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The king commands: "Do you drink," "Do you mix the wine," "Do you sing," "Do you go," "Do you come." I obey that the game may be broken up through me. But if he says, "Think that you are in evil plight": I answer, "I do not think so"; and who compel me to think so? |
Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles. He who is appointed to play Agamemnon says to me, "Go to Achilles and tear from him Briseis." I go. |
He says, "Come," and I come. For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical arguments, so ought we to do in life. "Suppose it to be night." |
I suppose that it is night. "Well then; is it day?" No, for I admitted the hypothesis that it was night. |
"Suppose that you think that it is night?" Suppose that I do. "But also think that it is night." |
That is not consistent with the hypothesis. So in this case also: "Suppose that you are unfortunate." Well, suppose so. |
"Are you then unhappy?" Yes. "Well, then, are you troubled with an unfavourable demon?" |
Yes. "But think also that you are in misery." This is not consistent with the hypothesis; and Another forbids me to think so. |
How long then must we obey such orders? As long as it is profitable; and this means as long as I maintain that which is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are sour and of bad temper, and they say, "I cannot sup with this man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he fought in Mysia: 'I told you, brother, how I ascended the hill: then I began to be besieged again.'" |
But another says, "I prefer to get my supper and to hear him talk as much as he likes." And do you compare these estimates: only do nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one afflicted, nor as thinking that you are in misery, for no man compels you to that. Has it smoked in the chamber? |
If the smoke is moderate, I will stay; if it is excessive, I go out: for you must always remember this and hold it fast, that the door is open. Well, but you say to me, "Do not live in Nicopolis." I will not live there. |
"Nor in Athens." I will not live in Athens. "Nor in Rome." |
I will not live in Rome. "Live in Gyarus." I will live in Gyarus, but it seems like a great smoke to live in Gyarus; and I depart to the place where no man will hinder me from living, for that dwelling-place is open to all; and as to the last garment, that is the poor body, no one has any power over me beyond this. |
This was the reason why Demetrius said to Nero, "You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you." If I set my admiration on the poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave: if on my little possessions, I also make myself a slave: for I immediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as if the snake draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part of him which he guards; and do you he assured that whatever part you choose to guard, that part your master will attack. Remembering this, whom will you still flatter or fear? |
"But I should like to sit where the Senators sit." Do you see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are squeezing yourself. "How then shall I see well in any other way in the amphitheatre?" |
Man, do not be a spectator at all; and you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over, seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun yourself. |
For remember this general truth, that it is we who squeeze ourselves, who put ourselves in straits; that is, our opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For what is it to be reviled? Stand by a stone and revile it; and what will you gain? |
If, then, a man listens like a stone, what profit is there to the reviler? But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone the weakness of him who is reviled, then he accomplishes something. "Strip him." |
What do you mean by "him"? Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. "I have insulted you." |
Much good may it do you. This was the practice of Socrates: this was the reason why he always had one face. But we choose to practice and study anything rather than the means by which we shall be unimpeded and free. |
You say, "Philosophers talk paradoxes." But are there no paradoxes in the other arts? and what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye in order that he may see? |
If any one said this to a man ignorant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker? Where is the wonder then if in philosophy also many things which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced? In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we should provide against them Appearances to us in four ways: for either things appear as they are; or they are not, and do not even appear to be; or they are, and do not appear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be. |
Further, in all these cases to form a right judgement is the office of an educated man. But whatever it is that annoys us, to that we ought to apply a remedy. If the sophisms of Pyrrho and of the Academics are what annoys, we must apply the remedy to them. |
If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let us seek a remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to seek aid against habit. What aid then can we find against habit, The contrary habit. |
You hear the ignorant say: "That unfortunate person is dead: his father and mother are overpowered with sorrow; he was cut off by an untimely death and in a foreign land." Here the contrary way of speaking: tear yourself from these expressions: oppose to one habit the contrary habit; to sophistry oppose reason, and the exercise and discipline of reason; against persuasive appearances we ought to have manifest precognitions, cleared of all impurities and ready to hand. When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death is a necessary thing. |
For what shall I do, and where shall I escape it? Suppose that I am not Sarpedon, the son of Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way: "I will go and I am resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give to another the opportunity of doing so; if I cannot succeed in doing anything myself, I will not grudge another the doing of something noble." Suppose that it is above our power to act thus; is it not in our power to reason thus? |
Tell me where I can escape death: discover for me the country, show me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit. Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one, what do you wish me to do? |
I cannot escape from death. Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall I die lamenting and trembling? For the origin of perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen. |
Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my wish, I change them; but if I cannot, I am ready to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is not to endure to be deprived of the good, and not to endure the falling into the evil. Then, at last, when I am neither able to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who hinders me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can, Zeus and the rest of the gods. |
For if they do not care for me, what are they to me? "Yes, but you will be an impious man." In what respect then will it be worse for me than it is now? |
To sum up, remember this that unless piety and your interest be in the same thing, piety cannot be maintained in any man. Do not these things seem necessary? Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and make their objections. |
For I, as to my part, have no leisure for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defense of common consent. If I had a suit even about a bit of land, I would call in another to defend my interests. With what evidence then am I satisfied? |
With that which belongs to the matter in hand. How indeed perception is effected, whether through the whole body or any part, perhaps I cannot explain: for both opinions perplex me. But that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect certainty. |
"How do you know it?" When I intend to swallow anything, I never carry it to your b month, but to my own. When I intend to take bread, I never lay hold of a broom, but I always go to the bread as to a mark. |
And you yourselves who take away the evidence of the senses, do you act otherwise? Who among you, when he intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill? What then? |
Ought we not with all our power to hold to this also, the maintaining of general opinion, and fortifying ourselves against the arguments which are directed against it? Who denies that we ought to do this? Well, he should do it who is able, who has leisure for it; but as to him who trembles and is perturbed and is inwardly broken in heart, he must employ his time better on something else. |
That we ought not to he angry with men; and what are the small and the great things among men What is the cause of assenting to anything? The fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible then to assent to that which appears not to be true. |
Why? Because this is the nature of the understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with the false, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent. What is the proof of this? |
"Imagine, if you can, that it is now night." It is not possible. "Take away your persuasion that it is day." |
It is not possible. "Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the stars are even in number." It is impossible. |
When, then, any man assents to that which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato says; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit and the not fit, the profitable and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not, and whatever is like these. |
Can, then, a man think that a thing is useful to him and not choose it? He cannot. How says Medea? |
"'Tis true I know what evil I shall do, But passion overpowers the better council.'" She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her husband was more profitable than to spare her children. "It was so; but she was deceived." |
Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will not do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow except that which appears to herself? Nothing else. Why, then, are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered about the most important things, and is become a viper instead of a human creature? |
And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties which are supreme? Whoever, then, clearly remembers this, that to man the measure of every act is the appearance- whether the thing appears good or bad: if good, he is free from blame; if bad, himself suffers the penalty, for it is impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and he who suffers another person- whoever remembers this will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel with any man. "So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this origin, in the appearance?" |
Yes, this origin and no other. The Iliad is nothing else than appearance and the use of appearances. It appeared to Paris to carry off the wife of Menelaus: it appeared to Helen to follow him. |
If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have happened? Not only a wi would the Iliad have been lost, but the Odyssey also. "On so small a matter then did such great things depend?" |
But what do you mean by such great things? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of many men and cities. And what great matter is this? |
"Is it nothing?" But what great matter is the death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed? "Are these things, then, like those?" |
Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of oxen and sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the nests of storks. What is there in this great or dreadful? |
Or show me what is the difference between a man's house and a stork's nest, as far as each is a dwelling; except that man builds his little houses of beams and tiles and bricks, and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. "Are a stork and a man, then, like things?" What say you? |
In body they are very much alike. "Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork?" Don't suppose that I say so; but there is no difference in these matters. |
"In what, then, is the difference?" Seek and you will find that there is a difference in another matter. See whether it is not in a man the understanding of what he does, see if it is not in social community, in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence. |
Where then is the great good and evil in men? It is where the difference is. If the difference is preserved and remains fenced round, and neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man also is preserved; but if any of these things is destroyed and stormed like a city, then the man too perishes; and in this consist the great things. |
Paris, you say, sustained great damage, then, when the Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when his brothers perished. By no means; for no man is damaged by an action which is not his own; but what happened at that time was only the destruction of storks' nests: now the ruin of Paris was when he lost the character of modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency. When was Achilles ruined? |
Was it when Patroclus died? Not so. But it happened when he began to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he forgot that he was at Troy not to get mistresses, but to fight. |
These things are the ruin of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are corrupted. "When, then, women are carried off, when children are made captives, and when the men are killed, are these not evils?" How is it then that you add to the facts these opinions? |
Explain this to me also. "I shall not do that; but how is it that you say that these are not evils?" Let us come to the rules: produce the precognitions: for it is because this is neglected that we cannot sufficiently wonder at what men do. |
When we intend to judge of weights, we do not judge by guess: where we intend to judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge by guess. In all cases where it is our interest to know what is true in any matter, never will any man among us do anything by guess. But in things which depend on the first and on the only cause of doing right or wrong, of happiness or unhappiness, of being unfortunate or fortunate, there only we are inconsiderate and rash. |
There is then nothing like scales, nothing like a rule: but some appearance is presented, and straightway I act according to it. Must I then suppose that I am superior to Achilles or Agamemnon, so that they by following appearances do and suffer so many evils: and shall not the appearance be sufficient for me? And what tragedy has any other beginning? |
The Atreus of Euripides, what is it? An appearance. The OEdipus of Sophocles, what is it? |
An appearance. The Phoenix? An appearance. |
The Hippolytus? An appearance. What kind of a man then do you suppose him to be who pays no regard to this matter? |
And what is the name of those who follow every appearance? "They are called madmen." Do we then act at all differently? |
Chapter 29 On constancy The being of the Good is a certain Will; the being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. What then are externals? Materials for the Will, about which the will being conversant shall obtain its own good or evil. |
How shall it obtain the good? If it does not admire the materials; for the opinions about the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good: but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. God has fixed this law, and says, "If you would have anything good, receive it from yourself." |
You say, "No, but I have it from another." Do not so: but receive it from yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls me, I say, "Whom do you threaten If he says, "I will put you in chains," I say, "You threaten my hands and my feet." |
If he says, "I will cut off your head," I reply, "You threaten my head." If he says, "I will throw you into prison," I say, "You threaten the whole of this poor body." If he threatens me with banishment, I say the same. |
"Does he, then, not threaten you at all?" If I feel that all these things do not concern me, he does not threaten me at all; but if I fear any of them, it is I whom he threatens. Whom then do I fear? |
the master of what? The master of things which are in my own power? There is no such master. |
Do I fear the master of things which are not in my power? And what are these things to me? "Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings?" |
I hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them the power over things which they possess? Take my poor body, take my property, take my reputation, take those who are about me. |
If I advise any persons to claim these things, they may truly accuse me. "Yes, but I intend to command your opinions also." And who has given you this power? |
How can you conquer the opinion of another man? "By applying terror to it," he replies, "I will conquer it." Do you not know that opinion conquers itself, and is not conquered by another? |
But nothing else can conquer Will except the Will itself. For this reason, too, the law of God is most powerful and most just, which is this: "Let the stronger always be superior to the weaker." "Ten are stronger than one." |
For what? For putting in chains, for killing, for dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man has. The ten therefore conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. |
"In what then are the ten weaker," If the one possess right opinions and the others do not. "Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter?" How is it possible? |
If we were placed in the scales, must not the heavier draw down the scale in which it is? "How strange, then, that Socrates should have been so treated by the Athenians." Slave, why do you say Socrates? |
Speak of the thing as it is: how strange that the poor body of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged to prison by stronger men, and that any one should have given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it should breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange. do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things blame God? |
Had Socrates then no equivalent for these things, Where, then, for him was the nature of good? Whom shall we listen to, you or him? And what does Socrates say? |
"Anytus and Meletus can kill me, but they cannot hurt me": and further, he says, "If it so pleases God, so let it be." But show me that he who has the inferior principles overpowers him who is superior in principles. You will never show this, nor come near showing it; for this is the law of nature and of God that the superior shall always overpower the inferior. |
In what? In that in which it is superior. One body is stronger than another: many are stronger than one: the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. |
This is the reason why I also lost my lamp, because in wakefulness the thief was superior to me. But the man bought the lamp at this price: for a lamp he became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good bargain. |
Be it so. But a man has seized me by the cloak, and is drawing me to the public place: then others bawl out, "Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions? see you are dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded." |
And what system of philosophy could f have made so that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of my cloak, I should not be dragged off; that if ten men should have laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not be cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I have learned to see that everything which happens, if it be independent of my will, is nothing to me. |
I may ask if you have not gained by this. Why then do you seek advantage in anything else than in that in which you have learned that advantage is? Then sitting in prison I say: "The man who cries out in this way neither hears what words mean, nor understands what is said, nor does he care at all to know what philosophers say or what they do. |
Let him alone." But now he says to the prisoner, "Come out from your prison." If you have no further need of me in prison, I come out: if you should have need of me again, I will enter the prison. |
"How long will you act thus?" So long as reason requires me to be with the body: but when reason does not require this, take away the body, and fare you well. Only we must not do it inconsiderately, nor weakly, nor for any slight reason; for, on the other hand, God does not wish it to be done, and he has need of such a world and such inhabitants in it. |
But if he sounds the signal for retreat, as he did to Socrates, we must obey him who gives the signal, as if he were a general. "Well, then, ought we to say such things to the many?" Why should we? |
Is it not enough for a man to be persuaded himself? When children come clapping their hands and crying out, "To-day is the good Saturnalia," do we say, "The Saturnalia are not good?" By no means, but we clap our hands also. |
Do you also then, when you are not able to make a man change his mind, be assured that he is a child, and clap your hands with him, and if you do not choose to do this, keep silent. A man must keep this in mind; and when he is called to any such difficulty, he should know that the time is come for showing if he has been instructed. For he who is come into a difficulty is like a young man from a school who has practiced the resolution of syllogisms; and if any person proposes to him an easy syllogism, he says, "Rather propose to me a syllogism which is skillfully complicated that I may exercise myself on it." |
Even athletes are dissatisfied with slight young men, and say "He cannot lift me." "This is a youth of noble disposition." But when the time of trial is come, one of you must weep and say, "I wish that I had learned more." |
A little more of what? If you did not learn these things in order to show them in practice, why did you learn them? I think that there is some one among you who are sitting here, who is suffering like a woman in labour, and saying, "Oh, that such a difficulty does not present itself to me as that which has come to this man; oh, that I should be wasting my life in a corner, when I might be crowned at Olympia. |
When will any one announce to me such a contest?" Such ought to be the disposition of all of you. Even among the gladiators of Caesar there are some who complain grievously that they are not brought forward and matched, and they offer up prayers to God and address themselves to their superintendents entreating that they might fight. |
And will no one among you show himself such? I would willingly take a voyage for this purpose and see what my athlete is doing, how he is studying his subject. "I do not choose such a subject," he says. |
Why, is it in your power to take what subject you choose? There has been given to you such a body as you have, such parents, such brethren, such a country, such a place in your country: then you come to me and say, "Change my subject." Have you not abilities which enable you to manage the subject which has been given to you? |
"It is your business to propose; it is mine to exercise myself well." However, you do not say so, but you say, "Do not propose to me such a tropic, but such: do not urge against me such an objection, but such." There will be a time, perhaps, when tragic actors will suppose that they are masks and buskins and the long cloak. |
I say, these things, man, are your material and subject. Utter something that we may know whether you are a tragic actor or a buffoon; for both of you have all the rest in common. If any one then should take away the tragic actor's buskins and his mask, and introduce him on the stage as a phantom, is the tragic actor lost, or does he still remain? |
If he has voice, he still remains. An example of another kind. "Assume the governorship of a province." |
I assume it, and when I have assumed it, I show how an instructed man behaves. "Lay aside the laticlave and, clothing yourself in rags, come forward in this character." What then have I not the power of displaying a good voice? |
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