail to support a strong inference of scienter, because Plaintiffs fail to plead\\nthat any Defendant knew of these errors at the time, and the misstatements\\nwere not sufficiently obvious that Defendants were severely reckless in\\npresenting the information. As the district court pointed out, although\\nPlaintiffs pleaded that the three non-CnF wells used in the September 2015\\npresentation were downwardly adjusted, they βfailed to plead facts\\nestablishing this discrepancy is true throughout FracMaxβs 80,000 well\\ndatabase,β and βa trend as to six wells out of 80,000 is not sufficient on its own\\nto establish a strong inference of scienter.β Plaintiffs contend that the fact that\\nthe discrepancies inured to Flotekβs benefit weighs in favor of a finding of\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nscienter, as it suggests that Chisholm made intentional misrepresentations\\nrather than mistakes. But the mere fact that an error favors the defendant is\\ninsufficient to support a strong inference of scienter. Cf. Shaw, 537 F.3d at\\n543 (characterizing allegations that defendants would benefit from\\nrepresentations as supporting an inference of motive rather than going directly\\nto severe recklessness, and noting that motive alone is insufficient for scienter).\\n It does appear that it would have been very easy to check if this data was\\ncorrectβFlotek verified the alleged errors and responded to the Bronte Report\\nwithin a day. However, while this suggests negligence, there is no indication\\nthat Defendants had reason to know of any deficiencies in quality control\\nproblems before the data was made public. Cf. Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc.,\\n292 F.3d 424, 432 (5th Cir. 2002) (βPlaintiffs point to no allegations that the\\ndefendants knew about the internal control problems, only that they should\\nhave known or that their lack of knowledge based on their corporate positions\\ndemonstrates recklessness.β). Plaintiffs rely on the fact that Flotek revised its\\nallocation algorithm, which they claim implies that there was an issue with\\nthe previous algorithm. However, we have previously declined to draw a\\nsimilar inference, concluding in Abrams that β[t]he fact that Baker Hughes was\\noverhauling its accounting system . . . does not command an inference that\\ncompany officials should have anticipated finding a problem or assumed that\\nfinancial data reported under [the] old system was inaccurate.β Abrams, 292\\nF.3d at 433. Thus, Chisholmβs use of incorrect data at the September 2015\\nconference also fails to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.\\n 4. Statement that Data Was Back-Checked and Validated\\n Finally, Plaintiffs claim that Chisholm represented that the data\\npresented at the September 2015 conference was βback check[ed] and\\nvalidate[d].β Plaintiffs allege that this was false, as βFlotek had no internal\\ncontrols in place to ensure the integrity of the FracMax database.β Indeed, as\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nChisholm admitted, there was a failure in quality control, because Flotek did\\nnot cross-reference β[the Drillinginfo data] with the [Texas] Railroad\\nCommission data.β Despite Chisholmβs subsequent recognition that Flotek\\nβshould have had the quality control in place that could have validated [the\\nDrillinginfo data] and it wasnβt,β Plaintiffs nonetheless fail to allege that\\nChisholm knew of this lack of quality control at the time he made the\\nstatement, or that it would have been so obvious that he should have known.\\nCf. Abrams, 292 F.3d at 432 (βPlaintiffs point to no allegations that the\\ndefendants knew about the internal control problems, only that they should\\nhave known or that their lack of knowledge based on their corporate\\npositions demonstrates recklessness.β). Further, the statement is ambiguous\\nbecause Chisholm does not say whether Flotek itself back checks and validates\\nthe data, or instead relies on a third party to do so, which Chisholm may well\\nhave believed was a part of the process. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 538 (analyzing\\nβmore likely, nonculpable inference, absent any other detailsβ about the\\nrepresentation). Accordingly, this allegation also fails to give rise to a strong\\ninference of scienter.\\n C\\n In the absence of specific allegations that any Defendant knew of the\\nfalsity of any of the statements discussed above at the time they were made or\\nwere severely reckless with respect to the statementsβ truth, Plaintiffs invoke\\nChisholmβs position as an inventor of the FracMax technology as sufficient to\\nβpermit a plaintiff to plead scienter.β 3 Neiman, 854 F.3d at 749. Our case law\\n\\n\\n\\n 3Plaintiffsβ complaint repeatedly refers to Chisholm as βone of FracMaxβs inventors\\nand President and CEO of Flotek,β but does not specify what role Chisholm played in\\ninventing FracMax. Although conceivable that Chisholm knew the intricacies of the software\\ncode underpinning FracMax, the Plaintiffs have made no specific allegations from which we\\ncould conclude such an inference is as likely as an opposing inference that Chisholm merely\\nthought of the concept while others implemented it. The lack of specific facts leading to an\\n 12\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\nprovides that an inference of scienter may be drawn solely from βa defendantβs\\nposition in the companyβ only if certain βspecial circumstancesβ are alleged. Id.\\nWe have stated these βspecial circumstancesβ as follows: (1) βthe smaller the\\ncompany the more likely it is that corporate executives would be familiar with\\nthe intricacies of day to day operationsβ; (2) βthe transaction at issue may have\\nbeen critical to the companyβs continued vitalityβ; (3) βthe misrepresented or\\nomitted information at issue would have been readily apparent to the speakerβ;\\nand (4) βthe defendantβs statements were internally inconsistent with one\\nanother.β Id. at 749β50 (quoting Local 731 I.B. of T. Excavators & Pavers\\nPension Tr. Fund v. Diodes, Inc., 810 F.3d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 2016)).\\n Our βspecial circumstancesβ doctrine does not apply here, and therefore\\nour analysis regarding the alleged misrepresentations, supra Part III.B, holds.\\nPlaintiffs concede that they βdo[] not contend Flotek is a small company,β and\\ninstead ask us to find special circumstances based on Defendantsβ knowledge\\nof the FracMax product. However, we have never found special circumstances\\npermitting an inference of scienter based solely on a defendantβs position when\\nthe company was large. Compare Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d\\n333, 342β43 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding special circumstances where defendant\\ncompany had no employees itself and was managed by company with only eight\\nemployees) and Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 425 (inference warranted where\\ncompany had roughly thirty-five employees), with Neiman, 854 F.3d at 750\\n(β[W]ith over 60 employees, [defendant] was approximately twice as large as\\nthe companies in the cases where this court has found a βspecial\\ncircumstance.ββ).\\n\\n\\n\\ninference of knowledge or severe recklessness of FracMaxβs flaws leaves only the possibility\\nthat Chisholmβs title as βone of FracMaxβs inventors and President and CEO of Flotekβ might\\nresult in such an inference, a possibility which we conclude also fails under our βspecial\\ncircumstancesβ test.\\n 13\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n The other special circumstances factors also cut against applying that\\ndoctrine here. Although FracMax was important to Flotekβs sales of CnF, it\\ncannot be said to be critical to its βcontinued vitality,β as required. 4 See Diodes,\\n810 F.3d at 959 (finding omissions regarding a labor shortage not sufficiently\\nimportant where the plaintiff did not allege that the labor shortage\\nβjeopardized the companyβs existenceβ). Nor would it have been βreadily\\napparent to the speakerββprimarily, Chisholmβthat the statements were\\nincorrect, as discussed above in analyzing each statement individually. See\\nsupra Part III.B. Finally, despite Plaintiffsβ contrary contention, no internal\\ninconsistency exists between the statements that well data was un-altered and\\nthat FracMax data was conclusive, on the one hand, and the later revelations\\nabout the accuracy of that data and the lack of internal controls, on the other.\\nThe earlier statements do not directly contradict that later information. As\\ndiscussed, the context of the use of these terms reveals that the term\\nβconclusiveβ was used to tout the economic benefits of CnF products, and the\\nterm βun-adjustedβ was used in conjunction with references to FracMax as an\\nβanalytical model.β As such, these statements do not conflict with later\\nrevelations that flaws existed in the data and that Flotek relied on a third\\nparty to provide accurate information. See supra Part III.B.1β2.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 We have concluded that, in order to constitute a special circumstance, the required\\nlevel of importance to the company must be such that the companyβs continued existence\\ndepends on, or the company would be completely transformed by, the success of a product or\\nbusiness line. See Dorsey, 540 F.3d at 342 (defendant company βwas essentially a one-trick\\nponyβ); Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., Etc., 407 F.3d 690, 700 (5th Cir. 2005) (defendant βwas a\\nstruggling company that announced to the public that it had reached agreements . . . that\\nwould bring them multimillion dollar revenues, which would amount to a thirty-fold\\nincreaseβ in revenue); Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 425 (βZonagen was essentially a one product\\ncompanyβ).\\n 14\\n\\f Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-20308\\n D\\n Finally, we review the complaint holistically, as the district court did, to\\ndetermine βwhether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a\\nstrong inference of scienter,β Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 323. The district court\\ncorrectly pointed out that βPlaintiffs ask this Court to assume scienter based\\nsolely on the importance of FracMax to Flotekβs business, Defendantsβ positions\\nwithin the company, and the fact that the alleged βmistakeβ happened in a way\\nthat made Flotekβs core product, CnF, look more profitable.β We agree that\\nsuch allegations are insufficient to raise a strong inference of scienter and, at\\nmost, indicate βsimple or even inexcusable negligence,β a lesser showing than\\nis required here. See Rosenzweig, 332 F.3d at 866. This conclusion is further\\nbuttressed by Plaintiffsβ pervasive use of group pleadingβreferring generally\\nto βDefendantsβ rather than specific individualsβa practice this court has\\nexpressly rejected. See Shaw, 537 F.3d at 533 (β[T]his court has rejected the\\ngroup pleading approach to scienter and instead looks to the state of mind of\\nthe individual corporate official or officials.β). For these reasons, the district\\ncourtβs holistic analysis was also correct.\\n IV\\n Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred by dismissing their\\nSection 20(a) claims against the individual defendants for control-person\\nliability. βControl person liability is secondary only and cannot exist in the\\nabsence of a primary violation.β Southland, 365 F.3d at 383. Because Plaintiffs\\nhave not established a primary violation, their Section 20(a) claims fail.\\n ***\\n For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":595,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588860,"string":"4,588,860"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry KELLY, Also Known as T.K., Defendant-Appellant."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Terry Kelly"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-60133"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Duncan, Engelhardt\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133 United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 8, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\\n\\n\\n PlaintiffβAppellee,\\n\\nversus\\n\\nTERRY KELLY, Also Known as T.K.,\\n\\n DefendantβAppellant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Mississippi\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBefore SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\\nJERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Terry Kelly pleaded guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1) and enhanced per the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct (βACCAβ), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e) (2012). As part of his plea agreement, Kelly\\nagreed to an appeal waiver, yet he appeals.\\n\\n Kelly raises two issues. First, he asserts that the district court plainly\\nerred in applying the ACCA enhancement because he lacks the requisite\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nnumber of violent felony predicates. Second, he claims that he received in-\\neffective assistance of counsel (βIACβ), resulting in an increased term of impris-\\nonment. Because Kellyβs ACCA enhancement claim is barred by his appeal\\nwaiver and his IAC claim is not ripe for review on direct appeal, we dismiss\\nthe appeal as to both claims.\\n\\n I.\\n Police searched Kellyβs house after receiving information that stolen\\nproperty might be there. During the search, officers discovered that Kelly, a\\nconvicted felon, was in possession of two rifles, hence the indictment. 1\\n\\n Kelly and his lawyer signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead\\nguilty to the one-count indictment in exchange for the governmentβs agreement\\nβnot to charge [him] with any other offenses known by the [g]overnment arising\\nfrom or related to the above charges.β As part of the deal, Kelly agreed to a\\nwaiver of appeals and collateral attacks, which stated,\\n WAIVER OF APPEALS AND COLLATERAL ATTACKS: Defen-\\n dant hereby expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the con-\\n viction in this case, on any ground whatsoever, including but not\\n limited to the grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742. Defendant\\n also hereby expressly waives all rights to contest or collaterally at-\\n tack the conviction in any post-conviction proceeding, including\\n but not limited to a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255,\\n excepting only allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and\\n prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant waives these rights in ex-\\n change for the concessions and recommendations made by the\\n United States in this plea agreement.\\n The district court held a Rule 11 plea hearing. In addition to discussing\\nthe charge and the related enhancement, the court emphasized Kellyβs appeal\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). The indictment listed three of Kellyβs previous\\nfelony convictions, including burglary of a dwelling, burglary, and shooting into an occupied\\ndwelling.\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nwaiver: β[D]o you, in particular, understand that by entering into the Plea\\nAgreement and entering a guilty plea, you will waive all rights to appeal your\\nconviction on any ground and to collaterally attack your conviction except for\\nallegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct?β\\nKelly answered in the affirmative (βYes, maβam.β), acknowledging that he\\nunderstood his plea agreement and the related appeal waiver.\\n\\n After the guilty plea, the government filed a U.S.S.G. Β§ 5K1.1 motion on\\nbehalf of Kelly for his substantial assistance with a RICO investigation against\\nthe Aryan Brotherhood of Mississippi. 2 The district court granted the Β§ 5K1.1\\nmotion and imposed a 100-month term of imprisonment plus five years of\\nsupervised release. The sentence imposed was below both the ACCA minimum\\nof fifteen years and the recommended guideline range of 180 to 188 months.\\nAt sentencing, Kelly again affirmed that he βexpressly waive[d] any and all\\nrightsβ to appeal or collaterally attack βthe conviction or sentence imposed\\n. . . except [as] to claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective\\nassistance of counsel relating to the validity of the waiver of appeal or the\\nvalidity of the guilty plea itself.β\\n\\n After sentencing, however, Kelly raised an IAC claim, which prompted\\nhis trial counsel to withdraw. This court assigned the Federal Public Defender\\nto represent Kelly on appeal and granted Kellyβs unopposed motion for leave\\nto file an untimely notice of appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n Kelly raises two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court\\n\\n\\n 2 In its Β§ 5K1.1 motion, the government noted that, inter alia, βKelly showed courage\\nby sitting on the stand across from two individuals who had the authority within [the Aryan\\nBrotherhood of Mississippi] to order that he be killed. And he testified truthfully and pro-\\nvided the government with substantial assistance . . . in secur[ing] conviction at that trial for\\nthe two defendants who [Kelly] testified against.β\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nplainly erred in applying the ACCA enhancement. Second, he claims IAC.\\nBefore analyzing either claim, we must address the applicability and scope of\\nthe appeal waiver.\\n\\n A.\\n βThis court reviews de novo whether an appeal waiver bars an appeal.β\\nUnited States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2014). βA criminal defendant\\nmay waive his statutory right to appeal in a valid plea agreement.β United\\nStates v. Pleitez, 876 F.3d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 2017). When deciding βwhether\\nan appeal of a sentence is barred by an appeal waiver provision in a plea agree-\\nment, we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the waiver was knowing and\\nvoluntary and (2) whether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand,\\nbased on the plain language of the agreement.β United States v. Bond,\\n414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, β[a] defendant must know\\nthat he had a βright to appeal his sentence and that he was giving up that\\nright.ββ United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, β[a]\\nwaiver is both knowing and voluntary if the defendant indicates that he read\\nand understood the agreement and the agreement contains an βexplicit, un-\\nambiguous waiver of appeal.ββ Keele, 755 F.3d at 754 (quoting United States v.\\nMcKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005)). But, as acknowledged in the\\nplea agreement, βa defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited\\ngrounds that the waiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β United States\\nv. White, 307 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2002).\\n\\n βWe apply normal principles of contract interpretation when construing\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nplea agreements.β 3 When determining βwhether an appeal waiver applies to\\nthe issues presented, this [c]ourt βascertain[s] the ordinary meaning of the\\nwaiver provision,ββ Pleitez, 876 F.3d at 156 (quoting United States v. Jacobs,\\n635 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011)), and βconstrue[s] appeal waivers narrowly\\n. . . against the government,β id. (quoting United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d\\n484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006)). Nonetheless, β[t]he government has a strong and\\nlegitimate interest in both the finality of convictions and in the enforcement of\\nplea bargains.β United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1998).\\n\\n B.\\n With respect to his ACCA claim, Kelly concedes in his reply brief that\\nβthere is a strong presumption for finding the waiver enforceable, as he . . .\\nknowingly and voluntarily plea[ded] guilty and the language in the plea is suf-\\nficiently clear.β Kelly, however, tempers this admission by further asserting\\nthat βhe would not have [pleaded] guilty had he known there was a potential\\nchallengeβ to the ACCA enhancement under recent Supreme Court caselaw.\\nAccordingly, Kelly contends that he βknowingly and voluntarily agreed to plead\\nguilty, but only under the premise that there were no meritorious arguments\\nto be made regarding the ACCA enhancement.β\\n\\n In response, the government asserts that the waiver (1) was knowing\\nand voluntary and (2) bars the ACCA issue Kelly raises on appeal. The govern-\\nment maintains that β[w]here the plea agreement contains an unambiguous\\nwaiver signed by the defendant, and the defendant states during the Rule 11\\nplea colloquy that he has read and understood [the] agreement, the waiver is\\nconsidered knowing and voluntary.β The government further asserts that\\n\\n\\n 3 McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746; see also United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 304 (5th\\nCir. 1999) (β[W]e apply general principles of contract law in order to interpret the terms of\\nthe plea agreement.β).\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nKelly knew that βhe had a right to appeal his sentence and that he was giving\\nup that rightβ (quoting Portillo, 18 F.3d at 292). The government posits that\\nβ[i]t is plain, based on his signing the plea agreement and his two declarations\\nto the district judge, that Kelly was well aware of his right to appeal and vol-\\nuntarily waived that right.β 4\\n\\n Turning to the second prong, the government claims that β[Kellyβs] chal-\\nlenge to the ACCA enhancement is clearly barred because it does not fall\\nwithin the Fifth Circuitβs exceptions to enforcement of a validly executed\\nwaiver.β 5 Consequently, the waiver is enforceable and bars Kellyβs appeal of\\nthis issue.\\n\\n We must determine whether Kellyβs waiver was knowing and voluntary\\nand βwhether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the\\nplain language of the plea agreement.β McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746. The waiver\\nsays that β[d]efendant hereby expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the\\nconviction in this case, on any ground whatsoever . . . .β 6 At the plea hearing,\\nthe court asked Kelly whether he βunderst[ood] that by entering into the Plea\\nAgreement and entering a guilty plea, [he] waive[d] all rights to appeal [his]\\nconviction on any ground and to collaterally attack [his] conviction except for\\nallegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.β 7\\nKelly replied, βYes, maβam.β\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (βSolemn declarations in open court\\ncarry a strong presumption of verity.β).\\n 5 The government concedes, however, that Kellyβs IAC claim is not barred by this\\ncourtβs precedent, but βonly to the extent that his claim challenges the validity of [the]\\nwaiver.β\\n 6The waiver further states that β[d]efendant waives these rights in exchange for the\\nconcessions and recommendations made by the United States in this plea agreement.β\\n 7 Kelly also answered affirmatively when asked whether he βunderst[ood] the terms\\nof the Plea Agreement and the Plea Supplement.β\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\n At the sentencing hearing, the court again discussed, at some length, the\\nscope and terms of Kellyβs appeal waiver, stating,\\n The defendant expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the\\n conviction or sentence imposed in this case, pursuant to his Plea\\n Agreement, and the manner in which sentence was imposed on any\\n ground whatsoever, including, but not limited to, the grounds set\\n forth in [18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742] except [as] to claims relating to prose-\\n cutorial misconduct and [IAC] relating to the validity of the waiver\\n of appeal or the validity of the guilty plea itself. The defendant\\n also expressly waives all rights to contest or collaterally attack the\\n conviction and/or sentence and the manner in which the sentence\\n was imposed in any post-conviction proceeding, including, but not\\n limited to, a motion brought pursuant to [28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255] except\\n [as] to claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct and [IAC]\\n relating to the validity of the waiver of appeal or the validity of the\\n guilty plea itself.\\nThe district court next asked Kelly whether he understood his sentence as spe-\\ncified by the court. Again, Kelly affirmatively acknowledged his understanding\\nof the sentence (including the related terms of his plea agreement) by stating\\nβYes, maβam.β 8\\n\\n Kellyβs waiver was both knowing and voluntary because the record dem-\\nonstrates that βhe [both] read and understood the agreement, which include[d]\\nan explicit, unambiguous waiver of appeal.β Bond, 414 F.3d at 544; see also\\nKeele, 755 F.3d at 754β56; McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746. Moreover, the waiver\\napplies to all of Kellyβs potential claimsβincluding a challenge to the applica-\\ntion of the ACCA enhancementβexcept those concerning prosecutorial mis-\\nconduct or IAC. Accordingly, although Kelly may not pursue his ACCA claimβ\\nit is barred by the clear terms of his appeal waiverβhe may appeal his IAC\\nclaim, under the terms of the plea agreement, and under this courtβs precedent\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Kelly also confirmed that he did not βhave any questions about any matter related\\nto [his] sentence or any part of [the sentencing] proceeding.β\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nthat βa defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited grounds that the\\nwaiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β White, 307 F.3d at 339; see also\\nUnited States v. Henderson, 72 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995).\\n\\n III.\\n A.\\n In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687β96 (1984), the Court out-\\nlined a two-pronged test for determining whether counselβs performance was\\nineffective. 9 First, β[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of [IAC], the\\ndefendant must show that counselβs representation fell below an objective stan-\\ndard of reasonableness.β Id. at 687β88. Second, βany deficiencies in counselβs\\nperformance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute [IAC]\\nunder the Constitution.β Id. at 692. Nonetheless, β[b]ecause of the difficulties\\ninherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption\\nthat counselβs conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional\\nassistance . . . .β Id. at 689. 10 A defendantβs right to effective assistance of\\ncounsel extends to the plea-bargaining process. 11\\n\\n β[A] defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited grounds that\\nthe waiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β White, 307 F.3d at 339; see\\nalso Henderson, 72 F.3d at 465. Nonetheless, β[t]he general rule in this circuit\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 See also Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2008) (βA defendantβs Sixth Amendment\\nright to counsel is violated if: (1) his counselβs performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient\\nperformance prejudiced his defense.β).\\n 10βA fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to\\neliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counselβs\\nchallenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counselβs perspective at the time.β\\nWashington, 466 U.S. at 689.\\n 11 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (βDuring plea negotiations defendants are\\nβentitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.ββ (quoting McMann v. Richardson,\\n397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140β44 (2012).\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nis that a claim of [IAC] cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has\\nnot been raised before the district court since no opportunity existed to develop\\nthe record on the merits of the allegations.β United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d\\n312, 313β14 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Gulley, 526 F.3d at 821. Consequently,\\nβ[o]nly in those rare occasions where the record is sufficiently developed will\\n[this] court undertake to consider claims of inadequate representation on direct\\nappeal.β Gulley, 526 F.3d at 821. Ultimately, unless we can βfairly evaluate\\nthe claim from the record, we must decline to consider the issue without preju-\\ndice to a defendantβs right to raise it in a subsequent proceeding.β Id. 12\\n\\n B.\\n Kelly contends that β[t]his is one of those rare casesβ in which the record\\nis sufficiently developed to allow us to reach the merits of his IAC claim on\\ndirect appeal. Turning to the Washington factors, Kelly asserts that β[t]he\\nmere failure [of trial counsel] to challenge [his] prior convictions post-Johnson\\nand Mathis was deficient performance and severely prejudiced [him].β Kelly\\nfurther maintains that β[f]ailing to keep current on Supreme Court cases and\\nrelevant circuit court precedent is deficient performance,β especially given that\\nboth precedents βwere easily accessible and gravely important to challenging\\nthe ACCA enhancement.β 13 Accordingly, β[n]o sound trial strategy can be rea-\\nsoned for not objecting to the [ACCA] enhancement at the infancy of the case\\nor at sentencing,β and his trial counselβs performance should be deemed defici-\\nent because βit falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.β\\n\\n Kelly also asserts that he was prejudiced by his counselβs deficient\\n\\n\\n 12See also United States v. Villegas-Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (βWe\\ndo not review a claim of [IAC] on direct appeal unless the district court has first addressed it\\nor unless the record is sufficiently developed to allow us to evaluate the claim on its merits.β).\\n 13Kelly notes that Johnson was released before both his change-of-plea hearing and\\nsentencing, while Mathis was released before sentencing.\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nperformance. He acknowledges that he βbears the burden of demonstrating\\n. . . βthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counselβs errors, he would\\nnot have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trialββ (quoting\\nHill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Kelly maintains that had the ACCA\\nenhancement not been applied, βhe would have faced a substantially lower\\nguidelines range which would have led to a plea agreement without the ACCA\\nenhancement.β Kelly claims that β[i]nstead of a fifteen-year mandatory mini-\\nmum and a suggested [g]uidelines range of 180β188 months,β he would have\\nfaced a range of 46β57 months even before the court granted the Β§ 5K1.1\\nmotion. 14 Moreover, had his trial counsel been effective, βKelly would have\\nbeen able to preserve his objection to the [ACCA] enhancement,β thereby also\\nproviding the benefit of de novo, rather than plain error, review.\\n\\n In response, the government contends that the record in the district\\ncourt is insufficient to determine whether trial counselβs plea strategy was\\nsound. Highlighting circuit precedent, the government maintains that β[i]f\\n[this] [c]ourt cannot make the determination on the record before it, it should\\ndismiss the claim without prejudice and allow the defendant to raise it in\\nanother proceeding where the record can be developed.β β[F]ar from being a\\nrare case ripe for direct review,β the government asserts that βKellyβs [IAC]\\nclaim begs for further factual development.β\\n\\n The government likewise challenges the assumption that βhad [Kellyβs]\\ncounsel raised the issues he now [raises] on appeal, he would have gotten a\\nbetter result,β contending that such an approach βoverlooks a variety of\\n\\n\\n\\n 14The government disputes this claim, maintaining that β[t]here are . . . uncertainties\\nas to what Kellyβs guideline range would be if he was not a violent offender under the ACCA.\\nKelly recalculates his guideline range assuming that both of his violent felonies should be\\ndiscounted; however, if [only] one violent felony is discounted . . . then his guideline range\\nwould be higher than he estimates.β\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\npractical considerations that may have affected his sentence.β Ultimately, the\\ngovernment maintains that βthe [c]ourt can only speculate as to why Kellyβs\\ncounsel chose not to object to the ACCA enhancementβ and urges that we βdis-\\nmiss [the IAC] claim without prejudice [so that] Kelly [may] pursue it in the\\ntrial court.β\\n\\n At bottom, Kellyβs IAC claim was not sufficiently developed. Although\\nhe raised the issue in a pro se habeas corpus petition that he filed in the district\\ncourt after sentencing, the court dismissed it without prejudice for lack of jur-\\nisdiction because βKellyβs direct appeal [was] pending.β The court did not hold\\na hearing on the claim.\\n\\n Ultimately, much like the defendant in Gulley, Kellyβs βclaim is not ripe\\nfor review because βthe district court did not hold a hearing and the record does\\nnot provide sufficient detail about trial counselβs conduct and motivations to\\nallow this court to make a fair evaluation of the merits of [his] claim.ββ Gulley,\\n526 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 503 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir.\\n2007)). Here, as in Higdon, 832 F.3d at 314, we βcan only speculate on the\\nbasis for defense counselβs actionsβ because there is no discussion in the record\\nconcerning trial counselβs rationale for making his strategic choices, including\\nthe decision not to challenge the ACCA enhancement. Accordingly, Kellyβs IAC\\nclaim is not ripe for review on direct appeal.\\n\\n In sum, because Kellyβs ACCA enhancement claim is barred by the\\nappeal waiver, and his IAC claim is not ripe for review on direct appeal, the\\nappeal is DISMISSED, but without prejudice to Kellyβs right to raise IAC on\\ncollateral review. See United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366113/\", \"author_raw\": \"JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DUNCAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ENGELHARDT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588860/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry KELLY, Also Known as T.K., Defendant-Appellant.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-60133 United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n February 8, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\n\n\n PlaintiffβAppellee,\n\nversus\n\nTERRY KELLY, Also Known as T.K.,\n\n DefendantβAppellant.\n\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Mississippi\n\n\n\n\nBefore SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\nJERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\n\n Terry Kelly pleaded guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1) and enhanced per the Armed Career Criminal\nAct (βACCAβ), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e) (2012). As part of his plea agreement, Kelly\nagreed to an appeal waiver, yet he appeals.\n\n Kelly raises two issues. First, he asserts that the district court plainly\nerred in applying the ACCA enhancement because he lacks the requisite\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\nnumber of violent felony predicates. Second, he claims that he received in-\neffective assistance of counsel (βIACβ), resulting in an increased term of impris-\nonment. Because Kellyβs ACCA enhancement claim is barred by his appeal\nwaiver and his IAC claim is not ripe for review on direct appeal, we dismiss\nthe appeal as to both claims.\n\n I.\n Police searched Kellyβs house after receiving information that stolen\nproperty might be there. During the search, officers discovered that Kelly, a\nconvicted felon, was in possession of two rifles, hence the indictment. 1\n\n Kelly and his lawyer signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead\nguilty to the one-count indictment in exchange for the governmentβs agreement\nβnot to charge [him] with any other offenses known by the [g]overnment arising\nfrom or related to the above charges.β As part of the deal, Kelly agreed to a\nwaiver of appeals and collateral attacks, which stated,\n WAIVER OF APPEALS AND COLLATERAL ATTACKS: Defen-\n dant hereby expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the con-\n viction in this case, on any ground whatsoever, including but not\n limited to the grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742. Defendant\n also hereby expressly waives all rights to contest or collaterally at-\n tack the conviction in any post-conviction proceeding, including\n but not limited to a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255,\n excepting only allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and\n prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant waives these rights in ex-\n change for the concessions and recommendations made by the\n United States in this plea agreement.\n The district court held a Rule 11 plea hearing. In addition to discussing\nthe charge and the related enhancement, the court emphasized Kellyβs appeal\n\n\n\n 1 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). The indictment listed three of Kellyβs previous\nfelony convictions, including burglary of a dwelling, burglary, and shooting into an occupied\ndwelling.\n 2\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\nwaiver: β[D]o you, in particular, understand that by entering into the Plea\nAgreement and entering a guilty plea, you will waive all rights to appeal your\nconviction on any ground and to collaterally attack your conviction except for\nallegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct?β\nKelly answered in the affirmative (βYes, maβam.β), acknowledging that he\nunderstood his plea agreement and the related appeal waiver.\n\n After the guilty plea, the government filed a U.S.S.G. Β§ 5K1.1 motion on\nbehalf of Kelly for his substantial assistance with a RICO investigation against\nthe Aryan Brotherhood of Mississippi. 2 The district court granted the Β§ 5K1.1\nmotion and imposed a 100-month term of imprisonment plus five years of\nsupervised release. The sentence imposed was below both the ACCA minimum\nof fifteen years and the recommended guideline range of 180 to 188 months.\nAt sentencing, Kelly again affirmed that he βexpressly waive[d] any and all\nrightsβ to appeal or collaterally attack βthe conviction or sentence imposed\n. . . except [as] to claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective\nassistance of counsel relating to the validity of the waiver of appeal or the\nvalidity of the guilty plea itself.β\n\n After sentencing, however, Kelly raised an IAC claim, which prompted\nhis trial counsel to withdraw. This court assigned the Federal Public Defender\nto represent Kelly on appeal and granted Kellyβs unopposed motion for leave\nto file an untimely notice of appeal.\n\n II.\n Kelly raises two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court\n\n\n 2 In its Β§ 5K1.1 motion, the government noted that, inter alia, βKelly showed courage\nby sitting on the stand across from two individuals who had the authority within [the Aryan\nBrotherhood of Mississippi] to order that he be killed. And he testified truthfully and pro-\nvided the government with substantial assistance . . . in secur[ing] conviction at that trial for\nthe two defendants who [Kelly] testified against.β\n 3\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\nplainly erred in applying the ACCA enhancement. Second, he claims IAC.\nBefore analyzing either claim, we must address the applicability and scope of\nthe appeal waiver.\n\n A.\n βThis court reviews de novo whether an appeal waiver bars an appeal.β\nUnited States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2014). βA criminal defendant\nmay waive his statutory right to appeal in a valid plea agreement.β United\nStates v. Pleitez, 876 F.3d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 2017). When deciding βwhether\nan appeal of a sentence is barred by an appeal waiver provision in a plea agree-\nment, we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the waiver was knowing and\nvoluntary and (2) whether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand,\nbased on the plain language of the agreement.β United States v. Bond,\n414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005).\n\n For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, β[a] defendant must know\nthat he had a βright to appeal his sentence and that he was giving up that\nright.ββ United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting\nUnited States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, β[a]\nwaiver is both knowing and voluntary if the defendant indicates that he read\nand understood the agreement and the agreement contains an βexplicit, un-\nambiguous waiver of appeal.ββ Keele, 755 F.3d at 754 (quoting United States v.\nMcKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005)). But, as acknowledged in the\nplea agreement, βa defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited\ngrounds that the waiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β United States\nv. White, 307 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2002).\n\n βWe apply normal principles of contract interpretation when construing\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\nplea agreements.β 3 When determining βwhether an appeal waiver applies to\nthe issues presented, this [c]ourt βascertain[s] the ordinary meaning of the\nwaiver provision,ββ Pleitez, 876 F.3d at 156 (quoting United States v. Jacobs,\n635 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011)), and βconstrue[s] appeal waivers narrowly\n. . . against the government,β id. (quoting United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d\n484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006)). Nonetheless, β[t]he government has a strong and\nlegitimate interest in both the finality of convictions and in the enforcement of\nplea bargains.β United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1998).\n\n B.\n With respect to his ACCA claim, Kelly concedes in his reply brief that\nβthere is a strong presumption for finding the waiver enforceable, as he . . .\nknowingly and voluntarily plea[ded] guilty and the language in the plea is suf-\nficiently clear.β Kelly, however, tempers this admission by further asserting\nthat βhe would not have [pleaded] guilty had he known there was a potential\nchallengeβ to the ACCA enhancement under recent Supreme Court caselaw.\nAccordingly, Kelly contends that he βknowingly and voluntarily agreed to plead\nguilty, but only under the premise that there were no meritorious arguments\nto be made regarding the ACCA enhancement.β\n\n In response, the government asserts that the waiver (1) was knowing\nand voluntary and (2) bars the ACCA issue Kelly raises on appeal. The govern-\nment maintains that β[w]here the plea agreement contains an unambiguous\nwaiver signed by the defendant, and the defendant states during the Rule 11\nplea colloquy that he has read and understood [the] agreement, the waiver is\nconsidered knowing and voluntary.β The government further asserts that\n\n\n 3 McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746; see also United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 304 (5th\nCir. 1999) (β[W]e apply general principles of contract law in order to interpret the terms of\nthe plea agreement.β).\n 5\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\nKelly knew that βhe had a right to appeal his sentence and that he was giving\nup that rightβ (quoting Portillo, 18 F.3d at 292). The government posits that\nβ[i]t is plain, based on his signing the plea agreement and his two declarations\nto the district judge, that Kelly was well aware of his right to appeal and vol-\nuntarily waived that right.β 4\n\n Turning to the second prong, the government claims that β[Kellyβs] chal-\nlenge to the ACCA enhancement is clearly barred because it does not fall\nwithin the Fifth Circuitβs exceptions to enforcement of a validly executed\nwaiver.β 5 Consequently, the waiver is enforceable and bars Kellyβs appeal of\nthis issue.\n\n We must determine whether Kellyβs waiver was knowing and voluntary\nand βwhether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the\nplain language of the plea agreement.β McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746. The waiver\nsays that β[d]efendant hereby expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the\nconviction in this case, on any ground whatsoever . . . .β 6 At the plea hearing,\nthe court asked Kelly whether he βunderst[ood] that by entering into the Plea\nAgreement and entering a guilty plea, [he] waive[d] all rights to appeal [his]\nconviction on any ground and to collaterally attack [his] conviction except for\nallegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.β 7\nKelly replied, βYes, maβam.β\n\n\n\n 4 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (βSolemn declarations in open court\ncarry a strong presumption of verity.β).\n 5 The government concedes, however, that Kellyβs IAC claim is not barred by this\ncourtβs precedent, but βonly to the extent that his claim challenges the validity of [the]\nwaiver.β\n 6The waiver further states that β[d]efendant waives these rights in exchange for the\nconcessions and recommendations made by the United States in this plea agreement.β\n 7 Kelly also answered affirmatively when asked whether he βunderst[ood] the terms\nof the Plea Agreement and the Plea Supplement.β\n 6\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\n At the sentencing hearing, the court again discussed, at some length, the\nscope and terms of Kellyβs appeal waiver, stating,\n The defendant expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the\n conviction or sentence imposed in this case, pursuant to his Plea\n Agreement, and the manner in which sentence was imposed on any\n ground whatsoever, including, but not limited to, the grounds set\n forth in [18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742] except [as] to claims relating to prose-\n cutorial misconduct and [IAC] relating to the validity of the waiver\n of appeal or the validity of the guilty plea itself. The defendant\n also expressly waives all rights to contest or collaterally attack the\n conviction and/or sentence and the manner in which the sentence\n was imposed in any post-conviction proceeding, including, but not\n limited to, a motion brought pursuant to [28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255] except\n [as] to claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct and [IAC]\n relating to the validity of the waiver of appeal or the validity of the\n guilty plea itself.\nThe district court next asked Kelly whether he understood his sentence as spe-\ncified by the court. Again, Kelly affirmatively acknowledged his understanding\nof the sentence (including the related terms of his plea agreement) by stating\nβYes, maβam.β 8\n\n Kellyβs waiver was both knowing and voluntary because the record dem-\nonstrates that βhe [both] read and understood the agreement, which include[d]\nan explicit, unambiguous waiver of appeal.β Bond, 414 F.3d at 544; see also\nKeele, 755 F.3d at 754β56; McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746. Moreover, the waiver\napplies to all of Kellyβs potential claimsβincluding a challenge to the applica-\ntion of the ACCA enhancementβexcept those concerning prosecutorial mis-\nconduct or IAC. Accordingly, although Kelly may not pursue his ACCA claimβ\nit is barred by the clear terms of his appeal waiverβhe may appeal his IAC\nclaim, under the terms of the plea agreement, and under this courtβs precedent\n\n\n\n 8 Kelly also confirmed that he did not βhave any questions about any matter related\nto [his] sentence or any part of [the sentencing] proceeding.β\n 7\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\nthat βa defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited grounds that the\nwaiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β White, 307 F.3d at 339; see also\nUnited States v. Henderson, 72 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995).\n\n III.\n A.\n In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687β96 (1984), the Court out-\nlined a two-pronged test for determining whether counselβs performance was\nineffective. 9 First, β[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of [IAC], the\ndefendant must show that counselβs representation fell below an objective stan-\ndard of reasonableness.β Id. at 687β88. Second, βany deficiencies in counselβs\nperformance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute [IAC]\nunder the Constitution.β Id. at 692. Nonetheless, β[b]ecause of the difficulties\ninherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption\nthat counselβs conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional\nassistance . . . .β Id. at 689. 10 A defendantβs right to effective assistance of\ncounsel extends to the plea-bargaining process. 11\n\n β[A] defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited grounds that\nthe waiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β White, 307 F.3d at 339; see\nalso Henderson, 72 F.3d at 465. Nonetheless, β[t]he general rule in this circuit\n\n\n\n 9 See also Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2008) (βA defendantβs Sixth Amendment\nright to counsel is violated if: (1) his counselβs performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient\nperformance prejudiced his defense.β).\n 10βA fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to\neliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counselβs\nchallenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counselβs perspective at the time.β\nWashington, 466 U.S. at 689.\n 11 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (βDuring plea negotiations defendants are\nβentitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.ββ (quoting McMann v. Richardson,\n397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140β44 (2012).\n 8\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\nis that a claim of [IAC] cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has\nnot been raised before the district court since no opportunity existed to develop\nthe record on the merits of the allegations.β United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d\n312, 313β14 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Gulley, 526 F.3d at 821. Consequently,\nβ[o]nly in those rare occasions where the record is sufficiently developed will\n[this] court undertake to consider claims of inadequate representation on direct\nappeal.β Gulley, 526 F.3d at 821. Ultimately, unless we can βfairly evaluate\nthe claim from the record, we must decline to consider the issue without preju-\ndice to a defendantβs right to raise it in a subsequent proceeding.β Id. 12\n\n B.\n Kelly contends that β[t]his is one of those rare casesβ in which the record\nis sufficiently developed to allow us to reach the merits of his IAC claim on\ndirect appeal. Turning to the Washington factors, Kelly asserts that β[t]he\nmere failure [of trial counsel] to challenge [his] prior convictions post-Johnson\nand Mathis was deficient performance and severely prejudiced [him].β Kelly\nfurther maintains that β[f]ailing to keep current on Supreme Court cases and\nrelevant circuit court precedent is deficient performance,β especially given that\nboth precedents βwere easily accessible and gravely important to challenging\nthe ACCA enhancement.β 13 Accordingly, β[n]o sound trial strategy can be rea-\nsoned for not objecting to the [ACCA] enhancement at the infancy of the case\nor at sentencing,β and his trial counselβs performance should be deemed defici-\nent because βit falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.β\n\n Kelly also asserts that he was prejudiced by his counselβs deficient\n\n\n 12See also United States v. Villegas-Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (βWe\ndo not review a claim of [IAC] on direct appeal unless the district court has first addressed it\nor unless the record is sufficiently developed to allow us to evaluate the claim on its merits.β).\n 13Kelly notes that Johnson was released before both his change-of-plea hearing and\nsentencing, while Mathis was released before sentencing.\n 9\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\nperformance. He acknowledges that he βbears the burden of demonstrating\n. . . βthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counselβs errors, he would\nnot have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trialββ (quoting\nHill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Kelly maintains that had the ACCA\nenhancement not been applied, βhe would have faced a substantially lower\nguidelines range which would have led to a plea agreement without the ACCA\nenhancement.β Kelly claims that β[i]nstead of a fifteen-year mandatory mini-\nmum and a suggested [g]uidelines range of 180β188 months,β he would have\nfaced a range of 46β57 months even before the court granted the Β§ 5K1.1\nmotion. 14 Moreover, had his trial counsel been effective, βKelly would have\nbeen able to preserve his objection to the [ACCA] enhancement,β thereby also\nproviding the benefit of de novo, rather than plain error, review.\n\n In response, the government contends that the record in the district\ncourt is insufficient to determine whether trial counselβs plea strategy was\nsound. Highlighting circuit precedent, the government maintains that β[i]f\n[this] [c]ourt cannot make the determination on the record before it, it should\ndismiss the claim without prejudice and allow the defendant to raise it in\nanother proceeding where the record can be developed.β β[F]ar from being a\nrare case ripe for direct review,β the government asserts that βKellyβs [IAC]\nclaim begs for further factual development.β\n\n The government likewise challenges the assumption that βhad [Kellyβs]\ncounsel raised the issues he now [raises] on appeal, he would have gotten a\nbetter result,β contending that such an approach βoverlooks a variety of\n\n\n\n 14The government disputes this claim, maintaining that β[t]here are . . . uncertainties\nas to what Kellyβs guideline range would be if he was not a violent offender under the ACCA.\nKelly recalculates his guideline range assuming that both of his violent felonies should be\ndiscounted; however, if [only] one violent felony is discounted . . . then his guideline range\nwould be higher than he estimates.β\n 10\n\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-60133\npractical considerations that may have affected his sentence.β Ultimately, the\ngovernment maintains that βthe [c]ourt can only speculate as to why Kellyβs\ncounsel chose not to object to the ACCA enhancementβ and urges that we βdis-\nmiss [the IAC] claim without prejudice [so that] Kelly [may] pursue it in the\ntrial court.β\n\n At bottom, Kellyβs IAC claim was not sufficiently developed. Although\nhe raised the issue in a pro se habeas corpus petition that he filed in the district\ncourt after sentencing, the court dismissed it without prejudice for lack of jur-\nisdiction because βKellyβs direct appeal [was] pending.β The court did not hold\na hearing on the claim.\n\n Ultimately, much like the defendant in Gulley, Kellyβs βclaim is not ripe\nfor review because βthe district court did not hold a hearing and the record does\nnot provide sufficient detail about trial counselβs conduct and motivations to\nallow this court to make a fair evaluation of the merits of [his] claim.ββ Gulley,\n526 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 503 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir.\n2007)). Here, as in Higdon, 832 F.3d at 314, we βcan only speculate on the\nbasis for defense counselβs actionsβ because there is no discussion in the record\nconcerning trial counselβs rationale for making his strategic choices, including\nthe decision not to challenge the ACCA enhancement. Accordingly, Kellyβs IAC\nclaim is not ripe for review on direct appeal.\n\n In sum, because Kellyβs ACCA enhancement claim is barred by the\nappeal waiver, and his IAC claim is not ripe for review on direct appeal, the\nappeal is DISMISSED, but without prejudice to Kellyβs right to raise IAC on\ncollateral review. See United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).\n\n\n\n\n 11\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry KELLY, Also Known as T.K., Defendant-Appellant.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133 United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n February 8, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\\n\\n\\n PlaintiffβAppellee,\\n\\nversus\\n\\nTERRY KELLY, Also Known as T.K.,\\n\\n DefendantβAppellant.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Mississippi\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBefore SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\\nJERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n Terry Kelly pleaded guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in\\nviolation of 18 U.S.C. Β§ 922(g)(1) and enhanced per the Armed Career Criminal\\nAct (βACCAβ), 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(e) (2012). As part of his plea agreement, Kelly\\nagreed to an appeal waiver, yet he appeals.\\n\\n Kelly raises two issues. First, he asserts that the district court plainly\\nerred in applying the ACCA enhancement because he lacks the requisite\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nnumber of violent felony predicates. Second, he claims that he received in-\\neffective assistance of counsel (βIACβ), resulting in an increased term of impris-\\nonment. Because Kellyβs ACCA enhancement claim is barred by his appeal\\nwaiver and his IAC claim is not ripe for review on direct appeal, we dismiss\\nthe appeal as to both claims.\\n\\n I.\\n Police searched Kellyβs house after receiving information that stolen\\nproperty might be there. During the search, officers discovered that Kelly, a\\nconvicted felon, was in possession of two rifles, hence the indictment. 1\\n\\n Kelly and his lawyer signed a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead\\nguilty to the one-count indictment in exchange for the governmentβs agreement\\nβnot to charge [him] with any other offenses known by the [g]overnment arising\\nfrom or related to the above charges.β As part of the deal, Kelly agreed to a\\nwaiver of appeals and collateral attacks, which stated,\\n WAIVER OF APPEALS AND COLLATERAL ATTACKS: Defen-\\n dant hereby expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the con-\\n viction in this case, on any ground whatsoever, including but not\\n limited to the grounds set forth in 18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742. Defendant\\n also hereby expressly waives all rights to contest or collaterally at-\\n tack the conviction in any post-conviction proceeding, including\\n but not limited to a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255,\\n excepting only allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and\\n prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant waives these rights in ex-\\n change for the concessions and recommendations made by the\\n United States in this plea agreement.\\n The district court held a Rule 11 plea hearing. In addition to discussing\\nthe charge and the related enhancement, the court emphasized Kellyβs appeal\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). The indictment listed three of Kellyβs previous\\nfelony convictions, including burglary of a dwelling, burglary, and shooting into an occupied\\ndwelling.\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nwaiver: β[D]o you, in particular, understand that by entering into the Plea\\nAgreement and entering a guilty plea, you will waive all rights to appeal your\\nconviction on any ground and to collaterally attack your conviction except for\\nallegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct?β\\nKelly answered in the affirmative (βYes, maβam.β), acknowledging that he\\nunderstood his plea agreement and the related appeal waiver.\\n\\n After the guilty plea, the government filed a U.S.S.G. Β§ 5K1.1 motion on\\nbehalf of Kelly for his substantial assistance with a RICO investigation against\\nthe Aryan Brotherhood of Mississippi. 2 The district court granted the Β§ 5K1.1\\nmotion and imposed a 100-month term of imprisonment plus five years of\\nsupervised release. The sentence imposed was below both the ACCA minimum\\nof fifteen years and the recommended guideline range of 180 to 188 months.\\nAt sentencing, Kelly again affirmed that he βexpressly waive[d] any and all\\nrightsβ to appeal or collaterally attack βthe conviction or sentence imposed\\n. . . except [as] to claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective\\nassistance of counsel relating to the validity of the waiver of appeal or the\\nvalidity of the guilty plea itself.β\\n\\n After sentencing, however, Kelly raised an IAC claim, which prompted\\nhis trial counsel to withdraw. This court assigned the Federal Public Defender\\nto represent Kelly on appeal and granted Kellyβs unopposed motion for leave\\nto file an untimely notice of appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n Kelly raises two issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court\\n\\n\\n 2 In its Β§ 5K1.1 motion, the government noted that, inter alia, βKelly showed courage\\nby sitting on the stand across from two individuals who had the authority within [the Aryan\\nBrotherhood of Mississippi] to order that he be killed. And he testified truthfully and pro-\\nvided the government with substantial assistance . . . in secur[ing] conviction at that trial for\\nthe two defendants who [Kelly] testified against.β\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nplainly erred in applying the ACCA enhancement. Second, he claims IAC.\\nBefore analyzing either claim, we must address the applicability and scope of\\nthe appeal waiver.\\n\\n A.\\n βThis court reviews de novo whether an appeal waiver bars an appeal.β\\nUnited States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2014). βA criminal defendant\\nmay waive his statutory right to appeal in a valid plea agreement.β United\\nStates v. Pleitez, 876 F.3d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 2017). When deciding βwhether\\nan appeal of a sentence is barred by an appeal waiver provision in a plea agree-\\nment, we conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the waiver was knowing and\\nvoluntary and (2) whether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand,\\nbased on the plain language of the agreement.β United States v. Bond,\\n414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005).\\n\\n For a waiver to be knowing and voluntary, β[a] defendant must know\\nthat he had a βright to appeal his sentence and that he was giving up that\\nright.ββ United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting\\nUnited States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, β[a]\\nwaiver is both knowing and voluntary if the defendant indicates that he read\\nand understood the agreement and the agreement contains an βexplicit, un-\\nambiguous waiver of appeal.ββ Keele, 755 F.3d at 754 (quoting United States v.\\nMcKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2005)). But, as acknowledged in the\\nplea agreement, βa defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited\\ngrounds that the waiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β United States\\nv. White, 307 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 2002).\\n\\n βWe apply normal principles of contract interpretation when construing\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nplea agreements.β 3 When determining βwhether an appeal waiver applies to\\nthe issues presented, this [c]ourt βascertain[s] the ordinary meaning of the\\nwaiver provision,ββ Pleitez, 876 F.3d at 156 (quoting United States v. Jacobs,\\n635 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2011)), and βconstrue[s] appeal waivers narrowly\\n. . . against the government,β id. (quoting United States v. Palmer, 456 F.3d\\n484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006)). Nonetheless, β[t]he government has a strong and\\nlegitimate interest in both the finality of convictions and in the enforcement of\\nplea bargains.β United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1998).\\n\\n B.\\n With respect to his ACCA claim, Kelly concedes in his reply brief that\\nβthere is a strong presumption for finding the waiver enforceable, as he . . .\\nknowingly and voluntarily plea[ded] guilty and the language in the plea is suf-\\nficiently clear.β Kelly, however, tempers this admission by further asserting\\nthat βhe would not have [pleaded] guilty had he known there was a potential\\nchallengeβ to the ACCA enhancement under recent Supreme Court caselaw.\\nAccordingly, Kelly contends that he βknowingly and voluntarily agreed to plead\\nguilty, but only under the premise that there were no meritorious arguments\\nto be made regarding the ACCA enhancement.β\\n\\n In response, the government asserts that the waiver (1) was knowing\\nand voluntary and (2) bars the ACCA issue Kelly raises on appeal. The govern-\\nment maintains that β[w]here the plea agreement contains an unambiguous\\nwaiver signed by the defendant, and the defendant states during the Rule 11\\nplea colloquy that he has read and understood [the] agreement, the waiver is\\nconsidered knowing and voluntary.β The government further asserts that\\n\\n\\n 3 McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746; see also United States v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 304 (5th\\nCir. 1999) (β[W]e apply general principles of contract law in order to interpret the terms of\\nthe plea agreement.β).\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nKelly knew that βhe had a right to appeal his sentence and that he was giving\\nup that rightβ (quoting Portillo, 18 F.3d at 292). The government posits that\\nβ[i]t is plain, based on his signing the plea agreement and his two declarations\\nto the district judge, that Kelly was well aware of his right to appeal and vol-\\nuntarily waived that right.β 4\\n\\n Turning to the second prong, the government claims that β[Kellyβs] chal-\\nlenge to the ACCA enhancement is clearly barred because it does not fall\\nwithin the Fifth Circuitβs exceptions to enforcement of a validly executed\\nwaiver.β 5 Consequently, the waiver is enforceable and bars Kellyβs appeal of\\nthis issue.\\n\\n We must determine whether Kellyβs waiver was knowing and voluntary\\nand βwhether the waiver applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the\\nplain language of the plea agreement.β McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746. The waiver\\nsays that β[d]efendant hereby expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the\\nconviction in this case, on any ground whatsoever . . . .β 6 At the plea hearing,\\nthe court asked Kelly whether he βunderst[ood] that by entering into the Plea\\nAgreement and entering a guilty plea, [he] waive[d] all rights to appeal [his]\\nconviction on any ground and to collaterally attack [his] conviction except for\\nallegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct.β 7\\nKelly replied, βYes, maβam.β\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (βSolemn declarations in open court\\ncarry a strong presumption of verity.β).\\n 5 The government concedes, however, that Kellyβs IAC claim is not barred by this\\ncourtβs precedent, but βonly to the extent that his claim challenges the validity of [the]\\nwaiver.β\\n 6The waiver further states that β[d]efendant waives these rights in exchange for the\\nconcessions and recommendations made by the United States in this plea agreement.β\\n 7 Kelly also answered affirmatively when asked whether he βunderst[ood] the terms\\nof the Plea Agreement and the Plea Supplement.β\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\n At the sentencing hearing, the court again discussed, at some length, the\\nscope and terms of Kellyβs appeal waiver, stating,\\n The defendant expressly waives any and all rights to appeal the\\n conviction or sentence imposed in this case, pursuant to his Plea\\n Agreement, and the manner in which sentence was imposed on any\\n ground whatsoever, including, but not limited to, the grounds set\\n forth in [18 U.S.C. Β§ 3742] except [as] to claims relating to prose-\\n cutorial misconduct and [IAC] relating to the validity of the waiver\\n of appeal or the validity of the guilty plea itself. The defendant\\n also expressly waives all rights to contest or collaterally attack the\\n conviction and/or sentence and the manner in which the sentence\\n was imposed in any post-conviction proceeding, including, but not\\n limited to, a motion brought pursuant to [28 U.S.C. Β§ 2255] except\\n [as] to claims relating to prosecutorial misconduct and [IAC]\\n relating to the validity of the waiver of appeal or the validity of the\\n guilty plea itself.\\nThe district court next asked Kelly whether he understood his sentence as spe-\\ncified by the court. Again, Kelly affirmatively acknowledged his understanding\\nof the sentence (including the related terms of his plea agreement) by stating\\nβYes, maβam.β 8\\n\\n Kellyβs waiver was both knowing and voluntary because the record dem-\\nonstrates that βhe [both] read and understood the agreement, which include[d]\\nan explicit, unambiguous waiver of appeal.β Bond, 414 F.3d at 544; see also\\nKeele, 755 F.3d at 754β56; McKinney, 406 F.3d at 746. Moreover, the waiver\\napplies to all of Kellyβs potential claimsβincluding a challenge to the applica-\\ntion of the ACCA enhancementβexcept those concerning prosecutorial mis-\\nconduct or IAC. Accordingly, although Kelly may not pursue his ACCA claimβ\\nit is barred by the clear terms of his appeal waiverβhe may appeal his IAC\\nclaim, under the terms of the plea agreement, and under this courtβs precedent\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Kelly also confirmed that he did not βhave any questions about any matter related\\nto [his] sentence or any part of [the sentencing] proceeding.β\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nthat βa defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited grounds that the\\nwaiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β White, 307 F.3d at 339; see also\\nUnited States v. Henderson, 72 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995).\\n\\n III.\\n A.\\n In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687β96 (1984), the Court out-\\nlined a two-pronged test for determining whether counselβs performance was\\nineffective. 9 First, β[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of [IAC], the\\ndefendant must show that counselβs representation fell below an objective stan-\\ndard of reasonableness.β Id. at 687β88. Second, βany deficiencies in counselβs\\nperformance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute [IAC]\\nunder the Constitution.β Id. at 692. Nonetheless, β[b]ecause of the difficulties\\ninherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption\\nthat counselβs conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional\\nassistance . . . .β Id. at 689. 10 A defendantβs right to effective assistance of\\ncounsel extends to the plea-bargaining process. 11\\n\\n β[A] defendant may always avoid a waiver on the limited grounds that\\nthe waiver of appeal itself was tainted by [IAC].β White, 307 F.3d at 339; see\\nalso Henderson, 72 F.3d at 465. Nonetheless, β[t]he general rule in this circuit\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 See also Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 821 (5th Cir. 2008) (βA defendantβs Sixth Amendment\\nright to counsel is violated if: (1) his counselβs performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient\\nperformance prejudiced his defense.β).\\n 10βA fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to\\neliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counselβs\\nchallenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counselβs perspective at the time.β\\nWashington, 466 U.S. at 689.\\n 11 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (βDuring plea negotiations defendants are\\nβentitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.ββ (quoting McMann v. Richardson,\\n397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140β44 (2012).\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nis that a claim of [IAC] cannot be resolved on direct appeal when the claim has\\nnot been raised before the district court since no opportunity existed to develop\\nthe record on the merits of the allegations.β United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d\\n312, 313β14 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Gulley, 526 F.3d at 821. Consequently,\\nβ[o]nly in those rare occasions where the record is sufficiently developed will\\n[this] court undertake to consider claims of inadequate representation on direct\\nappeal.β Gulley, 526 F.3d at 821. Ultimately, unless we can βfairly evaluate\\nthe claim from the record, we must decline to consider the issue without preju-\\ndice to a defendantβs right to raise it in a subsequent proceeding.β Id. 12\\n\\n B.\\n Kelly contends that β[t]his is one of those rare casesβ in which the record\\nis sufficiently developed to allow us to reach the merits of his IAC claim on\\ndirect appeal. Turning to the Washington factors, Kelly asserts that β[t]he\\nmere failure [of trial counsel] to challenge [his] prior convictions post-Johnson\\nand Mathis was deficient performance and severely prejudiced [him].β Kelly\\nfurther maintains that β[f]ailing to keep current on Supreme Court cases and\\nrelevant circuit court precedent is deficient performance,β especially given that\\nboth precedents βwere easily accessible and gravely important to challenging\\nthe ACCA enhancement.β 13 Accordingly, β[n]o sound trial strategy can be rea-\\nsoned for not objecting to the [ACCA] enhancement at the infancy of the case\\nor at sentencing,β and his trial counselβs performance should be deemed defici-\\nent because βit falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.β\\n\\n Kelly also asserts that he was prejudiced by his counselβs deficient\\n\\n\\n 12See also United States v. Villegas-Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (βWe\\ndo not review a claim of [IAC] on direct appeal unless the district court has first addressed it\\nor unless the record is sufficiently developed to allow us to evaluate the claim on its merits.β).\\n 13Kelly notes that Johnson was released before both his change-of-plea hearing and\\nsentencing, while Mathis was released before sentencing.\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\nperformance. He acknowledges that he βbears the burden of demonstrating\\n. . . βthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counselβs errors, he would\\nnot have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trialββ (quoting\\nHill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Kelly maintains that had the ACCA\\nenhancement not been applied, βhe would have faced a substantially lower\\nguidelines range which would have led to a plea agreement without the ACCA\\nenhancement.β Kelly claims that β[i]nstead of a fifteen-year mandatory mini-\\nmum and a suggested [g]uidelines range of 180β188 months,β he would have\\nfaced a range of 46β57 months even before the court granted the Β§ 5K1.1\\nmotion. 14 Moreover, had his trial counsel been effective, βKelly would have\\nbeen able to preserve his objection to the [ACCA] enhancement,β thereby also\\nproviding the benefit of de novo, rather than plain error, review.\\n\\n In response, the government contends that the record in the district\\ncourt is insufficient to determine whether trial counselβs plea strategy was\\nsound. Highlighting circuit precedent, the government maintains that β[i]f\\n[this] [c]ourt cannot make the determination on the record before it, it should\\ndismiss the claim without prejudice and allow the defendant to raise it in\\nanother proceeding where the record can be developed.β β[F]ar from being a\\nrare case ripe for direct review,β the government asserts that βKellyβs [IAC]\\nclaim begs for further factual development.β\\n\\n The government likewise challenges the assumption that βhad [Kellyβs]\\ncounsel raised the issues he now [raises] on appeal, he would have gotten a\\nbetter result,β contending that such an approach βoverlooks a variety of\\n\\n\\n\\n 14The government disputes this claim, maintaining that β[t]here are . . . uncertainties\\nas to what Kellyβs guideline range would be if he was not a violent offender under the ACCA.\\nKelly recalculates his guideline range assuming that both of his violent felonies should be\\ndiscounted; however, if [only] one violent felony is discounted . . . then his guideline range\\nwould be higher than he estimates.β\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-60133\\npractical considerations that may have affected his sentence.β Ultimately, the\\ngovernment maintains that βthe [c]ourt can only speculate as to why Kellyβs\\ncounsel chose not to object to the ACCA enhancementβ and urges that we βdis-\\nmiss [the IAC] claim without prejudice [so that] Kelly [may] pursue it in the\\ntrial court.β\\n\\n At bottom, Kellyβs IAC claim was not sufficiently developed. Although\\nhe raised the issue in a pro se habeas corpus petition that he filed in the district\\ncourt after sentencing, the court dismissed it without prejudice for lack of jur-\\nisdiction because βKellyβs direct appeal [was] pending.β The court did not hold\\na hearing on the claim.\\n\\n Ultimately, much like the defendant in Gulley, Kellyβs βclaim is not ripe\\nfor review because βthe district court did not hold a hearing and the record does\\nnot provide sufficient detail about trial counselβs conduct and motivations to\\nallow this court to make a fair evaluation of the merits of [his] claim.ββ Gulley,\\n526 F.3d at 821 (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 503 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir.\\n2007)). Here, as in Higdon, 832 F.3d at 314, we βcan only speculate on the\\nbasis for defense counselβs actionsβ because there is no discussion in the record\\nconcerning trial counselβs rationale for making his strategic choices, including\\nthe decision not to challenge the ACCA enhancement. Accordingly, Kellyβs IAC\\nclaim is not ripe for review on direct appeal.\\n\\n In sum, because Kellyβs ACCA enhancement claim is barred by the\\nappeal waiver, and his IAC claim is not ripe for review on direct appeal, the\\nappeal is DISMISSED, but without prejudice to Kellyβs right to raise IAC on\\ncollateral review. See United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":596,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588862,"string":"4,588,862"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jennifer Lynn RICHMOND, Defendant - Appellant"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jennifer Richmond"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-40299"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Graves, Costa, Bennett\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 17-40299 February 8, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\nv.\\n\\nJENNIFER LYNN RICHMOND,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore GRAVES and COSTA, Circuit Judges and BENNETT, District Judge.*\\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\\n During a traffic stop, a state trooper pushed his fingers against the\\nvehicleβs tire to try and confirm his suspicion that it contained more than just\\nair. We conclude that the brief physical examination of the tire was subject to\\nthe Fourth Amendment under the recently revived trespass test for deciding\\nwhat is a search. The search was a reasonable one, however, because there\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n * District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nwas probable cause to believe the loose tire posed a safety risk.\\n I.\\n A\\n Texas State Trooper Manuel Gonzales was patrolling U.S. Highway 77\\nin south Texas when he saw a blue pickup Jennifer Richmond was driving. He\\ndrove alongside the truck and saw that the tires were βshaking,β βwobbly,β and\\nβunbalanced.β He was concerned that the tires were a potential danger to the\\npublic. After the truck drove across the fog line between the right lane and the\\nshoulder of the highway, Gonzales initiated a traffic stop. When the vehicle\\ncame to a stop, Gonzales saw that one of the truckβs brake lights was broken.\\nHe ran the license plate and learned the truck was registered two days earlier\\nin nearby Brownsville.\\n When he approached the vehicle, Gonzales explained the reason for the\\nstopβthat Richmond crossed the fog lineβand also told her about the brake\\nlight. Richmond apologized and, without prompting, stated that she was from\\nArizona. She avoided eye contact, and Gonzales noticed that her hands were\\nβtrembling,β her mouth was βdry,β and her lips had βa white coating.β\\n In response to questioning, Richmond said that she was from Tucson but\\nwas traveling to Brownsville, where she was moving with her husband.\\nGonzales asked Richmond to exit the truck so that he could show her the\\nbroken brake light. Richmond complied.\\n As Gonzales walked to the rear of the truck, he looked at the passenger-\\nside rear tire and observed that the bolts βhad been stripped as [if] they had\\nbeen taken off numerous times.β\\n This is when the challenged conduct occurred. Gonzales pushed on the\\ntire with his hand. The resulting sound was not what βa normal tire with airβ\\nwould produce; instead there was a βsolid thumping noiseβ that indicated\\nsomething besides air was inside. Gonzales, who already was concerned about\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nthe tires because he had seen them bouncing before the stop, became more\\nsuspicious that they might contain drugs.\\n After tapping the tire, Gonzales resumed asking Richmond about her\\npersonal history and itinerary. She could not readily recall her age, date of\\nbirth, or husbandβs name. Richmond asserted that she was traveling to Dallas\\nto visit a friend, but did not know the friendβs phone number or address.\\nStranger still, she said she intended to use Google to learn the friendβs address\\nand would return home if that search came up empty.\\n When Gonzales went back to his car to check Richmondβs license and the\\nvehicleβs registration, he discovered that, contrary to her story about driving\\nfrom Arizona, the truck had entered Mexico the day before. It had crossed\\nback into the United States only a few hours before the traffic stop.\\n Gonzalez then obtained Richmondβs consent to search the truck. After\\nfinding suspicious items inside the vehicle, Gonzales βlet some air out [of the\\ntires] and [ ] smelled some kind of chemical cleaning odor coming out of them.β\\nAt least one of the tires did not release air. Gonzales checked beneath the\\ntruck and saw βfingerprints [ ] on the inside of . . . the rimsβ and an atypical\\namount of weight placed on the tires to try to balance them. When he removed\\nthe tires, they seemed unusually heavy and solid.\\n Gonzales decided to take the truck to a local car dealership and have the\\ntires examined. Technicians at the dealership discovered secret compartments\\nthat contained methamphetamine.\\n B\\n After being charged with trafficking that meth, Richmond tried to\\nsuppress its discovery. She challenged the lawfulness of the stop and its\\nlength. The district court rejected those arguments, concluding that\\nreasonable suspicion of a traffic violation supported the stop and that\\nRichmondβs suspicious statements and demeanor raised sufficient concerns\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nabout drug trafficking to support extending the stop for the additional time\\nthat resulted in her consenting to the search.\\n After the motion was denied, Richmond entered a guilty plea that\\nallowed her to appeal the suppression ruling. Before sentencing, Richmond\\nfiled an amended motion to suppress that argued for the first time that\\nGonzalesβs tap of her tire was a search not supported by probable cause. At\\nthe sentencing hearing, the district court considered but rejected Richmondβs\\namended motion because βas the law stands now, tapping tires is not a search.β\\nThe district court noted that it would permit Richmond to appeal the tire tap\\nissue along with her original Fourth Amendment claims in light of her\\nconditional guilty plea.\\n II.\\n Richmond no longer challenges the initial stop or that there was\\nreasonable suspicion of drug trafficking to extend the stop until the point when\\nGonzales physically examined the tire. And in not challenging events after\\nGonzales learned that the tire likely contained more than just air, Richmond\\napparently acknowledges that discovery justified further investigation into the\\ntrafficking up until when she consented to a full search. 1\\n So the tap of the tire is the focus of this appeal. Richmond contends that\\nit was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. That is the\\ncase, she says, because touching the tire was a trespass which counts as a\\nsearch under recent Supreme Court cases. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.\\n1, 5 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404β07 & n.3 (2012).\\n The government counters that we have previously held that similar law\\nenforcement conduct is not a search. In United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The government does not dispute Richmondβs premise that an unlawful search of the\\ntire would have tainted the investigation that followed, including her consent.\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nF.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1990), a border patrol agent used a pocket knife to tap the\\nside of a propane tank mounted in the bed of a pickup. Id. at 1432. We\\nacknowledged that the tapping βmay have constituted a technical trespass,β id.\\nat 1435, but explained that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), had\\nβrejected the notion that what constitutes a trespass under various property\\nlaws necessarily constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.β 894 F.2d\\nat 1434. Instead, the then-prevailing Katz testβwhich came not from the\\nmajority opinion but from Justice Harlanβs concurrenceβasked whether the\\nperson challenging a search had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item\\nbeing examined. 2 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360β61 (Harlan, J.,\\nconcurring)). The answer was βnoβ for the owner of the tapped propane tank\\nbecause he βsurely . . . must have reasonably expected that someone, such as a\\ngasoline station attendant, might lean against the tank or touch it in some\\nmanner.β Id at 1435.\\n That expectation of contact is even greater for a vehicleβs tire as it is\\nroutinely checked for air pressure. So Muniz-Melcher binds us on the\\nβreasonable expectation of privacyβ question. Richmond did not have a\\nreasonable basis to believe that the tire would not be touched.\\n But a precedent binds us only as far as it goes. See Brecht v. Abrahmson,\\n507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993) (explaining that an opinion is not binding on a\\nquestion it βnever squarely addressedβ). Richmond contends that Muniz-\\nMelcher did not decide whether tapping part of a vehicle was a search under a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2Katzβs focus on privacy marked a reversal in allowing electronic eavesdropping to be\\ntreated as a search even when it does not involve physical penetration into an individualβs\\nproperty. 389 U.S. at 352β53 (overruling Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), and\\nOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)); see also Orin Kerr, The Curious History of\\nFourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 85 (recognizing that pre-Katz cases had\\nβeventually focus[ed] on physical penetration into a protected space as the primary test for a\\nFourth Amendment searchβ even if trespass was not the focus).\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\ntrespass theory because, as the opinion recognized, at that time a physical\\nintrusion did not on its own constitute a search.\\n We agree. Katz held that β[t]he premise that property interests control\\nthe right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.β 389\\nU.S. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). In the\\ndecades that followed, a trespass did not automatically amount to a search.\\nSee United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (β[A]n actual trespass is\\nneither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.β); Oliver\\nv. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183β84 (1984) (holding that narcotics agent\\nsearching for marijuana in the open fields of a farm was not a search even\\nthough it was a trespass). But in 2012, United States v. Jones revived the\\nproperty approach that most, including our court, thought Katz had\\njettisoned. 3 565 U.S. at 400. In explaining why a search occurred when law\\nenforcement placed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a car, the\\nCourt relied on βthe common-law trespassory test,β which it treated as a\\nseparate basis for finding a search alongside the Katz βreasonable expectation\\nof privacyβ test. 565 U.S. at 409.\\n Lower courts recognized Jones as a sea change. See, e.g., United States\\nv. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.) (explaining\\nthat that there is now βreason to wonderβ about the vitality of a 1984 Supreme\\nCourt decision after βJones held that the Katz formula is but one way to\\ndetermine if a . . . βsearchβ has taken placeβ); United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d\\n893, 899 (7th Cir. 2016) (βIn recent years, the Supreme Court has revived a\\nβproperty-based approachβ to identify unconstitutional searches.β); United\\n\\n\\n 3A prominent Fourth Amendment scholar contends that Jones did not so much revive\\nthe property-based approach as invent it. Kerr, supra note 2, at 68 (reaching βthe surprising\\nconclusion that no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz eraβ). That historical account is\\neven more problematic for the governmentβs view that a trespass test has always governed\\nFourth Amendment law, including when Muniz-Melcher was decided.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nStates v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (explaining that\\nβJones fundamentally altered [the] legal landscape by revivingβafter a forty-\\nfive year hibernationβthe Supreme Courtβs trespass theoryβ). So did Fourth\\nAmendment scholars. 4 The leading treatise on searches had to add a new\\nchapter to its section on βProtected Areas and Interests.β The title of the\\naddition? βTrespass as an alternate theory.β Compare Wayne R. LaFave et\\nal., 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT Β§ 2.1(e) (5th\\ned. 2012) (explaining that although Katz βseemed to sound the death knell for\\nthe pre-Katz βtrespassβ approach,β the βdoctrine re-emerged as an alternate\\ntheory to the Katz expectation-of-privacy testβ), with id. Β§ 2.1 (4th ed. 2004) (no\\nsubsection on trespass). The most colorful description of Jonesβs revival of the\\ntrespass approach was the comment that β[i]t turns out that approach was not\\ndead, just taking a really long nap.β John P. Elwood & Eric A. White, What\\nWere They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October Term 2011, 15\\nGREEN BAG 2D 405, 409 (2012).\\n Jones thus requires us to consider the trespass test that Muniz-Melchor\\ndid not think was sufficient to establish a search but now is. Even under Jones,\\nhowever, a trespass does not get a defendant all the way to characterizing\\npolice conduct as a search. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5. Consistent with the\\nmeaning of βsearch,β a trespass βmust be conjoinedβ with βan attempt to find\\nsomething or obtain information.β Id.; see also id. at 404 (describing the\\n\\n\\n 4 The notion that the trespass test had remained part of the post-Katz Fourth\\nAmendment inquiry βcame as a surprise to every student and scholar of the Fourth\\nAmendment.β Kerr, supra note 2, at 68 n.5. The titles of numerous post-Jones articles reflect\\nthis view that the decision restored a property-based approach that had been dormant since\\nKatz. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones: Return To Trespass-Good News Or\\nBad, 82 MISS. L.J. 879 (2013); Nancy Foster, Back to the Future: United States v. Jones\\nResuscitates Property Law Concepts in Fourth American Jurisprudence, 42 U. BALT. L. REV.\\n445 (2013); Herbert W. Titus & William J. Olson, United States v. Jones, Reviving the\\nProperty Foundation of the Fourth Amendment, 3 CASE W. RESERVE L.J. TECH. & INTERNET\\n243 (2012).\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\ngovernmentβs conduct as βphysically occup[ying] private property for the\\npurpose of obtaining informationβ). This prevents a mere physical touching,\\nsuch as when an officer leans on the door of a car while questioning its driver,\\nfrom being a search. Gonzalesβs tapping of the tire was not that type of\\nincidental conduct. He touched the tire in order to help find out what was\\ninside. That satisfies the second Jones requirement.\\n So whether the touching was a search comes down to whether it was a\\ntrespass. Muniz-Melchor thought tapping a tank βmay have constituted a\\ntechnical trespass,β but did not decide if that was the case. 894 F.2d at 1435.\\nIts βtechnicalβ qualifier may have come from the absence of damage to the tank,\\nwhich modern tort law requires for trespass to chattel. See Jones, 565 U.S. at\\n419 & n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting W. Keeton et al., PROSSER & KEETON\\nON LAW OF TORTS Β§ 14, at 87 (5th ed. 1984)). But in concluding that attaching\\na GPS to the exterior of a vehicle was a trespass, Jones relied on its reading of\\nthe common law of trespass as it existed in 1791 when the Fourth Amendment\\nwas ratified. 5 Id. at 404β05 (tying the Fourth Amendment to common law\\ntrespass and concluding that a βphysical intrusion would have been considered\\na βsearchβ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted)\\n(citing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)); id. at 419 & n.2\\n(Alito, J., concurring) (characterizing the common law for trespass to chattels\\nas requiring only a βviolation of βthe dignitary interest in the inviolability of\\nchattelsβ (quoting W. Keeton et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS Β§ 14,\\nat 87 (5th ed. 1984)). In terms of the physical intrusion, we see no difference\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 Professor Kerr also questions whether Jones got history right on this point. He\\nobserves that installing a device on the exterior of a car βis not an obvious case for trespass,β\\nas a βtrespass usually implies some sort of invasion into propertyβ beyond just touching it.\\nKerr, supra note 2, at 91.\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nbetween the Jones device touching the car and an officer touching the tire. 6\\nNor, apparently, does the government as it does not dispute that the tire tap\\nwas a trespass. Of course, the GPS device remained attached for a longer\\nperiod and gathered a lot more information compared to a tire tap, but Jones\\nfound a trespass because of the physical contact the device made with the car\\nat the moment it was affixed. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (focusing on the\\nβinstallation of a GPS deviceβ). Indeed, Justice Alitoβs opinion in Jones\\ncritiques the majorityβs trespass approach because it βlargely disregards what\\nis really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) and\\ninstead attaches great significance to something that most would view as\\nrelatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does\\nnot interfere in any way with the carβs operation).β Id. at 424β25 (Alito, J.,\\nconcurring). The also βrelatively minorβ act of tapping tires is thus a trespass.\\nBecause that trespass occurred to learn what was inside the tires, it qualifies\\nas a search.\\n This trespass analysis might seem simplistic. But proponents of the\\nproperty-based approach view its bright line as a virtue over the less\\npredictable expectation-of-privacy inquiry. 565 U.S. at 412β13 (noting the line-\\ndrawing problems that would arise from applying the Katz test to the GPS\\ntracking device); Erica Goldberg, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our\\nFaith in the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 68β\\n69 (2011) (suggesting that a property-based test provides a βclearer, cleaner\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Jones recognized this similarity in addressing Cardwell v. Jones, 417 U.S. 583\\n(1974), a case that found no Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement inspected\\nthe tread of a tire and collected paint scrapings from the exterior of a car. In Jones, the\\ngovernment argued that Cardwell supported its position that installation of the GPS tracker\\nwas not a search. The Court disagreed on the ground that the plurality opinion in Cardwell\\nwas βunclearβ about whether it ruled that way because there was no search or because the\\nsearch was a reasonable one supported by probable cause. Jones, 565 U.S. at n.7 (quoting\\nCardwell, 417 U.S. at 591β92).\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nmetric of when the Fourth Amendment is implicatedβ). It may also seem\\ntroubling that the brief touching of a tire reveals far less information than\\nother lawful conduct, like a dog sniff, that is not considered a search. See\\nIllinois v. Cabelles, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). That critique, however, views the\\nsearch question through the invasion-of-privacy mindset. Rightly or wrongly,\\nJones held that a trespassory search implicates the Fourth Amendment even\\nif it does not offend privacy interests. Under that property-based approach,\\nGonzalesβs tapping of the tire was a search regardless of how insignificant it\\nmight seem.\\n III.\\n Although the limited nature of the intrusion does not affect whether the\\nphysical examination of the tire is deemed a search, that is only the\\npreliminary Fourth Amendment question. The ultimate question is whether\\nthe governmentβs conduct was reasonable. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct.\\n530, 536 (2014). And in that analysis the extent of the intrusion on an\\nindividualβs Fourth Amendment interests is relevant. See, e.g., United States\\nv. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118β19 (2001) (explaining that the reasonableness of\\na search depends on balancing the governmental interest in the search against\\nthe degree of the intrusion on the individual). 7\\n The government first argues that a search of the tire complied with the\\nFourth Amendment because Gonzales had probable cause to believe drugs\\nwere inside. Probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband allows a\\nwarrantless search because of the carβs mobility. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S.\\n465, 467 (1999).\\n\\n\\n 7 The district court held that Gonzalez did not search the tire, but we may consider\\nthe reasonableness of the search because we may affirm the denial of a suppression ruling\\non any basis supported by the record. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 540 (5th Cir.\\n2011).\\n\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\n Did that probable cause exist before Gonzales tapped the tire? The\\ninformation Gonzales had by that timeβthe wobbly tires, stripped bolts,\\nRichmondβs nervousness, and the new registration on an older vehicle stopped\\nin a trafficking corridorβcertainly gave him the reasonable suspicion of drug\\ntrafficking needed to justify extending the traffic stop to investigate further.\\nUnited States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). But\\nprobable cause is a higher rung on the probability ladder than reasonable\\nsuspicion. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (explaining\\nthat the evidence required for reasonable suspicion βis obviously less than is\\nnecessary for probable causeβ (citation omitted)). Demonstrating the greater\\nshowing required for probable cause, evidence rising to that level would be\\nenough to have supported an arrest of Richmond for drug trafficking or a grand\\njury indictment charging that crime. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.\\n411 (1976) (holding that probable cause supports warrantless arrest of a\\nsuspect); U.S. CONST. amend. V. We doubt the information Gonzales had prior\\nto tapping the tire rose to that level.\\n But if probable cause of drug trafficking did not yet exist, the government\\nargues that the physical inspection of the tire served another interest:\\nβensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.β\\nIndeed, the wobbly tires, the truck veering outside its lane, and the stripped\\nbolts gave a reasonable officer probable cause to believe that the tire posed a\\nsafety risk. TEX. TRANSP. CODE Β§ 547.004(a) (making it a misdemeanor to\\noperate a vehicle that is βunsafe so as to endanger a personβ). On that basis,\\nthe tapping of the tire was justified. It does not matter that Gonzales also\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nwanted to find out if drugs were in the tire. See Whren v. United States, 517\\nU.S. 806, 813 (1996). 8\\n Pulling back from the discrete Fourth Amendment doctrines we have\\nexamined, finding no constitutional violation makes sense in terms of the\\noverall Fourth Amendment balance. The governmentβs interest in making sure\\nthat a loose tire does not pose a safety threat strongly outweighs the\\nintrusiveness of an officerβs tapping the tire for a second or two.\\n ***\\n The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Richmond argues that public safety must be an officerβs sole motivation when that\\nis the justification for the search, citing the pre-Whren cases of South Dakota v. Opperman,\\n428 U.S. 364 (1976), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Both of those cases\\ninvolved searches conducted as part of routine police procedures. Opperman, 482 U.S. at 369\\n(postimpoundment inventory search); Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 436 (post-tow search of trunk\\nconsistent with department policy to retrieve officerβs weapon). Whatever role subjective\\nmotivation plays in the context of regulatory searches, Whren says that intent does not\\nmatter for searches based on individualized suspicion. See Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d\\n546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009) (making this distinction between Whren and Dombrowski); cf.\\nMichigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (explaining that the βemergency aidβ exception to\\nthe Fourth Amendment βdoes not depend on the officerβs subjective intentβ). Suspicion\\nparticular to Richmondβprobable cause to believe the loose tires on her pickup posed a safety\\nriskβis the basis for finding the tap of the tire reasonable.\\n 12\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366115/\", \"author_raw\": \"GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"GRAVES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"COSTA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BENNETT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588862/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jennifer Lynn RICHMOND, Defendant - Appellant\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n No. 17-40299 February 8, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\n\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee\n\nv.\n\nJENNIFER LYNN RICHMOND,\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Texas\n\n\nBefore GRAVES and COSTA, Circuit Judges and BENNETT, District Judge.*\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\n During a traffic stop, a state trooper pushed his fingers against the\nvehicleβs tire to try and confirm his suspicion that it contained more than just\nair. We conclude that the brief physical examination of the tire was subject to\nthe Fourth Amendment under the recently revived trespass test for deciding\nwhat is a search. The search was a reasonable one, however, because there\n\n\n\n\n * District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\nwas probable cause to believe the loose tire posed a safety risk.\n I.\n A\n Texas State Trooper Manuel Gonzales was patrolling U.S. Highway 77\nin south Texas when he saw a blue pickup Jennifer Richmond was driving. He\ndrove alongside the truck and saw that the tires were βshaking,β βwobbly,β and\nβunbalanced.β He was concerned that the tires were a potential danger to the\npublic. After the truck drove across the fog line between the right lane and the\nshoulder of the highway, Gonzales initiated a traffic stop. When the vehicle\ncame to a stop, Gonzales saw that one of the truckβs brake lights was broken.\nHe ran the license plate and learned the truck was registered two days earlier\nin nearby Brownsville.\n When he approached the vehicle, Gonzales explained the reason for the\nstopβthat Richmond crossed the fog lineβand also told her about the brake\nlight. Richmond apologized and, without prompting, stated that she was from\nArizona. She avoided eye contact, and Gonzales noticed that her hands were\nβtrembling,β her mouth was βdry,β and her lips had βa white coating.β\n In response to questioning, Richmond said that she was from Tucson but\nwas traveling to Brownsville, where she was moving with her husband.\nGonzales asked Richmond to exit the truck so that he could show her the\nbroken brake light. Richmond complied.\n As Gonzales walked to the rear of the truck, he looked at the passenger-\nside rear tire and observed that the bolts βhad been stripped as [if] they had\nbeen taken off numerous times.β\n This is when the challenged conduct occurred. Gonzales pushed on the\ntire with his hand. The resulting sound was not what βa normal tire with airβ\nwould produce; instead there was a βsolid thumping noiseβ that indicated\nsomething besides air was inside. Gonzales, who already was concerned about\n 2\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\nthe tires because he had seen them bouncing before the stop, became more\nsuspicious that they might contain drugs.\n After tapping the tire, Gonzales resumed asking Richmond about her\npersonal history and itinerary. She could not readily recall her age, date of\nbirth, or husbandβs name. Richmond asserted that she was traveling to Dallas\nto visit a friend, but did not know the friendβs phone number or address.\nStranger still, she said she intended to use Google to learn the friendβs address\nand would return home if that search came up empty.\n When Gonzales went back to his car to check Richmondβs license and the\nvehicleβs registration, he discovered that, contrary to her story about driving\nfrom Arizona, the truck had entered Mexico the day before. It had crossed\nback into the United States only a few hours before the traffic stop.\n Gonzalez then obtained Richmondβs consent to search the truck. After\nfinding suspicious items inside the vehicle, Gonzales βlet some air out [of the\ntires] and [ ] smelled some kind of chemical cleaning odor coming out of them.β\nAt least one of the tires did not release air. Gonzales checked beneath the\ntruck and saw βfingerprints [ ] on the inside of . . . the rimsβ and an atypical\namount of weight placed on the tires to try to balance them. When he removed\nthe tires, they seemed unusually heavy and solid.\n Gonzales decided to take the truck to a local car dealership and have the\ntires examined. Technicians at the dealership discovered secret compartments\nthat contained methamphetamine.\n B\n After being charged with trafficking that meth, Richmond tried to\nsuppress its discovery. She challenged the lawfulness of the stop and its\nlength. The district court rejected those arguments, concluding that\nreasonable suspicion of a traffic violation supported the stop and that\nRichmondβs suspicious statements and demeanor raised sufficient concerns\n 3\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\nabout drug trafficking to support extending the stop for the additional time\nthat resulted in her consenting to the search.\n After the motion was denied, Richmond entered a guilty plea that\nallowed her to appeal the suppression ruling. Before sentencing, Richmond\nfiled an amended motion to suppress that argued for the first time that\nGonzalesβs tap of her tire was a search not supported by probable cause. At\nthe sentencing hearing, the district court considered but rejected Richmondβs\namended motion because βas the law stands now, tapping tires is not a search.β\nThe district court noted that it would permit Richmond to appeal the tire tap\nissue along with her original Fourth Amendment claims in light of her\nconditional guilty plea.\n II.\n Richmond no longer challenges the initial stop or that there was\nreasonable suspicion of drug trafficking to extend the stop until the point when\nGonzales physically examined the tire. And in not challenging events after\nGonzales learned that the tire likely contained more than just air, Richmond\napparently acknowledges that discovery justified further investigation into the\ntrafficking up until when she consented to a full search. 1\n So the tap of the tire is the focus of this appeal. Richmond contends that\nit was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. That is the\ncase, she says, because touching the tire was a trespass which counts as a\nsearch under recent Supreme Court cases. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.\n1, 5 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404β07 & n.3 (2012).\n The government counters that we have previously held that similar law\nenforcement conduct is not a search. In United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894\n\n\n\n 1 The government does not dispute Richmondβs premise that an unlawful search of the\ntire would have tainted the investigation that followed, including her consent.\n 4\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\nF.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1990), a border patrol agent used a pocket knife to tap the\nside of a propane tank mounted in the bed of a pickup. Id. at 1432. We\nacknowledged that the tapping βmay have constituted a technical trespass,β id.\nat 1435, but explained that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), had\nβrejected the notion that what constitutes a trespass under various property\nlaws necessarily constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.β 894 F.2d\nat 1434. Instead, the then-prevailing Katz testβwhich came not from the\nmajority opinion but from Justice Harlanβs concurrenceβasked whether the\nperson challenging a search had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item\nbeing examined. 2 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360β61 (Harlan, J.,\nconcurring)). The answer was βnoβ for the owner of the tapped propane tank\nbecause he βsurely . . . must have reasonably expected that someone, such as a\ngasoline station attendant, might lean against the tank or touch it in some\nmanner.β Id at 1435.\n That expectation of contact is even greater for a vehicleβs tire as it is\nroutinely checked for air pressure. So Muniz-Melcher binds us on the\nβreasonable expectation of privacyβ question. Richmond did not have a\nreasonable basis to believe that the tire would not be touched.\n But a precedent binds us only as far as it goes. See Brecht v. Abrahmson,\n507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993) (explaining that an opinion is not binding on a\nquestion it βnever squarely addressedβ). Richmond contends that Muniz-\nMelcher did not decide whether tapping part of a vehicle was a search under a\n\n\n\n\n 2Katzβs focus on privacy marked a reversal in allowing electronic eavesdropping to be\ntreated as a search even when it does not involve physical penetration into an individualβs\nproperty. 389 U.S. at 352β53 (overruling Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), and\nOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)); see also Orin Kerr, The Curious History of\nFourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 85 (recognizing that pre-Katz cases had\nβeventually focus[ed] on physical penetration into a protected space as the primary test for a\nFourth Amendment searchβ even if trespass was not the focus).\n 5\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\ntrespass theory because, as the opinion recognized, at that time a physical\nintrusion did not on its own constitute a search.\n We agree. Katz held that β[t]he premise that property interests control\nthe right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.β 389\nU.S. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). In the\ndecades that followed, a trespass did not automatically amount to a search.\nSee United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (β[A]n actual trespass is\nneither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.β); Oliver\nv. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183β84 (1984) (holding that narcotics agent\nsearching for marijuana in the open fields of a farm was not a search even\nthough it was a trespass). But in 2012, United States v. Jones revived the\nproperty approach that most, including our court, thought Katz had\njettisoned. 3 565 U.S. at 400. In explaining why a search occurred when law\nenforcement placed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a car, the\nCourt relied on βthe common-law trespassory test,β which it treated as a\nseparate basis for finding a search alongside the Katz βreasonable expectation\nof privacyβ test. 565 U.S. at 409.\n Lower courts recognized Jones as a sea change. See, e.g., United States\nv. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.) (explaining\nthat that there is now βreason to wonderβ about the vitality of a 1984 Supreme\nCourt decision after βJones held that the Katz formula is but one way to\ndetermine if a . . . βsearchβ has taken placeβ); United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d\n893, 899 (7th Cir. 2016) (βIn recent years, the Supreme Court has revived a\nβproperty-based approachβ to identify unconstitutional searches.β); United\n\n\n 3A prominent Fourth Amendment scholar contends that Jones did not so much revive\nthe property-based approach as invent it. Kerr, supra note 2, at 68 (reaching βthe surprising\nconclusion that no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz eraβ). That historical account is\neven more problematic for the governmentβs view that a trespass test has always governed\nFourth Amendment law, including when Muniz-Melcher was decided.\n 6\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\nStates v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (explaining that\nβJones fundamentally altered [the] legal landscape by revivingβafter a forty-\nfive year hibernationβthe Supreme Courtβs trespass theoryβ). So did Fourth\nAmendment scholars. 4 The leading treatise on searches had to add a new\nchapter to its section on βProtected Areas and Interests.β The title of the\naddition? βTrespass as an alternate theory.β Compare Wayne R. LaFave et\nal., 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT Β§ 2.1(e) (5th\ned. 2012) (explaining that although Katz βseemed to sound the death knell for\nthe pre-Katz βtrespassβ approach,β the βdoctrine re-emerged as an alternate\ntheory to the Katz expectation-of-privacy testβ), with id. Β§ 2.1 (4th ed. 2004) (no\nsubsection on trespass). The most colorful description of Jonesβs revival of the\ntrespass approach was the comment that β[i]t turns out that approach was not\ndead, just taking a really long nap.β John P. Elwood & Eric A. White, What\nWere They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October Term 2011, 15\nGREEN BAG 2D 405, 409 (2012).\n Jones thus requires us to consider the trespass test that Muniz-Melchor\ndid not think was sufficient to establish a search but now is. Even under Jones,\nhowever, a trespass does not get a defendant all the way to characterizing\npolice conduct as a search. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5. Consistent with the\nmeaning of βsearch,β a trespass βmust be conjoinedβ with βan attempt to find\nsomething or obtain information.β Id.; see also id. at 404 (describing the\n\n\n 4 The notion that the trespass test had remained part of the post-Katz Fourth\nAmendment inquiry βcame as a surprise to every student and scholar of the Fourth\nAmendment.β Kerr, supra note 2, at 68 n.5. The titles of numerous post-Jones articles reflect\nthis view that the decision restored a property-based approach that had been dormant since\nKatz. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones: Return To Trespass-Good News Or\nBad, 82 MISS. L.J. 879 (2013); Nancy Foster, Back to the Future: United States v. Jones\nResuscitates Property Law Concepts in Fourth American Jurisprudence, 42 U. BALT. L. REV.\n445 (2013); Herbert W. Titus & William J. Olson, United States v. Jones, Reviving the\nProperty Foundation of the Fourth Amendment, 3 CASE W. RESERVE L.J. TECH. & INTERNET\n243 (2012).\n 7\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\ngovernmentβs conduct as βphysically occup[ying] private property for the\npurpose of obtaining informationβ). This prevents a mere physical touching,\nsuch as when an officer leans on the door of a car while questioning its driver,\nfrom being a search. Gonzalesβs tapping of the tire was not that type of\nincidental conduct. He touched the tire in order to help find out what was\ninside. That satisfies the second Jones requirement.\n So whether the touching was a search comes down to whether it was a\ntrespass. Muniz-Melchor thought tapping a tank βmay have constituted a\ntechnical trespass,β but did not decide if that was the case. 894 F.2d at 1435.\nIts βtechnicalβ qualifier may have come from the absence of damage to the tank,\nwhich modern tort law requires for trespass to chattel. See Jones, 565 U.S. at\n419 & n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting W. Keeton et al., PROSSER & KEETON\nON LAW OF TORTS Β§ 14, at 87 (5th ed. 1984)). But in concluding that attaching\na GPS to the exterior of a vehicle was a trespass, Jones relied on its reading of\nthe common law of trespass as it existed in 1791 when the Fourth Amendment\nwas ratified. 5 Id. at 404β05 (tying the Fourth Amendment to common law\ntrespass and concluding that a βphysical intrusion would have been considered\na βsearchβ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted)\n(citing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)); id. at 419 & n.2\n(Alito, J., concurring) (characterizing the common law for trespass to chattels\nas requiring only a βviolation of βthe dignitary interest in the inviolability of\nchattelsβ (quoting W. Keeton et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS Β§ 14,\nat 87 (5th ed. 1984)). In terms of the physical intrusion, we see no difference\n\n\n\n\n 5 Professor Kerr also questions whether Jones got history right on this point. He\nobserves that installing a device on the exterior of a car βis not an obvious case for trespass,β\nas a βtrespass usually implies some sort of invasion into propertyβ beyond just touching it.\nKerr, supra note 2, at 91.\n 8\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\nbetween the Jones device touching the car and an officer touching the tire. 6\nNor, apparently, does the government as it does not dispute that the tire tap\nwas a trespass. Of course, the GPS device remained attached for a longer\nperiod and gathered a lot more information compared to a tire tap, but Jones\nfound a trespass because of the physical contact the device made with the car\nat the moment it was affixed. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (focusing on the\nβinstallation of a GPS deviceβ). Indeed, Justice Alitoβs opinion in Jones\ncritiques the majorityβs trespass approach because it βlargely disregards what\nis really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) and\ninstead attaches great significance to something that most would view as\nrelatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does\nnot interfere in any way with the carβs operation).β Id. at 424β25 (Alito, J.,\nconcurring). The also βrelatively minorβ act of tapping tires is thus a trespass.\nBecause that trespass occurred to learn what was inside the tires, it qualifies\nas a search.\n This trespass analysis might seem simplistic. But proponents of the\nproperty-based approach view its bright line as a virtue over the less\npredictable expectation-of-privacy inquiry. 565 U.S. at 412β13 (noting the line-\ndrawing problems that would arise from applying the Katz test to the GPS\ntracking device); Erica Goldberg, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our\nFaith in the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 68β\n69 (2011) (suggesting that a property-based test provides a βclearer, cleaner\n\n\n\n 6 Jones recognized this similarity in addressing Cardwell v. Jones, 417 U.S. 583\n(1974), a case that found no Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement inspected\nthe tread of a tire and collected paint scrapings from the exterior of a car. In Jones, the\ngovernment argued that Cardwell supported its position that installation of the GPS tracker\nwas not a search. The Court disagreed on the ground that the plurality opinion in Cardwell\nwas βunclearβ about whether it ruled that way because there was no search or because the\nsearch was a reasonable one supported by probable cause. Jones, 565 U.S. at n.7 (quoting\nCardwell, 417 U.S. at 591β92).\n 9\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\nmetric of when the Fourth Amendment is implicatedβ). It may also seem\ntroubling that the brief touching of a tire reveals far less information than\nother lawful conduct, like a dog sniff, that is not considered a search. See\nIllinois v. Cabelles, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). That critique, however, views the\nsearch question through the invasion-of-privacy mindset. Rightly or wrongly,\nJones held that a trespassory search implicates the Fourth Amendment even\nif it does not offend privacy interests. Under that property-based approach,\nGonzalesβs tapping of the tire was a search regardless of how insignificant it\nmight seem.\n III.\n Although the limited nature of the intrusion does not affect whether the\nphysical examination of the tire is deemed a search, that is only the\npreliminary Fourth Amendment question. The ultimate question is whether\nthe governmentβs conduct was reasonable. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct.\n530, 536 (2014). And in that analysis the extent of the intrusion on an\nindividualβs Fourth Amendment interests is relevant. See, e.g., United States\nv. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118β19 (2001) (explaining that the reasonableness of\na search depends on balancing the governmental interest in the search against\nthe degree of the intrusion on the individual). 7\n The government first argues that a search of the tire complied with the\nFourth Amendment because Gonzales had probable cause to believe drugs\nwere inside. Probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband allows a\nwarrantless search because of the carβs mobility. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S.\n465, 467 (1999).\n\n\n 7 The district court held that Gonzalez did not search the tire, but we may consider\nthe reasonableness of the search because we may affirm the denial of a suppression ruling\non any basis supported by the record. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 540 (5th Cir.\n2011).\n\n 10\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\n Did that probable cause exist before Gonzales tapped the tire? The\ninformation Gonzales had by that timeβthe wobbly tires, stripped bolts,\nRichmondβs nervousness, and the new registration on an older vehicle stopped\nin a trafficking corridorβcertainly gave him the reasonable suspicion of drug\ntrafficking needed to justify extending the traffic stop to investigate further.\nUnited States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). But\nprobable cause is a higher rung on the probability ladder than reasonable\nsuspicion. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (explaining\nthat the evidence required for reasonable suspicion βis obviously less than is\nnecessary for probable causeβ (citation omitted)). Demonstrating the greater\nshowing required for probable cause, evidence rising to that level would be\nenough to have supported an arrest of Richmond for drug trafficking or a grand\njury indictment charging that crime. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.\n411 (1976) (holding that probable cause supports warrantless arrest of a\nsuspect); U.S. CONST. amend. V. We doubt the information Gonzales had prior\nto tapping the tire rose to that level.\n But if probable cause of drug trafficking did not yet exist, the government\nargues that the physical inspection of the tire served another interest:\nβensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.β\nIndeed, the wobbly tires, the truck veering outside its lane, and the stripped\nbolts gave a reasonable officer probable cause to believe that the tire posed a\nsafety risk. TEX. TRANSP. CODE Β§ 547.004(a) (making it a misdemeanor to\noperate a vehicle that is βunsafe so as to endanger a personβ). On that basis,\nthe tapping of the tire was justified. It does not matter that Gonzales also\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40299\nwanted to find out if drugs were in the tire. See Whren v. United States, 517\nU.S. 806, 813 (1996). 8\n Pulling back from the discrete Fourth Amendment doctrines we have\nexamined, finding no constitutional violation makes sense in terms of the\noverall Fourth Amendment balance. The governmentβs interest in making sure\nthat a loose tire does not pose a safety threat strongly outweighs the\nintrusiveness of an officerβs tapping the tire for a second or two.\n ***\n The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 8 Richmond argues that public safety must be an officerβs sole motivation when that\nis the justification for the search, citing the pre-Whren cases of South Dakota v. Opperman,\n428 U.S. 364 (1976), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Both of those cases\ninvolved searches conducted as part of routine police procedures. Opperman, 482 U.S. at 369\n(postimpoundment inventory search); Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 436 (post-tow search of trunk\nconsistent with department policy to retrieve officerβs weapon). Whatever role subjective\nmotivation plays in the context of regulatory searches, Whren says that intent does not\nmatter for searches based on individualized suspicion. See Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d\n546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009) (making this distinction between Whren and Dombrowski); cf.\nMichigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (explaining that the βemergency aidβ exception to\nthe Fourth Amendment βdoes not depend on the officerβs subjective intentβ). Suspicion\nparticular to Richmondβprobable cause to believe the loose tires on her pickup posed a safety\nriskβis the basis for finding the tap of the tire reasonable.\n 12\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jennifer Lynn RICHMOND, Defendant - Appellant\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 17-40299 February 8, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk\\n\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee\\n\\nv.\\n\\nJENNIFER LYNN RICHMOND,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Texas\\n\\n\\nBefore GRAVES and COSTA, Circuit Judges and BENNETT, District Judge.*\\nGREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:\\n During a traffic stop, a state trooper pushed his fingers against the\\nvehicleβs tire to try and confirm his suspicion that it contained more than just\\nair. We conclude that the brief physical examination of the tire was subject to\\nthe Fourth Amendment under the recently revived trespass test for deciding\\nwhat is a search. The search was a reasonable one, however, because there\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n * District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nwas probable cause to believe the loose tire posed a safety risk.\\n I.\\n A\\n Texas State Trooper Manuel Gonzales was patrolling U.S. Highway 77\\nin south Texas when he saw a blue pickup Jennifer Richmond was driving. He\\ndrove alongside the truck and saw that the tires were βshaking,β βwobbly,β and\\nβunbalanced.β He was concerned that the tires were a potential danger to the\\npublic. After the truck drove across the fog line between the right lane and the\\nshoulder of the highway, Gonzales initiated a traffic stop. When the vehicle\\ncame to a stop, Gonzales saw that one of the truckβs brake lights was broken.\\nHe ran the license plate and learned the truck was registered two days earlier\\nin nearby Brownsville.\\n When he approached the vehicle, Gonzales explained the reason for the\\nstopβthat Richmond crossed the fog lineβand also told her about the brake\\nlight. Richmond apologized and, without prompting, stated that she was from\\nArizona. She avoided eye contact, and Gonzales noticed that her hands were\\nβtrembling,β her mouth was βdry,β and her lips had βa white coating.β\\n In response to questioning, Richmond said that she was from Tucson but\\nwas traveling to Brownsville, where she was moving with her husband.\\nGonzales asked Richmond to exit the truck so that he could show her the\\nbroken brake light. Richmond complied.\\n As Gonzales walked to the rear of the truck, he looked at the passenger-\\nside rear tire and observed that the bolts βhad been stripped as [if] they had\\nbeen taken off numerous times.β\\n This is when the challenged conduct occurred. Gonzales pushed on the\\ntire with his hand. The resulting sound was not what βa normal tire with airβ\\nwould produce; instead there was a βsolid thumping noiseβ that indicated\\nsomething besides air was inside. Gonzales, who already was concerned about\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nthe tires because he had seen them bouncing before the stop, became more\\nsuspicious that they might contain drugs.\\n After tapping the tire, Gonzales resumed asking Richmond about her\\npersonal history and itinerary. She could not readily recall her age, date of\\nbirth, or husbandβs name. Richmond asserted that she was traveling to Dallas\\nto visit a friend, but did not know the friendβs phone number or address.\\nStranger still, she said she intended to use Google to learn the friendβs address\\nand would return home if that search came up empty.\\n When Gonzales went back to his car to check Richmondβs license and the\\nvehicleβs registration, he discovered that, contrary to her story about driving\\nfrom Arizona, the truck had entered Mexico the day before. It had crossed\\nback into the United States only a few hours before the traffic stop.\\n Gonzalez then obtained Richmondβs consent to search the truck. After\\nfinding suspicious items inside the vehicle, Gonzales βlet some air out [of the\\ntires] and [ ] smelled some kind of chemical cleaning odor coming out of them.β\\nAt least one of the tires did not release air. Gonzales checked beneath the\\ntruck and saw βfingerprints [ ] on the inside of . . . the rimsβ and an atypical\\namount of weight placed on the tires to try to balance them. When he removed\\nthe tires, they seemed unusually heavy and solid.\\n Gonzales decided to take the truck to a local car dealership and have the\\ntires examined. Technicians at the dealership discovered secret compartments\\nthat contained methamphetamine.\\n B\\n After being charged with trafficking that meth, Richmond tried to\\nsuppress its discovery. She challenged the lawfulness of the stop and its\\nlength. The district court rejected those arguments, concluding that\\nreasonable suspicion of a traffic violation supported the stop and that\\nRichmondβs suspicious statements and demeanor raised sufficient concerns\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nabout drug trafficking to support extending the stop for the additional time\\nthat resulted in her consenting to the search.\\n After the motion was denied, Richmond entered a guilty plea that\\nallowed her to appeal the suppression ruling. Before sentencing, Richmond\\nfiled an amended motion to suppress that argued for the first time that\\nGonzalesβs tap of her tire was a search not supported by probable cause. At\\nthe sentencing hearing, the district court considered but rejected Richmondβs\\namended motion because βas the law stands now, tapping tires is not a search.β\\nThe district court noted that it would permit Richmond to appeal the tire tap\\nissue along with her original Fourth Amendment claims in light of her\\nconditional guilty plea.\\n II.\\n Richmond no longer challenges the initial stop or that there was\\nreasonable suspicion of drug trafficking to extend the stop until the point when\\nGonzales physically examined the tire. And in not challenging events after\\nGonzales learned that the tire likely contained more than just air, Richmond\\napparently acknowledges that discovery justified further investigation into the\\ntrafficking up until when she consented to a full search. 1\\n So the tap of the tire is the focus of this appeal. Richmond contends that\\nit was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. That is the\\ncase, she says, because touching the tire was a trespass which counts as a\\nsearch under recent Supreme Court cases. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.\\n1, 5 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404β07 & n.3 (2012).\\n The government counters that we have previously held that similar law\\nenforcement conduct is not a search. In United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The government does not dispute Richmondβs premise that an unlawful search of the\\ntire would have tainted the investigation that followed, including her consent.\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nF.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1990), a border patrol agent used a pocket knife to tap the\\nside of a propane tank mounted in the bed of a pickup. Id. at 1432. We\\nacknowledged that the tapping βmay have constituted a technical trespass,β id.\\nat 1435, but explained that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), had\\nβrejected the notion that what constitutes a trespass under various property\\nlaws necessarily constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.β 894 F.2d\\nat 1434. Instead, the then-prevailing Katz testβwhich came not from the\\nmajority opinion but from Justice Harlanβs concurrenceβasked whether the\\nperson challenging a search had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item\\nbeing examined. 2 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360β61 (Harlan, J.,\\nconcurring)). The answer was βnoβ for the owner of the tapped propane tank\\nbecause he βsurely . . . must have reasonably expected that someone, such as a\\ngasoline station attendant, might lean against the tank or touch it in some\\nmanner.β Id at 1435.\\n That expectation of contact is even greater for a vehicleβs tire as it is\\nroutinely checked for air pressure. So Muniz-Melcher binds us on the\\nβreasonable expectation of privacyβ question. Richmond did not have a\\nreasonable basis to believe that the tire would not be touched.\\n But a precedent binds us only as far as it goes. See Brecht v. Abrahmson,\\n507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993) (explaining that an opinion is not binding on a\\nquestion it βnever squarely addressedβ). Richmond contends that Muniz-\\nMelcher did not decide whether tapping part of a vehicle was a search under a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2Katzβs focus on privacy marked a reversal in allowing electronic eavesdropping to be\\ntreated as a search even when it does not involve physical penetration into an individualβs\\nproperty. 389 U.S. at 352β53 (overruling Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), and\\nOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)); see also Orin Kerr, The Curious History of\\nFourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 85 (recognizing that pre-Katz cases had\\nβeventually focus[ed] on physical penetration into a protected space as the primary test for a\\nFourth Amendment searchβ even if trespass was not the focus).\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\ntrespass theory because, as the opinion recognized, at that time a physical\\nintrusion did not on its own constitute a search.\\n We agree. Katz held that β[t]he premise that property interests control\\nthe right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.β 389\\nU.S. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). In the\\ndecades that followed, a trespass did not automatically amount to a search.\\nSee United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (β[A]n actual trespass is\\nneither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.β); Oliver\\nv. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183β84 (1984) (holding that narcotics agent\\nsearching for marijuana in the open fields of a farm was not a search even\\nthough it was a trespass). But in 2012, United States v. Jones revived the\\nproperty approach that most, including our court, thought Katz had\\njettisoned. 3 565 U.S. at 400. In explaining why a search occurred when law\\nenforcement placed a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a car, the\\nCourt relied on βthe common-law trespassory test,β which it treated as a\\nseparate basis for finding a search alongside the Katz βreasonable expectation\\nof privacyβ test. 565 U.S. at 409.\\n Lower courts recognized Jones as a sea change. See, e.g., United States\\nv. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.) (explaining\\nthat that there is now βreason to wonderβ about the vitality of a 1984 Supreme\\nCourt decision after βJones held that the Katz formula is but one way to\\ndetermine if a . . . βsearchβ has taken placeβ); United States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d\\n893, 899 (7th Cir. 2016) (βIn recent years, the Supreme Court has revived a\\nβproperty-based approachβ to identify unconstitutional searches.β); United\\n\\n\\n 3A prominent Fourth Amendment scholar contends that Jones did not so much revive\\nthe property-based approach as invent it. Kerr, supra note 2, at 68 (reaching βthe surprising\\nconclusion that no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz eraβ). That historical account is\\neven more problematic for the governmentβs view that a trespass test has always governed\\nFourth Amendment law, including when Muniz-Melcher was decided.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nStates v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 181 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (explaining that\\nβJones fundamentally altered [the] legal landscape by revivingβafter a forty-\\nfive year hibernationβthe Supreme Courtβs trespass theoryβ). So did Fourth\\nAmendment scholars. 4 The leading treatise on searches had to add a new\\nchapter to its section on βProtected Areas and Interests.β The title of the\\naddition? βTrespass as an alternate theory.β Compare Wayne R. LaFave et\\nal., 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT Β§ 2.1(e) (5th\\ned. 2012) (explaining that although Katz βseemed to sound the death knell for\\nthe pre-Katz βtrespassβ approach,β the βdoctrine re-emerged as an alternate\\ntheory to the Katz expectation-of-privacy testβ), with id. Β§ 2.1 (4th ed. 2004) (no\\nsubsection on trespass). The most colorful description of Jonesβs revival of the\\ntrespass approach was the comment that β[i]t turns out that approach was not\\ndead, just taking a really long nap.β John P. Elwood & Eric A. White, What\\nWere They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October Term 2011, 15\\nGREEN BAG 2D 405, 409 (2012).\\n Jones thus requires us to consider the trespass test that Muniz-Melchor\\ndid not think was sufficient to establish a search but now is. Even under Jones,\\nhowever, a trespass does not get a defendant all the way to characterizing\\npolice conduct as a search. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5. Consistent with the\\nmeaning of βsearch,β a trespass βmust be conjoinedβ with βan attempt to find\\nsomething or obtain information.β Id.; see also id. at 404 (describing the\\n\\n\\n 4 The notion that the trespass test had remained part of the post-Katz Fourth\\nAmendment inquiry βcame as a surprise to every student and scholar of the Fourth\\nAmendment.β Kerr, supra note 2, at 68 n.5. The titles of numerous post-Jones articles reflect\\nthis view that the decision restored a property-based approach that had been dormant since\\nKatz. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, United States v. Jones: Return To Trespass-Good News Or\\nBad, 82 MISS. L.J. 879 (2013); Nancy Foster, Back to the Future: United States v. Jones\\nResuscitates Property Law Concepts in Fourth American Jurisprudence, 42 U. BALT. L. REV.\\n445 (2013); Herbert W. Titus & William J. Olson, United States v. Jones, Reviving the\\nProperty Foundation of the Fourth Amendment, 3 CASE W. RESERVE L.J. TECH. & INTERNET\\n243 (2012).\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\ngovernmentβs conduct as βphysically occup[ying] private property for the\\npurpose of obtaining informationβ). This prevents a mere physical touching,\\nsuch as when an officer leans on the door of a car while questioning its driver,\\nfrom being a search. Gonzalesβs tapping of the tire was not that type of\\nincidental conduct. He touched the tire in order to help find out what was\\ninside. That satisfies the second Jones requirement.\\n So whether the touching was a search comes down to whether it was a\\ntrespass. Muniz-Melchor thought tapping a tank βmay have constituted a\\ntechnical trespass,β but did not decide if that was the case. 894 F.2d at 1435.\\nIts βtechnicalβ qualifier may have come from the absence of damage to the tank,\\nwhich modern tort law requires for trespass to chattel. See Jones, 565 U.S. at\\n419 & n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting W. Keeton et al., PROSSER & KEETON\\nON LAW OF TORTS Β§ 14, at 87 (5th ed. 1984)). But in concluding that attaching\\na GPS to the exterior of a vehicle was a trespass, Jones relied on its reading of\\nthe common law of trespass as it existed in 1791 when the Fourth Amendment\\nwas ratified. 5 Id. at 404β05 (tying the Fourth Amendment to common law\\ntrespass and concluding that a βphysical intrusion would have been considered\\na βsearchβ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted)\\n(citing Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)); id. at 419 & n.2\\n(Alito, J., concurring) (characterizing the common law for trespass to chattels\\nas requiring only a βviolation of βthe dignitary interest in the inviolability of\\nchattelsβ (quoting W. Keeton et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS Β§ 14,\\nat 87 (5th ed. 1984)). In terms of the physical intrusion, we see no difference\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 Professor Kerr also questions whether Jones got history right on this point. He\\nobserves that installing a device on the exterior of a car βis not an obvious case for trespass,β\\nas a βtrespass usually implies some sort of invasion into propertyβ beyond just touching it.\\nKerr, supra note 2, at 91.\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nbetween the Jones device touching the car and an officer touching the tire. 6\\nNor, apparently, does the government as it does not dispute that the tire tap\\nwas a trespass. Of course, the GPS device remained attached for a longer\\nperiod and gathered a lot more information compared to a tire tap, but Jones\\nfound a trespass because of the physical contact the device made with the car\\nat the moment it was affixed. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (focusing on the\\nβinstallation of a GPS deviceβ). Indeed, Justice Alitoβs opinion in Jones\\ncritiques the majorityβs trespass approach because it βlargely disregards what\\nis really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking) and\\ninstead attaches great significance to something that most would view as\\nrelatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does\\nnot interfere in any way with the carβs operation).β Id. at 424β25 (Alito, J.,\\nconcurring). The also βrelatively minorβ act of tapping tires is thus a trespass.\\nBecause that trespass occurred to learn what was inside the tires, it qualifies\\nas a search.\\n This trespass analysis might seem simplistic. But proponents of the\\nproperty-based approach view its bright line as a virtue over the less\\npredictable expectation-of-privacy inquiry. 565 U.S. at 412β13 (noting the line-\\ndrawing problems that would arise from applying the Katz test to the GPS\\ntracking device); Erica Goldberg, How United States v. Jones Can Restore Our\\nFaith in the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62, 68β\\n69 (2011) (suggesting that a property-based test provides a βclearer, cleaner\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Jones recognized this similarity in addressing Cardwell v. Jones, 417 U.S. 583\\n(1974), a case that found no Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement inspected\\nthe tread of a tire and collected paint scrapings from the exterior of a car. In Jones, the\\ngovernment argued that Cardwell supported its position that installation of the GPS tracker\\nwas not a search. The Court disagreed on the ground that the plurality opinion in Cardwell\\nwas βunclearβ about whether it ruled that way because there was no search or because the\\nsearch was a reasonable one supported by probable cause. Jones, 565 U.S. at n.7 (quoting\\nCardwell, 417 U.S. at 591β92).\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nmetric of when the Fourth Amendment is implicatedβ). It may also seem\\ntroubling that the brief touching of a tire reveals far less information than\\nother lawful conduct, like a dog sniff, that is not considered a search. See\\nIllinois v. Cabelles, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005). That critique, however, views the\\nsearch question through the invasion-of-privacy mindset. Rightly or wrongly,\\nJones held that a trespassory search implicates the Fourth Amendment even\\nif it does not offend privacy interests. Under that property-based approach,\\nGonzalesβs tapping of the tire was a search regardless of how insignificant it\\nmight seem.\\n III.\\n Although the limited nature of the intrusion does not affect whether the\\nphysical examination of the tire is deemed a search, that is only the\\npreliminary Fourth Amendment question. The ultimate question is whether\\nthe governmentβs conduct was reasonable. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct.\\n530, 536 (2014). And in that analysis the extent of the intrusion on an\\nindividualβs Fourth Amendment interests is relevant. See, e.g., United States\\nv. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118β19 (2001) (explaining that the reasonableness of\\na search depends on balancing the governmental interest in the search against\\nthe degree of the intrusion on the individual). 7\\n The government first argues that a search of the tire complied with the\\nFourth Amendment because Gonzales had probable cause to believe drugs\\nwere inside. Probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband allows a\\nwarrantless search because of the carβs mobility. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S.\\n465, 467 (1999).\\n\\n\\n 7 The district court held that Gonzalez did not search the tire, but we may consider\\nthe reasonableness of the search because we may affirm the denial of a suppression ruling\\non any basis supported by the record. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 540 (5th Cir.\\n2011).\\n\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\n Did that probable cause exist before Gonzales tapped the tire? The\\ninformation Gonzales had by that timeβthe wobbly tires, stripped bolts,\\nRichmondβs nervousness, and the new registration on an older vehicle stopped\\nin a trafficking corridorβcertainly gave him the reasonable suspicion of drug\\ntrafficking needed to justify extending the traffic stop to investigate further.\\nUnited States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). But\\nprobable cause is a higher rung on the probability ladder than reasonable\\nsuspicion. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014) (explaining\\nthat the evidence required for reasonable suspicion βis obviously less than is\\nnecessary for probable causeβ (citation omitted)). Demonstrating the greater\\nshowing required for probable cause, evidence rising to that level would be\\nenough to have supported an arrest of Richmond for drug trafficking or a grand\\njury indictment charging that crime. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.\\n411 (1976) (holding that probable cause supports warrantless arrest of a\\nsuspect); U.S. CONST. amend. V. We doubt the information Gonzales had prior\\nto tapping the tire rose to that level.\\n But if probable cause of drug trafficking did not yet exist, the government\\nargues that the physical inspection of the tire served another interest:\\nβensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.β\\nIndeed, the wobbly tires, the truck veering outside its lane, and the stripped\\nbolts gave a reasonable officer probable cause to believe that the tire posed a\\nsafety risk. TEX. TRANSP. CODE Β§ 547.004(a) (making it a misdemeanor to\\noperate a vehicle that is βunsafe so as to endanger a personβ). On that basis,\\nthe tapping of the tire was justified. It does not matter that Gonzales also\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40299\\nwanted to find out if drugs were in the tire. See Whren v. United States, 517\\nU.S. 806, 813 (1996). 8\\n Pulling back from the discrete Fourth Amendment doctrines we have\\nexamined, finding no constitutional violation makes sense in terms of the\\noverall Fourth Amendment balance. The governmentβs interest in making sure\\nthat a loose tire does not pose a safety threat strongly outweighs the\\nintrusiveness of an officerβs tapping the tire for a second or two.\\n ***\\n The judgement of the district court is AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Richmond argues that public safety must be an officerβs sole motivation when that\\nis the justification for the search, citing the pre-Whren cases of South Dakota v. Opperman,\\n428 U.S. 364 (1976), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Both of those cases\\ninvolved searches conducted as part of routine police procedures. Opperman, 482 U.S. at 369\\n(postimpoundment inventory search); Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 436 (post-tow search of trunk\\nconsistent with department policy to retrieve officerβs weapon). Whatever role subjective\\nmotivation plays in the context of regulatory searches, Whren says that intent does not\\nmatter for searches based on individualized suspicion. See Hunsberger v. Wood, 570 F.3d\\n546, 554 (4th Cir. 2009) (making this distinction between Whren and Dombrowski); cf.\\nMichigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47 (2009) (explaining that the βemergency aidβ exception to\\nthe Fourth Amendment βdoes not depend on the officerβs subjective intentβ). Suspicion\\nparticular to Richmondβprobable cause to believe the loose tires on her pickup posed a safety\\nriskβis the basis for finding the tap of the tire reasonable.\\n 12\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":597,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4588864,"string":"4,588,864"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"I.F., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee."},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Paul Fletcher v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"17-40722"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Smith, Duncan, Engelhardt\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 17-40722 February 8, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\n\\n\\nI.F.,\\n\\n PlaintiffβAppellant,\\n\\nversus\\n\\nLEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,\\n\\n DefendantβAppellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Texas\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBefore SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\\nJERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n I.F., a former student, sued Lewisville Independent School District\\n(βLISDβ) for violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1681β1688 (2012), claiming that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her\\nalleged sexual harassment and retaliated against her by withholding Title IX\\nprotections. LISD moved for summary judgment, and I.F. moved for partial\\nsummary judgment. The district court granted in part and denied in part\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nLISDβs motion, finding that whereas the evidence did not establish a genuine\\ndispute of material fact regarding whether LISD was deliberately indifferent\\nto I.F.βs reports of sexual harassment and bullying, there was a genuine dis-\\npute of material fact regarding the retaliation claim. The court also denied\\nI.F.βs motion. I.F. appeals, challenging only the summary judgment on deliber-\\nate indifference. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n I.F. was a ninth-grade student at the Hebron High School Ninth Grade\\nCampus (βHebronβ) in LISD during the 2012β13 school year. On Friday, Sep-\\ntember 28, 2012, she attended a non-school-sponsored, non-school-affiliated\\nparty at the private residence of fellow Hebron student S.S. at which no LISD\\npersonnel were present. At the party, A.V. and I.G. engaged in sexual activity\\nwith I.F., which she claims was rape.\\n\\n When I.F. returned to school on Monday, her classmates began to harass\\nand bully her. According to the complaint, they called her a βwhoreβ and a\\nβslut,β asked whether she had sex with multiple people, and inquired βhow did\\nit feel to be fucked in every single hole of your body?β A.V. βwore the pants that\\nhe raped [I.F.] in to school, which had [her] blood on them from intercourse,\\nand stood on the lunch table and said, these are the pants that I took [I.F.βs]\\nvirginity in.β\\n\\n I.F. informed her mother, Jaime Fletcher (βFletcherβ), that she was being\\nbullied, and on October 10, Fletcher contacted Hebron counselor Debra\\nDenson-Whitehead to report the bullying but said nothing about sexual active-\\nity or assault. 1 Denson-Whitehead told Fletcher that she would speak with\\n\\n\\n 1 Fletcher stated during her deposition that she told Denson-Whitehead that βthereβs\\nsomething . . . horribly wrong. Something happened. I donβt know what, but my daughter is\\nbeing severely bullied, and itβs really bad.β Ms. Fletcher also told Denson-Whitehead that\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nI.F. about the bullying when I.F. returned to school. But on Friday, October 12,\\nwhen I.F. next attended school, before Denson-Whitehead could speak with\\nI.F., Fletcher emailed Denson-Whitehead and told her not to speak with I.F.\\nthat day about the bullying. Denson-Whitehead complied and informed Flet-\\ncher that she would check in with I.F. the following week. Nevertheless, I.F.\\nnever physically attended any LISD school after October 12.\\n\\n That same day, I.F.βs parents (βthe Fletchersβ) learned for the first time\\nfrom other parents at a football game that I.F. allegedly had been sexually\\nassaulted. The Fletchers reported the assault to the Carrollton Police Depart-\\nment (βCPDβ), which opened an investigation.\\n\\n On Monday, October 15, the Fletchers met with Denson-Whitehead to\\ninform her that I.F. had been sexually assaulted at a party by two Hebron\\nstudents and that they had reported the assault to CPD, which had opened an\\ninvestigation. The Fletchers also gave Denson-Whitehead a list of students\\nwho they believed were involved. This meeting was the first time that Denson-\\nWhitehead learned of I.F.βs alleged sexual assault. Denson-Whitehead alleges\\nthat she expressed her shock and sorrow to the Fletchers and advised them\\nthat she would notify the administration. According to the Fletchers, Denson-\\nWhitehead told them that βit was going to be very difficult going against the\\nfootball teamβ and that βthe best thing for [I.F.] would be to transfer schools.β\\nAfter the meeting, Denson-Whitehead conveyed the information she had\\nlearned regarding the sexual assault to Hebron Assistant Principal Amanda\\nWerneke and Hebron School Resource Officer Cole Langston, who was also a\\npolice officer at CPD.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nshe didnβt know whether the bullying was cheerleading bullying, and there was a senior who\\nwas βsaying something,β but she βdidnβt have any names.β\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n On October 16, 2012, Denson-Whitehead reported the same information\\nto Hebron Principal Mark Dalton. Dalton, Denson-Whitehead, and Werneke\\nconsulted with Langston about the alleged assault. Langston confirmed that\\nCPD had opened a case and was investigating the sexual assault. He requested\\nthat Hebron refrain from investigating the matter until CPD informed LISD\\nthat it could proceed because any LISD investigation could interfere with and\\npotentially compromise the criminal investigation. Dalton interpreted that\\nrequest to apply to both Fletcherβs complaint that I.F. was being bullied and\\nI.F.βs alleged sexual assault. Furthermore, both Daltonβs and Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs concerns about I.F.βs alleged sexual assault took precedence over\\nthe previously reported bullying. 2\\n\\n During this time, I.F. was not attending school, so LISD took steps to\\nensure that she earned credit for the classes she was taking. First, Dalton and\\nDenson-Whitehead worked together with I.F.βs teachers to get I.F. the work\\nshe needed to complete her first-grading-period classes. Dalton also requested\\nthat the teachers be flexible and informed them that I.F. need not complete all\\nwork that was expected from students who were regularly attending class.\\n\\n Second, Denson-Whitehead informed the Fletchers of several options for\\nI.F. to continue her education, including continuing to attend Hebron, enrolling\\nin Texas Tech online/correspondence courses, or transferring to a charter\\nschool. The Fletchers did not choose any of those options. Though they desired\\nthat I.F. return to Hebron, this was not an option unless her alleged assailants\\nwere removed from the school, and the online courses were outside their bud-\\nget. Instead, after finding out about the LISD Homebound program from the\\n\\n\\n 2Denson-Whitehead stated in her affidavit that β[w]hile not minimizing the purported\\nbullying of I.F., she considered [the] report of an alleged rape to be much more serious . . .,\\nparticularly given that Mrs. Fletcher had asked [her] . . . not to talk to I.F. about the\\nbullying.β\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nChildrenβs Medical Center in Dallas, the Fletchers requested that LISD place\\nI.F. into that program.\\n\\n LISDβs Homebound program allows students who are unable to attend\\nschool for an extended period of time, for medical reasons, to work from home\\nand receive credit. LISD requires a physicianβs recommendation before a stu-\\ndent may be placed into the program. The Fletchers obtained that recommen-\\ndation, and LISD enrolled I.F. in the Homebound program by October 30,\\nwhere she remained for the rest of the 2012β13 school year.\\n\\n In early October 2012, Brian Brazil, Hebron High Schoolβs head football\\ncoach and athletic coordinator, was informed by a freshman football coach that\\nsome of the football players may have been involved in a party, where alcohol\\nwas consumed, thrown by S.S., a member of the freshman team. Brazil held a\\nmeeting with all the football players, where he discussed the rumor of alcohol\\nconsumption at a party and reminded them that LISDβs Extra-Curricular Code\\nof Conduct prohibited the consumption of alcohol.\\n\\n Following the meeting, he spoke with S.S. individually about the party,\\nincluding asking about the presence of alcohol and drugs. S.S. admitted that\\nhe had consumed alcohol at the party, but falsely stated that no other football\\nplayers were present at the party. Brazil suspended S.S. for two games for\\nviolating the alcohol consumption prohibition and spoke with S.S.βs father\\nabout his meeting with S.S.\\n\\n During the team-wide meeting and the individual meeting with S.S.,\\nBrazil discussed the party only in relation to alcohol and drugs. At that time,\\nhe did not know anything about the alleged sexual assault. Before he could\\ninterview other players, the Hebron administration advised him that the police\\nwere conducting an investigation into the party and that he should not speak\\nwith anyone else about the party.\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n At the end of October 2012, Langston informed LISD that CPD had suf-\\nficiently progressed in its investigation of alcohol and drug consumption at the\\nparty that LISD could proceed with its own investigation of alcohol and drug\\nconsumption. Soon thereafter, at the beginning of November, Dalton in-\\nstructed Brazil to investigate the alcohol consumption issue with the football\\nplayers. Brazil interviewed several more players, including A.V. and I.G.; at\\nno point during any of those meetings was there mention of an alleged sexual\\nassault or alleged sexual misconduct by anyone at the party. After completing\\nhis investigation, Brazil reported to Dalton that only one student had admitted\\nto drinking and had been disciplined.\\n\\n In either early November or mid-December, the police authorized LISD\\nto proceed with its investigation into I.F.βs allegation of sexual assault. 3 Dur-\\ning that time, LISD schools were closed for both Thanksgiving break (Novem-\\nber 20β25, 2012) and Christmas/New Years break (December 21, 2012, to Jan-\\nuary 6, 2013). Beginning in early January 2013, Hebron conducted two simul-\\ntaneous investigations regarding I.F.: one concerning the allegation of sexual\\nassault and another concerning I.F.βs allegations of being cyberbullied.\\n\\n Werneke led both investigations. For the sexual assault investigation,\\nduring the month of January 2013, LISD interviewed fourteen students,\\nincluding A.V. and I.G. On February 19, LISD followed up with four students,\\nagain including A.V. and I.G., interviewing them a second time. Throughout\\nthe interviews, A.V. and I.G. were represented by counsel and did not answer\\nall of LISDβs questions. Nevertheless, A.V. and I.G. insisted that the sexual\\nactivity with I.F. was consensual. LISD also interviewed I.F., with her lawyer\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The parties disagree regarding when CPD authorized LISD to proceed with its inves-\\ntigation into sexual assault. LISD contends that the authorization occurred in mid-Decem-\\nber; I.F. asserts that it occurred in early November.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\npresent, and she gave a written statement.\\n\\n LISDβs investigation revealed that no adults or LISD personnel wit-\\nnessed the events at the September 28, 2012, party. Furthermore, the wit-\\nnesses gave conflicting accounts regarding who was involved, precisely what\\nhad occurred, how intoxicated the students were, and whether I.F.βs sexual\\nactivity with A.V. and I.G. was consensual. LISD found that it did not have\\nsufficient evidence that I.F. was sexually assaulted at the party. LISD con-\\ncluded, therefore, that there was no basis for any discipline for sexual assault.\\n\\n For the cyberbullying investigation, Werneke first became aware that\\nI.F. was being cyberbullied as she was beginning the sexual-assault investiga-\\ntion when Fletcher explained the situation in person and provided Werneke a\\nlist of names and the Twitter posting that had started the cyberbullying.\\nAssisted by Dalton and Assistant Principals Michael Vargas and James Scott,\\nWerneke interviewed nineteen students in early-to-mid-January and reviewed\\nseveral social media posts and photographs that Fletcher had provided. The\\ninvestigation revealed that the cyberbullying complaint stemmed from Twitter\\ntweets and retweets by Hebron High School students on or around Decem-\\nber 31, 2012, and January 1, 2013, and that appeared to be in response to a\\ntweet by I.F. regarding Christianity. Many of the implicated students had not\\nthemselves tweeted but had merely retweeted or liked a comment by another\\nstudent.\\n\\n LISD concluded that those social media posts did not amount to βbully-\\ningβ as defined by LISD policy because there was no indication that they oc-\\ncurred while the students were on school property or at a school-sponsored\\nactivity, they did not threaten harm to I.F.βs person or property, and they were\\nnot sufficiently pervasive to create a harassing environment. Nevertheless,\\nLISD did consider the postings βimproper and hurtful,β so LISD counseled the\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\ninterviewed students about improper social media conduct, advised them not\\nto engage in such behavior, and contacted their parents. Werneke received no\\nfurther complaints from the Fletchers regarding cyberbullying by the individu-\\nals involved in this phase of the cyberbullying investigation.\\n\\n On February 19, however, Fletcher informed Werneke of a different form\\nof cyberbullying I.F. was experiencing, this time arising from photographs and\\nharassing comments posted on two Instagram accounts. The next day, Wer-\\nneke reported the complaint to Langston and Dalton, and CPD began an inves-\\ntigation. Langston interviewed several Hebron students, including J.J.D., who\\nlater admitted that he had created one of the Instagram accounts and was\\nresponsible for all of the accountβs posts. 4 The police charged J.J.D. with crim-\\ninal harassment, and LISD suspended him for three days and then assigned\\nhim to the Disciplinary Alternative Education Program for thirty days as pun-\\nishment. After the Instagram cyberbullying complaint, the Fletchers made no\\nother cyberbullying complaints.\\n\\n Once LISD had completed the sexual assault and cyberbullying investi-\\ngations, it reported its findings to the Fletchers by letter dated April 5, 2013.\\nI.F. completed her ninth-grade coursework through the Homebound program\\nand advanced to the tenth grade at the end of the 2012β13 school year. There-\\nafter, the Fletchers withdrew her from LISD, and she never returned there as\\na student.\\n\\n II.\\n I.F. sued LISD for violating Title IX, asserting that LISD was deliber-\\nately indifferent to her alleged sexual harassment and retaliated against her\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 The other account was created by a former LISD student who had left LISD and was\\nattending a private school in Carrollton.\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nby withholding Title IX protections. LISD moved for summary judgment on\\nall of I.F.βs claims, and I.F. moved for partial summary judgment to establish\\nthat she had proved two essential elements of her claims: (1) that she was\\nsexually assaulted by two classmates and (2) that she engaged in an activity\\nprotected under Title IX. The magistrate judge (βMJβ) granted LISDβs motion\\nand denied I.F.βs, determining that the alleged sexually harassing conduct was\\nnot βsevere, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable,β that LISDβs responses to\\nI.F.βs allegations of sexual assault, bullying, and cyberbullying were not delib-\\nerately indifferent, and that I.F. had failed to show any evidence of retaliatory\\nactions by LISD.\\n\\n I.F. objected to the MJβs order and report and recommendation in the\\ndistrict court. Considering the partiesβ motions de novo, the district court\\ngranted in part and denied in part LISDβs motion, finding that whereas the\\nevidence did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether\\nLISD was deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs reports of sexual harassment and\\nbullying, 5 there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding I.F.βs retali-\\nation claim. The retaliation claim proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a\\nverdict in favor of LISD.\\n\\n On appeal, I.F. challenges only the summary judgment for LISD on the\\ndeliberate indifference claim. She asserts that summary judgment was inap-\\npropriate because (1) the question of whether a school district acted with delib-\\nerate indifference generally should be decided by a jury; (2) the summary judg-\\nment evidence contained a factual dispute regarding when LISD should have\\ncommenced its investigation into I.F.βs reports of sexual assault, harassment,\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 Though the district court agreed with the MJ on this point, it found that I.F.βs har-\\nassment was sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive so as to have had a con-\\ncrete, negative effect on her access to education.\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nand bullying; and (3) βallowing deliberate-indifference claims to be resolved by\\njury deliberations . . . serves the underlying purpose of discouraging gender-\\nbased 6 discrimination, which is the very purpose for which Title IX was enacted\\nin the first place.β\\n\\n III.\\n Title IX states that β[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis\\nof sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-\\njected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving\\nFederal financial assistance.β 20 U.S.C. Β§ 1681(a). βA school district that\\nreceives federal funds may be liable for student-on-student harassment if the\\ndistrict (1) had actual knowledge of the harassment, (2) the harasser was\\nunder the districtβs control, (3) the harassment was based on the victimβs sex,\\n(4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it\\neffectively bar[red] the victimβs access to an educational opportunity or benefit,\\nand (5) the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.β Sanches\\nv. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir.\\n2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n For a school district to be liable under Title IX, it must have been delib-\\nerately indifferent to student-on-student harassment. βDeliberate indifference\\nis an extremely high standard to meet.β Domino v. Tex. Depβt of Crim. Justice,\\n239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). A school districtβs βresponse to the harass-\\nment or lack thereof [must be] clearly unreasonable in light of the known\\ncircumstances.β Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ.,\\n526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). Because βdeliberate indifference . . . is . . . a lesser\\n\\n\\n 6I.F.βs reference to βgenderβ is entirely inappropriate. This case is about sex, not\\ngender. Title IX addresses sex and never mentions gender. We will flexibly treat I.F.βs claims\\nas regarding sex discrimination.\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nform of intent rather than a heightened degree of negligence,β Leffall v. Dall.\\nIndep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quo-\\ntation marks omitted), neither negligent nor merely unreasonable responses\\nare enough, Sanches, 647 F.3d at 167. 7 βActions and decisions by officials that\\nare merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliber-\\nate indifference . . . .β Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211,\\n219 (5th Cir. 1998). 8 Indeed, as the district court noted, our precedent βmakes\\nit clear that negligent delays, botched investigations of complaints due to the\\nineptitude of investigators, or responses that most reasonable persons could\\nhave improved upon do not equate to deliberate indifference.β 9\\n\\n School districts enjoy flexibility in responding to student-on-student har-\\nassment and βmay tailor their responses to the circumstances.β Lance,\\n743 F.3d at 1000. Title IX does not require school districts to purge themselves\\nof harassment, take specific disciplinary actions, nor comply with parentsβ\\nremedial demands. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Even a school districtβs βfailure to\\ncomply with [its] regulations . . . does not establish the requisite . . . deliberate\\nindifference.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 169 (citation omitted). Given this flexibil-\\nity, βcourts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions\\nmade by school administrators.β Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.\\n\\n\\n 7 See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (β[D]eliberate indifference\\nentails something more than mere negligence . . . .β).\\n 8 See also Sanches, 647 F.3d at 168 (βIneffective responses . . . are not necessarily\\nclearly unreasonable.β).\\n 9 See Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 997 (5th Cir. 2014)\\n(determining that the districtβs response to complainantβs bullying, despite several instances\\nof inaction, was not deliberately indifferent); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.,\\n220 F.3d 380, 388β89 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district was not deliberately indifferent\\ndespite its having erroneously concluded that the complainant had not been sexually as-\\nsaulted); Leffall, 28 F.3d at 531β32 (finding that the districtβs decision to hire two unarmed\\nsecurity guards for a school dance where a student was fatally shot established a lack of\\ndeliberate indifference despite awareness of the risk of violence).\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n Accordingly, the strict nature of the deliberate indifference standard and\\nthe considerable flexibility school districts exercise in responding to harass-\\nment counsel that βTitle IX does not require flawless investigations or perfect\\nsolutions.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 170. Instead, school districts βmust merely\\nrespond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasona-\\nble.β Davis, 526 U.S. at 649.\\n\\n IV.\\n I.F. asserts that βgenerally,β β[t]he question of whether an action by a\\nschool district is βclearly unreasonable,ββ and therefore, that the school district\\nwas deliberately indifferent, βshould . . . be decided by juries.β Though she\\nacknowledges that judgment as a matter of law (βJMLβ) on deliberate indiffer-\\nence is permissible β[i]n an appropriate case,β id., she relies on principles from\\ncivil rights jurisprudence and qualified immunity to contend that the\\nβSupreme Court would prefer the deliberate-indifference issue to be resolved\\nby juries rather than judges.β\\n\\n I.F. first maintains that because the Supreme Court adopted the delib-\\nerate indifference standard from its civil rights jurisprudence, where the ques-\\ntion of deliberate indifference is routinely placed before juries, the issue should\\nbe decided by a jury in the Title IX context as well. Second, she states that\\nbecause the public policy underlying qualified immunity for individual govern-\\nmental employees does not apply to school districts, the question whether a\\nschool districtβs response to student-on-student harassment was not clearly\\nunreasonable, and therefore not deliberately indifferent, should be a question\\nof fact for a jury to decide. I.F. also attempts to distinguish Sanches by inter-\\npreting it to have found, unlike in the current case, βthat there was no evidence\\nin the record of sexual-based harassment . . . and, therefore, as a matter of law,\\nthe defendant school district could not have been deliberately indifferent to it.β\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nI.F.βs assertions conflict with uncontroverted Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit\\nprecedent, and her analogies to disparate areas of law are unavailing.\\n\\n First, the Supreme Court and this court recognize that in ruling on a\\nmotion for summary judgment, a district court can determine, as a matter of\\nlaw, that a party was not deliberately indifferent. βThe deliberate-indifference\\ninquiry does not transform every school disciplinary decision into a jury ques-\\ntion.β Nevills v. Mart Indep. Sch. Dist., 608 F. Appβx 217, 221 (5th Cir. 2015)\\n(per curiam) (citation omitted). Instead, β[i]n an appropriate case, there is no\\nreason why courts, on a motion . . . for summary judgment, . . . could not iden-\\ntify a response as not βclearly unreasonableβ as a matter of law.β Davis,\\n526 U.S. at 649. βWhether an officialβs response to actual knowledge of dis-\\ncrimination amounted to deliberate indifference . . . may appropriately be\\ndetermined on summary judgment.β Doe, 220 F.3d at 387.\\n\\n Following these principles, we have repeatedly upheld summary judg-\\nments after finding, as a matter of law, that a school districtβs response to har-\\nassment was not deliberately indifferent. 10 In the context of Title IX student-\\non-student harassment claims, summary judgment remains an appropriate\\ntool, and courts may grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute\\nof material fact regarding deliberate indifference. See Doe, 153 F.3d at 220 n.8.\\nTherefore, I.F.βs claim that courts should generally allow juries to decide the\\nquestion of deliberate indifference is merely an advocacy position not grounded\\nin the law. 11\\n\\n Second, I.F.βs attempt to rely on principles of qualified immunity is\\n\\n\\n 10 See, e.g., Nevills, 608 F. Appβx at 222; Lance, 743 F.3d at 997, 1000β01; Sanches,\\n647 F.3d at 167β70; Doe, 220 F.3d at 387β89.\\n 11 Moreover, I.F. concedes that we have βissued several opinions in recent years in\\nwhich [we have] affirmed summary judgments on deliberate-indifference claims arising out\\nof student-on-student harassment.β\\n 13\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nmeritless. Qualified immunity is not implicated in this appeal, and the doc-\\ntrine does not speak to whether I.F. raised a genuine dispute of material fact\\non deliberate indifference to avoid summary judgment. Therefore, the alleged\\nfact that questions of qualified immunity are often resolved as a matter of law\\nand that LISD cannot assert qualified immunity here, has no import in resolv-\\ning whether a district court may decide deliberate indifference as a matter of\\nlaw.\\n\\n Third, in attempting to distinguish Sanches, I.F. misconstrues its find-\\nings. Contrary to I.F.βs assertion, Sanches held the opposite and explicitly\\nstated that βthe district was not deliberately indifferent.β Sanches, 647 F.3d\\nat 170. Accordingly, I.F.βs claimβthat the question whether an action by a\\nschool district was clearly unreasonable, and, thus, that the district was delib-\\nerately indifferent, should generally be decided by a juryβis meritless.\\n\\n V.\\n I.F. claims that a district courtβs finding, as a matter of law, that a school\\ndistrict was not deliberately indifferent instead of allowing a jury to decide the\\nquestion βdissuades . . . potential future victims from pursuing their legal rem-\\nedies, thereby rewarding those who engage in the conduct that Title IX was\\nenacted to deter.β She likens her case to those of black plaintiffs β50 years agoβ\\nand asserts that βthis Court should not conclude today that Texansβ perceived\\nlove of high-school football should eviscerate a young womanβs right to a jury\\ntrial when her gender-discrimination claim potentially threatens the success\\nof an all-male football team.β At its core, I.F.βs policy reasoning is that allowing\\nclaims of Title IX student-on-student harassment to be decided by a court on\\nsummary judgment is contrary to Title IXβs βpurposeβ and will βeviscerate the\\nstatute[] that w[as] designed to prevent prejudice.β I.F.βs theory is\\nunpersuasive.\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n The law on whether a district court can grant summary judgment on\\nTitle IX student-on-student harassment claims is settled. Summary judgment\\non Title IX claims is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes as to material\\nfacts and the moving party is entitled to JML, and the Supreme Court agrees.\\nDavis, 526 U.S. at 649. The district court did precisely that, granting summary\\njudgment to LISD because βI.F. has not shown the existence of a material issue\\nof fact under the objective standard applicable to review of a Title IX deliberate\\nindifference claim.β Though I.F. attempts to alter this law by relying on asser-\\ntions regarding the purpose of Title IX and the alleged consequences of grant-\\ning summary judgment on these types of claims, her points are untenable.\\nTheir logical endpoint is that a court would never be able to grant summary\\njudgment against a claimant without essentially declaring that the movantβs\\ninterests are more important than the claimantβs right to be free from Title IX\\ndiscrimination. Consequently, I.F.βs points conflict with settled law.\\n\\n I.F. further supports her policy reasoning by misconstruing a statement\\nby the district court regarding high school football. I.F. states that the court\\nβtacitlyβ acknowledged that βjurors in the Eastern District of Texas will place\\na greater emphasis on preserving a successful high-school football team than\\non other conceivable public-policy goals,β such as preventing student-on-\\nstudent harassment under Title IX. I.F. uses this interpretation to urge that\\nthe district court should not be allowed to decide that jurors will favor high\\nschool football as a matter of law, and, therefore, that the question of deliberate\\nindifference should be decided by a jury. Understood in context, however, the\\ndistrict courtβs statement was merely an explanation of why Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs comment that I.F. would encounter difficulties if she βwent\\nagainst the football teamβ was a legitimate, if inartful, concern. Therefore, I.F.\\ncannot use the district courtβs observation to support her assertion that by\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nallowing courts to grant summary judgment on Title IX claims, they would be\\ncountenancing putting football above preventing Title IX harassment and\\neviscerating the antidiscrimination protections afforded by the statute.\\n\\n VI.\\n Liability for student-on-student harassment under Title IX requires the\\nclaimant to prove each of five elements. Therefore, to prevail on summary\\njudgment for a claim of student-on-student harassment, a defendant school\\ndistrict, as the moving party, must demonstrate that there is no genuine dis-\\npute as to any one of the following material facts and that it is therefore\\nentitled to JML: β(1) [The district] had actual knowledge of the harassment,\\n(2) the harasser was under the districtβs control, (3) the harassment was based\\non the victimβs sex, (4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and object-\\ntively offensive that it effectively bar[red] the victimβs access to an educational\\nopportunity or benefit, and (5) the district was deliberately indifferent to the\\nharassment.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 165 (citation and internal quotation marks\\nomitted).\\n\\n I.F. and LISD do not dispute prong (2) or (3): I.F.βs harassers, as stu-\\ndents, were under LISDβs control, and the harassment was based on I.F.βs sex.\\nThe parties dispute the other elements. Based on a de novo review of the rec-\\nord, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to I.F., we determine that\\nsummary judgment is appropriate in LISDβs favor because there is no genuine\\ndispute that LISD was not deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs claims of\\nharassment.\\n\\n A.\\n The first material fact is whether LISD had actual knowledge of the\\nharassment. I.F. asserts two distinct allegations of harassment: a sexual\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nassault on September 28, 2012, and incidents of sexual harassment following\\nthe alleged sexual assault in the form of bullying and cyberbullying. The bully-\\ning consists of three episodes: (1) bullying and harassment by fellow students\\nin the two weeks following the alleged sexual assault, (2) cyberbullying com-\\nprising Twitter posts, retweets, and likes that occurred on or around Decem-\\nber 31, 2012, and January 1, 2013, and (3) cyberbullying in the form of har-\\nassing Instagram posts in February 2013.\\n\\n First, for the sexual assault allegation, LISD had actual knowledge of\\nthe harassment on October 15, 2012, when the Fletchers reported it to Denson-\\nWhitehead. By October 16, Denson-Whitehead had reported the information\\nshe had learned regarding the sexual assault to Dalton and Werneke. Second,\\nfor the bullying complaint, LISD had actual knowledge of the harassment on\\nOctober 10, when Fletcher contacted Denson-Whitehead to report that I.F. was\\nbeing bullied. Denson-Whitehead informed Dalton of the bullying complaint\\nby October 16. Third, for the Twitter cyberbullying complaint, LISD had actual\\nknowledge of the harassment on January 7, when Fletcher went to Hebron and\\nprovided Werneke with a list of students who she claimed had been cyber-\\nbullying I.F. on Twitter and a copy of the alleged post that had started the\\nharassment. Fourth, for the Instagram cyberbullying complaint, LISD had\\nactual knowledge of the harassment on February 19, when Fletcher contacted\\nWerneke and told her about photographs and harassing comments posted by\\ntwo Instagram accounts. The next day, Werneke reported the complaint to\\nDalton.\\n\\n LISD does not dispute that it had actual knowledge of the sexual assault\\nand two forms of cyberbullying on the dates set forth above, but it does assert\\nthat it did not have actual knowledge of βany sex-based bullying in connection\\nwith the October 10, 2012, reportβ because Fletcherβs complaint to Denson-\\n\\n 17\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nWhitehead on that date did not implicate Title IX. LISD maintains that Flet-\\ncher merely described that I.F. was being bullied generally, or at most, was\\nexperiencing cheerleading bullying, but Fletcher did not give any information\\nthat would lead Denson-Whitehead to believe the bullying was sex-based.\\n\\n Nevertheless, LISDβs contention is better directed at the question of\\nLISDβs deliberate indifference, not whether it had actual knowledge of the\\nbullying. Based on the evidence, it is indisputable that LISD had actual knowl-\\nedge, through Denson-Whitehead, that I.F. was being bullied in some manner.\\nThough the parties may dispute whether LISDβs response to that knowledge\\nwas deliberately indifferent, the fact is that LISD knew of the harassment on\\nthat day.\\n\\n B.\\n The second material fact is whether the harassment was so severe, per-\\nvasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred I.F.βs access to an\\neducational opportunity or benefit. The MJ and the district court reached\\ndifferent conclusions. The MJ determined that the harassing conduct I.F.\\nendured βwas not severe, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable,β nor did it\\nhave a concrete, negative effect on her access to education. Conversely, the\\ndistrict court found that there was a genuine dispute concerning this material\\nelement. The court determined that I.F. had provided evidence that, βif\\nbelieved by a jury, could be a basis for a jury finding that the sexual harass-\\nment was so severe, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable so as to have had a\\nconcrete, negative effect on I.F.βs access to education.β Although neither side\\nchallenges this finding on appeal, we are not bound by the partiesβ agreement\\nbut must review the summary judgment de novo. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P.,\\n864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Based on that de novo review,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to I.F., we determine that I.F.\\n\\n 18\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nhas demonstrated a genuine dispute as to a material fact, namely, whether the\\nharassment she endured was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive\\nthat it effectively barred her access to an educational opportunity or benefit.\\n\\n First, I.F. has raised a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment\\nshe endured was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. Her classmates\\ncalled her a βwhoreβ and a βslut.β They spread rumors about her, talked about\\nher loudly in her presence, and excluded her during cheerleading. One student\\nasked her the race of the baby she would be having. Others asked whether she\\nhad sex with multiple people and βhow did it feel to be fucked in every single\\nhole of your body?β A.V., one of the students I.F. asserts raped her, βwore the\\npants that he raped [I.F.] in to school, which had [her] blood on them from\\nintercourse, and stood on the lunch table and said, these are the pants that\\nI took [I.F.βs] virginity in.β Multiple football players called her a liar and told\\nher that she was βgoing to ruin everything.β The harassment continued online,\\nwith students commenting about I.F.βs alleged assault on Twitter and Insta-\\ngram. As a result of the harassment, I.F. felt suicidal and depressed, began\\ncutting herself, had nightmares, and experienced panic attacks. Therefore, she\\nhas demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding whether the harassment was\\nsevere, pervasive, and objectively offensive.\\n\\n Second, I.F. has raised a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment\\neffectively barred her access to an educational opportunity or benefit because\\nshe provided evidence that she felt that she could not return to Hebron on\\naccount of the harassment. In her statement of events dated February 8, 2013,\\nI.F. stated that βI asked [my parents] to pull me out of school because of the\\nbullying, and that I didnβt want to be there with those two boys who raped me.β\\nβI thought once the police and school heard about what happened to me that\\nthey would arrest the boys and kick them out of school and I could go back to\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 20 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nschool, but no!β I.F. also asserted during her deposition that Fletcher had\\ninformed LISD that I.F. could not βbe going to the same school as [her] rapists.β\\nAccordingly, I.F. has presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute\\nas to a material fact, namely, that the harassment she endured was so severe,\\npervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred her access to an\\neducational opportunity or benefit.\\n\\n C.\\n The third material fact is whether LISD was deliberately indifferent to\\nthe harassment. The MJ and the district court agreed that βthere is no issue\\nof fact as to whether the district was deliberately indifferent.β Based on a de\\nnovo review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\\nI.F., we determine that I.F. has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of\\nmaterial fact to show that LISDβs responses to I.F.βs alleged sexual assault on\\nSeptember 28, 2012, and incidents of sexual harassment following the alleged\\nsexual assault in the form of bullying and cyberbullying, were deliberately\\nindifferent. Therefore, LISD is entitled to JML.\\n\\n 1.\\n I.F. claims that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her alleged sexual\\nassault because there was a βlengthy and unjustified delayβ before it began its\\ninvestigation. I.F. rejects LISDβs contention that it was not cleared to inves-\\ntigate the sexual assault allegation until mid-December 2012 and asserts that\\nalthough CPD βfinished its criminal investigation on November 8, 2012, . . .\\nLISD did not begin its investigation for nearly two months,β in January 2013.\\nAside from generally averring that LISD should have initiated the investiga-\\ntion soon after it received clearance from the police in early November 2012,\\nI.F. proffers three reasons why LISDβs delay was unjustified.\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 21 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n First, I.F. contends that the delayed investigation contravened the βDear\\nColleague Letter,β sent to LISD and all other school districts in the United\\nStates, by the U.S. Department of Educationβs Office for Civil Rights in 2011,\\nwhich states that βa school . . . must promptly investigateβ potential harass-\\nment and that βa law enforcement investigation does not relieve the school of\\nits independent Title IX obligation to investigate the conduct.β 12 Second, she\\nclaims the delay was motivated by LISDβs preference for its high school football\\nprogram over the Title IX rights of its students. Third, I.F. asserts that the\\ndistrict court mistakenly did not apply the reasoning of Williams v. Board of\\nRegents of the University System of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007),\\nwhich I.F. interprets as holding that a school may not delay its investigation\\nin light of a pending criminal investigation where that investigation would not\\naffect the schoolβs ability to institute its own procedures. Accepting I.F.βs ver-\\nsion of when LISD received authorization from CPD to begin its investigation,\\neach of I.F.βs claims nevertheless fails, and the evidence instead supports the\\nconclusion that LISD was not deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs sexual assault\\nallegation.\\n\\n I.F. misconstrues the Dear Colleague Letter by selectively quoting it.\\nThough she claims that the letter states that a school district may not delay\\nits investigation in light of a simultaneous criminal investigation, the letter\\ncontains additional language regarding how a district should approach\\ncoordinating its Title IX investigation with a criminal investigation:\\n Although a school may need to delay temporarily the fact-finding\\n portion of a Title IX investigation while the police are gathering\\n evidence, once notified that the police department has completed\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence 4, Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secβy for Civil\\nRights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Depβt of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011),\\nhttps://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.\\n 21\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 22 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n its gathering of evidence (not the ultimate outcome of the investi-\\n gation or the filing of any charges), the school must promptly re-\\n sume and complete its fact-finding for the Title IX investiga-\\n tion.[ 13]\\n LISD first learned of I.F.βs sexual assault allegation on October 15, 2012.\\nThe next day, Langston requested that LISD refrain from investigating the\\nmatter until CPD informed LISD that it could proceed because any LISD inves-\\ntigation could interfere with the criminal investigation. According to I.F.,\\nLISD received that authorization on November 8, 2012, and, thus, should have\\nbegun its investigation at that time. Therefore, because it was complying with\\nthe police request not to investigate for approximately three weeks between\\nOctober 15 and November 8, LISD was not violating the letter during that\\ntime.\\n\\n Furthermore, though LISD did not begin its investigation until January,\\naccepting I.F.βs version of events, LISDβs delay after the initial three-week per-\\niod was not because it was waiting for police authorization. Consequently,\\nI.F.βs attempt to use the Dear Colleague Letterβs statements about coordination\\nwith criminal investigationsβto demonstrate that LISD was deliberately\\nindifferent during this periodβfails. To the extent that I.F. contends that\\nLISD violated the letterβs mandate that school districts promptly resume their\\ninvestigations after a criminal investigation has been completed, that is\\nexactly the inquiry we are engaging in when we analyze whether LISDβs delay\\nin beginning its investigation was deliberately indifferent. 14\\n\\n Next, even accepting I.F.βs allegation of Denson-Whiteheadβs statements\\n\\n\\n 13 Id. at 10.\\n The U.S. Department of Educationβs Office for Civil Rights has since rescinded the\\n 14\\n\\nDear Colleague Letter. Dear Colleague Letter, Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Secβy for\\nCivil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Depβt of Educ. (Sept. 22, 2017),\\nhttps://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf.\\n 22\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 23 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nas true, I.F. has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs statements evidence LISDβs deliberate indifference because they\\nwere motivated by an animus against I.F. for attempting to βgo against the\\nfootball team.β As the district court explained, at many high schools in Texas,\\nthe football team and its games are a source of school and community pride.\\nMany students are involved in the team or related organizations, such as the\\ncheerleading squad or the band. Consequently, an individual who raises seri-\\nous sexual assault allegations against members of the team may experience\\nresistance.\\n\\n Denson-Whiteheadβs statement that βit was going to be very difficult\\ngoing against the football teamβ must be construed in this context as express-\\ning her concern to I.F. and her parents about this potential resistance. Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs subsequent actions support this interpretation. She did not keep\\nI.F.βs sexual assault allegation to herself or change details to make it seem less\\nserious. Instead, the same day that she learned of the allegation, she informed\\nWerneke and Langston, and the next day, she told Dalton. Though Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs comment was inartful and could have been more tactful, it is not\\nobjective evidence of deliberate indifference.\\n\\n Finally, I.F.βs reliance on Williams, an out-of-circuit case, is misplaced.\\nThe Eleventh Circuit found that the University of Georgia was deliberately\\nindifferent because it waited eight months after receiving a full police report\\nbefore conducting a disciplinary hearing regarding an alleged sexual assault.\\nThough the university tried to justify the delay by averring to the pending\\ncriminal trials against the alleged assailants, the court rejected its contentions\\nas insufficient. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1296β97.\\n\\n I.F.βs case is readily distinguishable from Williams. LISD did not delay\\nits investigation after receiving a full police report or because criminal trials\\n\\n 23\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 24 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nwere pending. Instead, LISD delayed because of a specific directive from CPD.\\nAccepting I.F.βs version of events as true, LISD then further delayed the inves-\\ntigation for about two months, which included Thanksgiving break and the\\nChristmas/New Years holidays. This delay was much shorter than the eight-\\nmonth delay that the Williams court relied on, in part, in finding that the\\nuniversity was deliberately indifferent.\\n\\n Contrary to I.F.βs theory that LISDβs delayed investigation shows delib-\\nerate indifference, the evidence supports the conclusion that LISD performed\\nan extensive investigation within a reasonable time. Accepting I.F.βs version\\nof events that LISD received authorization to begin investigating the sexual\\nassault allegation on November 8, 2012, LISDβs delay consisted of two periods:\\nwaiting for police authorization from October 16, 2012, to November 8, 2012,\\nand the November 8, 2012, to January 7, 2013, period. 15\\n\\n Though a delay in instituting remedial actions may constitute deliberate\\nindifference under Title IX, 16 LISDβs twenty-eight school-day delay does not\\nrise to that level. During that period, LISD was actively taking steps to provide\\nrelief to I.F. It worked together with I.F.βs teachers to get her the work she\\nwas missing during her absence and requested the teachers be flexible with\\nI.F.βs workload, provided her with information regarding educational oppor-\\ntunities outside of LISD, and assisted I.F. in enrolling in the Homebound\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15Based on a 2012-year calendar and the dates for the vacation periods LISD provides,\\nThanksgiving break and the Christmas/New Years holidays together consumed three full\\nschool weeks.\\n 16 See, e.g., Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 669β70 (2d Cir. 2012)\\n(holding that a jury was within its power to find that a school district was deliberately indif-\\nferent where it waited over a year to implement remedial action in response to a complaint);\\nMatthews v. Nwankwo, 36 F. Supp. 3d 718, 725 (N.D. Miss. 2014) (holding that an unjustified\\ndelay of two to three months in separating a complainant from the alleged assailantβs class\\nwas deliberate indifference).\\n 24\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 25 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nprogram. 17 In light of these known circumstances, the delay was not clearly\\nunreasonable and thus was not deliberately indifferent. See Davis, 526 U.S.\\nat 648; Sanches, 647 F.3d at 167β68.\\n\\n Once it began its investigation, moreover, LISDβs response was not\\ndeliberately indifferent. It interviewed fourteen students about the alleged\\nsexual assault and followed up with four students, including the two alleged\\nassailants. It interviewed I.F., with her lawyer present, and accepted her writ-\\nten statement. After reviewing the evidence, LISD concluded that it could not\\nestablish, with sufficient evidence, that I.F. had been sexually assaulted at the\\nparty, so there was no basis for any LISD discipline for sexual assault. Title IX\\ndid not require LISD to take specific disciplinary actions, comply with parentsβ\\nremedial demands, or comply with its own regulations in investigating the\\ncomplaint. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648; Sanches, 647 F.3d at 169. Instead of being\\nclearly unreasonable, to the contrary, LISDβs investigation was thorough and\\nappropriate. Therefore, LISDβs response to I.F.βs sexual assault allegation was\\nnot deliberately indifferent.\\n\\n 2.\\n I.F. contends that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her October 10,\\n2012, bullying complaints because it βnever undertook an investigation intoβ\\nthem. Nevertheless, in light of the known circumstances, LISDβs response to\\nthe harassment in the form of bullying was not deliberately indifferent.\\n\\n When Fletcher contacted Denson-Whitehead on October 10 to report that\\nI.F. was being bullied, she did not give specific details. Fletcher stated that\\nI.F. was being βseverely bulliedβ and opined that it could be cheerleading\\n\\n\\n\\n 17 Furthermore, I.F. was separated from her alleged assailants by her absence from\\nschool and subsequent enrollment in the Homebound program.\\n 25\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 26 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nbullying, but other than giving Denson-Whitehead the names of several stu-\\ndents, who had bullied I.F. at her middle school, who Fletcher was unsure were\\ninvolved, Fletcher βdidnβt have any namesβ for this bullying complaint.\\nDenson-Whitehead said that she would speak with I.F. about the bullying\\nwhen I.F. next attended school. But when I.F. returned to school on Friday,\\nOctober 12, for the first time since Denson-Whitehead and Fletcherβs conver-\\nsation, before Denson-Whitehead could speak with I.F., Fletcher emailed\\nDenson-Whitehead to request that she not speak with I.F., and Denson-\\nWhitehead complied.\\n\\n The following Monday, October 15, LISD learned of I.F.βs alleged sexual\\nassault and shifted its focus to investigating that claim. After that date, I.F.\\nnever provided a statement to LISD regarding the bullying, nor did the Flet-\\nchers give LISD further details to supplement their earlier complaint about\\nthe bullying. Therefore, in light of the known circumstances, LISDβs response\\nto the bullying complaint was not clearly unreasonable and thus was not\\ndeliberately indifferent.\\n\\n 3.\\n I.F. does not specifically allege that LISD was deliberately indifferent to\\nher complaints of cyberbullying through Twitter and Instagram. Because,\\nhowever, I.F. asserts that the cyberbullying was sexual harassment under\\nTitle IX, if there is a genuine dispute regarding whether LISD was deliberately\\nindifferent to these complaints, summary judgment was inappropriate. Never-\\ntheless, LISD was not deliberately indifferent to the cyberbullying complaints.\\n\\n In response to I.F.βs first cyberbullying complaint on January 7, 2013,\\nLISD promptly interviewed nineteen students in early-to-mid January and\\nreviewed the alleged offending social media posts. Though LISD concluded\\nthat the posts did not constitute βbullyingβ as defined by LISD policy, it still\\n 26\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 27 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nconsidered them improper and hurtful. LISD therefore counseled the impli-\\ncated students about inappropriate social media behavior, advised them not to\\nengage in such behavior in the future, and contacted their parents.\\n\\n In response to I.F.βs second cyberbullying complaint on February 19,\\n2013, LISD promptly reported the matter to CPD, which began an investiga-\\ntion. As a result, one Hebron student was charged with criminal harassment,\\nand LISD suspended him for three days and assigned him to the Disciplinary\\nAlternative Education Program for thirty days as punishment.\\n\\n LISDβs responses to both cyberbullying complaints were reasonable\\ninvestigatory efforts aimed at discovering who was responsible, determining\\nwhether Title IX sexual harassment had occurred, and remedying offending\\nconduct. Consequently, LISDβs investigation was not clearly unreasonable,\\nand it was not deliberately indifferent.\\n\\n There is no error. The summary judgment is AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 27\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366117/\", \"author_raw\": \"JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"DUNCAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ENGELHARDT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588864/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: I.F., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nCase: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n FILED\n No. 17-40722 February 8, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Clerk\n\n\nI.F.,\n\n PlaintiffβAppellant,\n\nversus\n\nLEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,\n\n DefendantβAppellee.\n\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Texas\n\n\n\n\nBefore SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\nJERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\n\n I.F., a former student, sued Lewisville Independent School District\n(βLISDβ) for violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.\n§§ 1681β1688 (2012), claiming that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her\nalleged sexual harassment and retaliated against her by withholding Title IX\nprotections. LISD moved for summary judgment, and I.F. moved for partial\nsummary judgment. The district court granted in part and denied in part\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nLISDβs motion, finding that whereas the evidence did not establish a genuine\ndispute of material fact regarding whether LISD was deliberately indifferent\nto I.F.βs reports of sexual harassment and bullying, there was a genuine dis-\npute of material fact regarding the retaliation claim. The court also denied\nI.F.βs motion. I.F. appeals, challenging only the summary judgment on deliber-\nate indifference. We affirm.\n\n I.\n I.F. was a ninth-grade student at the Hebron High School Ninth Grade\nCampus (βHebronβ) in LISD during the 2012β13 school year. On Friday, Sep-\ntember 28, 2012, she attended a non-school-sponsored, non-school-affiliated\nparty at the private residence of fellow Hebron student S.S. at which no LISD\npersonnel were present. At the party, A.V. and I.G. engaged in sexual activity\nwith I.F., which she claims was rape.\n\n When I.F. returned to school on Monday, her classmates began to harass\nand bully her. According to the complaint, they called her a βwhoreβ and a\nβslut,β asked whether she had sex with multiple people, and inquired βhow did\nit feel to be fucked in every single hole of your body?β A.V. βwore the pants that\nhe raped [I.F.] in to school, which had [her] blood on them from intercourse,\nand stood on the lunch table and said, these are the pants that I took [I.F.βs]\nvirginity in.β\n\n I.F. informed her mother, Jaime Fletcher (βFletcherβ), that she was being\nbullied, and on October 10, Fletcher contacted Hebron counselor Debra\nDenson-Whitehead to report the bullying but said nothing about sexual active-\nity or assault. 1 Denson-Whitehead told Fletcher that she would speak with\n\n\n 1 Fletcher stated during her deposition that she told Denson-Whitehead that βthereβs\nsomething . . . horribly wrong. Something happened. I donβt know what, but my daughter is\nbeing severely bullied, and itβs really bad.β Ms. Fletcher also told Denson-Whitehead that\n 2\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nI.F. about the bullying when I.F. returned to school. But on Friday, October 12,\nwhen I.F. next attended school, before Denson-Whitehead could speak with\nI.F., Fletcher emailed Denson-Whitehead and told her not to speak with I.F.\nthat day about the bullying. Denson-Whitehead complied and informed Flet-\ncher that she would check in with I.F. the following week. Nevertheless, I.F.\nnever physically attended any LISD school after October 12.\n\n That same day, I.F.βs parents (βthe Fletchersβ) learned for the first time\nfrom other parents at a football game that I.F. allegedly had been sexually\nassaulted. The Fletchers reported the assault to the Carrollton Police Depart-\nment (βCPDβ), which opened an investigation.\n\n On Monday, October 15, the Fletchers met with Denson-Whitehead to\ninform her that I.F. had been sexually assaulted at a party by two Hebron\nstudents and that they had reported the assault to CPD, which had opened an\ninvestigation. The Fletchers also gave Denson-Whitehead a list of students\nwho they believed were involved. This meeting was the first time that Denson-\nWhitehead learned of I.F.βs alleged sexual assault. Denson-Whitehead alleges\nthat she expressed her shock and sorrow to the Fletchers and advised them\nthat she would notify the administration. According to the Fletchers, Denson-\nWhitehead told them that βit was going to be very difficult going against the\nfootball teamβ and that βthe best thing for [I.F.] would be to transfer schools.β\nAfter the meeting, Denson-Whitehead conveyed the information she had\nlearned regarding the sexual assault to Hebron Assistant Principal Amanda\nWerneke and Hebron School Resource Officer Cole Langston, who was also a\npolice officer at CPD.\n\n\n\n\nshe didnβt know whether the bullying was cheerleading bullying, and there was a senior who\nwas βsaying something,β but she βdidnβt have any names.β\n 3\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\n On October 16, 2012, Denson-Whitehead reported the same information\nto Hebron Principal Mark Dalton. Dalton, Denson-Whitehead, and Werneke\nconsulted with Langston about the alleged assault. Langston confirmed that\nCPD had opened a case and was investigating the sexual assault. He requested\nthat Hebron refrain from investigating the matter until CPD informed LISD\nthat it could proceed because any LISD investigation could interfere with and\npotentially compromise the criminal investigation. Dalton interpreted that\nrequest to apply to both Fletcherβs complaint that I.F. was being bullied and\nI.F.βs alleged sexual assault. Furthermore, both Daltonβs and Denson-\nWhiteheadβs concerns about I.F.βs alleged sexual assault took precedence over\nthe previously reported bullying. 2\n\n During this time, I.F. was not attending school, so LISD took steps to\nensure that she earned credit for the classes she was taking. First, Dalton and\nDenson-Whitehead worked together with I.F.βs teachers to get I.F. the work\nshe needed to complete her first-grading-period classes. Dalton also requested\nthat the teachers be flexible and informed them that I.F. need not complete all\nwork that was expected from students who were regularly attending class.\n\n Second, Denson-Whitehead informed the Fletchers of several options for\nI.F. to continue her education, including continuing to attend Hebron, enrolling\nin Texas Tech online/correspondence courses, or transferring to a charter\nschool. The Fletchers did not choose any of those options. Though they desired\nthat I.F. return to Hebron, this was not an option unless her alleged assailants\nwere removed from the school, and the online courses were outside their bud-\nget. Instead, after finding out about the LISD Homebound program from the\n\n\n 2Denson-Whitehead stated in her affidavit that β[w]hile not minimizing the purported\nbullying of I.F., she considered [the] report of an alleged rape to be much more serious . . .,\nparticularly given that Mrs. Fletcher had asked [her] . . . not to talk to I.F. about the\nbullying.β\n 4\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nChildrenβs Medical Center in Dallas, the Fletchers requested that LISD place\nI.F. into that program.\n\n LISDβs Homebound program allows students who are unable to attend\nschool for an extended period of time, for medical reasons, to work from home\nand receive credit. LISD requires a physicianβs recommendation before a stu-\ndent may be placed into the program. The Fletchers obtained that recommen-\ndation, and LISD enrolled I.F. in the Homebound program by October 30,\nwhere she remained for the rest of the 2012β13 school year.\n\n In early October 2012, Brian Brazil, Hebron High Schoolβs head football\ncoach and athletic coordinator, was informed by a freshman football coach that\nsome of the football players may have been involved in a party, where alcohol\nwas consumed, thrown by S.S., a member of the freshman team. Brazil held a\nmeeting with all the football players, where he discussed the rumor of alcohol\nconsumption at a party and reminded them that LISDβs Extra-Curricular Code\nof Conduct prohibited the consumption of alcohol.\n\n Following the meeting, he spoke with S.S. individually about the party,\nincluding asking about the presence of alcohol and drugs. S.S. admitted that\nhe had consumed alcohol at the party, but falsely stated that no other football\nplayers were present at the party. Brazil suspended S.S. for two games for\nviolating the alcohol consumption prohibition and spoke with S.S.βs father\nabout his meeting with S.S.\n\n During the team-wide meeting and the individual meeting with S.S.,\nBrazil discussed the party only in relation to alcohol and drugs. At that time,\nhe did not know anything about the alleged sexual assault. Before he could\ninterview other players, the Hebron administration advised him that the police\nwere conducting an investigation into the party and that he should not speak\nwith anyone else about the party.\n 5\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\n At the end of October 2012, Langston informed LISD that CPD had suf-\nficiently progressed in its investigation of alcohol and drug consumption at the\nparty that LISD could proceed with its own investigation of alcohol and drug\nconsumption. Soon thereafter, at the beginning of November, Dalton in-\nstructed Brazil to investigate the alcohol consumption issue with the football\nplayers. Brazil interviewed several more players, including A.V. and I.G.; at\nno point during any of those meetings was there mention of an alleged sexual\nassault or alleged sexual misconduct by anyone at the party. After completing\nhis investigation, Brazil reported to Dalton that only one student had admitted\nto drinking and had been disciplined.\n\n In either early November or mid-December, the police authorized LISD\nto proceed with its investigation into I.F.βs allegation of sexual assault. 3 Dur-\ning that time, LISD schools were closed for both Thanksgiving break (Novem-\nber 20β25, 2012) and Christmas/New Years break (December 21, 2012, to Jan-\nuary 6, 2013). Beginning in early January 2013, Hebron conducted two simul-\ntaneous investigations regarding I.F.: one concerning the allegation of sexual\nassault and another concerning I.F.βs allegations of being cyberbullied.\n\n Werneke led both investigations. For the sexual assault investigation,\nduring the month of January 2013, LISD interviewed fourteen students,\nincluding A.V. and I.G. On February 19, LISD followed up with four students,\nagain including A.V. and I.G., interviewing them a second time. Throughout\nthe interviews, A.V. and I.G. were represented by counsel and did not answer\nall of LISDβs questions. Nevertheless, A.V. and I.G. insisted that the sexual\nactivity with I.F. was consensual. LISD also interviewed I.F., with her lawyer\n\n\n\n 3 The parties disagree regarding when CPD authorized LISD to proceed with its inves-\ntigation into sexual assault. LISD contends that the authorization occurred in mid-Decem-\nber; I.F. asserts that it occurred in early November.\n 6\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\npresent, and she gave a written statement.\n\n LISDβs investigation revealed that no adults or LISD personnel wit-\nnessed the events at the September 28, 2012, party. Furthermore, the wit-\nnesses gave conflicting accounts regarding who was involved, precisely what\nhad occurred, how intoxicated the students were, and whether I.F.βs sexual\nactivity with A.V. and I.G. was consensual. LISD found that it did not have\nsufficient evidence that I.F. was sexually assaulted at the party. LISD con-\ncluded, therefore, that there was no basis for any discipline for sexual assault.\n\n For the cyberbullying investigation, Werneke first became aware that\nI.F. was being cyberbullied as she was beginning the sexual-assault investiga-\ntion when Fletcher explained the situation in person and provided Werneke a\nlist of names and the Twitter posting that had started the cyberbullying.\nAssisted by Dalton and Assistant Principals Michael Vargas and James Scott,\nWerneke interviewed nineteen students in early-to-mid-January and reviewed\nseveral social media posts and photographs that Fletcher had provided. The\ninvestigation revealed that the cyberbullying complaint stemmed from Twitter\ntweets and retweets by Hebron High School students on or around Decem-\nber 31, 2012, and January 1, 2013, and that appeared to be in response to a\ntweet by I.F. regarding Christianity. Many of the implicated students had not\nthemselves tweeted but had merely retweeted or liked a comment by another\nstudent.\n\n LISD concluded that those social media posts did not amount to βbully-\ningβ as defined by LISD policy because there was no indication that they oc-\ncurred while the students were on school property or at a school-sponsored\nactivity, they did not threaten harm to I.F.βs person or property, and they were\nnot sufficiently pervasive to create a harassing environment. Nevertheless,\nLISD did consider the postings βimproper and hurtful,β so LISD counseled the\n\n 7\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\ninterviewed students about improper social media conduct, advised them not\nto engage in such behavior, and contacted their parents. Werneke received no\nfurther complaints from the Fletchers regarding cyberbullying by the individu-\nals involved in this phase of the cyberbullying investigation.\n\n On February 19, however, Fletcher informed Werneke of a different form\nof cyberbullying I.F. was experiencing, this time arising from photographs and\nharassing comments posted on two Instagram accounts. The next day, Wer-\nneke reported the complaint to Langston and Dalton, and CPD began an inves-\ntigation. Langston interviewed several Hebron students, including J.J.D., who\nlater admitted that he had created one of the Instagram accounts and was\nresponsible for all of the accountβs posts. 4 The police charged J.J.D. with crim-\ninal harassment, and LISD suspended him for three days and then assigned\nhim to the Disciplinary Alternative Education Program for thirty days as pun-\nishment. After the Instagram cyberbullying complaint, the Fletchers made no\nother cyberbullying complaints.\n\n Once LISD had completed the sexual assault and cyberbullying investi-\ngations, it reported its findings to the Fletchers by letter dated April 5, 2013.\nI.F. completed her ninth-grade coursework through the Homebound program\nand advanced to the tenth grade at the end of the 2012β13 school year. There-\nafter, the Fletchers withdrew her from LISD, and she never returned there as\na student.\n\n II.\n I.F. sued LISD for violating Title IX, asserting that LISD was deliber-\nately indifferent to her alleged sexual harassment and retaliated against her\n\n\n\n 4 The other account was created by a former LISD student who had left LISD and was\nattending a private school in Carrollton.\n 8\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nby withholding Title IX protections. LISD moved for summary judgment on\nall of I.F.βs claims, and I.F. moved for partial summary judgment to establish\nthat she had proved two essential elements of her claims: (1) that she was\nsexually assaulted by two classmates and (2) that she engaged in an activity\nprotected under Title IX. The magistrate judge (βMJβ) granted LISDβs motion\nand denied I.F.βs, determining that the alleged sexually harassing conduct was\nnot βsevere, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable,β that LISDβs responses to\nI.F.βs allegations of sexual assault, bullying, and cyberbullying were not delib-\nerately indifferent, and that I.F. had failed to show any evidence of retaliatory\nactions by LISD.\n\n I.F. objected to the MJβs order and report and recommendation in the\ndistrict court. Considering the partiesβ motions de novo, the district court\ngranted in part and denied in part LISDβs motion, finding that whereas the\nevidence did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether\nLISD was deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs reports of sexual harassment and\nbullying, 5 there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding I.F.βs retali-\nation claim. The retaliation claim proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a\nverdict in favor of LISD.\n\n On appeal, I.F. challenges only the summary judgment for LISD on the\ndeliberate indifference claim. She asserts that summary judgment was inap-\npropriate because (1) the question of whether a school district acted with delib-\nerate indifference generally should be decided by a jury; (2) the summary judg-\nment evidence contained a factual dispute regarding when LISD should have\ncommenced its investigation into I.F.βs reports of sexual assault, harassment,\n\n\n\n 5 Though the district court agreed with the MJ on this point, it found that I.F.βs har-\nassment was sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive so as to have had a con-\ncrete, negative effect on her access to education.\n 9\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nand bullying; and (3) βallowing deliberate-indifference claims to be resolved by\njury deliberations . . . serves the underlying purpose of discouraging gender-\nbased 6 discrimination, which is the very purpose for which Title IX was enacted\nin the first place.β\n\n III.\n Title IX states that β[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis\nof sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-\njected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving\nFederal financial assistance.β 20 U.S.C. Β§ 1681(a). βA school district that\nreceives federal funds may be liable for student-on-student harassment if the\ndistrict (1) had actual knowledge of the harassment, (2) the harasser was\nunder the districtβs control, (3) the harassment was based on the victimβs sex,\n(4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it\neffectively bar[red] the victimβs access to an educational opportunity or benefit,\nand (5) the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.β Sanches\nv. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir.\n2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n For a school district to be liable under Title IX, it must have been delib-\nerately indifferent to student-on-student harassment. βDeliberate indifference\nis an extremely high standard to meet.β Domino v. Tex. Depβt of Crim. Justice,\n239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). A school districtβs βresponse to the harass-\nment or lack thereof [must be] clearly unreasonable in light of the known\ncircumstances.β Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ.,\n526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). Because βdeliberate indifference . . . is . . . a lesser\n\n\n 6I.F.βs reference to βgenderβ is entirely inappropriate. This case is about sex, not\ngender. Title IX addresses sex and never mentions gender. We will flexibly treat I.F.βs claims\nas regarding sex discrimination.\n 10\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nform of intent rather than a heightened degree of negligence,β Leffall v. Dall.\nIndep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quo-\ntation marks omitted), neither negligent nor merely unreasonable responses\nare enough, Sanches, 647 F.3d at 167. 7 βActions and decisions by officials that\nare merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliber-\nate indifference . . . .β Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211,\n219 (5th Cir. 1998). 8 Indeed, as the district court noted, our precedent βmakes\nit clear that negligent delays, botched investigations of complaints due to the\nineptitude of investigators, or responses that most reasonable persons could\nhave improved upon do not equate to deliberate indifference.β 9\n\n School districts enjoy flexibility in responding to student-on-student har-\nassment and βmay tailor their responses to the circumstances.β Lance,\n743 F.3d at 1000. Title IX does not require school districts to purge themselves\nof harassment, take specific disciplinary actions, nor comply with parentsβ\nremedial demands. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Even a school districtβs βfailure to\ncomply with [its] regulations . . . does not establish the requisite . . . deliberate\nindifference.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 169 (citation omitted). Given this flexibil-\nity, βcourts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions\nmade by school administrators.β Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.\n\n\n 7 See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (β[D]eliberate indifference\nentails something more than mere negligence . . . .β).\n 8 See also Sanches, 647 F.3d at 168 (βIneffective responses . . . are not necessarily\nclearly unreasonable.β).\n 9 See Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 997 (5th Cir. 2014)\n(determining that the districtβs response to complainantβs bullying, despite several instances\nof inaction, was not deliberately indifferent); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.,\n220 F.3d 380, 388β89 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district was not deliberately indifferent\ndespite its having erroneously concluded that the complainant had not been sexually as-\nsaulted); Leffall, 28 F.3d at 531β32 (finding that the districtβs decision to hire two unarmed\nsecurity guards for a school dance where a student was fatally shot established a lack of\ndeliberate indifference despite awareness of the risk of violence).\n 11\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\n Accordingly, the strict nature of the deliberate indifference standard and\nthe considerable flexibility school districts exercise in responding to harass-\nment counsel that βTitle IX does not require flawless investigations or perfect\nsolutions.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 170. Instead, school districts βmust merely\nrespond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasona-\nble.β Davis, 526 U.S. at 649.\n\n IV.\n I.F. asserts that βgenerally,β β[t]he question of whether an action by a\nschool district is βclearly unreasonable,ββ and therefore, that the school district\nwas deliberately indifferent, βshould . . . be decided by juries.β Though she\nacknowledges that judgment as a matter of law (βJMLβ) on deliberate indiffer-\nence is permissible β[i]n an appropriate case,β id., she relies on principles from\ncivil rights jurisprudence and qualified immunity to contend that the\nβSupreme Court would prefer the deliberate-indifference issue to be resolved\nby juries rather than judges.β\n\n I.F. first maintains that because the Supreme Court adopted the delib-\nerate indifference standard from its civil rights jurisprudence, where the ques-\ntion of deliberate indifference is routinely placed before juries, the issue should\nbe decided by a jury in the Title IX context as well. Second, she states that\nbecause the public policy underlying qualified immunity for individual govern-\nmental employees does not apply to school districts, the question whether a\nschool districtβs response to student-on-student harassment was not clearly\nunreasonable, and therefore not deliberately indifferent, should be a question\nof fact for a jury to decide. I.F. also attempts to distinguish Sanches by inter-\npreting it to have found, unlike in the current case, βthat there was no evidence\nin the record of sexual-based harassment . . . and, therefore, as a matter of law,\nthe defendant school district could not have been deliberately indifferent to it.β\n\n 12\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nI.F.βs assertions conflict with uncontroverted Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit\nprecedent, and her analogies to disparate areas of law are unavailing.\n\n First, the Supreme Court and this court recognize that in ruling on a\nmotion for summary judgment, a district court can determine, as a matter of\nlaw, that a party was not deliberately indifferent. βThe deliberate-indifference\ninquiry does not transform every school disciplinary decision into a jury ques-\ntion.β Nevills v. Mart Indep. Sch. Dist., 608 F. Appβx 217, 221 (5th Cir. 2015)\n(per curiam) (citation omitted). Instead, β[i]n an appropriate case, there is no\nreason why courts, on a motion . . . for summary judgment, . . . could not iden-\ntify a response as not βclearly unreasonableβ as a matter of law.β Davis,\n526 U.S. at 649. βWhether an officialβs response to actual knowledge of dis-\ncrimination amounted to deliberate indifference . . . may appropriately be\ndetermined on summary judgment.β Doe, 220 F.3d at 387.\n\n Following these principles, we have repeatedly upheld summary judg-\nments after finding, as a matter of law, that a school districtβs response to har-\nassment was not deliberately indifferent. 10 In the context of Title IX student-\non-student harassment claims, summary judgment remains an appropriate\ntool, and courts may grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute\nof material fact regarding deliberate indifference. See Doe, 153 F.3d at 220 n.8.\nTherefore, I.F.βs claim that courts should generally allow juries to decide the\nquestion of deliberate indifference is merely an advocacy position not grounded\nin the law. 11\n\n Second, I.F.βs attempt to rely on principles of qualified immunity is\n\n\n 10 See, e.g., Nevills, 608 F. Appβx at 222; Lance, 743 F.3d at 997, 1000β01; Sanches,\n647 F.3d at 167β70; Doe, 220 F.3d at 387β89.\n 11 Moreover, I.F. concedes that we have βissued several opinions in recent years in\nwhich [we have] affirmed summary judgments on deliberate-indifference claims arising out\nof student-on-student harassment.β\n 13\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nmeritless. Qualified immunity is not implicated in this appeal, and the doc-\ntrine does not speak to whether I.F. raised a genuine dispute of material fact\non deliberate indifference to avoid summary judgment. Therefore, the alleged\nfact that questions of qualified immunity are often resolved as a matter of law\nand that LISD cannot assert qualified immunity here, has no import in resolv-\ning whether a district court may decide deliberate indifference as a matter of\nlaw.\n\n Third, in attempting to distinguish Sanches, I.F. misconstrues its find-\nings. Contrary to I.F.βs assertion, Sanches held the opposite and explicitly\nstated that βthe district was not deliberately indifferent.β Sanches, 647 F.3d\nat 170. Accordingly, I.F.βs claimβthat the question whether an action by a\nschool district was clearly unreasonable, and, thus, that the district was delib-\nerately indifferent, should generally be decided by a juryβis meritless.\n\n V.\n I.F. claims that a district courtβs finding, as a matter of law, that a school\ndistrict was not deliberately indifferent instead of allowing a jury to decide the\nquestion βdissuades . . . potential future victims from pursuing their legal rem-\nedies, thereby rewarding those who engage in the conduct that Title IX was\nenacted to deter.β She likens her case to those of black plaintiffs β50 years agoβ\nand asserts that βthis Court should not conclude today that Texansβ perceived\nlove of high-school football should eviscerate a young womanβs right to a jury\ntrial when her gender-discrimination claim potentially threatens the success\nof an all-male football team.β At its core, I.F.βs policy reasoning is that allowing\nclaims of Title IX student-on-student harassment to be decided by a court on\nsummary judgment is contrary to Title IXβs βpurposeβ and will βeviscerate the\nstatute[] that w[as] designed to prevent prejudice.β I.F.βs theory is\nunpersuasive.\n\n 14\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\n The law on whether a district court can grant summary judgment on\nTitle IX student-on-student harassment claims is settled. Summary judgment\non Title IX claims is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes as to material\nfacts and the moving party is entitled to JML, and the Supreme Court agrees.\nDavis, 526 U.S. at 649. The district court did precisely that, granting summary\njudgment to LISD because βI.F. has not shown the existence of a material issue\nof fact under the objective standard applicable to review of a Title IX deliberate\nindifference claim.β Though I.F. attempts to alter this law by relying on asser-\ntions regarding the purpose of Title IX and the alleged consequences of grant-\ning summary judgment on these types of claims, her points are untenable.\nTheir logical endpoint is that a court would never be able to grant summary\njudgment against a claimant without essentially declaring that the movantβs\ninterests are more important than the claimantβs right to be free from Title IX\ndiscrimination. Consequently, I.F.βs points conflict with settled law.\n\n I.F. further supports her policy reasoning by misconstruing a statement\nby the district court regarding high school football. I.F. states that the court\nβtacitlyβ acknowledged that βjurors in the Eastern District of Texas will place\na greater emphasis on preserving a successful high-school football team than\non other conceivable public-policy goals,β such as preventing student-on-\nstudent harassment under Title IX. I.F. uses this interpretation to urge that\nthe district court should not be allowed to decide that jurors will favor high\nschool football as a matter of law, and, therefore, that the question of deliberate\nindifference should be decided by a jury. Understood in context, however, the\ndistrict courtβs statement was merely an explanation of why Denson-\nWhiteheadβs comment that I.F. would encounter difficulties if she βwent\nagainst the football teamβ was a legitimate, if inartful, concern. Therefore, I.F.\ncannot use the district courtβs observation to support her assertion that by\n\n 15\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nallowing courts to grant summary judgment on Title IX claims, they would be\ncountenancing putting football above preventing Title IX harassment and\neviscerating the antidiscrimination protections afforded by the statute.\n\n VI.\n Liability for student-on-student harassment under Title IX requires the\nclaimant to prove each of five elements. Therefore, to prevail on summary\njudgment for a claim of student-on-student harassment, a defendant school\ndistrict, as the moving party, must demonstrate that there is no genuine dis-\npute as to any one of the following material facts and that it is therefore\nentitled to JML: β(1) [The district] had actual knowledge of the harassment,\n(2) the harasser was under the districtβs control, (3) the harassment was based\non the victimβs sex, (4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and object-\ntively offensive that it effectively bar[red] the victimβs access to an educational\nopportunity or benefit, and (5) the district was deliberately indifferent to the\nharassment.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 165 (citation and internal quotation marks\nomitted).\n\n I.F. and LISD do not dispute prong (2) or (3): I.F.βs harassers, as stu-\ndents, were under LISDβs control, and the harassment was based on I.F.βs sex.\nThe parties dispute the other elements. Based on a de novo review of the rec-\nord, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to I.F., we determine that\nsummary judgment is appropriate in LISDβs favor because there is no genuine\ndispute that LISD was not deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs claims of\nharassment.\n\n A.\n The first material fact is whether LISD had actual knowledge of the\nharassment. I.F. asserts two distinct allegations of harassment: a sexual\n\n 16\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nassault on September 28, 2012, and incidents of sexual harassment following\nthe alleged sexual assault in the form of bullying and cyberbullying. The bully-\ning consists of three episodes: (1) bullying and harassment by fellow students\nin the two weeks following the alleged sexual assault, (2) cyberbullying com-\nprising Twitter posts, retweets, and likes that occurred on or around Decem-\nber 31, 2012, and January 1, 2013, and (3) cyberbullying in the form of har-\nassing Instagram posts in February 2013.\n\n First, for the sexual assault allegation, LISD had actual knowledge of\nthe harassment on October 15, 2012, when the Fletchers reported it to Denson-\nWhitehead. By October 16, Denson-Whitehead had reported the information\nshe had learned regarding the sexual assault to Dalton and Werneke. Second,\nfor the bullying complaint, LISD had actual knowledge of the harassment on\nOctober 10, when Fletcher contacted Denson-Whitehead to report that I.F. was\nbeing bullied. Denson-Whitehead informed Dalton of the bullying complaint\nby October 16. Third, for the Twitter cyberbullying complaint, LISD had actual\nknowledge of the harassment on January 7, when Fletcher went to Hebron and\nprovided Werneke with a list of students who she claimed had been cyber-\nbullying I.F. on Twitter and a copy of the alleged post that had started the\nharassment. Fourth, for the Instagram cyberbullying complaint, LISD had\nactual knowledge of the harassment on February 19, when Fletcher contacted\nWerneke and told her about photographs and harassing comments posted by\ntwo Instagram accounts. The next day, Werneke reported the complaint to\nDalton.\n\n LISD does not dispute that it had actual knowledge of the sexual assault\nand two forms of cyberbullying on the dates set forth above, but it does assert\nthat it did not have actual knowledge of βany sex-based bullying in connection\nwith the October 10, 2012, reportβ because Fletcherβs complaint to Denson-\n\n 17\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nWhitehead on that date did not implicate Title IX. LISD maintains that Flet-\ncher merely described that I.F. was being bullied generally, or at most, was\nexperiencing cheerleading bullying, but Fletcher did not give any information\nthat would lead Denson-Whitehead to believe the bullying was sex-based.\n\n Nevertheless, LISDβs contention is better directed at the question of\nLISDβs deliberate indifference, not whether it had actual knowledge of the\nbullying. Based on the evidence, it is indisputable that LISD had actual knowl-\nedge, through Denson-Whitehead, that I.F. was being bullied in some manner.\nThough the parties may dispute whether LISDβs response to that knowledge\nwas deliberately indifferent, the fact is that LISD knew of the harassment on\nthat day.\n\n B.\n The second material fact is whether the harassment was so severe, per-\nvasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred I.F.βs access to an\neducational opportunity or benefit. The MJ and the district court reached\ndifferent conclusions. The MJ determined that the harassing conduct I.F.\nendured βwas not severe, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable,β nor did it\nhave a concrete, negative effect on her access to education. Conversely, the\ndistrict court found that there was a genuine dispute concerning this material\nelement. The court determined that I.F. had provided evidence that, βif\nbelieved by a jury, could be a basis for a jury finding that the sexual harass-\nment was so severe, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable so as to have had a\nconcrete, negative effect on I.F.βs access to education.β Although neither side\nchallenges this finding on appeal, we are not bound by the partiesβ agreement\nbut must review the summary judgment de novo. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P.,\n864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Based on that de novo review,\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to I.F., we determine that I.F.\n\n 18\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nhas demonstrated a genuine dispute as to a material fact, namely, whether the\nharassment she endured was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive\nthat it effectively barred her access to an educational opportunity or benefit.\n\n First, I.F. has raised a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment\nshe endured was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. Her classmates\ncalled her a βwhoreβ and a βslut.β They spread rumors about her, talked about\nher loudly in her presence, and excluded her during cheerleading. One student\nasked her the race of the baby she would be having. Others asked whether she\nhad sex with multiple people and βhow did it feel to be fucked in every single\nhole of your body?β A.V., one of the students I.F. asserts raped her, βwore the\npants that he raped [I.F.] in to school, which had [her] blood on them from\nintercourse, and stood on the lunch table and said, these are the pants that\nI took [I.F.βs] virginity in.β Multiple football players called her a liar and told\nher that she was βgoing to ruin everything.β The harassment continued online,\nwith students commenting about I.F.βs alleged assault on Twitter and Insta-\ngram. As a result of the harassment, I.F. felt suicidal and depressed, began\ncutting herself, had nightmares, and experienced panic attacks. Therefore, she\nhas demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding whether the harassment was\nsevere, pervasive, and objectively offensive.\n\n Second, I.F. has raised a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment\neffectively barred her access to an educational opportunity or benefit because\nshe provided evidence that she felt that she could not return to Hebron on\naccount of the harassment. In her statement of events dated February 8, 2013,\nI.F. stated that βI asked [my parents] to pull me out of school because of the\nbullying, and that I didnβt want to be there with those two boys who raped me.β\nβI thought once the police and school heard about what happened to me that\nthey would arrest the boys and kick them out of school and I could go back to\n\n 19\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 20 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nschool, but no!β I.F. also asserted during her deposition that Fletcher had\ninformed LISD that I.F. could not βbe going to the same school as [her] rapists.β\nAccordingly, I.F. has presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute\nas to a material fact, namely, that the harassment she endured was so severe,\npervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred her access to an\neducational opportunity or benefit.\n\n C.\n The third material fact is whether LISD was deliberately indifferent to\nthe harassment. The MJ and the district court agreed that βthere is no issue\nof fact as to whether the district was deliberately indifferent.β Based on a de\nnovo review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\nI.F., we determine that I.F. has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of\nmaterial fact to show that LISDβs responses to I.F.βs alleged sexual assault on\nSeptember 28, 2012, and incidents of sexual harassment following the alleged\nsexual assault in the form of bullying and cyberbullying, were deliberately\nindifferent. Therefore, LISD is entitled to JML.\n\n 1.\n I.F. claims that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her alleged sexual\nassault because there was a βlengthy and unjustified delayβ before it began its\ninvestigation. I.F. rejects LISDβs contention that it was not cleared to inves-\ntigate the sexual assault allegation until mid-December 2012 and asserts that\nalthough CPD βfinished its criminal investigation on November 8, 2012, . . .\nLISD did not begin its investigation for nearly two months,β in January 2013.\nAside from generally averring that LISD should have initiated the investiga-\ntion soon after it received clearance from the police in early November 2012,\nI.F. proffers three reasons why LISDβs delay was unjustified.\n\n\n 20\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 21 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\n First, I.F. contends that the delayed investigation contravened the βDear\nColleague Letter,β sent to LISD and all other school districts in the United\nStates, by the U.S. Department of Educationβs Office for Civil Rights in 2011,\nwhich states that βa school . . . must promptly investigateβ potential harass-\nment and that βa law enforcement investigation does not relieve the school of\nits independent Title IX obligation to investigate the conduct.β 12 Second, she\nclaims the delay was motivated by LISDβs preference for its high school football\nprogram over the Title IX rights of its students. Third, I.F. asserts that the\ndistrict court mistakenly did not apply the reasoning of Williams v. Board of\nRegents of the University System of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007),\nwhich I.F. interprets as holding that a school may not delay its investigation\nin light of a pending criminal investigation where that investigation would not\naffect the schoolβs ability to institute its own procedures. Accepting I.F.βs ver-\nsion of when LISD received authorization from CPD to begin its investigation,\neach of I.F.βs claims nevertheless fails, and the evidence instead supports the\nconclusion that LISD was not deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs sexual assault\nallegation.\n\n I.F. misconstrues the Dear Colleague Letter by selectively quoting it.\nThough she claims that the letter states that a school district may not delay\nits investigation in light of a simultaneous criminal investigation, the letter\ncontains additional language regarding how a district should approach\ncoordinating its Title IX investigation with a criminal investigation:\n Although a school may need to delay temporarily the fact-finding\n portion of a Title IX investigation while the police are gathering\n evidence, once notified that the police department has completed\n\n\n\n 12 Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence 4, Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secβy for Civil\nRights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Depβt of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011),\nhttps://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.\n 21\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 22 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\n its gathering of evidence (not the ultimate outcome of the investi-\n gation or the filing of any charges), the school must promptly re-\n sume and complete its fact-finding for the Title IX investiga-\n tion.[ 13]\n LISD first learned of I.F.βs sexual assault allegation on October 15, 2012.\nThe next day, Langston requested that LISD refrain from investigating the\nmatter until CPD informed LISD that it could proceed because any LISD inves-\ntigation could interfere with the criminal investigation. According to I.F.,\nLISD received that authorization on November 8, 2012, and, thus, should have\nbegun its investigation at that time. Therefore, because it was complying with\nthe police request not to investigate for approximately three weeks between\nOctober 15 and November 8, LISD was not violating the letter during that\ntime.\n\n Furthermore, though LISD did not begin its investigation until January,\naccepting I.F.βs version of events, LISDβs delay after the initial three-week per-\niod was not because it was waiting for police authorization. Consequently,\nI.F.βs attempt to use the Dear Colleague Letterβs statements about coordination\nwith criminal investigationsβto demonstrate that LISD was deliberately\nindifferent during this periodβfails. To the extent that I.F. contends that\nLISD violated the letterβs mandate that school districts promptly resume their\ninvestigations after a criminal investigation has been completed, that is\nexactly the inquiry we are engaging in when we analyze whether LISDβs delay\nin beginning its investigation was deliberately indifferent. 14\n\n Next, even accepting I.F.βs allegation of Denson-Whiteheadβs statements\n\n\n 13 Id. at 10.\n The U.S. Department of Educationβs Office for Civil Rights has since rescinded the\n 14\n\nDear Colleague Letter. Dear Colleague Letter, Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Secβy for\nCivil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Depβt of Educ. (Sept. 22, 2017),\nhttps://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf.\n 22\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 23 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nas true, I.F. has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that Denson-\nWhiteheadβs statements evidence LISDβs deliberate indifference because they\nwere motivated by an animus against I.F. for attempting to βgo against the\nfootball team.β As the district court explained, at many high schools in Texas,\nthe football team and its games are a source of school and community pride.\nMany students are involved in the team or related organizations, such as the\ncheerleading squad or the band. Consequently, an individual who raises seri-\nous sexual assault allegations against members of the team may experience\nresistance.\n\n Denson-Whiteheadβs statement that βit was going to be very difficult\ngoing against the football teamβ must be construed in this context as express-\ning her concern to I.F. and her parents about this potential resistance. Denson-\nWhiteheadβs subsequent actions support this interpretation. She did not keep\nI.F.βs sexual assault allegation to herself or change details to make it seem less\nserious. Instead, the same day that she learned of the allegation, she informed\nWerneke and Langston, and the next day, she told Dalton. Though Denson-\nWhiteheadβs comment was inartful and could have been more tactful, it is not\nobjective evidence of deliberate indifference.\n\n Finally, I.F.βs reliance on Williams, an out-of-circuit case, is misplaced.\nThe Eleventh Circuit found that the University of Georgia was deliberately\nindifferent because it waited eight months after receiving a full police report\nbefore conducting a disciplinary hearing regarding an alleged sexual assault.\nThough the university tried to justify the delay by averring to the pending\ncriminal trials against the alleged assailants, the court rejected its contentions\nas insufficient. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1296β97.\n\n I.F.βs case is readily distinguishable from Williams. LISD did not delay\nits investigation after receiving a full police report or because criminal trials\n\n 23\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 24 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nwere pending. Instead, LISD delayed because of a specific directive from CPD.\nAccepting I.F.βs version of events as true, LISD then further delayed the inves-\ntigation for about two months, which included Thanksgiving break and the\nChristmas/New Years holidays. This delay was much shorter than the eight-\nmonth delay that the Williams court relied on, in part, in finding that the\nuniversity was deliberately indifferent.\n\n Contrary to I.F.βs theory that LISDβs delayed investigation shows delib-\nerate indifference, the evidence supports the conclusion that LISD performed\nan extensive investigation within a reasonable time. Accepting I.F.βs version\nof events that LISD received authorization to begin investigating the sexual\nassault allegation on November 8, 2012, LISDβs delay consisted of two periods:\nwaiting for police authorization from October 16, 2012, to November 8, 2012,\nand the November 8, 2012, to January 7, 2013, period. 15\n\n Though a delay in instituting remedial actions may constitute deliberate\nindifference under Title IX, 16 LISDβs twenty-eight school-day delay does not\nrise to that level. During that period, LISD was actively taking steps to provide\nrelief to I.F. It worked together with I.F.βs teachers to get her the work she\nwas missing during her absence and requested the teachers be flexible with\nI.F.βs workload, provided her with information regarding educational oppor-\ntunities outside of LISD, and assisted I.F. in enrolling in the Homebound\n\n\n\n\n 15Based on a 2012-year calendar and the dates for the vacation periods LISD provides,\nThanksgiving break and the Christmas/New Years holidays together consumed three full\nschool weeks.\n 16 See, e.g., Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 669β70 (2d Cir. 2012)\n(holding that a jury was within its power to find that a school district was deliberately indif-\nferent where it waited over a year to implement remedial action in response to a complaint);\nMatthews v. Nwankwo, 36 F. Supp. 3d 718, 725 (N.D. Miss. 2014) (holding that an unjustified\ndelay of two to three months in separating a complainant from the alleged assailantβs class\nwas deliberate indifference).\n 24\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 25 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nprogram. 17 In light of these known circumstances, the delay was not clearly\nunreasonable and thus was not deliberately indifferent. See Davis, 526 U.S.\nat 648; Sanches, 647 F.3d at 167β68.\n\n Once it began its investigation, moreover, LISDβs response was not\ndeliberately indifferent. It interviewed fourteen students about the alleged\nsexual assault and followed up with four students, including the two alleged\nassailants. It interviewed I.F., with her lawyer present, and accepted her writ-\nten statement. After reviewing the evidence, LISD concluded that it could not\nestablish, with sufficient evidence, that I.F. had been sexually assaulted at the\nparty, so there was no basis for any LISD discipline for sexual assault. Title IX\ndid not require LISD to take specific disciplinary actions, comply with parentsβ\nremedial demands, or comply with its own regulations in investigating the\ncomplaint. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648; Sanches, 647 F.3d at 169. Instead of being\nclearly unreasonable, to the contrary, LISDβs investigation was thorough and\nappropriate. Therefore, LISDβs response to I.F.βs sexual assault allegation was\nnot deliberately indifferent.\n\n 2.\n I.F. contends that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her October 10,\n2012, bullying complaints because it βnever undertook an investigation intoβ\nthem. Nevertheless, in light of the known circumstances, LISDβs response to\nthe harassment in the form of bullying was not deliberately indifferent.\n\n When Fletcher contacted Denson-Whitehead on October 10 to report that\nI.F. was being bullied, she did not give specific details. Fletcher stated that\nI.F. was being βseverely bulliedβ and opined that it could be cheerleading\n\n\n\n 17 Furthermore, I.F. was separated from her alleged assailants by her absence from\nschool and subsequent enrollment in the Homebound program.\n 25\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 26 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nbullying, but other than giving Denson-Whitehead the names of several stu-\ndents, who had bullied I.F. at her middle school, who Fletcher was unsure were\ninvolved, Fletcher βdidnβt have any namesβ for this bullying complaint.\nDenson-Whitehead said that she would speak with I.F. about the bullying\nwhen I.F. next attended school. But when I.F. returned to school on Friday,\nOctober 12, for the first time since Denson-Whitehead and Fletcherβs conver-\nsation, before Denson-Whitehead could speak with I.F., Fletcher emailed\nDenson-Whitehead to request that she not speak with I.F., and Denson-\nWhitehead complied.\n\n The following Monday, October 15, LISD learned of I.F.βs alleged sexual\nassault and shifted its focus to investigating that claim. After that date, I.F.\nnever provided a statement to LISD regarding the bullying, nor did the Flet-\nchers give LISD further details to supplement their earlier complaint about\nthe bullying. Therefore, in light of the known circumstances, LISDβs response\nto the bullying complaint was not clearly unreasonable and thus was not\ndeliberately indifferent.\n\n 3.\n I.F. does not specifically allege that LISD was deliberately indifferent to\nher complaints of cyberbullying through Twitter and Instagram. Because,\nhowever, I.F. asserts that the cyberbullying was sexual harassment under\nTitle IX, if there is a genuine dispute regarding whether LISD was deliberately\nindifferent to these complaints, summary judgment was inappropriate. Never-\ntheless, LISD was not deliberately indifferent to the cyberbullying complaints.\n\n In response to I.F.βs first cyberbullying complaint on January 7, 2013,\nLISD promptly interviewed nineteen students in early-to-mid January and\nreviewed the alleged offending social media posts. Though LISD concluded\nthat the posts did not constitute βbullyingβ as defined by LISD policy, it still\n 26\n\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 27 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n No. 17-40722\nconsidered them improper and hurtful. LISD therefore counseled the impli-\ncated students about inappropriate social media behavior, advised them not to\nengage in such behavior in the future, and contacted their parents.\n\n In response to I.F.βs second cyberbullying complaint on February 19,\n2013, LISD promptly reported the matter to CPD, which began an investiga-\ntion. As a result, one Hebron student was charged with criminal harassment,\nand LISD suspended him for three days and assigned him to the Disciplinary\nAlternative Education Program for thirty days as punishment.\n\n LISDβs responses to both cyberbullying complaints were reasonable\ninvestigatory efforts aimed at discovering who was responsible, determining\nwhether Title IX sexual harassment had occurred, and remedying offending\nconduct. Consequently, LISDβs investigation was not clearly unreasonable,\nand it was not deliberately indifferent.\n\n There is no error. The summary judgment is AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 27\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: I.F., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nCase: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n FILED\\n No. 17-40722 February 8, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\n\\n\\nI.F.,\\n\\n PlaintiffβAppellant,\\n\\nversus\\n\\nLEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,\\n\\n DefendantβAppellee.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Texas\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nBefore SMITH, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.\\nJERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:\\n\\n I.F., a former student, sued Lewisville Independent School District\\n(βLISDβ) for violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.\\n§§ 1681β1688 (2012), claiming that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her\\nalleged sexual harassment and retaliated against her by withholding Title IX\\nprotections. LISD moved for summary judgment, and I.F. moved for partial\\nsummary judgment. The district court granted in part and denied in part\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nLISDβs motion, finding that whereas the evidence did not establish a genuine\\ndispute of material fact regarding whether LISD was deliberately indifferent\\nto I.F.βs reports of sexual harassment and bullying, there was a genuine dis-\\npute of material fact regarding the retaliation claim. The court also denied\\nI.F.βs motion. I.F. appeals, challenging only the summary judgment on deliber-\\nate indifference. We affirm.\\n\\n I.\\n I.F. was a ninth-grade student at the Hebron High School Ninth Grade\\nCampus (βHebronβ) in LISD during the 2012β13 school year. On Friday, Sep-\\ntember 28, 2012, she attended a non-school-sponsored, non-school-affiliated\\nparty at the private residence of fellow Hebron student S.S. at which no LISD\\npersonnel were present. At the party, A.V. and I.G. engaged in sexual activity\\nwith I.F., which she claims was rape.\\n\\n When I.F. returned to school on Monday, her classmates began to harass\\nand bully her. According to the complaint, they called her a βwhoreβ and a\\nβslut,β asked whether she had sex with multiple people, and inquired βhow did\\nit feel to be fucked in every single hole of your body?β A.V. βwore the pants that\\nhe raped [I.F.] in to school, which had [her] blood on them from intercourse,\\nand stood on the lunch table and said, these are the pants that I took [I.F.βs]\\nvirginity in.β\\n\\n I.F. informed her mother, Jaime Fletcher (βFletcherβ), that she was being\\nbullied, and on October 10, Fletcher contacted Hebron counselor Debra\\nDenson-Whitehead to report the bullying but said nothing about sexual active-\\nity or assault. 1 Denson-Whitehead told Fletcher that she would speak with\\n\\n\\n 1 Fletcher stated during her deposition that she told Denson-Whitehead that βthereβs\\nsomething . . . horribly wrong. Something happened. I donβt know what, but my daughter is\\nbeing severely bullied, and itβs really bad.β Ms. Fletcher also told Denson-Whitehead that\\n 2\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nI.F. about the bullying when I.F. returned to school. But on Friday, October 12,\\nwhen I.F. next attended school, before Denson-Whitehead could speak with\\nI.F., Fletcher emailed Denson-Whitehead and told her not to speak with I.F.\\nthat day about the bullying. Denson-Whitehead complied and informed Flet-\\ncher that she would check in with I.F. the following week. Nevertheless, I.F.\\nnever physically attended any LISD school after October 12.\\n\\n That same day, I.F.βs parents (βthe Fletchersβ) learned for the first time\\nfrom other parents at a football game that I.F. allegedly had been sexually\\nassaulted. The Fletchers reported the assault to the Carrollton Police Depart-\\nment (βCPDβ), which opened an investigation.\\n\\n On Monday, October 15, the Fletchers met with Denson-Whitehead to\\ninform her that I.F. had been sexually assaulted at a party by two Hebron\\nstudents and that they had reported the assault to CPD, which had opened an\\ninvestigation. The Fletchers also gave Denson-Whitehead a list of students\\nwho they believed were involved. This meeting was the first time that Denson-\\nWhitehead learned of I.F.βs alleged sexual assault. Denson-Whitehead alleges\\nthat she expressed her shock and sorrow to the Fletchers and advised them\\nthat she would notify the administration. According to the Fletchers, Denson-\\nWhitehead told them that βit was going to be very difficult going against the\\nfootball teamβ and that βthe best thing for [I.F.] would be to transfer schools.β\\nAfter the meeting, Denson-Whitehead conveyed the information she had\\nlearned regarding the sexual assault to Hebron Assistant Principal Amanda\\nWerneke and Hebron School Resource Officer Cole Langston, who was also a\\npolice officer at CPD.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nshe didnβt know whether the bullying was cheerleading bullying, and there was a senior who\\nwas βsaying something,β but she βdidnβt have any names.β\\n 3\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n On October 16, 2012, Denson-Whitehead reported the same information\\nto Hebron Principal Mark Dalton. Dalton, Denson-Whitehead, and Werneke\\nconsulted with Langston about the alleged assault. Langston confirmed that\\nCPD had opened a case and was investigating the sexual assault. He requested\\nthat Hebron refrain from investigating the matter until CPD informed LISD\\nthat it could proceed because any LISD investigation could interfere with and\\npotentially compromise the criminal investigation. Dalton interpreted that\\nrequest to apply to both Fletcherβs complaint that I.F. was being bullied and\\nI.F.βs alleged sexual assault. Furthermore, both Daltonβs and Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs concerns about I.F.βs alleged sexual assault took precedence over\\nthe previously reported bullying. 2\\n\\n During this time, I.F. was not attending school, so LISD took steps to\\nensure that she earned credit for the classes she was taking. First, Dalton and\\nDenson-Whitehead worked together with I.F.βs teachers to get I.F. the work\\nshe needed to complete her first-grading-period classes. Dalton also requested\\nthat the teachers be flexible and informed them that I.F. need not complete all\\nwork that was expected from students who were regularly attending class.\\n\\n Second, Denson-Whitehead informed the Fletchers of several options for\\nI.F. to continue her education, including continuing to attend Hebron, enrolling\\nin Texas Tech online/correspondence courses, or transferring to a charter\\nschool. The Fletchers did not choose any of those options. Though they desired\\nthat I.F. return to Hebron, this was not an option unless her alleged assailants\\nwere removed from the school, and the online courses were outside their bud-\\nget. Instead, after finding out about the LISD Homebound program from the\\n\\n\\n 2Denson-Whitehead stated in her affidavit that β[w]hile not minimizing the purported\\nbullying of I.F., she considered [the] report of an alleged rape to be much more serious . . .,\\nparticularly given that Mrs. Fletcher had asked [her] . . . not to talk to I.F. about the\\nbullying.β\\n 4\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nChildrenβs Medical Center in Dallas, the Fletchers requested that LISD place\\nI.F. into that program.\\n\\n LISDβs Homebound program allows students who are unable to attend\\nschool for an extended period of time, for medical reasons, to work from home\\nand receive credit. LISD requires a physicianβs recommendation before a stu-\\ndent may be placed into the program. The Fletchers obtained that recommen-\\ndation, and LISD enrolled I.F. in the Homebound program by October 30,\\nwhere she remained for the rest of the 2012β13 school year.\\n\\n In early October 2012, Brian Brazil, Hebron High Schoolβs head football\\ncoach and athletic coordinator, was informed by a freshman football coach that\\nsome of the football players may have been involved in a party, where alcohol\\nwas consumed, thrown by S.S., a member of the freshman team. Brazil held a\\nmeeting with all the football players, where he discussed the rumor of alcohol\\nconsumption at a party and reminded them that LISDβs Extra-Curricular Code\\nof Conduct prohibited the consumption of alcohol.\\n\\n Following the meeting, he spoke with S.S. individually about the party,\\nincluding asking about the presence of alcohol and drugs. S.S. admitted that\\nhe had consumed alcohol at the party, but falsely stated that no other football\\nplayers were present at the party. Brazil suspended S.S. for two games for\\nviolating the alcohol consumption prohibition and spoke with S.S.βs father\\nabout his meeting with S.S.\\n\\n During the team-wide meeting and the individual meeting with S.S.,\\nBrazil discussed the party only in relation to alcohol and drugs. At that time,\\nhe did not know anything about the alleged sexual assault. Before he could\\ninterview other players, the Hebron administration advised him that the police\\nwere conducting an investigation into the party and that he should not speak\\nwith anyone else about the party.\\n 5\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n At the end of October 2012, Langston informed LISD that CPD had suf-\\nficiently progressed in its investigation of alcohol and drug consumption at the\\nparty that LISD could proceed with its own investigation of alcohol and drug\\nconsumption. Soon thereafter, at the beginning of November, Dalton in-\\nstructed Brazil to investigate the alcohol consumption issue with the football\\nplayers. Brazil interviewed several more players, including A.V. and I.G.; at\\nno point during any of those meetings was there mention of an alleged sexual\\nassault or alleged sexual misconduct by anyone at the party. After completing\\nhis investigation, Brazil reported to Dalton that only one student had admitted\\nto drinking and had been disciplined.\\n\\n In either early November or mid-December, the police authorized LISD\\nto proceed with its investigation into I.F.βs allegation of sexual assault. 3 Dur-\\ning that time, LISD schools were closed for both Thanksgiving break (Novem-\\nber 20β25, 2012) and Christmas/New Years break (December 21, 2012, to Jan-\\nuary 6, 2013). Beginning in early January 2013, Hebron conducted two simul-\\ntaneous investigations regarding I.F.: one concerning the allegation of sexual\\nassault and another concerning I.F.βs allegations of being cyberbullied.\\n\\n Werneke led both investigations. For the sexual assault investigation,\\nduring the month of January 2013, LISD interviewed fourteen students,\\nincluding A.V. and I.G. On February 19, LISD followed up with four students,\\nagain including A.V. and I.G., interviewing them a second time. Throughout\\nthe interviews, A.V. and I.G. were represented by counsel and did not answer\\nall of LISDβs questions. Nevertheless, A.V. and I.G. insisted that the sexual\\nactivity with I.F. was consensual. LISD also interviewed I.F., with her lawyer\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The parties disagree regarding when CPD authorized LISD to proceed with its inves-\\ntigation into sexual assault. LISD contends that the authorization occurred in mid-Decem-\\nber; I.F. asserts that it occurred in early November.\\n 6\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\npresent, and she gave a written statement.\\n\\n LISDβs investigation revealed that no adults or LISD personnel wit-\\nnessed the events at the September 28, 2012, party. Furthermore, the wit-\\nnesses gave conflicting accounts regarding who was involved, precisely what\\nhad occurred, how intoxicated the students were, and whether I.F.βs sexual\\nactivity with A.V. and I.G. was consensual. LISD found that it did not have\\nsufficient evidence that I.F. was sexually assaulted at the party. LISD con-\\ncluded, therefore, that there was no basis for any discipline for sexual assault.\\n\\n For the cyberbullying investigation, Werneke first became aware that\\nI.F. was being cyberbullied as she was beginning the sexual-assault investiga-\\ntion when Fletcher explained the situation in person and provided Werneke a\\nlist of names and the Twitter posting that had started the cyberbullying.\\nAssisted by Dalton and Assistant Principals Michael Vargas and James Scott,\\nWerneke interviewed nineteen students in early-to-mid-January and reviewed\\nseveral social media posts and photographs that Fletcher had provided. The\\ninvestigation revealed that the cyberbullying complaint stemmed from Twitter\\ntweets and retweets by Hebron High School students on or around Decem-\\nber 31, 2012, and January 1, 2013, and that appeared to be in response to a\\ntweet by I.F. regarding Christianity. Many of the implicated students had not\\nthemselves tweeted but had merely retweeted or liked a comment by another\\nstudent.\\n\\n LISD concluded that those social media posts did not amount to βbully-\\ningβ as defined by LISD policy because there was no indication that they oc-\\ncurred while the students were on school property or at a school-sponsored\\nactivity, they did not threaten harm to I.F.βs person or property, and they were\\nnot sufficiently pervasive to create a harassing environment. Nevertheless,\\nLISD did consider the postings βimproper and hurtful,β so LISD counseled the\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\ninterviewed students about improper social media conduct, advised them not\\nto engage in such behavior, and contacted their parents. Werneke received no\\nfurther complaints from the Fletchers regarding cyberbullying by the individu-\\nals involved in this phase of the cyberbullying investigation.\\n\\n On February 19, however, Fletcher informed Werneke of a different form\\nof cyberbullying I.F. was experiencing, this time arising from photographs and\\nharassing comments posted on two Instagram accounts. The next day, Wer-\\nneke reported the complaint to Langston and Dalton, and CPD began an inves-\\ntigation. Langston interviewed several Hebron students, including J.J.D., who\\nlater admitted that he had created one of the Instagram accounts and was\\nresponsible for all of the accountβs posts. 4 The police charged J.J.D. with crim-\\ninal harassment, and LISD suspended him for three days and then assigned\\nhim to the Disciplinary Alternative Education Program for thirty days as pun-\\nishment. After the Instagram cyberbullying complaint, the Fletchers made no\\nother cyberbullying complaints.\\n\\n Once LISD had completed the sexual assault and cyberbullying investi-\\ngations, it reported its findings to the Fletchers by letter dated April 5, 2013.\\nI.F. completed her ninth-grade coursework through the Homebound program\\nand advanced to the tenth grade at the end of the 2012β13 school year. There-\\nafter, the Fletchers withdrew her from LISD, and she never returned there as\\na student.\\n\\n II.\\n I.F. sued LISD for violating Title IX, asserting that LISD was deliber-\\nately indifferent to her alleged sexual harassment and retaliated against her\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 The other account was created by a former LISD student who had left LISD and was\\nattending a private school in Carrollton.\\n 8\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nby withholding Title IX protections. LISD moved for summary judgment on\\nall of I.F.βs claims, and I.F. moved for partial summary judgment to establish\\nthat she had proved two essential elements of her claims: (1) that she was\\nsexually assaulted by two classmates and (2) that she engaged in an activity\\nprotected under Title IX. The magistrate judge (βMJβ) granted LISDβs motion\\nand denied I.F.βs, determining that the alleged sexually harassing conduct was\\nnot βsevere, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable,β that LISDβs responses to\\nI.F.βs allegations of sexual assault, bullying, and cyberbullying were not delib-\\nerately indifferent, and that I.F. had failed to show any evidence of retaliatory\\nactions by LISD.\\n\\n I.F. objected to the MJβs order and report and recommendation in the\\ndistrict court. Considering the partiesβ motions de novo, the district court\\ngranted in part and denied in part LISDβs motion, finding that whereas the\\nevidence did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether\\nLISD was deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs reports of sexual harassment and\\nbullying, 5 there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding I.F.βs retali-\\nation claim. The retaliation claim proceeded to trial, and a jury returned a\\nverdict in favor of LISD.\\n\\n On appeal, I.F. challenges only the summary judgment for LISD on the\\ndeliberate indifference claim. She asserts that summary judgment was inap-\\npropriate because (1) the question of whether a school district acted with delib-\\nerate indifference generally should be decided by a jury; (2) the summary judg-\\nment evidence contained a factual dispute regarding when LISD should have\\ncommenced its investigation into I.F.βs reports of sexual assault, harassment,\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 Though the district court agreed with the MJ on this point, it found that I.F.βs har-\\nassment was sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive so as to have had a con-\\ncrete, negative effect on her access to education.\\n 9\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nand bullying; and (3) βallowing deliberate-indifference claims to be resolved by\\njury deliberations . . . serves the underlying purpose of discouraging gender-\\nbased 6 discrimination, which is the very purpose for which Title IX was enacted\\nin the first place.β\\n\\n III.\\n Title IX states that β[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis\\nof sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-\\njected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving\\nFederal financial assistance.β 20 U.S.C. Β§ 1681(a). βA school district that\\nreceives federal funds may be liable for student-on-student harassment if the\\ndistrict (1) had actual knowledge of the harassment, (2) the harasser was\\nunder the districtβs control, (3) the harassment was based on the victimβs sex,\\n(4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it\\neffectively bar[red] the victimβs access to an educational opportunity or benefit,\\nand (5) the district was deliberately indifferent to the harassment.β Sanches\\nv. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir.\\n2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n For a school district to be liable under Title IX, it must have been delib-\\nerately indifferent to student-on-student harassment. βDeliberate indifference\\nis an extremely high standard to meet.β Domino v. Tex. Depβt of Crim. Justice,\\n239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). A school districtβs βresponse to the harass-\\nment or lack thereof [must be] clearly unreasonable in light of the known\\ncircumstances.β Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ.,\\n526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). Because βdeliberate indifference . . . is . . . a lesser\\n\\n\\n 6I.F.βs reference to βgenderβ is entirely inappropriate. This case is about sex, not\\ngender. Title IX addresses sex and never mentions gender. We will flexibly treat I.F.βs claims\\nas regarding sex discrimination.\\n 10\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nform of intent rather than a heightened degree of negligence,β Leffall v. Dall.\\nIndep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quo-\\ntation marks omitted), neither negligent nor merely unreasonable responses\\nare enough, Sanches, 647 F.3d at 167. 7 βActions and decisions by officials that\\nare merely inept, erroneous, ineffective, or negligent do not amount to deliber-\\nate indifference . . . .β Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211,\\n219 (5th Cir. 1998). 8 Indeed, as the district court noted, our precedent βmakes\\nit clear that negligent delays, botched investigations of complaints due to the\\nineptitude of investigators, or responses that most reasonable persons could\\nhave improved upon do not equate to deliberate indifference.β 9\\n\\n School districts enjoy flexibility in responding to student-on-student har-\\nassment and βmay tailor their responses to the circumstances.β Lance,\\n743 F.3d at 1000. Title IX does not require school districts to purge themselves\\nof harassment, take specific disciplinary actions, nor comply with parentsβ\\nremedial demands. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. Even a school districtβs βfailure to\\ncomply with [its] regulations . . . does not establish the requisite . . . deliberate\\nindifference.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 169 (citation omitted). Given this flexibil-\\nity, βcourts should refrain from second-guessing the disciplinary decisions\\nmade by school administrators.β Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.\\n\\n\\n 7 See also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994) (β[D]eliberate indifference\\nentails something more than mere negligence . . . .β).\\n 8 See also Sanches, 647 F.3d at 168 (βIneffective responses . . . are not necessarily\\nclearly unreasonable.β).\\n 9 See Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 982, 997 (5th Cir. 2014)\\n(determining that the districtβs response to complainantβs bullying, despite several instances\\nof inaction, was not deliberately indifferent); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.,\\n220 F.3d 380, 388β89 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district was not deliberately indifferent\\ndespite its having erroneously concluded that the complainant had not been sexually as-\\nsaulted); Leffall, 28 F.3d at 531β32 (finding that the districtβs decision to hire two unarmed\\nsecurity guards for a school dance where a student was fatally shot established a lack of\\ndeliberate indifference despite awareness of the risk of violence).\\n 11\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n Accordingly, the strict nature of the deliberate indifference standard and\\nthe considerable flexibility school districts exercise in responding to harass-\\nment counsel that βTitle IX does not require flawless investigations or perfect\\nsolutions.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 170. Instead, school districts βmust merely\\nrespond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasona-\\nble.β Davis, 526 U.S. at 649.\\n\\n IV.\\n I.F. asserts that βgenerally,β β[t]he question of whether an action by a\\nschool district is βclearly unreasonable,ββ and therefore, that the school district\\nwas deliberately indifferent, βshould . . . be decided by juries.β Though she\\nacknowledges that judgment as a matter of law (βJMLβ) on deliberate indiffer-\\nence is permissible β[i]n an appropriate case,β id., she relies on principles from\\ncivil rights jurisprudence and qualified immunity to contend that the\\nβSupreme Court would prefer the deliberate-indifference issue to be resolved\\nby juries rather than judges.β\\n\\n I.F. first maintains that because the Supreme Court adopted the delib-\\nerate indifference standard from its civil rights jurisprudence, where the ques-\\ntion of deliberate indifference is routinely placed before juries, the issue should\\nbe decided by a jury in the Title IX context as well. Second, she states that\\nbecause the public policy underlying qualified immunity for individual govern-\\nmental employees does not apply to school districts, the question whether a\\nschool districtβs response to student-on-student harassment was not clearly\\nunreasonable, and therefore not deliberately indifferent, should be a question\\nof fact for a jury to decide. I.F. also attempts to distinguish Sanches by inter-\\npreting it to have found, unlike in the current case, βthat there was no evidence\\nin the record of sexual-based harassment . . . and, therefore, as a matter of law,\\nthe defendant school district could not have been deliberately indifferent to it.β\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nI.F.βs assertions conflict with uncontroverted Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit\\nprecedent, and her analogies to disparate areas of law are unavailing.\\n\\n First, the Supreme Court and this court recognize that in ruling on a\\nmotion for summary judgment, a district court can determine, as a matter of\\nlaw, that a party was not deliberately indifferent. βThe deliberate-indifference\\ninquiry does not transform every school disciplinary decision into a jury ques-\\ntion.β Nevills v. Mart Indep. Sch. Dist., 608 F. Appβx 217, 221 (5th Cir. 2015)\\n(per curiam) (citation omitted). Instead, β[i]n an appropriate case, there is no\\nreason why courts, on a motion . . . for summary judgment, . . . could not iden-\\ntify a response as not βclearly unreasonableβ as a matter of law.β Davis,\\n526 U.S. at 649. βWhether an officialβs response to actual knowledge of dis-\\ncrimination amounted to deliberate indifference . . . may appropriately be\\ndetermined on summary judgment.β Doe, 220 F.3d at 387.\\n\\n Following these principles, we have repeatedly upheld summary judg-\\nments after finding, as a matter of law, that a school districtβs response to har-\\nassment was not deliberately indifferent. 10 In the context of Title IX student-\\non-student harassment claims, summary judgment remains an appropriate\\ntool, and courts may grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute\\nof material fact regarding deliberate indifference. See Doe, 153 F.3d at 220 n.8.\\nTherefore, I.F.βs claim that courts should generally allow juries to decide the\\nquestion of deliberate indifference is merely an advocacy position not grounded\\nin the law. 11\\n\\n Second, I.F.βs attempt to rely on principles of qualified immunity is\\n\\n\\n 10 See, e.g., Nevills, 608 F. Appβx at 222; Lance, 743 F.3d at 997, 1000β01; Sanches,\\n647 F.3d at 167β70; Doe, 220 F.3d at 387β89.\\n 11 Moreover, I.F. concedes that we have βissued several opinions in recent years in\\nwhich [we have] affirmed summary judgments on deliberate-indifference claims arising out\\nof student-on-student harassment.β\\n 13\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nmeritless. Qualified immunity is not implicated in this appeal, and the doc-\\ntrine does not speak to whether I.F. raised a genuine dispute of material fact\\non deliberate indifference to avoid summary judgment. Therefore, the alleged\\nfact that questions of qualified immunity are often resolved as a matter of law\\nand that LISD cannot assert qualified immunity here, has no import in resolv-\\ning whether a district court may decide deliberate indifference as a matter of\\nlaw.\\n\\n Third, in attempting to distinguish Sanches, I.F. misconstrues its find-\\nings. Contrary to I.F.βs assertion, Sanches held the opposite and explicitly\\nstated that βthe district was not deliberately indifferent.β Sanches, 647 F.3d\\nat 170. Accordingly, I.F.βs claimβthat the question whether an action by a\\nschool district was clearly unreasonable, and, thus, that the district was delib-\\nerately indifferent, should generally be decided by a juryβis meritless.\\n\\n V.\\n I.F. claims that a district courtβs finding, as a matter of law, that a school\\ndistrict was not deliberately indifferent instead of allowing a jury to decide the\\nquestion βdissuades . . . potential future victims from pursuing their legal rem-\\nedies, thereby rewarding those who engage in the conduct that Title IX was\\nenacted to deter.β She likens her case to those of black plaintiffs β50 years agoβ\\nand asserts that βthis Court should not conclude today that Texansβ perceived\\nlove of high-school football should eviscerate a young womanβs right to a jury\\ntrial when her gender-discrimination claim potentially threatens the success\\nof an all-male football team.β At its core, I.F.βs policy reasoning is that allowing\\nclaims of Title IX student-on-student harassment to be decided by a court on\\nsummary judgment is contrary to Title IXβs βpurposeβ and will βeviscerate the\\nstatute[] that w[as] designed to prevent prejudice.β I.F.βs theory is\\nunpersuasive.\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n The law on whether a district court can grant summary judgment on\\nTitle IX student-on-student harassment claims is settled. Summary judgment\\non Title IX claims is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes as to material\\nfacts and the moving party is entitled to JML, and the Supreme Court agrees.\\nDavis, 526 U.S. at 649. The district court did precisely that, granting summary\\njudgment to LISD because βI.F. has not shown the existence of a material issue\\nof fact under the objective standard applicable to review of a Title IX deliberate\\nindifference claim.β Though I.F. attempts to alter this law by relying on asser-\\ntions regarding the purpose of Title IX and the alleged consequences of grant-\\ning summary judgment on these types of claims, her points are untenable.\\nTheir logical endpoint is that a court would never be able to grant summary\\njudgment against a claimant without essentially declaring that the movantβs\\ninterests are more important than the claimantβs right to be free from Title IX\\ndiscrimination. Consequently, I.F.βs points conflict with settled law.\\n\\n I.F. further supports her policy reasoning by misconstruing a statement\\nby the district court regarding high school football. I.F. states that the court\\nβtacitlyβ acknowledged that βjurors in the Eastern District of Texas will place\\na greater emphasis on preserving a successful high-school football team than\\non other conceivable public-policy goals,β such as preventing student-on-\\nstudent harassment under Title IX. I.F. uses this interpretation to urge that\\nthe district court should not be allowed to decide that jurors will favor high\\nschool football as a matter of law, and, therefore, that the question of deliberate\\nindifference should be decided by a jury. Understood in context, however, the\\ndistrict courtβs statement was merely an explanation of why Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs comment that I.F. would encounter difficulties if she βwent\\nagainst the football teamβ was a legitimate, if inartful, concern. Therefore, I.F.\\ncannot use the district courtβs observation to support her assertion that by\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nallowing courts to grant summary judgment on Title IX claims, they would be\\ncountenancing putting football above preventing Title IX harassment and\\neviscerating the antidiscrimination protections afforded by the statute.\\n\\n VI.\\n Liability for student-on-student harassment under Title IX requires the\\nclaimant to prove each of five elements. Therefore, to prevail on summary\\njudgment for a claim of student-on-student harassment, a defendant school\\ndistrict, as the moving party, must demonstrate that there is no genuine dis-\\npute as to any one of the following material facts and that it is therefore\\nentitled to JML: β(1) [The district] had actual knowledge of the harassment,\\n(2) the harasser was under the districtβs control, (3) the harassment was based\\non the victimβs sex, (4) the harassment was so severe, pervasive, and object-\\ntively offensive that it effectively bar[red] the victimβs access to an educational\\nopportunity or benefit, and (5) the district was deliberately indifferent to the\\nharassment.β Sanches, 647 F.3d at 165 (citation and internal quotation marks\\nomitted).\\n\\n I.F. and LISD do not dispute prong (2) or (3): I.F.βs harassers, as stu-\\ndents, were under LISDβs control, and the harassment was based on I.F.βs sex.\\nThe parties dispute the other elements. Based on a de novo review of the rec-\\nord, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to I.F., we determine that\\nsummary judgment is appropriate in LISDβs favor because there is no genuine\\ndispute that LISD was not deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs claims of\\nharassment.\\n\\n A.\\n The first material fact is whether LISD had actual knowledge of the\\nharassment. I.F. asserts two distinct allegations of harassment: a sexual\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nassault on September 28, 2012, and incidents of sexual harassment following\\nthe alleged sexual assault in the form of bullying and cyberbullying. The bully-\\ning consists of three episodes: (1) bullying and harassment by fellow students\\nin the two weeks following the alleged sexual assault, (2) cyberbullying com-\\nprising Twitter posts, retweets, and likes that occurred on or around Decem-\\nber 31, 2012, and January 1, 2013, and (3) cyberbullying in the form of har-\\nassing Instagram posts in February 2013.\\n\\n First, for the sexual assault allegation, LISD had actual knowledge of\\nthe harassment on October 15, 2012, when the Fletchers reported it to Denson-\\nWhitehead. By October 16, Denson-Whitehead had reported the information\\nshe had learned regarding the sexual assault to Dalton and Werneke. Second,\\nfor the bullying complaint, LISD had actual knowledge of the harassment on\\nOctober 10, when Fletcher contacted Denson-Whitehead to report that I.F. was\\nbeing bullied. Denson-Whitehead informed Dalton of the bullying complaint\\nby October 16. Third, for the Twitter cyberbullying complaint, LISD had actual\\nknowledge of the harassment on January 7, when Fletcher went to Hebron and\\nprovided Werneke with a list of students who she claimed had been cyber-\\nbullying I.F. on Twitter and a copy of the alleged post that had started the\\nharassment. Fourth, for the Instagram cyberbullying complaint, LISD had\\nactual knowledge of the harassment on February 19, when Fletcher contacted\\nWerneke and told her about photographs and harassing comments posted by\\ntwo Instagram accounts. The next day, Werneke reported the complaint to\\nDalton.\\n\\n LISD does not dispute that it had actual knowledge of the sexual assault\\nand two forms of cyberbullying on the dates set forth above, but it does assert\\nthat it did not have actual knowledge of βany sex-based bullying in connection\\nwith the October 10, 2012, reportβ because Fletcherβs complaint to Denson-\\n\\n 17\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nWhitehead on that date did not implicate Title IX. LISD maintains that Flet-\\ncher merely described that I.F. was being bullied generally, or at most, was\\nexperiencing cheerleading bullying, but Fletcher did not give any information\\nthat would lead Denson-Whitehead to believe the bullying was sex-based.\\n\\n Nevertheless, LISDβs contention is better directed at the question of\\nLISDβs deliberate indifference, not whether it had actual knowledge of the\\nbullying. Based on the evidence, it is indisputable that LISD had actual knowl-\\nedge, through Denson-Whitehead, that I.F. was being bullied in some manner.\\nThough the parties may dispute whether LISDβs response to that knowledge\\nwas deliberately indifferent, the fact is that LISD knew of the harassment on\\nthat day.\\n\\n B.\\n The second material fact is whether the harassment was so severe, per-\\nvasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred I.F.βs access to an\\neducational opportunity or benefit. The MJ and the district court reached\\ndifferent conclusions. The MJ determined that the harassing conduct I.F.\\nendured βwas not severe, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable,β nor did it\\nhave a concrete, negative effect on her access to education. Conversely, the\\ndistrict court found that there was a genuine dispute concerning this material\\nelement. The court determined that I.F. had provided evidence that, βif\\nbelieved by a jury, could be a basis for a jury finding that the sexual harass-\\nment was so severe, pervasive, or objectively unreasonable so as to have had a\\nconcrete, negative effect on I.F.βs access to education.β Although neither side\\nchallenges this finding on appeal, we are not bound by the partiesβ agreement\\nbut must review the summary judgment de novo. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P.,\\n864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Based on that de novo review,\\nviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to I.F., we determine that I.F.\\n\\n 18\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nhas demonstrated a genuine dispute as to a material fact, namely, whether the\\nharassment she endured was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive\\nthat it effectively barred her access to an educational opportunity or benefit.\\n\\n First, I.F. has raised a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment\\nshe endured was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. Her classmates\\ncalled her a βwhoreβ and a βslut.β They spread rumors about her, talked about\\nher loudly in her presence, and excluded her during cheerleading. One student\\nasked her the race of the baby she would be having. Others asked whether she\\nhad sex with multiple people and βhow did it feel to be fucked in every single\\nhole of your body?β A.V., one of the students I.F. asserts raped her, βwore the\\npants that he raped [I.F.] in to school, which had [her] blood on them from\\nintercourse, and stood on the lunch table and said, these are the pants that\\nI took [I.F.βs] virginity in.β Multiple football players called her a liar and told\\nher that she was βgoing to ruin everything.β The harassment continued online,\\nwith students commenting about I.F.βs alleged assault on Twitter and Insta-\\ngram. As a result of the harassment, I.F. felt suicidal and depressed, began\\ncutting herself, had nightmares, and experienced panic attacks. Therefore, she\\nhas demonstrated a genuine dispute regarding whether the harassment was\\nsevere, pervasive, and objectively offensive.\\n\\n Second, I.F. has raised a genuine dispute as to whether the harassment\\neffectively barred her access to an educational opportunity or benefit because\\nshe provided evidence that she felt that she could not return to Hebron on\\naccount of the harassment. In her statement of events dated February 8, 2013,\\nI.F. stated that βI asked [my parents] to pull me out of school because of the\\nbullying, and that I didnβt want to be there with those two boys who raped me.β\\nβI thought once the police and school heard about what happened to me that\\nthey would arrest the boys and kick them out of school and I could go back to\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 20 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nschool, but no!β I.F. also asserted during her deposition that Fletcher had\\ninformed LISD that I.F. could not βbe going to the same school as [her] rapists.β\\nAccordingly, I.F. has presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute\\nas to a material fact, namely, that the harassment she endured was so severe,\\npervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively barred her access to an\\neducational opportunity or benefit.\\n\\n C.\\n The third material fact is whether LISD was deliberately indifferent to\\nthe harassment. The MJ and the district court agreed that βthere is no issue\\nof fact as to whether the district was deliberately indifferent.β Based on a de\\nnovo review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\\nI.F., we determine that I.F. has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of\\nmaterial fact to show that LISDβs responses to I.F.βs alleged sexual assault on\\nSeptember 28, 2012, and incidents of sexual harassment following the alleged\\nsexual assault in the form of bullying and cyberbullying, were deliberately\\nindifferent. Therefore, LISD is entitled to JML.\\n\\n 1.\\n I.F. claims that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her alleged sexual\\nassault because there was a βlengthy and unjustified delayβ before it began its\\ninvestigation. I.F. rejects LISDβs contention that it was not cleared to inves-\\ntigate the sexual assault allegation until mid-December 2012 and asserts that\\nalthough CPD βfinished its criminal investigation on November 8, 2012, . . .\\nLISD did not begin its investigation for nearly two months,β in January 2013.\\nAside from generally averring that LISD should have initiated the investiga-\\ntion soon after it received clearance from the police in early November 2012,\\nI.F. proffers three reasons why LISDβs delay was unjustified.\\n\\n\\n 20\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 21 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n First, I.F. contends that the delayed investigation contravened the βDear\\nColleague Letter,β sent to LISD and all other school districts in the United\\nStates, by the U.S. Department of Educationβs Office for Civil Rights in 2011,\\nwhich states that βa school . . . must promptly investigateβ potential harass-\\nment and that βa law enforcement investigation does not relieve the school of\\nits independent Title IX obligation to investigate the conduct.β 12 Second, she\\nclaims the delay was motivated by LISDβs preference for its high school football\\nprogram over the Title IX rights of its students. Third, I.F. asserts that the\\ndistrict court mistakenly did not apply the reasoning of Williams v. Board of\\nRegents of the University System of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007),\\nwhich I.F. interprets as holding that a school may not delay its investigation\\nin light of a pending criminal investigation where that investigation would not\\naffect the schoolβs ability to institute its own procedures. Accepting I.F.βs ver-\\nsion of when LISD received authorization from CPD to begin its investigation,\\neach of I.F.βs claims nevertheless fails, and the evidence instead supports the\\nconclusion that LISD was not deliberately indifferent to I.F.βs sexual assault\\nallegation.\\n\\n I.F. misconstrues the Dear Colleague Letter by selectively quoting it.\\nThough she claims that the letter states that a school district may not delay\\nits investigation in light of a simultaneous criminal investigation, the letter\\ncontains additional language regarding how a district should approach\\ncoordinating its Title IX investigation with a criminal investigation:\\n Although a school may need to delay temporarily the fact-finding\\n portion of a Title IX investigation while the police are gathering\\n evidence, once notified that the police department has completed\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Dear Colleague Letter: Sexual Violence 4, Russlynn Ali, Assistant Secβy for Civil\\nRights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Depβt of Educ. (Apr. 4, 2011),\\nhttps://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.\\n 21\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 22 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\n its gathering of evidence (not the ultimate outcome of the investi-\\n gation or the filing of any charges), the school must promptly re-\\n sume and complete its fact-finding for the Title IX investiga-\\n tion.[ 13]\\n LISD first learned of I.F.βs sexual assault allegation on October 15, 2012.\\nThe next day, Langston requested that LISD refrain from investigating the\\nmatter until CPD informed LISD that it could proceed because any LISD inves-\\ntigation could interfere with the criminal investigation. According to I.F.,\\nLISD received that authorization on November 8, 2012, and, thus, should have\\nbegun its investigation at that time. Therefore, because it was complying with\\nthe police request not to investigate for approximately three weeks between\\nOctober 15 and November 8, LISD was not violating the letter during that\\ntime.\\n\\n Furthermore, though LISD did not begin its investigation until January,\\naccepting I.F.βs version of events, LISDβs delay after the initial three-week per-\\niod was not because it was waiting for police authorization. Consequently,\\nI.F.βs attempt to use the Dear Colleague Letterβs statements about coordination\\nwith criminal investigationsβto demonstrate that LISD was deliberately\\nindifferent during this periodβfails. To the extent that I.F. contends that\\nLISD violated the letterβs mandate that school districts promptly resume their\\ninvestigations after a criminal investigation has been completed, that is\\nexactly the inquiry we are engaging in when we analyze whether LISDβs delay\\nin beginning its investigation was deliberately indifferent. 14\\n\\n Next, even accepting I.F.βs allegation of Denson-Whiteheadβs statements\\n\\n\\n 13 Id. at 10.\\n The U.S. Department of Educationβs Office for Civil Rights has since rescinded the\\n 14\\n\\nDear Colleague Letter. Dear Colleague Letter, Candice Jackson, Acting Assistant Secβy for\\nCivil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Depβt of Educ. (Sept. 22, 2017),\\nhttps://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf.\\n 22\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 23 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nas true, I.F. has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs statements evidence LISDβs deliberate indifference because they\\nwere motivated by an animus against I.F. for attempting to βgo against the\\nfootball team.β As the district court explained, at many high schools in Texas,\\nthe football team and its games are a source of school and community pride.\\nMany students are involved in the team or related organizations, such as the\\ncheerleading squad or the band. Consequently, an individual who raises seri-\\nous sexual assault allegations against members of the team may experience\\nresistance.\\n\\n Denson-Whiteheadβs statement that βit was going to be very difficult\\ngoing against the football teamβ must be construed in this context as express-\\ning her concern to I.F. and her parents about this potential resistance. Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs subsequent actions support this interpretation. She did not keep\\nI.F.βs sexual assault allegation to herself or change details to make it seem less\\nserious. Instead, the same day that she learned of the allegation, she informed\\nWerneke and Langston, and the next day, she told Dalton. Though Denson-\\nWhiteheadβs comment was inartful and could have been more tactful, it is not\\nobjective evidence of deliberate indifference.\\n\\n Finally, I.F.βs reliance on Williams, an out-of-circuit case, is misplaced.\\nThe Eleventh Circuit found that the University of Georgia was deliberately\\nindifferent because it waited eight months after receiving a full police report\\nbefore conducting a disciplinary hearing regarding an alleged sexual assault.\\nThough the university tried to justify the delay by averring to the pending\\ncriminal trials against the alleged assailants, the court rejected its contentions\\nas insufficient. Williams, 477 F.3d at 1296β97.\\n\\n I.F.βs case is readily distinguishable from Williams. LISD did not delay\\nits investigation after receiving a full police report or because criminal trials\\n\\n 23\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 24 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nwere pending. Instead, LISD delayed because of a specific directive from CPD.\\nAccepting I.F.βs version of events as true, LISD then further delayed the inves-\\ntigation for about two months, which included Thanksgiving break and the\\nChristmas/New Years holidays. This delay was much shorter than the eight-\\nmonth delay that the Williams court relied on, in part, in finding that the\\nuniversity was deliberately indifferent.\\n\\n Contrary to I.F.βs theory that LISDβs delayed investigation shows delib-\\nerate indifference, the evidence supports the conclusion that LISD performed\\nan extensive investigation within a reasonable time. Accepting I.F.βs version\\nof events that LISD received authorization to begin investigating the sexual\\nassault allegation on November 8, 2012, LISDβs delay consisted of two periods:\\nwaiting for police authorization from October 16, 2012, to November 8, 2012,\\nand the November 8, 2012, to January 7, 2013, period. 15\\n\\n Though a delay in instituting remedial actions may constitute deliberate\\nindifference under Title IX, 16 LISDβs twenty-eight school-day delay does not\\nrise to that level. During that period, LISD was actively taking steps to provide\\nrelief to I.F. It worked together with I.F.βs teachers to get her the work she\\nwas missing during her absence and requested the teachers be flexible with\\nI.F.βs workload, provided her with information regarding educational oppor-\\ntunities outside of LISD, and assisted I.F. in enrolling in the Homebound\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15Based on a 2012-year calendar and the dates for the vacation periods LISD provides,\\nThanksgiving break and the Christmas/New Years holidays together consumed three full\\nschool weeks.\\n 16 See, e.g., Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 669β70 (2d Cir. 2012)\\n(holding that a jury was within its power to find that a school district was deliberately indif-\\nferent where it waited over a year to implement remedial action in response to a complaint);\\nMatthews v. Nwankwo, 36 F. Supp. 3d 718, 725 (N.D. Miss. 2014) (holding that an unjustified\\ndelay of two to three months in separating a complainant from the alleged assailantβs class\\nwas deliberate indifference).\\n 24\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 25 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nprogram. 17 In light of these known circumstances, the delay was not clearly\\nunreasonable and thus was not deliberately indifferent. See Davis, 526 U.S.\\nat 648; Sanches, 647 F.3d at 167β68.\\n\\n Once it began its investigation, moreover, LISDβs response was not\\ndeliberately indifferent. It interviewed fourteen students about the alleged\\nsexual assault and followed up with four students, including the two alleged\\nassailants. It interviewed I.F., with her lawyer present, and accepted her writ-\\nten statement. After reviewing the evidence, LISD concluded that it could not\\nestablish, with sufficient evidence, that I.F. had been sexually assaulted at the\\nparty, so there was no basis for any LISD discipline for sexual assault. Title IX\\ndid not require LISD to take specific disciplinary actions, comply with parentsβ\\nremedial demands, or comply with its own regulations in investigating the\\ncomplaint. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648; Sanches, 647 F.3d at 169. Instead of being\\nclearly unreasonable, to the contrary, LISDβs investigation was thorough and\\nappropriate. Therefore, LISDβs response to I.F.βs sexual assault allegation was\\nnot deliberately indifferent.\\n\\n 2.\\n I.F. contends that LISD was deliberately indifferent to her October 10,\\n2012, bullying complaints because it βnever undertook an investigation intoβ\\nthem. Nevertheless, in light of the known circumstances, LISDβs response to\\nthe harassment in the form of bullying was not deliberately indifferent.\\n\\n When Fletcher contacted Denson-Whitehead on October 10 to report that\\nI.F. was being bullied, she did not give specific details. Fletcher stated that\\nI.F. was being βseverely bulliedβ and opined that it could be cheerleading\\n\\n\\n\\n 17 Furthermore, I.F. was separated from her alleged assailants by her absence from\\nschool and subsequent enrollment in the Homebound program.\\n 25\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 26 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nbullying, but other than giving Denson-Whitehead the names of several stu-\\ndents, who had bullied I.F. at her middle school, who Fletcher was unsure were\\ninvolved, Fletcher βdidnβt have any namesβ for this bullying complaint.\\nDenson-Whitehead said that she would speak with I.F. about the bullying\\nwhen I.F. next attended school. But when I.F. returned to school on Friday,\\nOctober 12, for the first time since Denson-Whitehead and Fletcherβs conver-\\nsation, before Denson-Whitehead could speak with I.F., Fletcher emailed\\nDenson-Whitehead to request that she not speak with I.F., and Denson-\\nWhitehead complied.\\n\\n The following Monday, October 15, LISD learned of I.F.βs alleged sexual\\nassault and shifted its focus to investigating that claim. After that date, I.F.\\nnever provided a statement to LISD regarding the bullying, nor did the Flet-\\nchers give LISD further details to supplement their earlier complaint about\\nthe bullying. Therefore, in light of the known circumstances, LISDβs response\\nto the bullying complaint was not clearly unreasonable and thus was not\\ndeliberately indifferent.\\n\\n 3.\\n I.F. does not specifically allege that LISD was deliberately indifferent to\\nher complaints of cyberbullying through Twitter and Instagram. Because,\\nhowever, I.F. asserts that the cyberbullying was sexual harassment under\\nTitle IX, if there is a genuine dispute regarding whether LISD was deliberately\\nindifferent to these complaints, summary judgment was inappropriate. Never-\\ntheless, LISD was not deliberately indifferent to the cyberbullying complaints.\\n\\n In response to I.F.βs first cyberbullying complaint on January 7, 2013,\\nLISD promptly interviewed nineteen students in early-to-mid January and\\nreviewed the alleged offending social media posts. Though LISD concluded\\nthat the posts did not constitute βbullyingβ as defined by LISD policy, it still\\n 26\\n\\f Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 27 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\\n\\n\\n\\n No. 17-40722\\nconsidered them improper and hurtful. LISD therefore counseled the impli-\\ncated students about inappropriate social media behavior, advised them not to\\nengage in such behavior in the future, and contacted their parents.\\n\\n In response to I.F.βs second cyberbullying complaint on February 19,\\n2013, LISD promptly reported the matter to CPD, which began an investiga-\\ntion. As a result, one Hebron student was charged with criminal harassment,\\nand LISD suspended him for three days and assigned him to the Disciplinary\\nAlternative Education Program for thirty days as punishment.\\n\\n LISDβs responses to both cyberbullying complaints were reasonable\\ninvestigatory efforts aimed at discovering who was responsible, determining\\nwhether Title IX sexual harassment had occurred, and remedying offending\\nconduct. Consequently, LISDβs investigation was not clearly unreasonable,\\nand it was not deliberately indifferent.\\n\\n There is no error. The summary judgment is AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 27\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":598,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":8443874,"string":"8,443,874"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":"Randy COLE Karen Cole Ryan Cole v. Carl CARSON, - Randy Cole Karen Cole Ryan Cole v. Michael Hunter Martin Cassidy"},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Cole v. Carson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"No. 14-10228; cons. w/ No. 15-10045"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"020lead\", \"text\": \"\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415303/\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":""},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443874/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Randy COLE Karen Cole Ryan Cole v. Carl CARSON, - Randy Cole Karen Cole Ryan Cole v. Michael Hunter Martin Cassidy\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Randy COLE Karen Cole Ryan Cole v. Carl CARSON, - Randy Cole Karen Cole Ryan Cole v. Michael Hunter Martin Cassidy\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":599,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":4589527,"string":"4,589,527"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Randy Cole v. Michael Hunter"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2019-02-11"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"14-10228"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n _____________________\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n No. 14-10228 FILED\\n _____________________ February 8, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\nRANDY COLE; KAREN COLE; RYAN COLE,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nCARL CARSON,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\\ncons. w/No. 15-10045\\n\\nRANDY COLE; KAREN COLE; RYAN COLE,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nMICHAEL HUNTER; MARTIN CASSIDY,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellants\\n\\n __________________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Texas\\n __________________________\\n\\n ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC\\n\\n (Opinion September 25, 2015, 5 Cir., 2015, 802 F.3d 752)\\n (Opinion on Remand from U.S. Sup.Ct. September 25, 2018,\\n 5 Cir., 2018, 905 F.3d 334)\\n\\f No. 14-10228 c/w No. 15-10045\\n\\n\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN, ELROD,\\nSOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO,\\nDUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\nBY THE COURT:\\n\\n A member of the court having requested a poll on the petition for\\nrehearing en banc, and a majority of the circuit judges in regular active\\nservice and not disqualified having voted in favor,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/4366780/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"STEWART"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"JONES"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"SMITH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":"DENNIS; OWEN; ELROD; SOUTHWICK; HAYNES; GRAVES; HIGGINSON; COSTA; WILLETT; HO; DUNCAN; ENGELHARDT; OLDHAM"},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"STEWART\": \", Chief\", \"JONES\": \", Circuit\", \"SMITH\": \", Circuit\", \"DENNIS\": \", Circuit\", \"OWEN\": \", Circuit\", \"ELROD\": \", Circuit\", \"SOUTHWICK\": \", Circuit\", \"HAYNES\": \", Circuit\", \"GRAVES\": \", Circuit\", \"HIGGINSON\": \", Circuit\", \"COSTA\": \", Circuit\", \"WILLETT\": \", Circuit\", \"HO\": \", Circuit\", \"DUNCAN\": \", Circuit\", \"ENGELHARDT\": \", Circuit\", \"OLDHAM\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589527/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2019,"string":"2,019"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples β use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Randy Cole v. Michael Hunter\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\nDate decided: 2019-02-11\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n _____________________\n United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circuit\n\n No. 14-10228 FILED\n _____________________ February 8, 2019\n Lyle W. Cayce\n Clerk\nRANDY COLE; KAREN COLE; RYAN COLE,\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\n\nCARL CARSON,\n\n Defendant - Appellant\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\ncons. w/No. 15-10045\n\nRANDY COLE; KAREN COLE; RYAN COLE,\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\nv.\n\nMICHAEL HUNTER; MARTIN CASSIDY,\n\n Defendants - Appellants\n\n __________________________\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Texas\n __________________________\n\n ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC\n\n (Opinion September 25, 2015, 5 Cir., 2015, 802 F.3d 752)\n (Opinion on Remand from U.S. Sup.Ct. September 25, 2018,\n 5 Cir., 2018, 905 F.3d 334)\n\f No. 14-10228 c/w No. 15-10045\n\n\n\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN, ELROD,\nSOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO,\nDUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.\n\nBY THE COURT:\n\n A member of the court having requested a poll on the petition for\nrehearing en banc, and a majority of the circuit judges in regular active\nservice and not disqualified having voted in favor,\n\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only β only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits β only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1β7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1β9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1β3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0β3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2β4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area β see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT β AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes β 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) β 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation β 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits β 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline β 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law β 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions β 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto β 13 (Miscellaneous) β this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case β i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. Β§ 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act Β§ 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. Β§ 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare β use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. Β§ 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE β apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples β use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A β Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B β Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) β prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution β 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C β Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) β government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation β 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion β may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence β the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only β the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine β the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Randy Cole v. Michael Hunter\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2019-02-11\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nIN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\\n _____________________\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Fifth Circuit\\n\\n No. 14-10228 FILED\\n _____________________ February 8, 2019\\n Lyle W. Cayce\\n Clerk\\nRANDY COLE; KAREN COLE; RYAN COLE,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nCARL CARSON,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant\\n\\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\\ncons. w/No. 15-10045\\n\\nRANDY COLE; KAREN COLE; RYAN COLE,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellees\\nv.\\n\\nMICHAEL HUNTER; MARTIN CASSIDY,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellants\\n\\n __________________________\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Texas\\n __________________________\\n\\n ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC\\n\\n (Opinion September 25, 2015, 5 Cir., 2015, 802 F.3d 752)\\n (Opinion on Remand from U.S. Sup.Ct. September 25, 2018,\\n 5 Cir., 2018, 905 F.3d 334)\\n\\f No. 14-10228 c/w No. 15-10045\\n\\n\\n\\nBefore STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN, ELROD,\\nSOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO,\\nDUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\nBY THE COURT:\\n\\n A member of the court having requested a poll on the petition for\\nrehearing en banc, and a majority of the circuit judges in regular active\\nservice and not disqualified having voted in favor,\\n\\n IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the court en banc\\nwith oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a\\nbriefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}}],"truncated":false,"partial":false},"paginationData":{"pageIndex":5,"numItemsPerPage":100,"numTotalItems":31175,"offset":500,"length":100}},"jwt":"eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSJ9.eyJyZWFkIjp0cnVlLCJwZXJtaXNzaW9ucyI6eyJyZXBvLmNvbnRlbnQucmVhZCI6dHJ1ZX0sImlhdCI6MTc3ODQyNDEwNCwic3ViIjoiL2RhdGFzZXRzL2VpdGFucy1wdS9jbC1jb2RpbmctaW5wdXQiLCJleHAiOjE3Nzg0Mjc3MDQsImlzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vaHVnZ2luZ2ZhY2UuY28ifQ.wCM3RuX_any7sOKRUAIsZ8h7gZdiquU5nb9Ob_essjoZZwtl_B64wTsX_o_qe1U2xV4mG9d5v7EIBRxbI0RsDQ","displayUrls":true,"splitSizeSummaries":[{"config":"default","split":"train","numRows":31175,"numBytesParquet":1629387251}]},"discussionsStats":{"closed":0,"open":1,"total":1},"fullWidth":true,"hasGatedAccess":true,"hasFullAccess":true,"isEmbedded":false,"savedQueries":{"community":[],"user":[]}}">
id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
8,443,882 | DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW YORK v. State of NEW YORK, New York State Unified Court System, Janet DiFiore, as Chief Judge of the New York State Unified Court System, Lawrence K. Marks, as Chief Administrative Judge of the New York State Unified Court System | Disability Rights N.Y. v. New York | 2019-02-15 | Docket No. 17-2812-cv; August Term 2018 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Cabranes, Chin, Lynch", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415311/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CABRANES | CHIN | LYNCH | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443882/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,883 | James A. HARNAGE v. Rikel LIGHTNER, Dr. Wu, Dr. Pillai, Dr. O'Hallaran, Dr. Nagvi, P.A. Kevin McChrystal, P.A. Rob, L.P. N. Francis, Lisa Caldonero, Nurse Caroline, Nurse Nikki, RN Heidi Greene, Nurse Marissa, Nurse Miya, Nurse James, Dr. David M. Giles, Surgical Intern Shari, Jane Does, 1-5, John Does, 1-5 | Harnage v. Lightner | 2019-02-15 | No. 18-1559-pr; August Term 2018 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Cabranes, Calabresi, Chin", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415312/", "author_raw": "PER CURIAM"}]} | CABRANES | CALABRESI | CHIN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443883/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,884 | U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Successor (Wells Fargo Bank, NA), as Trustee (Registered Holders of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C6, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2007-C6 ), Acting By and Through Special Servicer CWCapital Asset Management LLC v. BANK OF AMERICA N.A. | U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Bank of Am. N.A. | 2019-02-15 | Docket No. 16-3560-cv; August Term 2017 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Chin, Leval, Livingston", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415313/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v... | CHIN | LEVAL | LIVINGSTON | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443884/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,591,904 | NRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo | 2019-02-20 | 17-783-cv | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SACK, PARKER, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUSANΒ L.Β CARNEY,Β CircuitΒ Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "17-783-cv\nNRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo\n\n\n 17-783-cv\n NRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo\n\n\n\n ... | SACK | PARKER | CARNEY | 1 | {"SACK": ", Circuit", "PARKER": ", Circuit", "CARNEY": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591904/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,591,905 | Dhinsa v. Krueger | 2019-02-20 | 17-874-pr | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "B e f o r e : CABRANES, CARNEY, Circuit Judges, and VILARDO, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SUSANΒ L.Β CARNEY,Β CircuitΒ Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "17-874-pr\nDhinsa v. Krueger\n\n\n 17-874-pr\n Dhinsa v. Krueger\n\n\n\n ... | CABRANES | CARNEY | VILARDO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591905/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,591,906 | CONNECTICUT FINE WINE AND SPIRITS, LLC, D/B/a, Total Wine & More, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Commissioner Michelle H. SEAGULL, Department of Consumer Protection, John Suchy, Director, Division of Liquor Control, Defendants-Appellees, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Connecticut, Inc., Connecticut Beer Wholesalers Association... | Connecticut Fine Wine and Spirits LLC v. Seagull | 2019-02-20 | Docket 17-2003-cv; August Term, 2017 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Pooler, Sack, Engelmayer", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "17-2003\nConnecticut Fine Wine and Spirits LLC v. Seagull\n\n\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT\n\n\n... | POOLER | SACK | ENGELMAYER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591906/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,885 | NRP HOLDINGS LLC, NRP Properties LLC v. CITY OF BUFFALO, Byron W. Brown, Demone A. Smith, Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency, Steven M. Casey, Richard A. Stenhouse, Buffalo Jeremiah Partnership for Community Development, Inc., John Doe 1-10, John Doe Companies, 1-5 | NRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo | 2019-02-20 | Docket No. 17-783-cv; August Term, 2017 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Carney, Parker, Sack", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415315/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CARNEY | PARKER | SACK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443885/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,903 | Gurmeet Singh DHINSA v. J. E. KRUEGER, as Warden of FCI Schuylkill | Dhinsa v. Krueger | 2019-02-20 | 17-874 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Cabranes, Carney, Vilardo", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415334/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CABRANES | CARNEY | VILARDO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443903/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,444,046 | CONNECTICUT FINE WINE AND SPIRITS, LLC, d/b/a, Total Wine & More v. Commissioner Michelle H. SEAGULL, Department of Consumer Protection, John Suchy, Director, Division of Liquor Control, Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Connecticut, Inc., Connecticut Beer Wholesalers Association, Inc., Connecticut Restaurant Association, ... | Conn Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull | 2019-02-20 | Docket No. 17-2003-cv; August Term, 2017 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Engelmayer, Pooler, Sack", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415484/", "author_raw": ""}]} | ENGELMAYER | POOLER | SACK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8444046/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,592,356 | Chunn v. Amtrak | 2019-02-21 | 17-3617-cv | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Before: KEARSE, JACOBS, SACK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DENNISΒ JACOBS,Β CircuitΒ Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "17β3617βcvΒ \nChunnΒ v.Β Amtrak\n\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n for the Second Circuit\n ... | KEARSE | JACOBS | SACK | 1 | {"KEARSE": ", Circuit", "JACOBS": ", Circuit", "SACK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592356/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,592,357 | Rafael CEARA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOCCS Officer Joseph DEACON, Defendant-Appellee. | Ceara v. Deacon | 2019-02-21 | 17-569-pr; August Term 2018 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Cabranes, Parker, Matsumoto", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "17-569-pr\nCeara v. Deacon\n\n\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n ... | CABRANES | PARKER | MATSUMOTO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592357/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,886 | Christopher CHUNN v. AMTRAK, P.O. Coleman, P.O. Looney, Drug Enforcement Administration Agency, Colon, Supervising John Doe, Agent, DEA Officer Alex Colon, Special Agent John Hannon | Chunn v. Amtrak | 2019-02-21 | No. 17-3617-cv; August Term 2018 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Jacobs, Kearse, Sack", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415316/", "author_raw": ""}]} | JACOBS | KEARSE | SACK | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443886/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,002 | Fernandez v. Capra | 2019-02-22 | 16-4053 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Before: JACOBS, CALABRESI, Circuit Judges; RAKOFF,* District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DENNISΒ JACOBS,Β CircuitΒ Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "16β4053Β \nFernandezΒ v.Β CapraΒ \nΒ \n\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n for the Second C... | JACOBS | CALABRESI | RAKOFF | 1 | {"JACOBS": ", Circuit", "CALABRESI": ", Circuit", "RAKOFF": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593002/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,593,435 | Fernandez v. Capra | 2019-02-22 | 16-4053 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Before: JACOBS, CALABRESI, Circuit Judges; RAKOFF,* District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DENNISΒ JACOBS,Β CircuitΒ Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "16β4053Β \nFernandezΒ v.Β CapraΒ \nΒ \n\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n for the Second C... | JACOBS | CALABRESI | RAKOFF | 1 | {"JACOBS": ", Circuit", "CALABRESI": ", Circuit", "RAKOFF": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593435/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,887 | Pablo FERNANDEZ v. Michael CAPRA, Christopher Artuz, Philip Heath, Charles Greiner | Fernandez v. Capra | 2019-02-22 | 16-4053 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Calabresi, Jacobs, Rakoff", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415317/", "author_raw": ""}]} | CALABRESI | JACOBS | RAKOFF | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443887/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,433 | United States v. Moore | 2019-02-25 | 16-1604 (L) | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Before: KATZMANN, Chief Judge, WALKER and POOLER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "No.Β 1:15-cr-27-1Β -Β ThomasΒ J.Β McAvoy,Β DistrictΒ Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "16β1604Β (L)Β \n UnitedΒ StatesΒ v.Β MooreΒ \n\n 1\n\n 2 In the\n 3 ... | KATZMANN | WALKER | POOLER | 1 | {"KATZMANN": ", Chief", "WALKER": ", Circuit", "POOLER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593433/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,593,434 | In RE: Irving H. PICARD, TRUSTEE FOR the LIQUIDATION OF BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT SECURITIES LLC | In re Picard | 2019-02-25 | Docket 17-2992(L); 17-2995; 17-2996; 17-2999; 17-3003; 17-3004; 17-3005; 17-3006; 17-3007; 17-3008; 17-3009; 17-3010; 17-3011; 17-3012; 17-3013; 17-3014; 17-3016; 17-3018; 17-3019; 17-3020; 17-3021; 17-3023; 17-3024; 17-3025; 17-3026; 17-3029; 17-3032; 17-3033; 17-3034; 17-3035; 17-3038; 17-3039; 17-3040; 17-3041; 17-3... | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Jacobs, Pooler, Wesley", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WESLEY,Β CircuitΒ Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "17β2992(L)Β \nInΒ reΒ PicardΒ \n Β \n UNITEDΒ STATESΒ COURTΒ OFΒ APPEALSΒ \n FORΒ THEΒ SECONDΒ CIRCUITΒ \n ... | JACOBS | POOLER | WESLEY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593434/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,888 | United States v. Calvin Stephon MOORE | United States v. Moore | 2019-02-25 | No. 16-1604 (L); No. 16-1624 (con); August Term, 2017 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Katzmann, Pooler, Walker", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415318/", "author_raw": ""}]} | KATZMANN | POOLER | WALKER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443888/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,594,889 | Levy v. BASF Metals, Ltd. | 2019-02-28 | 17-3823-cv | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Before: WINTER and POOLER, Circuit Judges, and ABRAMS, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JudgeΒ RonnieΒ Abrams,Β UnitedΒ StatesΒ DistrictΒ CourtΒ forΒ theΒ SouthernΒ DistrictΒ of", "type": "010combined", "text": "17β3823βcvΒ \n LevyΒ v.Β BASFΒ Metals,Β Ltd.Β \n\n\n 17β3823βcvΒ \n LevyΒ v.Β B... | WINTER | POOLER | ABRAMS | 1 | {"WINTER": ", Circuit", "POOLER": ", Circuit", "ABRAMS": ", District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594889/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,904 | Susan LEVY v. BASF METALS LIMITED, BASF Corporation, Goldman Sachs International, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co., Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P., ICBC Standard Bank PLC, UBS AG, UBS Securities LLC, HSBC Bank USA, N.A., London Platinum and Palladium Fixing Company Limited | Levy v. BASF Metals Ltd. | 2019-02-28 | Docket No. 17-3823 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | {"judges": "Abrams, Pooler, Winter", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415335/", "author_raw": "PER CURIAM"}]} | ABRAMS | POOLER | WINTER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443904/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,515 | James R. ADAMS v. GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE, Appellant. | James Adams v. Governor of Delaware | 2019-02-05 | 18-1045 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MCKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "FUENTES, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _________________\n\n No. 18-1045\n ... | MCKEE | RESTREPO | FUENTES | 1 | {"MCKEE": ", Circuit", "RESTREPO": ", Circuit", "FUENTES": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587515/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,872 | Jeffrey WORKMAN v. SUPERINTENDENT ALBION SCI District Attorney Philadelphia Attorney General Pennsylvania | Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI | 2019-02-06 | No. 16-1969 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Fuentes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415301/", "author_raw": ""}]} | FUENTES | FUENTES | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443872/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,588,420 | UNITED STATES of America v. Maliki Hassan CHAPMAN, A/K/A Terrence Wallace, Appellant | United States v. Maliki Chapman | 2019-02-07 | 17-1656 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "McKee, Vanaskie, Restrepo", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "without limitations. βThe sentencing judge has always", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n ____________\n\n No. 17-1656\n ____________... | MCKEE | VANASKIE | RESTREPO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588420/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,421 | UNITED STATES of America v. Kenneth DANIELS, Appellant | United States v. Kenneth Daniels | 2019-02-07 | 17-3503 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Krause, Cowen, Fuentes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "COWEN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n ______________\n\n No. 17-3503\n ______________\n\n UNITED ST... | KRAUSE | COWEN | FUENTES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588421/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,832 | UNITED STATES of America v. James GARNER, A/K/A ABD Al Rahman James Garner, Appellant | United States v. James Garner | 2019-02-08 | 17-1181 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Ambro, Shwartz, Fuentes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "AMBRO, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n ________________\n\n No. 17-1181\n ________________\n\n UNITED STATES O... | AMBRO | SHWARTZ | FUENTES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588832/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,589,785 | Jeffrey WORKMAN, Appellant v. SUPERINTENDENT ALBION SCI; District Attorney Philadelphia; Attorney General Pennsylvania | Jeffrey Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI | 2019-02-12 | 16-1969 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Ambro, Restrepo, Fuentes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 16-1969\n\n\n JEFFREY WORKMAN,\n Appellant\... | AMBRO | RESTREPO | FUENTES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589785/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,589,786 | Earl PATTERSON, Appellant v. PENNSYLVANIA LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD | Earl Patterson v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bo | 2019-02-12 | 17-2742 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Greenaway, Restrepo, Bibas", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n\n _____________\n\n No. 17-2742\n ... | GREENAWAY | RESTREPO | BIBAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589786/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,590,193 | James Adams v. Governor of Delaware | 2019-02-13 | 18-1045 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MCKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _________________\n\n No. 18-1... | MCKEE | RESTREPO | FUENTES | 1 | {"MCKEE": ", Circuit", "RESTREPO": ", Circuit", "FUENTES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4590193/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,590,194 | James Adams v. Governor of Delaware | 2019-02-13 | 18-1045 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MCKEE, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "FUENTES, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _________________\n\n No. 18-1045\n ... | MCKEE | RESTREPO | FUENTES | 1 | {"MCKEE": ", Circuit", "RESTREPO": ", Circuit", "FUENTES": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4590194/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,590,724 | Jerome MCKINNEY v. UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, Appellant | Jerome McKinney v. University of Pittsburgh | 2019-02-14 | 17-3084 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Hardiman, Krause, Bibas", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _______________\n\n No. 17-3084\n _______... | HARDIMAN | KRAUSE | BIBAS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4590724/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,590,725 | Adel DESSOUKI, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES of America, Respondent Adel Dessouki, Appellant v. Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security; Attorney General United States of America; Acting Director United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; Acting District Director United S... | Adel Dessouki v. Attorney General United States | 2019-02-14 | 17-3131; 18-1510; 18-2110 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Greenaway, Bibas, Fuentes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BIBAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _______________\n\n Nos. 17-3131 & 18-1510\n _____________... | GREENAWAY | BIBAS | FUENTES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4590725/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,591,284 | CITY OF PHILADELPHIA v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant | City of Philadelphia v. Attorney General United States | 2019-02-15 | Case 18-2648 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Ambro, Scirica, Rendell", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "District Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n\n\n Case No. 18-2648\n\n\n\n CITY OF PHILADELPHIA\n\n ... | AMBRO | SCIRICA | RENDELL | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591284/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,591,731 | Marie BRYAN v. GOVERNMENT OF the VIRGIN ISLANDS Naomi Clarke Thomas v. Government of the Virgin Islands Marie Bryan; Naomi Clarke Thomas, Appellants | Marie Bryan v. Government of the VI | 2019-02-19 | 18-1941 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Chagares, Hardiman, Restrepo", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n ___________\n\n No. 18-1941\n ___________\n\n M... | CHAGARES | HARDIMAN | RESTREPO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591731/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,591,732 | Carmen Josefina CONTRERAS AYBAR; Dario De Jesus Moreta Contrera, Appellants v. SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; Director United States Citizenship and Immigration Services; Director United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Vermont; Attorney General United States of America; United Stat... | Carmen Contreras Aybar v. Secretary United States Depart | 2019-02-19 | 18-1462 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Ambro, Scirica, Rendell", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "AMBRO, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n ________________\n\n No. 18-1462\n _______________... | AMBRO | SCIRICA | RENDELL | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591732/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,592,086 | In RE: Paul H. TITUS, Alleged Debtor Robert Shearer, Trustee Appellant in No. 17-3823 v. Paul H. Titus; Bonnie Titus, Appellants in No. 17-3701 | Shearer v. Titus (In Re Titus) | 2019-02-20 | 17-3701 & 17-3823 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Ambro, Shwartz, Fuentes", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "AMBRO, Circuit Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\nUNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n ________________\n\n Nos. 17-3701 & 17-3823\n ________________\n\n In re: PAUL H. TI... | AMBRO | SHWARTZ | FUENTES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592086/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,109 | Mary Barbato v. Greystone Alliance LLC | 2019-02-22 | 18-1042 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges (Opinion", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _______________\n\n N... | HARDIMAN | KRAUSE | BIBAS | 1 | {"HARDIMAN": ", Circuit", "KRAUSE": ", Circuit", "BIBAS": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593109/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,889 | Mary BARBATO v. GREYSTONE ALLIANCE, LLC Turning Point Capital Inc Crown Asset Management LLC Crown Asset Management LLC | Barbato v. Greystone Alliance, LLC | 2019-02-22 | No. 18-1042 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Bibas, Hardiman, Krause", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415319/", "author_raw": ""}]} | BIBAS | HARDIMAN | KRAUSE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443889/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,528 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Appellant v. SHIRE VIROPHARMA, INC. | Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Shire Viropharma, Inc. | 2019-02-25 | 18-1807 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, McKee, Fisher", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "SMITH, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _____________\n\n No. 18-1807\n _____________\n\n FEDERA... | SMITH | MCKEE | FISHER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593528/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,925 | UNITED STATES of America v. Donte ISLAND, A/K/A Norman Tomas, A/K/A Norman Thomas Donte Island, Appellant | United States v. Donte Island | 2019-02-26 | 17-3826 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Scirica, Rendell", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888066/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "040dissent", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/... | SCIRICA | RENDELL | SCIRICA | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593925/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,926 | Thomas SKΓLD, Appellant in 17-3148 v. GALDERMA LABORATORIES L.P.; Galderma Laboratories, Inc.; Galderma S.A.; Nestle Skin Health S.A., Appellants in 17-3231 | Thomas Skold v. Galderma Laboratories LP | 2019-02-26 | 17-3148; 17-3231 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "Chagares, Jordan, Vanaskie", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JORDAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _____________\n\n Nos. 17-3148 & 17-3231\n _____________\n\n ... | CHAGARES | JORDAN | VANASKIE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593926/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,594,518 | Jason PIASECKI, Appellant v. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, BUCKS COUNTY, PA; District Attorney Bucks County; Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania | Piasecki v. Court of Common Pleas, Bucks Cnty., PA | 2019-02-27 | 16-4175 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | {"judges": "McKee, Ambro, Restrepo", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "PRECEDENTIAL\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n _____________\n\n No. 16-4175\n _____________\n\n ... | MCKEE | AMBRO | RESTREPO | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594518/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,586,748 | Oscar Adilio CRUZ-QUINTANILLA, Petitioner, v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. | Oscar Cruz-Quintanilla v. Matthew Whitaker | 2019-02-01 | 17-2404 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Motz, Keenan, Harris", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-2404\n\n\nOSCAR ... | MOTZ | KEENAN | HARRIS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586748/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,201 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. James Eric JONES, Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. James Jones | 2019-02-04 | 18-6070 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Niemeyer, Wynn", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KING, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-6070\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF ... | KING | NIEMEYER | WYNN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587201/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,203 | BOOKING.COM B v. Plaintiff-Appellee, v. the UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ; Andrei Iancu, in His Official Capacity as Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Defendants-Appellants. American Intellectual Property Law Association, A... | Booking.com. B v. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office | 2019-02-04 | 17-2458; 17-2459 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Duncan, Wynn", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887963/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "035concurrenceinpart", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/... | KING | DUNCAN | WYNN | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587203/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,553 | Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land | 2019-02-05 | 18-1159 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | GREGORY | WYNN | HARRIS | 1 | {"GREGORY": ", Chief", "WYNN": ", Circuit", "HARRIS": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587553/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,587,555 | Charles Williams v. Bryan Stirling | 2019-02-05 | 18-2 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before NIEMEYER, AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "AGEE, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18... | NIEMEYER | AGEE | DIAZ | 1 | {"NIEMEYER": ", Circuit", "AGEE": ", Circuit", "DIAZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587555/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
8,443,873 | MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC v. 6.56 ACRES OF LAND, OWNED BY SANDRA TOWNES POWELL, Montgomery County Tax Map Parcel No. 015900 and being MVP Parcel No. VA-MO-3370 1.81 Acres of Land, Owned by Robert M. Jones and Donna Thomas Jones, Montgomery County Tax Map Parcel No. 024588 and being MVP Parcel No. VA-MO-5511 1.29 Ac... | Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land | 2019-02-05 | No. 18-1159; No. 18-1165; No. 18-1175; No. 18-1181; No. 18-1187; No. 18-1242; No. 18-1300 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Gregory, Harris, Wynn", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415302/", "author_raw": ""}]} | GREGORY | HARRIS | WYNN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443873/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,974 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Willie JOHNSON, Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Willie Johnson | 2019-02-06 | 18-4345 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Wilkinson, Harris, Quattlebaum", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-4345\n\n\n... | WILKINSON | HARRIS | QUATTLEBAUM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587974/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,978 | UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner - Appellee, v. Blake CHARBONEAU, Respondent - Appellant. | United States v. Blake Charboneau | 2019-02-06 | 17-7306 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Motz, Duncan, Quattlebaum", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-7306\n\n\nUNITED ST... | MOTZ | DUNCAN | QUATTLEBAUM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587978/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,983 | Garry CURTIS, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. PROPEL PROPERTY TAX FUNDING, LLC; Propel Financial Services, LLC, Defendants - Appellants. | Garry Curtis v. Propel Property Tax Funding | 2019-02-06 | 17-2114 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Duncan, Keenan, Diaz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-2114\n\n\nGARRY CURTI... | DUNCAN | KEENAN | DIAZ | 1 | {} | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587983/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,465 | TRANA DISCOVERY, INC., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. SOUTHERN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Defendant - Appellee. | Trana Discovery, Inc. v. Southern Research Institute | 2019-02-07 | 17-2136 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Diaz, Richardson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-2136\n\n\nTRAN... | KING | DIAZ | RICHARDSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588465/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,467 | JESUS CHRIST IS THE ANSWER MINISTRIES, INC.; Rev. Lucy Ware, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND; Board of Appeals of Baltimore County, Maryland, Defendants - Appellees. United States of America, Amicus Supporting Appellants. | Jesus Christ is the Answer Ministries, Inc. v. Balt. Cnty. | 2019-02-07 | 18-1450 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Niemeyer, Agee, Diaz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DIAZ, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1450\n\n\n... | NIEMEYER | AGEE | DIAZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588467/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,872 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Samuel PRATT, A/K/A Promise, Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Samuel Pratt | 2019-02-08 | 17-4489 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Motz, Agee, Diaz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DIAZ, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-4489\n\n\nUNITED STATES OF AM... | MOTZ | AGEE | DIAZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588872/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,877 | UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary of Labor, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. FIRE & SAFETY INVESTIGATION CONSULTING SERVICES, LLC; Christopher Harris, Individually and as Owner of Fire & Safety Investigation Consulting Services LLC, Defendants - Appellants. | U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Fire & Safety Investigation Consulting Servs., LLC | 2019-02-08 | 18-1632 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Gregory, Wynn, Thacker", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WYNN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1632\n\n\nUNITED STATE... | GREGORY | WYNN | THACKER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588877/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,878 | SUMMITBRIDGE NATIONAL INVESTMENTS III, LLC, Creditor - Appellant, v. Ollie William FAISON, Debtor - Appellee. | Summitbridge Nat'l Invs. III, LLC v. Faison | 2019-02-08 | 17-2441 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Floyd, Harris, Coggins", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-2441\n\n\n... | FLOYD | HARRIS | COGGINS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588878/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,886 | Evangeline J. PARKER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. REEMA CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., Defendant - Appellee. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; National Women's Law Center; A Better Balance; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO; American Association of University Women; American Sexual He... | Evangeline Parker v. Reema Consulting Services, Inc | 2019-02-08 | 18-1206 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Niemeyer, Agee, Diaz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887983/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "035concurrenceinpart", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/res... | NIEMEYER | AGEE | DIAZ | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588886/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,589,556 | United States v. Samuel Pratt | 2019-02-08 | 17-4489 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before MOTZ, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DIAZ, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-4... | MOTZ | AGEE | DIAZ | 1 | {"MOTZ": ", Circuit", "AGEE": ", Circuit", "DIAZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589556/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,589,555 | Caleigh WOOD, Plaintiff - Appellant, and John Wood; Melissa Wood, on Behalf of Her Minor Child, C.W., Plaintiffs, v. Evelyn ARNOLD; Shannon Morris, Defendants - Appellees, and Board of Education of Charles County; Charles County Public Schools, Defendants, Christian Action Network, Amicus Supporting Appellant. | Caleigh Wood v. Evelyn Arnold | 2019-02-11 | 18-1430 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Keenan, Wynn, Harris", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | KEENAN | WYNN | HARRIS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589555/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,589,849 | Eduardo Antonio RODRIGUEZ-ARIAS, Petitioner, v. Matthew G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. | Eduardo Rodriguez-Arias v. Matthew Whitaker | 2019-02-12 | 17-2211 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Donald C. COGGINS, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "FLOYD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF... | FLOYD | HARRIS | DONALD C COGGINS | 1 | {"FLOYD": ", Circuit", "HARRIS": ", Circuit", "C COGGINS": ", United States District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589849/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,591,332 | NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF ROANOKE, a Virginia Municipality, Defendant - Appellee, and Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Intervenor/Defendant - Appellee. | Norfolk Southern Railway v. City of Roanoke | 2019-02-15 | 18-1060 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Wilkinson, Wynn, Diaz", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888025/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/... | WILKINSON | WYNN | DIAZ | 1 | {} | 6 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591332/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,591,792 | HANNAH P., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel COATS, Director of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence McLean, VA, Defendant-Appellee, and Mark Ewing, in His Personal Capacity McLean, VA, Defendant. | Hannah P. v. Daniel Coats | 2019-02-19 | 17-1943 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Gregory, Thacker, Quattlebaum", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888034/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "035concurrenceinpart", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.co... | GREGORY | THACKER | QUATTLEBAUM | 1 | {} | 4 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4591792/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,592,127 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Gregory Kyle SEERDEN, Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Gregory Seerden | 2019-02-20 | 18-4124 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Wilkinson, Agee, Thacker", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THACKER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-4124\n\n\nUNITED STA... | WILKINSON | AGEE | THACKER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592127/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,592,596 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Nicholas YOUNG, Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Nicholas Young | 2019-02-21 | 18-4138 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Agee, Keenan, Richardson", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "AGEE, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-4138\n\n\nUNITED STAT... | AGEE | KEENAN | RICHARDSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592596/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,592,600 | United States v. Gregory Seerden | 2019-02-21 | 18-4124 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THACKER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | WILKINSON | AGEE | THACKER | 1 | {"WILKINSON": ", Circuit", "AGEE": ", Circuit", "THACKER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592600/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,592,605 | ACA FINANCIAL GUARANTY CORPORATION; UMB Bank, NA, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. CITY OF BUENA VISTA, VIRGINIA ; Public Recreational Facilities Authority of the City of Buena Vista, Virginia, Defendants - Appellees, and Russell J. Singer and Douglas L. Sbertoli, SR., Trustees. | ACA Financial Guaranty v. City of Buena Vista, Virginia | 2019-02-21 | 18-1268 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Gregory, Thacker, Quattlebaum", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1268\n\n\nA... | GREGORY | THACKER | QUATTLEBAUM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4592605/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,142 | Nikki Thomas v. Nancy Berryhill | 2019-02-22 | 17-2215 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before KING, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "FLOYD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | KING | FLOYD | THACKER | 1 | {"KING": ", Circuit", "FLOYD": ", Circuit", "THACKER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593142/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,593,143 | Mitra RANGARAJAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Defendant - Appellee. Mitra Rangarajan, United States of America, State of Maryland, Ex Rel., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation; Johns Hopkins Hospital, Incorporated, Trading as Johns Hopkins Medicine; Anthony Kalloo, ... | Mitra Rangarajan v. Johns Hopkins University | 2019-02-22 | 17-1834; 17-1835; 17-1836 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Gregory, Niemeyer, Harris", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-1834\n\n\nMITRA RANGA... | GREGORY | NIEMEYER | HARRIS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593143/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,595 | Sarah ROE, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Linda HOWARD, Defendant - Appellant, and Estate of Russell Howard, Defendant. | Sarah Roe v. Linda Howard | 2019-02-25 | 17-2338 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Wilkinson, King, Quattlebaum", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "KING, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 17-2338\n\n\nSARAH ROE... | WILKINSON | KING | QUATTLEBAUM | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593595/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,593,603 | Jesus Christ is the Answer v. Baltimore County, Maryland | 2019-02-25 | 18-1450 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DIAZ, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | NIEMEYER | AGEE | DIAZ | 1 | {"NIEMEYER": ", Circuit", "AGEE": ", Circuit", "DIAZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4593603/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,594,017 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paulette MARTIN, A/K/A Paulette Murphy, A/K/A Paulette Akuffo, A/K/A Paula Murphy, A/K/A Auntie, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis Felipe Mangual, Sr., Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Paulette Martin | 2019-02-26 | 17-6199; 17-6200 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Gregory, Motz, Floyd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | GREGORY | MOTZ | FLOYD | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594017/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,594,024 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Keith Wayne CARVER, Jr., Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Keith Carver, Jr. | 2019-02-26 | 18-4153 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Wilkinson, Niemeyer, King", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-4153\n\n\nUNITE... | WILKINSON | NIEMEYER | KING | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594024/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,594,028 | United States v. Antonio Tillmon | 2019-02-26 | 17-4648 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Before NIEMEYER, AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "AGEE, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n N... | NIEMEYER | AGEE | DIAZ | 1 | {"NIEMEYER": ", Circuit", "AGEE": ", Circuit", "DIAZ": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594028/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,594,567 | WILLIAMSON FARM, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DIVERSIFIED CROP INSURANCE SERVICES, A/K/A CGB Diversified Services, Inc., Defendant - Appellee. | Williamson Farm v. Diversified Crop Ins. Servs. | 2019-02-27 | 18-1463 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Keenan, Floyd, Thacker", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "THACKER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1463\n\n\nWILLIA... | KEENAN | FLOYD | THACKER | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594567/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,594,571 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Jesmene LOCKHART, A/K/A Jesmene Laquin-Montre Lockhart, A/K/A Jasmene Lockhart, Defendant - Appellant. | United States v. Jesmene Lockhart | 2019-02-27 | 16-4441 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Gregory, Keenan, Floyd", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 16-4441\... | GREGORY | KEENAN | FLOYD | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4594571/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,595,199 | SHARP FARMS; Robert W. May ; Tucker Farms Inc.; Worthington Farms, Inc., Objectors-Appellants, v. Teresa M. SPEAKS; Toby Speaks ; Stan Smith; Eddie Brown; Robert Poindexter ; Mike Mitchell; Roy L. Cook; Alex Shugart ; H. Randle Wood; Robin Rogers; Daniel Lee Nelson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, and U. S. Tobacco Cooperative I... | Teresa Speaks v. U. S. Tobacco Cooperative Inc. | 2019-02-28 | 18-1316; 18-1325 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Gregory, Thacker, Quattlebaum", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9888078/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/... | GREGORY | THACKER | QUATTLEBAUM | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595199/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,595,213 | GATEWAY RESIDENCES AT EXCHANGE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS UNION INSURANCE COMPANY, D/B/A ACE American Insurance Company, D/B/A ACE Environmental, D/B/A ACE USA, D/B/A ACE USA Companies, Defendant-Appellee. | Gateway Residences at Exch., LLC v. Ill. Union Ins. Co. | 2019-02-28 | 18-1491 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | {"judges": "Agee, Diaz, Harris", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DIAZ, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "PUBLISHED\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-1491\n\n\nGATEWAY RESIDENCES ... | AGEE | DIAZ | HARRIS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4595213/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,586,728 | United States v. David Hughes | 2019-02-01 | 18-20015 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "REVISED February 1, 2019\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n No. 18-... | REAVLEY | ELROD | WILLETT | 1 | {"REAVLEY": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586728/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,586,730 | ST. BERNARD PARISH, Through the St. Bernard Parish Government, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAFARGE NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee, v. Richard T. Seymour; Law Office of Richard T. Seymour, P.L.L.C., Movants-Appellants. | St. Bernard Parish v. Lafarge North America, Inc. | 2019-02-01 | 18-30029 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Stewart, Dennis, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-30029 Document: 00514819166 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Uni... | STEWART | DENNIS | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586730/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,586,916 | United States v. City of Meridian | 2019-02-01 | 17-60805 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before REAVLEY, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-60805 Document: 00514819440 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n ... | REAVLEY | ELROD | HIGGINSON | 1 | {"REAVLEY": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586916/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,586,919 | Joseph Dacar v. Saybolt L.P. | 2019-02-01 | 16-20751 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals\n Fifth Circu... | DAVIS | JONES | HIGGINSON | 1 | {"DAVIS": ", Circuit", "JONES": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586919/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,586,920 | Alexandro PUGA; Norma Puga, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. RCX SOLUTIONS, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant | Alexandro Puga v. About Tyme Transport, Inc | 2019-02-01 | 17-41282 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Stewart, King, Owen", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CARL E. STEWART, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-41282 Document: 00514820085 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | STEWART | KING | OWEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4586920/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,619,565 | UNITED STATES of America v. LAUDERDALE COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI Judge Veldore Young-Graham, in Her Official Capacity and Judge Lisa Howell, in Her Official Capacity | United States v. Lauderdale Cnty. | 2019-02-01 | No. 17-60805 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Elrod, Higginson, Reavley", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8598815/", "author_raw": ""}]} | ELROD | HIGGINSON | REAVLEY | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8619565/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,291 | In the MATTER OF: ONDOVA LIMITED COMPANY, Debtor Jeffrey Baron, Appellant v. Daniel J. Sherman ; Munsch, Hardt, Kopf & Harr, P.C.; Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees | Baron v. Sherman (In Re Ondova Ltd. Co.) | 2019-02-04 | 18-10182 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Reavley, Elrod, Willett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-10182 Document: 00514821265 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\n\n ... | REAVLEY | ELROD | WILLETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587291/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,865 | PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF GREATER TEXAS FAMILY PLANNING AND PREVENTATIVE HEALTH SERVICES, INC. Planned Parenthood San Antonio Planned Parenthood Cameron County Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc Planned Parenthood South Texas Surgical Center Jane Doe 1 Jane Doe 2 Jane Doe 4 Jane Doe 7 Jane Doe 9 Jane Doe 10 Jane Doe 11 v. ... | Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Family Planning & Preventative Health Servs., Inc. v. Smith | 2019-02-04 | No. 17-50282 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415292/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443865/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
4,587,545 | Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi | 2019-02-05 | 17-50282 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, CLEMENT, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision", "type": "010combined", "text... | STEWART | JONES | SMITH | 2 | DENNIS; CLEMENT; OWEN; ELROD; SOUTHWICK; HAYNES; GRAVES; HIGGINSON; COSTA; WILLETT; HO; DUNCAN; ENGELHARDT | {"STEWART": ", Chief", "JONES": ", Circuit", "SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "CLEMENT": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit", "SOUTHWICK": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "COSTA": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", ... | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587545/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,638 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Milo EADEN, Defendant-Appellant | United States v. Milo Eaden | 2019-02-05 | 18-50379 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Jolly, Jones, Dennis", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-50379 Document: 00514823508 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | JOLLY | JONES | DENNIS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587638/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,643 | Steve Vic PARKER, Also Known as Jerry Wilson, Petitioner-Appellant v. Lorie DAVIS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee | Steve Parker v. Lorie Davis, Director | 2019-02-05 | 15-20451 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Higginson, Costa", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 15-20451 Document: 00514823639 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | KING | HIGGINSON | COSTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587643/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,644 | Planned Parenthood of Grt TX v. Charles Smi | 2019-02-05 | 17-50282 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Judge Oldham is recused and did not participate in this decision", "type": "010combined", "text": "IN TH... | STEWART | JONES | SMITH | 2 | DENNIS; OWEN; ELROD; SOUTHWICK; HAYNES; GRAVES; HIGGINSON; COSTA; WILLETT; HO; DUNCAN; ENGELHARDT | {"STEWART": ", Chief", "JONES": ", Circuit", "SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit", "SOUTHWICK": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "COSTA": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit", "... | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587644/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,587,645 | In the MATTER OF: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Debtor New Industries, Incorporated, Appellant v. Allison D. Byman, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding, Incorporated; Estate of Martin M. Sneed, Sr., Appellees | New Indus., Inc. v. Byman (In Re Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc.) | 2019-02-05 | 18-40350 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before KING, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 18-40350 Document: 00514823377 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR ... | KING | HIGGINSON | COSTA | 1 | {"KING": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "COSTA": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4587645/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,890 | In the MATTER OF: SNEED SHIPBUILDING, INCORPORATED, Debtor New Industries, Incorporated v. Allison D. Byman, Chapter 11 Trustee of Sneed Shipbuilding, Incorporated Estate of Martin M. Sneed, Sr. | New Indus., Inc. v. Byman (In re Sneed Shipbuilding, Inc.) | 2019-02-05 | No. 18-40350 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Costa, Higginson, King", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415320/", "author_raw": ""}]} | COSTA | HIGGINSON | KING | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443890/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,150 | Nicole C. WITTMER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. PHILLIPS 66 COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee | Nicole Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Company | 2019-02-06 | 18-20251 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "James, Higginbotham, Elrod", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/9887973/", "author_raw": ""}, {"author": "", "type": "030concurrence", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/res... | JAMES | HIGGINBOTHAM | ELROD | 1 | {} | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588150/ | Published | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,151 | Kymberli GARDNER, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CLC OF PASCAGOULA, L.L.C., Doing Business as Plaza Community Living Center, Defendant - Appellee | Kymberli Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C. | 2019-02-06 | 17-60072 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "King, Dennis, Costa", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514825674 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/06/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | KING | DENNIS | COSTA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588151/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,549 | Lonnie Kade WELSH, Plaintiff - Appellant v. CORRECT CARE, L.L.C. ; Marsha McLane, TCCO Executive Director; Michael Searcy; Bill Vanier; Janie Salazar ; Mary Leaks; Brian Thomas, in His Individual Capacity as Director of TCCC; Amy Goldstein, in Her Individual Capacity as Head of Clinical Operations at TCCC; Christopher ... | Lonnie Welsh v. Correct Care. L.L.C. | 2019-02-07 | 17-11522 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Davis, Dennis, Jones", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-11522 Document: 00514827110 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n ... | DAVIS | DENNIS | JONES | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588549/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,550 | Kymberli Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C. | 2019-02-07 | 17-60072 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before KING, DENNIS, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-60072 Document: 00514827002 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n\n REVISED February 7, 2019\n\n IN THE UNITE... | KING | DENNIS | COSTA | 1 | {"KING": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "COSTA": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588550/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
4,588,552 | ALASKA ELECTRICAL PENSION FUND, Lead Plaintiff, Plaintiff - Appellant v. FLOTEK INDUSTRIES, INCORPORATED; John W. Chisholm ; H. Richard Walton; Robert M. Schmitz, Defendants - Appellees | Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flotek Indus., Inc. | 2019-02-07 | 17-20308 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Dennis, Clement, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JAMES L. DENNIS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-20308 Document: 00514827066 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n... | DENNIS | CLEMENT | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588552/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,860 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terry KELLY, Also Known as T.K., Defendant-Appellant. | United States v. Terry Kelly | 2019-02-08 | 17-60133 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Duncan, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-60133 Document: 00514827715 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT\n\... | SMITH | DUNCAN | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588860/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,862 | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jennifer Lynn RICHMOND, Defendant - Appellant | United States v. Jennifer Richmond | 2019-02-08 | 17-40299 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Graves, Costa, Bennett", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-40299 Document: 00514827910 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH ... | GRAVES | COSTA | BENNETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588862/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
4,588,864 | I.F., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEWISVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee. | Paul Fletcher v. Lewisville Indep Sch Dist | 2019-02-08 | 17-40722 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Smith, Duncan, Engelhardt", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "Case: 17-40722 Document: 00514828083 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2019\n\n\n\n\n IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT... | SMITH | DUNCAN | ENGELHARDT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4588864/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
8,443,874 | Randy COLE Karen Cole Ryan Cole v. Carl CARSON, - Randy Cole Karen Cole Ryan Cole v. Michael Hunter Martin Cassidy | Cole v. Carson | 2019-02-08 | No. 14-10228; cons. w/ No. 15-10045 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "020lead", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/8415303/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/8443874/ | Published | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||||
4,589,527 | Randy Cole v. Michael Hunter | 2019-02-11 | 14-10228 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | {"judges": "Before STEWART, Chief Judge, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, GRAVES, HIGGINSON, COSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR... | STEWART | JONES | SMITH | 2 | DENNIS; OWEN; ELROD; SOUTHWICK; HAYNES; GRAVES; HIGGINSON; COSTA; WILLETT; HO; DUNCAN; ENGELHARDT; OLDHAM | {"STEWART": ", Chief", "JONES": ", Circuit", "SMITH": ", Circuit", "DENNIS": ", Circuit", "OWEN": ", Circuit", "ELROD": ", Circuit", "SOUTHWICK": ", Circuit", "HAYNES": ", Circuit", "GRAVES": ", Circuit", "HIGGINSON": ", Circuit", "COSTA": ", Circuit", "WILLETT": ", Circuit", "HO": ", Circuit", "DUNCAN": ", Circuit", "... | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/4589527/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,019 | 2 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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