ParlaSpoof-BR / README.md
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metadata
configs:
  - config_name: default
    data_files:
      - split: train
        path: audio/**/*.parquet
annotations_creators:
  - expert-generated
  - machine-generated
language_creators:
  - found
  - machine-generated
language:
  - pt
license: cc-by-4.0
multilinguality:
  - monolingual
size_categories:
  - 100K<n<1M
source_datasets:
  - extended|other-camara-deputados-audio
task_categories:
  - audio-classification
task_ids:
  - speaker-identification
paperswithcode_id: parlaspoof-br
pretty_name: ParlaSpoof-BR
tags:
  - audio-deepfake-detection
  - synthetic-voice-detection
  - anti-spoofing
  - voice-cloning
  - speech-synthesis
  - political-speech
  - brazilian-portuguese

ParlaSpoof-BR: A Brazilian Portuguese Political Speech Audio Deepfake Dataset

License: CC BY 4.0 Dataset on Hugging Face Project Page

ParlaSpoof-BR is the first audio deepfake detection benchmark specifically designed for political speech in Brazilian Portuguese. Constructed from official recordings of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the dataset provides a domain-specific evaluation framework for electoral integrity and assesses detector robustness against modern zero-shot voice cloning, voice conversion, and semantically targeted partial manipulation (speech infilling).


📌 Key Features

  • Authentic Bona Fide Utterances: 2,000 real speech samples from 40 parliamentarians (20 male, 20 female), balanced across all 5 geographic regions of Brazil (North, Northeast, Center-West, Southeast, and South).
  • Full-Synthesis Attacks (TTS & VC):
    • 5 Zero-Shot TTS Models: Chatterbox Multilingual V3, XTTS-v2, OmniVoice, VoxCPM2, and Qwen3-TTS.
    • 5 Voice Conversion (VC) Models: Seed-VC, kNN-VC, OpenVoice-v2, X-VC, and EZ-VC.
  • Partial Manipulation Attacks (Speech Infilling):
    • Masked infilling via OmniVoice with word alignments provided by WhisperX.
    • LLM-Guided Semantic Attacks: Meaning-inverting edits (antonyms, numbers, names, phrases, and negations) preserving acoustic context.
    • Contiguous Resynthesis: Span resynthesis covering 25%, 50%, and 75% of the utterance duration.
  • Acoustic Robustness Perturbations:
    • Babble Noise Injection: Parliamentary background chatter added at 20 dB, 15 dB, and 10 dB SNR.
    • Lossy Codec Compression: Roundtrip transcoding for MP3 and OGG formats.
    • Speech Enhancement: Resemble Enhance, Demucs, and MetricGAN+.
  • Total Scale: 134,400 audio files (11,200 bona fide / 123,200 spoofed).

📊 Dataset Composition

The benchmark is partitioned into a Core Evaluation Set (unperturbed primary set) and a Robustness Set (acoustic perturbations and codec variants).

Label Subset / Source File Count
Bona fide Original Chamber of Deputies recordings 2,000
Bona fide Speech enhancement variants (Resemble Enhance, Demucs, MetricGAN+) 6,000
Bona fide Transcoded variants (MP3 / OGG $\rightarrow$ WAV) 3,200
Spoof Text-to-Speech (TTS) — 5 generators 10,000
Spoof Voice Conversion (VC) — 5 systems 10,000
Spoof Partial Manipulation (OmniVoice Infilling) 8,000
Spoof Babble Noise Injection (SNRs: 10, 15, 20 dB) 60,000
Spoof Transcoded variants (MP3 / OGG $\rightarrow$ WAV) 35,200
(Excluded) Voice-cloning reference prompts ($\ge$ 10s per speaker) 200
Summary Core Evaluation Set 30,000
Summary Robustness Variants Set 104,400
TOTAL Total Benchmark Files 134,400

📈 Benchmark Detector Performance

We evaluated three state-of-the-art audio anti-spoofing architectures (AASIST, AASIST-L, and DF-Arena-1B). The empirical results reveal a severe cross-domain generalization gap when models trained on standard benchmarks (such as ASVspoof) are applied to real-world political speech in Brazilian Portuguese.

Overall Performance on Core Evaluation Set (30,000 files)

Detector EER (%) $\downarrow$ AUC $\uparrow$ Precision Recall Macro-F1 Accuracy (%)
AASIST 50.98 0.481 0.911 0.923 0.503 84.85
AASIST-L 53.70 0.445 0.911 0.962 0.500 87.99
DF-Arena-1B 32.30 0.715 0.944 0.830 0.595 80.05

Note: AASIST and AASIST-L exhibit severe bias, classifying over 90% of genuine parliamentary speech as spoofed (False Positive Rates of 91.7% and 95.4%).

DF-Arena-1B Performance by Synthesis Generator

Attack Family Generator / Method EER (%) $\downarrow$ AUC $\uparrow$ Recall (%) $\uparrow$
VC OpenVoice-v2 19.6 0.892 99.7
VC kNN-VC 21.4 0.849 99.4
VC X-VC 23.2 0.820 98.1
VC Seed-VC 30.0 0.743 94.0
VC EZ-VC 36.0 0.671 83.1
TTS XTTS-v2 25.5 0.808 95.8
TTS Chatterbox Multilingual V3 26.1 0.799 96.5
TTS OmniVoice 33.9 0.705 87.5
TTS VoxCPM2 53.1 0.463 41.4
TTS Qwen3-TTS 58.0 0.390 31.2

🔍 Key Findings & Bias Analysis

  1. Methodological Bias Dominates Demographic Factors:
    • Synthesis Generator Choice: Massive disparity in detectability (a 68.5 pp gap between OpenVoice-v2 and Qwen3-TTS). Portuguese-optimized TTS models (e.g., VoxCPM2, Qwen3-TTS) evade detection at rates exceeding 60%.
    • Gender & Region: Demographic disparities are minimal in comparison (a 0.7 pp gap for gender and a 3.7 pp gap across regional accents).
  2. Efficacy of Partial Manipulation:
    • Replacing a few consequential words is significantly more stealthy than full utterance synthesis. The detection rate (recall) for DF-Arena-1B drops to 29.2% on 25% modified audio (compared to 73.5% on 75% modified audio).
  3. Codec Asymmetry and Noise Vulnerability:
    • Genuine audio transcoded via OGG causes a catastrophic 94.8% false positive rate in DF-Arena-1B, as compression artifacts closely mimic neural vocoder signatures.
    • Adding authentic background chatter (babble noise at 10 dB SNR) allows 22.2% of previously detected deepfakes to successfully evade detection.

📁 File Structure & Metadata

Each sample in the dataset includes automated transcriptions, word-level alignments (WhisperX), and rich metadata annotations:

{
  "id": "parlaspoof_br_001234",
  "speaker_id": "dep_042",
  "gender": "female",
  "region": "Norte",
  "label": "spoof",
  "attack_category": "partial_manipulation",
  "generator_model": "OmniVoice",
  "infill_strategy": "LLM_semantic_antonym",
  "modification_percentage": 0.15,
  "transcription": "O projeto de lei foi rejeitado na comissão.",
  "audio": {
    "path": "audio/spoof/infill/parlaspoof_br_001234.wav",
    "sampling_rate": 16000
  }
}

📜 License and Ethical Use

The ParlaSpoof-BR dataset is released under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), inheriting the open redistribution license of the official Chamber of Deputies audio archive.

  • Intended Use: Academic research, benchmarking audio forensics tools, supporting fact-checking initiatives, and bolstering democratic electoral integrity.
  • Prohibited Use: Malicious impersonation, synthesis of political disinformation, or any activity that violates electoral integrity regulations is strictly forbidden.