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rate 3.8 deaths/1,000 population Net migration rate -1.6 migrant(s)/1,000 population Urbanisation Urban Population: 24.7% of total population Rate of Urbanization: 3.91% annual rate of change Sex ratio At Birth: 1.05 male(s)/female 0–14 years: 1.06 male(s)/female 15–24 years: 1.06 male(s)/female 25–54 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 55–64 years: 1.07 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.88 male(s)/female Total Population: 1.04 male(s)/female (2020 est.) Maternal mortality rate 104 deaths/100,000 live births Life expectancy at birth Total population: 76.2 years Male: 73.5 years Female: 79 years (2020 est.) Total fertility rate 2.97 children born/woman (2020 est.) Health expenditure 5.2% of GDP Physicians density 0.2 physicians/1,000 population Hospital bed density 1.4 beds/1,000 population Nationality Solomon Islanders (noun) Solomon Islander (adjective) Ethnic groups Melanesian 95.3% Polynesian 3.1%	of Honiara is situated on Guadalcanal, the largest island. The other principal towns are Gizo, Auki, and Kirakira. Most Solomon Islanders are Christian, with the Anglican, Methodist, Roman Catholic, South Seas Evangelical, and Seventh-day Adventist faiths predominating. About 5% of the population maintain traditional beliefs. The chief characteristics of the traditional Melanesian social structure are: The practice of subsistence economy; The recognition of bonds of kinship, with important obligations extending beyond the immediate family group; Generally egalitarian relationships, emphasising acquired rather than inherited status; and A strong attachment of the people to the land. Most Solomon Islanders maintain this traditional social structure and find their roots in village life. Vital statistics Births and deaths The World Factbook demographic statistics The following demographic statistics are from The World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated. Population 685,097 Age structure 0–14 years: 32.99% (male 116,397/female 109,604) 15–24 years: 19.82% (male 69,914/female 65,874) 25–54 years: 37.64% (male 131,201/female 126,681) 55–64 years: 5.04% (male 17,844/female 16,704) 65 years and over: 4.51% (male 14,461/female 16,417) (2020 est.) Population growth rate 1.84% Birth rate 23.6 births/1,000 population Death rate 3.8 deaths/1,000 population Net migration rate -1.6 migrant(s)/1,000 population Urbanisation Urban Population: 24.7% of total population Rate of Urbanization: 3.91% annual rate of change Sex ratio At Birth: 1.05 male(s)/female 0–14 years: 1.06 male(s)/female 15–24 years: 1.06 male(s)/female 25–54 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 55–64 years: 1.07
in Bartholomew Ulufa'alu's election as Prime Minister, heading a coalition government, which christened itself the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change. In June 2000, an insurrection mounted by militants from the island of Malaita resulted in the brief detention of Ulufa’alu and his subsequent forced resignation. Prior to this Ulufa'alu had requested Australian intervention to stabilise the deteriorating situation in Solomon Islands, which was refused. Manasseh Sogavare, leader of the People's Progressive Party, was chosen Prime Minister by a loose coalition of parties. New elections in December 2001 brought Sir Allan Kemakeza into the Prime Minister's chair with the support of a coalition of parties. Bartholomew Ulufa’alu was Leader of the Opposition. Kemakeza, attempted to address the deteriorating law and order situation in the country, but the prevailing atmosphere of lawlessness, widespread extortion, and ineffective police, prompted a formal request by the Solomon Islands Government for outside help. In July 2003, Australian and Pacific Island police and troops arrived in the Solomon Islands under the auspices of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The mission, consisting of a policing effort, military support, and a large development component, largely restored law and order to Honiara and the other provinces of Solomon Islands. Efforts are now underway to identify a donor base and reestablish credible systems of governance and financial management. In the 2006 legislative election Kemakeza's People's Alliance Party suffered a major defeat, losing more than half its seats. However Deputy Prime Minister Synder Rini succeeded in gaining the support of enough Independent Members of Parliament to form government. This resulted in rioting in the capital of Honiara. Much of the violence was directed at Chinese businessmen who were accused of influencing the election result. Reinforcements to RAMSI stabilised the situation, but not before serious damage was done to the nation's already fragile economy. Rini resigned shortly before a motion of no confidence was due to take place, and was succeeded by Manasseh Sogavare, a former Prime Minister. The inability of RAMSI to oversee a peaceful election has raised serious doubts about the success of the mission. Land ownership Land ownership is reserved for Solomon Islanders. At the time of independence, citizenship was granted to all persons whose parents are or were both British	Minister following the national elections in June 1993, and headed the government until November 1994 when four Cabinet Ministers were allegedly bribed by a foreign logging company to shift their parliamentary loyalties and bring Solomon Mamaloni back to power. The national election of 6 August 1997 resulted in Bartholomew Ulufa'alu's election as Prime Minister, heading a coalition government, which christened itself the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change. In June 2000, an insurrection mounted by militants from the island of Malaita resulted in the brief detention of Ulufa’alu and his subsequent forced resignation. Prior to this Ulufa'alu had requested Australian intervention to stabilise the deteriorating situation in Solomon Islands, which was refused. Manasseh Sogavare, leader of the People's Progressive Party, was chosen Prime Minister by a loose coalition of parties. New elections in December 2001 brought Sir Allan Kemakeza into the Prime Minister's chair with the support of a coalition of parties. Bartholomew Ulufa’alu was Leader of the Opposition. Kemakeza, attempted to address the deteriorating law and order situation in the country, but the prevailing atmosphere of lawlessness, widespread extortion, and ineffective police, prompted a formal request by the Solomon Islands Government for outside help. In July 2003, Australian and Pacific Island police and troops arrived in the Solomon Islands under the auspices of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The mission, consisting of a policing effort, military support, and a large development component, largely restored law and order to Honiara and the other provinces of Solomon Islands. Efforts are now underway to identify a donor base and reestablish credible systems of governance and financial management. In the 2006 legislative election Kemakeza's People's Alliance Party suffered a major defeat, losing more than half its seats. However Deputy Prime Minister Synder Rini succeeded in gaining the support of enough Independent Members of Parliament to form government. This resulted in rioting in the capital of Honiara. Much of the violence was directed at Chinese businessmen who were accused of influencing the election result. Reinforcements to RAMSI stabilised the situation, but not before serious damage was done to the nation's already fragile economy. Rini resigned shortly before a motion of no confidence was due to take place, and was succeeded by Manasseh Sogavare, a former Prime Minister. The inability of RAMSI to oversee a peaceful election has raised serious doubts about the success of the mission. Land ownership Land ownership is reserved for Solomon Islanders. At the time of independence, citizenship was granted to all persons whose parents are or were both British protected persons and members of a group, tribe, or line indigenous to Solomon Islands. The law provides that resident expatriates, such as the Chinese and Kiribati, may obtain citizenship through naturalization. Land generally is held on a family or village basis and may be handed down from mother or father according to local custom. The islanders are reluctant to provide land for nontraditional economic undertakings, and this has resulted in continual disputes over land ownership. Military No military forces are maintained by Solomon Islands, although the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIP) of nearly 500 includes a border protection element. The police also have responsibility for fire service, disaster relief, and maritime surveillance. The police force is headed by a commissioner, appointed by the Governor General and responsible to the prime minister. See also Foreign relations of Solomon Islands References External links Parliament of Solomon Islands Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Constitutional Reform Unit Office of the Auditor General Central Bank of Solomon Islands Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Labour and Immigration Department of External Trade Ministry of Mines and Energy Politics
number: 7-digits Telekom: 7xx xxxx bmobile: 8xx xxxx Connectivity International Satellite: Leased geostationary and constellation Ka, Ku band satellites Undersea fibre: In January 2020, Solomon Islands was connected to Sydney, Australia via the Coral Seas Cable System (CS2) Earth stations: based in Honiara and Gizo Domestic Satellite: Leased, bi-directional geostationary satellites are used to connect Provinces too remote for microwave and fibre Undersea fibre: Interchange Cable Network 2 (ICN2S) In February 2020 as part of the Coral Seas Cable System project, Honiara (Guadalcanal Province) was also connected to Auki (Mataita Province), Taro (Choiseul Province) and Noro (Western Province) DSL, ADSL: To homes and businesses Fixed Wireless: Honiara Mobile: 2G/3G/4GLTE Radio Radio broadcast stations: AM 1, FM 4 Paoa FM, ZFM100, Wan FM, and Barava FM, shortwave 1 (2002). The Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation, founded in 1976, transmits regular programming. Radio Receivers: 57,000 (1997) In addition to regular broadcast stations, several shortwave utility station networks exist, such as the Church of Melanesia network. Television TTV is the Solomon Islands only television network and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Solomon Telekom Co. Ltd. (STCL). STCL operates under the brand name - Our Telekom. TTV transmits in digital HD and analogue and is a free-to-air, commercial, terrestrial television network, located in the capital, Honiara. History: The first television broadcast was made possible in July 1992 by STCL who downlinked the Barcelona Summer Olympics utilising the satellite antennas used to relay international	Parliament live to air on TTV ONE. 2019: Broadcast three analogue SD and sixteen 1080i/50 HD digital (DVB-T) channels in the VHF/UHF frequency bands. The HD channels, available in Honiara, are a mixture of overseas sport, news and entertainments channels. Two of the TTV branded analogue SD channels (TTV 1, TTV 2) are distributed to five major locations in the Solomons: Gizo, Noro, Munda, Auki and Lata. Distribution is via satellite and microwave links. Standards: TTV conforms to the Australian television frequencies for both analogue and digital transmissions and production (1080i/50). Channels: TTV branded channels include: TTV ONE, TTV TWO and TTV THREE. TTV ONE is the main commercial channel and carries a mixture of local and international sport, news and entertainment programming. Online: TTV is also streamed Online (as programme rights allow) and is accessible via the Our Telekom mobile network throughout the Solomons. The service is Geoblocked to the Solomons. Televisions: 3,000 (1997). Estimated viewership: 35,000 (2017) Internet Internet
marine: none (1999 est.) Airports: 36 (2012) Airports - with paved runways: total: 1 1,524 to 2,437 m: 1 (Honiara International Airport) (2012) Airports - with unpaved runways: total: 35 1,524 to 2,437 m: 1 914 to	(2002) Ports and harbors: Aola Bay, Honiara, Lofung, Noro, Viru Harbor, Yandina Merchant marine: none (1999 est.) Airports: 36 (2012) Airports - with paved runways: total: 1 1,524 to 2,437 m: 1 (Honiara International Airport) (2012) Airports - with unpaved runways: total: 35 1,524 to 2,437 m: 1 914 to 1,523 m: 9 under 914
the south. The official languages of Somalia are Somali and Arabic. Most people in the country are Muslims, the majority of them Sunni. In antiquity, Somalia was an important commercial center. It is among the most probable locations of the fabled ancient Land of Punt. During the Middle Ages, several powerful Somali empires dominated the regional trade, including the Ajuran Sultanate, the Adal Sultanate, and the Sultanate of the Geledi. In the late 19th century, Somali Sultanates like the Isaaq Sultanate and the Majeerteen Sultanate were colonized by Italy, Britain and Ethiopia. European colonists merged the tribal territories into two colonies, which were Italian Somaliland and the British Somaliland Protectorate. Meanwhile, in the interior, the Dervishes lead by Mohammed Abdullah Hassan engaged in a two-decade confrontation against Abyssinia, Italian Somaliland, and British Somaliland and were finally defeated in the 1920 Somaliland Campaign. Italy acquired full control of the northeastern, central, and southern parts of the area after successfully waging the Campaign of the Sultanates against the ruling Majeerteen Sultanate and Sultanate of Hobyo. In 1960, the two territories united to form the independent Somali Republic under a civilian government. The Supreme Revolutionary Council seized power in 1969 and established the Somali Democratic Republic, brutally attempting to squash the Somaliland War of Independence in the north of the country. The SRC subsequently collapsed 22 years later, in 1991, with the onset of the Somali Civil War and Somaliland soon declared independence. Somaliland still controls the northwestern portion of Somalia representing just over 27% of its territory. Since this period most regions returned to customary and religious law. In the early 2000s, a number of interim federal administrations were created. The Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in 2000, followed by the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, which reestablished the Somali Armed Forces. In 2006, with a US backed Ethiopian intervention, the TFG assumed control of most of the nation's southern conflict zones from the newly formed Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU subsequently splintered into more radical groups, such as Al-Shabaab, which battled the TFG and its AMISOM allies for control of the region. By mid-2012, the insurgents had lost most of the territory they had seized, and a search for more permanent democratic institutions began. Despite this, insurgents still control much of central and southern Somalia, and wield influence in government-controlled areas, with the town of Jilib acting as the insurgents' de-facto capital. A new provisional constitution was passed in August 2012, reforming Somalia as a federation. The same month, the Federal Government of Somalia was formed and a period of reconstruction began in Mogadishu. Somalia has maintained an informal economy mainly based on livestock, remittances from Somalis working abroad, and telecommunications. It is a member of the United Nations, the Arab League, African Union, Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. History Prehistory Somalia was likely one of the first lands to be settled by early humans due to its location. Hunter-gatherers who would later migrate out of Africa likely settled here before their migrations. During the Stone Age, the Doian and Hargeisan cultures flourished here. The oldest evidence of burial customs in the Horn of Africa comes from cemeteries in Somalia dating back to the 4th millennium BCE. The stone implements from the Jalelo site in the north were also characterized in 1909 as important artifacts demonstrating the archaeological universality during the Paleolithic between the East and the West. According to linguists, the first Afroasiatic-speaking populations arrived in the region during the ensuing Neolithic period from the family's proposed urheimat ("original homeland") in the Nile Valley, or the Near East. The Laas Geel complex on the outskirts of Hargeisa in northwestern Somalia dates back approximately 5,000 years, and has rock art depicting both wild animals and decorated cows. Other cave paintings are found in the northern Dhambalin region, which feature one of the earliest known depictions of a hunter on horseback. The rock art is dated to 1,000 to 3,000 BCE. Additionally, between the towns of Las Khorey and El Ayo in northern Somalia lies Karinhegane, the site of numerous cave paintings of both real and mythical animals. Each painting has an inscription below it, which collectively have been estimated to be around 2,500 years old. Antiquity and classical era Ancient pyramidical structures, mausoleums, ruined cities and stone walls, such as the Wargaade Wall, are evidence of an old civilization that once thrived in the Somali peninsula. This civilization enjoyed a trading relationship with ancient Egypt and Mycenaean Greece since the second millennium BCE, supporting the hypothesis that Somalia or adjacent regions were the location of the ancient Land of Punt. The Puntites native to the region, traded myrrh, spices, gold, ebony, short-horned cattle, ivory and frankincense with the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Babylonians, Indians, Chinese and Romans through their commercial ports. An Egyptian expedition sent to Punt by the 18th dynasty Queen Hatshepsut is recorded on the temple reliefs at Deir el-Bahari, during the reign of the Puntite King Parahu and Queen Ati. In 2015, isotopic analysis of ancient baboon mummies from Punt that had been brought to Egypt as gifts indicated that the specimens likely originated from an area encompassing eastern Somalia and the Eritrea-Ethiopia corridor. In the classical era, the Macrobians, who may have been ancestral to Somalis, established a powerful tribal kingdom that ruled large parts of modern Somalia. They were reputed for their longevity and wealth, and were said to be the "tallest and handsomest of all men". The Macrobians were warrior herders and seafarers. According to Herodotus' account, the Persian Emperor Cambyses II, upon his conquest of Egypt in 525 BC, sent ambassadors to Macrobia, bringing luxury gifts for the Macrobian king to entice his submission. The Macrobian ruler, who was elected based on his stature and beauty, replied instead with a challenge for his Persian counterpart in the form of an unstrung bow: if the Persians could manage to draw it, they would have the right to invade his country; but until then, they should thank the gods that the Macrobians never decided to invade their empire. The Macrobians were a regional power reputed for their advanced architecture and gold wealth, which was so plentiful that they shackled their prisoners in golden chains. The camel is believed to have been domesticated in the Horn region sometime between the 2nd and 3rd millennium BCE. From there, it spread to Egypt and the Maghreb. During the classical period, the Barbara city-states also known as sesea of Mosylon, Opone, Mundus, Isis, Malao, Avalites, Essina, Nikon and Sarapion developed a lucrative trade network, connecting with merchants from Ptolemaic Egypt, Ancient Greece, Phoenicia, Parthian Persia, Saba, the Nabataean Kingdom, and the Roman Empire. They used the ancient Somali maritime vessel known as the beden to transport their cargo. After the Roman conquest of the Nabataean Empire and the Roman naval presence at Aden to curb piracy, Arab and Somali merchants agreed with the Romans to bar Indian ships from trading in the free port cities of the Arabian peninsula to protect the interests of Somali and Arab merchants in the lucrative commerce between the Red and Mediterranean Seas. However, Indian merchants continued to trade in the port cities of the Somali peninsula, which was free from Roman interference. For centuries, Indian merchants brought large quantities of cinnamon to Somalia and Arabia from Ceylon and the Spice Islands. The source of the cinnamon and other spices is said to have been the best-kept secret of Arab and Somali merchants in their trade with the Roman and Greek world; the Romans and Greeks believed the source to have been the Somali peninsula. The collusive agreement among Somali and Arab traders inflated the price of Indian and Chinese cinnamon in North Africa, the Near East, and Europe, and made the cinnamon trade a very profitable revenue generator, especially for the Somali merchants through whose hands large quantities were shipped across sea and land routes. Birth of Islam and the Middle Ages Islam was introduced to the area early on by the first Muslims of Mecca fleeing prosecution during the first Hejira with Masjid al-Qiblatayn in Zeila being built before the Qiblah towards Mecca. It is one of the oldest mosques in Africa. In the late 9th century, Al-Yaqubi wrote that Muslims were living along the northern Somali seaboard. He also mentioned that the Adal Kingdom had its capital in the city. According to Leo Africanus, the Adal Sultanate was governed by local Somali dynasties and its realm encompassed the geographical area between the Bab el Mandeb and Cape Guardafui. It was thus flanked to the south by the Ajuran Empire and to the west by the Abyssinian Empire. Throughout the Middle Ages, Arab immigrants arrived in Somaliland, a historical experience which would later lead to the legendary stories about Muslim sheikhs such as Daarood and Ishaaq bin Ahmed (the purported ancestors of the Darod and Isaaq clans, respectively) travelling from Arabia to Somalia and marrying into the local Dir clan. In 1332, the Zeila-based King of Adal was slain in a military campaign aimed at halting Abyssinian emperor Amda Seyon I's march toward the city. When the last Sultan of Ifat, Sa'ad ad-Din II, was also killed by Emperor Dawit I in Zeila in 1410, his children escaped to Yemen, before returning in 1415. In the early 15th century, Adal's capital was moved further inland to the town of Dakkar, where Sabr ad-Din II, the eldest son of Sa'ad ad-Din II, established a new base after his return from Yemen. Adal's headquarters were again relocated the following century, this time southward to Harar. From this new capital, Adal organised an effective army led by Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Ahmad "Gurey" or "Gran"; both meaning "the left-handed") that invaded the Abyssinian empire. This 16th-century campaign is historically known as the Conquest of Abyssinia (Futuh al-Habash). During the war, Imam Ahmad pioneered the use of cannons supplied by the Ottoman Empire, which he imported through Zeila and deployed against Abyssinian forces and their Portuguese allies led by Cristóvão da Gama. Some scholars argue that this conflict proved, through their use on both sides, the value of firearms such as the matchlock musket, cannon, and the arquebus over traditional weapons. During the Ajuran Sultanate period, the sultanates and republics of Merca, Mogadishu, Barawa, Hobyo and their respective ports flourished and had a lucrative foreign commerce, with ships sailing to and coming from Arabia, India, Venetia, Persia, Egypt, Portugal, and as far away as China. Vasco da Gama, who passed by Mogadishu in the 15th century, noted that it was a large city with houses several storeys high and large palaces in its centre, in addition to many mosques with cylindrical minarets. The Harla, an early Hamitic group of tall stature who inhabited parts of Somalia, Tchertcher and other areas in the Horn, also erected various tumuli. These masons are believed to have been ancestral to ethnic Somalis. In the 16th century, Duarte Barbosa noted that many ships from the Kingdom of Cambaya in modern-day India sailed to Mogadishu with cloth and spices, for which they in return received gold, wax and ivory. Barbosa also highlighted the abundance of meat, wheat, barley, horses, and fruit on the coastal markets, which generated enormous wealth for the merchants. Mogadishu, the center of a thriving textile industry known as toob benadir (specialized for the markets in Egypt, among other places), together with Merca and Barawa, also served as a transit stop for Swahili merchants from Mombasa and Malindi and for the gold trade from Kilwa. Jewish merchants from the Hormuz brought their Indian textile and fruit to the Somali coast in exchange for grain and wood. Trading relations were established with Malacca in the 15th century, with cloth, ambergris and porcelain being the main commodities of the trade. Giraffes, zebras and incense were exported to the Ming Empire of China, which established Somali merchants as leaders in the commerce between East Asia and the Horn. Hindu merchants from Surat and Southeast African merchants from Pate, seeking to bypass both the Portuguese India blockade ( and later the Omani interference), used the Somali ports of Merca and Barawa (which were out of the two powers' direct jurisdiction) to conduct their trade in safety and without interference. Early modern era and the scramble for Africa In the early modern period, successor states to the Adal Sultanate and Ajuran Sultanate began to flourish in Somalia. These included the Hiraab Imamate, the Bari Dynasties, the Sultanate of the Geledi (Gobroon dynasty), the Majeerteen Sultanate (Migiurtinia), and the Sultanate of Hobyo (Obbia). They continued the tradition of castle-building and seaborne trade established by previous Somali empires. Sultan Yusuf Mahamud Ibrahim, the third Sultan of the House of Gobroon, started the golden age of the Gobroon Dynasty. His army came out victorious during the Bardheere Jihad, which restored stability in the region and revitalized the East African ivory trade. He also received presents from and had cordial relations with the rulers of neighbouring and distant kingdoms such as the Omani, Witu and Yemeni Sultans. Sultan Ibrahim's son Ahmed Yusuf succeeded him and was one of the most important figures in 19th-century East Africa, receiving tribute from Omani governors and creating alliances with important Muslim families on the East African coast. In Somalland, the Isaaq Sultanate was established in 1750. The Isaaq Sultanate was a Somali kingdom that ruled parts of the Horn of Africa during the 18th and 19th centuries. It spanned the territories of the Isaaq clan, descendants of the Banu Hashim clan, in modern-day Somaliland and Ethiopia. The sultanate was governed by the Rer Guled branch established by the first sultan, Sultan Guled Abdi, of the Eidagale clan. The sultanate is the pre-colonial predecessor to the modern Republic of Somaliland. According to oral tradition, prior to the Guled dynasty the Isaaq clan-family were ruled by a dynasty of the Tolje'lo branch starting from, descendants of Ahmed nicknamed Tol Je'lo, the eldest son of Sheikh Ishaaq's Harari wife. There were eight Tolje'lo rulers in total, starting with Boqor Harun () who ruled the Isaaq Sultanate for centuries starting from the 13th century. The last Tolje'lo ruler Garad Dhuh Barar () was overthrown by a coalition of Isaaq clans. The once strong Tolje'lo clan were scattered and took refuge amongst the Habr Awal with whom they still mostly live. In the late 19th century, after the Berlin Conference of 1884, European powers began the Scramble for Africa. In that year, a British protectorate was declared over part of Somalia, on the African coast opposite South Yemen. Initially, this region was under the control of the Indian Office, and so administered as part of the Indian Empire; in 1898 it was transferred to control by London. The Dervish movement successfully repulsed the British Empire four times and forced it to retreat to the coastal region. The Darawiish defeated the Italian, British, Abyssinian colonial powers on numerous occasions, most notably, the 1903 victory at Cagaarweyne commanded by Suleiman Aden Galaydh, forcing the British Empire to retreat to the coastal region in the late 1900s. The Dervishes were finally defeated in 1920 by British airpower. The dawn of fascism in the early 1920s heralded a change of strategy for Italy, as the north-eastern sultanates were soon to be forced within the boundaries of La Grande Somalia according to the plan of Fascist Italy. With the arrival of Governor Cesare Maria De Vecchi on 15 December 1923, things began to change for that part of Somaliland known as Italian Somaliland. Italy had access to these areas under the successive protection treaties, but not direct rule. The Fascist government had direct rule only over the Benadir territory. Fascist Italy, under Benito Mussolini, attacked Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, with an aim to colonize it. The invasion was condemned by the League of Nations, but little was done to stop it or to liberate occupied Ethiopia. On 3 August 1940, Italian troops, including Somali colonial units, crossed from Ethiopia to invade British Somaliland, and by 14 August, succeeded in taking Berbera from the British. A British force, including troops from several African countries, launched the campaign in January 1941 from Kenya to liberate British Somaliland and Italian-occupied Ethiopia and conquer Italian Somaliland. By February most of Italian Somaliland was captured and, in March, British Somaliland was retaken from the sea. The forces of the British Empire operating in Somaliland comprised the three divisions of South African, West African, and East African troops. They were assisted by Somali forces led by Abdulahi Hassan with Somalis of the Isaaq, Dhulbahante, and Warsangali clans prominently participating. The number of Italian Somalis began to decline after World War II, with fewer than 10,000 remaining in 1960. Independence (1960–1969) Following World War II, Britain retained control of both British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland as protectorates. In 1945, during the Potsdam Conference, the United Nations granted Italy trusteeship of Italian Somaliland as the Trust Territory of Somaliland, on the condition first proposed by the Somali Youth League (SYL) and other nascent Somali political organizations, such as Hizbia Digil Mirifle Somali (HDMS) and the Somali National League (SNL)—that Somalia achieve independence within ten years. British Somaliland remained a protectorate of Britain until 1960. To the extent that Italy held the territory by UN mandate, the trusteeship provisions gave the Somalis the opportunity to gain experience in Western political education and self-government. These were advantages that British Somaliland, which was to be incorporated into the new Somali state, did not have. Although in the 1950s British colonial officials attempted, through various administrative development efforts, to make up for past neglect, the protectorate stagnated in political administrative development. The disparity between the two territories in economic development and political experience would later cause serious difficulties integrating the two parts. Meanwhile, in 1948, under pressure from their World War II allies and to the dismay of the Somalis, the British returned the Haud (an important Somali grazing area that was presumably protected by British treaties with the Somalis in 1884 and 1886) and the Somali Region to Ethiopia, based on a treaty they signed in 1897 in which the British ceded Somali territory to the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik in exchange for his help against possible advances by the French. Britain included the conditional provision that the Somali residents would retain their autonomy, but Ethiopia immediately claimed sovereignty over the area. This prompted an unsuccessful bid by Britain in 1956 to buy back the Somali lands it had turned over. Britain also granted administration of the almost exclusively Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD) to Kenyan nationalists. This was despite a plebiscite in which, according to a British colonial commission, almost all of the territory's ethnic Somalis favored joining the newly formed Somali Republic. A referendum was held in neighbouring Djibouti (then known as French Somaliland) in 1958, on the eve of Somalia's independence in 1960, to decide whether or not to join the Somali Republic or to remain with France. The referendum turned out in favour of a continued association with France, largely due to a combined yes vote by the sizable Afar ethnic group and resident Europeans. There was also widespread vote rigging, with the French expelling thousands of Somalis before the referendum reached the polls. The majority of those who voted 'no' were Somalis who were strongly in favour of joining a united Somalia, as had been proposed by Mahmoud Harbi, Vice President of the Government Council. Harbi was killed in a plane crash two years later. Djibouti finally gained independence from France in 1977, and Hassan Gouled Aptidon, a Somali who had campaigned for a 'yes' vote in the referendum of 1976, eventually became Djibouti's first president (1977–1999). On 1 July 1960, five days after the former British Somaliland protectorate obtained independence as the State of Somaliland, the territory united with the Trust Territory of Somaliland to form the Somali Republic, albeit within boundaries drawn up by Italy and Britain. A government was formed by Abdullahi Issa and Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal with other members of the trusteeship and protectorate governments, with Abdulcadir Muhammed Aden as President of the Somali National Assembly, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar as President of the Somali Republic, and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister (later to become president from 1967 to 1969). On 20 July 1961 and through a popular referendum, was ratified popularly by the people of Somalia under Italian trusteeship, But most of the people from the former Somaliland Protectorate didn't participated the referendum, due to the marginalization graveness made on their rights of power sharing of the unity government. only small number of Somalilanders participated the referendum voted against the new constitution, which was first drafted in 1960. In 1967, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal became Prime Minister, a position to which he was appointed by Shermarke. Egal would later become the President of the autonomous Somaliland region in northwestern Somalia. On 15 October 1969, while paying a visit to the northern town of Las Anod, Somalia's then President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was shot dead by one of his own bodyguards. His assassination was quickly followed by a military coup d'état on 21 October 1969 (the day after his funeral), in which the Somali Army seized power without encountering armed opposition — essentially a bloodless takeover. The putsch was spearheaded by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who at the time commanded the army. Somali Democratic Republic (1969–1991) Alongside Barre, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) that assumed power after President Sharmarke's assassination was led by Lieutenant Colonel Salaad Gabeyre Kediye and Chief of Police Jama Korshel. Kediye officially held the title "Father of the Revolution", and Barre shortly afterwards became the head of the SRC. The SRC subsequently renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic, dissolved the parliament and the Supreme Court, and suspended the constitution. The revolutionary army established large-scale public works programs and successfully implemented an urban and rural literacy campaign, which helped dramatically increase the literacy rate. In addition to a nationalization program of industry and land, the new regime's foreign policy placed an emphasis on Somalia's traditional and religious links with the Arab world, eventually joining the Arab League in February, 1974. That same year, Barre also served as chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU). In July 1976, Barre's SRC disbanded itself and established in its place the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), a one-party government based on scientific socialism and Islamic tenets. The SRSP was an attempt to reconcile the official state ideology with the official state religion by adapting Marxist precepts to local circumstances. Emphasis was placed on the Muslim principles of social progress, equality and justice, which the government argued formed the core of scientific socialism and its own accent on self-sufficiency, public participation and popular control, as well as direct ownership of the means of production. While the SRSP encouraged private investment on a limited scale, the administration's overall direction was essentially communist. In July 1977, the Ogaden War broke out after Barre's government used a plea for national unity to justify an aggressive incorporation of the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia into a Pan-Somali Greater Somalia, along with the rich agricultural lands of south-eastern Ethiopia, infrastructure, and strategically important areas as far north as Djibouti. In the first week of the conflict, Somali armed forces took southern and central Ogaden and for most of the war, the Somali army scored continuous victories on the Ethiopian army and followed them as far as Sidamo. By September 1977, Somalia controlled 90% of the Ogaden and captured strategic cities such as Jijiga and put heavy pressure on Dire Dawa, threatening the train route from the latter city to Djibouti. After the siege of Harar, a massive unprecedented Soviet intervention consisting of 20,000 Cuban forces and several thousand Soviet experts came to the aid of Ethiopia's communist Derg regime. By 1978, the Somali troops were ultimately pushed out of the Ogaden. This shift in support by the Soviet Union motivated the Barre government to seek allies elsewhere. It eventually settled on the Soviets' Cold War arch-rival, the United States, which had been courting the Somali government for some time. All in all, Somalia's initial friendship with the Soviet Union and later partnership with the United States enabled it to build the largest army in Africa. A new constitution was promulgated in 1979 under which elections for a People's Assembly were held. However, Barre's Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party politburo continued to rule. In October 1980, the SRSP was disbanded, and the Supreme Revolutionary Council was re-established in its place. By that time, Barre's government had become increasingly unpopular. Many Somalis had become disillusioned with life under military dictatorship. The regime was weakened further in the 1980s as the Cold War drew to a close and Somalia's strategic importance was diminished. The government became increasingly authoritarian, and resistance movements, encouraged by Ethiopia, sprang up across the country, eventually leading to the Somali Civil War. Among the militia groups were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), together with the non-violent political oppositions of the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG). Somalia Civil War The moral authority of Barre's government was gradually eroded, as many Somalis became disillusioned with life under military rule. By the mid-1980s, resistance movements supported by Ethiopia's communist Derg administration had sprung up across the country. Barre responded by ordering punitive measures against those he perceived as locally supporting the guerrillas, especially in the northern regions. The clampdown included bombing of cities, with the northwestern administrative centre of Hargeisa, a Somali National Movement (SNM) stronghold, among the targeted areas in 1988. The bombardment was led by General Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan, Barre's son-in-law. During 1990, in the capital city of Mogadishu, the residents were prohibited from gathering publicly in groups greater than three or four. Fuel shortages caused long lines of cars at petrol stations. Inflation had driven the price of pasta (ordinary dry Italian noodles, a staple at that time) to five U.S. dollars per kilogram. The price of khat, imported daily from Kenya, was also five U.S. dollars per standard bunch. Paper currency notes were of such low value that several bundles were needed to pay for simple restaurant meals. A thriving black market existed in the centre of the city as banks experienced shortages of local currency for exchange. At night, the city of Mogadishu lay in darkness. Close monitoring of all visiting foreigners was in effect. Harsh exchange control regulations were introduced to prevent export of foreign currency. Although no travel restrictions were placed on foreigners, photographing many locations was banned. During daytime in Mogadishu, the appearance of any government military force was extremely rare. Alleged late-night operations by government authorities, however, included "disappearances" of individuals from their homes. In 1991, the Barre administration was ousted by a coalition of clan-based opposition groups, backed by Ethiopia's then-ruling Derg regime and Libya. Following a meeting of the Somali National Movement and northern clans' elders, the northern former British portion of the country declared its independence as the Republic of Somaliland in May 1991. Although independent and relatively stable compared to the tumultuous south, it has not been recognized by any foreign government. Many of the opposition groups subsequently began competing for influence in the power vacuum that followed the ouster of Barre's regime. In the south, armed factions led by USC commanders General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, in particular, clashed as each sought to exert authority over the capital. In 1991, a multi-phased international conference on Somalia was held in neighbouring Djibouti. Aidid boycotted the first meeting in protest. Owing to the legitimacy bestowed on Muhammad by the Djibouti conference, he was subsequently recognized by the international community as the new President of Somalia. Djibouti, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Italy were among the countries that officially extended recognition to Muhammad's administration. He was not able to exert his authority beyond parts of the capital. Power was instead vied with other faction leaders in the southern half of Somalia and with autonomous sub-national entities in the north. The Djibouti conference was followed by two abortive agreements for national reconciliation and disarmament, which were signed by 15 political stakeholders: an agreement to hold an Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation, and the 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement made at the Conference on National Reconciliation. In the early 1990s, due to the protracted lack of a permanent central authority, Somalia began to be characterized as a "failed state". Political scientist Ken Menkhaus argues that evidence suggested that the nation had already attained failed state status by the mid-1980s, while Robert I. Rotberg similarly posits that the state failure had preceded the ouster of the Barre administration. Hoehne (2009), Branwen (2009) and Verhoeven (2009) also used Somalia during this period as a case study to critique various aspects of the "state failure" discourse. Transitional institutions The Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in April–May 2000 at the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Arta, Djibouti. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected as the President of the nation's new Transitional National Government (TNG), an interim administration formed to guide Somalia to its third permanent republican government. The TNG's internal problems led to the replacement of the Prime Minister four times in three years, and the administrative body's reported bankruptcy in December 2003. Its mandate ended at the same time. On 10 October 2004, legislators elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the first President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Transitional National Government's successor. the TFG was the second interim administration aiming to restore national institutions to Somalia after the 1991 collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the ensuing civil war. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was the internationally recognised government of Somalia until 20 August 2012, when its tenure officially ended. It was established as one of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) of government as defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The Transitional Federal Government officially comprised the executive branch of government, with the TFP serving as the legislative branch. The government was headed by the President of Somalia, to whom the cabinet reported through the Prime Minister. However, it was also used as a general term to refer to all three branches collectively. Islamic Courts Union In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), assumed control of much of the southern part of the country and imposed Shari'a law. Top UN officials have referred to this brief period as a 'Golden era' in the history of Somali politics. Transitional Federal Government The Transitional Federal Government sought to re-establish its authority, and, with the assistance of Ethiopian troops, African Union peacekeepers and air support by the United States, drove out the ICU and solidified its rule. On 8 January 2007, TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, entered Mogadishu with the Ethiopian military support for the first time since being elected to office. The government then relocated to Villa Somalia in the capital from its interim location in Baidoa. This marked the first time since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 that the federal government controlled most of the country. Al Shabaab insurgency Al-Shabaab opposed the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia and continued an insurgency against the TFG. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had forced the Ethiopian troops to retreat, leaving behind an under-equipped African Union peacekeeping force to assist the Transitional Federal Government's troops. Owing to a lack of funding and human resources, an arms embargo that made it difficult to re-establish a national security force, and general indifference on the part of the international community, Yusuf found himself obliged to deploy thousands of troops from Puntland to Mogadishu to sustain the battle against insurgent elements in the southern part of the country. Financial support for this effort was provided by the autonomous region's government. This left little revenue for Puntland's own security forces and civil service employees, leaving the territory vulnerable to piracy and terrorist attacks. On 29 December 2008, Yusuf announced before a united parliament in Baidoa his resignation as President of Somalia. In his speech, which was broadcast on national radio, Yusuf expressed regret at failing to end the country's seventeen-year conflict as his government had been mandated to do. He also blamed the international community for their failure to support the government, and said that the speaker of parliament would succeed him in office per the Charter of the Transitional Federal Government. End of transitional period Between 31 May and 9 June 2008, representatives of Somalia's federal government and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) participated in peace talks in Djibouti brokered by the former United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The conference ended with a signed agreement calling for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in exchange for the cessation of armed confrontation. Parliament was subsequently expanded to 550 seats to accommodate ARS members, which then elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, as president. With the help of a small team of African Union troops, the TFG began a counteroffensive in February 2009 to assume full control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its rule, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union, other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, a moderate Sufi militia. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the two main Islamist groups in opposition, began to fight amongst themselves in mid-2009. As a truce, in March 2009, the TFG announced that it would re-implement Shari'a as the nation's official judicial system. However, conflict continued in the southern and central parts of the country. Within months, the TFG had gone from holding about 70% of south-central Somalia's conflict zones, to losing control of over 80% of the disputed territory to the Islamist insurgents. In October 2011, a coordinated operation, Operation Linda Nchi between the Somali and Kenyan militaries and multinational forces began against the Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia. By September 2012, Somali, Kenyan, and Raskamboni forces had managed to capture Al-Shabaab's last major stronghold, the southern port of Kismayo. In July 2012, three European Union operations were launched to engage with Somalia: EUTM Somalia, EU Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa, and EUCAP Nestor. As part of the official "Roadmap for the End of Transition", a political process that provided clear benchmarks leading toward the formation of permanent democratic institutions in Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government's interim mandate ended on 20 August 2012. The Federal Parliament of Somalia was concurrently inaugurated. Federal government The Federal Government of Somalia, the first permanent central government in the country since the start of the civil war, was established in August 2012. In August 2014, the Somali government-led Operation Indian Ocean was launched against insurgent-held pockets in the countryside. Geography Somalia is bordered by Ethiopia to the west, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Somali Sea and Guardafui Channel to the east, and Kenya to the southwest. With a land area of 637,657 square kilometers, Somalia's terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. Its coastline is more than 3,333 kilometers in length, the longest of mainland Africa. It has been described as being roughly shaped "like a tilted number seven". In the far north, the rugged east–west ranges of the Ogo Mountains lie at varying distances from the Gulf of Aden coast. Hot conditions prevail year-round, along with periodic monsoon winds and irregular rainfall. Geology suggests the presence of valuable mineral deposits. Somalia is separated from Seychelles by the Somali Sea and is separated from Socotra by the Guardafui Channel. Regions and districts Somalia is officially divided into thirteen regions and five claimed regions (gobollada, singular gobol), which in turn are subdivided into districts. The regions are: Northern Somalia is now de facto divided up among the autonomous regions of Puntland (which considers itself an autonomous state) and Somaliland (a self-declared but unrecognized sovereign state). In central Somalia, Galmudug is another regional entity that emerged just south of Puntland. Jubaland in the far south is a fourth autonomous region within the federation. In 2014, a new Southwestern Somalia was likewise established. In April 2015, a formation conference was also launched for a new Central Regions State. The Federal Parliament is tasked with selecting the ultimate number and boundaries of the autonomous regional states (officially Federal Member States) within the Federal Republic of Somalia. Location Somalia is bordered by Kenya to the southwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Guardafui Channel and Indian Ocean to the east, and Ethiopia to the west. The country claims a border with Djibouti through the disputed territory of Somaliland to the northwest. It lies between latitudes 2°S and 12°N, and longitudes 41° and 52°E. Strategically located at the mouth of the Bab el Mandeb gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the country occupies the tip of a region that, due to its resemblance on the map to a rhinoceros' horn, is commonly referred to as the Horn of Africa. Waters Somalia has the longest coastline on the mainland of Africa, with a seaboard that stretches . Its terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. The nation has a total area of of which constitutes land, with of water. Somalia's land boundaries extend to about ; of that is shared with Djibouti, with Kenya, and with Ethiopia. Its maritime claims include territorial waters of . Somalia has several islands and archipelagos on its coast, including the Bajuni Islands and the Saad ad-Din Archipelago: see islands of Somalia. Habitat Somalia contains seven terrestrial ecoregions: Ethiopian montane forests, Northern Zanzibar–Inhambane coastal forest mosaic, Somali Acacia–Commiphora bushlands and thickets, Ethiopian xeric grasslands and shrublands, Hobyo grasslands and shrublands, Somali montane xeric woodlands, and East African mangroves. In the north, a scrub-covered, semi-desert plain referred as the Guban lies parallel to the Gulf of Aden littoral. With a width of twelve kilometres in the west to as little as two kilometres in the east, the plain is bisected by watercourses that are essentially beds of dry sand except during the rainy seasons. When the rains arrive, the Guban's low bushes and grass clumps transform into lush vegetation. This coastal strip is part of the Ethiopian xeric grasslands and shrublands ecoregion. Cal Madow is a mountain range in the northeastern part of the country. Extending from several kilometres west of the city of Bosaso to the northwest of Erigavo, it features Somalia's highest peak, Shimbiris, which sits at an elevation of about . The rugged east–west ranges of the Karkaar Mountains also lie to the interior of the Gulf of Aden littoral. In the central regions, the country's northern mountain ranges give way to shallow plateaus and typically dry watercourses that are referred to locally as the Ogo. The Ogo's western plateau, in turn, gradually merges into the Haud, an important grazing area for livestock. Somalia has only two permanent rivers, the Jubba and Shabele, both of which begin in the Ethiopian Highlands. These rivers mainly flow southwards, with the Jubba River entering the Indian Ocean at Kismayo. The Shabele River at one time apparently used to enter the sea near Merca, but now reaches a point just southwest of Mogadishu. After that, it consists of swamps and dry reaches before finally disappearing in the desert terrain east of Jilib, near the Jubba River. Environment Somalia is a semi-arid country with about 1.64% arable land. The first local environmental organizations were Ecoterra Somalia and the Somali Ecological Society, both of which helped promote awareness about ecological concerns and mobilized environmental programs in all governmental sectors as well as in civil society. From 1971 onward, a massive tree-planting campaign on a nationwide scale was introduced by the Siad Barre government to halt the advance of thousands of acres of wind-driven sand dunes that threatened to engulf towns, roads and farm land. By 1988, 265 hectares of a projected 336 hectares had been treated, with 39 range reserve sites and 36 forestry plantation sites established. In 1986, the Wildlife Rescue, Research and Monitoring Centre was established by Ecoterra International, with the goal of sensitizing the public to ecological issues. This educational effort led in 1989 to the so-called "Somalia proposal" and a decision by the Somali government to adhere to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which established for the first time a worldwide ban on the trade of elephant ivory. Later, Fatima Jibrell, a prominent Somali environmental activist, mounted a successful campaign to conserve old-growth forests of acacia trees in the northeastern part of Somalia. These trees, which can live for 500 years, were being cut down to make charcoal which was highly in demand in the Arabian Peninsula, where the region's Bedouin tribes believe the acacia to be sacred. However, while being a relatively inexpensive fuel that meets a user's needs, the production of charcoal often leads to deforestation and desertification. As a way of addressing this problem, Jibrell and the Horn of Africa Relief and Development Organization (Horn Relief; now Adeso), an organization of which she was the founder and executive director, trained a group of teens to educate the public on the permanent damage that producing charcoal can create. In 1999, Horn Relief coordinated a peace march in the northeastern Puntland region of Somalia to put an end to the so-called "charcoal wars". As a result of Jibrell's lobbying and education efforts, the Puntland government in 2000 prohibited the exportation of charcoal. The government has also since enforced the ban, which has reportedly led to an 80% drop in exports of the product. Jibrell was awarded the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2002 for her efforts against environmental degradation and desertification. In 2008, she also won the National Geographic Society/Buffett Foundation Award for Leadership in Conservation. Following the massive tsunami of December 2004, there have also emerged allegations that after the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in the late 1980s, Somalia's long, remote shoreline was used as a dump site for the disposal of toxic waste. The huge waves that battered northern Somalia after the tsunami are believed to have stirred up tons of nuclear and toxic waste that might have been dumped illegally in the country by foreign firms. The European Green Party followed	Mogadishu lay in darkness. Close monitoring of all visiting foreigners was in effect. Harsh exchange control regulations were introduced to prevent export of foreign currency. Although no travel restrictions were placed on foreigners, photographing many locations was banned. During daytime in Mogadishu, the appearance of any government military force was extremely rare. Alleged late-night operations by government authorities, however, included "disappearances" of individuals from their homes. In 1991, the Barre administration was ousted by a coalition of clan-based opposition groups, backed by Ethiopia's then-ruling Derg regime and Libya. Following a meeting of the Somali National Movement and northern clans' elders, the northern former British portion of the country declared its independence as the Republic of Somaliland in May 1991. Although independent and relatively stable compared to the tumultuous south, it has not been recognized by any foreign government. Many of the opposition groups subsequently began competing for influence in the power vacuum that followed the ouster of Barre's regime. In the south, armed factions led by USC commanders General Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, in particular, clashed as each sought to exert authority over the capital. In 1991, a multi-phased international conference on Somalia was held in neighbouring Djibouti. Aidid boycotted the first meeting in protest. Owing to the legitimacy bestowed on Muhammad by the Djibouti conference, he was subsequently recognized by the international community as the new President of Somalia. Djibouti, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Italy were among the countries that officially extended recognition to Muhammad's administration. He was not able to exert his authority beyond parts of the capital. Power was instead vied with other faction leaders in the southern half of Somalia and with autonomous sub-national entities in the north. The Djibouti conference was followed by two abortive agreements for national reconciliation and disarmament, which were signed by 15 political stakeholders: an agreement to hold an Informal Preparatory Meeting on National Reconciliation, and the 1993 Addis Ababa Agreement made at the Conference on National Reconciliation. In the early 1990s, due to the protracted lack of a permanent central authority, Somalia began to be characterized as a "failed state". Political scientist Ken Menkhaus argues that evidence suggested that the nation had already attained failed state status by the mid-1980s, while Robert I. Rotberg similarly posits that the state failure had preceded the ouster of the Barre administration. Hoehne (2009), Branwen (2009) and Verhoeven (2009) also used Somalia during this period as a case study to critique various aspects of the "state failure" discourse. Transitional institutions The Transitional National Government (TNG) was established in April–May 2000 at the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Arta, Djibouti. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected as the President of the nation's new Transitional National Government (TNG), an interim administration formed to guide Somalia to its third permanent republican government. The TNG's internal problems led to the replacement of the Prime Minister four times in three years, and the administrative body's reported bankruptcy in December 2003. Its mandate ended at the same time. On 10 October 2004, legislators elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as the first President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Transitional National Government's successor. the TFG was the second interim administration aiming to restore national institutions to Somalia after the 1991 collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the ensuing civil war. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was the internationally recognised government of Somalia until 20 August 2012, when its tenure officially ended. It was established as one of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) of government as defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The Transitional Federal Government officially comprised the executive branch of government, with the TFP serving as the legislative branch. The government was headed by the President of Somalia, to whom the cabinet reported through the Prime Minister. However, it was also used as a general term to refer to all three branches collectively. Islamic Courts Union In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), assumed control of much of the southern part of the country and imposed Shari'a law. Top UN officials have referred to this brief period as a 'Golden era' in the history of Somali politics. Transitional Federal Government The Transitional Federal Government sought to re-establish its authority, and, with the assistance of Ethiopian troops, African Union peacekeepers and air support by the United States, drove out the ICU and solidified its rule. On 8 January 2007, TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, entered Mogadishu with the Ethiopian military support for the first time since being elected to office. The government then relocated to Villa Somalia in the capital from its interim location in Baidoa. This marked the first time since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 that the federal government controlled most of the country. Al Shabaab insurgency Al-Shabaab opposed the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia and continued an insurgency against the TFG. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had forced the Ethiopian troops to retreat, leaving behind an under-equipped African Union peacekeeping force to assist the Transitional Federal Government's troops. Owing to a lack of funding and human resources, an arms embargo that made it difficult to re-establish a national security force, and general indifference on the part of the international community, Yusuf found himself obliged to deploy thousands of troops from Puntland to Mogadishu to sustain the battle against insurgent elements in the southern part of the country. Financial support for this effort was provided by the autonomous region's government. This left little revenue for Puntland's own security forces and civil service employees, leaving the territory vulnerable to piracy and terrorist attacks. On 29 December 2008, Yusuf announced before a united parliament in Baidoa his resignation as President of Somalia. In his speech, which was broadcast on national radio, Yusuf expressed regret at failing to end the country's seventeen-year conflict as his government had been mandated to do. He also blamed the international community for their failure to support the government, and said that the speaker of parliament would succeed him in office per the Charter of the Transitional Federal Government. End of transitional period Between 31 May and 9 June 2008, representatives of Somalia's federal government and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) participated in peace talks in Djibouti brokered by the former United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The conference ended with a signed agreement calling for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in exchange for the cessation of armed confrontation. Parliament was subsequently expanded to 550 seats to accommodate ARS members, which then elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, as president. With the help of a small team of African Union troops, the TFG began a counteroffensive in February 2009 to assume full control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its rule, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union, other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, a moderate Sufi militia. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the two main Islamist groups in opposition, began to fight amongst themselves in mid-2009. As a truce, in March 2009, the TFG announced that it would re-implement Shari'a as the nation's official judicial system. However, conflict continued in the southern and central parts of the country. Within months, the TFG had gone from holding about 70% of south-central Somalia's conflict zones, to losing control of over 80% of the disputed territory to the Islamist insurgents. In October 2011, a coordinated operation, Operation Linda Nchi between the Somali and Kenyan militaries and multinational forces began against the Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia. By September 2012, Somali, Kenyan, and Raskamboni forces had managed to capture Al-Shabaab's last major stronghold, the southern port of Kismayo. In July 2012, three European Union operations were launched to engage with Somalia: EUTM Somalia, EU Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa, and EUCAP Nestor. As part of the official "Roadmap for the End of Transition", a political process that provided clear benchmarks leading toward the formation of permanent democratic institutions in Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government's interim mandate ended on 20 August 2012. The Federal Parliament of Somalia was concurrently inaugurated. Federal government The Federal Government of Somalia, the first permanent central government in the country since the start of the civil war, was established in August 2012. In August 2014, the Somali government-led Operation Indian Ocean was launched against insurgent-held pockets in the countryside. Geography Somalia is bordered by Ethiopia to the west, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Somali Sea and Guardafui Channel to the east, and Kenya to the southwest. With a land area of 637,657 square kilometers, Somalia's terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. Its coastline is more than 3,333 kilometers in length, the longest of mainland Africa. It has been described as being roughly shaped "like a tilted number seven". In the far north, the rugged east–west ranges of the Ogo Mountains lie at varying distances from the Gulf of Aden coast. Hot conditions prevail year-round, along with periodic monsoon winds and irregular rainfall. Geology suggests the presence of valuable mineral deposits. Somalia is separated from Seychelles by the Somali Sea and is separated from Socotra by the Guardafui Channel. Regions and districts Somalia is officially divided into thirteen regions and five claimed regions (gobollada, singular gobol), which in turn are subdivided into districts. The regions are: Northern Somalia is now de facto divided up among the autonomous regions of Puntland (which considers itself an autonomous state) and Somaliland (a self-declared but unrecognized sovereign state). In central Somalia, Galmudug is another regional entity that emerged just south of Puntland. Jubaland in the far south is a fourth autonomous region within the federation. In 2014, a new Southwestern Somalia was likewise established. In April 2015, a formation conference was also launched for a new Central Regions State. The Federal Parliament is tasked with selecting the ultimate number and boundaries of the autonomous regional states (officially Federal Member States) within the Federal Republic of Somalia. Location Somalia is bordered by Kenya to the southwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Guardafui Channel and Indian Ocean to the east, and Ethiopia to the west. The country claims a border with Djibouti through the disputed territory of Somaliland to the northwest. It lies between latitudes 2°S and 12°N, and longitudes 41° and 52°E. Strategically located at the mouth of the Bab el Mandeb gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, the country occupies the tip of a region that, due to its resemblance on the map to a rhinoceros' horn, is commonly referred to as the Horn of Africa. Waters Somalia has the longest coastline on the mainland of Africa, with a seaboard that stretches . Its terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. The nation has a total area of of which constitutes land, with of water. Somalia's land boundaries extend to about ; of that is shared with Djibouti, with Kenya, and with Ethiopia. Its maritime claims include territorial waters of . Somalia has several islands and archipelagos on its coast, including the Bajuni Islands and the Saad ad-Din Archipelago: see islands of Somalia. Habitat Somalia contains seven terrestrial ecoregions: Ethiopian montane forests, Northern Zanzibar–Inhambane coastal forest mosaic, Somali Acacia–Commiphora bushlands and thickets, Ethiopian xeric grasslands and shrublands, Hobyo grasslands and shrublands, Somali montane xeric woodlands, and East African mangroves. In the north, a scrub-covered, semi-desert plain referred as the Guban lies parallel to the Gulf of Aden littoral. With a width of twelve kilometres in the west to as little as two kilometres in the east, the plain is bisected by watercourses that are essentially beds of dry sand except during the rainy seasons. When the rains arrive, the Guban's low bushes and grass clumps transform into lush vegetation. This coastal strip is part of the Ethiopian xeric grasslands and shrublands ecoregion. Cal Madow is a mountain range in the northeastern part of the country. Extending from several kilometres west of the city of Bosaso to the northwest of Erigavo, it features Somalia's highest peak, Shimbiris, which sits at an elevation of about . The rugged east–west ranges of the Karkaar Mountains also lie to the interior of the Gulf of Aden littoral. In the central regions, the country's northern mountain ranges give way to shallow plateaus and typically dry watercourses that are referred to locally as the Ogo. The Ogo's western plateau, in turn, gradually merges into the Haud, an important grazing area for livestock. Somalia has only two permanent rivers, the Jubba and Shabele, both of which begin in the Ethiopian Highlands. These rivers mainly flow southwards, with the Jubba River entering the Indian Ocean at Kismayo. The Shabele River at one time apparently used to enter the sea near Merca, but now reaches a point just southwest of Mogadishu. After that, it consists of swamps and dry reaches before finally disappearing in the desert terrain east of Jilib, near the Jubba River. Environment Somalia is a semi-arid country with about 1.64% arable land. The first local environmental organizations were Ecoterra Somalia and the Somali Ecological Society, both of which helped promote awareness about ecological concerns and mobilized environmental programs in all governmental sectors as well as in civil society. From 1971 onward, a massive tree-planting campaign on a nationwide scale was introduced by the Siad Barre government to halt the advance of thousands of acres of wind-driven sand dunes that threatened to engulf towns, roads and farm land. By 1988, 265 hectares of a projected 336 hectares had been treated, with 39 range reserve sites and 36 forestry plantation sites established. In 1986, the Wildlife Rescue, Research and Monitoring Centre was established by Ecoterra International, with the goal of sensitizing the public to ecological issues. This educational effort led in 1989 to the so-called "Somalia proposal" and a decision by the Somali government to adhere to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which established for the first time a worldwide ban on the trade of elephant ivory. Later, Fatima Jibrell, a prominent Somali environmental activist, mounted a successful campaign to conserve old-growth forests of acacia trees in the northeastern part of Somalia. These trees, which can live for 500 years, were being cut down to make charcoal which was highly in demand in the Arabian Peninsula, where the region's Bedouin tribes believe the acacia to be sacred. However, while being a relatively inexpensive fuel that meets a user's needs, the production of charcoal often leads to deforestation and desertification. As a way of addressing this problem, Jibrell and the Horn of Africa Relief and Development Organization (Horn Relief; now Adeso), an organization of which she was the founder and executive director, trained a group of teens to educate the public on the permanent damage that producing charcoal can create. In 1999, Horn Relief coordinated a peace march in the northeastern Puntland region of Somalia to put an end to the so-called "charcoal wars". As a result of Jibrell's lobbying and education efforts, the Puntland government in 2000 prohibited the exportation of charcoal. The government has also since enforced the ban, which has reportedly led to an 80% drop in exports of the product. Jibrell was awarded the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2002 for her efforts against environmental degradation and desertification. In 2008, she also won the National Geographic Society/Buffett Foundation Award for Leadership in Conservation. Following the massive tsunami of December 2004, there have also emerged allegations that after the outbreak of the Somali Civil War in the late 1980s, Somalia's long, remote shoreline was used as a dump site for the disposal of toxic waste. The huge waves that battered northern Somalia after the tsunami are believed to have stirred up tons of nuclear and toxic waste that might have been dumped illegally in the country by foreign firms. The European Green Party followed up these revelations by presenting before the press and the European Parliament in Strasbourg copies of contracts signed by two European companies — the Italian Swiss firm, Achair Partners, and an Italian waste broker, Progresso — and representatives of the then President of Somalia, the faction leader Ali Mahdi Mohamed, to accept 10 million tonnes of toxic waste in exchange for $80 million (then about £60 million). According to reports by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the waste has resulted in far higher than normal cases of respiratory infections, mouth ulcers and bleeding, abdominal haemorrhages and unusual skin infections among many inhabitants of the areas around the northeastern towns of Hobyo and Benadir on the Indian Ocean coast — diseases consistent with radiation sickness. UNEP adds that the situation along the Somali coastline poses a very serious environmental hazard not only in Somalia, but also in the eastern Africa sub-region. Climate Owing to Somalia's proximity to the equator, there is not much seasonal variation in its climate. Hot conditions prevail year-round along with periodic monsoon winds and irregular rainfall. Mean daily maximum temperatures range from , except at higher elevations along the eastern seaboard, where the effects of a cold offshore current can be felt. In Mogadishu, for instance, average afternoon highs range from in April. Some of the highest mean annual temperatures in the world have been recorded in the country; Berbera on the northwestern coast has an afternoon high that averages more than from June through September. Nationally, mean daily minimums usually vary from about . The greatest range in climate occurs in northern Somalia, where temperatures sometimes surpass in July on the littoral plains and drop below the freezing point during December in the highlands. In this region, relative humidity ranges from about 40% in the mid-afternoon to 85% at night, changing somewhat according to the season. Unlike the climates of most other countries at this latitude, conditions in Somalia range from arid in the northeastern and central regions to semiarid in the northwest and south. In the northeast, annual rainfall is less than ; in the central plateaus, it is about . The northwestern and southwestern parts of the nation, however, receive considerably more rain, with an average of falling per year. Although the coastal regions are hot and humid throughout the year, the hinterland is typically dry and hot. There are four main seasons around which pastoral and agricultural life revolve, and these are dictated by shifts in the wind patterns. From December to March is the Jilal, the harshest dry season of the year. The main rainy season, referred to as the Gu, lasts from April to June. This period is characterized by the southwest monsoons, which rejuvenate the pasture land, especially the central plateau, and briefly transform the desert into lush vegetation. From July to September is the second dry season, the Xagaa (pronounced "Hagaa"). The Dayr, which is the shortest rainy season, lasts from October to December. The tangambili periods that intervene between the two monsoons (October–November and March–May) are hot and humid. Wildlife Somalia contains a variety of mammals due to its geographical and climatic diversity. Wildlife still occurring includes cheetah, lion, reticulated giraffe, baboon, serval, elephant, bushpig, gazelle, ibex, kudu, dik-dik, oribi, Somali wild ass, reedbuck and Grévy's zebra, elephant shrew, rock hyrax, golden mole and antelope. It also has a large population of the dromedary camel. Somalia is home to around 727 species of birds. Of these, eight are endemic, one has been introduced by humans, and one is rare or accidental. Fourteen species are globally threatened. Birds species found exclusively in the country include the Somali Pigeon, Alaemon hamertoni (Alaudidae), Lesser Hoopoe-Lark, Heteromirafra archeri (Alaudidae), Archer's Lark, Mirafra ashi, Ash's Bushlark, Mirafra somalica (Alaudidae), Somali Bushlark, Spizocorys obbiensis (Alaudidae), Obbia Lark, Carduelis johannis (Fringillidae), and Warsangli Linnet. Somalia's territorial waters are prime fishing grounds for highly migratory marine species, such as tuna. A narrow but productive continental shelf contains several demersal fish and crustacean species. Fish species found exclusively in the nation include Cirrhitichthys randalli (Cirrhitidae), Symphurus fuscus (Cynoglossidae), Parapercis simulata OC (Pinguipedidae), Cociella somaliensis OC (Platycephalidae), and Pseudochromis melanotus (Pseudochromidae). There are roughly 235 species of reptiles. Of these, almost half live in the northern areas. Reptiles endemic to Somalia include the Hughes' saw-scaled viper, the Southern Somali garter snake, a racer (Platyceps messanai), a diadem snake (Spalerosophis josephscorteccii), the Somali sand boa, the angled worm lizard, a spiny-tailed lizard (Uromastyx macfadyeni), Lanza's agama, a gecko (Hemidactylus granchii), the Somali semaphore gecko, and a sand lizard (Mesalina or Eremias). A colubrid snake (Aprosdoketophis andreonei) and Haacke-Greer's skink (Haackgreerius miopus) are endemic species. Politics and government Somalia is a parliamentary representative democratic republic. The President of Somalia is the head of state and commander-in-chief of the Somali Armed Forces and selects a Prime Minister to act as head of government. The Federal Parliament of Somalia is the national parliament of Somalia. The bicameral National Legislature consists of the House of the People (lower house) and the Senate (upper house), whose members are elected to serve four-year terms. The parliament elects the President, Speaker of Parliament and Deputy Speakers. It also has the authority to pass and veto laws. The Judiciary of Somalia is defined by the Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Adopted on 1 August 2012 by a National Constitutional Assembly in Mogadishu, the document was formulated by a committee of specialists chaired by attorney and Speaker of the Federal Parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari. It provides the legal foundation for the existence of the Federal Republic and source of legal authority. The national court structure is organized into three tiers: the Constitutional Court, Federal Government level courts and State level courts. A nine-member Judicial Service Commission appoints any Federal tier member of the judiciary. It also selects and presents potential Constitutional Court judges to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament for approval. If endorsed, the President appoints the candidate as a judge of the Constitutional Court. The five-member Constitutional Court adjudicates issues pertaining to the constitution, in addition to various Federal and sub-national matters. Somali law draws from a mixture of three different systems: civil law, Islamic law and customary law. After the collapse of Somalia in 1991, there were no relations or any contact between the Somaliland government, which declared itself a country and the government of Somalia. Foreign relations Somalia's foreign relations are handled by the President as the head of state, the Prime Minister as the head of government, and the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Article 54 of the national constitution, the allocation of powers and resources between the Federal Government and the Federal Republic of Somalia's constituent Federal Member States shall be negotiated and agreed upon by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States, except in matters pertaining to foreign affairs, national defence, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy. Article 53 also stipulates that the Federal Government shall consult the Federal Member States on major issues related to international agreements, including negotiations vis-a-vis foreign trade, finance and treaties. The Federal Government maintains bilateral relations with a number of other central governments in the international community. Among these are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Turkey, Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, the United States, the People's Republic of China, Japan, Russian Federation and South Korea. Additionally, Somalia has several diplomatic missions abroad. There are likewise various foreign embassies and consulates based in the capital Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country. Somalia is also a member of many international organizations, such as the United Nations, African Union and Arab League. It was a founding member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in 1969. Other memberships include the African Development Bank, Group of 77, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, Non-Aligned Movement, World Federation of Trade Unions and World Meteorological Organization. Military The Somali Armed Forces (SAF) are the military forces of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Headed by the President as Commander in Chief, they are constitutionally mandated to ensure the nation's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The SAF was initially made up of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Police Force and the National Security Service. In the post-independence period, it grew to become among the larger militaries on the continent. The subsequent outbreak of the civil war in 1991 led to the disbandment of the Somali National Army. In 2004, the gradual process of reconstituting the military was put in motion with the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The Somali Armed Forces are now overseen by the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Government of Somalia, formed in mid-2012. In January 2013, the Somali federal government also re-opened the national intelligence service in Mogadishu, renaming the agency the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA). The Somaliland and Puntland regional governments maintain their own security and police forces. Human rights Both male and female same-sex sexual activity is illegal and could be punished by up to death. On October 3, 2020, a UN human rights investigator raised concerns over Somali government's backtracking of human rights commitments. According to information collected by the investigator, Somali authorities were regressing on commitments to protect peoples’ economic, social and cultural rights. Economy According to the CIA and the Central Bank of Somalia, despite experiencing civil unrest, Somalia has maintained a healthy informal economy, based mainly on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies and telecommunications. Owing to a dearth of formal government statistics and the recent civil war, it is difficult to gauge the size or growth of the economy. For 1994, the CIA estimated the GDP at $3.3 billion. In 2001, it was estimated to be $4.1 billion. By 2009, the CIA estimated that the GDP had grown to $5.731 billion, with a projected real growth rate of 2.6%. According to a 2007 British Chambers of Commerce report, the private sector also grew, particularly in the service sector. Unlike the pre-civil war period when most services and the industrial sector were government-run, there has been substantial, albeit unmeasured, private investment in commercial activities; this has been largely financed by the Somali diaspora, and includes trade and marketing, money transfer services, transportation, communications, fishery equipment, airlines, telecommunications, education, health, construction and hotels. Libertarian economist Peter Leeson attributes this increased economic activity to the Somali customary law (referred to as Xeer), which he suggests provides a stable environment to conduct business in. According to the Central Bank of Somalia, the country's GDP per capita is $226, a slight reduction in real terms from 1990. About 43% of the population lives on less than 1 US dollar a day, with around 24% of those found in urban areas and 54% living in rural areas. Somalia's economy consists of both traditional and modern production, with a gradual shift toward modern industrial techniques. Somalia has the largest population of camels in the world. According to the Central Bank of Somalia, about 80% of the population are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists, who keep goats, sheep, camels and cattle. The nomads also gather resins and gums to supplement their income. Agriculture Agriculture is the most important economic sector of Somalia. It accounts for about 65% of the GDP and employs 65% of the workforce. Livestock contributes about 40% to GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Other principal exports include fish, charcoal and bananas; sugar, sorghum and corn are products for the domestic market. According to the Central Bank of Somalia, imports of goods total about $460 million per year, surpassing aggregate imports prior to the start of the civil war in 1991. Exports, which total about $270 million annually, have also surpassed pre-war aggregate export levels. Somalia has a trade deficit of about $190 million per year, but this is exceeded by remittances sent by Somalis in the diaspora, estimated to be about $1 billion. With the advantage of being located near the Arabian Peninsula, Somali traders have increasingly begun to challenge Australia's traditional dominance over the Gulf Arab livestock and meat market, offering quality animals at very low prices. In response, Gulf Arab states have started to make strategic investments in the country, with Saudi Arabia building livestock export infrastructure and the United Arab Emirates purchasing large farmlands. Somalia is also a major world supplier of frankincense and myrrh. The modest industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, accounts for 10% of Somalia's GDP. According to the Somali Chamber of Commerce and Industry, over six private airline firms also offer commercial flights to both domestic and international locations, including Daallo Airlines, Jubba Airways, African Express Airways, East Africa 540, Central Air and Hajara. In 2008, the Puntland government signed a multimillion-dollar deal with Dubai's Lootah Group, a regional industrial group operating in the Middle East and Africa. According to the agreement, the first phase of the investment is worth Dhs 170 m and will see a set of new companies established to operate, manage and build Bosaso's free trade zone and sea and airport facilities. The Bosaso Airport Company is slated to develop the airport complex to meet international standards, including a new runway, main and auxiliary buildings, taxi and apron areas, and security perimeters. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, the roughly 53 state-owned small, medium and large manufacturing firms were foundering, with the ensuing conflict destroying many of the remaining industries. However, primarily as a result of substantial local investment by the Somali diaspora, many of these small-scale plants have re-opened and newer ones have been created. The latter include fish-canning and meat-processing plants in the northern regions, as well as about 25 factories in the Mogadishu area, which manufacture pasta, mineral water, confections, plastic bags, fabric, hides and skins, detergent and soap, aluminium, foam mattresses and pillows, fishing boats, carry out packaging, and stone processing. In 2004, an $8.3 million Coca-Cola bottling plant also opened in the city, with investors hailing from various constituencies in Somalia. Foreign investment also included multinationals including General Motors and Dole Fruit. Monetary and payment system The Central Bank of Somalia is the official monetary authority of Somalia. In terms of financial management, it is in the process of assuming the task of both formulating and implementing monetary policy. Owing to a lack of confidence in the local currency, the US dollar is widely accepted as a medium of exchange alongside the Somali shilling. Dollarization notwithstanding, the large issuance of the Somali shilling has increasingly fuelled price hikes, especially for low value transactions. According to the Central Bank, this inflationary environment is expected to come to an end as soon as the bank assumes full control of monetary policy and replaces the presently circulating currency introduced by the private sector. Although Somalia has had no central monetary authority for more than 15 years between the outbreak of the civil war in 1991 and the subsequent re-establishment of the Central Bank of Somalia in 2009, the nation's payment system is fairly advanced primarily due to the widespread existence of private money transfer operators (MTO) that have acted as informal banking networks. These remittance firms (hawalas) have become a large industry in Somalia, with an estimated US$1.6 billion annually remitted to the region by Somalis in the diaspora via money transfer companies. Most are members of the Somali Money Transfer Association (SOMTA), an umbrella organization that regulates the community's money transfer sector, or its predecessor, the Somali Financial Services Association (SFSA). The largest of the Somali MTOs is Dahabshiil, a Somali-owned firm employing more than 2,000 people across 144 countries with branches in London and Dubai. As the reconstituted Central Bank of Somalia fully assumes its monetary policy responsibilities, some of the existing money transfer companies are expected in the near future to seek licenses so as to develop into full-fledged commercial banks. This will serve to expand the national payments system to include formal cheques, which in turn is expected to reinforce the efficacy of the use of monetary policy in domestic macroeconomic management. With a significant improvement in local security, Somali expatriates began returning to the country for investment opportunities. Coupled with modest foreign investment, the inflow of funds have helped the Somali shilling increase considerably in value. By March 2014, the currency had appreciated by almost 60% against the U.S. dollar over the previous 12 months. The Somali shilling was the strongest among the 175 global currencies traded by Bloomberg, rising close to 50 percentage points higher than the next most robust global currency over the same period. The Somalia Stock Exchange (SSE) is the national bourse of Somalia. It was founded in 2012 by the Somali diplomat Idd Mohamed, Ambassador extraordinary and deputy permanent representative to the United Nations. The SSE was established to attract investment from both Somali-owned firms and global companies in order to accelerate the ongoing post-conflict reconstruction process in Somalia. Energy and natural resources The World Bank reports that electricity is now in large part supplied by local businesses. Among these domestic firms is the Somali Energy Company, which performs generation, transmission and distribution of electric power. In 2010, the nation produced 310 million kWh and consumed 288.3 million kWh of electricity, ranked 170th and 177th, respectively, according to the CIA. Somalia has reserves of several natural resources, including uranium, iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt and natural gas. The CIA reports that there are 5.663 billion cubic metres of proven natural gas reserves. The presence or extent of proven oil reserves in Somalia is uncertain. The CIA asserts that there are no proven reserves of oil in the country, while UNCTAD suggests that most proven oil reserves in Somalia lie off its northwestern coast, in the Somaliland region. An oil group listed in Sydney, Range Resources, estimates that the Puntland region in the northeast has the potential to produce to of oil, compared to the 6.7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in Sudan. As a result of these developments, the Somalia Petroleum Corporation was established by the federal government. In the late 1960s, UN geologists also discovered major uranium deposits and other rare mineral reserves in Somalia. The find was the largest of its kind, with industry experts estimating that the amount of the deposits could amount to over 25% of the world's then known uranium reserves of 800,000 tons. In 1984, the IUREP Orientation Phase Mission to Somalia reported that the country had 5,000 tons of uranium reasonably assured resources (RAR), 11,000 tons of uranium estimated additional resources (EAR) in calcrete deposits, as well as 0–150,000 tons of uranium speculative resources (SR) in sandstone and calcrete deposits. Somalia evolved into a major world supplier of uranium, with American, UAE, Italian and Brazilian mineral companies vying for extraction rights. Link Natural Resources has a stake in the central region, and Kilimanjaro Capital has a stake in the Amsas-Coriole-Afgoi (ACA) Block, which includes uranium exploration. The Trans-National Industrial Electricity and Gas Company is an energy conglomerate based in Mogadishu. It unites five major Somali companies from the trade, finance, security and telecommunications sectors, following a 2010 joint agreement signed in Istanbul to provide electricity and gas infrastructure in Somalia. With an initial investment budget of $1 billion, the company launched the Somalia Peace Dividend Project, a labour-intensive energy program aimed at facilitating local industrialization initiatives. According to the Central Bank of Somalia, as the nation embarks on the path of reconstruction, the economy is expected to not only match its pre-civil war levels, but also to accelerate in growth and development due to Somalia's untapped natural resources. Telecommunications and media After the start of the civil war, various new telecommunications companies began to spring up and compete to provide missing infrastructure. Funded by Somali entrepreneurs and backed by expertise from China, South Korea and Europe, these nascent telecommunications firms offer affordable mobile phone and Internet services that are not available in many other parts of the continent. Customers can conduct money transfers (such as through the popular Dahabshiil) and other banking activities via mobile phones, as well as easily gain wireless Internet access. After forming partnerships with multinational corporations such as Sprint, ITT and Telenor, these firms now offer the cheapest and clearest phone calls in Africa. These Somali telecommunication companies also provide services to every city and town in Somalia. There are presently around 25 mainlines per 1,000 persons, and the local availability of telephone lines (tele-density) is higher than in neighbouring countries; three times greater than in adjacent Ethiopia. Prominent Somali telecommunications companies include Golis Telecom Group, Hormuud Telecom, Somafone, Nationlink, Netco, Telcom and Somali Telecom Group. Hormuud Telecom alone grosses about $40 million a year. Despite their rivalry, several of these companies signed an inter-connectivity deal in 2005 that allows them to set prices, maintain and expand their networks, and ensure that competition does not get out of control. Investment in the telecom industry is held to be one of the clearest signs that Somalia's economy has continued to develop despite civil strife in parts of the country. The state-run Somali National Television is the principal national public service TV channel. After a twenty-year hiatus, the station was officially re-launched on 4 April 2011. Its radio counterpart Radio Mogadishu also broadcasts from the capital. Somaliland National TV and Puntland TV and Radio air from the northern regions. Additionally, Somalia has several private television and radio networks. Among these are Horn Cable Television and Universal TV. The political Xog Doon and Xog Ogaal and Horyaal Sports broadsheets publish out of the capital. There are also a number of online media outlets covering local news, including Garowe Online, Wardheernews, and Puntland Post. The internet country code top-level domain (ccTLD) for Somalia is .so. It was officially relaunched on 1 November 2010 by .SO Registry, which is regulated by the nation's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. On 22 March 2012, the Somali Cabinet also unanimously approved the National Communications Act. The bill paves the way for the establishment of a National Communications regulator in the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors. In November 2013, following a Memorandum of Understanding signed with Emirates Post in April of the year, the federal Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications officially reconstituted the Somali Postal Service (Somali Post). In October 2014, the ministry also relaunched postal delivery from abroad. The postal system is slated to be implemented in each of the country's 18 administrative provinces via a new postal coding and numbering system. Tourism Somalia has a number of local attractions, consisting of historical sites, beaches, waterfalls, mountain ranges and national parks. The tourist industry is regulated by the national Ministry of Tourism. The autonomous Puntland and Somaliland regions maintain their own tourism offices. The Somali Tourism Association (SOMTA) also provides consulting services from within the country on the national tourist industry. As of March 2015, the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife of the South West State announced that it is slated to establish additional game reserves and wildlife ranges. The United States Government recommends travelers to not travel to Somalia. Notable sights include the Laas Geel caves containing Neolithic rock art; the Cal Madow, Golis Mountains and Ogo Mountains; the Iskushuban and Lamadaya waterfalls; and the Hargeisa National Park, Jilib National Park, Kismayo National Park and Lag Badana National Park. Transport Somalia's network of roads is long. , streets are paved and are unpaved. A highway connects major cities in the northern part of the country, such as Bosaso, Galkayo and Garowe, with towns in the south. The Somali Civil Aviation Authority (SOMCAA) is Somalia's national civil aviation authority body. After a long period of management by the Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia (CACAS), SOMCAA is slated to re-assume control of Somalia's airspace by 31 December 2013. Sixty-two airports across Somalia accommodate aerial transportation; seven of these have paved runways. Among the latter, four airports have runways of over ; two are between and one is long. There are fifty-five airports with unpaved landing areas. One has a runway of over 3,047 m; four are between 2,438 m and 3,047 m in length; twenty are 1,524 m to 2,437 m; twenty-four are 914 m to 1,523 m; and six are under . Major airports in the nation include the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, the Hargeisa International Airport in Hargeisa, the Kismayo Airport in Kismayo, the Baidoa Airport in Baidoa, and the Bender Qassim International Airport in Bosaso. Established in 1964, Somali Airlines was the flag carrier of Somalia. It suspended operations during the civil war. However, a reconstituted Somali government later began preparations in 2012 for an expected relaunch of the airline, with the first new Somali Airlines aircraft scheduled for delivery by the end of December 2013. According to the Somali Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the void created by the closure of Somali Airlines has since been filled by various Somali-owned private carriers. Over six of these private airline firms offer commercial flights to both domestic and international locations, including Daallo Airlines, Jubba Airways, African Express Airways, East Africa 540, Central Air and Hajara. Possessing the longest coastline on the continent, Somalia has several major seaports. Maritime transport facilities are found in the port cities of Mogadishu, Bosaso, Berbera, Kismayo and Merca. There is also one merchant marine. Established in 2008, it is cargo-based. Demographics Somalia lacks reliable population data. The country had an estimated population of around million inhabitants in ; the total population according to the 1975 census was 3.3 million. A United Nations Population Fund survey conducted in 2013 and 2014 estimated the total population to be 12,316,895. About 85% of local residents are ethnic Somalis, who have historically inhabited the northern part of the country. They have traditionally been organized into nomadic pastoral clans, loose empires, sultanates and city-states. Civil strife in the early 1990s greatly increased the size of the Somali diaspora, as many of the best educated Somalis left the country. Non-Somali ethnic minority groups make up the remainder of Somalia's population, and are largely concentrated in the southern regions. They include Bravanese, Bantus, Bajuni, Ethiopians (especially Oromos), Yemenis, Indians, Persians, Italians and Britons. The Bantus, the largest ethnic minority group in Somalia, are the descendants of slaves who were brought in from southeastern Africa by Arab and Somali traders. In 1940, there were about 50,000 Italians living in Italian Somaliland. Most Europeans left after independence, while a small number of Westerners are still present in Somalia mainly working for international organizations operating in Somalia. A sizable Somali diaspora exists in various Western countries, such as the United States (in particular in the state of Minnesota) and in the United Kingdom (particularly in London), Sweden, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Australia, Switzerland, Austria, and Italy, as well on the Arabian peninsula, and several African nations, such as Uganda and South Africa. The Somali diaspora is deeply involved in the politics and development of Somalia. The president of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, was a former diaspora Somali and held US citizenship which he voluntarily renounced in 2019. Somalia's population is expanding at a growth rate of 1.75% per annum and a birth rate of 40.87 births per 1,000 people. The total fertility rate of Somalia is 6.08 children born per woman (2014 estimates), the fourth highest in the world, according to the CIA World Factbook. Most local residents are young, with a median age of 17.7 years; about 44% of the population is between the ages of 0–14 years, 52.4% is between the ages of 15–64 years, and only 2.3% is 65 years of age or older. The gender ratio is roughly balanced, with proportionally about as many men as women. There is little reliable statistical information on urbanization in Somalia. Rough estimates have been made indicating a rate of urbanization of 4.79% per annum (2005–2010 est.), with many towns quickly growing into cities. Many ethnic minorities have also moved from rural areas to urban centres since the onset of the civil war, particularly to Mogadishu and Kismayo. , 37.7% of the nation's population live in towns and cities, with the percentage rapidly increasing. Languages Somali and Arabic are the official languages of Somalia. The Somali language is the mother tongue of the Somali people, the nation's most populous ethnic group. It is a member of the Cushitic branch of the Afro-Asiatic language family, and its nearest relatives are the Oromo, Afar and Saho languages. Somali is the best documented of the Cushitic languages, with academic studies of it dating from before 1900. Somali dialects are divided into three main groups: Northern, Benadir and Maay. Northern Somali (or Northern-Central Somali) forms the basis for Standard Somali. Benadir (also known as Coastal Somali) is spoken on the Benadir coast, from Adale to south of Merca including Mogadishu, as well as in the immediate hinterland. The coastal dialects have additional phonemes that do not exist in Standard Somali. Maay is principally spoken by the Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) clans in the southern areas of Somalia. Benadiri is the main dialect spoken in the country, in contrast to Northern Somali which is the main dialect spoken in Somaliland. A number of writing systems have been used over the years for transcribing the Somali language. Of
De Vecchi had to reassess his plans as he was being humiliated on many fronts. After one year of exerting full force he could not yet manage to gain a result over the sultanate. In spite of the fact that the Italian navy sealed the sultanate's main coastal entrance, they could not succeed in stopping them from receiving arms and ammunition through it. It was only early 1927 when they finally succeeded in shutting the northern coast of the sultanate, thus cutting arms and ammunition supplies for the Majeerteen. By this time, the balance had tilted to the Italians' side, and in January 1927 they began to attack with a massive force, capturing Iskushuban, at the heart of the Majeerteen. Hersi Boqor unsuccessfully attacked and challenged the Italians at Iskushuban. To demoralise the resistance, ships were ordered to target and bombard the sultanate's coastal towns and villages. In the interior, the Italian troops confiscated livestock. By the end of the 1927, the Italians had taken full control of the sultanate. Hersi Boqor and his troops retreated to Ethiopia in order to rebuild their forces, but were unable to retake their territories, effectively ending the Campaign of the Sultanates. "Somalia italiana" and World War II On 9 May 1936, Mussolini proclaimed the creation of the Italian Empire, calling it the Africa Orientale Italiana (A.O.I.) and formed by Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland (called officially "Somalia italiana"). The Italians made many new investments in infrastructure in the region, such as the Strada Imperiale ("imperial road") between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu and the railway Mogadishu-Villabruzzi of 114 km. Over the course of Italian Somaliland's existence, many Somali troops fought in the so-called Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali. The soldiers were enrolled as Dubats, Zaptié and Bande irregolari. During World War II, these troops were regarded as a wing of the Italian Army's Infantry Division, as was the case in Libya and Eritrea. The Zaptié provided a ceremonial escort for the Italian Viceroy (Governor) as well as the territorial police. There were already more than one thousand such soldiers in 1922. In 1941, in Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia, 2,186 Zaptié plus an additional 500 recruits under training officially constituted a part of the Carabinieri. They were organised into a battalion commanded by Major Alfredo Serranti that defended Culqualber (Ethiopia) for three months until this military unit was destroyed by the Allies. After heavy fighting, the Somali troops and the Italian Carabinieri received full military honors from the British. In the first half of 1940, there were 22,000 Italians living in Somalia and the colony was one of the most developed in East Africa in terms of the standard of living of the colonists and of the Somalis, mainly in the urban areas. More than 10,000 Italians were living in Mogadishu, the administrative capital of the Africa Orientale Italiana, and new buildings were erected in the Italian architectural tradition. By 1940, the Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi (now Jowhar) had a population of 12,000 people, of whom nearly 3,000 were Italian Somalis, and enjoyed a notable level of development with a small manufacturing area with agricultural industries (sugar mills, etc.). In the second half of 1940, Italian troops invaded British Somaliland and ejected the British. The Italians also occupied parts of the British East Africa Protectorate bordering Jubaland around the towns of Moyale and Buna. Mussolini boasted in front of a group of Somalis leaders -in late summer 1940- that he had created the "Greater Somalia" (dreamed by the Somali population) after the union of British Somaliland to his Somalia Governorate. Independence During World War II, Britain regained control of British Somaliland and conquered Italian Somaliland, administering both militarily as protectorates. In November 1945, during the Potsdam Conference, the United Nations granted Italy trusteeship of Italian Somaliland, but only under close supervision and on the condition—first proposed by the Somali Youth League (SYL) and other nascent Somali political organizations, such as Hizbia Digil Mirifle Somali (HDMS) and the Somali National League (SNL)—that Somalia achieve independence within ten years. British Somaliland remained a protectorate of Britain until 1960. To the extent that Italy held the territory by UN mandate, the trusteeship provisions gave the Somalis the opportunity to gain experience in political education and self-government. These were advantages that British Somaliland, which was to be incorporated into the new Somali state, did not have. Although, in the 1950s, British colonial officials attempted, through various administrative development efforts, to make up for past neglect, the protectorate stagnated. The disparity between the two territories in economic development and political experience would cause serious difficulties when it came time to integrate the two parts. Britain included the proviso that the Somali nomads would retain their autonomy, but Ethiopia immediately claimed sovereignty over them. This prompted an unsuccessful bid by Britain in 1956 to buy back the Somali lands it had turned over. Britain also granted administration of the almost exclusively Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD) to Kenyan nationalists despite an informal plebiscite demonstrating the overwhelming desire of the region's population to join the newly formed Somali Republic. A referendum was held in neighboring Djibouti (then known as French Somaliland) in 1958, on the eve of Somalia's independence in 1960, to decide whether or not to join the Somali Republic or to remain with France. The referendum turned out in favour of a continued association with France, largely due to a combined yes vote by the sizable Afar ethnic group and resident Europeans. There was also allegations of widespread vote rigging, with the French expelling thousands of Somalis before the referendum reached the polls. The majority of those who voted "no" were Somalis who were strongly in favour of joining a united Somalia, as had been proposed by Mahmoud Harbi, Vice President of the Government Council. Harbi was killed in a plane crash two years later. Djibouti finally gained its independence from France in 1977, and Hassan Gouled Aptidon, a Somali who had campaigned for a yes vote in the referendum of 1958, eventually wound up as Djibouti's first president (1977–1991). On 1 July 1960, the two territories united to form the Somali Republic, albeit within boundaries drawn up by Italy and Britain. A government was formed by Abdullahi Issa Mohamud and Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal and other members of the trusteeship and protectorate governments, with the Speaker of the Somali Union Act Haji Bashir Ismail Yusuf as President of the Somali National Assembly, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar as President of Somali Republic, and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister (later to become president from 1967 to 1969). On 20 July 1961 and through a popular referendum, the people of Somalia ratified a new constitution, which was first drafted in 1960. In 1967, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal became Prime Minister, a position to which he was appointed by Shermarke. Egal would later become the President of the autonomous Somaliland region in northwestern Somalia. On 15 October 1969, while paying a visit to the northern town of Las Anod, Somalia's then President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was shot dead by a policeman. His assassination was quickly followed by a military coup d'état on 21 October 1969 (the day after his funeral), in which the Somali Army seized power without encountering armed opposition – essentially a bloodless takeover. The putsch was spearheaded by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who at the time commanded the army. Somali Democratic Republic Supreme Revolutionary Council Alongside Barre, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) that assumed power after President Sharmarke's assassination was led by Lieutenant Colonel Salaad Gabeyre Kediye and Chief of Police Jama Korshel. Kediye officially held the title of "Father of the Revolution," and Barre shortly afterwards became the head of the SRC. The SRC subsequently renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic, dissolved the parliament and the Supreme Court, and suspended the constitution. The revolutionary army established large-scale public works programs and successfully implemented an urban and rural literacy campaign, which helped dramatically increase the literacy rate. In addition to a nationalization program of industry and land, the new regime's foreign policy placed an emphasis on Somalia's traditional and religious links with the Arab world, eventually joining the Arab League (AL) in 1974. That same year, Barre also served as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU). In July 1976, Barre's SRC disbanded itself and established in its place the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), a one-party government based on scientific socialism and Islamic tenets. The SRSP was an attempt to reconcile the official state ideology with the official state religion by adapting Marxist precepts to local circumstances. Emphasis was placed on the Muslim principles of social progress, equality and justice, which the government argued formed the core of scientific socialism and its own accent on self-sufficiency, public participation and popular control, as well as direct ownership of the means of production. While the SRSP encouraged private investment on a limited scale, the administration's overall direction was essentially communist. Ogaden War In July 1977, the Ogaden War broke out after Barre's government sought to incorporate the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia into a Pan-Somali Greater Somalia. In the first week of the conflict, Somali armed forces seized the southern and central parts of the Ogaden. The units in the Godey Front were led by Colonel Abdullahi Ahmed Irro. For most of the war, the Somali army scored continuous victories on the Ethiopian army, following it as far as Sidamo. By September 1977, Somalia controlled 90% of the Ogaden and captured strategic cities such as Jijiga and put heavy pressure on Dire Dawa, threatening the train route from the latter city to Djibouti. After the siege of Harar, a massive unprecedented Soviet intervention consisting of 20,000 Cuban forces and several thousand Soviet experts came to the aid of Ethiopia's communist Derg regime. By 1978, the Somali troops were ultimately pushed out of the Ogaden. This shift in support by the Soviet Union motivated the Barre government to seek allies elsewhere. It eventually settled on the Soviets' Cold War arch-rival, the United States, which had been courting the Somali government for some time. All in all, Somalia's initial friendship with the Soviet Union and later partnership with the United States enabled it to build the largest army in Africa. Isaaq genocide Isaaq genocide was the systematic, state-sponsored massacre of Isaaq civilians between 1987 and 1989 by the Somali Democratic Republic under the dictatorship of Siad Barre. The number of civilian deaths in this massacre is estimated to be between 50,000 and 100,000 according to various sources, whilst local reports estimate the total civilian deaths to be upwards of 200,000 Isaaq civilians. This genocide also included the levelling and complete destruction of the second and third largest cities in Somalia, Hargeisa (which was 90 percent destroyed) and Burao (70 per cent destroyed) respectively, and had caused up to 500,000 Somalis (primarily of the Isaaq clan) to flee their land and cross the border to Hartasheikh in Ethiopia as refugees, in what was described as "one of the fastest and largest forced movements of people recorded in Africa", and resulted in the creation of the world's largest refugee camp then (1988), with another 400,000 being displaced. The scale of destruction led to Hargeisa being known as the 'Dresden of Africa'. The killings happened during the Somali Civil War and have been referred to as a "forgotten genocide". Rebellion A new constitution was promulgated in 1979 under which elections for a People's Assembly were held. However, Barre's Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party politburo continued to rule. In October 1980, the SRSP was disbanded, and the Supreme Revolutionary Council was re-established in its place. In May 1986, President Barre suffered serious injuries in a life-threatening automobile accident near Mogadishu, when the car that was transporting him smashed into the back of a bus during a heavy rainstorm. He was treated in a hospital in Saudi Arabia for head injuries, broken ribs and shock over a period of a month. Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samatar, then Vice President, subsequently served as de facto head of state for the next several months. Although Barre managed to recover enough to present himself as the sole presidential candidate for re-election over a term of seven years on 23 December 1986, his poor health and advanced age led to speculation about who would succeed him in power. Possible contenders included his son-in-law General Ahmed Suleiman Abdille, who was at the time the Minister of the Interior, in addition to Barre's Vice President Lt. Gen. Samatar. By that time, Barre's government had become increasingly unpopular. Many Somalis had become disillusioned with life under military dictatorship. The regime was weakened further in the 1980s as the Cold War drew to a close and Somalia's strategic importance was diminished. The government became increasingly totalitarian, and resistance movements, encouraged by Ethiopia, sprang up across the country, eventually leading to the Somali Civil War. Among the militia groups were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), together with the non-violent political oppositions of the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG). Somali Civil War With the political situation deteriorating, Barre's long-standing government in 1991 eventually collapsed under the pressure. The national army disbanded shortly afterwards. United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 was unanimously passed on 3 December 1992, which approved a coalition of United Nations peacekeepers led by the United States. Forming the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the force was tasked with assuring security until humanitarian efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation were transferred to the UN. Landing in 1993, the UN peacekeeping coalition started the two-year United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) primarily in the south to provide humanitarian relief. Some militias that had seized power after the oust of Barre regime's interpreted the UN troops' presence as a threat to their hegemony. Consequently, several gun battles took place in Mogadishu between local gunmen and peacekeepers. Among these was the Battle of Mogadishu, an unsuccessful attempt by US troops to apprehend faction leader Mohamed Farah Aidid. The UN soldiers eventually withdrew altogether from the country on 3 March 1995, having incurred more significant casualties. Decentralization Following the outbreak of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the central government, Somalia's residents reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, either secular, traditional or Islamic law, with a provision for appeal of all sentences. The legal structure in Somalia is thus divided along three lines: civil law, religious law and customary law. Civil law While Somalia's formal judicial system was largely destroyed after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, it was later gradually rebuilt and administered under different regional governments, such as the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland macro-regions. In the case of the later Transitional Federal Government, a new interim judicial structure was formed through various international conferences. Despite some significant political differences between them, all of these administrations share similar legal structures, much of which are predicated on the judicial systems of previous Somali administrations. These similarities in civil law include: a) a charter which affirms the primacy of Muslim shari'a or religious law, although in practice shari'a is applied mainly to matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and civil issues. The charter guarantees respect for universal standards of human rights to all subjects of the law. It also assures the independence of the judiciary, which in turn is protected by a judicial committee; b) a three-tier judicial system including a supreme court, a court of appeals, and courts of first instance (either divided between district and regional courts, or a single court per region); and c) the laws of the civilian government which were in effect prior to the military coup d'état that saw the Barre regime into power remain in force until the laws are amended. Shari'a Islamic shari'a has traditionally played a significant part in Somali society. In theory, it has served as the basis for all national legislation in every Somali constitution. In practice, however, it only applied to common civil cases such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and family matters. This changed after the start of the civil war when a number of new shari'a courts began to spring up in many different cities and towns across the country. These new shari'a courts serve three functions; namely, to pass rulings in both criminal and civil cases, to organize a militia capable of arresting criminals, and to keep convicted prisoners incarcerated. The shari'a courts, though structured along simple lines, feature a conventional hierarchy of a chairman, vice-chairman and four judges. A police force that reports to the court enforces the judges' rulings, but also helps settle community disputes and apprehend suspected criminals. In addition, the courts manage detention centers where criminals are kept. An independent finance committee is also assigned the task of collecting and managing tax revenue levied on regional merchants by the local authorities. Xeer Somalis have for centuries practiced a form of customary law, called Xeer (pronounced /ħeːr/). Xeer is a polycentric legal system where there is no monopolistic institution or agent that determines what the law should be or how it should be interpreted. The Xeer legal system is assumed to have developed exclusively in the Horn of Africa since approximately the 7th century. There is no evidence that it developed elsewhere or was greatly influenced by any foreign legal system. Its legal terminology is practically devoid of loan words from foreign languages, suggesting that it is truly indigenous. The Xeer legal system also requires a certain amount of specialization of different functions within the legal framework. Thus, one can find odayaal (judges), xeerbogeyaal (jurists), guurtiyaal (detectives), garxajiyaal (attorneys), markhaatiyal (witnesses) and waranle (police officers) to enforce the law. Xeer is defined by a few fundamental tenets that are immutable and which closely approximate the principle of jus cogens in international law: These precepts include: a) payment of blood money (locally referred to as diya) for libel, theft, physical harm, rape and death, as well as supplying assistance to relatives; b) assuring good inter-clan relations by treating women justly, negotiating with "peace emissaries" in good faith, and sparing the lives of socially protected groups "Birr Magaydo," (e.g. children, women, the pious, poets, messengers, sheikhs, and guests); c) family obligations such as the payment of dowry, and sanctions for eloping; d) rules pertaining to the management of resources such as the use of pasture land, water, and other natural resources; e) providing financial support to married female relatives and newlyweds; f) donating livestock and other assets to the poor. Recent history Transitional National Government In 2000, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected as the President of the nation's new Transitional National Government (TNG), an interim administration formed to guide Somalia to its third permanent republican government. On 10 October 2004, in a session held by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected as President of the succeeding Transitional Federal Government (TFG), an interim federal administrative body that he had helped establish earlier in the year. He received 189 votes from the TFG Parliament, while the closest contender, erstwhile Somali ambassador to Washington Abdullahi Ahmed Addou, got 79 votes in the third round of voting. The then incumbent President of Somalia, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, peacefully withdrew his candidature. Ahmed was sworn in a few days later on 14 October 2004. Transitional Federal Institutions The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was the internationally recognised government of Somalia until 20 August 2012, when its tenure officially ended. It was established as one of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) of government as defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The Transitional Federal Government officially comprised the executive branch of government, with the TFP serving as the legislative branch. The government was headed by the President of Somalia, to whom the cabinet reported through the Prime Minister. However, it was also used as a general term to refer to all three branches collectively. Islamic Courts Union and Ethiopian intervention In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamist organization, assumed control of much of the southern part of the country and promptly imposed Shari'a law. The Transitional Federal Government sought to reestablish its authority, and, with the assistance of Ethiopian troops, African Union peacekeepers and air support by the United States, managed to drive out the rival ICU and solidify its rule. On 8 January 2007, as the Battle of Ras Kamboni raged, TFG President and founder Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a former colonel in the Somali Army and decorated war hero, entered Mogadishu for the first time since being elected to office. The government then relocated to Villa Somalia in the capital from its interim location in Baidoa. This marked the first time since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 that the federal government controlled most of the country. Following this defeat, the Islamic Courts Union splintered into several different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and oppose the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, the group had captured Baidoa but not Mogadishu. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian troops to retreat, leaving behind an under-equipped African Union peacekeeping force to assist the Transitional Federal Government's troops. Owing to a lack of funding and human resources, an arms embargo that made it difficult to re-establish a national security force, and general indifference on the part of the international community, President Yusuf found himself obliged to deploy thousands of troops from Puntland to Mogadishu to sustain the battle against insurgent elements in the southern part of the country. Financial support for this effort was provided by the autonomous region's government. This left little revenue for Puntland's own security forces and civil service employees, leaving the territory vulnerable to piracy and terrorist attacks. On 29 December 2008, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed announced before a united parliament in Baidoa his resignation as President of Somalia. In his speech, which was broadcast on national radio, Yusuf expressed regret at failing to end the country's seventeen-year conflict as his government had mandated to do. He also blamed the international community for its failure to support the government, and said that the speaker of parliament would succeed him in office per the Charter of the Transitional Federal Government. Coalition government Between May 31st and June 9th 2008, representatives of Somalia's federal government and the moderate Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) group of Islamist rebels participated in peace talks in Djibouti brokered by the former United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The conference ended with a signed agreement calling for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in exchange for the cessation of armed confrontation. Parliament was subsequently expanded to 550 seats to accommodate ARS members, which then elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former ARS chairman, to office. President Sharif shortly afterwards appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, the son of the assassinated former President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as the nation's new Prime Minister. With the help of a small team of African Union troops, the coalition government also began a counteroffensive in February 2009 to assume full control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its rule, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union, other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, a moderate Sufi militia. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the two main Islamist groups in opposition, began to fight amongst themselves in mid-2009. As a truce, in March 2009, Somalia's coalition government announced that it would re-implement Shari'a as the nation's official judicial system. However, conflict continued in the southern and central parts of the country. Within months, the coalition government had gone from holding about 70% of south-central Somalia's conflict zones, territory which it had inherited from the previous Yusuf administration, to losing control of over 80% of the disputed territory to the Islamist insurgents. On 14 October 2010, diplomat Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmajo) was appointed the new Prime Minister of Somalia. The former Premier Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke resigned the month before following a protracted dispute with President Sharif over a proposed draft constitution. Per the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) Charter, Prime Minister Mohamed named a new Cabinet on 12 November 2010, which has been lauded by the international community. As had been expected, the allotted ministerial positions were significantly reduced in numbers, with only 18 administrative posts unveiled versus the previous government's bloated 39 portfolios. Only two Ministers from the previous Cabinet were reappointed: Hussein Abdi Halane, the former Minister of Finance and a well-regarded figure in the international community, was put in charge of a consolidated Ministry of Finance and Treasury; and Dr. Mohamud Abdi Ibrahim was reassigned to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, a moderate Sufi group and an important military ally of the TFG, was also accorded the key Interior and Labour ministries. The remaining ministerial positions were largely assigned to technocrats new to the Somali political arena. In its first 50 days in office, Prime Minister Mohamed's new administration completed its first monthly payment of stipends to government soldiers, and initiated the implementation of a full biometric register for the security forces within a window of four months. Additional members of the Independent Constitutional Commission were also appointed to engage Somali constitutional lawyers, religious scholars and experts in Somali culture over the nation's upcoming new	De Vecchi moved the deposed sultan to Mogadishu. Fascist Italy was poised to re-conquer the sultanate by whatever means. To maneuver the situation within Hobyo, they even contemplated the idea of reinstating Ali Yusuf. However, the idea was dropped after they became pessimistic about the results. To undermine the resistance, however, and before the Eritrean reinforcement could arrive, De Vecchi began to instill distrust among the local people by buying the loyalty of some of them. In fact, these tactics had better results than the military campaign had, and the resistance began gradually to wear down. Given the anarchy that would follow, the new policy was a success. On the military front, Italian troops finally overran El Buur on 26 December 1925, and the forces of Omar Samatar were compelled to retreat to Western Somaliland. By neutralising Hobyo, the fascists could concentrate on the Majeerteen. In early October 1924, E. Coronaro, the new Alula commissioner, presented Boqor (king) Osman Mahamuud with an ultimatum to disarm and surrender. Meanwhile, Italian troops began to pour into the sultanate in anticipation of this operation. While landing at Haafuun and Alula, the sultanate's troops opened fire on them. Fierce fighting ensued and to avoid escalating the conflict and to press the fascist government to revoke their policy, Boqor Osman tried to open a dialogue. However, he failed, and again fighting broke out between the two parties. Following this disturbance, on 7 October, the Governor instructed Coronaro to order the Sultan to surrender; to intimidate the people he ordered the seizure of all merchant boats in the Alula area. At Hafun, Arimondi bombarded and destroyed all the boats in the area. On 13 October, Coronaro was to meet Boqor Osman at Baargaal to press for his surrender. Under siege already, Boqor Osman was playing for time. However, on 23 October, Boqor Osman sent an angry response to the Governor defying his order. Following this a full-scale attack was ordered in November. Baargaal was bombarded and destroyed to the ground. This region was ethnically compact, and was out of range of direct action by the fascist government of Muqdisho. The attempt of the colonizers to suppress the region erupted into explosive confrontation. The Italians were meeting fierce resistance on many fronts. In December 1925, led by the charismatic leader Hersi Boqor, son of Boqor Osman, the sultanate forces drove the Italians out of Hurdia and Hafun, two strategic coastal towns. Another contingent attacked and destroyed an Italian communications centre at Cape Guardafui, at the tip of the Horn. In retaliation the Bernica and other warships were called on to bombard all main coastal towns of the Majeerteen. After a violent confrontation Italian forces captured Eyl (Eil), which until then had remained in the hands of Hersi Boqor. In response to the unyielding situation, Italy called for reinforcements from their other colonies, notably Eritrea. With their arrival at the closing of 1926, the Italians began to move into the interior where they had not been able to venture since their first seizure of the coastal towns. Their attempt to capture Dharoor Valley was resisted, and ended in failure. De Vecchi had to reassess his plans as he was being humiliated on many fronts. After one year of exerting full force he could not yet manage to gain a result over the sultanate. In spite of the fact that the Italian navy sealed the sultanate's main coastal entrance, they could not succeed in stopping them from receiving arms and ammunition through it. It was only early 1927 when they finally succeeded in shutting the northern coast of the sultanate, thus cutting arms and ammunition supplies for the Majeerteen. By this time, the balance had tilted to the Italians' side, and in January 1927 they began to attack with a massive force, capturing Iskushuban, at the heart of the Majeerteen. Hersi Boqor unsuccessfully attacked and challenged the Italians at Iskushuban. To demoralise the resistance, ships were ordered to target and bombard the sultanate's coastal towns and villages. In the interior, the Italian troops confiscated livestock. By the end of the 1927, the Italians had taken full control of the sultanate. Hersi Boqor and his troops retreated to Ethiopia in order to rebuild their forces, but were unable to retake their territories, effectively ending the Campaign of the Sultanates. "Somalia italiana" and World War II On 9 May 1936, Mussolini proclaimed the creation of the Italian Empire, calling it the Africa Orientale Italiana (A.O.I.) and formed by Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland (called officially "Somalia italiana"). The Italians made many new investments in infrastructure in the region, such as the Strada Imperiale ("imperial road") between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu and the railway Mogadishu-Villabruzzi of 114 km. Over the course of Italian Somaliland's existence, many Somali troops fought in the so-called Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali. The soldiers were enrolled as Dubats, Zaptié and Bande irregolari. During World War II, these troops were regarded as a wing of the Italian Army's Infantry Division, as was the case in Libya and Eritrea. The Zaptié provided a ceremonial escort for the Italian Viceroy (Governor) as well as the territorial police. There were already more than one thousand such soldiers in 1922. In 1941, in Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia, 2,186 Zaptié plus an additional 500 recruits under training officially constituted a part of the Carabinieri. They were organised into a battalion commanded by Major Alfredo Serranti that defended Culqualber (Ethiopia) for three months until this military unit was destroyed by the Allies. After heavy fighting, the Somali troops and the Italian Carabinieri received full military honors from the British. In the first half of 1940, there were 22,000 Italians living in Somalia and the colony was one of the most developed in East Africa in terms of the standard of living of the colonists and of the Somalis, mainly in the urban areas. More than 10,000 Italians were living in Mogadishu, the administrative capital of the Africa Orientale Italiana, and new buildings were erected in the Italian architectural tradition. By 1940, the Villaggio Duca degli Abruzzi (now Jowhar) had a population of 12,000 people, of whom nearly 3,000 were Italian Somalis, and enjoyed a notable level of development with a small manufacturing area with agricultural industries (sugar mills, etc.). In the second half of 1940, Italian troops invaded British Somaliland and ejected the British. The Italians also occupied parts of the British East Africa Protectorate bordering Jubaland around the towns of Moyale and Buna. Mussolini boasted in front of a group of Somalis leaders -in late summer 1940- that he had created the "Greater Somalia" (dreamed by the Somali population) after the union of British Somaliland to his Somalia Governorate. Independence During World War II, Britain regained control of British Somaliland and conquered Italian Somaliland, administering both militarily as protectorates. In November 1945, during the Potsdam Conference, the United Nations granted Italy trusteeship of Italian Somaliland, but only under close supervision and on the condition—first proposed by the Somali Youth League (SYL) and other nascent Somali political organizations, such as Hizbia Digil Mirifle Somali (HDMS) and the Somali National League (SNL)—that Somalia achieve independence within ten years. British Somaliland remained a protectorate of Britain until 1960. To the extent that Italy held the territory by UN mandate, the trusteeship provisions gave the Somalis the opportunity to gain experience in political education and self-government. These were advantages that British Somaliland, which was to be incorporated into the new Somali state, did not have. Although, in the 1950s, British colonial officials attempted, through various administrative development efforts, to make up for past neglect, the protectorate stagnated. The disparity between the two territories in economic development and political experience would cause serious difficulties when it came time to integrate the two parts. Britain included the proviso that the Somali nomads would retain their autonomy, but Ethiopia immediately claimed sovereignty over them. This prompted an unsuccessful bid by Britain in 1956 to buy back the Somali lands it had turned over. Britain also granted administration of the almost exclusively Somali-inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD) to Kenyan nationalists despite an informal plebiscite demonstrating the overwhelming desire of the region's population to join the newly formed Somali Republic. A referendum was held in neighboring Djibouti (then known as French Somaliland) in 1958, on the eve of Somalia's independence in 1960, to decide whether or not to join the Somali Republic or to remain with France. The referendum turned out in favour of a continued association with France, largely due to a combined yes vote by the sizable Afar ethnic group and resident Europeans. There was also allegations of widespread vote rigging, with the French expelling thousands of Somalis before the referendum reached the polls. The majority of those who voted "no" were Somalis who were strongly in favour of joining a united Somalia, as had been proposed by Mahmoud Harbi, Vice President of the Government Council. Harbi was killed in a plane crash two years later. Djibouti finally gained its independence from France in 1977, and Hassan Gouled Aptidon, a Somali who had campaigned for a yes vote in the referendum of 1958, eventually wound up as Djibouti's first president (1977–1991). On 1 July 1960, the two territories united to form the Somali Republic, albeit within boundaries drawn up by Italy and Britain. A government was formed by Abdullahi Issa Mohamud and Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal and other members of the trusteeship and protectorate governments, with the Speaker of the Somali Union Act Haji Bashir Ismail Yusuf as President of the Somali National Assembly, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar as President of Somali Republic, and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister (later to become president from 1967 to 1969). On 20 July 1961 and through a popular referendum, the people of Somalia ratified a new constitution, which was first drafted in 1960. In 1967, Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal became Prime Minister, a position to which he was appointed by Shermarke. Egal would later become the President of the autonomous Somaliland region in northwestern Somalia. On 15 October 1969, while paying a visit to the northern town of Las Anod, Somalia's then President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was shot dead by a policeman. His assassination was quickly followed by a military coup d'état on 21 October 1969 (the day after his funeral), in which the Somali Army seized power without encountering armed opposition – essentially a bloodless takeover. The putsch was spearheaded by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, who at the time commanded the army. Somali Democratic Republic Supreme Revolutionary Council Alongside Barre, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) that assumed power after President Sharmarke's assassination was led by Lieutenant Colonel Salaad Gabeyre Kediye and Chief of Police Jama Korshel. Kediye officially held the title of "Father of the Revolution," and Barre shortly afterwards became the head of the SRC. The SRC subsequently renamed the country the Somali Democratic Republic, dissolved the parliament and the Supreme Court, and suspended the constitution. The revolutionary army established large-scale public works programs and successfully implemented an urban and rural literacy campaign, which helped dramatically increase the literacy rate. In addition to a nationalization program of industry and land, the new regime's foreign policy placed an emphasis on Somalia's traditional and religious links with the Arab world, eventually joining the Arab League (AL) in 1974. That same year, Barre also served as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union (AU). In July 1976, Barre's SRC disbanded itself and established in its place the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), a one-party government based on scientific socialism and Islamic tenets. The SRSP was an attempt to reconcile the official state ideology with the official state religion by adapting Marxist precepts to local circumstances. Emphasis was placed on the Muslim principles of social progress, equality and justice, which the government argued formed the core of scientific socialism and its own accent on self-sufficiency, public participation and popular control, as well as direct ownership of the means of production. While the SRSP encouraged private investment on a limited scale, the administration's overall direction was essentially communist. Ogaden War In July 1977, the Ogaden War broke out after Barre's government sought to incorporate the predominantly Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia into a Pan-Somali Greater Somalia. In the first week of the conflict, Somali armed forces seized the southern and central parts of the Ogaden. The units in the Godey Front were led by Colonel Abdullahi Ahmed Irro. For most of the war, the Somali army scored continuous victories on the Ethiopian army, following it as far as Sidamo. By September 1977, Somalia controlled 90% of the Ogaden and captured strategic cities such as Jijiga and put heavy pressure on Dire Dawa, threatening the train route from the latter city to Djibouti. After the siege of Harar, a massive unprecedented Soviet intervention consisting of 20,000 Cuban forces and several thousand Soviet experts came to the aid of Ethiopia's communist Derg regime. By 1978, the Somali troops were ultimately pushed out of the Ogaden. This shift in support by the Soviet Union motivated the Barre government to seek allies elsewhere. It eventually settled on the Soviets' Cold War arch-rival, the United States, which had been courting the Somali government for some time. All in all, Somalia's initial friendship with the Soviet Union and later partnership with the United States enabled it to build the largest army in Africa. Isaaq genocide Isaaq genocide was the systematic, state-sponsored massacre of Isaaq civilians between 1987 and 1989 by the Somali Democratic Republic under the dictatorship of Siad Barre. The number of civilian deaths in this massacre is estimated to be between 50,000 and 100,000 according to various sources, whilst local reports estimate the total civilian deaths to be upwards of 200,000 Isaaq civilians. This genocide also included the levelling and complete destruction of the second and third largest cities in Somalia, Hargeisa (which was 90 percent destroyed) and Burao (70 per cent destroyed) respectively, and had caused up to 500,000 Somalis (primarily of the Isaaq clan) to flee their land and cross the border to Hartasheikh in Ethiopia as refugees, in what was described as "one of the fastest and largest forced movements of people recorded in Africa", and resulted in the creation of the world's largest refugee camp then (1988), with another 400,000 being displaced. The scale of destruction led to Hargeisa being known as the 'Dresden of Africa'. The killings happened during the Somali Civil War and have been referred to as a "forgotten genocide". Rebellion A new constitution was promulgated in 1979 under which elections for a People's Assembly were held. However, Barre's Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party politburo continued to rule. In October 1980, the SRSP was disbanded, and the Supreme Revolutionary Council was re-established in its place. In May 1986, President Barre suffered serious injuries in a life-threatening automobile accident near Mogadishu, when the car that was transporting him smashed into the back of a bus during a heavy rainstorm. He was treated in a hospital in Saudi Arabia for head injuries, broken ribs and shock over a period of a month. Lieutenant General Mohamed Ali Samatar, then Vice President, subsequently served as de facto head of state for the next several months. Although Barre managed to recover enough to present himself as the sole presidential candidate for re-election over a term of seven years on 23 December 1986, his poor health and advanced age led to speculation about who would succeed him in power. Possible contenders included his son-in-law General Ahmed Suleiman Abdille, who was at the time the Minister of the Interior, in addition to Barre's Vice President Lt. Gen. Samatar. By that time, Barre's government had become increasingly unpopular. Many Somalis had become disillusioned with life under military dictatorship. The regime was weakened further in the 1980s as the Cold War drew to a close and Somalia's strategic importance was diminished. The government became increasingly totalitarian, and resistance movements, encouraged by Ethiopia, sprang up across the country, eventually leading to the Somali Civil War. Among the militia groups were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), together with the non-violent political oppositions of the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG). Somali Civil War With the political situation deteriorating, Barre's long-standing government in 1991 eventually collapsed under the pressure. The national army disbanded shortly afterwards. United Nations Security Council Resolution 794 was unanimously passed on 3 December 1992, which approved a coalition of United Nations peacekeepers led by the United States. Forming the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the force was tasked with assuring security until humanitarian efforts aimed at stabilizing the situation were transferred to the UN. Landing in 1993, the UN peacekeeping coalition started the two-year United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) primarily in the south to provide humanitarian relief. Some militias that had seized power after the oust of Barre regime's interpreted the UN troops' presence as a threat to their hegemony. Consequently, several gun battles took place in Mogadishu between local gunmen and peacekeepers. Among these was the Battle of Mogadishu, an unsuccessful attempt by US troops to apprehend faction leader Mohamed Farah Aidid. The UN soldiers eventually withdrew altogether from the country on 3 March 1995, having incurred more significant casualties. Decentralization Following the outbreak of the civil war and the ensuing collapse of the central government, Somalia's residents reverted to local forms of conflict resolution, either secular, traditional or Islamic law, with a provision for appeal of all sentences. The legal structure in Somalia is thus divided along three lines: civil law, religious law and customary law. Civil law While Somalia's formal judicial system was largely destroyed after the fall of the Siad Barre regime, it was later gradually rebuilt and administered under different regional governments, such as the autonomous Puntland and Somaliland macro-regions. In the case of the later Transitional Federal Government, a new interim judicial structure was formed through various international conferences. Despite some significant political differences between them, all of these administrations share similar legal structures, much of which are predicated on the judicial systems of previous Somali administrations. These similarities in civil law include: a) a charter which affirms the primacy of Muslim shari'a or religious law, although in practice shari'a is applied mainly to matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and civil issues. The charter guarantees respect for universal standards of human rights to all subjects of the law. It also assures the independence of the judiciary, which in turn is protected by a judicial committee; b) a three-tier judicial system including a supreme court, a court of appeals, and courts of first instance (either divided between district and regional courts, or a single court per region); and c) the laws of the civilian government which were in effect prior to the military coup d'état that saw the Barre regime into power remain in force until the laws are amended. Shari'a Islamic shari'a has traditionally played a significant part in Somali society. In theory, it has served as the basis for all national legislation in every Somali constitution. In practice, however, it only applied to common civil cases such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and family matters. This changed after the start of the civil war when a number of new shari'a courts began to spring up in many different cities and towns across the country. These new shari'a courts serve three functions; namely, to pass rulings in both criminal and civil cases, to organize a militia capable of arresting criminals, and to keep convicted prisoners incarcerated. The shari'a courts, though structured along simple lines, feature a conventional hierarchy of a chairman, vice-chairman and four judges. A police force that reports to the court enforces the judges' rulings, but also helps settle community disputes and apprehend suspected criminals. In addition, the courts manage detention centers where criminals are kept. An independent finance committee is also assigned the task of collecting and managing tax revenue levied on regional merchants by the local authorities. Xeer Somalis have for centuries practiced a form of customary law, called Xeer (pronounced /ħeːr/). Xeer is a polycentric legal system where there is no monopolistic institution or agent that determines what the law should be or how it should be interpreted. The Xeer legal system is assumed to have developed exclusively in the Horn of Africa since approximately the 7th century. There is no evidence that it developed elsewhere or was greatly influenced by any foreign legal system. Its legal terminology is practically devoid of loan words from foreign languages, suggesting that it is truly indigenous. The Xeer legal system also requires a certain amount of specialization of different functions within the legal framework. Thus, one can find odayaal (judges), xeerbogeyaal (jurists), guurtiyaal (detectives), garxajiyaal (attorneys), markhaatiyal (witnesses) and waranle (police officers) to enforce the law. Xeer is defined by a few fundamental tenets that are immutable and which closely approximate the principle of jus cogens in international law: These precepts include: a) payment of blood money (locally referred to as diya) for libel, theft, physical harm, rape and death, as well as supplying assistance to relatives; b) assuring good inter-clan relations by treating women justly, negotiating with "peace emissaries" in good faith, and sparing the lives of socially protected groups "Birr Magaydo," (e.g. children, women, the pious, poets, messengers, sheikhs, and guests); c) family obligations such as the payment of dowry, and sanctions for eloping; d) rules pertaining to the management of resources such as the use of pasture land, water, and other natural resources; e) providing financial support to married female relatives and newlyweds; f) donating livestock and other assets to the poor. Recent history Transitional National Government In 2000, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was selected as the President of the nation's new Transitional National Government (TNG), an interim administration formed to guide Somalia to its third permanent republican government. On 10 October 2004, in a session held by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected as President of the succeeding Transitional Federal Government (TFG), an interim federal administrative body that he had helped establish earlier in the year. He received 189 votes from the TFG Parliament, while the closest contender, erstwhile Somali ambassador to Washington Abdullahi Ahmed Addou, got 79 votes in the third round of voting. The then incumbent President of Somalia, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, peacefully withdrew his candidature. Ahmed was sworn in a few days later on 14 October 2004. Transitional Federal Institutions The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was the internationally recognised government of Somalia until 20 August 2012, when its tenure officially ended. It was established as one of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) of government as defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) adopted in November 2004 by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The Transitional Federal Government officially comprised the executive branch of government, with the TFP serving as the legislative branch. The government was headed by the President of Somalia, to whom the cabinet reported through the Prime Minister. However, it was also used as a general term to refer to all three branches collectively. Islamic Courts Union and Ethiopian intervention In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamist organization, assumed control of much of the southern part of the country and promptly imposed Shari'a law. The Transitional Federal Government sought to reestablish its authority, and, with the assistance of Ethiopian troops, African Union peacekeepers and air support by the United States, managed to drive out the rival ICU and solidify its rule. On 8 January 2007, as the Battle of Ras Kamboni raged, TFG President and founder Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, a former colonel in the Somali Army and decorated war hero, entered Mogadishu for the first time since being elected to office. The government then relocated to Villa Somalia in the capital from its interim location in Baidoa. This marked the first time since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 that the federal government controlled most of the country. Following this defeat, the Islamic Courts Union splintered into several different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-Shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and oppose the Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia. Throughout 2007 and 2008, Al-Shabaab scored military victories, seizing control of key towns and ports in both central and southern Somalia. At the end of 2008, the group had captured Baidoa but not Mogadishu. By January 2009, Al-Shabaab and other militias had managed to force the Ethiopian troops to retreat, leaving behind an under-equipped African Union peacekeeping force to assist the Transitional Federal Government's troops. Owing to a lack of funding and human resources, an arms embargo that made it difficult to re-establish a national security force, and general indifference on the part of the international community, President Yusuf found himself obliged to deploy thousands of troops from Puntland to Mogadishu to sustain the battle against insurgent elements in the southern part of the country. Financial support for this effort was provided by the autonomous region's government. This left little revenue for Puntland's own security forces and civil service employees, leaving the territory vulnerable to piracy and terrorist attacks. On 29 December 2008, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed announced before a united parliament in Baidoa his resignation as President of Somalia. In his speech, which was broadcast on national radio, Yusuf expressed regret at failing to end the country's seventeen-year conflict as his government had mandated to do. He also blamed the international community for its failure to support the government, and said that the speaker of parliament would succeed him in office per the Charter of the Transitional Federal Government. Coalition government Between May 31st and June 9th 2008, representatives of Somalia's federal government and the moderate Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) group of Islamist rebels participated in peace talks in Djibouti brokered by the former United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The conference ended with a signed agreement calling for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in exchange for the cessation of armed confrontation. Parliament was subsequently expanded to 550 seats to accommodate ARS members, which then elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former ARS chairman, to office. President Sharif shortly afterwards appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, the son of the assassinated former President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as the nation's new Prime Minister. With the help of a small team of African Union troops, the coalition government also began a counteroffensive in February 2009 to assume full control of the southern half of the country. To solidify its rule, the TFG formed an alliance with the Islamic Courts Union, other members of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, and Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, a moderate Sufi militia. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the two main Islamist groups in opposition, began to fight amongst themselves in mid-2009. As a truce, in March 2009, Somalia's coalition government announced that it would re-implement Shari'a as the nation's official judicial system. However, conflict
were available, and when adjusted for the significant inequality that exists in Somalia, its HDI is even lower. The UNDP notes that "inequalities across different social groups, a major driver of conflict, have been widening". Somalia's economy consists of both traditional and modern production, with a gradual shift to more modern industrial techniques. According to the Central Bank of Somalia, about 80% of the population are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists, who keep goats, sheep, camels and cattle. The nomads also gather resins and gums to supplement their income. According to the World Bank, Somalia's economy has suffered as a result of the state failure that accompanied the country's civil war. Some economists, including libertarian Peter T. Leeson, have argued instead that state collapse has actually helped improve economic welfare, because the previous Somali state was predatory. Economic indicators According to the African Development Bank, Somalia is "characterized by a severe lack of basic economic and social statistics". This situation has been exacerbated by the civil war and institutional collapse, although even prior to Somalia's state failure, data was often unreliable. The World Bank reports that Somalia's GDP was $917.0 million in 1990 and its total population was 13.42 million in 2014, and has since risen to 15 million as of 2018, marking roughly a 12% increase in its total population since then. In 2018 the World bank estimated an annual GDP of $6.2 billion, similar in size to Guam and the Kyrgyz Republic, and classifies it as a low-income country. The United Nations Statistics Division reports a GDP figure of $1.306 billion for 2012, compared to $2.316 billion in 2005 and $1.071 billion in 2010. According to the Central Bank of Somalia, sometime in the 2000s the country's GDP per capita according to the World Bank was $230, a slight reduction in real terms from 1990. The 2012 Human Development Report estimates per capita GDP to be $284, compared with an average across sub-Saharan Africa of $1,300 per capita. This GDP per capita figure is the fourth lowest in the world. About 43% of the population live on less than 1 US dollar a day, with about 24% of those found in urban areas and 54% living in rural areas. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Somalia, the country had some of the lowest development indicators in the world, and a "strikingly low" Human Development Index (HDI) value of 0.285. This would rank amongst the lowest in the world if comparable data were available, and when adjusted for the significant inequality that exists in Somalia, its HDI is even lower. The UNDP notes that "inequalities across different social groups, a major driver of conflict, have been widening". The UN has classified Somalia as a least developed country since its Committee for Development Policy began categorising states in this way in 1971. An International Monetary Fund mission to Somalia reports estimated GDP growth of 3.7% in 2014 and CPI inflation of -71.10%. The report notes that provided that Somalia's security situation continues to improve modestly and there is no drought, economic growth in the medium term should average 5%, but that "growth will remain inadequate to redress poverty and gender disparities". An estimated 73% of the people of Somalia live below the poverty line in 2016. State failure and economic welfare According to the World Bank, within two years of the outbreak of civil war in 1988, Somali state institutions collapsed and "most of the economic and social infrastructure and assets were destroyed". In 2003 the Bank said that despite the absence of a state and its institutions, the Somali private sector experienced impressive growth, but that "most of these sectors are now becoming either stagnant or their growth is hindered due to the lack of investment, trained manpower and the absence of a relevant legal and regulatory framework to enforce rules and regulations, common standards and quality control". The report notes difficulties encouraging and making use of domestic savings for investment, due to the lack of formal financial services and regulatory agencies. The lack of state institutions, the Bank argues, resulted in the prevention of access to international capital markets. In an article published in 2007, libertarian economist Peter T. Leeson argues that the Somali state was predatory, and that its collapse has improved the economic welfare of its citizens, with 14 out of 18 key development indicators being more positive in the period 2000-2005 than in 1985–1990. Similarly, economists Benjamin Powell, Ryan Ford and Alex Nowrasteh argue that Somalia's economic performance, relative to other African states, has improved during the period of statelessness. Ersun Kurtulus states that Leeson and Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh's articles provide "the most unequivocal evidence to indicate that Somalia has been faring far better under anarchy than it did under Barre's regime". Kurtulus argues that these authors may provide a valid explanation of the situation in Somalia, but that "the argument appears to be derived from a hypothesis which is rooted in a liberal conceptualisation of statehood rather than in a quantitative analysis which establishes a negative correlation between indicators of state predation and those of economic and social welfare". Kurtulus suggests that the collapse of a repressive state may improve personal and civil liberties, but that such an account "overemphasises endogenous factors that are vested in the domestic arena, while neglecting the exogenous factors that operate at the regional and international level". Agriculture Agriculture is the most important economic sector. It accounts for about 65% of the GDP and employs 65% of the workforce. Livestock contributes about 40% to GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Other principal exports include fish, charcoal and bananas; sugar, sorghum and corn are products for the domestic market. According to the Central Bank of Somalia, imports of goods total about $460 million per year, and have recovered and even surpassed aggregate imports prior to the start of the civil war in 1991. Exports, which total about $270 million annually, have also surpassed pre-war aggregate export levels but still lead to a trade account deficit of about $190 million US dollars per year. However, this trade deficit is far exceeded by remittances sent by Somalis in the diaspora, which have helped sustain the import level. With the advantage of being located near the Arabian Peninsula, Somali traders have increasingly begun to challenge Australia's traditional dominance over the Persian Gulf Arab livestock and meat market, offering quality animals at very low prices.	Dahabshiil is the largest of the Somali money transfer operators (MTO), having captured most of the market vacated by Al-Barakaat. The firm has its headquarters in London and employs more than 2000 people across 144 countries, with 130 branches in the United Kingdom alone, a further 130 branches in Somalia, and 400 branches globally, including one in Dubai. The company provides a broad range of financial services to international organisations, as well as to both large and small businesses and private individuals. After Dahabshiil, Qaran Express is the largest Somali-owned funds transfer company. The firm has its headquarters in both London and Dubai, with 175 agents worldwide, 66 agents in Somalia and 64 in London, and charges nothing for remitting charity funds. Mustaqbal is the third most prominent Somali MTO, with 8 agents in Somalia and 49 in the UK. As with Dahabshiil and Qaran Express, it also has a notable presence internationally. As the reconstituted Central Bank of Somalia fully assumes its monetary policy responsibilities, some of the existing money transfer companies are expected in the near future to seek licenses so as to develop into full-fledged commercial banks. This will serve to expand the national payments system to include formal cheques, which in turn is expected to reinforce the efficacy of the use of monetary policy in domestic macroeconomic management. With a significant improvement in local security, Somali expatriates began returning to the country for investment opportunities. Coupled with modest foreign investment, the inflow of funds have helped the Somali shilling increase considerably in value. By March 2014, the currency had appreciated by almost 60% against the U.S. dollar over the previous 12 months. The Somali shilling was the strongest among the 175 global currencies traded by Bloomberg, rising close to 50 percentage points higher than the next most robust global currency over the same period. Stock exchange The Somalia Stock Exchange (SSE) is the national bourse of Somalia. It was founded in 2012 by the Somali diplomat Idd Mohamed, Ambassador extraordinary and deputy permanent representative to the United Nations. The SSE was established to attract investment from both Somali-owned firms and global companies in order to accelerate the ongoing post-conflict reconstruction process in Somalia. In August 2012, the SSE signed a Memorandum of understanding with the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) to assist it in technical development. The agreement includes identifying appropriate expertise and support. Sharia compliant sukuk bonds and halal equities are also envisioned as part of the deal as Somalia's nascent stock market develops. As of November 2014, the Somalia Stock Exchange has established administrative offices in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and other urban centers in Somalia. The bourse is slated to officially open in 2015. Initially, seven Somali-owned firms from the financial services, telecommunications and transportation sectors are expected to list their shares therein for prospective global investment. Natural Resources Somalia has untapped reserves of numerous natural resources, including uranium, iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt and natural gas. Australian and Chinese oil companies have been granted licenses for finding petroleum and other natural resources in the country. An oil group listed in Sydney, Range Resources, anticipates that the Puntland province in the north has the potential to produce to of oil. As a result of these developments, the Somali Petroleum Company was created by the federal government. In the late 1960s, UN geologists also discovered major uranium deposits and other rare mineral reserves in Somalia. The find was the largest of its kind, with industry experts estimating the deposits at over 25% of the world's then known uranium reserves of 800,000 tons. In 1984, the IUREP Orientation Phase Mission to Somalia reported that the country had 5,000 tons of uranium reasonably assured resources (RAR), 11,000 tons of uranium estimated additional resources (EAR) in calcrete deposits, as well as possibly up to 150,000 tons of uranium speculative resources (SR) in sandstone and calcrete deposits. Somalia concurrently evolved into a major world supplier of uranium, with American, UAE, Italian and Brazilian mineral companies vying for extraction rights. Link Natural resources have a stake in the natural resources of the central region, Kilimanjaro Capital has a stake in the 1,161,400 acres Amsas-Coriole-Afgoi (ACA) Block, which includes uranium exploration. Besides uranium, an unspecified quantity of yttrium, a rare earth element and costly mineral, was also found in the country. Energy In mid-2010, Somalia's business community pledged to invest $1 billion in the national gas and electricity industries over the following five years. Abdullahi Hussein, the director of the just-formed Trans-National Industrial Electricity and Gas Company, predicted that the investment strategy would create 100,000 jobs. The new firm was established through the merger of five Somali companies from the trade, finance, security, and telecommunications sectors. The first phase of the project started within six months of the establishment of the company, and trained youth to supply electricity to economic areas and communities. The second phase began in mid-to-late 2011 and saw the construction of factories in specially designated economic zones for the fishing, agriculture, livestock and mining industries. In 2012, the Farole administration gave the green light to the first official oil exploration project in Puntland and Somalia at large. Led by the Canadian oil company Africa Oil and its partner Range Resources, initial drilling in the Shabeel-1 well on Puntland's Dharoor Block in March of the year successfully yielded oil. According to the Central Bank of Somalia, as the nation embarks on the path of reconstruction, the economy is expected to not only match its pre-civil war levels, but also to accelerate in growth and development due to the Somalia's untapped natural resources. See also Oil exploration in Puntland United Nations Economic Commission for Africa References Notes Bibliography Mauri, Arnaldo, Banking Development in Somalia, SSRN 958442 (1971). External links Somalia latest trade data on ITC Trade Map CIA World Factbook:
firms offer affordable mobile phone and internet services that are not available in many other parts of the continent. Customers can conduct money transfers (such as through the popular Dahabshiil) and other banking activities via mobile phones, as well as easily gain wireless Internet access. After forming partnerships with multinational corporations such as Sprint, ITT and Telenor, these firms now offer the cheapest and clearest phone calls in Africa. These Somali telecommunication companies also provide services to every city, town and hamlet in Somalia. There are presently around 25 mainlines per 1,000 persons, and the local availability of telephone lines (tele-density) is higher than in neighboring countries; three times greater than in adjacent Ethiopia. Prominent Somali telecommunications companies include Somtel Network, Golis Telecom Group, Hormuud Telecom, Somafone, Nationlink, Netco, Telcom and Somali Telecom Group. Hormuud Telecom alone grosses about $40 million a year. Despite their rivalry, several of these companies signed an interconnectivity deal in 2005 that allows them to set prices, maintain and expand their networks, and ensure that competition does not get out of control. In 2008, Dahabshiil Group acquired a majority stake in Somtel Network, a Hargeisa-based telecommunications firm specialising in high speed broadband, mobile internet, LTE services, mobile money transfer and mobile phone services. The acquisition provided Dahabshiil with the necessary platform for a subsequent expansion into mobile banking, a growth industry in the regional banking sector. In 2014, Somalia's three largest telecommunication operators, Hormuud Telecom, NationLink and Somtel, also signed an interconnection agreement. The cooperative deal will see the firms establish the Somali Telecommunication Company (STC), which will allow their mobile clients to communicate across the three networks. Investment in the telecom industry is held to be one of the clearest signs that Somalia's economy has continued to develop. The sector provides key communication services, and in the process facilitates job creation and income generation. Regulation Somalia's telecommunication sector is governed by the National Communications Law (also called the Telecoms Act) that was signed into law by president Abdullahi Farmajo on 2 October 2017, after passing the Cabinet and the two Houses of Parliament (Senate and House of the People). It entered into effect immediately. This Act had a very long way in coming, as its drafting had already started in 2005. It was already approved by the Somali Cabinet in 2012. The new law paves the way for the establishment of a National Communications Regulatory Commission in the broadcasting and telecommunications sectors. The bill was passed following consultations between government representatives and communications, academic and civil society stakeholders. According to the Ministry of Information, Posts and Telecommunication, the Act is expected to create an environment conducive to investment and the certainty it provides will encourage further infrastructural development, resulting in more efficient service delivery. Firms Companies providing telecommunication services in Somalia include: Mail The Somali Postal Service (Somali Post) is the national postal service of the Federal Government of Somalia. It is part of the Ministry of Information, Posts and Telecommunication. The national postal infrastructure was completely destroyed during the civil war. In order to fill the vacuum, Somali Post signed an agreement in 2003 with the United Arab Emirates' Emirates Post to process mail to and from Somalia. Emirates Post's mail transit hub at the Dubai International Airport was then used to forward mail from Somalia to the UAE and various Western destinations, including Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada. Concurrently, the Somali Transitional Federal Government began preparations to revive the national postal service. The government's overall reconstruction plan for Somali Post is structured into three Phases spread out over a period of ten years. Phase I will see the reconstruction of the postal headquarters and General Post Office (GPO), as well as the establishment of 16 branch offices in the capital and 17 in regional bases. Somali authorities re-established Somalia's membership with the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 2012 and began participating again in the Union's affairs. They have also rehabilitated the GPO in Mogadishu, and appointed an official Postal Consultant to provide professional advice on the renovations. Phase II of the rehabilitation project involved the construction of 718 postal outlets from 2014 to 2016. International postal services for Somalia officially resumed in late 2013, with the assistance of the UPU in developing capacity, providing technical assistance, and furnishing basic mail processing equipment. Radio There are a number of radio news agencies based in Somalia. Established during the colonial period, Radio Mogadishu initially broadcast news items in both Somali and Italian. The station was modernized with Russian assistance following independence in 1960, and began offering home service in Somali, Amharic and Oromo. After closing down operations in the early 1990s due to the civil war, the station was officially re-opened in the early 2000s by the Transitional National Government. In the late 2000s, Radio Mogadishu also launched a complementary website of the same name, with news items in Somali, Arabic and English. Other radio stations based in Mogadishu include radio Dalsan, Mustaqbal Media corporation and the Shabelle Media Network, the latter of which was in 2010 awarded the Media of	offices in the capital and 17 in regional bases. Somali authorities re-established Somalia's membership with the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 2012 and began participating again in the Union's affairs. They have also rehabilitated the GPO in Mogadishu, and appointed an official Postal Consultant to provide professional advice on the renovations. Phase II of the rehabilitation project involved the construction of 718 postal outlets from 2014 to 2016. International postal services for Somalia officially resumed in late 2013, with the assistance of the UPU in developing capacity, providing technical assistance, and furnishing basic mail processing equipment. Radio There are a number of radio news agencies based in Somalia. Established during the colonial period, Radio Mogadishu initially broadcast news items in both Somali and Italian. The station was modernized with Russian assistance following independence in 1960, and began offering home service in Somali, Amharic and Oromo. After closing down operations in the early 1990s due to the civil war, the station was officially re-opened in the early 2000s by the Transitional National Government. In the late 2000s, Radio Mogadishu also launched a complementary website of the same name, with news items in Somali, Arabic and English. Other radio stations based in Mogadishu include radio Dalsan, Mustaqbal Media corporation and the Shabelle Media Network, the latter of which was in 2010 awarded the Media of the Year prize by the Paris-based journalism organisation, Reporters Without Borders (RSF). In total, about one short-wave and ten private FM radio stations broadcast from the capital, with several radio stations broadcasting from the central and southern regions. The northeastern Puntland region has around six private radio stations, including Radio Garowe, Radio Daljir, Radio Codka-Nabbada and Radio Codka-Mudug. Radio Gaalkacyo, formerly known as Radio Free Somalia, operates from Galkayo in the north-central Mudug province. Additionally, the Somaliland region in the northwest has one government-operated radio station. As of 2007, transmissions for two internationally based broadcasters were also available. Television The Mogadishu-based Somali National Television is the principal national public service broadcaster. On 18 March 2011, the Ministry of Information of the Transitional Federal Government began experimental broadcasts of the new TV channel. After a 20-year hiatus, the station was shortly thereafter officially re-launched on 4 April 2011. SNTV broadcasts 24 hours a day, and can be viewed both within Somalia and abroad via terrestrial and satellite platforms. Additionally, Somalia has several private television networks, including Horn Cable Television and Universal TV. Two such TV stations re-broadcast Al-Jazeera and CNN. Eastern Television Network and SBC TV air from Bosaso, the commercial capital of Puntland. The Puntland and Somaliland regions also each have one government-run TV channel, Puntland TV and Radio and Somaliland National TV, respectively. Print In the early 2000s, print media in Somalia reached a peak in activity. Around 50 newspapers were published in Mogadishu alone during this period, including Qaran, Mogadishu Times, Sana'a, Shabelle Press, Ayaamaha, Mandeeq, Sky Sport, Goal, The Nation, Dalka, Panorama, Aayaha Nolosha, Codka Xuriyada and Xidigta Maanta. In 2003, as new free electronic media outlets started to proliferate, advertisers increasingly began switching over from print ads to radio and online commercials in order to reach more customers. A number of the broadsheets in circulation subsequently closed down operations, as they were no longer able to cover printing costs in the face of the electronic revolution. In 2012, the political Xog Doon and Xog Ogaal and Horyaal Sports were reportedly the last remaining newspapers printed in the capital. According to Issa Farah, a former editor with the Dalka broadsheet, newspaper publishing in Somalia is likely to experience a resurgence if the National Somali Printing Press is re-opened and the sector is given adequate public support. Online news outlets covering Somalia include Garowe Online, Wardheernews, Horseedmedia, Calannka, Jowhar, Hiiraan, Boramanews and Puntland Post. Telephone To call in Somalia, the following format is used: yxx xxxx, yy xxx xxx or yyy xxx xxx - Calls within Somalia +252 yxx xxxx, +252 yy xxx xxx or +252 yyy xxx xxx - Calls from outside Somalia As of the end of 2013, over 52% of Somalia's population used a cellphone. Internet Internet users: 163,185 in 2014 (156th in the world) or 1.51% of the population (156nd in the world). According to Global Internet, one of the largest Internet providers in central and southern Somalia, unofficial estimates on local Internet usage are higher, with 2.0% of the population estimated to have Internet access as of 2011. Internet hosts: 186 hosts in 2012 (202nd in the world). IPv4: 10,240 addresses allocated, less than 0.05% of the world total, 1.0 addresses per 1000 people (2012). .so is the Internet top-level domain (ccTLD) for Somalia. After a long absence, the .so domain was officially relaunched in November 2010 by the .SO Registry. Regulated by the national Ministry of Posts and Telecommunication, the registrar offers several domain name spaces geared toward specific communities and interest groups: .so – General usage com.so – Commercial enterprises net.so – Networks org.so – Non-profit organizations gov.so – Government agencies According to the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD) and the African Union/United Nations Information Support Team (IST), Somalia did not have systemic internet blocking or filtering as of December 2012. The application of content standards online was also unclear. Somalia established its first ISP in 1999, one of the last countries in Africa to get connected to the Internet. According to the telecommunications resource Balancing Act, growth in internet connectivity has since then grown considerably, with around 53% of the entire nation covered as of 2009. Both internet commerce and telephony have consequently become among the quickest growing local businesses. According to the World Bank, the number of internet users in Somalia rose from only 200 in the year 2000 to 1.8% of the population in 2015, with the percentage continuing to rise. The number of mobile cellular subscriptions rose much faster, from 1.1 per 100 people in 2000 to 52.5 per 100 people in 2015. The Somali Telecommunication Association (STA), a watchdog organization that oversees the policy development and regulatory framework of Somalia's ICT sector, reported in 2006 that there were over half a million users of internet services within the territory. There were also 22 established ISPs and 234 cyber cafes, with an annual growth rate of 15.6%. As of 2009, dial up, wireless and satellite services were available. Dial up internet services in Somalia were among the fastest growing on the continent, with an annual landline growth rate of over 12.5%. The increase in usage was largely due to innovative policy initiatives adopted by the various Somali telecom operators, including free local in-town calls, a flat rate of $10 per month for unlimited calls, a low charge of $0.005 per minute for Internet connections, and a one-time connection fee of $50. Global Internet Company, a firm jointly owned by the major Somali telecommunication networks Hormuud Telecom, Telcom Somalia and Nationlink, was the country's largest ISP. It was at the time the only provider of dial
the New Deal Compact for Somalia, the initiative's implementation is facilitated by 17.75 million Euros and 3 million Euros provided by the EU and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), respectively. Among other objectives, the project aims to renovate the highway between Galkayo and Garowe, including funding refurbishments on the damaged segments of the road and construction of check dams and flood control structures. The initiative also involves a routine annual maintenance program, which focuses on side brushing, clearing bridges after floods, drainage and culvert clearance, and pothole filling. Additionally, the project will offer policy support to the Puntland Ministry of Public Works and the Puntland Highway Authority, and local contractors will receive on-the-job training to upgrade their skills. Air Airports The Somali Civil Aviation Authority (SOMCAA) is Somalia's national civil aviation authority body. Based at Aden Abdulle International Airport in Mogadishu, it is under the aegis of the federal Ministry of Air and Land Transport. In 2012, the ministry along with the Somali Civil Aviation Steering Committee set a three-year window for reconstruction of the national civil aviation capacity. After a long period of management by the Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia (CACAS), SCAMA in conjunction with the International Civil Aviation Organization also finalized a process in December 2014 to transfer control of Somalia's airspace to the new Air Space Management Centre in the capital. As of 2012, Somalia has 61 airports according to the CIA factfile. 7 of these have paved runways. Among the latter, four have runways of over 3,047 m; two between 2,438 m and 3,047 m; and one 1,524 m to 2,437 m long. There are 55 airports with unpaved landing areas. One has a runway of over 3,047 m; four are between 2,438 m to 3,047 m in length; twenty are 1,524 m to 2,437 m; twenty four are 914 m to 1,523 m; and six are under 914 m. Major airports in the country include the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu, the Hargeisa International Airport in Hargeisa, the Kismayo Airport in Kismayo, the Bender Qassim International Airport in Bosaso, the Berbera Airport in Berbera, and the Garowe International Airport in Garowe. In September 2013, the Turkish company Favori LLC began operations at the airport. The firm announced plans to renovate the aviation building and construct a new one, as well as upgrade other modern service structures. A$10 million project, it will increase the airport's existing 15 aircraft capacity to 60. According to Favori, there were 439,879 domestic and international flights at the airport in 2014, an increase of 319,925 flights from the previous year. In April 2014, construction began on a new national Aviation Training Academy at the Aden Adde International Airport. The new institution is intended to enhance the capacity of aviation personnel working in Somalia's airports, and focus training within the country. A modern terminal that is concurrently being built at the airport, with funding provided by the Favori firm. According to Minister of Air Transportation and Civil Aviation Said Jama Qorshel, construction of the new terminal is scheduled to take six months, and is expected to improve the airport's functionality and operations. He added that his Ministry is also slated to establish other airports on the capital's outskirts. This in turn would serve to reduce congestion at the Aden Adde International Airport, which would then be exclusively used by large aircraft. In December 2014, the foundation stone for a new runway was also laid at the Bender Qassim International Airport. The China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation is now slated to upgrade the airport's existing gravel runway, pave it with asphalt, and convert it from 1.8 km to 2.65 km in accordance with the code 4C operations clause. Airlines Somali Airlines was the flag carrier of Somalia. Established in 1964, it offered flights to both domestic and international destinations. Due to the outbreak of the civil war in the early 1990s, all of the carrier's operations were officially suspended in 1991. A reconstituted Somali government later began preparations in 2012 for an expected relaunch of the carrier, with the first new Somali Airlines aircraft scheduled for delivery by the end of December 2013. According to the Somali Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the void created by the closure of Somali Airlines has since been filled by various Somali-owned private carriers. Over six of these private airline firms offer commercial flights to both domestic and international locations, including Daallo Airlines, Jubba Airways, African Express Airways, East Africa 540, Central Air and Hajara. Additionally, the Somali central government flies its own public aircraft. Sea Ports Possessing the longest coastline on mainland Africa, Somalia has a number of maritime transport facilities across the country. In total, there are over 15 seaports. Major class ports are found at Mogadishu, Bosaso, Berbera and Kismayo. Two jetty class ports are also situated at Las Khorey and Merca. Additionally, Aluula, Maydh, Lughaya, Eyl, Qandala, Hafun, Hobyo, Garacad and El Maan all have smaller ports. In	preparations in 2012 for an expected relaunch of the carrier, with the first new Somali Airlines aircraft scheduled for delivery by the end of December 2013. According to the Somali Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the void created by the closure of Somali Airlines has since been filled by various Somali-owned private carriers. Over six of these private airline firms offer commercial flights to both domestic and international locations, including Daallo Airlines, Jubba Airways, African Express Airways, East Africa 540, Central Air and Hajara. Additionally, the Somali central government flies its own public aircraft. Sea Ports Possessing the longest coastline on mainland Africa, Somalia has a number of maritime transport facilities across the country. In total, there are over 15 seaports. Major class ports are found at Mogadishu, Bosaso, Berbera and Kismayo. Two jetty class ports are also situated at Las Khorey and Merca. Additionally, Aluula, Maydh, Lughaya, Eyl, Qandala, Hafun, Hobyo, Garacad and El Maan all have smaller ports. In October 2013, the federal Cabinet endorsed an agreement with the Turkish firm Al-Bayrak to manage the Port of Mogadishu for a 20-year period. According to the Prime Minister's Office, the deal was secured by the Ministry of Ports and Public Works, and also assigns Al-Bayrak responsibility for rebuilding and modernizing the port. In April 2014, the Federal Parliament postponed finalization of the Seaport Management Deal pending the approval of a new foreign investment bill. The MPs also requested that the agreement be submitted to the legislature for deliberation and to ensure that the interests of the port's manual labourers are taken into account. In September 2014, the federal government officially delegated management of the Mogadishu Port to Al-Bayrak. According to Al-Bayrak, the majority of its revenue share will be re-invested in the seaport through additional port-based trade and new docks, construction materials and machinery. The company also plans to install an environment wall and a closed circuit camera system in accordance with international security protocols, erect a modern port administration building, and clean the ship entrance channels via underwater surveillance. As of September 2014, the first phase of the renovations are reportedly complete, with the second phase underway. The Port of Bosaso was constructed during the mid-1980s by the Siad Barre administration for annual livestock shipments to the Middle East. In January 2012, a renovation project was launched, with KMC contracted to upgrade the harbor. The initiative's first phase saw the clean-up of unwanted materials from the dockyard and was completed within the month. The second phase involves the reconstruction of the port's adjoining seabed, with the objective of accommodating larger ships. Adeso, an organization founded by Somali environmentalist Fatima Jibrell, began a project for the redevelopment of the Port of Las Khorey. The initiative was later taken up by Faisal Hawar, CEO of the Maakhir Resource Company. In 2012, he brokered an agreement with a Greek investment firm for the development of the commercial seaport. A team of
Republic is vested in the courts. The judiciary is independent of the legislative and executive branches of government whilst fulfilling its judicial functions. It can declare statutes as null and void if they are in violation of the Federal Constitution. The national court structure consists of: The Constitutional Court The Federal Government level courts The Federal Member State level courts A nine-member Judicial Service Commission appoints any Federal tier member of the judiciary. It also selects and presents potential Constitutional Court judges to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament for approval. If endorsed, the President appoints the candidate as a judge of the Constitutional Court. The five-member Constitutional Court adjudicates issues pertaining to the constitution, in addition to various Federal and sub-national matters. The Constitutional Court is composed of 5 judges, The Judicial Service Commission shall nominate as judge of the Constitutional Court only persons of high integrity, with appropriate qualifications in law and Shari’a, and who is highly competent in Constitutional matters, and who are of high moral character. Nominees are then presented to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament for approval. If endorsed, the President appoints the candidate as a judge of the Constitutional Court. The Chief Judge and Deputy Chief Judge are later chosen by the Constitutional Court judges from within their membership ranks. Administrative divisions Somalia is officially divided into eighteen regions (plural gobollada; singular gobol), which in turn are subdivided into districts. The regions are: Political parties and elections See also Constitution	elects the President and has the authority to pass and veto laws. and consists of a 275-seat lower house as well as an upper house capped at 54 representatives. Judiciary The Constitution states that the judiciary is independent of the legislative and executive branches of government whilst fulfilling its judicial functions. Members of the judiciary shall be subject only to the law. The Somali judicial system is based on Islamic law, Judicial authority of the Federal Republic is vested in the courts. The judiciary is independent of the legislative and executive branches of government whilst fulfilling its judicial functions. It can declare statutes as null and void if they are in violation of the Federal Constitution. The national court structure consists of: The Constitutional Court The Federal Government level courts The Federal Member State level courts A nine-member Judicial Service Commission appoints any Federal tier member of the judiciary. It also selects and presents potential Constitutional Court judges to the House of the People of the Federal Parliament for approval. If endorsed, the President appoints the candidate as a judge of the Constitutional Court. The five-member Constitutional Court adjudicates issues pertaining to
conscription and to the campaigns against guerrilla groups resulted in widespread evasion of military service. As a result, during the late 1980s the government normally met manpower requirements by impressing men into military service. This practice alienated an increasing number of Somalis, who wanted the government to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the conflicts that were slowly destroying Somali society. However, as the 1980s wore on, Siad Barre increasingly used clanism as a political resource. Barre filled the key positions in the army and security forces with members of three Darood clans closely related to his own reer: the Marehan, Dhulbahante, and Ogaden known as the MOD Alliance . Adam says that '..As early as 1976, when Colonel Omar Mohamed Farah was asked to train and command a tank brigade stationed in Mogadishu, he found that out of about 540 soldiers, at least 500 were from the Marehan clan. The whole tank division was headed by a Marehan officer, Umar Haji Masala.' Compagnon wrote in 1992: "Colonels and generals were part of the president's personal patronage network; they had to remain loyal to him and his relatives, whether they had command or were temporarily in the cabinet." As a result, by 1990 many Somalis looked upon the armed forces as Siad Barre's personal army. This perception eventually destroyed the military's reputation as a national institution. The critical posts of commander of the 2nd Tank Brigade and 2nd Artillery Brigade in Mogadishu were both held by Marehan officers, as were the posts of commander of the three reserve brigades in Hargeisa in the north. By 1987 the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimated the army was 40,000 strong (with Ethiopian army strength estimated at the same time as 260,000). The President, Mohamed Siad Barre, held the rank of Major General and acted as Minister of Defence. There were three vice-ministers of national defence. From the SNA headquarters in Mogadishu four sectors were directed: 26th Sector at Hargeisa, 54th Sector at Garowe, 21st Sector at Dusa Mareb, and 60th Sector at Baidoa. Thirteen divisions, averaging 3,300 strong, were divided between the four sectors – four in the northernmost and three in each of the other sectors. The sectors were under the command of brigadiers (three) and a colonel (one). Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan has been reported as 26th Sector commander from 1986 to 1988. Barre's son, Maslah Mohammed Siad Barre was commanding the 77th Sector in Mogadishu in November 1987, and later became Chief of Staff (also reported as Commander-in-Chief) of the Army. Maslah may have become Commander-in-Chief in early March 1989. By the mid-1980s, more resistance movements supported by Ethiopia's Derg administration had sprung up across the country. Barre responded by ordering punitive measures against those he perceived as locally supporting the guerillas, especially in the northern regions. The clampdown included bombing of cities, with the northwestern administrative center of Hargeisa, a Somali National Movement (SNM) stronghold, among the targeted areas in 1988. Compagnon writes that: Military exercises between the United States and the Siad Barre regime continued during the 1980s. After Exercise Eastern Wind ’83, the Los Angeles Times was told that "the exercise failed dismally.…The Somali army did not perform up to any standard," one diplomat said. … "The inefficiency of the Somali armed forces is legendary among foreign military men." 'Valiant Usher '86' took place during the U.S. Fiscal Year of 1986, but actually in late 1985, and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit participated in Exercise Eastern Wind in August 1987 in the area of Geesalay (in the vicinity of Cape Guardafui). U.S. Army elements conducted training with the Somali 31st Commando Brigade at Baledogle Airfield outside Mogadishu in 1989. As of 1 June 1989, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the Army comprised four corps and 12 division headquarters. The IISS noted that these formations 'were in name only; below establishment in units, men, and equipment. Brigades were of battalion size.' In 1989-90 six military sectors , twelve divisions, four tank brigades, 45 mechanized and infantry brigades, 4 commando brigades, one surface-to-air missile brigade, three field artillery brigades, 30 field battalions [sic: probably field artillery battalions], and one air defence artillery battalion were listed. The armed forces declined in size from a possible high of 65,000 in early 1990 to about 10,000 later that year, due to desertions and battlefield defeats. On 12–13 November 1989, a group of Hawiye officers and men belonging to the 4th Division at Galkayo, in Mudug, mutinied. General Barre's son, Maslah, lead a force of Marehan clansmen to suppress the mutiny. Punishment was meted out to local Hawiye villages. In mid-November 1989, rebel forces briefly captured Galkayo. They reportedly seized significant quantities of military equipment at the 4th Division Headquarters, including tanks, 30 mobile anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers. However, the rebels were unable to take most of this equipment so they incinerated it. Government forces thereafter launched massive reprisals against civilians residing in the regions corresponding with the 21st, 54th, 60th and 77th military sectors. The impacted towns and villages included Gowlalo, Dagaari, Sadle-Higlo, Bandiir Adley, Galinsor, Wargalo, Do'ol, Halimo, Go'ondalay and Galkayo. By mid-1990, USC insurgents had captured most of the towns and villages surrounding Mogadishu. On 8 November 1990, USC forces launched attack on the government garrison at Bulo-Burte, killing the commander. From 30 December 1990, there was a major upsurge in local violence in Mogadishu, and continuous fighting between government troops and USC insurgents. The next four weeks were marked by increasing rebel gains. On 27 January 1991, Siad Barre fled the capital for Kismayo, along with many of his supporters. This marked the culmination of the first phase of the civil war. By this time the Armed Forces had dissolved, split into clan factions. On 23 January 1992, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo via United Nations Security Council Resolution 733 to stop the flow of weapons to feuding militia groups. Much military equipment was left in situ, deteriorating, and was sometimes discovered and photographed by intervention forces in the early 1990s. In May 2019, the New York Times reported that a former commander of the SNA's Fifth Brigade in northern Somalia had been found responsible for torture during the 1980s by a U.S. jury. Twenty-first century It was reported on 7 November 2001, that Transitional National Government (TNG) military forces had seized control of Marka in Lower Shabelle. From 2002, Ismail Qasim Naji served as the TNG military chief. He was given the rank of Major General. The TNG's new army, made up of 90 women and 2,010 men, was equipped on 21 March 2002 with guns and armed wagons surrendered to the TNG by private parties in exchange for money, according to TNG officials. TNG president Abdulkassim Salat Hassan instructed the recruits to use the weaponry to "pacify Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia by fighting bandits, anarchists and all forces that operate for survival outside the law." But the TNG controlled only one part of Mogadishu; rival warlords controlled the remainder. Some TNG weapons were stolen and looted in late 2002. During this time, the TNG was opposed militarily and politically by the rival Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). Eventually the leadership of the SRRC and the TNG were reconciled, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in 2004 by Somali politicians in Nairobi. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed from Puntland was elected as President. The TFG later moved its temporary headquarters to Baidoa. President Yusuf requested that the African Union deploy military forces in Somalia. However, as the AU lacked the resources to do so, Yusuf brought in his own militia from Puntland. Along with the U.S. funding the ARPCT coalition, this alarmed many in south-central Somalia, and recruits flocked to the ascendant Islamic Courts Union (ICU). A battle for Mogadishu followed in the first half of 2006 in which the ARPCT confronted the ICU. However, with local support, the ICU captured the city in June of the year. It then expanded its area of control in south-central Somalia over the following months, assisted militarily by Eritrea. In an effort at reconciliation, TFG and ICU representatives held several rounds of talks in Khartoum under the auspices of the Arab League. The meetings ended unsuccessfully due to uncompromising positions retained by both parties. Hardline Islamists subsequently gained power within the ICU, prompting fears of a Talibanization of the movement. In December 2006, Ethiopian troops entered Somalia to assist the TFG against the advancing Islamic Courts Union, initially winning the Battle of Baidoa. On 28 December 2006, the allied forces recaptured the capital from the ICU. The offensive helped the TFG solidify its rule. Ethiopian and TFG forces forced the ICU from Ras Kamboni between 7–12 January 2007. They were assisted by at least two U.S. air strikes. On 8 January 2007, for the first time since taking office, President Ahmed entered Mogadishu from Baidoa, as the TFG moved its base to the national capital. President Ahmed brought his Puntland army chief with him, and Abdullahi Ali Omar became Somali chief of army on 10 February 2007. On 20 January 2007, through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was formally authorised. Seven hundred Ugandan troops, earmarked for AMISOM, were landed at Mogadishu airport on 7–8 March 2007. In Mogadishu, Hawiye residents resented the Islamic Courts Union's defeat. They distrusted the TFG, which was at the time dominated by the Darod clan, believing that it was dedicated to the advancement of Darod interests in lieu of the Hawiye. Additionally, they feared reprisals for massacres committed in 1991 in Mogadishu by Hawiye militants against Darod civilians, and were dismayed by Ethiopian involvement. Critics of the TFG likewise charged that its federalist platform was part of a plot by the Ethiopian government to keep Somalia weak and divided. During its first few months in the capital, the TFG was initially restricted to key strategic points, with the large northwestern and western suburbs controlled by Hawiye rebels. In March 2007, President Ahmed announced plans to forcibly disarm militias in the city. According to the ISA, a coalition of local insurgents led by Al-Shabaab subsequently launched a wave of attacks against the TFG and Ethiopian troops. The allied forces in return mounted a heavy-handed response. All of the warring parties were responsible for widespread violations of the laws of war, as civilians were caught in the ensuing crossfire. Insurgents reportedly deployed militants and established strongholds in heavily populated neighborhoods, launched mortar rounds from residential areas, and targeted public and private individuals for assassination and violence. TFG forces alleged to have failed to efficaciously warn civilians in combat zones, impeded relief efforts, plundered property, in some instances engaged in murder and violence, and mistreated detainees during mass arrests. According to HRW, the implicated TFG forces included military, police and intelligence personnel, as well as the private guards of senior TFG officials. Victims were often unable to identify TFG personnel, and confused militiamen aligned with TFG officials with TFG police officers and other state security personnel. In May 2007, U.S. diplomats spoke with the TFG's Ambassador to Ethiopia. Among the topics of conversation were Somali security forces, and Ambassador Abdulkarim Farah said that the TFG had trained nearly 7,000 militia in Baledogle who were now patrolling throughout Somalia, from Kismayo to Puntland. Another 3,500 militia were undergoing training. Farah said that on 18 May he planned to his hometown of Beledweyne to establish a militia training camp there, at the instruction of President Yusuf. Farah estimated that approximately 60 per cent of the militia were Darod, 30 per cent were Hawiye, and the remaining 10 per cent were from other clans; the majority of security forces in Mogadishu were Darod. He said that the TFG had not sought to exclude Darod from the militia, and attributed the imbalance to Hawiye having primarily supported the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). In December 2008, the International Crisis Group reported: Yusuf has built a largely subservient and loyal apparatus by putting his fellow Majerteen clansmen in strategic positions. The National Security Agency (NSA) under General Mohamed Warsame ("Darwish") and the so-called "Majerteen militia" units in the TFG army operate in parallel and often above other security agencies. Their exact number is hard to ascertain, but estimates suggest about 2,000. They are well catered for, well armed and often carry out counter-insurgency operations with little or no coordination with other security agencies. In the short term, this strategy may appear effective for the president, who can unilaterally employ the force essentially as he pleases. However, it undermines morale in the security services and is a cause of their high desertion rates. Much of the problem building armed forces was the lack of functioning TFG government institutions: Beyond the endemic internal power struggles, the TFG has faced far more serious problems in establishing its authority and rebuilding the structures of governance. Its writ has never extended much beyond Baidoa. Its control of Mogadishu is ever more contested, and it is largely under siege in the rest of the country. There are no properly functioning government institutions. Also in December 2008, Human Rights Watch described the Somali National Army as the 'TFG's largely theoretical professional military force.' It said that 'where trained TFG military forces appear, 'they were identified by their victims as Ethiopian-trained forces, often acting in concert with ENDF (Ethiopian National Defense Force) forces or under the command of ENDF officers.' HRW also said that 'Human Rights Watch's own research has uncovered a pattern of violent abuses by TFG forces including widespread acts of murder, rape, looting, assault, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture. Those responsible include police, military, and intelligence personnel as well as the personal militias of high-ranking TFG officials.' HRW went on to say: 'The TFG has deployed a confusing array of security forces and armed militias to act on its behalf. Victims of the widespread abuses in which these forces have been implicated often have trouble identifying whether their attackers were TFG police officers, other TFG security personnel, or militias linked to TFG officials. Furthermore, formal command-and-control structures are to a large degree illusory. TFG security forces often wear multiple hats, acting on orders from their formal superiors one day, as clan militias another day, and as autonomous self-interested armed groups the next.' In April 2009, donors at a UN-sponsored conference pledged over $250 million to help improve security. The funds were earmarked for AMISOM and supporting Somalia's security, including the build-up of a security force of 6,000 members as well as an augmented police force of 10,000 men. In June 2009, the Somali military received 40 tonnes worth of arms and ammunition from the U.S. government to assist it in combating the insurgency. In November 2010, a new technocratic government was elected to office. In its first 50 days in office, the new administration completed its first monthly payment of stipends to government fighters. It was the first of many Somali administrations to announce plans for a full biometric register for the security forces. While it aimed to complete the biometric register within four months, little further was reported. By August 2011, AMISOM and Somali forces had managed to capture all of Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab. Powerful vested interests and corrupt commanders were, as of February 2011, the largest obstacle to reforming the army. Some newly delivered weaponry was sold by officers. The International Crisis Group also said that AMISOM's efforts at assisting in formalizing the military's structure and providing training to the estimated 8,000 SNA were problematic. Resistance continued to the establishment of an effective chain of command, logical military formations and a credible troop roster. Although General Mohamed Gelle Kahiye, the respected former army chief, attempted to instill reforms, he was marginalized and eventually dismissed. In October 2011, following a weekend preparatory meeting between Somali and Kenyan military officials in the town of Dhobley, the Kenya Defence Forces launched an attack across the border against Al-Shabaab, aiming for Kismayo. In early June 2012, Kenyan troops were formally integrated into AMISOM. In January 2012, Somali government forces and their AMISOM allies launched offensives on Al-Shabaab's last foothold on the northern outskirts of Mogadishu. The following month, Somali forces fighting alongside AMISOM seized Baidoa from the insurgent group. By June 2012, the allied forces had also captured El Bur, Afgooye, and Balad. Progress by the Kenya Army from the border towards Kismayo was slow, but Afmadow was also reported captured on 1 June 2012. Creation of Federal Government The Federal Government of Somalia was established in August/September 2012. On 6 March 2013, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2093 was passed. The resolution lifted the purchase ban on light weapons for a provisional period of one year, but retained restrictions on the procurement of heavy arms such as surface-to-air missiles and artillery. On 13 March 2013, Dahir Adan Elmi was appointed Chief of Army at a transfer ceremony in Mogadishu, where he replaced Abdulkadir Sheikh Dini. Abdirizak Khalif Elmi was appointed as Elmi's new Deputy Chief of Army. In August 2013, Federal Government of Somalia officials and Jubaland regional representatives signed an agreement in Addis Ababa brokered by the Government of Ethiopia, which stipulated that all Jubaland security elements will be integrated into the Somali National Army. The Juba Interim Administration would control the regional police. In November 2013, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was directed to support the SNA across South Central Somalia. They	conscription and to the campaigns against guerrilla groups resulted in widespread evasion of military service. As a result, during the late 1980s the government normally met manpower requirements by impressing men into military service. This practice alienated an increasing number of Somalis, who wanted the government to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the conflicts that were slowly destroying Somali society. However, as the 1980s wore on, Siad Barre increasingly used clanism as a political resource. Barre filled the key positions in the army and security forces with members of three Darood clans closely related to his own reer: the Marehan, Dhulbahante, and Ogaden known as the MOD Alliance . Adam says that '..As early as 1976, when Colonel Omar Mohamed Farah was asked to train and command a tank brigade stationed in Mogadishu, he found that out of about 540 soldiers, at least 500 were from the Marehan clan. The whole tank division was headed by a Marehan officer, Umar Haji Masala.' Compagnon wrote in 1992: "Colonels and generals were part of the president's personal patronage network; they had to remain loyal to him and his relatives, whether they had command or were temporarily in the cabinet." As a result, by 1990 many Somalis looked upon the armed forces as Siad Barre's personal army. This perception eventually destroyed the military's reputation as a national institution. The critical posts of commander of the 2nd Tank Brigade and 2nd Artillery Brigade in Mogadishu were both held by Marehan officers, as were the posts of commander of the three reserve brigades in Hargeisa in the north. By 1987 the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimated the army was 40,000 strong (with Ethiopian army strength estimated at the same time as 260,000). The President, Mohamed Siad Barre, held the rank of Major General and acted as Minister of Defence. There were three vice-ministers of national defence. From the SNA headquarters in Mogadishu four sectors were directed: 26th Sector at Hargeisa, 54th Sector at Garowe, 21st Sector at Dusa Mareb, and 60th Sector at Baidoa. Thirteen divisions, averaging 3,300 strong, were divided between the four sectors – four in the northernmost and three in each of the other sectors. The sectors were under the command of brigadiers (three) and a colonel (one). Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan has been reported as 26th Sector commander from 1986 to 1988. Barre's son, Maslah Mohammed Siad Barre was commanding the 77th Sector in Mogadishu in November 1987, and later became Chief of Staff (also reported as Commander-in-Chief) of the Army. Maslah may have become Commander-in-Chief in early March 1989. By the mid-1980s, more resistance movements supported by Ethiopia's Derg administration had sprung up across the country. Barre responded by ordering punitive measures against those he perceived as locally supporting the guerillas, especially in the northern regions. The clampdown included bombing of cities, with the northwestern administrative center of Hargeisa, a Somali National Movement (SNM) stronghold, among the targeted areas in 1988. Compagnon writes that: Military exercises between the United States and the Siad Barre regime continued during the 1980s. After Exercise Eastern Wind ’83, the Los Angeles Times was told that "the exercise failed dismally.…The Somali army did not perform up to any standard," one diplomat said. … "The inefficiency of the Somali armed forces is legendary among foreign military men." 'Valiant Usher '86' took place during the U.S. Fiscal Year of 1986, but actually in late 1985, and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit participated in Exercise Eastern Wind in August 1987 in the area of Geesalay (in the vicinity of Cape Guardafui). U.S. Army elements conducted training with the Somali 31st Commando Brigade at Baledogle Airfield outside Mogadishu in 1989. As of 1 June 1989, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the Army comprised four corps and 12 division headquarters. The IISS noted that these formations 'were in name only; below establishment in units, men, and equipment. Brigades were of battalion size.' In 1989-90 six military sectors , twelve divisions, four tank brigades, 45 mechanized and infantry brigades, 4 commando brigades, one surface-to-air missile brigade, three field artillery brigades, 30 field battalions [sic: probably field artillery battalions], and one air defence artillery battalion were listed. The armed forces declined in size from a possible high of 65,000 in early 1990 to about 10,000 later that year, due to desertions and battlefield defeats. On 12–13 November 1989, a group of Hawiye officers and men belonging to the 4th Division at Galkayo, in Mudug, mutinied. General Barre's son, Maslah, lead a force of Marehan clansmen to suppress the mutiny. Punishment was meted out to local Hawiye villages. In mid-November 1989, rebel forces briefly captured Galkayo. They reportedly seized significant quantities of military equipment at the 4th Division Headquarters, including tanks, 30 mobile anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers. However, the rebels were unable to take most of this equipment so they incinerated it. Government forces thereafter launched massive reprisals against civilians residing in the regions corresponding with the 21st, 54th, 60th and 77th military sectors. The impacted towns and villages included Gowlalo, Dagaari, Sadle-Higlo, Bandiir Adley, Galinsor, Wargalo, Do'ol, Halimo, Go'ondalay and Galkayo. By mid-1990, USC insurgents had captured most of the towns and villages surrounding Mogadishu. On 8 November 1990, USC forces launched attack on the government garrison at Bulo-Burte, killing the commander. From 30 December 1990, there was a major upsurge in local violence in Mogadishu, and continuous fighting between government troops and USC insurgents. The next four weeks were marked by increasing rebel gains. On 27 January 1991, Siad Barre fled the capital for Kismayo, along with many of his supporters. This marked the culmination of the first phase of the civil war. By this time the Armed Forces had dissolved, split into clan factions. On 23 January 1992, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo via United Nations Security Council Resolution 733 to stop the flow of weapons to feuding militia groups. Much military equipment was left in situ, deteriorating, and was sometimes discovered and photographed by intervention forces in the early 1990s. In May 2019, the New York Times reported that a former commander of the SNA's Fifth Brigade in northern Somalia had been found responsible for torture during the 1980s by a U.S. jury. Twenty-first century It was reported on 7 November 2001, that Transitional National Government (TNG) military forces had seized control of Marka in Lower Shabelle. From 2002, Ismail Qasim Naji served as the TNG military chief. He was given the rank of Major General. The TNG's new army, made up of 90 women and 2,010 men, was equipped on 21 March 2002 with guns and armed wagons surrendered to the TNG by private parties in exchange for money, according to TNG officials. TNG president Abdulkassim Salat Hassan instructed the recruits to use the weaponry to "pacify Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia by fighting bandits, anarchists and all forces that operate for survival outside the law." But the TNG controlled only one part of Mogadishu; rival warlords controlled the remainder. Some TNG weapons were stolen and looted in late 2002. During this time, the TNG was opposed militarily and politically by the rival Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). Eventually the leadership of the SRRC and the TNG were reconciled, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in 2004 by Somali politicians in Nairobi. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed from Puntland was elected as President. The TFG later moved its temporary headquarters to Baidoa. President Yusuf requested that the African Union deploy military forces in Somalia. However, as the AU lacked the resources to do so, Yusuf brought in his own militia from Puntland. Along with the U.S. funding the ARPCT coalition, this alarmed many in south-central Somalia, and recruits flocked to the ascendant Islamic Courts Union (ICU). A battle for Mogadishu followed in the first half of 2006 in which the ARPCT confronted the ICU. However, with local support, the ICU captured the city in June of the year. It then expanded its area of control in south-central Somalia over the following months, assisted militarily by Eritrea. In an effort at reconciliation, TFG and ICU representatives held several rounds of talks in Khartoum under the auspices of the Arab League. The meetings ended unsuccessfully due to uncompromising positions retained by both parties. Hardline Islamists subsequently gained power within the ICU, prompting fears of a Talibanization of the movement. In December 2006, Ethiopian troops entered Somalia to assist the TFG against the advancing Islamic Courts Union, initially winning the Battle of Baidoa. On 28 December 2006, the allied forces recaptured the capital from the ICU. The offensive helped the TFG solidify its rule. Ethiopian and TFG forces forced the ICU from Ras Kamboni between 7–12 January 2007. They were assisted by at least two U.S. air strikes. On 8 January 2007, for the first time since taking office, President Ahmed entered Mogadishu from Baidoa, as the TFG moved its base to the national capital. President Ahmed brought his Puntland army chief with him, and Abdullahi Ali Omar became Somali chief of army on 10 February 2007. On 20 January 2007, through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was formally authorised. Seven hundred Ugandan troops, earmarked for AMISOM, were landed at Mogadishu airport on 7–8 March 2007. In Mogadishu, Hawiye residents resented the Islamic Courts Union's defeat. They distrusted the TFG, which was at the time dominated by the Darod clan, believing that it was dedicated to the advancement of Darod interests in lieu of the Hawiye. Additionally, they feared reprisals for massacres committed in 1991 in Mogadishu by Hawiye militants against Darod civilians, and were dismayed by Ethiopian involvement. Critics of the TFG likewise charged that its federalist platform was part of a plot by the Ethiopian government to keep Somalia weak and divided. During its first few months in the capital, the TFG was initially restricted to key strategic points, with the large northwestern and western suburbs controlled by Hawiye rebels. In March 2007, President Ahmed announced plans to forcibly disarm militias in the city. According to the ISA, a coalition of local insurgents led by Al-Shabaab subsequently launched a wave of attacks against the TFG and Ethiopian troops. The allied forces in return mounted a heavy-handed response. All of the warring parties were responsible for widespread violations of the laws of war, as civilians were caught in the ensuing crossfire. Insurgents reportedly deployed militants and established strongholds in heavily populated neighborhoods, launched mortar rounds from residential areas, and targeted public and private individuals for assassination and violence. TFG forces alleged to have failed to efficaciously warn civilians in combat zones, impeded relief efforts, plundered property, in some instances engaged in murder and violence, and mistreated detainees during mass arrests. According to HRW, the implicated TFG forces included military, police and intelligence personnel, as well as the private guards of senior TFG officials. Victims were often unable to identify TFG personnel, and confused militiamen aligned with TFG officials with TFG police officers and other state security personnel. In May 2007, U.S. diplomats spoke with the TFG's Ambassador to Ethiopia. Among the topics of conversation were Somali security forces, and Ambassador Abdulkarim Farah said that the TFG had trained nearly 7,000 militia in Baledogle who were now patrolling throughout Somalia, from Kismayo to Puntland. Another 3,500 militia were undergoing training. Farah said that on 18 May he planned to his hometown of Beledweyne to establish a militia training camp there, at the instruction of President Yusuf. Farah estimated that approximately 60 per cent of the militia were Darod, 30 per cent were Hawiye, and the remaining 10 per cent were from other clans; the majority of security forces in Mogadishu were Darod. He said that the TFG had not sought to exclude Darod from the militia, and attributed the imbalance to Hawiye having primarily supported the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). In December 2008, the International Crisis Group reported: Yusuf has built a largely subservient and loyal apparatus by putting his fellow Majerteen clansmen in strategic positions. The National Security Agency (NSA) under General Mohamed Warsame ("Darwish") and the so-called "Majerteen militia" units in the TFG army operate in parallel and often above other security agencies. Their exact number is hard to ascertain, but estimates suggest about 2,000. They are well catered for, well armed and often carry out counter-insurgency operations with little or no coordination with other security agencies. In the short term, this strategy may appear effective for the president, who can unilaterally employ the force essentially as he pleases. However, it undermines morale in the security services and is a cause of their high desertion rates. Much of the problem building armed forces was the lack of functioning TFG government institutions: Beyond the endemic internal power struggles, the TFG has faced far more serious problems in establishing its authority and rebuilding the structures of governance. Its writ has never extended much beyond Baidoa. Its control of Mogadishu is ever more contested, and it is largely under siege in the rest of the country. There are no properly functioning government institutions. Also in December 2008, Human Rights Watch described the Somali National Army as the 'TFG's largely theoretical professional military force.' It said that 'where trained TFG military forces appear, 'they were identified by their victims as Ethiopian-trained forces, often acting in concert with ENDF (Ethiopian National Defense Force) forces or under the command of ENDF officers.' HRW also said that 'Human Rights Watch's own research has uncovered a pattern of violent abuses by TFG forces including widespread acts of murder, rape, looting, assault, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture. Those responsible include police, military, and intelligence personnel as well as the personal militias of high-ranking TFG officials.' HRW went on to say: 'The TFG has deployed a confusing array of security forces and armed militias to act on its behalf. Victims of the widespread abuses in which these forces have been implicated often have trouble identifying whether their attackers were TFG police officers, other TFG security personnel, or militias linked to TFG officials. Furthermore, formal command-and-control structures are to a large degree illusory. TFG security forces often wear multiple hats, acting on orders from their formal superiors one day, as clan militias another day, and as autonomous self-interested armed groups the next.' In April 2009, donors at a UN-sponsored conference pledged over $250 million to help improve security. The funds were earmarked for AMISOM and supporting Somalia's security, including the build-up of a security force of 6,000 members as well as an augmented police force of 10,000 men. In June 2009, the Somali military received 40 tonnes worth of arms and ammunition from the U.S. government to assist it in combating the insurgency. In November 2010, a new technocratic government was elected to office. In its first 50 days in office, the new administration completed its first monthly payment of stipends to government fighters. It was the first of many Somali administrations to announce plans for a full biometric register for the security forces. While it aimed to complete the biometric register within four months, little further was reported. By August 2011, AMISOM and Somali forces had managed to capture all of Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab. Powerful vested interests and corrupt commanders were, as of February 2011, the largest obstacle to reforming the army. Some newly delivered weaponry was sold by officers. The International Crisis Group also said that AMISOM's efforts at assisting in formalizing the military's structure and providing training to the estimated 8,000 SNA were problematic. Resistance continued to the establishment of an effective chain of command, logical military formations and a credible troop roster. Although General Mohamed Gelle Kahiye, the respected former army chief, attempted to instill reforms, he was marginalized and eventually dismissed. In October 2011, following a weekend preparatory meeting between Somali and Kenyan military officials in the town of Dhobley, the Kenya Defence Forces launched an attack across the border against Al-Shabaab, aiming for Kismayo. In early June 2012, Kenyan troops were formally integrated into AMISOM. In January 2012, Somali government forces and their AMISOM allies launched offensives on Al-Shabaab's last foothold on the northern outskirts of Mogadishu. The following month, Somali forces fighting alongside AMISOM seized Baidoa from the insurgent group. By June 2012, the allied forces had also captured El Bur, Afgooye, and Balad. Progress by the Kenya Army from the border towards Kismayo was slow, but Afmadow was also reported captured on 1 June 2012. Creation of Federal Government The Federal Government of Somalia was established in August/September 2012. On 6 March 2013, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2093 was passed. The resolution lifted the purchase ban on light weapons for a provisional period of one year, but retained restrictions on the procurement of heavy arms such as surface-to-air missiles and artillery. On 13 March 2013, Dahir Adan Elmi was appointed Chief of Army at a transfer ceremony in Mogadishu, where he replaced Abdulkadir Sheikh Dini. Abdirizak Khalif Elmi was appointed as Elmi's new Deputy Chief of Army. In August 2013, Federal Government of Somalia officials and Jubaland regional representatives signed an agreement in Addis Ababa brokered by the Government of Ethiopia, which stipulated that all Jubaland security elements will be integrated into the Somali National Army. The Juba Interim Administration would control the regional police. In November 2013, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) was directed to support the SNA across South Central Somalia. They were to better supply a force of 10,900 Somalis to fight al-Shabaab forces. The SNA force would initially be trained by the AMISOM contingents. On the passing of specific UN requirements, designated SNA battalions would then participate in joint operations with AMISOM. UNSOA's support during the period comprised food supplements, shelter, fuel, water and medical support. In early March 2014, Somali security forces and AMISOM troops launched another operation against Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia. According to Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed, the government subsequently launched
Somalia, maintains consulate-level informal relations with some foreign governments. However, its self-proclaimed independence remains unrecognised by any country or international organisation. Bilateral relations Africa Americas Asia Europe International organization membership Somalia is a member of a number of international organizations, such as the United Nations, African Union, and Arab League. Other memberships include the African Development Bank, UNESCO, the UNHCR and the	to foreign affairs, national defense, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy. Article 53 also stipulates that the Federal Government shall consult the Federal Member States on major issues related to international agreements, including negotiations vis-a-vis foreign trade, finance and treaties. Somaliland, a self-declared sovereign state that is internationally recognised as an autonomous region of Somalia, maintains consulate-level informal relations with some foreign governments. However, its self-proclaimed independence remains unrecognised by any country or international organisation. Bilateral relations Africa Americas Asia Europe International organization membership Somalia is a member of a number of international organizations, such as the United
The Republic of South Africa is a parliamentary representative democratic republic. The President of South Africa serves both as head of state and as head of government. The President is elected by the National Assembly (the lower house of the South African Parliament) and must retain the confidence of the Assembly in order to remain in office. South Africans also elect provincial legislatures which govern each of the country's nine provinces. Since the end of apartheid in 1994 the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated South Africa's politics. The ANC is the ruling party in the national legislature, as well as in eight of the nine provinces (Western Cape is governed by the Democratic Alliance). The ANC received 57.50% of the vote during the 2019 general election. It had received 62.9% of the popular vote in the 2011 municipal election. The main challenger to the ANC's rule is the Democratic Alliance, led by John Steenhuisen (previously by Mmusi Maimane), which received 20.77% of the vote in the 2019 election. Other major political parties represented in Parliament include the Economic Freedom Fighters and the Inkatha Freedom Party, which mainly represents Zulu voters. The formerly dominant New National Party, which both introduced and ended apartheid through its predecessor the National Party, disbanded in 2005 to merge with the ANC. Jacob Zuma served as President of South Africa since 9 May 2009 until his resignation in February 2018. Zuma was replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa. The country's 2019 general election was held on 8 May. With some arguing that South Africa represents a dysfunctional state. Context On 31 May 1910, the Cape Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal and the Orange River Colony were united in one state called the Union of South Africa. The Union of South Africa adopted a system of governance based on the political system of the United Kingdom. The British monarch was the ceremonial head of state of South Africa and was represented by a Governor-General. Real political power lay in the hands of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The basic ideas of this system such as a three branch government and strong Parliament remain in force today. On 15 November 1926, the Balfour Declaration was adopted at the 1926 Imperial Conference. This document made the dominions of the British Empire including South Africa equal to each other and the United Kingdom. In practice, this made the Union of South Africa a self-governing dominion of the British Empire. The Union of South Africa became formally independent in 1931 when the Statute of Westminster was passed. It gave the Parliament of South Africa the power to make laws for South Africa without the approval of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. In 1948, the National Party of South Africa adopted a policy of institutional racial segregation called apartheid. People of colour, especially the majority black population, were deprived of the few rights they had. Racial classification and discrimination was used to distribute economic resources and control political power. The white population, particularly the Afrikaners, controlled the political system. Black people were disenfranchised in all provinces of South Africa. In 1961, South Africa became a Republic. The British monarch was replaced as head of state by a President elected by the minority of the population through elected representatives. In 1970, the Homeland Citizens Act was passed. It built on the system of reservations for the indigenous black African population to create a system of superficially independent black countries. Many Black people were deprived of their South African citizenship and instead became citizens of the Bantustan of their tribe. They were not recognized by a majority of the world's countries and the extent of their independent control over internal affairs was highly limited. The African National Congress (ANC) led the fight against this system of apartheid. After intense international pressure and domestic struggle, the De Klerk government repealed or relaxed many apartheid laws. After negotiations between the ANC, Inkatha Freedom Party, NP and other organizations, apartheid was formally abolished and the Interim Constitution was passed. The Bantustans were abolished and reintegrated into South Africa and their citizens regained South African citizenship. The Government of National Unity (GNU) established under the interim constitution ostensibly remained in effect until the 1999 national elections. The parties originally comprising the GNU – the African National Congress (ANC), the National Party (NP), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) – shared executive power. On 30 June 1996, the NP withdrew from the GNU to become part of the opposition. Many of the principles of racial equality, majority	led by John Steenhuisen (previously by Mmusi Maimane), which received 20.77% of the vote in the 2019 election. Other major political parties represented in Parliament include the Economic Freedom Fighters and the Inkatha Freedom Party, which mainly represents Zulu voters. The formerly dominant New National Party, which both introduced and ended apartheid through its predecessor the National Party, disbanded in 2005 to merge with the ANC. Jacob Zuma served as President of South Africa since 9 May 2009 until his resignation in February 2018. Zuma was replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa. The country's 2019 general election was held on 8 May. With some arguing that South Africa represents a dysfunctional state. Context On 31 May 1910, the Cape Colony, Natal Colony, Transvaal and the Orange River Colony were united in one state called the Union of South Africa. The Union of South Africa adopted a system of governance based on the political system of the United Kingdom. The British monarch was the ceremonial head of state of South Africa and was represented by a Governor-General. Real political power lay in the hands of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The basic ideas of this system such as a three branch government and strong Parliament remain in force today. On 15 November 1926, the Balfour Declaration was adopted at the 1926 Imperial Conference. This document made the dominions of the British Empire including South Africa equal to each other and the United Kingdom. In practice, this made the Union of South Africa a self-governing dominion of the British Empire. The Union of South Africa became formally independent in 1931 when the Statute of Westminster was passed. It gave the Parliament of South Africa the power to make laws for South Africa without the approval of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. In 1948, the National Party of South Africa adopted a policy of institutional racial segregation called apartheid. People of colour, especially the majority black population, were deprived of the few rights they had. Racial classification and discrimination was used to distribute economic resources and control political power. The white population, particularly the Afrikaners, controlled the political system. Black people were disenfranchised in all provinces of South Africa. In 1961, South Africa became a Republic. The British monarch was replaced as head of state by a President elected by the minority of the population through elected representatives. In 1970, the Homeland Citizens Act was passed. It built on the system of reservations for the indigenous black African population to create a system of superficially independent black countries. Many Black people were deprived of their South African citizenship and instead became citizens of the Bantustan of their tribe. They were not recognized by a majority of the world's countries and the extent of their independent control over internal affairs was highly limited. The African National Congress (ANC) led the fight against this system of apartheid. After intense international pressure and domestic struggle, the De Klerk government repealed or relaxed many apartheid laws. After negotiations between the ANC, Inkatha Freedom Party, NP and other organizations, apartheid was formally abolished and the Interim Constitution
5.10% of Whites. The official unemployment rate, though very high by international standards, understates its magnitude because it includes only adults who are actively looking for work. Therefore, excluding those who have given up looking for employment. Only 41% of the population of working age have any kind of job (formal or informal). This rate is 30% points lower than that of China, and about 25% lower than that of Brazil or Indonesia. The relatively generous social grants reduces the political cost of unemployment. There is some evidence that households view paid employment and social grants as substitutes at the margin: households that lose a pension-eligible member subsequently report increased labour force participation. The unemployment problem is characterised by its lengthy duration. In the mid-1990s, nearly two-thirds of unemployed people had never worked for a salary. The 2005 Labour Force Survey found that 40% of unemployed individuals have been unemployed for more than three years, while 59% had never had a job at all. The unemployment rate has fuelled crime, inequality and social unrest. The global economic downturn made the problem worse, wiping out more than one million jobs. In September 2010, over one-third of South Africa's workforce were out of work, and so were more than half of Blacks aged 15–34, three times the level than Whites. Some experts contend that higher wages negotiated by politically powerful trade unions have suppressed job growth. According to a study by Dani Rodrik, the shrinkage of the non-mineral tradable sector since the early-1990s and the weakness of the export-oriented manufacturing were more to blame for the low level of employment. Knowledge There has been a large degree of human capital flight from South Africa in recent years. South Africa's Bureau of Statistics estimates that between 1 million and 1.6 million people in skilled, professional, and managerial occupations have emigrated overseas between 1994 and 2004 and that, for every emigrant, 10 unskilled people lose their jobs. There are a range of causes cited for the migration of skilled South Africans. In mid-1998, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) undertook a study to examine and assess the range of factors that contribute to skilled South Africans’ desire to leave the country: over two-thirds of the sample said that they had given the idea of emigration some thought while 38% said they had given it a "great deal of thought". Among the reasons cited for wishing to leave the country was the declining quality of life and high levels of crime. Furthermore, the government's affirmative action policy was identified as another factor influencing the emigration of skilled White South Africans. The results of the survey indicate that skilled Whites are strongly opposed to this policy and the arguments advanced in support of it, due to the negative impact it has had on South Africa. However, flight of human capital in South Africa should not be attributed solely to regional factors. For example, the demand for skilled labourers in the UK, US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia has led to active recruitment programs by those countries in South Africa. These countries accounted for 75% (by volume) of recent skilled emigration with the UK receiving approximately half of annual skilled South African emigration from 1990 to 1996. It has been suggested that the role of domestic socio-political variables may be negligible. The health sector has been hit particularly hard. A widespread skills drain in South Africa and in the developing world in general is generally considered to be a cause for concern. For the medical sector, the loss of returns from investment for all doctors emigrating is $1.41bn for South Africa. The benefit to destination countries is huge: $2.7bn for the United Kingdom alone. In a case of reverse brain drain a net 359,000 high-skilled South Africans have returned to South Africa from foreign work assignments over a five-year period from 2008 to 2013. This was catalysed by the global financial crisis of 2007-8 and perceptions of higher quality of life in South Africa relative to the countries from which they first emigrated to. It is estimated that around 37% of those returning are professionals such as lawyers, doctors, engineers and accountants. Immigration Refugees from poorer neighbouring countries include many immigrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and others, representing a large portion of the informal sector. With high unemployment levels amongst poorer South Africans, xenophobia is prevalent and many South Africans feel resentful of immigrants who are seen to be depriving the native population of jobs, a feeling which has been given credibility by the fact that many South African employers have employed migrants from other countries for lower pay than South African citizens, especially in the construction, tourism, agriculture and domestic service industries. Illegal immigrants are also heavily involved in informal trading. However, many immigrants to South Africa continue to live in poor conditions, and the South African immigration policy has become increasingly restrictive since 1994. Trade unions Since 2007 the South African unions representing public sector workers recurrently went on strike, demanding pay rises significantly above inflation, in a practice that some experts argue is suppressing job growth, harming millions of South Africans who are out of a job. In August and September 2010, South African unions organised a crippling four-week national strike involving 1.3 million public sector workers, demanding an 8.6% wage increase. The strike ended after the government had raised its 5.2% wage increase to 7.5%. The deal swelled state spending by about 1%. Protesters sought to block hospitals, and South African media have reported numerous acts of violence against health and education staff who insisted on going to work. Volunteers and army medics were called in to help at hospitals, and some patients were moved to private medical facilities. There is a persistent wage differential between unionised and non-unionised workers in South Africa, suggesting that unions are keeping wages higher for their members, thereby posing additional challenges to the unemployment problem. In July 2014, amidst a national strike by 220,000 metalworkers, General Motors temporarily shut down its vehicle assembly plant, frustrating its plans to build 50,000 cars a year in the country. "The ongoing labour disruptions are harming the South African economy and are affecting the country's image around the globe," the company said in a statement at the time. Black Economic Empowerment The demise of apartheid in 1994 left a skewed racial economic hierarchy that placed Whites firmly at the top, followed by Indians, Coloureds, and then Blacks. Since then, the African National Congress government has made Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) a policy centre-piece, but by the party's own admission it has failed to improve the lot of the vast majority of Black South Africans and has taken much opportunity from the White minority, who are mainly a skilled minority. As of 2014 roughly ten percent of the Top 100 companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were directly held by black investors though Black Economic Empowerment schemes. Black Economic Empowerment policies have been credited with creating a class of Black South Africans with a level of wealth on the same order of magnitude as very rich White South Africans. Black Economic Empowerment—its purpose the "economic empowerment of all black people, including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas"—requires the Minister of Trade and Industry to develop and publish Codes of Good Practice, aimed at setting guidelines for the process of BEE in the whole economy. A scorecard is used by the department to measure compliance with the BEE requirements, and is used for public procurement, public-private partnerships, sale of state-owned enterprises, when licenses are applied for, and for any other relevant economic activity. The government's Black Economic Empowerment policies have drawn criticism from the Development Bank of Southern Africa for focusing "almost exclusively on promoting individual ownership by black people (which) does little to address broader economic disparities, though the rich may become more diverse." The System has also been criticised for placing lesser educated people in more important positions in the workplace and their failure to perform to the standards required has had an immense impact on the economy. Another criticism also includes that the system goes against the constitution's preaching of equality by having preference over people, not on merit, but for their skin colour and is considered the opposite of what many people fought for during the Apartheid era. Official affirmative action policies have seen a rise in black economic wealth and an emerging black middle class. An increasing number of black candidates who are supposed to be beneficiaries of affirmative action are dissociating themselves from it, largely because of the perception that the appointments are not based on merit. The policy has also been criticised for having a negative impact on employment levels as it is viewed as being more of an additional burden for employees than as a transformative agent for the unemployed. Particularity in an economy where a major cause of inequality has been a growing disparity of income within the majority black population divided along lines of employment. Gender Equality South Africans in general, regardless of race, hold what would be considered "traditional" stances on gender roles for men and women. The majority of the workforce is composed of males, while the majority of women do not participate. This viewpoint on males as "breadwinners" is very much in line with traditional African values across the continent. Additionally, females face a problem in terms of earnings, with 77% of women earning the same as their male counterparts. However, more women are becoming part of the agricultural workforce (55%) as of 2012, marking a move towards modernisation for women's participation in the economy. South African legislation is strongly geared to promoting gender equality in the workplace. This is characterised by several comprehensive government programs and organisations that provide resources and services to females, both adult and adolescent. Such initiatives include the Employment Equity Act, No. 55 of 1988 (aimed at promoting women's participation in mainly private sector jobs). UNFPA South Africa is one such promoter of these policies and programs. Internally, the South African government has founded the Commission for Gender Equality. The commissions main focus is on securing adequate education and job training for women who are disenfranchised or otherwise at a disadvantage when attempting to enter the workforce. Not uncommon in Africa, gender equality seems to be a very cogent problem in the South African workforce. According to Bain & Company, around 31% of companies have no form of female leadership, either in management or executive positions. 22% of board directors are women, however, only 7% were designated as "executives", lower than the global average of 12%. Additionally, the eNPE (Employee Net Promoter Score) for women is a net negative (- 4) as compared to men (8), according to a survey conducted of 1000 participants. This indicated a low level of actual economic promotion for women, despite public and international initiative towards the contrary. Infrastructure Energy Scheduled rolling blackouts are a part of daily life. Electricity theft is widespread. After years of sub-standard maintenance and the South African government's inability to manage strategic resources, the state-owned power supplier Eskom started experiencing deficiency in capacity in the electrical generating and reticulation infrastructure in 2007. Such lack led to inability to meet the routine demands of industry and consumers, resulting in countrywide rolling blackouts. Initially, the lack of capacity was triggered by a failure at Koeberg nuclear power station, but a general lack of capacity due to increased demand and lack of government planning soon came to light. The supplier and the South African government has been widely criticised for failing to adequately plan for and construct sufficient electrical generating capacity, although ultimately the government has admitted that it was at fault for refusing to approve funding for investment in infrastructure. The margin between national demand and available capacity is still low or negative (particularly in peak hours), and power stations are under strain, such that surges in demand, which are common during winter, or drops in supply, often a result of a lack of coal for power plants, result in another phase of rolling blackouts. The government and Eskom are currently planning new power stations, at cost to the South African consumer. The power utility plans to have 20,000 megawatts of nuclear power in its grid by 2025. Water Some predictions show surface water supply could decrease by 60% by the year 2070 in parts of the Western Cape. The South African government planned to spend R69 billion on water infrastructure between 2008 and 2015. This involves building new dams and ancillary infrastructure, and repairing existing infrastructure. South Africa has an estimated total water capacity of 38 billion cubic metres, but will need 65 billion by 2025 if the economy is to keep on growing. The massive urban migration has placed further strain on the country's ageing water infrastructure and created a large backlog. Developments and Maintenance As part of an international attempt to modernize infrastructure, South Africa has faced increasing pressure to invest government funds into its water and electricity sectors. At current, these sectors are underfunded by approximately US$464 billion (This is according to the G20 GI Hub). Income levels South Africa has extreme differences in incomes and wealth. The good level of economic growth in the post-apartheid period has led to a measurable decline in income poverty, but inequality has increased. The high level of overall income inequality has further accentuated: the country's Gini coefficient increased by four percentage points, from 0.66 to 0.70, between 1993 and 2008, and income has become increasingly concentrated in the top decile. Inequality between urban and rural areas is changing: while rural poverty rates remain substantially higher than those in urban areas, urban poverty rates are rising and rural rates seem to be falling. While between-race inequality is slowly falling, an increase in intra-race inequality is preventing the aggregate measures from declining. Despite that, between-race inequality remains a central issue: real incomes have been rising for all groups, but many blacks in the country still live in poverty. At any poverty line, blacks are very much poorer than coloureds, who are very much poorer than Indians, who are poorer than whites. In 2002, according to one estimate, 62% of Black Africans, 29% of Coloureds, 11% of Asians, and 4% of Whites lived in poverty. The mean per-capita income has risen from R10,741 in 1993 to R24,409 in 2008, but these figures hide large differences in household welfare, both within and across population groups: the average Black income increased from R6,018 in 1993 to R9,718 in 2008; for Coloured households, the increase was from R7,498 to R25,269; for Whites, the increase was from R29,372 to R110,195. While mean income rose about 130% from 1993 to 2008, the median income rose just 15% over the same period, from R4,444 to R5,096, indicating that the increases are being driven by a small number of very large incomes, especially for Whites. In 2000 the average white household was earning six times more than the average black household. In 2004, 29.8% of all households had an income (at constant 2001 prices) of less than R9,600 per annum, while 10.3% of all households enjoyed an annual income (at constant 2001 prices) of more than R153,601 per annum. One study using calculations based on National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) data suggests that 47% of South Africans live below the poverty line: 56% of blacks live in poverty compared to 2% of whites, using an arbitrary income poverty line of R502 per capita. Although, it should also be noted that black South Africans make up the majority of the population at 79.2% while white South Africans make up only 8.9% of the population according to the Statistics South Africa census released in 2011. The United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index (HDI) ranked South Africa 110 out of 169 countries in 2010. The report notes, however, that the region's assessment has improved slowly since 1980. The HDI includes a Human Poverty Index (HPI-1), which ranked South Africa 85 out of 135 countries. The number of South Africans living below the poverty line, identified according to Apartheid-era social categories, was calculated in one study as 56% "black", 27% "coloured", 9% "Indian", and 2% "white". In the past inequality in South Africa was largely defined along race lines, but it has become increasingly defined by inequality within population groups as the gap between rich and poor within each group has increased substantially. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development proposals for addressing income inequality included: encouraging more saving and investment; a liberalisation of product-market regulation; easier access to credit for small businesses; greater co-ordination in wage bargaining; and measures to tackle the high level of youth unemployment. Some proposals have included wage subsidies for people being trained, a minimum wage differentiated by age, and extended periods of probation for young workers. A 2011 study published by the University of Cape Town about the richest 10% found that nearly 40% are black, where this group had once been almost exclusively white. While only 29% of the absolute wealthiest South Africans are black, this jumps to 50% among the "entry-level" rich (defined as earning more than $4,000 per month). Factors that were found to be common among those in the entry-level rich group include being young, entrepreneurial and having some post-secondary education. According to one estimate, 10.4% of South Africans belonged to the "higher middle class" in 2004, defined as having a per capita income of over R40,000 (in 2000 Rand). Taxes and transfers Taxation The top rate of personal income tax rate in South Africa is 45%; the corporate tax rate is 28%. Other taxes include a value-added tax and a capital gains tax, with the overall tax burden amounting to 23.4% of total domestic income. Social benefits South Africa has about three times as many recipients of social benefits as it has income tax-payers, an extremely high ratio by international standards. After 1994 resources have been rapidly reallocated to black households: while approximately 40% of aggregate social spending was directed to whites and 43% to blacks in the mid-1980s, by the late 1990s fully 80% of total social spending was assigned to blacks and less than 10% to whites. At present, blacks contribute some 50% of total government transfers, while receiving roughly 80%. The Unemployment Insurance Fund is financed out of premiums, contributions and benefits depend on earnings, and focuses on insuring workers against the risk of income loss. Social assistance grants Social assistance grants are non-contributory, income-tested benefits provided by the state to the poor, and are financed out of general tax revenues without any links between contributions and benefits. They are provided in the form of: grants for older persons; disability grants; war veterans grants; care dependency grants; foster child grants; child support grants; grant-in-aid; social relief of distress. The state old age pension, received by over 80% of the elderly, is a non-contributory pension and pays more than twice median per capita Black income, thus representing an important source of income for a third of all Black households in the country. It pays a maximum of R1,780 (as of July 2019) to people who reach pension age without access to private pensions. The child support grant provides R420 per month, per child (as of July 2019) for every child in the household younger than 18, and benefited 9.1 million children by April 2009. The war veterans grant is provided to former soldiers who fought in the Second World War or the Korean War, and pays a maximum amount of R1,800 per month (as of July 2019). Comparison with other emerging markets According to a December 2010 article by the South African Government Communication and Information System's now-defunct BuaNews news service, South Africa was said to compare well to other emerging markets on affordability and availability of capital, financial market sophistication, business tax rates and infrastructure, but to fare poorly on the cost and availability of labour, education, and the use of technology and innovation. South Africa does have expertise in the Space industry, and students learning more through the South African SEDS. With the correct government support, South Africa can increase the jobs in the manufacturing, testing, and analysis sectors of the growing Space industry. Released in early December 2010 and no longer available online, the survey by Brazil's National Confederation of Industry, “Competitividade Brasil 2010: Comparaçao com Paises Selecionados“, (Competition Brazil: A comparison with selected countries), found South Africa to have the second most	which accounts for an estimated 65% of GDP or $230 billion in nominal GDP terms. The country's economy is reasonably diversified with key economic sectors including mining, agriculture and fisheries, vehicle manufacturing and assembly, food processing, clothing and textiles, telecommunication, energy, financial and business services, real estate, tourism, manufacturing, IT, transportation, and wholesale and retail trade. Natural resources In 2019, the country was the world's largest producer of platinum; the world's largest producer of chromium; the world's largest producer of manganese; the 2nd largest world producer of titanium; the world's 11th largest producer of gold; the 3rd worldwide producer of vanadium; the 6th largest world producer of iron ore; the 11th largest world producer of cobalt; and the 15th largest world producer of phosphate. It was the world's 12th largest producer of uranium in 2018. Mining has been the main driving force behind the history and development of Africa's most advanced economy. Large-scale and profitable mining started with the discovery of a diamond on the banks of the Orange River in 1867 by Erasmus Jacobs and the subsequent discovery and exploitation of the Kimberley pipes a few years later. Gold rushes to Pilgrim's Rest and Barberton were precursors to the biggest discovery of all, the Main Reef/Main Reef Leader on Gerhardus Oosthuizen's farm Langlaagte, Portion C, in 1886, the Witwatersrand Gold Rush and the subsequent rapid development of the goldfield there, the biggest of them all. South Africa is one of the world's leading mining and mineral-processing countries. Though mining's contribution to the national GDP has fallen from 21% in 1970 to 6% in 2011, it still represents almost 60% of exports. The mining sector accounts for up to 9% of value added. In 2008, South Africa's estimated share of world platinum production amounted to 77%; kyanite and other materials, 55%; chromium, 45%; palladium, 39%; vermiculite, 39%; vanadium, 38%; zirconium, 30%; manganese, 21%; rutile, 20%; ilmenite, 19%; gold, 11%; fluorspar, 6%; aluminium, 2%; antimony, 2%; iron ore, 2%; nickel, 2%; and phosphate rock, 1%. South Africa also accounted for nearly 5% of the world's polished diamond production by value. The country's estimated share of world reserves of platinum group metals amounted to 89%; hafnium, 46%; zirconium, 27%; vanadium, 23%; manganese, 19%; rutile, 18%; fluorspar, 18%; gold, 13%; phosphate rock, 10%; ilmenite, 9%; and nickel, 5%. It is also the world's third largest coal exporter. The mining sector has a mix of privately owned and state-controlled mines, the latter including African Exploration Mining and Finance Corporation. Agriculture and food processing In 2018, South Africa produced 19.3 million tonnes of sugarcane (14th largest producer in the world), 12.5 million tonnes of maize (12th largest producer in the world) 1.9 million tons of grape (11th largest producer in the world), 1.7 million tons of orange (11th largest producer in the world) and 397 thousand tons of pear (7th largest producer in the world). In addition, in the same year, it produced 2.4 million tons of potato, 1.8 million tons of wheat, 1.5 million tons of soy, 862 thousand tons of sunflower seed, 829 thousand tons of apple, 726 thousand tons of onion, 537 thousand tons of tomato, 474 thousand tons of lemon, 445 thousand tons of grapefruit, 444 thousand tons of banana, 421 thousand tons of barley, in addition to smaller productions of other agricultural products, such as avocado, pineapple, peach, tangerine, pumpkin, cabbage, carrot, rapeseed, sorghum etc. The agricultural industry contributes around 5% of formal employment, relatively low compared to other parts of Africa, as well as providing work for casual labourers and contributing around 2.8% of GDP for the nation. However, due to the aridity of the land, only 13.5% can be used for crop production, and only 3% is considered high potential land. The sector continues to face problems, with increased foreign competition and crime being two of the major challenges for the industry. The government has been accused of either putting in too much effort, or not enough effort, to tackle the problem of farm attacks as opposed to other forms of violent crime. Maize production, which contributes to a 36% majority of the gross value of South Africa's field crops, has also experienced negative effects due to climate change. The estimated value of loss, which takes into consideration scenarios with and without the carbon dioxide fertilisation effect, ranges between tens and hundreds of millions of Rands. According to FAOSTAT, South Africa is one of world's largest producers of: chicory roots (4th); grapefruit (4th); cereals (5th); green maize and maize (7th); castor oil seed (9th); pears (9th); sisal (10th); fibre crops (10th). In the first quarter of 2010, the agricultural sector earned export revenues for R10.1 billion and used R8.4 billion to pay for imported agricultural products, therefore earning a positive trade balance of R1.7 billion. The most important agricultural exports of South Africa include: edible fruit and nuts, beverages, preserved food, tobacco, cereals, wool not carded or combed, miscellaneous food, sugar, meat, milling products, malt and starch. These products accounted for over 80% of agricultural export revenue in the first quarter of 2010. The most important agricultural imports, which accounted for over 60% of agricultural import value during the same period, include: cereals, meat, soya-bean oil cake, beverages, soya-bean oil and its fractions, tobacco, palm oil and its fractions, miscellaneous food, spices, coffee, tea, and preserved food. The dairy industry consists of around 4,300 milk producers providing employment for 60,000 farm workers and contributing to the livelihoods of around 40,000 others. The food sub-sector is the largest employer within the agro-processing sector – contributing 1.4% to total employment, and 11.5% within the manufacturing sector. In 2006, the agro-processing sector represented 24.7% of the total manufacturing output. Although the economy as a whole gained 975,941 jobs between 1995 and 2006, the agro-processing sector lost 45,977 jobs. The competitive pressures from abroad, particularly from China and India, played a role in the decline of exports for the food, textiles and paper sub-sectors, as firms in these sectors increasingly compete with lower cost producers. Increased exports from the beverages, tobacco, wood and leather sub-sectors over the period are probably due to the presence of large dominant firms within these sectors in South Africa, that have managed to remain competitive. Manufacturing The manufacturing industry's contribution to the economy is relatively small, providing just 13.3% of jobs and 15% of GDP. There are growing sectors of manufacturing, however, such as in the Space industry. Labour costs are low, but not nearly as low as in most other emerging markets, and the cost of the transport, communications and general living is much higher. The South African automotive industry accounts for about 10% of South Africa's manufacturing exports, contributes 7.5% to the country's GDP and employs around 36,000 people. Annual production in 2007 was 535,000 vehicles, out of a global production of 73 million units in the same year. Vehicle exports were in the region of 170,000 units in 2007, exported mainly to Japan (about 29% of the value of total exports), Australia (20%), the UK (12%) and the US (11%). South Africa also exported ZAR 30.3 billion worth of auto components in 2006. BMW, Ford, Volkswagen, Daimler-Chrysler, General Motors, Nissan and Toyota all have production plants in South Africa. Large component manufacturers with bases in the country are Arvin Exhaust, Bloxwitch, Corning and Senior Flexonics. There are also about 200 automotive component manufacturers in South Africa, and more than 150 others that supply the industry on a non-exclusive basis. The industry is concentrated in two provinces, the Eastern Cape and Gauteng. Companies producing in South Africa can take advantage of the low production costs and the access to new markets as a result of trade agreements with the European Union and the Southern African Development Community. After a steep decline of 10.4% in 2009, the manufacturing sector performed well in 2010, growing by 5%, though this rebound was primarily limited to the automotive, basic chemicals, iron and steel and food and beverages industries. The performance of this sector remains curtailed by the low demand in South Africa's main export markets in the developed world. There is growth in some areas, such as the Space industry in South Africa, which is expected to see an increase in Space industry jobs, and jobs in supporting technology and manufacturing sectors. Service industry Tourism Telecommunications The domestic telecommunications infrastructure provides modern and efficient service to urban and rural areas. This includes cellular and internet services from 5G to Gigabit Broadband. In 1997, Telkom, the South African telecommunications parastatal, was partly privatised and entered into a strategic equity partnership with a consortium of SBC (AT&T), in exchange for a monopoly to provide certain services for 5 years. Telkom assumed an obligation to facilitate network modernisation and expansion into the unserved areas. A Second Network Operator, Neotel was to be licensed to compete with Telkom across its spectrum of services in 2002. Licensing officially began in late 2005. Five mobile-phone companies provide service to over 50 million subscribers, with South Africa considered to have the 4th most advanced mobile telecommunications network worldwide. The five major cellular providers are Vodacom, MTN, Cell C(Vodacom), Telkom Mobile(8.ta) and Rain, with Neotel owned by Liquid Telecoms not offering mobile service anymore. South African companies which provide services related to the Space industry, also increasing, and with the correct government legislation and support, this sector is expected to grow in South Africa. Business process outsourcing Over the last few decades, South Africa and particularly the Cape Town region has established itself as a successful call centre and business process outsourcing destination. With a highly talented pool of productive labour and with Cape Town sharing cultural affinity with Britain, large overseas firms such as Lufthansa, Amazon.com, ASDA, The Carphone Warehouse, Delta Airlines and many more have established inbound call centres within Cape Town as a means of utilising Cape Town's low labour costs and talented labour force. Tourism South Africa is a popular tourist destination, with around 860,000 arrivals per month (March 2008) of which around 210,000 is from outside the African continent. In 2012 South Africa received 9.2 million international arrivals. In August 2017 3.5 million travellers came to South Africa. According to the World Travel & Tourism Council, travel and tourism directly contributed ZAR102 billion to South African GDP in 2012 and supports 10.3% of jobs in the country. Among the main attractions are the diverse and picturesque landscape, the game reserves and the highly regarded local wines. The country's borders were reopened on 1 October 2020, with some exceptions to tourists travelling from specific European countries and the US, due to high levels of COVID-19 activity taking place there. Financial services South Africa has a sophisticated financial structure, with the JSE Limited, the largest stock exchange on the African continent, ranking 17th in the world in terms of total market capitalisation, which is $1,005 Trillion as of August 2020. The banking industry, overseen by the South African Reserve Bank, is dominated by four local players: Nedbank, ABSA, Standard Bank and First Rand. These banks provide both retail and investment banking services as the sector has become highly competitive with the re-entry of many experienced foreign banks, which returned to the market in the mid-1990s, having left in the late 1980s. Banks operating in South Africa, when left short of liquidity, need to borrow from the SARB at a fluctuating repo rate, which, in turn, allows the central bank to monitor liquidity positions. Informal sector South Africa's informal sector contributes 8% of the country's GDP and supports 27% of all working people. The South African Local Economic Development Network values the informal economy at 28% of SA's GDP. Given the relevance of this input, there is a constant interest in developing actions on an inclusive urban planning for the working poor. Trade and investment Principal international trading partners of South Africa—besides other African countries—include Germany, the United States, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, Bangladesh and Spain. Chief exports include corn, diamonds, fruits, gold, metals and minerals, sugar, and wool. Machinery and transportation equipment make up more than one-third of the value of the country's imports. Other imports include chemicals, manufactured goods, and petroleum. As a result of a November 1993 bilateral agreement, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) can assist US investors in the South African market with services such as political risk insurance and loans and loan guarantees. In July 1996, the US and South Africa signed an investment fund protocol for a $120 million OPIC fund to make equity investments in South and Southern Africa. OPIC is establishing an additional fund – the Sub-Saharan Africa Infrastructure Fund, capitalised at $350 million – to investment in infrastructure projects. The Trade and Development Agency also has been actively involved in funding feasibility studies and identifying investment opportunities in South Africa for U.S. businesses. Despite the numerous positive economic achievements since 1994, South Africa has struggled to attract significant foreign direct investment. The situation may have started to change however, with 2005 seeing the largest single FDI into South Africa when Barclays bought a majority share in local bank Absa Group Limited. Deals between the British-based Vodafone and South Africa's Vodacom have taken place in 2006. In 2010, two multibillion-dollar deals, one by HSBC to acquire Nedbank and one by Walmart to acquire Massmart Holdings, fell through. (Walmart did buy Massmart in 2011) Land reform and property rights Nationalisation of mines debate South Africa has been riven by arguments over whether the state should take over mineral resources. A study commissioned by the African National Congress recommended against the policy, saying nationalisation would be an "economic disaster." However, the ANC Youth Employment supporters disagree and state that it will give the government direct control over the mining sector which is also in alignment with the Freedom Charter signed in 1995. Land redistribution The government aimed to transfer 30% of the 82 million hectares estimated to be in the hands of white farmers by Gugile Nkwinti, Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform, amounting to 24.5 million hectares, to black farmers by 2014. 6.7 million hectares had been transferred by early 2012 via redistribution and restitution. The land reform program has been criticised both by farmers' groups and by landless workers, the latter alleging that the pace of change has not been fast enough, and the former alleging anti white racist treatment with threats of genocide, voiced openly on multiple occasions by the ANC, including the former president Zuma, and expressing concerns that a similar situation to Zimbabwe's land reform policy may develop, a fear exacerbated by comments made by former deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Labour market South Africa has an extreme and persistent high unemployment rate of over 30%, which interacts with other socioeconomic problems such as: inadequate education, poor health and high levels of crime. The poorest have limited access to economic opportunities and basic services. According to a 2013 Goldman Sachs report, that number increases to 35% when including people who have given up looking for work. A quarter of South Africans live on less than US$1.25 a day. South Africa's mass unemployment dates back to the 1970s, and continued to rise throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Unemployment has increased substantially since the African National Congress came to power in 1994, increasing from 15.6% in 1995 to 30.3% in 2001. In the second quarter of 2010, the jobless rate increased to 25.3%, and the number of people with work fell by 61,000 to 12,700,000. The biggest decline in employment was recorded in the manufacturing industry, which lost 53,000 jobs. Agriculture lost 32,000 jobs, employment in the construction industry fell by 15,000. In the third quarter of 2010, 29.80% of Blacks were recorded as unemployed, compared with 22.30% of Coloureds, 8.60 of Asians and 5.10% of Whites. The official unemployment rate, though very high by international standards, understates its magnitude because it includes only adults who are actively looking for work. Therefore, excluding those who have given up looking for employment. Only 41% of the population of working age have any kind of job (formal or informal). This rate is 30% points lower than that of China, and about 25% lower than that of Brazil or Indonesia. The relatively generous social grants reduces the political cost of unemployment. There is some evidence that households view paid employment and social grants as substitutes at the margin: households that lose a pension-eligible member subsequently report increased labour force participation. The unemployment problem is characterised by its lengthy duration. In the mid-1990s, nearly two-thirds of unemployed people had never worked for a salary. The 2005 Labour Force Survey found that 40% of unemployed individuals have been unemployed for more than three years, while 59% had never had a job at all. The unemployment rate has fuelled crime, inequality and social unrest. The global economic downturn made the problem worse, wiping out more than one million jobs. In September 2010, over one-third of South Africa's workforce were out of work, and so were more than half of Blacks aged 15–34, three times the level than Whites. Some experts contend that higher wages negotiated by politically powerful trade unions have suppressed job growth. According to a study by Dani Rodrik, the shrinkage of the non-mineral tradable sector since the early-1990s and the weakness of the export-oriented manufacturing were more to blame for the low level of employment. Knowledge There has been a large degree of human capital flight from South Africa in recent years. South Africa's Bureau of Statistics estimates that between 1 million and 1.6 million people in skilled, professional, and managerial occupations have emigrated overseas between 1994 and 2004 and that, for every emigrant, 10 unskilled people lose their jobs. There are a range of causes cited for the migration of skilled South Africans. In mid-1998, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) undertook a study to examine and assess the range of factors that contribute to skilled South Africans’ desire to leave the country: over two-thirds of the sample said that they had given the idea of emigration some thought while 38% said they had given it a "great deal of thought". Among the reasons cited for wishing to leave the country was the declining quality of life and high levels of crime. Furthermore, the government's affirmative action policy was identified as another factor influencing the emigration of skilled White South Africans. The results of the survey indicate that skilled Whites are strongly opposed to this policy and the arguments advanced in support of it, due to the negative impact it has had on South Africa. However, flight of human capital in South Africa should not be attributed solely to regional factors. For example, the demand for skilled labourers in the UK, US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia has led to active recruitment programs by those countries in South Africa. These countries accounted for 75% (by volume) of recent skilled emigration with the UK receiving approximately half of annual skilled South African emigration from 1990 to 1996. It has been suggested that the role of domestic socio-political variables may be negligible. The health sector has been hit particularly hard. A widespread skills drain in South Africa and in the developing world in general is generally considered to be a cause for concern. For the medical sector, the loss of returns from investment for all doctors emigrating is $1.41bn for South Africa. The benefit to destination countries is huge: $2.7bn for the United Kingdom alone. In a case of reverse brain drain a net 359,000 high-skilled South Africans have returned to South Africa from foreign work assignments over a five-year period from 2008 to 2013. This was catalysed by the global financial crisis of 2007-8 and perceptions of higher quality of life in South Africa relative to the countries from which they first emigrated to. It is estimated that around 37% of those returning are professionals such as lawyers, doctors, engineers and accountants. Immigration Refugees from poorer neighbouring countries include many immigrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and others, representing a large portion of the informal sector. With high unemployment levels amongst poorer South Africans, xenophobia is prevalent and many South Africans feel resentful of immigrants who are seen to be depriving the native population of jobs, a feeling which has been given credibility by the fact that many South African employers have employed migrants from other countries for lower pay than South African citizens, especially in the construction, tourism, agriculture and domestic service industries. Illegal immigrants are also heavily involved in informal trading. However, many immigrants to South Africa continue to live in poor conditions, and the South African immigration policy has become increasingly restrictive since 1994. Trade unions Since 2007 the South African unions representing public sector workers recurrently went on strike, demanding pay rises significantly above inflation, in a practice that some experts argue is suppressing job growth, harming millions of South Africans who are out of a job. In August and September 2010, South African unions organised a crippling four-week national strike involving 1.3 million public sector workers, demanding an 8.6% wage increase. The strike ended after the government had raised its 5.2% wage increase to 7.5%. The deal swelled state spending by about 1%. Protesters sought to block hospitals, and South African media have reported numerous acts of violence against health and education staff who insisted on going to work. Volunteers and army medics were called in to help
As of January 2010, none of the companies granted a license have begun providing services. However, On Digital Media (ODM), have stated that they are on track to begin sale of their product in May 2010, and that prices will be significantly cheaper than their competitor DStv. In 2012, DSTV now has added 8 more channels all for movies. Internet Although expensive compared to more developed nations, broadband is easily obtainable in South Africa. Fixed line options such as ADSL, ISDN, Diginet and Leased Lines are available from the national operator Telkom. Recently, legislation was passed by government allowing all licensed telecommunications providers to build their own fixed line networks, resulting in a scramble by companies such as Vodacom, MTN South Africa and Neotel to construct their own country and citywide fibre-optic networks. Individual South African cities such as Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria are also in the process of, or have completed construction of city-owned fibre-optic networks. These will provide services to city and government-owned establishments, and will act as an extra source of income through the sale of excess bandwidth mainly to companies. Wireless options are available from Sentech, iBurst, Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, Telkom and a number of other ISP's. They typically provide speeds of up to 7.6 Mbit/s with HSDPA. HSUPA is also available. MTN South Africa was among the first mobile networks in the world to offer HSDPA services to its customers. Satellite options are available from both Sentech and Telkom. A SNO, Neotel, has been licensed in South Africa and is currently offering a wireless service in selected areas. According to Neotel, up-take of its services has exceeded expectations, and as a result Neotel are rapidly expanding services throughout major metropolitan areas in South Africa. In 2009, SEACOM - the second undersea cable to land in South Africa - jointly owned and operated by Neotel - was switched on. Neotel have stated that sale of SEACOM bandwidth, too, has exceeded expectations, and will drive the continual downward-spiral of internet prices in the country. As of January 2010, South Africa has over 2 million broadband subscribers. Whilst this is the largest number in Africa, South Africa's broadband penetration of 4% is significantly below international standards. Broadband ADSL In late 2009, Telkom began trialling 8 and 12 Mbit/s ADSL offerings. In August 2010, Telkom officially introduced ADSL at 10 Mbit/s. More than 20,000 4Mbit/s subscribers were upgraded free of charge. As of October 2018, fixed line DSL speeds on offer range between 2 Mbit/s to 40 Mbit/s. Fibre to the home (FTTH) Currently Openserve (a division of Telkom), Vumatel, MTN, and Broadband Infraco are among the providers rolling out fibre to the home (FTTH) networks across major cities and towns. There are also about a dozen other small providers rolling out mostly to gated estates and neighbourhoods. These networks are open access wholesale last mile networks meaning that you have to purchase a package from an internet service provider (ISP) such as Vox, Webafrica, Axxess, or Telkom. Openserve, which is 51.4% government-owned, currently has the largest footprint covering areas in many smaller cities and towns that include Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, and Knysna. Most of these providers offer additional high-end business services such as web hosting. The rollout has been rapid. Speeds range from 4/1 Mbit/s to 1000/1000 Mbit/s. A 100/50 Mbit/s plan will cost R900 to R1050 (US$ to $) depending on providers available in area and size of data package. An unlimited 1 Gbit/s/1 Gbit/s plan will cost around R1700 ($) so prices are still somewhat expensive when compared to other countries with FTTH but prices have been continually falling throughout the rollout. Comparatively, Google Fiber charges consumers $70 for an unlimited (uncapped) 1000/400 Mbit/s in the US. Pricing Broadband services are well above the world average. Charges consist of three parts: the ADSL line rental (costs range from R169 for 2 Mbit/s, R389 for 8Mbit/s, and R555 for 40Mbit/s line access), the analogue phone line rental (R157, as of August 2013, which includes a landline number) and an ISP account. The price of an ISP account can vary greatly, ranging from R109 ($) for 100 GB to R4099 ($) for 4 TB. Uncapped 1 Mbit/s ISP accounts start at R57 ($) and can range up to R817 ($) for uncapped 40 Mbit/s. Wireless There is a distinction between wireless broadband and mobile broadband, the local GSM operators (and their surrogates) provide GSM (up to LTE) broadband. A number of companies offer broadband alternatives. Iburst offer their namesake, while cellular network company Cell C offer GPRS and EDGE and more recently a 21.1 Mbit/s service. MTN and Vodacom also offer 3G with up to 21.1 Mbit/s HSDPA+. Telkom offers a 7.2/2.4 Mbit/s HSDPA/HSUPA service in Gauteng. Most of these offerings are more expensive than ADSL for mid-to-high usage, but can be cost effective if low usage is required. MTN triggered a price war in late February 2007, offering 2 GB for each 1 GB bought, with Iburst giving a small "data bonus" to their contract customers and Sentech also reducing their prices. Vodacom responded with dramatic price cuts of their own on 1 April 2007, after which Cell C reduced prices on their larger offerings to undercut both MTN and Vodacom. Internet hotspots are ubiquitous in hotels, coffee shops, and the like. This enables users—often tourists or people on the move—to easily go online without having to enter into a fixed contract with an ISP. Many hotspots offer usage free of charge, though frequently only after registration and/or for a limited amount of time or data. Voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) Until 1 February 2005, the usage of VoIP outside of company networks was illegal under South African communications law, ostensibly to protect jobs. The deregulation of VoIP was announced by former Minister of Communications Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri in September 2004. 1G 1G used to be offered by Vodacom, MTN, Cell C and Telkom. Since then	HD, SuperSport HD 2, M-Net Movies 1 HD and SuperSport HD 3. In 2008, additional pay-TV licenses were granted to various companies in South Africa. As of January 2010, none of the companies granted a license have begun providing services. However, On Digital Media (ODM), have stated that they are on track to begin sale of their product in May 2010, and that prices will be significantly cheaper than their competitor DStv. In 2012, DSTV now has added 8 more channels all for movies. Internet Although expensive compared to more developed nations, broadband is easily obtainable in South Africa. Fixed line options such as ADSL, ISDN, Diginet and Leased Lines are available from the national operator Telkom. Recently, legislation was passed by government allowing all licensed telecommunications providers to build their own fixed line networks, resulting in a scramble by companies such as Vodacom, MTN South Africa and Neotel to construct their own country and citywide fibre-optic networks. Individual South African cities such as Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria are also in the process of, or have completed construction of city-owned fibre-optic networks. These will provide services to city and government-owned establishments, and will act as an extra source of income through the sale of excess bandwidth mainly to companies. Wireless options are available from Sentech, iBurst, Vodacom, MTN, Cell C, Telkom and a number of other ISP's. They typically provide speeds of up to 7.6 Mbit/s with HSDPA. HSUPA is also available. MTN South Africa was among the first mobile networks in the world to offer HSDPA services to its customers. Satellite options are available from both Sentech and Telkom. A SNO, Neotel, has been licensed in South Africa and is currently offering a wireless service in selected areas. According to Neotel, up-take of its services has exceeded expectations, and as a result Neotel are rapidly expanding services throughout major metropolitan areas in South Africa. In 2009, SEACOM - the second undersea cable to land in South Africa - jointly owned and operated by Neotel - was switched on. Neotel have stated that sale of SEACOM bandwidth, too, has exceeded expectations, and will drive the continual downward-spiral of internet prices in the country. As of January 2010, South Africa has over 2 million broadband subscribers. Whilst this is the largest number in Africa, South Africa's broadband penetration of 4% is significantly below international standards. Broadband ADSL In late 2009, Telkom began trialling 8 and 12 Mbit/s ADSL offerings. In August 2010, Telkom officially introduced ADSL at 10 Mbit/s. More than 20,000 4Mbit/s subscribers were upgraded free of charge. As of October 2018, fixed line DSL speeds on offer range between 2 Mbit/s to 40 Mbit/s. Fibre to the home (FTTH) Currently Openserve (a division of Telkom), Vumatel, MTN, and Broadband Infraco are among the providers rolling out fibre to the home (FTTH) networks across major cities and towns. There are also about a dozen other small providers rolling out mostly to gated estates and neighbourhoods. These networks are open access wholesale last mile networks meaning that you have to purchase a package from an internet service provider (ISP) such as Vox, Webafrica, Axxess, or Telkom. Openserve, which is 51.4% government-owned, currently has the largest footprint covering areas in many smaller cities and towns that include Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, and Knysna. Most of these providers offer additional high-end business services such as web hosting. The rollout has been rapid. Speeds range from 4/1 Mbit/s to 1000/1000 Mbit/s. A 100/50 Mbit/s plan will cost R900 to R1050 (US$ to $) depending on providers available in area and size of data package. An unlimited 1 Gbit/s/1 Gbit/s plan will cost around R1700 ($) so prices are still somewhat expensive when compared to other countries with FTTH but prices have been continually falling throughout the rollout. Comparatively, Google Fiber charges consumers $70 for an unlimited (uncapped) 1000/400 Mbit/s in the US. Pricing Broadband services are well above the world average. Charges consist of three parts: the ADSL line rental (costs range from R169 for 2 Mbit/s, R389 for 8Mbit/s, and R555 for 40Mbit/s line access), the analogue phone line rental (R157, as of August 2013, which includes a landline number) and an ISP account. The price of an ISP account can vary greatly, ranging from R109 ($) for 100 GB to R4099 ($) for 4 TB. Uncapped 1 Mbit/s ISP accounts start at R57 ($) and can range up to R817 ($) for uncapped 40 Mbit/s. Wireless There is a distinction between wireless broadband and mobile broadband, the local GSM operators (and their surrogates) provide GSM (up to LTE) broadband. A number of companies offer broadband alternatives. Iburst offer their namesake, while cellular network company Cell C offer GPRS and EDGE and more recently a 21.1 Mbit/s service. MTN and Vodacom also offer 3G with up to 21.1 Mbit/s HSDPA+. Telkom offers a 7.2/2.4 Mbit/s HSDPA/HSUPA service in Gauteng. Most of these offerings are more expensive than ADSL for mid-to-high usage, but can be cost effective if low usage is required. MTN triggered a price war in late February 2007, offering 2 GB for each 1 GB bought, with Iburst giving a small "data bonus" to their contract customers and Sentech also reducing their prices. Vodacom responded with dramatic price cuts of their own on 1 April 2007, after which Cell C reduced prices on their larger offerings to undercut both MTN and Vodacom. Internet hotspots are ubiquitous in hotels, coffee shops, and the like. This enables users—often tourists or people on the move—to easily go online without having to enter into a fixed contract with an ISP. Many hotspots offer usage free of charge, though frequently only after registration and/or for a limited amount of time or data. Voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) Until 1 February 2005, the usage of VoIP outside of company networks was illegal under South African communications law, ostensibly to protect jobs. The deregulation of VoIP was announced by former Minister of Communications Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri in September 2004. 1G 1G used to be offered by Vodacom, MTN, Cell C and Telkom. Since then all 1G cell towers in South Africa have been repurposed as 2G, 3G, 4G or 5G infrastructure or decommissioned. 2G South Africa offers GSM 900 and GSM 1800 with almost 99% coverage. So far Vodacom has shown interest in turning off their 2G network, but it is still operating today 3G South Africa offers UMTS 900 and UMTS 2100 with 99.7% of
include 1400 km of dual carriageway freeway, 440 km of single carriageway freeway and 5300 km of single carriage main road with unlimited access." The Afrikaans translation of freeway is snelweg (literally fast road or expressway). Road Transport The Department of Transport is responsible for the regulation of all transportation in South Africa, including public transport, rail transportation, civil aviation, shipping, freight, and motor vehicles. According to the Department's vision statement, "Transport [is] the heartbeat of South Africa's economic growth and social development!" Minibus Taxis Minibus Taxis are the predominant form of transport for people in urban areas of South Africa. This is due to their availability and affordability to the public. Most minibus taxis are not subsidized by the state and the taxi industry is notorious for using vehicles that are not well maintained are that are often not roadworthy to keep costs low. Because many taxi owners own just a few taxis and each owner may choose to manage their business differently, there is not much known as to the inner workings of the industry that is rife with violence. Since 1994 there have been efforts to formalize the industry but as taxi organisations often don't abide by labour regulations, relationships between taxi operators and the state are often strained. Cape Town and MyCiTi IRT The City of Cape Town has made it clear that developing public transportation must be a priority, if it is to achieve its long-term developmental goals. As such, the City has planned out the development of an Integrated Rapid Transit (IRT) system called "MyCiTi IRT". In 2007, the construction of this system began with the implementation of Cape Town's "Bus Rapid Transit" system. This first phase has been designed to enable easy integration of other forms of public transport - ranging from cycling to South Africa's famous minibuses in later phases of the IRT development - including rail transit, seen currently as "the backbone of public transportation in Cape Town." Railways In 2000, South Africa had 20,384 km of rail transport, all of it narrow gauge. 20,070 km was gauge (9,090 km of that electrified), with the remaining 314 km gauge. The operation of the country's rail systems is accomplished by Transnet	Sandton. This is the first stage of a standard gauge passenger line connecting Johannesburg, Pretoria and ORTIA. Links exist to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. Railways linking Mozambique are under repair. Transportation systems in nearby countries Angola Tanzania same gauge as far as Dar es Salaam – transshipment to gauge at Kidatu Malawi Congo Botswana Lesotho Mozambique, under repair Namibia Swaziland Zambia Zimbabwe Airports Runways in South Africa International Airports and Airlines South Africa has international airports in four cities: Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Nelspruit. The main international airports are in Johannesburg, and to a lesser extent Cape Town. Nelspruit's international airport mainly serves travellers en route to the Kruger National park. There are many international airlines travelling to South Africa, giving travellers a healthy number of options. These include British Airways, Delta Airlines, Ethiopian Airways, Kenya Airways, Qantas, Singapore Airlines, South African Airways, Swiss International Air Lines, Thai Airways, Turkish Airlines, Virgin Atlantic, Air Mauritius, Air Botswana, Air France, KLM, Lufthansa, Alitalia, Malaysia Airlines and Qatar Airways. Water South Africa's major ports and harbours are Cape Town, Durban, East London, Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth, Richards Bay, George and Saldanha Bay. In 2006 the new port is to open: Ngqura, at Coega, which is 20 km northeast of Port Elizabeth. The administration and operation of the country's port facilities are done by two subsidiaries of Transnet, the Transnet National Ports Authority and South African Port Operations (SAPO). As of March 2018, the merchant marine consisted of 15 ships totalling 431,133 GT. Pipelines There are 931 km of crude oil pipeline transport, 1,748 km for other petroleum products, and 322 km for natural gas. Petronet, a subsidiary of Transnet, which in turn is majority-owned by the government, is principally responsible for the operation of South Africa's pipelines. Tramways A
Africa has also been elected as member of the UNSC for the 2019–2020 period. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa was the chair of the African Union from 2020 to 2021, the second time South Africa has chaired the organisation since its formation in 2003. History Pre-Apartheid South Africa, as a key member of the British Empire and Commonwealth as a Dominion, fought alongside the United Kingdom and the Allies in both World War I and World War II, and it participated in the postwar UN force in the Korean War. South Africa was a founding member of the League of Nations and in 1927 established a Department of External Affairs with diplomatic missions in the main Western European countries and in the United States. Apartheid South Africa introduced apartheid in 1948, as a systematic extension of pre-existing racial discrimination in the country. As a result, the country became increasingly isolated internationally until apartheid was abolished in 1991 and racial equality introduced between 1990 and 1993. This transition produced a change in South Africa's foreign policy. The country stopped trying to regain regional hegemony and started to behave as a central hub for co-operation as a regional unipole. Post-apartheid Having emerged from the international isolation of the apartheid era, South Africa has become a leading international actor. Its principal foreign policy objective is to develop good relations with all countries, especially its neighbours in the Southern African Development Community (*-see note below) and the other members of the African Union. South Africa has played a key role in seeking an end to various	the Allies in both World War I and World War II, and it participated in the postwar UN force in the Korean War. South Africa was a founding member of the League of Nations and in 1927 established a Department of External Affairs with diplomatic missions in the main Western European countries and in the United States. Apartheid South Africa introduced apartheid in 1948, as a systematic extension of pre-existing racial discrimination in the country. As a result, the country became increasingly isolated internationally until apartheid was abolished in 1991 and racial equality introduced between 1990 and 1993. This transition produced a change in South Africa's foreign policy. The country stopped trying to regain regional hegemony and started to behave as a central hub for co-operation as a regional unipole. Post-apartheid Having emerged from the international isolation of the apartheid era, South Africa has become a leading international actor. Its principal foreign policy objective is to develop good relations with all countries, especially its neighbours in the Southern African Development Community (*-see note below) and the other members of the African Union. South Africa has played a key role in seeking an end to various conflicts and political crises on the African continent, including in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Comoros, and Zimbabwe. In August 1998, South Africa assumed the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, which it relinquished in July 2002. Eswatini has asked South Africa to open negotiations on reincorporating some nearby South African territories that are populated by ethnic Swazis or that were long ago part of the Swazi kingdom. United Nations Security Council South Africa was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council from October 2006 until 2008. South African votes in the UNSC have not been without controversy. In particular, a 'no' vote on a resolution criticising the Burmese government attracted widespread criticism. South Africa also attempted to vote against economic sanctions for Iran; however, this was changed after South Africa realised that
cue ball into a pocket, or failing to hit the object ball. The latter is a common foul committed when a player fails to escape from a "", where the previous player has left the cue ball positioned such that no legal ball can be struck directly in a straight line without being wholly or partially obstructed by an illegal ball. Fouls incur a minimum of four penalty points unless a higher-value object ball is involved in the foul, up to a maximum of seven penalty points where the black ball is concerned. When a foul is committed, the offender's turn ends and the referee announces the penalty. All points scored in the break before the foul was committed are awarded to the striker, but no points are scored for any ball pocketed during the foul shot. If dissatisfied with the position left after a foul, the next player may nominate the opponent who committed the foul to play again from where the balls have come to rest. If the referee has also called a "miss"—meaning that the referee has deemed the opponent not to have made their best possible attempt to hit the object ball—the player has the option of having the balls replaced to their original positions and forcing the opponent to play the shot again. If, after a foul, the next player cannot cleanly strike both sides of the object ball, the referee may call a free ball, allowing the player to nominate any other ball in place of the object ball they might normally have played. If a player is awarded a free ball with all 15 red balls still in play, they can potentially make a break exceeding 147, with the highest possible being a 155 break, achieved by nominating the free ball as an extra red, then potting the black as the additional colour after potting the free-ball red, followed by the 15 reds with blacks, and finally the colours. Jamie Cope was the first player to achieve a verified 155 break during a practice frame in 2005, with other players such as Alex Higgins claiming to have made a similar break. One of snooker is called a "frame". A snooker generally consists of a predetermined number of frames. Most matches in current professional tournaments are played as the best of 7, 9, or 11 frames, with finals usually the best of 17 or 19 frames. The World Championship uses a longer format, with matches ranging from the best of 19 frames in the first round to best of 35 for the final, which is played over four of play held over two days. Some early world finals had much longer matches, such as the 1947 World Snooker Championship, which was played over the best of 145 frames. Governance and tournaments Professional Professional snooker players compete on the World Snooker Tour, which is a circuit of world ranking tournaments and invitational events held throughout the snooker season. All competitions are open to professional players who have qualified for the tour, and selected amateur players, but most events include a separate qualification stage. Players can qualify for the tour by virtue of their position in the world rankings from prior seasons, by winning continental championships, or through the Challenge Tour or Q School events. Players on the World Snooker Tour generally gain a two-year "tour card" for participation in the events. Beginning in the 2014–15 season, some players have also received invitational tour cards in recognition of their outstanding contributions to the sport; these cards are issued at the discretion of the World Snooker Board, and have been awarded to players including Steve Davis, James Wattana, Jimmy White, and Stephen Hendry. Some additional secondary tours have been contested over the years. A two-tier structure was adopted for the 1997–98 snooker season; comprising six tournaments known as the WPBSA Minor Tour was open to all professionals, but only ran for one season. A similar secondary UK Tour was first played from the 1997–98 season, which was renamed the Challenge Tour in 2000, Players Tour Championship in 2010 and returned as the Challenge Tour in 2018. The global governing body for professional snooker is the World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association (WPBSA), founded as the Professional Billiard Players' Association. The WPBSA owns and publishes the official rules of snooker, and has overall responsibility for policy-making in the professional sport of snooker. World Snooker Ltd responsible for the professional tour which is owned by both the WPBSA and Matchroom Sport. World rankings Every player on the World Snooker Tour is assigned a position on the WPBSA's official world ranking list, which is used to determine the seedings and the level of qualification each player requires for the tournaments on the professional circuit. The current world rankings are determined using a two-year rolling points system, where points are allocated to the players according to the prize money earned at designated tournaments. This "rolling" list is maintained and updated throughout the season, with points from tournaments played in the current season replacing points earned from the corresponding tournaments of two seasons ago. Additionally, "one-year" and "two-year" ranking lists are compiled at the end of every season, after the World Championship; these year-end lists are used for pre-qualification at certain tournaments and for tour-card guarantees. The top 16 players in the world ranking list, generally regarded as the "elite" of the professional snooker circuit, are not required to pre-qualify for some of the tournaments, such as the Shanghai Masters, the Masters and the World Snooker Championship. Certain other events, such as those in the Cazoo Cup series, use the one-year ranking list to qualify; these use the results of the current season to denote participants. As of the 2020–21 season, there are 128 places available on the World Snooker Tour, with players either in the top 64 on the official ranking list, or finishing as one of the top eight prize money earners during the most recent season, guaranteed a tour place for the next season, this being assessed after the World Championship. Tournaments The oldest current professional snooker tournament is the World Snooker Championship, which has taken place as an annual event most years since 1927. Hosted since 1977 at the Crucible Theatre in Sheffield, England, the championship was sponsored by tobacco company Embassy from 1976 to 2005, and has since been sponsored by various betting companies after the introduction of an EU-wide ban on advertising tobacco products. The Triple Crown tournaments are televised in the UK by the BBC, while most other tournaments are broadcast on the Eurosport network, or ITV Sport, as well as numerous other broadcasters internationally. The World Championship is the most highly valued title in professional snooker, both in terms of financial reward (the tournament has carried a £500,000 winner's prize since 2019), ranking points, and prestige. The UK Championship, held annually since 1977, is considered to be the second most important ranking tournament, after the World Championship. These two events, and the annual non-ranking Masters tournament, make up the Triple Crown Series; being some of the oldest competitions on the professional circuit, the Triple Crown events are valued by many players as the most prestigious. Only eleven players have won all three Triple Crown events, as of 2022. Snooker has faced criticism for matches taking too long. In response, Matchroom Sport chairman Barry Hearn introduced a series of timed tournaments. The shot-timed Premier League Snooker was held between 1987 and 2012, with seven players invited to compete at regular United Kingdom venues, is televised on Sky Sports. Players had twenty-five seconds to take each shot, with five time-outs per player per match. Although some success was achieved with this format, it did not receive the same amount of press attention or status as the regular ranking tournaments. This event has been taken out of the tour since 2013, when the Champion of Champions was established. The event saw players qualify by virtue of winning other events in the season, with 16 champions competing. In 2015, the WPBSA submitted an unsuccessful bid for snooker to be played at the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo, Japan. Another bid has been put forward for the 2024 Summer Olympics through the World Snooker Federation, founded in 2017. A trial for the format for cue sports to be played at the 2024 games was put forward at the 2019 World Team Trophy, also featuring nine-ball and carom billiards. Snooker has been contested at the World Games since 2001, and was included as an event at the 2019 African Games. Amateur Non-professional snooker (including youth competition) is governed by the International Billiards and Snooker Federation (IBSF). Events held specifically for seniors are handled by the WPBSA under the World Seniors Tour. World Disability Billiards and Snooker (WDBS) is a WPBSA subsidiary that organises events and playing aids in snooker and other cue sports for people with disabilities. Snooker is a mixed gender sport that affords men and women the same opportunities to progress at all levels of the game. While the main professional tour is open to female players, there is also a separate women's tour organised by World Women's Snooker (formerly the World Ladies Billiards and Snooker Association) that encourages female players to participate in the sport. The winner of the World Women's Snooker Championship now receives a two-year tour card to the main professional tour. The highest competition in the amateur sport is the IBSF World Snooker Championship, while the highest level of the senior sport is the World Seniors Championship. On the women's tour, the leading tournament is the World Women's Snooker Championship. The reigning champion is Reanne Evans who has held the women's world title twelve times since first winning the championship in 2005. Evans has also participated on the World Snooker Tour and has taken part in the qualifying rounds of the main world championship on five occasions, reaching the second round in 2017. The most prestigious amateur event in England is the English Amateur Championship; first held in 1916, this is the oldest snooker competition still being played in the world. Criticism Several players, such as Ronnie O'Sullivan, Mark Allen and Steve Davis, have warned that there are too many tournaments during the season, and that players risk burnout. In 2012, O'Sullivan played fewer tournaments to spend more time with his children, and ended the 2012–13 season ranked 19th in the world; he played only one tournament in 2013, the World Championship, which he won. He has suggested that a "breakaway tour" with fewer events would be beneficial to the sport, but as of 2018 no such tour has been organised. Some leagues have allowed clubs to exclude female players from tournaments. League committee leadership has defended the practice: "If we lose two of these clubs [with the men-only policies] we would lose four teams and we can't afford to lose four teams otherwise we would have no league." A World Women's Snooker spokesperson commented, "It is disappointing and unacceptable that in 2019 that (sic)	or it can be made to bounce off one or more cushions before hitting the required object ball. The game continues until every red ball has been potted and only the six colours and the cue ball are left on the table. The colours must next be potted in the ascending order of their values, from lowest to highest, i.e. first (worth two points), then (three points), (four points), (five points), (six points), and finally (seven points); each colour remains in the pocket after being potted. When the final ball is potted, the player with the most points wins the frame. If there are not enough points remaining on the table for a player to win the frame, that player may offer to concede the frame while at the table (but not while their opponent is still at the table); a frame concession is a common occurrence in professional snooker. Players will often play on even when there are not enough points available for them to win, hoping to force their opponent into playing foul shots by laying . These are shots that are designed to make playing a legal shot harder, such as leaving another ball between the cue ball and the object ball. If the scores are equal when all of the object balls have been potted, the black is used as a tiebreaker. In this situation, called a "", the black ball is returned to its designated spot and the cue ball is played , meaning that it may be placed anywhere on or within the lines of the "D" to start the tiebreak. The referee then tosses a coin and the winner of the toss decides who takes the first strike. The game continues until one of the players either pots the black ball to win the frame, or commits a foul (losing the frame). Professional and competitive amateur matches are officiated by a referee, who is charged with ensuring the proper conduct of players and making decisions "in the interests of fair play". The responsibilities of the referee include announcing the points scored during a break, determining when a foul has been committed and awarding penalty points and free balls accordingly, replacing colours onto their designated spots after they are potted, restoring the balls to their previous positions after the "miss" rule has been invoked (see Scoring), and cleaning the cue ball or any object ball upon request by the striker. Another duty of the referee is to recognise and declare a stalemate when neither player is able to make any progress in the frame. If both players agree, the balls are returned to their starting positions and the frame is restarted (known as a ""), with the same player taking the break-off shot as before. Professional players usually play the game in a sporting manner, declaring fouls they have committed which the referee has not noticed, acknowledging good shots from their opponent, and holding up a hand to apologise for a fortunate shot, known as a "fluke". Scoring Points in snooker are gained from potting the object balls in the correct sequence. The total number of consecutive points (excluding fouls) that a player amasses during one to the table is known as a "break". A player could achieve a break of 15, for example, by first potting a red followed by a black, then another red followed by a pink, before failing to pot the next red. Breaks of 100 points or more are referred to as a century break, and are recorded over the career of a professional player. A maximum break in snooker is achieved by potting all reds with blacks, then potting all six colours, yielding 147 points; this is often known as a "147" or a "maximum". , there have been 172 officially confirmed maximum breaks achieved in professional competition. Penalty points are awarded to a player when a foul is committed by the opponent. A foul can occur for various reasons, such as sending the cue ball into a pocket, or failing to hit the object ball. The latter is a common foul committed when a player fails to escape from a "", where the previous player has left the cue ball positioned such that no legal ball can be struck directly in a straight line without being wholly or partially obstructed by an illegal ball. Fouls incur a minimum of four penalty points unless a higher-value object ball is involved in the foul, up to a maximum of seven penalty points where the black ball is concerned. When a foul is committed, the offender's turn ends and the referee announces the penalty. All points scored in the break before the foul was committed are awarded to the striker, but no points are scored for any ball pocketed during the foul shot. If dissatisfied with the position left after a foul, the next player may nominate the opponent who committed the foul to play again from where the balls have come to rest. If the referee has also called a "miss"—meaning that the referee has deemed the opponent not to have made their best possible attempt to hit the object ball—the player has the option of having the balls replaced to their original positions and forcing the opponent to play the shot again. If, after a foul, the next player cannot cleanly strike both sides of the object ball, the referee may call a free ball, allowing the player to nominate any other ball in place of the object ball they might normally have played. If a player is awarded a free ball with all 15 red balls still in play, they can potentially make a break exceeding 147, with the highest possible being a 155 break, achieved by nominating the free ball as an extra red, then potting the black as the additional colour after potting the free-ball red, followed by the 15 reds with blacks, and finally the colours. Jamie Cope was the first player to achieve a verified 155 break during a practice frame in 2005, with other players such as Alex Higgins claiming to have made a similar break. One of snooker is called a "frame". A snooker generally consists of a predetermined number of frames. Most matches in current professional tournaments are played as the best of 7, 9, or 11 frames, with finals usually the best of 17 or 19 frames. The World Championship uses a longer format, with matches ranging from the best of 19 frames in the first round to best of 35 for the final, which is played over four of play held over two days. Some early world finals had much longer matches, such as the 1947 World Snooker Championship, which was played over the best of 145 frames. Governance and tournaments Professional Professional snooker players compete on the World Snooker Tour, which is a circuit of world ranking tournaments and invitational events held throughout the snooker season. All competitions are open to professional players who have qualified for the tour, and selected amateur players, but most events include a separate qualification stage. Players can qualify for the tour by virtue of their position in the world rankings from prior seasons, by winning continental championships, or through the Challenge Tour or Q School events. Players on the World Snooker Tour generally gain a two-year "tour card" for participation in the events. Beginning in the 2014–15 season, some players have also received invitational tour cards in recognition of their outstanding contributions to the sport; these cards are issued at the discretion of the World Snooker Board, and have been awarded to players including Steve Davis, James Wattana, Jimmy White, and Stephen Hendry. Some additional secondary tours have been contested over the years. A two-tier structure was adopted for the 1997–98 snooker season; comprising six tournaments known as the WPBSA Minor Tour was open to all professionals, but only ran for one season. A similar secondary UK Tour was first played from the 1997–98 season, which was renamed the Challenge Tour in 2000, Players Tour Championship in 2010 and returned as the Challenge Tour in 2018. The global governing body for professional snooker is the World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association (WPBSA), founded as the Professional Billiard Players' Association. The WPBSA owns and publishes the official rules of snooker, and has overall responsibility for policy-making in the professional sport of snooker. World Snooker Ltd responsible for the professional tour which is owned by both the WPBSA and Matchroom Sport. World rankings Every player on the World Snooker Tour is assigned a position on the WPBSA's official world ranking list, which is used to determine the seedings and the level of qualification each player requires for the tournaments on the professional circuit. The current world rankings are determined using a two-year rolling points system, where points are allocated to the players according to the prize money earned at designated tournaments. This "rolling" list is maintained and updated throughout the season, with points from tournaments played in the current season replacing points earned from the corresponding tournaments of two seasons ago. Additionally, "one-year" and "two-year" ranking lists are compiled at the end of every season, after the World Championship; these year-end lists are used for pre-qualification at certain tournaments and for tour-card guarantees. The top 16 players in the world ranking list, generally regarded as the "elite" of the professional snooker circuit, are not required to pre-qualify for some of the tournaments, such as the Shanghai Masters, the Masters and the World Snooker Championship. Certain other events, such as those in the Cazoo Cup series, use the one-year ranking list to qualify; these use the results of the current season to denote participants. As of the 2020–21 season, there are 128 places available on the World Snooker Tour, with players either in the top 64 on the official ranking list, or finishing as one of the top eight prize money earners during the most recent season, guaranteed a tour place for the next season, this being assessed after the World Championship. Tournaments The oldest current professional snooker tournament is the World Snooker Championship, which has taken place as an annual event most years since 1927. Hosted since 1977 at the Crucible Theatre in Sheffield, England, the championship was sponsored by tobacco company Embassy from 1976 to 2005, and has since been sponsored by various betting companies after the introduction of an EU-wide ban on advertising tobacco products. The Triple Crown tournaments are televised in the UK by the BBC, while most other tournaments are broadcast on the Eurosport network, or ITV Sport, as well as numerous other broadcasters internationally. The World Championship is the most highly valued title in professional snooker, both in terms of financial reward (the tournament has carried a £500,000 winner's prize since 2019), ranking points, and prestige. The UK Championship, held annually since 1977, is considered to be the second most important ranking tournament, after the World Championship. These two events, and the annual non-ranking Masters tournament, make up the Triple Crown Series; being some of the oldest competitions on the professional circuit, the Triple Crown events are valued by many players as the most prestigious. Only eleven players have won all three Triple Crown events, as of 2022. Snooker has faced criticism for matches taking too long. In response, Matchroom Sport chairman Barry Hearn introduced a series of timed tournaments. The shot-timed Premier League Snooker was held between 1987 and 2012, with seven players invited to compete at regular United Kingdom venues, is televised on Sky Sports. Players had twenty-five seconds to take each shot, with five time-outs per player per match. Although some success was achieved with this format, it did not receive the same amount of press attention or status as the regular ranking tournaments. This event has been taken out of the tour since 2013, when the Champion of Champions was established. The event saw players qualify by virtue of winning other events in the season, with 16 champions competing. In 2015, the WPBSA submitted an unsuccessful bid for snooker to be played at the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo, Japan. Another bid has been put forward for the 2024 Summer Olympics through the World Snooker Federation, founded in 2017. A trial for the format for cue sports to be played at the 2024 games was put forward at the 2019 World Team Trophy, also featuring nine-ball and carom billiards. Snooker has been contested at the World Games since 2001, and was included as an event at the 2019 African Games. Amateur Non-professional snooker (including youth competition) is governed by the International Billiards and Snooker Federation (IBSF). Events held specifically for seniors are handled by the WPBSA under the World Seniors Tour. World Disability Billiards and Snooker (WDBS) is a WPBSA subsidiary that organises events and playing aids in snooker and other cue sports for people with disabilities. Snooker is a mixed gender sport that affords men and women the same opportunities to progress at all levels of the game. While the main professional tour is open to female players, there is also a separate women's tour organised by World Women's Snooker (formerly the World Ladies Billiards and Snooker Association) that encourages female players to participate in the sport. The winner of the World Women's Snooker Championship now receives a two-year tour card to the main professional tour. The highest competition in the amateur sport is the IBSF World Snooker Championship, while the highest level of the senior sport is the World Seniors Championship. On the women's tour, the leading tournament is the World Women's Snooker Championship. The reigning champion is Reanne Evans who has held the women's world title twelve times since first winning the championship in 2005. Evans has also participated on the World Snooker Tour and has taken part in the qualifying rounds of the main world championship on five occasions, reaching the second round in 2017. The most prestigious amateur event in England is the English Amateur Championship; first held in 1916, this is the oldest snooker competition still being played in the world. Criticism Several players, such as Ronnie O'Sullivan, Mark Allen and Steve Davis, have warned that there are too many tournaments during the season, and that players risk burnout. In 2012, O'Sullivan played fewer tournaments to spend more time with his children, and ended the 2012–13 season ranked 19th in the world; he played only one tournament in 2013, the World Championship, which he won. He has suggested that a "breakaway tour" with fewer events would be beneficial to the sport, but as of 2018 no such tour has been organised. Some leagues have allowed clubs to exclude female players from tournaments.
in recent years, with many cruise ships and sailing yachts visiting the area (the only way to visit South Georgia is by sea; there are no airstrips on the Islands). The territory gains income from landing charges and the sale of souvenirs. Cruise ships often combine a Grytviken visit with a trip to the Antarctic Peninsula. Charter yacht visits usually begin in the Falkland Islands, last between four and six weeks, and enable guests to visit remote harbours of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Sailing vessels are now required to anchor out and can no longer tie up to the old whaling piers on shore. One exception to this is the recently upgraded/repaired yacht berth at Grytviken. All other jetties at former whaling stations lie inside a exclusion zone; and berthing, or putting ropes ashore, at these is forbidden. Yachts visiting South Georgia are normally expected to report to the Government Officers at King Edward Point before moving round the island. Postage stamps A large source of income from abroad also comes from the issue of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands postage stamps which are produced in the UK. A reasonable issue policy (few sets of stamps are issued each year) along with attractive subject matter (especially whales) makes them popular with topical stamp collectors. There are only four genuine first day cover sets from 16 March 1982 in existence. They were stamped at the South Georgia Post Office; all those in circulation were stamped elsewhere and sent out, but the only genuine ones were kept at the Post Office on South Georgia. These four sets were removed during the Falklands War by a member of staff of the British Antarctic Survey in the few moments the Argentinians allowed them to gather their belongings. Everything else was burnt, but these four sets were saved and brought to the UK by Robert Headland, BAS. Currency The pound sterling is the official currency of the islands, and the same notes and coins are used as in the United Kingdom. Internet domain registration The Internet country code top-level domain (ccTLD) for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is .gs. Ecology Plants Native plants The parts of the islands that are not permanently covered in snow or ice are part of the Scotia Sea Islands tundra ecoregion. In total there are 26 species of vascular plant native to South Georgia; six species of grass, four rushes, a single sedge, six ferns, one clubmoss and nine small forbs. There are also about 125 species of moss, 85 of liverworts and 150 lichens, as well as about 50 species of macrofungi. There are no trees or shrubs on the islands. The largest plant is the tussock grass Poa flabellata. This grows mostly on raised beaches and steep slopes near the shore and may reach . Other grasses include the tufted fescue (Festuca contracta), the Alpine cat's-tail (Phleum alpinum) and Antarctic hair-grass (Deschampsia antarctica), and one of the most common flowering plants is the greater burnet (Acaena magellanica). Introduced plants A number of introduced species have become naturalised; many of these were introduced by whalers in cattle fodder, and some are considered invasive. There have been 76 introduced plant species recorded in South Georgia. 35 of these are considered eradicated, with 41 still considered present on the island. 33 of these species are planned for eradication by 2020. It is considered important to control the spread of these exotic species as they readily enter this vulnerable, pristine ecosystem and outcompete populations of native flora for resources (e.g. light, nutrients) and negatively affect small, fragile habitats for the South Georgia fauna. Current pest plant management efforts began in the early 2000s and are primarily targeted toward the species with easier expectations of eradication in the near-term (such as bittercress and procumbent pearlwort), with remaining species to be targeted in future seasons. These programmes involved the collaboration of the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands Government, Royal Botanical Gardens Kew, UK Darwin Initiative and private contractors. The introduced plant species of South Georgia arrived primarily alongside human economic activities in the island and were mostly accidental, (before visitors had an understanding of their consequences). Annual meadow grass (Poa annua) is believed to have arrived approximately 1700 with the first sealers, and is now widespread across the island, particularly old sealing and whaling sites. Dandelions are believed to have been introduced alongside whaling operations, via the practice of including a handful of soil from the deceased whaler's home country. Bittercress was first spotted in 2002 and is thought to have arrived alongside building supplies at King Edward Cove. Introductions have since slowed in recent decades with the introduction of thorough biosecurity protocols. Non-native species management will require several years of regular, dedicated follow-up treatments to ensure that all germinating seed currently in the soil is controlled prior to maturity before success will be achieved. Birds South Georgia supports many sea birds, including albatross, a large colony of king penguins, Macaroni penguins and penguins of various other species, along with petrels, prions, shags, skuas, gulls and terns. Birds unique to the archipelago are the South Georgia shag, South Georgia pipit, and the South Georgia pintail. Both South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands have been identified as Important Bird Areas (IBA) by BirdLife International. Mammals Seals frequent the islands, and whales may be seen in the surrounding waters. There are no native land mammals, though reindeer, brown rats and mice were introduced to South Georgia through human activities. Rats, brought to the island as stowaways on sealing and whaling ships in the late 18th century, have caused much damage to native wildlife, destroying tens of millions of ground-nesting birds' eggs and chicks. While previously the island's glaciers formed a natural barrier to the spread of rats, these glaciers are now slowly melting as the climate warms. In 2011, scientists instituted a four-year programme to entirely eradicate the rats and mice, in what would be by far the largest rodent eradication attempt in the world to date. The project was led by zoologist Anthony Martin of The University of Dundee who stated, "This is a man-induced problem and it's about time that man put right earlier errors." In July 2013, the success of the main phase of the extermination of the rats, which took place in May that year, was announced. 180 tonnes of rat poison, brodifacoum, were dropped over 70% of the island, in what was the world's largest ever operation of this kind. Another 95 tonnes of rat poison was planned to be dropped by three helicopters in January 2015. In June 2015 the eradication programme concluded, apparently successfully, with the island believed "very likely" to be rat free. In 2017–18, an intensive six-month search by the South Georgia Heritage Trust, using sniffer dogs and baited traps, found no evidence of rodent presence. Monitoring will continue for a further two or three years. In 2018, the number of South Georgia pipits had clearly increased. Reindeer were introduced to South Georgia in 1911 by Norwegian whalers for meat and for sport hunting. In February 2011, the authorities announced that due to the reindeer's detrimental effect on native species and the threat of their spreading to presently pristine areas, a complete cull would take place, leading to the eradication of reindeer from the island. The eradication began in 2013 with 3,500 reindeer killed. Nearly all the rest were killed in early 2014, with the last (about 50) cleared in the 2014–15 southern summer. Marine ecosystem The seas around South Georgia have a high level of biodiversity. In a recent study (2009–2011), South Georgia has been discovered to contain one of the highest levels of biodiversity among all the ecosystems on Earth. In respect to species, marine inhabitants endemic to this ecosystem outnumber and (in respect to biodiversity) surpass well-known regions such as the Galápagos or Ecuador. The marine ecosystem is thought to be vulnerable because its low temperatures mean that it can repair itself only very slowly. On 23 February 2012, to protect marine biodiversity, the territory's government created the South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands Marine Protected Areacomprising . Military After the Falklands War in 1982, a full-time British military presence was maintained at King Edward Point on South Georgia. This was scaled down during the 1990s until the last detachment left South Georgia in March 2001, after a new station had been built and occupied by the British Antarctic Survey. The main British military facility in the region is at RAF Mount Pleasant and the adjacent Mare Harbour naval base on East Falkland, and three Remote Radar Heads on the Falklands: RRH Mount Kent, RRH Byron Heights and RRH Mount Alice. A handful of British naval vessels patrol the region, visiting South Georgia a few times each year and sometimes deploying small infantry patrols. Flights by RAF C-130 Hercules and Vickers VC10 (replaced by Voyager) aircraft also occasionally patrol the territory. A Royal Navy warship carries out the Atlantic Patrol Tasking South mission in the surrounding area. , the Royal Navy ice-patrol ship, operated in the South Georgia area during part of most southern summer seasons until her near loss due to flooding in 2008. She carried out hydrological and mapping work as well as assisting with scientific fieldwork for the British Antarctic Survey, film and photographic units, and youth expedition group BSES Expeditions. While the final decision on the fate of Endurance was pending, the Royal Navy chartered a Norwegian icebreaker, renamed , to act as replacement for three years. In September 2013 the British Ministry of Defence purchased the ship outright. It was announced on 7 October 2013 that Endurance would be sold for scrap. See also Bibliography of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands Cape Flannery Hardy Point Herd Point Horsburgh Point Hueca Point Lists of islands Rail transport in South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands References Further reading Basberg, Bjorn L. – The Shore Whaling Stations at South Georgia: A Study in Antarctic Industrial Archaeology. Burton, Robert. South Georgia. (4th edition ed.). The Commissioner, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Chaplin, J. M. – Narrative of Hydrographic Survey Operations in South Georgia and the South Shetland Islands, 1926–1930. Galbraith, Deirdre. (2011). A field guide to the flora of South Georgia. Great Britain: South Georgia Heritage Trust. . . Forster, Georg (1777). A Voyage Round the World in His Britannic Majesty's Sloop Resolution Commanded by Capt. James Cook, during the Years 1772, 3, 4 and 5 (2 vols.). London. Greene, Dorothy M. – A Conspectus of the Mosses of Antarctica, South Georgia, the Falkland Islands and Southern South America. Gregory, J. W. – Geological Relations and Some Fossils of South Georgia. Hardy, A. C. and E. R. Gunther – The Plankton of the South Georgia Whaling Grounds and Adjacent Waters, 1926–1927. Headland, R. K. (1984). The Island of South Georgia. Cambridge University Press. . Holdgate, Martin W., and Peter Edward Baker. The South Sandwich Islands: I. General description. Vol. 91. British Antarctic Survey, 1979. Kemp, Stanley, A. L. Nelson, and G. W. Tyrell – The South Sandwich Islands. Kohl-Larsen, Ludwig and William Barr – South Georgia, Gateway to Antarctica. Leader-Williams, N. – Reindeer on South Georgia: The Ecology of an Introduced Population. Matthews, L. Harrison – South Georgia: The British Empire’s Subantarctic Outpost. Murphy, Robert Cushman – The Penguins of South Georgia. Ovstedal, DO and RI Lewis Smith – Lichens of Antarctica and South Georgia: A Guide to Their Identification and Ecology. Poncet, Sally and Crosbie, Kim. A visitor's guide to South Georgia : the essential guide for any visitor. (2nd edition ed.). Princeton, New Jersey. . Skottsberg, C. – The Vegetation in South Georgia. Stonehouse, Bernard – The King Penguin Aptenodytes Patagonica of South Georgia 1. Breeding Behaviour and Development. Upson, Rebecca,. Field guide to the introduced flora of South Georgia. Myer, Bradley, Floyd, Kelvin, Lee, Jennifer, Clubbe, Colin,. Richmond, Surrey, UK. . Verrill, G. E. – Notes on Birds and Eggs from the Islands of Gough, Kerguelen, and South Georgia, With Two Plates. Wheeler, Tony (2004). The Falklands & South Georgia Island. Lonely Planet. . External links Government South Georgia government website South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. Map of the Argentine claim over Islas Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur Others South Georgia Association website South Georgia Heritage Trust Live picture from the South Georgia webcam Operation Paraquat Argentine invasion of South Georgia Antarctic region Disputed islands English-speaking countries and territories Important Bird	island consists of gneiss and argillaceous schists with occasional tuffs and other sedimentary layers from which fossils have been recovered. The island is a fragment of some greater land-mass now vanished and was probably a former extension of the Andean system. Smaller islands and islets off the coast of South Georgia Island include: Annenkov Island Bird Island Cooper Island Grass Island Jomfruene Pickersgill Islands Trinity Island Welcome Islands Willis Islands These remote rocks are also considered part of the South Georgia Group: Shag Rocks, west-northwest of South Georgia Island Black Rock, west-northwest of South Georgia Island Clerke Rocks, east-southeast of South Georgia Island South Sandwich Islands The South Sandwich Islands () comprise 11 mostly volcanic islands (excluding tiny satellite islands and offshore rocks), with some active volcanoes. They form an island arc running north–south in the region 56°18'–59°27'S, 26°23'–28°08'W, between about southeast of South Georgia. The northernmost of the South Sandwich Islands form the Traversay Islands and Candlemas Islands groups, while the southernmost make up Southern Thule. The three largest islandsSaunders, Montagu, and Bristollie between the two. The Islands' highest point is Mount Belinda () on Montagu Island. The fourth highest peak, Mount Michael () on Saunders Island has a persistent lava lake, known to occur at only eight volcanoes in the world. The South Sandwich Islands are uninhabited, though a permanently staffed Argentine research station was located on Thule Island from 1976 to 1982 (for details, see above). Automatic weather stations are on Thule Island and Zavodovski. To the northwest of Zavodovski Island is the Protector Shoal, a submarine volcano. The South Sandwich Islands from north to south are: A series of six passages separates each of the islands or island groups in the chain. They are, from north to south: Zavodovski Isl., Traverse passage, Visokoi Isl., Brown's passage, Candlemas Isl., Shackleton's passage, Saunders Isl., Larsen's passage, Montagu Isl., Biscoe's passage, Bristol Isl., Forsters Passage, Southern Thule. Nelson Channel is the passage between Candlemas and Vindication Island. Extreme points Northernmost point – Cape North Southernmost point – on Cook Island Westernmost point – on Main Island (of the Willis Islands) Easternmost point – on Montagu Island Highest point – Mount Paget: 2,934 m Lowest point – Atlantic Ocean: 0 Climate The climate is classified as polar, and the weather is highly variable and harsh; making a tundra (ET) in Köppen climate classification. Typical daily maximum temperatures in South Georgia at sea level are around in winter (August) and in summer (January). Winter minimum temperatures are typically about and rarely dip below . Annual precipitation in South Georgia is about , much of which falls as sleet or snow, which is possible the entire year. Inland, the snow line in summer is at an altitude of about . Westerly winds blow throughout the year interspersed with periods of calm—indeed, in 1963, 25% of winds were in the calm category at King Edward point, and the mean wind speed of around is around half that of the Falkland Islands. This gives the eastern side of South Georgia (leeward side) a more pleasant climate than the exposed western side. The prevailing weather conditions generally make the islands difficult to approach by ship, though the north coast of South Georgia has several large bays which provide good anchorage. Sunshine, as with many South Atlantic Islands, is low, at a maximum of just 21.5%. This amounts to around 1,000 hours of sunshine annually. The local topography, however, also contributes significantly to the low insolation. A study published during the early 1960s indicated that sunshine recording instruments remained significantly obscured throughout the year and entirely obscured during June. It was estimated that the theoretical sunshine exposure minus obstructions would be around 14% at Bird Island and 35% at King Edward Pointor, in hourly terms, ranging from around 650 hours in the west to 1,500 hours in the east. This illustrates the effect the Allardyce Range has in breaking up cloud cover. Mountain winds blow straight up the western side and straight down the eastern side of the mountains and become much warmer and drier due to the Föhn effect; this produces the most pleasant conditions when temperatures can occasionally rise over on summer days. The highest recorded temperature was at Grytviken. and at nearby King Edward point, both on the sheltered east side of the Islands. Conversely, the highest recorded temperature at Bird Island on the windward western side is a mere . As one might expect, the sheltered eastern side can also record lower winter temperatures—the absolute minimum for Grytviken being , King Edward Point , but Bird Island just . The seas surrounding South Georgia are cold throughout the year due to the proximity of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current. They usually remain free of pack ice in winter, though thin ice may form in sheltered bays, and icebergs are common. Sea temperatures drop to in late August and rise to around only in early April. The South Sandwich Islands are much colder than South Georgia, being farther south and more exposed to cold outbreaks from the Antarctic continent. They are also surrounded by sea ice from the middle of May to late November (even longer at their southern end). Recorded temperature extremes at South Thule Island have ranged from . Government Executive power is vested in the Monarch of the United Kingdom and is exercised by the commissioner, a post held by the Governor of the Falkland Islands. The current commissioner is Nigel Phillips, who became commissioner on 12 September 2017. The executive, based in Stanley, Falkland Islands, is made up as follows (as at July 2021): A Chief Executive Officer (Laura Sinclair Willis) is responsible for overall management and the good governance of the territory. A Director of Fisheries (Dr Mark Belchier) is responsible for the allocation of fishing licences and is supported by a Marine Environment & Fisheries Manager (Sue Gregory). A Director of Operations (Steve Brown) deals with administrative matters relating to the territory. A Director of Strategy & Policy (John Clorley) is responsible for policy and strategic drafting. A Visitor Management Officer (Ross James) manages tourism and other visit policies. An Environment Officer (Dr Jennifer Black) manages environmental issues; and A Finance, Admin and Logistics Officer (Rebecca Honeybone) manages finance and oversees the running of the Post Office. The Financial Secretary and Attorney General of the territory are appointed ex officio similar appointments in the Falkland Islands' government. On the island itself, Government Officers (Vicki Foster, Sam Balderson, David (Ben) Swain, Joshua Peck) manage vessel visits, fishing and tourism, and represent the government 'on the ground'. A summer Deputy Postmaster runs the Post Office at Grytviken during the tourism season. As no permanent inhabitants live on the islands, no legislative council and no elections are needed. The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) manages the foreign relations of the territory. Since 1982, the territory celebrates Liberation Day on 14 June. The constitution of the territory (adopted 3 October 1985), the manner in which its government is directed and the availability of judicial review were discussed in a series of litigations between 2001 and 2005 (see, in particular, Regina v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Appellant) ex parte Quark Fishing Limited [2005] UKHL 57). Although its government is entirely directed by the FCDO, it was held that, since it was acting as an agent of the Crown in right of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands rather than in right of the UK, its decisions under that direction could not be challenged as if they were in law decisions of a UK government department; thus the European Convention on Human Rights did not apply. Economy Commercial sealing occurred on the islands between 1817 and 1909. During that period 20 visits are recorded by sealing vessels. Economic activity in South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is limited. The territory has revenues of £6.3 million, 80% of which is derived from fishing licences (2020 figures). Other sources of revenue are the sale of postage stamps and coins, tourism, and customs and harbour dues. Fishing Fishing takes place around South Georgia and in adjacent waters in some months of the year, with fishing licences sold by the territory for Patagonian toothfish, cod icefish and krill. Fishing licences bring in millions of pounds a year, most of which is spent on fishery protection and research. All fisheries are regulated and managed in accordance with the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) system. In 2001 the South Georgia government was cited by the Marine Stewardship Council for its sustainable Patagonian toothfish fishery, certifying that South Georgia met the MSC's environmental standards. The certificate places limits on the timing and quantity of Patagonian toothfish that may be caught. Tourism Tourism has become a larger source of income in recent years, with many cruise ships and sailing yachts visiting the area (the only way to visit South Georgia is by sea; there are no airstrips on the Islands). The territory gains income from landing charges and the sale of souvenirs. Cruise ships often combine a Grytviken visit with a trip to the Antarctic Peninsula. Charter yacht visits usually begin in the Falkland Islands, last between four and six weeks, and enable guests to visit remote harbours of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Sailing vessels are now required to anchor out and can no longer tie up to the old whaling piers on shore. One exception to this is the recently upgraded/repaired yacht berth at Grytviken. All other jetties at former whaling stations lie inside a exclusion zone; and berthing, or putting ropes ashore, at these is forbidden. Yachts visiting South Georgia are normally expected to report to the Government Officers at King Edward Point before moving round the island. Postage stamps A large source of income from abroad also comes from the issue of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands postage stamps which are produced in the UK. A reasonable issue policy (few sets of stamps are issued each year) along with attractive subject matter (especially whales) makes them popular with topical stamp collectors. There are only four genuine first day cover sets from 16 March 1982 in existence. They were stamped at the South Georgia Post Office; all those in circulation were stamped elsewhere and sent out, but the only genuine ones were kept at the Post Office on South Georgia. These four sets were removed during the Falklands War by a member of staff of the British Antarctic Survey in the few moments the Argentinians allowed them to gather their belongings. Everything else was burnt, but these four sets were saved and brought to the UK by Robert Headland, BAS. Currency The pound sterling is the official currency of the islands, and the same notes and coins are used as in the United Kingdom. Internet domain registration The Internet country code top-level domain (ccTLD) for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is .gs. Ecology Plants Native plants The parts of the islands that are not permanently covered in snow or ice are part of the Scotia Sea Islands tundra ecoregion. In total there are 26 species of vascular plant native to South Georgia; six species of grass, four rushes, a single sedge, six ferns, one clubmoss and nine small forbs. There are also about 125 species of moss, 85 of liverworts and 150 lichens, as well as about 50 species of macrofungi. There are no trees or shrubs on the islands. The largest plant is the tussock grass Poa flabellata. This grows mostly on raised beaches and steep slopes near the shore and may reach . Other grasses include the tufted fescue (Festuca contracta), the Alpine cat's-tail (Phleum alpinum) and Antarctic hair-grass (Deschampsia antarctica), and one of the most common flowering plants is the greater burnet (Acaena magellanica). Introduced plants A number of introduced species have become naturalised; many of these were introduced by whalers in cattle fodder, and some are considered invasive. There have been 76 introduced plant species recorded in South Georgia. 35 of these are considered eradicated, with 41 still considered present on the island. 33 of these species are planned for eradication by 2020. It is considered important to control the spread of these exotic species as they readily enter this vulnerable, pristine ecosystem and outcompete populations of native flora for resources (e.g. light, nutrients) and negatively affect small, fragile habitats for the South Georgia fauna. Current pest plant management efforts began in the early 2000s and are primarily targeted toward the species with easier expectations of eradication in the near-term (such as bittercress and procumbent pearlwort), with remaining species to be targeted in future seasons. These programmes involved the collaboration of the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands Government, Royal Botanical Gardens Kew, UK Darwin Initiative and private contractors. The introduced plant species of South Georgia arrived primarily alongside human economic activities in the island and were mostly accidental, (before visitors had an understanding of their consequences). Annual meadow grass (Poa annua) is believed to have arrived approximately 1700 with the first sealers, and is now widespread across the island, particularly old sealing and whaling sites. Dandelions are believed to have been introduced alongside whaling operations, via the practice of including a handful of soil from the deceased whaler's home country. Bittercress was first spotted in 2002 and is thought to have arrived alongside building supplies at King Edward Cove. Introductions have since slowed in recent decades with the introduction of thorough biosecurity protocols. Non-native species management will require several years of regular, dedicated follow-up treatments to ensure that all germinating seed currently in the soil is controlled prior to maturity before success will be achieved. Birds South Georgia supports many sea birds, including albatross, a large colony of king penguins,
from the coast. To the west lie the hills of the northwest region and to the east the Basque mountains that link them to the Pyrenees. The Sistema Ibérico extends from the Cordillera Cantábrica southeastward and, close to the Mediterranean, spreads out from the Río Ebro to the Río Júcar. The barren, rugged slopes of this mountain range cover an area of close to 21,000 square kilometers. The mountains exceed 2,000 m in their northern region and reach a maximum height of over 2,300 m east of the headwaters of the Rio Duero. The extremely steep mountain slopes in this range are often cut by deep, narrow gorges. Lowland regions The major lowland regions are the Andalusian Plain in the southwest, the Ebro Basin in the northeast, and the coastal plains. The Andalusian Plain is essentially a wide river valley through which the Río Guadalquivir flows. The river broadens out along its course, reaching its widest point at the Golfo de Cadiz. The Andalusian Plain is bounded on the north by the Sierra Morena and on the south by the Sistema Penibético; it narrows to an apex in the east where these two mountain chains meet. The Ebro Basin is formed by the Río Ebro valley, contained by mountains on three sides—the Sistema Ibérico to the south and west, the Pyrenees to the north and east, and their coastal extensions paralleling the shore to the east. Minor low-lying river valleys close to the Portuguese border are located on the Tagus and the Río Guadiana. The Coastal Plains regions are narrow strips between the coastal mountains and the seas. They are broadest along the Golfo de Cádiz, where the coastal plain adjoins the Andalusian Plain, and along the southern and central eastern coasts. The narrowest coastal plain runs along the Bay of Biscay, where the Cordillera Cantábrica ends close to shore. The islands The remaining regions of Spain are the Balearic and the Canary Islands, the former located in the Mediterranean Sea and the latter in the Atlantic Ocean. The Balearic Islands, encompassing a total area of 5,000 square kilometers, lie 80 kilometers off Spain's central eastern coast. The mountains that rise up above the Mediterranean Sea to form these islands are an extension of the Sistema Penibetico. The archipelago's highest points, which reach 1,400 meters, are in northwestern Mallorca, close to the coast. The central portion of Mallorca is a plain, bounded on the east and the southeast by broken hills. The Canary Islands, ninety kilometers off the west coast of Africa, are of volcanic origin. The large central islands, Tenerife and Gran Canaria, have the highest peaks. Pico de Las Nieves, on Gran Canaria, rises to 1,949 meters, and the Teide, on Tenerife, to 3,718 meters. Teide, a dormant volcano, is the highest peak of Spain and the third largest volcano in the world from its base. Drainage, floods, and water stress Of the roughly 1,800 rivers and streams in Spain, only the Tagus is more than 960 kilometers long; all but 90 extend less than 96 kilometers. These shorter rivers carry small volumes of water on an irregular basis, and they have seasonally dry river beds; however, when they do flow, they often are swift and torrential. Most major rivers rise in the mountains rimming or dissecting the Meseta Central and flow westward across the plateau through Portugal to empty into the Atlantic Ocean. One significant exception is the Ebro, which flows eastward to the Mediterranean. Rivers in the extreme northwest and in the narrow northern coastal plain drain directly into the Atlantic Ocean. The northwestern coastline is also truncated by rias, waterbodies similar to fjords. The major rivers flowing westward throughout the Meseta Central include the Duero, the Tagus, the Guadiana, and the Guadalquivir. The Rio Guadalquivir is one of the most significant rivers in Spain because it irrigates a fertile valley, thus creating a rich agricultural area, and because it is navigable inland, making Seville the only inland river port for ocean-going traffic in Spain. The major river in the northwest region is the Miño. El Atazar Dam is a major dam built near Madrid to provide a water supply. Floods and erosion Certain Spanish regions can be considered vulnerable to both flooding and erosion. 15 October 1879, in Murcia, Santa Teresa flood. 13–15 October 1957, in Valencia, torrential rain results in a devastating flood, at least 81 people lost their lives. In 1982, the river Jucar (Valencia, Spain) broke the Tous Reservoir causing a flood that killed 30 people. Water stress Water stress or water lack, poses the greatest threat in Spain. Water scarcity is a significant issue in many regions throughout Spain and climate change may aggravate the problem, with longer periods of dry weather. Supply problems regularly occur in the Jucar basin during summer. In the Segura basin, water scarcity has resulted in an increase of the water prices by 30% for households. Overall, the regions in the south-east of Spain are particularly vulnerable to water shortages. Furthermore, large areas of the Mediterranean are affected by saltwater intrusion. Climate Peninsular Spain experiences three principal climatic types: semi-arid, maritime, and Mediterranean. The locally generated semi-arid climate covers the majority of peninsular Spain, influencing the Meseta Central, the adjoining mountains to the east and the south, and the Ebro Basin. This climate is characterized by wide diurnal and seasonal variations in temperature and by low, irregular rainfall with high rates of evaporation that leave the land arid. Annual rainfall generally is ; most of the Meseta region receives about . The northern Meseta, the Sistema Central, and the Ebro Basin have two rainy seasons, one in spring (April–June) and the other in autumn (October–November), with late spring being the wettest time of the year. In the southern Meseta, also, the wet seasons are spring and autumn, but the spring one is earlier (March), and autumn is the wetter season. Even during the wet seasons, rain is irregular and unreliable. Winters in these regions are cold, with strong winds and high humidity, despite the low precipitation. Except for mountain areas, the northern foothills of the Sistema Iberico are the coldest area, and frost is common. Summers are hot and cloudless, producing average daytime temperatures that reach the mid- or upper 30s °C (low 90s to low 100s °F) in the northern Meseta and the upper 30s °C (upper 90s to low 100s °F) in the southern Meseta; nighttime temperatures, however, drop to the upper teens °C (low to mid 60s °F). The Ebro Basin, at a lower altitude, is extremely hot during the summer, and temperatures can exceed . Summer humidities are low in the Meseta Central and in the Ebro Basin, except right along the shores of in the Rio Ebro, where humidity is high. A maritime climate prevails in the northern part of the country, from the Pyrenees to the northwest region, characterized by relatively mild winters, warm but not hot summers, and generally abundant rainfall spread out over the year. Temperatures vary only slightly, both on	the most prominent of which is the Andalusian Plain in the southwest. The country can be divided into ten natural regions or subregions: the dominant Meseta Central, the Cantabrian Mountains (Cordillera Cantabrica) and the northwest region, the Ibérico region, the Pyrenees, the Penibético region in the southeast, the Andalusian Plain, the Ebro Basin, the coastal plains, the Balearic Islands, and the Canary Islands. These are commonly grouped into four types: the Meseta Central and associated mountains, other mountainous regions, lowland regions, and islands. The Inner Plateau and associated mountains The Meseta Central ("Inner Plateau") is a vast plateau in the heart of peninsular Spain, which has elevations that range from 610 to 760 m. Rimmed by mountains, the Meseta Central slopes gently to the west and to the series of rivers that form some of the border with Portugal. The Sistema Central, described as the "dorsal spine" of the Meseta Central, divides the Meseta into northern and southern subregions, the former higher in elevation and smaller in area than the latter. The Sistema Central rims the capital city of Madrid with peaks that rise to over 2,400 m within the Madrid region. South-west of Madrid, the Sistema Central shows its highest peak, Pico Almanzor, of almost 2,600 m. The mountains of the Sistema Central, which continue westward into Portugal, display some glacial features; the highest of the peaks are snow-capped for most of the year. Despite their height, however, the mountain system does not create a major barrier between the northern and the southern portions of the Meseta Central because several passes permit road and railroad transportation to the northwest and the northeast. The southern portion of the Meseta () is further divided by twin mountain ranges, the Montes de Toledo running to the east with the Sierra de Guadalupe, to the west. Their peaks do not rise much higher than 1,500 m. With many easy passes, including those that connect the Meseta with the Andalusian Plain, the Montes de Toledo and the Sierra de Guadalupe do not present an obstacle to transportation and communication. The two mountain ranges are separated from the Sistema Central by the Tagus River. The mountain regions that rim the Meseta Central and are associated with it are the Sierra Morena, the Cordillera Cantábrica, and the Sistema Ibérico. Forming the southern edge of the Meseta Central, the Sierra Morena merges in the east with the southern extension of the Sistema Iberico and reaches westward along the northern edge of the Rio Guadalquivir valley to join the mountains in southern Portugal. The massif of the Sierra Morena extends northward to the Río Guadiana, which separates it from the Sistema Central. Despite their relatively low elevations, seldom surpassing 1,300 m, the mountains of the Sierra Morena are rugged at their southern edge. The Cordillera Cantábrica, a limestone formation, runs parallel to, and close to, the northern coast near the Bay of Biscay. Its highest points are the Picos de Europa, surpassing 2,500 m. The Cordillera Cantábrica extends 182 km and abruptly drops 1,500 m some 30 km from the coast. To the west lie the hills of the northwest region and to the east the Basque mountains that link them to the Pyrenees. The Sistema Ibérico extends from the Cordillera Cantábrica southeastward and, close to the Mediterranean, spreads out from the Río Ebro to the Río Júcar. The barren, rugged slopes of this mountain range cover an area of close to 21,000 square kilometers. The mountains exceed 2,000 m in their northern region and reach a maximum height of over 2,300 m east of the headwaters of the Rio Duero. The extremely steep mountain slopes in this range are often cut by deep, narrow gorges. Lowland regions The major lowland regions are the Andalusian Plain in the southwest, the Ebro Basin in the northeast, and the coastal plains. The Andalusian Plain is essentially a wide river valley through which the Río Guadalquivir flows. The river broadens out along its course, reaching its widest point at the Golfo de Cadiz. The Andalusian Plain is bounded on the north by the Sierra Morena and on the south by the Sistema Penibético; it narrows to an apex in the east where these two mountain chains meet. The Ebro Basin is formed by the Río Ebro valley, contained by mountains on three sides—the Sistema Ibérico to the south and west, the Pyrenees to the north and east, and their coastal extensions paralleling the shore to the east. Minor low-lying river valleys close to the Portuguese border are located on the Tagus and the Río Guadiana. The Coastal Plains regions are narrow strips between the coastal mountains and the seas. They are broadest along the Golfo de Cádiz, where the coastal plain adjoins the Andalusian Plain, and along the southern and central eastern coasts. The narrowest coastal plain runs along the Bay of Biscay, where the Cordillera Cantábrica ends close to shore. The islands The remaining regions of Spain are the Balearic and the Canary Islands, the former located in the Mediterranean Sea and the latter in the Atlantic Ocean. The Balearic Islands, encompassing a total area of 5,000 square kilometers, lie 80 kilometers off Spain's central eastern coast. The mountains that rise up above the Mediterranean Sea to form these islands are an extension of the Sistema Penibetico. The archipelago's highest points, which reach 1,400 meters, are in northwestern Mallorca, close to the coast. The central portion of Mallorca is a plain, bounded on the east and the southeast by broken hills. The Canary Islands, ninety kilometers off the west coast of Africa, are of volcanic origin. The large central islands, Tenerife and Gran Canaria, have the highest peaks. Pico de Las Nieves, on Gran Canaria, rises to 1,949 meters, and the Teide, on Tenerife, to 3,718 meters. Teide, a dormant volcano, is the highest peak of Spain and the third largest volcano in the world from its base. Drainage, floods, and water stress Of the roughly 1,800 rivers and streams in Spain, only the Tagus is more than 960 kilometers long; all but 90 extend less than 96 kilometers. These shorter rivers carry small volumes of water on an irregular basis, and they have seasonally dry river beds; however, when they do flow, they often are swift and torrential. Most major rivers rise in the mountains rimming or dissecting the Meseta Central and flow westward across the plateau through Portugal to empty into the Atlantic Ocean. One significant exception is the Ebro, which flows eastward to the Mediterranean. Rivers in the extreme northwest and in the narrow northern coastal plain drain directly into the Atlantic Ocean. The northwestern coastline is also truncated by rias, waterbodies similar to fjords. The major rivers flowing westward throughout the Meseta Central include the Duero, the Tagus, the Guadiana, and the Guadalquivir. The Rio Guadalquivir is one of the most significant rivers in Spain because it irrigates a fertile valley, thus creating a rich agricultural area, and because it is navigable inland, making Seville the only inland river port for ocean-going traffic in Spain. The major river in the northwest region is the Miño. El Atazar Dam is a major dam built near Madrid to provide a water supply. Floods and erosion Certain Spanish regions can be considered vulnerable to both flooding and erosion. 15 October 1879, in Murcia, Santa Teresa flood. 13–15 October 1957, in Valencia, torrential rain results in a devastating flood, at least 81 people lost their lives. In 1982, the river Jucar (Valencia, Spain) broke the Tous Reservoir causing a flood that killed 30 people. Water stress Water stress or water lack, poses the greatest threat in Spain. Water scarcity is a significant issue in many regions throughout Spain and climate change may aggravate the problem, with longer periods of dry weather. Supply problems regularly occur in the Jucar basin during
four children. 1945. Establishment of tax deductions for parents. 1952. End of rationing policies. 1975. End of the dictatorship, mass return of emigrated people. 1977. Legalization of contraception. Decline of birth rates. 1985. Legalization of abortion. 1988. After centuries of outwards emigration, the first events of illegal immigration from Africa occur. 1991. Spain becomes a net receiver of immigrants, after decades of mass emigration. 1994. Lowering of threshold of requirements to become a large family, only three children needed. 2007. Approval of €2,500 benefit for births. 2010. Legalization of abortion on demand. 2011. Withdrawal of the €2,500 benefit for births. 2015. First negative natural change since the Civil War due to the aging of Spanish population. Life expectancy from 1882 to 2015 Sources: Our World In Data and the United Nations. 1882-1950 1950-2015 Source: UN World Population Prospects Total Fertility Rate from 1850 to 1899 The total fertility rate is the number of children born per woman. It is based on fairly good data for the entire period. Sources: Our World In Data and Gapminder Foundation. Statistics since 1900 † = as of 1 January 2019 and 2020. In 2020 262,982 (77.5%) babies were born to mothers with Spanish nationality (including naturalized immigrants), 25,861 (7.6%) to mothers with an African nationality (including North Africa), 23,395 (6.9%) to mothers with an American nationality (both North and South America), 20,089 (5.9%) to mothers with a European nationality (both EU and non-EU countries of Europe), and 6,751 (2.0%) to mothers with an Asian nationality. Current vital statistics Other demographic statistics The following demographic statistics are from the World Population Review in 2019. One birth every minute One death every minute Net gain of one person every 131 minutes One net migrant every 13 minutes The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated. Population 46.723 million (Jan 2018 est.) Age structure 0-14 years: 15.02% (male 3,861,522/female 3,650,085) 15-24 years: 9.9% (male 2,557,504/female 2,392,498) 25-54 years: 43.61% (male 11,134,006/female 10,675,873) 55-64 years: 12.99% (male 3,177,080/female 3,319,823) 65 years and over: 18.49% (male 3,970,417/female 5,276,984) (2020 est.) 0-14 years: 15.3% (male 3,872,763/female 3,656,549) 15-24 years: 9.5% (male 2,424,352/female 2,267,429) 25-54 years: 44.9% (male 11,214,102/female 10,775,039) 54-64 years: 12.1% (male 2,899,088/female 3,044,111) 65 years and over: 17.9% (male 3,763,989/female 5,040,737) (2017 est.) 0-14 years: 14.4% (male 3,423,861/female 3,232,028) 15-64 years: 69.1% (male 16,185,575/female 15,683,433) 65 years and over: 16.5% (male 3,238,301/female 4,394,624) (2008 est.) Median age total: 43.9 years. Country comparison to the world: 21st male: 42.7 years female: 45.1 years (2020 est.) total: 42.7 years male: 41.5 years female: 43.9 years (2017 est.) Birth rate 8.05 births/1,000 population (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 212th 9.2 births/1,000 population (2017 est.) Death rate 9.78 deaths/1,000 population (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 55th Total fertility rate 1.51 children born/woman (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 207th Net migration rate 1.39 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 11th 7.8 current migrant(s)/1,000 population (2017 est.) Population growth rate -0.03% (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 143th 0.78% (2017 est.) Mother's mean age at first birth 30.9 years (2017 est.) Life expectancy at birth total population: 82.21 years. Country comparison to the world: 29nd male: 79.22 years female: 85.39 years (2021 est.) Infant mortality rate 3.14 deaths/1,000 live births (2021 est.). Country comparison to the world: 216th Sex ratio at birth: 1.07 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.06 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.02 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.75 male(s)/female total population: 0.98 male(s)/female (2020 est.) Literacy definition: age 15 and over can read and write (2018 est.) total population: 98.4% male: 98.9% female: 98.0% School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education) total: 18 years male: 17 years female: 18 years (2018) Unemployment, youth ages 15–24 total: 34.3%. Country comparison to the world: 24th male: 35.2% female: 33.3% (2018 est.) Nationality See also : Nationalities and regions of Spainnoun:Spaniard(s)adjective:Spanish Metropolitan areas The largest metropolitan areas in 2007 were: Madrid 6,489,162 Barcelona 5,375,774 Valencia 1,705,742 Seville 1,519,639 Bilbao 950,155 Málaga 897,563 Asturias (Gijón–Oviedo–Avilés) 857,079 Alicante–Elche 748,565 Zaragoza 731,803 Vigo - Pontevedra 662,412 Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 616,903 Bahía de Cádiz (Cádiz–Jerez de la Frontera) 615,494 Santa Cruz de Tenerife 573,825 Murcia 563,272 Palma de Mallorca 474,035 Granada 472,638 San Sebastián 402,168 Tarragona 406,042 A Coruña 403,007 Valladolid 400,400 Santander–Torrelavega 391,480 Córdoba 323,600 Pamplona 309,631 Islands Islander population: Tenerife 886,033 Majorca 846,210 Gran Canaria 829,597 Lanzarote 132,366 Ibiza 113,908 Fuerteventura 94,386 Menorca 86,697 La Palma 85,933 La Gomera 22,259 El Hierro 10,558 Formentera 7,957 Arousa 4,889 La Graciosa 658 Tabarca 105 Ons 61 Ethnic groups Definition of ethnicity or nationality in Spain is fraught politically. The term "Spanish people" (pueblo español) is defined in the 1978 constitution as the political sovereign, i.e. the citizens of the Kingdom of Spain. The same constitution in its preamble speaks of "peoples and nationalities of Spain" (pueblos y nacionalidades de España) and their respective cultures, traditions, languages and institutions. The formerly nomadic Gitanos and Mercheros are distinctly marked by endogamy and discrimination but they are dispersed through the country. The native Canarians are partly the descendants of the North African population of the Canary Islands prior to Spanish colonization in the 15th century although many Spaniards have varying levels of North African admixture as a result of the Islamic period. Also included are many Spaniard citizens who are descendants of people from Spain's former colonies, mostly from Equatorial Guinea, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, Morocco and the Philippines. There is also a sizable number of Spaniards of Eastern European, Maghrebian, Sub Saharan-African, South Asian and Middle Eastern descent. As of 2019, native-born Spanish citizens of all ethnic groups make up 84.6% of the total population, and 15.4% are immigrants, both naturalized and foreign. Among the immigrants, around 45% of them come from Spain's former territories in America (primarily Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia). The rest are predominantly North African, Eastern European and Western European. Foreign population As of 2018, the region had a foreign population of 4,734,691. The largest groups of foreigners were those of Moroccan, Romanian, British, Chinese and Italian citizenship. Meanwhile, Spain had a foreign-born population of 6,742,948, being those born in the	19th century and early 20th century: Relative economic stagnation and mass emigration to American countries. 1918. Flu pandemic, over 200,000 dead in Spain. 1936. Start of the Spanish Civil War. 1939. End of the Civil War. Establishment of a Fascist dictatorship, Start of rationing policies. Deepening of economic depression, mass emigration to European and American countries due to economic and political motives (Republican exile). 1941. Approval of benefits for large families, with at least four children. 1945. Establishment of tax deductions for parents. 1952. End of rationing policies. 1975. End of the dictatorship, mass return of emigrated people. 1977. Legalization of contraception. Decline of birth rates. 1985. Legalization of abortion. 1988. After centuries of outwards emigration, the first events of illegal immigration from Africa occur. 1991. Spain becomes a net receiver of immigrants, after decades of mass emigration. 1994. Lowering of threshold of requirements to become a large family, only three children needed. 2007. Approval of €2,500 benefit for births. 2010. Legalization of abortion on demand. 2011. Withdrawal of the €2,500 benefit for births. 2015. First negative natural change since the Civil War due to the aging of Spanish population. Life expectancy from 1882 to 2015 Sources: Our World In Data and the United Nations. 1882-1950 1950-2015 Source: UN World Population Prospects Total Fertility Rate from 1850 to 1899 The total fertility rate is the number of children born per woman. It is based on fairly good data for the entire period. Sources: Our World In Data and Gapminder Foundation. Statistics since 1900 † = as of 1 January 2019 and 2020. In 2020 262,982 (77.5%) babies were born to mothers with Spanish nationality (including naturalized immigrants), 25,861 (7.6%) to mothers with an African nationality (including North Africa), 23,395 (6.9%) to mothers with an American nationality (both North and South America), 20,089 (5.9%) to mothers with a European nationality (both EU and non-EU countries of Europe), and 6,751 (2.0%) to mothers with an Asian nationality. Current vital statistics Other demographic statistics The following demographic statistics are from the World Population Review in 2019. One birth every minute One death every minute Net gain of one person every 131 minutes One net migrant every 13 minutes The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated. Population 46.723 million (Jan 2018 est.) Age structure 0-14 years: 15.02% (male 3,861,522/female 3,650,085) 15-24 years: 9.9% (male 2,557,504/female 2,392,498) 25-54 years: 43.61% (male 11,134,006/female 10,675,873) 55-64 years: 12.99% (male 3,177,080/female 3,319,823) 65 years and over: 18.49% (male 3,970,417/female 5,276,984) (2020 est.) 0-14 years: 15.3% (male 3,872,763/female 3,656,549) 15-24 years: 9.5% (male 2,424,352/female 2,267,429) 25-54 years: 44.9% (male 11,214,102/female 10,775,039) 54-64 years: 12.1% (male 2,899,088/female 3,044,111) 65 years and over: 17.9% (male 3,763,989/female 5,040,737) (2017 est.) 0-14 years: 14.4% (male 3,423,861/female 3,232,028) 15-64 years: 69.1% (male 16,185,575/female 15,683,433) 65 years and over: 16.5% (male 3,238,301/female 4,394,624) (2008 est.) Median age total: 43.9 years. Country comparison to the world: 21st male: 42.7 years female: 45.1 years (2020 est.) total: 42.7 years male: 41.5 years female: 43.9 years (2017 est.) Birth rate 8.05 births/1,000 population (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 212th 9.2 births/1,000 population (2017 est.) Death rate 9.78 deaths/1,000 population (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 55th Total fertility rate 1.51 children born/woman (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 207th Net migration rate 1.39 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 11th 7.8 current migrant(s)/1,000 population (2017 est.) Population growth rate -0.03% (2021 est.) Country comparison to the world: 143th 0.78% (2017 est.) Mother's mean age at first birth 30.9 years (2017 est.) Life expectancy at birth total population: 82.21 years. Country comparison to the world: 29nd male: 79.22 years female: 85.39 years (2021 est.) Infant mortality rate 3.14 deaths/1,000 live births (2021 est.). Country comparison to the world: 216th Sex ratio at birth: 1.07 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.06 male(s)/female 15-64 years: 1.02 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.75 male(s)/female total population: 0.98 male(s)/female (2020 est.) Literacy definition: age 15 and over can read and write (2018 est.) total population: 98.4% male: 98.9% female: 98.0% School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education) total: 18 years male: 17 years female: 18 years (2018) Unemployment, youth ages 15–24 total: 34.3%. Country comparison to the world: 24th male: 35.2% female: 33.3% (2018 est.) Nationality See also : Nationalities and regions of Spainnoun:Spaniard(s)adjective:Spanish Metropolitan areas The largest metropolitan areas in 2007 were: Madrid 6,489,162 Barcelona 5,375,774 Valencia 1,705,742 Seville 1,519,639 Bilbao 950,155 Málaga 897,563 Asturias (Gijón–Oviedo–Avilés) 857,079 Alicante–Elche 748,565 Zaragoza
and the legislature, though constituting two separate institutions, are collectively identified with a specific name. A specific denomination may not refer to the same branch of government in all communities; for example, "Junta" may refer to the executive office in some communities, to the legislature in others, or to the collective name of all branches of government in others. The two autonomous cities have more limited competences. The executive is exercised by a president, which is also the major of the city. In the same way, limited legislative power is vested in a local Assembly in which the deputies are also the city councilors. Local government The constitution also guarantees certain degree of autonomy to two other "local" entities: the provinces of Spain (subdivisions of the autonomous communities) and the municipalities (subdivisions of the provinces). If the communities are integrated by a single province, then the institutions of government of the community replace those of the province. For the rest of the communities, provincial government is held by Provincial Deputations or Councils. With the creation of the autonomous communities, deputations have lost much of their power, and have a very limited scope of actions, with the exception of the Basque Country, where provinces are known as "historical territories" and their bodies of government retain more faculties. Except in the Basque Country, members of the Provincial Deputations are indirectly elected by citizens according to the results of the municipals elections and all of their members must be councilors of a town or a city in the province. In the Basque Country direct elections do take place. Spanish municipal administration is highly homogenous; most of the municipalities have the same faculties, such as managing the municipal police, traffic enforcement, urban planning and development, social services, collecting municipal taxes, and ensuring civil defense. In most municipalities, citizens elect the municipal council, which is responsible for electing the mayor, who then appoints a board of governors or councilors from his party or coalition. The only exceptions are municipalities with under 50 inhabitants, which act as an open council, with a directly elected major and an assembly of neighbors. Municipal elections are held every four years on the same date for all municipalities in Spain. Councilors are allotted using the D'Hondt method for proportional representation with the exception of municipalities with under 100 inhabitants where block voting is used instead. The number of councilors is determined by the population of the municipality; the smallest municipalities having 5, and the largest – Madrid – having 57. Political parties Spain is a multi-party constitutional parliamentary democracy. According to the constitution, political parties are the expression of political pluralism, contributing to the formation and expression of the will of the people, and are an essential instrument of political participation. Their internal structure and functioning must be democratic. The Law of Political Parties of 1978 provides them with public funding whose quantity is based on the number of seats held in the Cortes Generales and the number of votes received. Since the mid-1980s two parties dominate the national political landscape in Spain: the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party () and the People's Party (). The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) is a social democratic centre-left political party. It was founded in 1879 by Pablo Iglesias, at the beginning as a Marxist party for the workers' class, which later evolved towards social-democracy. Outlawed during Franco's dictatorship, it gained recognition during the Spanish transition to democracy period, when it officially renounced Marxism, under the leadership of Felipe González. It played a key role during the transition and the Constituent Assembly that wrote the Spanish current constitution. It governed Spain from 1982 to 1996 under the prime ministership of Felipe González. It governed again from 2004 to 2011 under the prime ministership of José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. The People's Party (PP) is a conservative centre-right party that took its current name in 1989, replacing the previous People's Alliance, a more conservative party founded in 1976 by seven former Franco's ministers. In its refoundation it incorporated the Liberal Party and the majority of the Christian democrats. In 2005 it integrated the Democratic and Social Center Party. It governed Spain under the prime ministership of José María Aznar from 1996 to 2004, and again from December 2011, and after much uncertainty caused by the inconclusive results of the 2015 general election and the 2016 election when the People's Party formed a minority government with confidence and supply support from liberal Ciudadanos (Cs) and the Canarian Coalition (CC), which passed due to the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) abstaining. A motion of no confidence in the Spanish government of Mariano Rajoy was held between 31 May and 1 June 2018, registered by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) after the People's Party(PP) was found to have profited from the illegal kickbacks-for-contracts scheme of the Gürtel case. The motion was successful and resulted in the PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez becoming the new Prime Minister of Spain until his 2019 state budget was rejected requiring him to call a snap election for 28 April of the same year. The parties or coalitions represented in the Cortes Generales after the 10 November 2019 election are: Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, or PSOE) People's Party (Partido Popular, or PP) Vox Unidas Podemos (United We Can) Citizens (Ciudadanos or C's) Republican Left of Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya or ERC) More Country (Más País) Together for Catalonia (Junts per Catalunya, or Junts) Basque Nationalist Party (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Parti National Basque, or PNV) Popular Unity Candidacy-For Rupture (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular, or CUP) Canarian Coalition (Coalición Canaria or CC-PNC) Galician Nationalist Bloc (, BNG) Basque Country Unite (Euskal Herria Bildu or EHB). Sum Navarre (Navarra Suma) Regionalist Party of Cantabria (Partido Regionalista de Cantabria, or PRC) Teruel Exists (Teruel Existe) Other parties represented in Congress from 2011 to 2016 were: Convergence and Union (, CiU), a coalition of two Catalan nationalist parties; after its dissolution Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (, CDC) renamed as Democracy and Freedom (Democràcia i Llibertat or DiL). Socialists' Party of Catalonia (, PSC), now integrated in the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) Plural Left (Spanish: Izquierda Plural, IP); a coalition of several left-wing parties, among which the largest party is the United Left (Spanish: Izquierda Unida, IU) Amaiur, a coalition of Basque nationalist parties Union, Progress and Democracy (, UPyD) Commitment Coalition (), a coalition of Valencian parties, now in a coalition with Más País. Citizen's Forum, Democracy and Freedom (Democràcia i Llibertat or DiL) Yes to the Future (). In addition, the Aragonese Party, United Extremadura, and the Union of Navarrese People participated in the 2011 elections forming regional coalitions with the People's Party. Electoral process Suffrage is free and secret to all Spanish citizens of age 18 and older to all elections, and to residents who are citizens of all European Union countries only in local municipal elections and elections to the European Parliament. Congress of Deputies Elections to the Cortes Generales are held every four years or before if the prime minister calls for an early election. Members of the Congress of Deputies are elected through proportional representation with closed party lists where provinces serve as electoral districts; that is, a list of deputies is selected from a province-wide list. Under the current system, sparsely populated provinces are overrepresented because more seats of representatives are allocated to the sparsely populated provinces than they would have if number of seats are allocated strictly according to the population proportion. Not only provinces with small population are over-represented in Spain's election system, the system also tends to favors major political parties. Despite the use of proportional representation voting system, which in general encourages the development of a larger number of small political parties rather than a few larger ones, Spain has effectively a two-party system in which smaller and regional parties tend to be underrepresented. This is owing to various reasons: Due to the great disparity in population among provinces, even though smaller provinces are overrepresented, the total number of deputies assigned to them is still small and tends to go to one or two major parties, even if other smaller parties managed to obtain more than 3% of the votes – the minimum threshold for representation in the Congress. The average district magnitude (the average number of seats per constituency) is one of the lowest in Europe, owing to the large number of constituencies. The low district magnitude tends to increase the number of wasted votes (the votes that could not affect the election results because they have been cast for the small parties which could not pass the effective threshold), and in turn increase the disproportionality (so the number of seats and the portion of votes got by a party becomes less proportional). It is often regarded as the most important factor that limits the number of parties in Spain. This point is advanced when Baldini and Pappalardo compare it with the case of Netherlands, where the parliament is elected using proportional representation in a single national constituency. There, the parliament is much more fragmented and the number of parties is much higher than in Spain. The D'Hondt method (a type of highest average method) is used to allocate the seats, which slightly favors the major parties when compared to Sainte-Laguë method (another type of highest average method) or the normal kinds of largest remainder methods. It is suggested that the use of D'Hondt method also contribute to a certain degree, though not as large as the low number of seats per constituency, to the bipolarization of the party system. The 3% threshold for entering the Congress is ineffective in many provinces, where the number of seats per constituency is so low that the actual threshold to enter the Congress is effectively higher, and thus many parties cannot obtain representation in Congress despite having obtained more than the 3% threshold in the constituency. For example, the actual threshold for the constituencies having 3 seats is 25%, much higher than 3%, making the 3% threshold irrelevant. However, in the largest constituencies like Madrid and Barcelona, where the number of seats is much higher, the 3% threshold is still effective to eliminate the smallest parties. The size of the Congress (350 members) is relatively small. It is suggested by Lijphart that the small size of parliament may encourage disproportionality and so favor the large parties. Senate In the Senate, each province, with the exception of the islands, select four senators using block voting: voters cast ballots for three candidates, and the four senators with the greatest number of votes are selected. The number of senators selected for the islands varies, depending on their size, from 3 to 1 senators. A similar procedure of block voting is used to select the three senators from the three major islands whereas the senators of the smaller islands or group of islands, are elected by plurality. In addition, the legislative assembly of each autonomous community designates one senator, and another for each additional one million inhabitants. Electoral participation Electoral participation, which is not compulsory, has traditionally been high, peaking just after democracy was restored in the late 1970s, falling during the 1980s, but trending upwards in the 1990s. Since then, voting abstention rate has been around one-fifth to nearly one-third of the electorate. Recent historical political developments The end of the Spanish Civil War put an end to the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939), after which a dictatorial regime was established, headed by general Francisco Franco. In 1947 he decreed, in one of the eight Fundamental Laws of his regime, the Law of Succession of the Head of State, that Spain was a monarchy with a vacant throne, that Franco was the head of State as general and caudillo of Spain, and that he would propose, when he deemed opportune, his successor, who would bear the title of King or Regent of Spain. Even though Juan of Bourbon, the legitimate heir of the monarchy, opposed the law, Franco met him in 1948, when they agreed that his son, Juan Carlos, then 10 years old, would finish his education in Spain – he was then living in Rome – according to the "principles" of the Francoist movement. In 1969, Franco finally designated Juan Carlos as his successor, with the title "Prince of Spain", bypassing his father Juan of Bourbon. Francisco Franco died on 20 November 1975, and Juan Carlos was crowned King of Spain by the Spanish Cortes, the non-elected Assembly that operated during Franco's regime. Even though Juan Carlos I had sworn allegiance to "National Movement", the sole legal party of the regime, he expressed his support for a transformation of the Spanish political system as soon as he took office. Such an endeavor was not meant to be easy or simple, as the opposition to the regime had to ensure that nobody in their ranks would turn into extremism, and the Army had to resist the temptation to intervene to restore the "Movement". In 1976 he designated Adolfo Suárez as prime minister – "president of the Government" – with the task of convincing the regime to dismantle itself and to call for elections to a Constituent Assembly. He accomplished both tasks, and the first democratically elected Constituent Cortes since the Second Spanish Republic met in 1977. In 1978 a new democratic constitution was promulgated and approved by referendum. The constitution declared Spain a constitutional parliamentary monarchy with H.M. King Juan Carlos I as Head of State. Spain's transformation from an authoritarian regime to a successful modern democracy was a remarkable achievement, even creating a model emulated by other countries undergoing similar transitions. Adolfo Suárez headed the prime ministership of Spain from 1977 to 1982, as the leader of the Union of the Democratic Center party. He resigned on 29 January 1981, but on 23 February 1981, day when the Congress of Deputies was to designate a new prime minister, rebel elements among the Civil Guard seized the Cortes Generales in an a failed coup that ended the day after. The great majority of the military forces remained loyal to the King, who used his personal and constitutional authority as commander-in-chief of the Spanish Armed forces, to diffuse the uprising and save the constitution, by addressing the country on television. In October 1982, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, led by Felipe González, swept both the Congress of Deputies and Senate, winning an absolute majority in both chambers of the Cortes Generales. González headed the prime ministership of Spain for the next 13 years, during which period Spain joined NATO and the European Community. The government also created new social laws and large scale infrastructural buildings, expanding the educational system and establishing a welfare state. While traditionally affiliated with one of Spain's major trade unions, the General Union of Workers (UGT), in an effort to improve Spain's competitiveness in preparation for admission to the EC as well as for further economic integration with Europe afterwards, the PSOE distanced itself from trade unions. Following a policy of liberalization, González's government closed state corporations under the state holding company, the National Industry Institute (INI), and downsized the coal, iron and steel industries. The PSOE implemented the single-market policies of the Single European Act and the domestic policies consistent with the Maastricht Treaty EMU criteria. The country was massively modernized and economically developed in this period, closing the gap with other European Community members. There was also a significant cultural shift, into a tolerant contemporary open society. In March 1996, José María Aznar, from the People's Party, obtained a relative majority in Congress. Aznar moved to further liberalize the economy, with a program of complete privatization of state-owned enterprises, labor market reform and other policies designed to increase competition in selected markets. Aznar liberalized the energy sector, national telecommunications and television broadcasting networks. To ensure a successful outcome of such liberalization, the government set up the Competition Defense Court (), an anti-trust regulator body entrusted with restricting monopolistic practices. During Aznar's government Spain qualified for the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union, and adopted the euro, replacing the peseta, in 2002. Spain participated, along with the United States and other NATO allies, in military operations in the former Yugoslavia. Spanish armed forces and police personnel were included in the international peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. Having obtained an absolute majority in the 2000 elections, Aznar, headed the prime ministership until 2004. Aznar supported transatlantic relations with the United States, and participated on the War on Terrorism and the invasion of Iraq. In 2004, he decided not to run as a candidate for the Popular Party, and proposed Mariano Rajoy, who had been minister under his government, as his successor as leader of the party. In the aftermath of the terrorist bomb attacks in Madrid, which occurred just three days before the elections, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party won a surprising victory. Its leader, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, headed the prime ministership	Deputies" presides a joint-session of the Cortes Generales. Each chamber of the Cortes Generales meets at separate precincts, and carry out their duties separately, except for specific important functions, in which case they meet in a joint session. Such functions include the elaboration of laws proposed by the executive ("the Government"), by one of the chambers, by an autonomous community, or through popular initiative; and the approval or amendment of the nation's budget proposed by the prime minister. The Congress of Deputies The Congress of Deputies must be integrated by a minimum of 300 and a maximum of 400 deputies (members of parliament) – currently 350 – elected by universal, free, equal, direct and secret suffrage, to four-year terms or until the dissolution of the Cortes Generales. The voting system used is that of proportional representation with closed party lists following D'Hondt method in which the province forms a constituency or electoral circumscription and must be assigned a minimum of 2 deputies; the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, are each assigned one deputy. The Congress of Deputies can initiate legislation, and they also have the power to ratify or reject the decree laws adopted by the executive. They also elect, via a vote of investiture, the prime minister (the "president of the Government"), before being formally sworn to office by the King. The Congress of Deputies may adopt a motion of censure whereby it can vote out the prime minister by absolute majority. On the other hand, the prime minister may request at any time a vote of confidence from the Congress of Deputies. If the prime minister fails to obtain it, then the Cortes Generales are dissolved, and new elections are called. Senate The upper chamber is the Senate. It is nominally the chamber of territorial representation. Four senators are elected for each province, with the exception of the insular provinces, in which the number of senator varies: three senators are elected for each of the three major islands – Gran Canaria, Mallorca and Tenerife – and one senator for Ibiza-Formentera, Menorca, Fuerteventura, La Gomera, El Hierro, Lanzarote and La Palma. The autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla each elect two senators. In addition, the legislative assembly of each autonomous community designates one senator, and another for each one million inhabitants. This designation must follow proportional representation. For the 2011 elections, this system allowed for 266 senators, 208 of which were elected and 58 of which were designated by the autonomous communities. Senators serve for four-year terms or until the dissolution of the Cortes Generales. Even though the constitution explicitly refers to the Senate as the chamber of territorial representation, as seen from the numbers before, only one-fifth of the senators actually represent the autonomous communities. Since the constitution allowed for the creation of autonomous communities, but the process itself was embryonic in nature – they were formed after the promulgation of the constitution, and the outcome was unpredictable – the constituent assembly chose the province as the basis for territorial representation. The Senate has less power than the Congress of Deputies: it can veto legislation, but its veto can be overturned by an absolute majority of the Congress of Deputies. Its only exclusive power concerns the autonomous communities, thus in a way performing a function in line with its nature of "territorial representation". By an overall majority, the Senate is the institution that authorizes the Government to adopt measures to enforce an autonomous community's compliance with its constitutional duties when it has failed to do so. For the first time ever, on Friday, 27 October 2017, the senate voted, by majority, to invoke article 155 of the constitution, which gave the central government the power to remove the government of the autonomous region of Cataluña for acting against the constitution of 1978 by having called an illegal referendum on 1 October. Executive The Government and the Council of Ministers At the national level, executive power in Spain is exercised only by "the Government". (The King is the head of state, but the constitution does not attribute to him any executive faculties). The Government is composed by a prime minister, known as the "president of the Government" (), one or more deputy prime ministers, known as "vice-presidents of the Government" () and all other ministers. The collegiate body composed by the prime minister, the deputy prime ministers, and all other ministers is called the Council of Ministers. The Government is in charge of both domestic and foreign policy, as well as defense and economic policies. As of 2 June 2018, the prime minister of Spain is Pedro Sánchez. The constitution establishes that after elections, the King, after consulting with all political groups represented in the Congress of Deputies, proposes a candidate to the "presidency of the Government" or prime ministership through the Speaker of Congress. The candidate then presents the political program of his or her government requesting the Congress's confidence. If the Congress grants him confidence by absolute majority, the King then nominates him formally as "president of the Government"; if he or she fails to obtain absolute majority, the Congress waits 48 hours to vote again, in which case, a simple majority suffices. If he or she fails again, then the King presents other candidates until one gains confidence. However, if after two months no candidate has obtained it, then the King dissolves the Cortes Generales and calls for new elections with the endorsement of the Speaker of Congress. In practice, the candidate has been the leader of the party that obtained the largest number of seats in the Congress. Since the constitution of 1978 came into effect, there have not been any coalition governments, even if the party with the largest number of seats has failed to obtained absolute majority, though in such cases the party in government has had to rely on the support of minority parties to gain confidence and to approve the State's budgets. After the candidate obtains the confidence of the Congress of Deputies, he is appointed by the King as prime minister in a ceremony of inauguration in which he is sworn at the Audience Hall of the Palace of Zarzuela – the residence of the King – and in presence of the Major Notary of the Kingdom. The candidate takes the oath of office over an open copy of the Constitution next to a Bible. The oath of office used is: "I swear/promise to faithfully carry out the duties of the position of president of the Government with loyalty to the King; to obey and enforce the Constitution as the fundamental law of the State, as well as to keep in secret the deliberations of the Council of Ministers". The prime ministers proposes the deputy prime ministers and the other ministers, which are then appointed by the King. The number and the scope of competences of each of the Ministries is established by the prime minister. Ministries are usually created to cover one or several similar sectors of government from an administrative function. Once formed, the Government meets as the "Council of Ministers", usually every Friday at the Palace of Moncloa in Madrid, the official residence of the prime minister who presides over the meetings, even though, on exceptions they can be held in any other Spanish city. Also, on exceptions, the meeting can be presided by the King of Spain, by request of the prime minister, in which case, the Council informs the King of the State's affairs. Currently, the government consists of these members: The Council of State The constitution also established the Council of State, a supreme advisory council to the Spanish government. Though the body has existed intermittently since medieval times, its current composition and the nature of its work are defined in the constitution and subsequent laws that have been published, the most recent in 2004. It is currently composed by a president, nominated by the Council of Ministers, several ex officio councillors – former prime ministers of Spain, directors or presidents of the Royal Spanish Academy, the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation, the Royal Academy of History, the Social and Economic Council, the Attorney General of the State, the Chief of Staff, the Governor of the Bank of Spain, the Director of the Juridical Service of the State, and the presidents of the General Commission of Codification and Law – several permanent councilors, appointed by decree, and no more than ten elected councilors in addition to the council's Secretary General. The Council of State serves only as an advisory body, that can give non-binding opinions upon request and to propose an alternative solution to the problem presented. Judiciary The Judiciary in Spain is integrated by judges and magistrates who administer justice in the King's name. The Judiciary is composed of different courts depending on the jurisdictional order and what is to be judged. The highest ranking court of the Spanish judiciary is the Supreme Court (), with jurisdiction in all Spain, superior in all matters except in constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court is headed by a president, nominated by the King, proposed by the General Council of the Judiciary. This institution is the governing body of the Judiciary, integrated by the president of the Supreme court, twenty members appointed by the King for a five-year term, among whom there are twelve judges and magistrates of all judicial categories, four members nominated by the Congress of Deputies, and four by the Senate, elected in both cases by three-fifths of their respective members. They are to be elected from among lawyers and jurists of acknowledged competence and with over 15 years of professional experience. The Constitutional Court () has jurisdiction over all Spain, competent to hear appeals against the alleged unconstitutionality of laws and regulations having the force of law, as well as individual appeals for protection (recursos de amparo) against violation of the rights and liberties granted by the constitution. It consists of 12 members, appointed by the King, 4 of which are proposed by the Congress of Deputies by three-fifths of its members, 4 of which are proposed by the Senate by three-fifths of its members as well, 2 proposed by the executive and 2 proposed by the General Council of the Judiciary. They are to be renowned magistrates and prosecutors, university professors, public officials or lawyers, all of them jurists with recognized competence or standing and more than 15 years of professional experience. Regional government The second article of the constitution declares the Spanish nation is the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, which is integrated by nationalities and regions to which the constitution recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government. Since the constitution of 1978 came into effect, these nationalities and regions progressively acceded to self-government and were constituted into 17 autonomous communities. In addition, two autonomous cities were constituted on the coast of North Africa. This administrative and political territorial division is known as the "State of Autonomies". Though highly decentralized, Spain is not a federation since the nation – as represented in the central institutions of government – retains full sovereignty. The State, that is, the central government, has progressively and asymmetrically devolved or transferred power and competences to the autonomous communities after the constitution of 1978 came into effect. Each autonomous community is governed by a set of institutions established in its own Statute of Autonomy. The Statute of Autonomy is the basic organic institutional law, approved by the legislature of the community itself as well as by the Cortes Generales, the Spanish Parliament. The Statutes of Autonomy establish the name of the community according to its historical identity; the delimitation of its territory; the name, organization and seat of the autonomous institutions of government; and the competences that they assume and the foundations for their devolution or transfer from the central government. All autonomous communities have a parliamentary form of government, with a clear separation of powers. Their legislatures represent the people of the community, exercising legislative power within the limits set forth in the constitution of Spain and the degree of devolution that the community has attained. Even though the central government has progressively transferred roughly the same amount of competences to all communities, devolution is still asymmetrical. More power was devolved to the so-called "historical nationalities" – the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. (Other communities chose afterwards to identify themselves as nationalities as well). The Basque Country, Catalonia and Navarre have their own police forces (Ertzaintza, Mossos d'Esquadra and the Chartered Police respectively) while the National Police Corps operates in the rest of the autonomous communities. On the other hand, two communities (the Basque Country and Navarre) are "communities of chartered regime", that is, they have full fiscal autonomy, whereas the rest are "communities of common regime", with limited fiscal powers (the majority of their taxes are administered centrally and redistributed among them all for fiscal equalization). The names of the executive government and the legislature vary between communities. Some institutions are restored historical bodies of government of the previous kingdoms or regional entities within the Spanish crown – like the Generalitat of Catalonia – while others are entirely new creations. In some, both the executive and the legislature, though constituting two separate institutions, are collectively identified with a specific name. A specific denomination may not refer to the same branch of government in all communities; for example, "Junta" may refer to the executive office in some communities, to the legislature in others, or to the collective name of all branches of government in others. The two autonomous cities have more limited competences. The executive is exercised by a president, which is also the major of the city. In the same way, limited legislative power is vested in a local Assembly in which the deputies are also the city councilors. Local government The constitution also guarantees certain degree of autonomy to two other "local" entities: the provinces of Spain (subdivisions of the autonomous communities) and the municipalities (subdivisions of the provinces). If the communities are integrated by a single province, then the institutions of government of the community replace those of the province. For the rest of the communities, provincial government is held by Provincial Deputations or Councils. With the creation of the autonomous communities, deputations have lost much of their power, and have a very limited scope of actions, with the exception of the Basque Country, where provinces are known as "historical territories" and their bodies of government retain more faculties. Except in the Basque Country, members of the Provincial Deputations are indirectly elected by citizens according to the results of the municipals elections and all of their members must be councilors of a town or a city in the province. In the Basque Country direct elections do take place. Spanish municipal administration is highly homogenous; most of the municipalities have the same faculties, such as managing the municipal police, traffic enforcement, urban planning and development, social services, collecting municipal taxes, and ensuring civil defense. In most municipalities, citizens elect the municipal council, which is responsible for electing the mayor, who then appoints a board of governors or councilors from his party or coalition. The only exceptions are municipalities with under 50 inhabitants, which act as an open council, with a directly elected major and an assembly of neighbors. Municipal elections are held every four years on the same date for all municipalities in Spain. Councilors are allotted using the D'Hondt method for proportional representation with the exception of municipalities with under 100 inhabitants where block voting is used instead. The number of councilors is determined by the population of
country managed to reverse the record trade deficit which had built up during the boom years. It attained a trade surplus in 2013, after three decades of running a trade deficit. The surplus kept strengthening during 2014 and 2015. In 2015, the Spanish GDP grew by 3.2%, a rate not seen since 2007, the last year before the world financial crisis struck. This growth rate was the highest among the larger EU economies that year. In just two years (2014–2015), the Spanish economy recovered 85% of the GDP lost during the 2009–2013 recession. This success led some international analysts to refer to Spain's current recovery as "the showcase for structural reform efforts". Strong GDP growth was registered also in 2016, with the country growing twice as fast as the eurozone average. In this regard, the Spanish economy was forecast to remain the best-performing major economy in the eurozone in 2017. Spain's unemployment rate fell substantially from 2013 to 2017. The real unemployment rate is much lower, as there is an estimation of millions of people working in the grey market, people who count as unemployed or inactive yet still perform jobs. Although estimates of the hidden economy vary, the real Spanish GDP may be around 20% bigger as it is estimated that the underground economy of Spain moves annually 190 billion Euros (US$224 billion). Among high income European countries, only Italy and Greece are estimated to have larger underground economies than Spain. Thus Spain may have higher purchasing power as well as a smaller gini coefficient than shown in official numbers. In 2012, the Spanish government officially requested a credit from the European Stability Mechanism to restructure its banking sector in the face of a financial crisis. The ESM approved up to €100 billion in assistance, although, in the end, Spain only drew €41.3 billion. The ESM programme for Spain ended with the full repayment of the credit drawn. eighteen months later. History When Spain joined the EEC in 1986 its GDP per capita was about 72% of the average of its members. At the second half of the 1990s, the conservative government of former prime minister Jose María Aznar had worked successfully to gain admission to the group of countries joining the euro in 1999. Due to its own economic development and the EU enlargements to 28 members, by 2007 Spain had achieved a GDP per capita of 105% of European Union's average, which placed it slightly ahead of Italy (103%). Three regions were included in the leading EU group exceeding 125% of the GDP per capita average level: the Basque Country , Madrid, and Navarre. According to calculations by the German newspaper Die Welt, Spain's economy had been on course to overtake countries like Germany in per capita income by 2011. Unemployment stood at 7.6% in October 2006, a rate that compared favorably to many other European countries, and especially with the early 1990s when it stood at over 20%. In the past, weak points of Spain's economy included high inflation and large underground economy. The turn to growth during the 1997-2007 period produced a real estate bubble fed by historically low interest rates, massive rates of foreign investment (during that period Spain had become a favorite of other European investment banks) and an immense surge in immigration. At its peak in 2007, construction had expanded to 15% of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of the country and 12% of total employment. During that time Spain capital inflows –including short term speculative investment– financed a large trade deficit. The downside of the real estate boom was a corresponding rise in the levels of private debt, both of households and of businesses; as prospective homeowners had struggled to meet asking prices, the average level of household debt tripled in less than a decade. This placed especially great pressure upon lower to middle income groups; by 2005 the median ratio of indebtedness to income had grown to 125%, due primarily to expensive boom time mortgages that now often exceed the value of the property. Noticeable progress continued until early 2008, when the global financial crisis burst Spain's property bubble. A European Commission forecast had predicted Spain would enter the world's late 2000s recession by the end of 2008. At the time, Spain's Economy Minister was quoted saying, "Spain is facing its deepest recession in half a century". Spain's government forecast the unemployment rate would rise to 16% in 2009. The ESADE business school predicted 20%. By 2017, Spain's GDP per capita had fallen back to 95% of the European Union's average. Economic and financial crisis Spain had continued on the path of economic growth when the ruling party changed in 2004, maintaining robust GDP growth during the first term of prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, even though some problems in the Spanish economy were becoming evident. According to the Financial Times, Spain's rapidly growing trade deficit, had reached 10% of the country's GDP by the summer of 2008, the "loss of competitiveness against its main trading partners" and, also, as a part of the latter, an inflation rate which had been traditionally higher than the one of its European partners, back then especially affected by house price increases of 150% from 1998 and a growing family indebtedness (115%) chiefly related to the Spanish Real Estate boom and rocketing oil prices. In 2011 the deficit reached a high of 8.5%. For 2016 the deficit objective of the government is around 4%, falling to 2.9% for 2017. The European Commission has demanded 3.9% for 2016 and 2.5% for 2017. The Spanish government official GDP growth forecast for 2008 in April was 2.3%. This figure was revised down by the Spanish Ministry of Economy to 1.6. Studies by most independent forecasters estimate that the rate had actually dropped to 0.8% instead, below the strong 3% plus GDP annual growth rates during the 1997–2007 decade. During the third quarter of 2008 the national GDP contracted for the first time in 15 years in February 2009, it was confirmed that Spain, along other European economies, had officially entered recession. In July 2009, the IMF worsened the estimates for Spain's 2009 contraction, to minus 4% of GDP for the year (close to the European average of minus 4.6%.) It estimated a further 0.8% contraction of the Spanish economy for 2010. Property boom and bust (2003–2014) The adoption of the Euro in 2002 had driven down long-term interest rates, prompting a surge in mortgage lending that jumped more than fourfold from 2000 to its 2010 apex. The growth in the Spanish property market, which had begun in 1997, accelerated and within a few years had developed into a property bubble, financed largely by regional banks, known as "Cajas", which are regional savings banks under the oversight of regional governments, and fed by the historically low interest rates and a massive growth of immigration. Fueling this trend, the Spanish economy was being credited for having avoided the virtual zero growth rate of some of its largest partners in the EU in the months previous to the global Great Recession. Spain's economy had created more than half of all the new jobs in the European Union over the five years ending 2005. At the top of its property boom, Spain was building more houses than Germany, France and the U.K. combined. Home prices soared by 71% between 2003 and 2008, in tandem with the credit explosion. The bubble imploded in 2008, causing the collapse of Spain's large property related and construction sectors, causing mass layoffs, and a collapsing domestic demand for goods and services. Unemployment shot up. At first, Spain's banks and financial services avoided the early crisis of their international counterparts. However, as the recession deepened and property prices slid, the growing bad debts of the smaller regional savings banks, the "cajas", forced the intervention of Spain's central bank and government through a stabilization and consolidation program, taking over or consolidating regional "cajas" and finally receiving a bank bailout from the European Central Bank in 2012 aimed specifically for the banking business and "cajas" in particular. Following the 2008 peak, home prices then plunged by 31%, before bottoming out in late 2014. Real estate recovery By 2017, following several months of prices picking up, homeowners who had been renting during the economic slump had started to put their properties back on the sales market. In this regard, home sales are expected to return in 2017 to pre-crisis (2008) level. In all, the Spanish real estate market is experiencing a new boom, this time in the rental sector. Out of 50 provinces and compared to May 2007, the National Statistics Institute has recorded higher rent levels in 48 provinces, with the 10 most populated accumulating rent inflation between 5% and 15% since 2007. The phenomenon is most visible in big cities such as Barcelona or Madrid, which are seeing new record average prices, partially fueled by short-term rentals to tourists. Euro debt crisis In the first weeks of 2010, renewed anxiety about the excessive levels of debt in some EU countries and, more generally, about the health of the euro has spread from Ireland and Greece to Portugal, and to a lesser extent in Spain. Many economists recommended a battery of policies to control the surging public debt caused by the recessionary collapse of tax revenues, combining drastic austerity measures with higher taxes. Some senior German policy makers went as far as to say that emergency bailouts should include harsh penalties to EU aid recipients such as Greece. It has been noted that the Spanish government budget was in surplus in the years immediately before the global financial crisis and that its debt was not considered excessive. At the beginning of 2010, Spain's public debt as a percentage of GDP was still less than those of Britain, France or Germany. However, commentators pointed out that Spain's recovery was fragile, that the public debt was growing quickly, that troubled regional banks may need large bailouts, growth prospects were poor and therefore limiting revenue and that the central government has limited control over the spending of the regional governments. Under the structure of shared governmental responsibilities that has evolved since 1975, much responsibility for spending had been given back to the regions. The central government found itself in the difficult position of trying to gain support for unpopular spending cuts from the recalcitrant regional governments. On 23 May 2010, the government announced further austerity measures, consolidating the ambitious plans announced in January. As of September 2011, Spanish banks hold a record high of €142 billion of Spanish national bonds. December 2011 bond auctions are "very likely to be covered" according to JPMorgan Chase. Till Q2 2012, Spanish banks were allowed to report real estate related assets in higher non-market price by regulators. Investors who bought into such banks must be aware. Spanish houses cannot be sold at land book value after being vacant over a period of years. Employment crisis Even though the sheer size of Spain's underground economy masks to some extent the	creation kept speeding up; in this regard, May 2017 was the best May to date in terms of social security affiliations since this record was started in 2001 and during that month jobless claims fell to the lowest figure since June 2009. At 17.2% in the second quarter 2017, unemployment fell below 4 million for the first time since 2008, with the country experiencing its steepest quarterly decline in unemployment on record to date (series starts in 1964). In 2018, at 14.6% the unemployment rate did not exceed the 15% threshold for the first time since 2008 when the crisis began. In 2019, Pedro Sánchez's socialist government increased the minimum wage by 22% in an attempt to boost hiring and encourage spending. Members of the opposition argued that this increase from €858 to €1050 a month would negatively affect 1.2 million workers due to their employers being unable to cover the aforementioned raise. Reduction of European Union funds Capital contributions from the EU, which had contributed significantly to the economic empowerment of Spain since joining the EEC, have decreased considerably since 1990 due to the economic standardization in relation to other countries and the effects of the EU's enlargement. On the one hand, agricultural funds from the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (CAP) are now spread across more countries. On the other hand, with 2004's and 2007's enlargement of the European Union, less developed countries joined the EU, lowering the average income per capita (or GDP per capita), so that Spanish regions which were considered to be relatively less developed, became in the European average or even above it. Spain has gradually become a net contributor of funds for less developed countries of the Union as opposed to receiving funds. Economic recovery (2014–2020) With a 3.2% increase in 2015, the Spanish GDP growth was the highest among larger EU economies that year. In just two years (2014–2015) the Spanish economy had recovered 85% of the GDP lost during the 2009-2013 recession, which got some international analysts to refer to Spain's current recovery as "the showcase for structural reform efforts". By Q2 2016 the Spanish economy had been accumulating 12 consecutive quarters of growth, managing to consistently outperform the rest of the Euro area. Such growth had continued, with the Spanish economy outperforming expectations and growing 3.2 per cent in 2016, almost twice as fast as the Euro zone average. Subsequently, in the second quarter of 2017 Spain recovered all the GDP lost during the economic crisis, exceeding for the first time the output level that had been reached in 2008. The Spanish economy is forecast to remain the best-performing major economy in the Euro zone also in 2017. One of the main drivers of economic recovery is international trade, in turn sparked by dramatic gains in labor productivity. During the economic downturn, Spain significantly reduced imports, increased exports and kept attracting growing numbers of tourists; as a result, after three decades of running a trade deficit the country attained in 2013 a trade surplus which has strengthened during 2014 and 2015. Exports have shot up, from around 25% (2008) to 33% of GDP (2016) on the back of an internal devaluation (the country's wage bill halved in the 2008-2016 period), a search for new markets and a recent mild recovery of the European economy. Data The following table shows the main economic indicators in 1980–2020 (plus IMF estimates for 2021–2026 in italics). Inflation below 5% is in green. Banking system Spanish private commercial banks played a central role in Spain's economic development, benefiting from their role as the state's creditor in the 19th century, from their ability to monetize public debt, and from state-sanctioned oligopolistic arrangements that lasted from the beginning of the 20th century until the late 1980s, when European rules forced a liberalization of the sector. It has been argued that the favorable treatment received by the main Spanish commercial banks and their close relationship to the Bank of Spain (Banco de España) following the end of the Franco regime allowed for a public-private partnership to restructure the large commercial banks into two large banks (Santander and BBVA) with the purpose of preparing the private institutions for international competition and external expansion once the European banking market was integrated in 1992 Alongside this financial mercantilism benefiting the commercial banking sector, Spanish regulators also allowed for the vast expansion of not for profit savings banks sponsored by regional governments who became heavily exposed to the housing mortgage and real estate development sectors during the Spanish economic boom of 1999–2007. Prior to 2010, the Spanish banking system had been credited as one of the most solid of all western banking systems in coping with the ongoing worldwide liquidity crisis, thanks to the country's conservative banking rules and practices. Banks were required to have high capital provisions and to demand various guarantees and securities from intending borrowers. This allowed the banks, particularly the geographically and industrially diversified large banks like BBVA and Santander, to weather the real estate deflation better than expected. Indeed, Spain's large commercial banks have been able to capitalize on their strong position to buy up distressed banking assets elsewhere in Europe and in the United States. Nevertheless, with the unprecedented crisis of the country's real estate sector, smaller local savings banks ("Cajas"), had been delaying the registering of bad loans, especially those backed by houses and land, to avoid declaring losses. In June 2009 the Spanish government set its banking bailout and reconstruction fund, the Fondo de reestructuración ordenada bancaria (FROB), known in English as Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring. In the event, State intervention of local savings banks due to default risk was less than feared. On 22 May 2010, the Banco de España took over "CajaSur", as part of a national program to put the country's smaller banks on a firm financial basis. In December 2011, the Spanish central bank, Banco de España (equivalent of the US Federal Reserve), forcibly took over "Caja Mediterraneo", also known as CAM, (a regional savings bank) to prevent its financial collapse. The international accounting firm, PriceWaterhouseCooper, estimated an imbalance between CAM's assets and debts of €3,500 million, not counting the industrial corporation. The troubled situation reached its peak with the partial nationalization of Bankia in May 2012. By then it was becoming clear that the mounting real estate losses of the savings banks were undermining confidence in the country's government bonds, thus aggravating a sovereign debt crisis. In early June 2012, Spain requested European funding of €41 billion "to recapitalize Spanish banks that need it". It was not a sovereign bailout in that the funds were used only for the restructuring of the banking sector a full-fledged bailout for an economy the size of the Spanish would have reached ten or twelve times that amount). In return for the credit line etended by the EMS, there were no tax or macroeconomic conditions. . As of 2017 the cost of restructuring Spain's bankrupt savings banks were estimated to have been €60.7 billion, of which nearly €41.8 billion was put up by the state through the FROB and the rest by the banking sector. The total cost will not be fully understood until those lenders still controlled by the State (Bankia and BMN) are newly privatized. In this regard, by early 2017 the Spanish government was considering a merger of both banks before privatizing the combined bank to recoup an estimated 400 million euros of their bailout costs. During the course of this transformation period, most regional savings banks such as the CAM, Catalunya Banc, Banco de Valencia, Novagalicia Banco, Unnim Banc or Cajasur have since been absorbed by the bigger, more international, Spanish banks, which imposed better management practices. Prices Due to the lack of own resources, Spain has to import all of its fossil fuels. Besides, until the 2008 crisis, Spain's recent performance had shown an inflationary tendency and an inflationary gap compared to other EMU countries, affecting the country's overall productivity. Moreover, when Spain joined the euro zone, it lost the recourse of resorting to competitive devaluations, risking a permanent and cumulative loss of competitive due to inflation. In a scenario of record oil prices by the mid 2000s this meant much added pressure to the inflation rate. In June 2008 the inflation rate reached a 13-year high at 5.00%. Then, with the dramatic decrease of oil prices that took place in the second half of 2008 plus the manifest bursting of the real estate bubble, concerns quickly shifted over to the risk of deflation, as Spain recorded in January 2009 its lowest inflation rate in 40 years, followed shortly afterwards, in March 2009 by a negative inflation rate for the first time since the gathering of these statistics started. Subsequently, apart from temporary minor oil shocks, the Spanish economy has generally oscillated between slightly negative to near-zero inflation rates during the 2009−early 2016 period. Analysts reckoned that this was not synonymous with deflation, due to the fact that GDP had been growing since 2014, domestic consumption had rebounded as well and, especially, because core inflation remained slightly positive. Indeed, as the impact of cheaper fuel prices faded and economic recovery took hold, moderate inflation in the 1-2% region (in other words, still below the ECB's target) has made a comeback in 2017. Economic strengths Since the 1990s some Spanish companies have gained multinational status, often expanding their activities in culturally close Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. Spain is the second biggest foreign investor in Latin America, after the United States. Spanish companies have also expanded into Asia, especially China and India. This early global expansion gave Spanish companies a competitive advantage over some of Spain's competitors and European neighbors. Another contribution to the success of Spanish firms may have to do with booming interest toward Spanish language and culture in Asia and Africa, but also a corporate culture that learned to take risks in unstable markets. Spanish companies invested in fields like biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, or renewable energy (Iberdrola is the world's largest renewable energy operator), technology companies like Telefónica, Abengoa, Mondragon Corporation, Movistar, Gamesa, Hisdesat, Indra, train manufacturers like CAF and Talgo, global corporations such as the textile company Inditex, petroleum companies like Repsol and infrastructure firms. Six of the ten biggest international construction firms specialising in transport are Spanish, lincluding Ferrovial, Acciona, ACS, OHL and FCC. Spain is equipped with a solid banking system as well, including two global systemically important banks, Banco Santander and BBVA. Infrastructure In the 2012–13 edition of the Global Competitiveness Report Spain was listed 10th in the world in terms of first-class infrastructure. It is the 5th EU country with best infrastructure and ahead of countries like Japan or the United States. In particular, the country is a leader in the field of high-speed rail, having developed the second longest network in the world (only behind China) and leading high-speed projects with Spanish technology around the world. The Spanish infrastructure concession companies, lead 262 transport infrastructure worldwide, representing 36% of the total, according to the latest rankings compiled by the publication Public Works Financing. The top three global occupy Spanish companies: ACS, Global Vía and Abertis, according to the ranking of companies by number of concessions for roads, railways, airports and ports in construction or operation in October 2012. Considering the investment, the first world infrastructure concessionaire is Ferrovial-Cintra, with 72,000 million euros, followed closely by ACS, with 70,200 million. Among the top ten in the world are also the Spanish Sacyr (21,500 million), FCC and Global Vía (with 19,400 million) and OHL (17,870 million). During 2013 Spanish civil engineering companies signed contracts around the world for a total of 40 billion euros, setting a new record for the national industry. The port of Valencia in Spain is the busiest seaport in the Mediterranean basin, 5th busiest in Europe and 30th busiest in the world. There are four other Spanish ports in the ranking of the top 125 busiest world seaports (Algeciras, Barcelona, Las Palmas, and Bilbao); as a result, Spain is tied with Japan in the third position of countries leading this ranking. Exports grow steadily During the boom years, Spain had built up a trade deficit eventually amounting a record equivalent to 10% of GDP (2007) and the external debt ballooned to the equivalent of 170% of GDP, one of the highest among Western economies. Then, during the economic downturn, Spain reduced significantly imports due to domestic consumption shrinking while – despite the global slowdown – it has been increasing exports and kept attracting growing numbers of tourists. Spanish exports grew by 4.2% in 2013, the highest rate in the European Union. As a result, after three decades of running a trade deficit Spain attained in 2013 a trade surplus. Export growth was driven by capital goods and the automotive sector and the forecast was to reach a surplus equivalent to 2.5% of GDP in 2014. Exports in 2014 were 34% of GDP, up from 24% in 2009. The trade surplus attained in 2013 has been consolidated in 2014 and 2015. Despite slightly declining exports from fellow EU countries in the same period, Spanish exports continued to grow and in the first half of 2016 the country beat its own record to date exporting goods for 128,041 million euros; from the total, almost 67% were exported to other EU countries. During this same period, from the 70 members of the World Trade Organization (whose combined economies amount to 90% of global GDP), Spain was the country whose exports had grown the most. In 2016, exports of goods hit historical highs despite a global slowdown in trade, making up for 33% of the total GDP (by comparison, exports represent 12% of GDP in the United States, 18% in Japan, 22% in China or 45% in Germany). In all, by 2017 foreign sales have been rising every year since 2010, with a degree of unplanned import substitution -a rather unusual feat for Spain when
facilities domestic: NA international: 22 coaxial submarine cables; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean), NA Eutelsat; tropospheric scatter to adjacent countries Radio Radio broadcast stations: AM 208, FM 715, shortwave 1 (1998) Radios: 13.1 million (1997) Television Television broadcast stations: 228 (plus 2,112 repeaters); note - these figures include 11 television broadcast stations and 89 repeaters in the Canary	technologies within Spain. Telephones (landline and cellular) Telephones - main lines in use: 18.583 million (2007) Telephones - mobile cellular: 48.8 million (2007) Telephone system: generally adequate, modern facilities domestic: NA international: 22 coaxial submarine cables; satellite earth stations - 2 Intelsat (1 Atlantic Ocean and
– no (Gibraltar has no railways) Tunnel across the Strait of Gibraltar In December 2003, Morocco and Spain agreed to explore the construction of an undersea rail tunnel across the Strait of Gibraltar, to connect their rail systems. High-speed rail Alta Velocidad Española (AVE) is a high-speed rail service in Spain operated by Renfe, the Spanish national railway company, at speeds of up to 310 km/h (193 mph). The name is literally translated from Spanish "Alta Velocidad Españolas" (Spanish High Speed), but its initials are also a play on the word ave, meaning "bird". As of December 2011, the Spanish AVE system is the longest HSR network in Europe with 2,665 km (1,656 mi) and the second in the world after China. AVE trains run on a network of dedicated high-speed rail track owned and managed by Adif. The first line was opened in 1992, connecting the cities of Madrid, Córdoba, and Sevilla. Unlike the rest of the Spanish broad gauge network, the AVE uses standard gauge, permitting direct connections outside Spain. Although AVE trains are operated by Renfe, the Spanish state railway company, private companies may be allowed to operate trains in the future using other brands, in accordance with European Union legislation. Some TGV-derived trains do run on the broad-gauge network at slower speeds, and these are branded separately as Euromed. On the line from Madrid to Seville, the service guarantees arrival within five minutes of the advertised time, and offers a full refund if the train is delayed further, although only 0.16% of trains have been so. In this regard, the punctuality of the AVE is exceptional compared to other non-long-distance RENFE services. On other AVE lines, this punctuality promise is more lax (15 minutes on the Barcelona line). A possible reason for this is that AVE services slow down to 200 km/h for the Sierra Morena section of the journey because of the tight curves and 250 km/h for the Córdoba-Seville section, possibly on account of medium-speed services running on the line, meaning that they have an easy means	Madrid and Seville was completed in 1992. In 2003, high-speed service was inaugurated on a new line from Madrid to Lleida and extended to Barcelona in 2008. The same year, lines from Madrid to Valladolid and from Córdoba to Málaga were inaugurated. In 2010, AVE line Madrid-Cuenca-Valencia was inaugurated. Cities with metro/light rail systems Alicante - Alicante Tram Barcelona - Barcelona Metro & Tram Bilbao - Bilbao Metro & Bilbao tram (Euskotren Tranbia) Castellon - Trolleybus A Coruña - under construction Granada - Granada Metro Jaén - Jaén Tram - completed but not operated Madrid - Madrid Metro Málaga - Málaga Metro Murcia - Murcia tram Palma - Palma Metro Parla - Parla Tram Santa Cruz de Tenerife - Tenerife Tram Seville - Seville Metro & MetroCentro Valencia - Metrovalencia Vélez-Málaga - Vélez-Málaga Tram - ceased operations Vitoria-Gasteiz - Vitoria-Gasteiz tram (Euskotren Tranbia) Zaragoza - Zaragoza Tram Railway links with adjacent countries Andorra – no (Andorra has no railways) France – yes/no – break-of-gauge ()/()/() (new high-speed line without any break-of-gauge) Portugal – yes, same gauge Morocco – no – proposed undersea tunnel. break-of-gauge ()/() Gibraltar – no (Gibraltar has no railways) Tunnel across the Strait of Gibraltar In December 2003, Morocco and Spain agreed to explore the construction of an undersea rail tunnel across the Strait of Gibraltar, to connect their rail systems. High-speed rail Alta Velocidad Española (AVE) is a high-speed rail service in Spain operated by Renfe, the Spanish national railway company, at speeds of up to 310 km/h (193 mph). The name is literally translated from Spanish "Alta Velocidad Españolas" (Spanish High Speed), but its initials are also a play on the word ave, meaning "bird". As of December 2011, the Spanish AVE system is the longest HSR network in Europe with 2,665 km (1,656 mi) and the second in the world after China. AVE trains run on a network of dedicated high-speed rail track owned and managed by Adif. The first line was opened in 1992, connecting the cities of Madrid, Córdoba, and Sevilla. Unlike the rest of the Spanish broad gauge network, the AVE uses standard gauge, permitting direct connections outside Spain. Although AVE trains are operated by Renfe, the Spanish state railway company, private companies may be allowed to operate trains in the future using other brands, in accordance with European Union legislation. Some TGV-derived trains do run on the broad-gauge network at slower speeds, and these are branded separately as Euromed. On the line from Madrid to Seville, the service guarantees arrival within five minutes of the advertised time, and offers a full refund if the train is delayed further, although only 0.16%
agreements and institutions configuring what it is known today as Western Europe were made apart from Francoist Spain. The 1953 military agreements with the United States entailed the acceptance of unprecedented conditions vis-à-vis the (peacetime) military installment of a foreign power on Spanish soil. Spain joined the UN in 1955 and the IMF in 1958. In the last rales of the dictator, the mismanaged decolonisation of Spanish Sahara ensued with the Moroccan invasion of the territory in 1975 and the purported partition of it between Morocco and Mauritania, spawning a protracted conflict pitting the Sahrawi national liberation Polisario Front against Morocco and (briefly) Mauritania lasting to this day. Spain joined NATO (1982) and entered the European Communities (1986). On a wide range of issues, Spain often prefers to coordinate its efforts with its EU partners through the European political cooperation mechanisms. History In 218 BC the Romans invaded the Iberian peninsula, which later became the Roman province of Hispania. The Romans introduced the Latin language, the ancestor of both modern-day Spanish and Italian. The Iberian peninsula remained under Roman rule for over 600 years, until the collapse of the Western-Roman Empire. In the Early modern period, until the 18th century, southern and insular Italy came under Spanish control, having been previously a domain of the Crown of Aragon. Charles V Charles V (1500–1558) inherited vast lands across Western Europe and the Americas, and expanded them by frequent wars. Among other domains he was King of Spain from 1516, and Holy Roman Emperor and Archduke of Austria from 1519. As head of the rising House of Habsburg during the first half of the 16th century, his dominions in Europe extending from Germany to northern Italy with direct rule over the Austrian hereditary lands and the Burgundian Low Countries, and a unified Spain with its southern Italian kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia. His great enemy on land was France, on the Mediterranean Sea it was the Ottoman Empire, which at times was allied with France. England and the Papacy were sometimes part of the coalition against him. Much of his attention focused on wars in Italy. At the Diet of Augsburg (1547) he secured recognition that the Netherlands belonged to the Hapsburg domain. However Charles was intensely Catholic and the northern Netherlands was Protestant. He and his Spanish heirs fought for a century against Dutch independence; despite the enormous cost they failed. Philip II, 1556–1598 Philip III, 1598–1621 Philip III has a poor reputation in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. He inherited two major conflicts from his father. The first of these, the long-running Dutch revolt, represented a serious challenge to Spanish power from the Protestant United Provinces in a crucial part of the Spanish Empire. The second, the Anglo–Spanish War was a newer, and less critical conflict with Protestant England, marked by a Spanish failure to successfully bring its huge military resources to bear on the smaller English military. Philip's own foreign policy can be divided into three phases. For the first nine years of his reign, he pursued a highly aggressive set of policies, aiming to deliver a 'great victory'. His instructions to his most important advisor Duke Lerma to wage a war of "blood and iron" on his rebellious subjects in the Netherlands reflects this. After 1609, when it became evident that Spain was financially exhausted and Philip sought a truce with the Dutch, there followed a period of retrenchment; in the background, tensions continued to grow, however, and by 1618 the policies of Philip's 'proconsols' were increasingly at odds with de Lerma's policy from Madrid. War of the Spanish Succession and after 1701–1759 The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) saw Spain in a nearly helpless position as multiple European powers battled for control over which of three rivals would be king. At first most of the warfare took place outside of Spain. However, in 1704 Spain was invaded by the Germans (officially by the Holy Roman Empire including Habsburg Austria and Prussia, as well as other minor German states), Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, the Duchy of Savoy and Portugal. The invaders wanted to make the Habsburg candidate king instead of the incumbent Philip V who the grandson of France's powerful king Louis XIV and candidate of the House of Bourbon. Spain had no real army, but it defense was a high priority for Louis XIV who sent in his French armies and after a devastating civil war eventually drove out the invaders from Spain. After years of warfare and changing coalitions, the final result was that Philip V remained king. In practice his wife Elisabeth Farnese ruled Spain from 1714 until 1746, and was more interested in Italy than Spain. Spain was not even invited to the peace treaties (Peace of Utrecht); they forbade any future possibility of unifying the French and Spanish crowns. Britain was the main winner; it blocked France from becoming too powerful. Britain acquired Minorca and Gibraltar from Spain, as well as the right to sell slaves to Spanish colonies. Britain also gained Newfoundland and Nova Scotia from France. Spain kept its American colonies but lost its European holdings in Italy and the Spanish Netherlands (modern Belgium), mostly to Austria. Spain briefly regained some Italian holdings until the British sank its fleet in 1718. Elisabeth Farnese succeeded in recapturing Naples and Sicily. She put her son on the throne there. He abdicated in 1759 to return to Madrid as King Charles III of Spain. American Revolutionary War: 1775-1783 Eager to gain revenge on the British for its defeat during the Seven Years' War, France offered support to rebel American colonists seeking independence from Britain during the American War of Independence and in 1778 entered the war on their side. They then urged Spain to do the same, hoping the combined force would be strong enough to overcome the British Royal Navy and be able to invade England. In 1779 Spain joined the war, hoping to take advantage of a substantially weakened Britain. Distrustful of republics, Spain did not officially recognize the new United States of America. A well-organised force under Bernardo de Galvez operating out of Spanish Louisiana launched repeated attacks on British colonies in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. They were easy winners against weak British garrisons, and were planning an expedition against Jamaica when peace was declared in 1783. Spain's highest priority was to recapture Gibraltar from Britain using the Great Siege of Gibraltar. Despite a prolonged besiegement, the British garrison there was able to hold out until relieved and it remained in British hands following the Treaty of Paris. Unlike their French allies (for whom the war proved largely to be a disaster, financially and militarily) the Spanish made a number of territorial gains, recovering Florida and Menorca. Regional relations Latin America The Ibero-American vision Spain has maintained its special identification with its fellow Spanish-speaking countries. Its policy emphasizes the concept of an Ibero-American community, essentially the renewal of the historically liberal concept of "Hispano-Americanismo" (or Hispanic as it is often referred to in English), which has sought to link the Iberian peninsula to the Spanish-speaking countries in Central and South America through language, commerce, history and culture. Spain has been an effective example of transition from dictatorship to democracy, as shown in the many trips that Spain's King and prime ministers have made to the region. Trends in diplomatic relations Spain maintains economic and technical cooperation programs and cultural exchanges with Latin American countries, both bilaterally and within the EU. During José María Aznar's government, Spanish relations worsened with countries like Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba, but were exceptionally good with others, like Colombia, the Dominican Republic and several Central American republics. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's victory in the 2004 general elections changed this setting. Despite long-standing close linguistic, economic and cultural relations with most of Latin America, some aspects of Spanish foreign policy during this time, such as its support for the Iraq War, were not supported or widely favored. Venezuela Currently, Spanish relations with Venezuela are amicable, which has caused some controversy with the United States, who has been in recent disagreements with Venezuela under Hugo Chávez (as well as Nicolas Maduro) and its growing relations with "Anti-American Nations", such as Cuba, China, Russia and several Islamic Middle Eastern countries. However, due to a notable public incident in 2007, Venezuelan-Spanish ties were briefly suspended, though were later re-established. Sub-Saharan Africa Spain has gradually begun to broaden its contacts with Sub-Saharan Africa. It has a particular interest in its former colony of Equatorial Guinea, where it maintains a large aid program. More recently, it has sought closer relation with Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and others to find solutions for the issue of illegal immigration to the Canary Islands. Middle East In the Middle East, Spain is known as a broker between powers. In its relations with the Arab world, Spain frequently supports Arab positions on Middle East issues. The Arab countries are a priority interest for Spain because of oil and gas imports and because several Arab nations have substantial investments in Spain. Europe Spain has been successful in managing its relations with its three immediate European neighbours, France, Andorra, and Portugal. The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU in 1986 has helped ease some of their periodic trade frictions by putting these into an EU context. Franco-Spanish bilateral cooperation has been enhanced by joint action against recurring violence by separatist Basque group ETA since the 1960s. Ties with the United Kingdom are generally good, although the question of Gibraltar remains a sensitive issue, especially since the UK vote on Brexit. Asia Today, Spain is trying to expand its still narrow relations with East Asian nations, with China, Japan and South Korea as its main points of interest in the region. Thailand and Indonesia are Spain's main allies in the ASEAN region, having a considerable number of agreements and a very good relationship. In the recent years Spain has also been boosting its contacts, relations and investment in other Asian countries, most notably Vietnam and Malaysia. Relations with the Philippines are, despite a very long colonial past, considerably weaker than the ones Spain has with other countries in the area, dealing mostly with cultural aspects and humanitarian assistance programs. Disputes Territorial disputes Whilst the disputed on Gibraltar with Great Britain is the best known territorial dispute of Spain, the country also has disputes with Portugal and Morocco. With Great Britain Ever since it was captured in 1704 by Anglo-Dutch forces during the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar has been the subject of a dispute between Britain and Spain. Situated at the southern tip of the Iberian peninsula, overseeing the Strait of Gibraltar which connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea, the territory has great strategic importance. Today, Gibraltar is a British Overseas Territory and houses an important base for the British Armed Forces. With Morocco The strategic position of the Strait of Gibraltar has left a legacy of a number of sovereignty disputes. These include the "five places of sovereignty" (plazas de soberanía) on and off the coast of Morocco - the coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which Morocco contests, as well as the islands of Peñon de Alhucemas, Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera, and Islas Chafarinas. Spain maintains sovereignty over Ceuta, Melilla, Peñon de Velez de la Gomera, Alhucemas and the Chafarinas Islands (captured following the Christian reconquest of Spain) based upon historical grounds, security reasons and on the basis of the UN principle of territorial integrity. Spain also maintains that the majority of residents are Spanish. Morocco claims these territories on the basis of the UN principles of decolonisation, territorial integrity and that Spanish arguments for the recovery of Gibraltar substantiate Morocco's claim. With Portugal Olivenza (Spanish) or Olivença (Portuguese) is a town and seat of a municipality, on a disputed section of the border between Portugal and Spain, which is claimed de jure by both countries and administered de facto as part of the Spanish autonomous community of Extremadura. The population is 80% ethnic Portuguese and 30% of Portuguese language. Olivenza/Olivença was under continuous Portuguese sovereignty since 1297 until it was occupied by the Spanish in 1801 and formally ceded by Portugal later that year by the Treaty of Badajoz. Spain claims the de jure (legal) sovereignty over Olivenza/Olivença on the grounds that the Treaty of Badajoz still stands and has never been revoked. Thus, the border between the two countries in the region of Olivenza/Olivença should be as demarcated by that treaty. Portugal claims the de jure sovereignty over Olivenza/Olivença on the grounds that the Treaty of Badajoz was revoked by its own terms (the breach of any of its articles would lead to its cancellation) when Spain invaded Portugal in the Peninsular War of 1807. Portugal further bases its case on Article	1898 after the Spanish-American War, and, in line with far-reaching efforts by other European powers, Spain began to sustain a colonial presence in the African continent, most notably in Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea. It also intervened in Nguyễn Vietnam alongside France and involved in the affairs of former colony Santo Domingo, which briefly returned to Spanish control. In the wake of the creation of a Spanish protectorate in Northern Morocco, the early 20th century saw a draining conflict against Riffian anti-colonial resistance. Spain sticked to a status of neutrality during World War I. The Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 became a proxy war between the axis powers Germany and Italy and the Soviet Union (which lost). The war ensued with the installment of a dictatorship under Francisco Franco lasting until 1975. In the aftermath of World War 2, the series of multilateral agreements and institutions configuring what it is known today as Western Europe were made apart from Francoist Spain. The 1953 military agreements with the United States entailed the acceptance of unprecedented conditions vis-à-vis the (peacetime) military installment of a foreign power on Spanish soil. Spain joined the UN in 1955 and the IMF in 1958. In the last rales of the dictator, the mismanaged decolonisation of Spanish Sahara ensued with the Moroccan invasion of the territory in 1975 and the purported partition of it between Morocco and Mauritania, spawning a protracted conflict pitting the Sahrawi national liberation Polisario Front against Morocco and (briefly) Mauritania lasting to this day. Spain joined NATO (1982) and entered the European Communities (1986). On a wide range of issues, Spain often prefers to coordinate its efforts with its EU partners through the European political cooperation mechanisms. History In 218 BC the Romans invaded the Iberian peninsula, which later became the Roman province of Hispania. The Romans introduced the Latin language, the ancestor of both modern-day Spanish and Italian. The Iberian peninsula remained under Roman rule for over 600 years, until the collapse of the Western-Roman Empire. In the Early modern period, until the 18th century, southern and insular Italy came under Spanish control, having been previously a domain of the Crown of Aragon. Charles V Charles V (1500–1558) inherited vast lands across Western Europe and the Americas, and expanded them by frequent wars. Among other domains he was King of Spain from 1516, and Holy Roman Emperor and Archduke of Austria from 1519. As head of the rising House of Habsburg during the first half of the 16th century, his dominions in Europe extending from Germany to northern Italy with direct rule over the Austrian hereditary lands and the Burgundian Low Countries, and a unified Spain with its southern Italian kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia. His great enemy on land was France, on the Mediterranean Sea it was the Ottoman Empire, which at times was allied with France. England and the Papacy were sometimes part of the coalition against him. Much of his attention focused on wars in Italy. At the Diet of Augsburg (1547) he secured recognition that the Netherlands belonged to the Hapsburg domain. However Charles was intensely Catholic and the northern Netherlands was Protestant. He and his Spanish heirs fought for a century against Dutch independence; despite the enormous cost they failed. Philip II, 1556–1598 Philip III, 1598–1621 Philip III has a poor reputation in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. He inherited two major conflicts from his father. The first of these, the long-running Dutch revolt, represented a serious challenge to Spanish power from the Protestant United Provinces in a crucial part of the Spanish Empire. The second, the Anglo–Spanish War was a newer, and less critical conflict with Protestant England, marked by a Spanish failure to successfully bring its huge military resources to bear on the smaller English military. Philip's own foreign policy can be divided into three phases. For the first nine years of his reign, he pursued a highly aggressive set of policies, aiming to deliver a 'great victory'. His instructions to his most important advisor Duke Lerma to wage a war of "blood and iron" on his rebellious subjects in the Netherlands reflects this. After 1609, when it became evident that Spain was financially exhausted and Philip sought a truce with the Dutch, there followed a period of retrenchment; in the background, tensions continued to grow, however, and by 1618 the policies of Philip's 'proconsols' were increasingly at odds with de Lerma's policy from Madrid. War of the Spanish Succession and after 1701–1759 The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) saw Spain in a nearly helpless position as multiple European powers battled for control over which of three rivals would be king. At first most of the warfare took place outside of Spain. However, in 1704 Spain was invaded by the Germans (officially by the Holy Roman Empire including Habsburg Austria and Prussia, as well as other minor German states), Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, the Duchy of Savoy and Portugal. The invaders wanted to make the Habsburg candidate king instead of the incumbent Philip V who the grandson of France's powerful king Louis XIV and candidate of the House of Bourbon. Spain had no real army, but it defense was a high priority for Louis XIV who sent in his French armies and after a devastating civil war eventually drove out the invaders from Spain. After years of warfare and changing coalitions, the final result was that Philip V remained king. In practice his wife Elisabeth Farnese ruled Spain from 1714 until 1746, and was more interested in Italy than Spain. Spain was not even invited to the peace treaties (Peace of Utrecht); they forbade any future possibility of unifying the French and Spanish crowns. Britain was the main winner; it blocked France from becoming too powerful. Britain acquired Minorca and Gibraltar from Spain, as well as the right to sell slaves to Spanish colonies. Britain also gained Newfoundland and Nova Scotia from France. Spain kept its American colonies but lost its European holdings in Italy and the Spanish Netherlands (modern Belgium), mostly to Austria. Spain briefly regained some Italian holdings until the British sank its fleet in 1718. Elisabeth Farnese succeeded in recapturing Naples and Sicily. She put her son on the throne there. He abdicated in 1759 to return to Madrid as King Charles III of Spain. American Revolutionary War: 1775-1783 Eager to gain revenge on the British for its defeat during the Seven Years' War, France offered support to rebel American colonists seeking independence from Britain during the American War of Independence and in 1778 entered the war on their side. They then urged Spain to do the same, hoping the combined force would be strong enough to overcome the British Royal Navy and be able to invade England. In 1779 Spain joined the war, hoping to take advantage of a substantially weakened Britain. Distrustful of republics, Spain did not officially recognize the new United States of America. A well-organised force under Bernardo de Galvez operating out of Spanish Louisiana launched repeated attacks on British colonies in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. They were easy winners against weak British garrisons, and were planning an expedition against Jamaica when peace was declared in 1783. Spain's highest priority was to recapture Gibraltar from Britain using the Great Siege of Gibraltar. Despite a prolonged besiegement, the British garrison there was able to hold out until relieved and it remained in British hands following the Treaty of Paris. Unlike their French allies (for whom the war proved largely to be a disaster, financially and militarily) the Spanish made a number of territorial gains, recovering Florida and Menorca. Regional relations Latin America The Ibero-American vision Spain has maintained its special identification with its fellow Spanish-speaking countries. Its policy emphasizes the concept of an Ibero-American community, essentially the renewal of the historically liberal concept of "Hispano-Americanismo" (or Hispanic as it is often referred to in English), which has sought to link the Iberian peninsula to the Spanish-speaking countries in Central and South America through language, commerce, history and culture. Spain has been an effective example of transition from dictatorship to democracy, as shown in the many trips that Spain's King and prime ministers have made to the region. Trends in diplomatic relations Spain maintains economic and technical cooperation programs and cultural exchanges with Latin American countries, both bilaterally and within the EU. During José María Aznar's government, Spanish relations worsened with countries like Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba, but were exceptionally good with others, like Colombia, the Dominican Republic and several Central American republics. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's victory in the 2004 general elections changed this setting. Despite long-standing close linguistic, economic and cultural relations with most of Latin America, some aspects of Spanish foreign policy during this time, such as its support for the Iraq War, were not supported or widely favored. Venezuela Currently, Spanish relations with Venezuela are amicable, which has caused some controversy with the United States, who has been in recent disagreements with Venezuela under Hugo Chávez (as well as Nicolas Maduro) and its growing relations with "Anti-American Nations", such as Cuba, China, Russia and several Islamic Middle Eastern countries. However, due to a notable public incident in 2007, Venezuelan-Spanish ties were briefly suspended, though were later re-established. Sub-Saharan Africa Spain has gradually begun to broaden its contacts with Sub-Saharan Africa. It has a particular interest in its former colony of Equatorial Guinea, where it maintains a large aid program. More recently, it has sought closer relation with Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and others to find solutions for the issue of illegal immigration to the Canary Islands. Middle East In the Middle East, Spain is known as a broker between powers. In its relations with the Arab world, Spain frequently supports Arab positions on Middle East issues. The Arab countries are a priority interest for Spain because of oil and gas imports and because several Arab nations have substantial investments in Spain. Europe Spain has been successful in managing its relations with its three immediate European neighbours, France, Andorra, and Portugal. The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU in 1986 has helped ease some of their periodic trade frictions by putting these into an EU context. Franco-Spanish bilateral cooperation has been enhanced by joint action against recurring violence by separatist Basque group ETA since the 1960s. Ties with the United Kingdom are generally good, although the question of Gibraltar remains a sensitive issue, especially since the UK vote on Brexit. Asia Today, Spain is trying to expand its still narrow relations with East Asian nations, with China, Japan and South Korea as its main points of interest in the region. Thailand and Indonesia are Spain's main allies in the ASEAN region, having a considerable number of agreements and a very good relationship. In the recent years Spain has also been boosting its contacts, relations and investment in other Asian countries, most notably Vietnam and Malaysia. Relations with the Philippines are, despite a very long colonial past, considerably weaker than the ones Spain has with other countries in the area, dealing mostly with cultural aspects and humanitarian assistance programs. Disputes Territorial disputes Whilst the disputed on Gibraltar with Great Britain is the best known territorial dispute of Spain, the country also has disputes with Portugal and Morocco. With Great Britain Ever since it was captured in 1704 by Anglo-Dutch forces during the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar has been the subject of a dispute between Britain and Spain. Situated at the southern tip of the Iberian peninsula, overseeing the Strait of Gibraltar which connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea, the territory has great strategic importance. Today, Gibraltar is a British Overseas Territory and houses an important base for the British Armed Forces. With Morocco The strategic position of the Strait of Gibraltar has left a legacy of a number of sovereignty disputes. These include the "five places of sovereignty" (plazas de soberanía) on and off the coast of Morocco - the coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which Morocco contests, as well as the islands of Peñon de Alhucemas, Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera, and Islas Chafarinas. Spain maintains sovereignty over Ceuta, Melilla, Peñon de Velez de la Gomera, Alhucemas and the Chafarinas Islands (captured following the Christian reconquest of Spain) based upon historical grounds, security reasons and on the basis of the UN principle of territorial integrity. Spain also maintains that the majority of residents are Spanish. Morocco claims these territories on the basis of the UN principles of decolonisation, territorial integrity and that Spanish arguments for the recovery of Gibraltar substantiate Morocco's claim. With Portugal Olivenza (Spanish) or Olivença (Portuguese) is a town and seat of a municipality, on a disputed section of the border between Portugal and Spain, which is claimed de jure by both countries and administered de facto as part of the Spanish autonomous community of Extremadura. The population is 80% ethnic Portuguese and 30% of Portuguese language. Olivenza/Olivença was under continuous Portuguese sovereignty since 1297 until it was occupied by the Spanish in 1801 and formally ceded by Portugal later that year by the Treaty of
that China and Vietnam both made a claim to these territories simultaneously, at the time, neither side was aware that its neighbour had already charted and made claims to the same stretch of islands.<ref name="KING">{{wikicite\|reference=King C. Chen, China's War with Vietnam (1979) Dispute over the Paracels and Spratlys, pp. 42–48].\|ref= }}</ref> An early European map, A correct chart of the China Seas of 1758 by William Herbert, left the Spratly Islands region (known then as the Dangerous Ground) as largely blank, indicating that region has yet to be properly surveyed, although some islands and shoals at its western edge were marked (one appears at the same place as Thitu Island). A number of maps of the South China Sea were later produced, but the first map that gives a reasonably accurate delineation of the Spratly Islands region (titled [South China Sea, Sheet 1) was only published in 1821 by the hydrographer of the East India Company James Horsburgh after a survey by Captain Daniel Ross. A later 1859 edition of the map named the Spratly Island as Storm Island. The islands were sporadically visited throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries by mariners from different European powers (including Richard Spratly, after whom the island group derives its most recognisable English name, who visited the group in the 1840s in his whaler Cyrus). However, these nations showed little interest in the islands. In 1883, German boats surveyed the Spratly and the Paracel Islands but eventually withdrew the survey, after receiving protests from the Guangdong government representing the Qing dynasty. China sent naval forces on inspection tours in 1902 and 1907 and placed flags and markers on the islands. In the 1950s, a group of individuals claimed sovereignty over the islands in the name of Morton F. Meads, supposedly an American descendant of a British naval captain who gave his name to Meads Island (Itu Aba) in the 1870s. In an affidavit made in 1971, the group claimed to represent the Kingdom of Humanity/Republic of Morac-Songhrati-Meads, which they asserted was in turn the successor entity for a supposed Kingdom of Humanity established between the two world wars on Meads Island, allegedly by the son of the British captain. This claim to this would-be micronation fell dormant after 1972, when several members of the group drowned in a typhoon. Military conflicts and diplomatic dialogues The following are political divisions for the Spratly Islands claimed by various area nations (in alphabetical order): Brunei: Part of Brunei's Exclusive Economic Zone China: Part of Sansha, Hainan Malaysia: Part of Sabah state Philippines: Part of Kalayaan, Palawan province Taiwan: Part of Kaohsiung municipality Vietnam: Part of Trường Sa, Khánh Hòa Province In the 19th century, Europeans found that Chinese fishermen from Hainan annually sojourned on the Spratly islands for part of the year, while in 1877 it was the British who launched the first modern legal claims to the Spratly Islands. When the Spratly Islands and Paracels were surveyed by Germany in 1883, China issued protests against them. The 1887 Chinese-Vietnamese Boundary convention signed between France and China after the Sino-French War said that China was the owner of the Spratly and Paracel islands. China sent naval forces on inspection tours in 1902 and 1907 and placed flags and markers on the islands. The Qing dynasty's successor state, the Republic of China, claimed the Spratly and Paracel islands under the jurisdiction of Hainan. In 1933, France asserted its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands on behalf of its then-colony Vietnam. It occupied a number of the Spratly Islands, including Taiping Island, built weather stations on two of the islands, and administered them as part of French Indochina. This occupation was protested by the Republic of China (ROC) government because France admitted finding Chinese fishermen there when French warships visited nine of the islands. In 1935, the ROC government also announced a sovereignty claim on the Spratly Islands. Japan occupied some of the islands in 1939 during World War II, and it used the islands as a submarine base for the occupation of Southeast Asia. During the Japanese occupation, these islands were called Shinnan Shoto (), literally the New Southern Islands, and together with the Paracel Islands (), they were put under the governance of the Japanese colonial authority in Taiwan. Japan occupied the Paracels and the Spratly Islands from February 1939 to August 1945. Japan annexed the Spratly Islands via Taiwan's jurisdiction and the Paracels via Hainan's jurisdiction. Parts of the Paracels and Spratly Islands were again controlled by Republic of China after the 1945 surrender of Japan, since the Allied powers assigned the Republic of China to receive Japanese surrenders in that area, however no successor was named to the islands. In November 1946, the ROC sent naval ships to take control of the islands after the surrender of Japan. It had chosen the largest and perhaps the only inhabitable island, Taiping Island, as its base, and it renamed the island under the name of the naval vessel as Taiping. Also following the defeat of Japan at the end of World War II, the ROC re-claimed the entirety of the Spratly Islands (including Taiping Island) after accepting the Japanese surrender of the islands based on the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. The Republic of China then garrisoned Itu Aba (Taiping) island in 1946 and posted Chinese flags. The aim of the Republic of China was to block the French claims. The Republic of China drew up the map showing the U-shaped claim on the entire South China Sea, showing the Spratly and Paracels in Chinese territory, in 1947. Japan had renounced all claims to the islands in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty together with the Paracels, Pratas and other islands captured from the Chinese, and upon these declarations, the government of the Republic of China reasserted its claim to the islands. The Chinese Kuomintang force withdrew from most of the Spratly and Paracel Islands after they retreated to Taiwan from the opposing Communist Party of China due to their losses in the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Taiwan quietly withdrew troops from Taiping Island in 1950, but then reinstated them in 1956 in response to Tomás Cloma's sudden claim to the island as part of Freedomland. , Taiping Island is administered by Taiwan. After pulling out its garrison in 1950 when the Republic of China evacuated to Taiwan, when the Filipino Tomas Cloma uprooted an ROC flag on Itu Aba laid claim to the Spratly Islands and, Taiwan again regarrisoned Itu Aba in 1956. In 1946, the Americans allegedly reminded the Philippines at its independence that the Spratly Islands were not Philippine territory, both to not anger Chiang Kai-shek in China and because the Spratly Islands were not part of the Philippines per the 1898 treaty Spain signed with the United States. However, no document was found to that effect. The Philippines then claimed the Spratly Islands in 1971 under President Marcos, after Taiwanese troops attacked and shot at a Philippine fishing boat on Itu Aba. Taiwan's garrison from 1946 to 1950 and 1956-now on Itu Aba represents an "effective occupation" of the Spratly Islands. China established a coastal defence system against Japanese pirates or smugglers. In 1958, China issued a declaration defining its territorial waters that encompassed the Spratly Islands. North Vietnam's prime minister, Phạm Văn Đồng, sent a formal note to Zhou Enlai, stating that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) respected the Chinese decision regarding the limit of territorial waters. While accepting the 12-nmi principal with respect to territorial waters, the letter did not actually address the issue of defining actual territorial boundaries. North Vietnam recognised China's claims on the Paracels and Spratly Islands during the Vietnam War as it was being supported by China. Only after winning the war and conquering South Vietnam did North Vietnam retract its recognition and admitted it recognised them as part of China to receive aid from China in fighting the Americans. In 1987, China installed a small military structure on Fiery Cross Reef under the pretext of building an oceanic observation station and installing a tide gauge for the Global Sea Level Observing System. After a deadly skirmish with the Vietnamese Navy, China installed some military structures on more reefs in the vicinity of the Philippines and Vietnamese occupied islands and this led to escalating tensions between these countries and China over the status and ownership of reefs. In 1988, the Vietnamese and Chinese navies engaged in a skirmish in the area of Johnson South Reef (also called Gạc Ma Reef in Vietnam and Yongshu Reef in China). Under President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan stated that "legally, historically, geographically, or in reality", all of the South China Sea and Spratly islands were Taiwan's territory and under Taiwanese sovereignty, and denounced actions undertaken there by Malaysia and the Philippines, in a statement on 13 July 1999 released by the foreign ministry of Taiwan. Taiwan and China's claims "mirror" each other; during international talks involving the Spratly islands, China and Taiwan have cooperated with each other since both have the same claims. It was unclear whether France continued its claim to the islands after World War II, since none of the islands, other than Taiping Island, was habitable. The South Vietnamese government took over the Trường Sa administration after the defeat of the French at the end of the First Indochina War. "The French bestowed its titles, rights, and claims over the two island chains to the Republic of Vietnam (RoV) in accordance with the Geneva Accords", said Nguyen Hong Thao, Associate Professor at Faculty of Law, Vietnam National University. In 1999, a Philippine navy ship (Number 57 – BRP Sierra Madre) was purposely run aground near Second Thomas Shoal to enable establishment of an outpost. it had not been removed, and Filipino marines have been stationed aboard since the grounding. Taiwan and mainland China are largely strategically aligned on the Spratly islands issue, since they both claim exactly the same area, so Taiwan's control of Itu Aba (Taiping) island is viewed as an extension of China's claim. Taiwan and China both claim the entire island chain, while all the other claimants only claim portions of them. China has proposed co-operation with Taiwan against all the other countries claiming the islands. Taiwanese lawmakers have demanded that Taiwan fortify Itu Aba (Taiping) island with weapons to defend against the Vietnamese, and both China and Taiwanese NGOs have pressured Taiwan to expand Taiwan's military capabilities on the island, which played a role in Taiwan expanding the island's runway in 2012. China has urged Taiwan to co-operate and offered Taiwan a share in oil and gas resources while shutting out all the other rival claimants. Taiwanese lawmakers have complained about repeated Vietnamese aggression and trespassing on Taiwan's Itu Aba (Taiping), and Taiwan has started viewing Vietnam as an enemy over the Spratly Islands, not China. Taiwan's state run oil company CPC Corp's board director Chiu Yi has called Vietnam as the "greatest threat" to Taiwan. Taiwan's airstrip on Taiping has irritated Vietnam. China views Taiwan's expansion of its military and airstrip on Taiping as benefiting China's position against the other rival claimants from southeast Asian countries. China's claims to the Spratly Islands benefit from legal weight because of Taiwan's presence on Itu Aba, while America on the other hand has regularly ignored Taiwan's claims in the South China Sea and does not include Taiwan in any talks on dispute resolution for the area. Taiwan performed live fire military exercises on Taiping island in September 2012; reports said that Vietnam was explicitly named by the Taiwanese military as the "imaginary enemy" in the drill. Vietnam protested against the exercises as violation of its territory and "voiced anger", demanding that Taiwan stop the drill. Among the inspectors of the live fire drill were Taiwanese national legislators, adding to the tensions. In May 2011, Chinese patrol boats attacked two Vietnamese oil exploration ships near the Spratly Islands. Also in May 2011, Chinese naval vessels opened fire on Vietnamese	of the Paracels and Spratly Islands were again controlled by Republic of China after the 1945 surrender of Japan, since the Allied powers assigned the Republic of China to receive Japanese surrenders in that area, however no successor was named to the islands. In November 1946, the ROC sent naval ships to take control of the islands after the surrender of Japan. It had chosen the largest and perhaps the only inhabitable island, Taiping Island, as its base, and it renamed the island under the name of the naval vessel as Taiping. Also following the defeat of Japan at the end of World War II, the ROC re-claimed the entirety of the Spratly Islands (including Taiping Island) after accepting the Japanese surrender of the islands based on the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations. The Republic of China then garrisoned Itu Aba (Taiping) island in 1946 and posted Chinese flags. The aim of the Republic of China was to block the French claims. The Republic of China drew up the map showing the U-shaped claim on the entire South China Sea, showing the Spratly and Paracels in Chinese territory, in 1947. Japan had renounced all claims to the islands in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty together with the Paracels, Pratas and other islands captured from the Chinese, and upon these declarations, the government of the Republic of China reasserted its claim to the islands. The Chinese Kuomintang force withdrew from most of the Spratly and Paracel Islands after they retreated to Taiwan from the opposing Communist Party of China due to their losses in the Chinese Civil War and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Taiwan quietly withdrew troops from Taiping Island in 1950, but then reinstated them in 1956 in response to Tomás Cloma's sudden claim to the island as part of Freedomland. , Taiping Island is administered by Taiwan. After pulling out its garrison in 1950 when the Republic of China evacuated to Taiwan, when the Filipino Tomas Cloma uprooted an ROC flag on Itu Aba laid claim to the Spratly Islands and, Taiwan again regarrisoned Itu Aba in 1956. In 1946, the Americans allegedly reminded the Philippines at its independence that the Spratly Islands were not Philippine territory, both to not anger Chiang Kai-shek in China and because the Spratly Islands were not part of the Philippines per the 1898 treaty Spain signed with the United States. However, no document was found to that effect. The Philippines then claimed the Spratly Islands in 1971 under President Marcos, after Taiwanese troops attacked and shot at a Philippine fishing boat on Itu Aba. Taiwan's garrison from 1946 to 1950 and 1956-now on Itu Aba represents an "effective occupation" of the Spratly Islands. China established a coastal defence system against Japanese pirates or smugglers. In 1958, China issued a declaration defining its territorial waters that encompassed the Spratly Islands. North Vietnam's prime minister, Phạm Văn Đồng, sent a formal note to Zhou Enlai, stating that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) respected the Chinese decision regarding the limit of territorial waters. While accepting the 12-nmi principal with respect to territorial waters, the letter did not actually address the issue of defining actual territorial boundaries. North Vietnam recognised China's claims on the Paracels and Spratly Islands during the Vietnam War as it was being supported by China. Only after winning the war and conquering South Vietnam did North Vietnam retract its recognition and admitted it recognised them as part of China to receive aid from China in fighting the Americans. In 1987, China installed a small military structure on Fiery Cross Reef under the pretext of building an oceanic observation station and installing a tide gauge for the Global Sea Level Observing System. After a deadly skirmish with the Vietnamese Navy, China installed some military structures on more reefs in the vicinity of the Philippines and Vietnamese occupied islands and this led to escalating tensions between these countries and China over the status and ownership of reefs. In 1988, the Vietnamese and Chinese navies engaged in a skirmish in the area of Johnson South Reef (also called Gạc Ma Reef in Vietnam and Yongshu Reef in China). Under President Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan stated that "legally, historically, geographically, or in reality", all of the South China Sea and Spratly islands were Taiwan's territory and under Taiwanese sovereignty, and denounced actions undertaken there by Malaysia and the Philippines, in a statement on 13 July 1999 released by the foreign ministry of Taiwan. Taiwan and China's claims "mirror" each other; during international talks involving the Spratly islands, China and Taiwan have cooperated with each other since both have the same claims. It was unclear whether France continued its claim to the islands after World War II, since none of the islands, other than Taiping Island, was habitable. The South Vietnamese government took over the Trường Sa administration after the defeat of the French at the end of the First Indochina War. "The French bestowed its titles, rights, and claims over the two island chains to the Republic of Vietnam (RoV) in accordance with the Geneva Accords", said Nguyen Hong Thao, Associate Professor at Faculty of Law, Vietnam National University. In 1999, a Philippine navy ship (Number 57 – BRP Sierra Madre) was purposely run aground near Second Thomas Shoal to enable establishment of an outpost. it had not been removed, and Filipino marines have been stationed aboard since the grounding. Taiwan and mainland China are largely strategically aligned on the Spratly islands issue, since they both claim exactly the same area, so Taiwan's control of Itu Aba (Taiping) island is viewed as an extension of China's claim. Taiwan and China both claim the entire island chain, while all the other claimants only claim portions of them. China has proposed co-operation with Taiwan against all the other countries claiming the islands. Taiwanese lawmakers have demanded that Taiwan fortify Itu Aba (Taiping) island with weapons to defend against the Vietnamese, and both China and Taiwanese NGOs have pressured Taiwan to expand Taiwan's military capabilities on the island, which played a role in Taiwan expanding the island's runway in 2012. China has urged Taiwan to co-operate and offered Taiwan a share in oil and gas resources while shutting out all the other rival claimants. Taiwanese lawmakers have complained about repeated Vietnamese aggression and trespassing on Taiwan's Itu Aba (Taiping), and Taiwan has started viewing Vietnam as an enemy over the Spratly Islands, not China. Taiwan's state run oil company CPC Corp's board director Chiu Yi has called Vietnam as the "greatest threat" to Taiwan. Taiwan's airstrip on Taiping has irritated Vietnam. China views Taiwan's expansion of its military and airstrip on Taiping as benefiting China's position against the other rival claimants from southeast Asian countries. China's claims to the Spratly Islands benefit from legal weight because of Taiwan's presence on Itu Aba, while America on the other hand has regularly ignored Taiwan's claims in the South China Sea and does not include Taiwan in any talks on dispute resolution for the area. Taiwan performed live fire military exercises on Taiping island in September 2012; reports said that Vietnam was explicitly named by the Taiwanese military as the "imaginary enemy" in the drill. Vietnam protested against the exercises as violation of its territory and "voiced anger", demanding that Taiwan stop the drill. Among the inspectors of the live fire drill were Taiwanese national legislators, adding to the tensions. In May 2011, Chinese patrol boats attacked two Vietnamese oil exploration ships near the Spratly Islands. Also in May 2011, Chinese naval vessels opened fire on Vietnamese fishing vessels operating off East London Reef (Da Dong). The three Chinese military vessels were numbered 989, 27 and 28, and they showed up with a small group of Chinese fishing vessels. Another Vietnamese fishing vessel was fired on near Fiery Cross Reef (Chu Thap). The Chief Commander of Border Guards in Phú Yên Province, Vietnam reported that a total of four Vietnamese vessels were fired upon by Chinese naval vessels. These incidents involving Chinese forces sparked mass protests in Vietnam, especially in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, and in various Vietnamese communities in the West (namely in the US state of California and in Paris) over attacks on Vietnamese citizens and the intrusion into what Vietnam claimed was part of its territory. In June 2011, the Philippines began officially referring to parts of the South China Sea as the "West Philippine Sea" and the Reed Bank as "Recto Bank". In July 2012, the National Assembly of Vietnam passed a law demarcating Vietnamese sea borders to include the Spratly and Paracel Islands.China Criticizes Vietnam in Dispute Over Islands , Pittsburgh Post-Gazette In 2010, it was reported that the former Malaysian Prime Minister (now the current Malaysian Prime Minister) Mahathir Mohamad believed Malaysia could profit from China's economic growth through co-operation with China, and said that China "was not a threat to anyone and was not worried about aggression from China", as well accusing the United States of provoking China and trying to turn China's neighbours against China. Malaysian authorities displayed no concern over China conducting a military exercise at James Shoal in March 2013, with its Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein suggested they might work with China and saying that Malaysia had no problem with China patrolling the South China Sea, and telling ASEAN, America, and Japan that "Just because you have enemies, doesn't mean your enemies are my enemies". However, until present Malaysia still maintained a balance relations with the countries involved in this dispute. But since China has started encroaching its territorial waters, Malaysia has become active in condemning China. The editorial of the Taiwanese news website Want China Times accused America of being behind the May 2014 flareup in the South China Sea, saying that Vietnam rammed a Chinese vessel on 2 May over an oil rig drilling platform and the Philippines detained 11 Chinese fishermens occurred because of Obama's visit to the region and that they were incited by America "behind the scenes". Want China Times claimed America ordered Vietnam on 7 May to complain about the drilling platform, and noted that a joint military exercise was happening at this time between the Philippines and America, and also noted that the American New York Times newspaper supported Vietnam. In a series of news stories on 16 April 2015, it was revealed, through photos taken by Airbus, that China had been building an airstrip on Fiery Cross Reef, one of the southern islands. The runway covers a significant portion of the island, and is viewed as a possible strategic threat to other countries with claims to the islands, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Champa historically had a large presence in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese broke Champa's power in an invasion of Champa in 1471, and then finally conquered the last remnants of the Cham people in an invasion in 1832. A Cham named Katip Suma who received Islamic education in Kelantan declared a Jihad against the Vietnamese, and fighting continued until the Vietnamese crushed the remnants of the resistance in 1835. The Cham organisation Front de Libération du Champa was part of the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races, which waged war against the Vietnamese for independence in the Vietnam War along with the Montagnard and Khmer Krom minorities. The last remaining FULRO insurgents surrendered to the United Nations in 1992. The Vietnamese government fears that evidence of Champa's influence over the disputed area in the South China Sea would bring attention to human rights violations and killings of ethnic minorities in Vietnam such as in the 2001 and 2004 uprisings, and lead to the issue of Cham autonomy being brought into the dispute, since the Vietnamese conquered the Hindu and Muslim Cham people in a war in 1832. Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji said in a journal article that the assumption amongst many Japanese people that the territory of the Philippines was being invaded by China, was incorrect. He pointed out that the Spratly islands were not part of the Philippines, when the US acquired the Philippines from Spain in the Treaty of Paris in 1898, and when the Japanese-ruled Taiwan itself had annexed the Spratly islands in 1938, the US-ruled Philippines did not challenge the move and never asserted that it was their territory. He also pointed out that other countries did not need to do full land reclamation since they already control islands, and that the reason China engaged in extensive land reclamation is because they needed it to build airfields since China only has control over reefs. The "Moro" as "people", is used to describe both the Filipino Muslims and their homeland. Ancestors of moro people were the owners of Spratly Islands prior to the arrival of the Spanish colonials in the 16th century, according to the Sultan of Sulu in the southern Philippines reported in a local paper. "China has no right over the Spratly Islands in what it calls the South China Sea because that is part of our ancestral domain," Majaraj Julmuner Jannaral, Sultanate information officer, told the Philippine Star. "The Spratly Archipelago is part of the Sulu Sea (the inner area around the islands in the southern Philippines, which is part of the West Philippine Sea (designation of parts of the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines to be part of its EEZ)," Jannaral concluded. "Exploration of the marine territory and the waters around the Spratly Archipelago, Palawan in southwestern Philippines and the southern Philippines, belong to the residents in those areas," he added. The Sultanate of Sulu claims historic proprietary rights over the Spratly Islands since before the Spanish colonial era. Various incidents of fishing boats being harassed by Chinese warships have occured. At least 2 vessels were rammed or sunk. One was a Vietnamese ship attacked by a Chinese coastguard vessel, and another was a Fillipino ship rammed and sunk by a Chinese fishing boat who let the Fillipino fishermen drift at sea without giving aid. The stranded fishermen were later rescued by a Vietnamese ship. In 2017, the United States despite not being a claimant in the Spratly dispute, has used freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) to challenge what it deemed as excessive and illegal maritime claims from multiple Asia-Pacific states including Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 2016 arbitration In January 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) across a range of issues, including the latter's historic rights claims over parts or all of the Spratly Islands inside the nine-dash line. A tribunal of arbitrators constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS appointed the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) as registry to the proceedings. On 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines on most of its submissions. While it would not "rule on any question of sovereignty over land territory and would not delimit any maritime boundary between the Parties", it concluded that China had not historically exercised exclusive control within the nine-dash line, hence has "no legal basis" to claim "historic rights" to resources. It also concluded that China's historic rights claims over the maritime areas (as opposed to land masses and territorial waters) inside the nine-dash line would have no lawful effect outside of what's entitled to under UNCLOS. It criticized China's land reclamation projects and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands, saying that they had caused "severe harm to the coral reef environment". Finally, it characterized Taiping Island and other features of the Spratly Islands as "rocks" under UNCLOS, and therefore are not entitled to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. The award was ruled as final and non-appealable by either country. China rejected the ruling, calling it "ill-founded". Taiwan, which currently administers Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands, also rejected the ruling. Eight governments have publicly called for the ruling to be respected, 35 have issued generally positive statements without calling for parties to abide by it, and eight have publicly rejected it. The eight governments in support were Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, United Kingdom, and the United States; the eight in opposition were China, Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, and Vanuatu.Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Award rendered in the Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China (archived from the original on February 9, 2018) The United Nations itself doesn't have a position on the legal and procedural merits of the case or on the disputed claims, and the Secretary-General expressed his hope that the continued consultations on a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China under the framework of the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea will lead to increased mutual understanding among all the parties. Transportation and communication Airports Telecommunications In 2005, a cellular phone base station was erected by the Philippines' Smart Communications on Pag-asa Island. On 18 May 2011,
history and the Burghers were given degree of self-government as early as 1833. It was not until 1909 that constitutional development began, with a partly elected assembly, and not until 1920 that elected members outnumbered official appointees. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1931 over the protests of the Sinhalese, Tamil and Burgher elite who objected to the common people being allowed to vote. Independence movement Ceylon National Congress (CNC) was founded to agitate for greater autonomy, although the party was soon split along ethnic and caste lines. Historian K. M. de Silva has stated that the refusal of the Ceylon Tamils to accept minority status is one of the main causes of the break up of the Ceylon National congress. The CNC did not seek independence (or "Swaraj"). What may be called the independence movement broke into two streams: the "constitutionalists", who sought independence by gradual modification of the status of Ceylon; and the more radical groups associated with the Colombo Youth League, Labour movement of Goonasinghe, and the Jaffna Youth Congress. These organizations were the first to raise the cry of "Swaraj" ("outright independence") following the Indian example when Jawaharlal Nehru, Sarojini Naidu and other Indian leaders visited Ceylon in 1926. The efforts of the constitutionalists led to the arrival of the Donoughmore Commission reforms in 1931 and the Soulbury Commission recommendations, which essentially upheld the 1944 draft constitution of the Board of ministers headed by D. S. Senanayake. The Marxist Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), which grew out of the Youth Leagues in 1935, made the demand for outright independence a cornerstone of their policy. Its deputies in the State Council, N.M. Perera and Philip Gunawardena, were aided in this struggle by other less radical members like Colvin R. De Silva, Leslie Goonewardene, Vivienne Goonewardene, Edmund Samarkody and Natesa Iyer. They also demanded the replacement of English as the official language by Sinhala and Tamil. The Marxist groups were a tiny minority and yet their movement was viewed with great interest by the British administration. The ineffective attempts to rouse the public against the British Raj in revolt would have led to certain bloodshed and a delay in independence. British state papers released in the 1950s show that the Marxist movement had a very negative impact on the policy makers at the Colonial office. The Soulbury Commission was the most important result of the agitation for constitutional reform in the 1930s. The Tamil organization was by then led by G. G. Ponnambalam, who had rejected the "Ceylonese identity". Ponnamblam had declared himself a "proud Dravidian" and proclaimed an independent identity for the Tamils. He attacked the Sinhalese and criticized their historical chronicle known as the Mahavamsa. The first Sinhalese-Tamil riot came in 1939. Ponnambalam opposed universal franchise, supported the caste system, and claimed that the protection of minority rights requires that minorities (35% of the population in 1931) having an equal number of seats in parliament to that of the Sinhalese (65% of the population). This "50-50" or "balanced representation" policy became the hall mark of Tamil politics of the time. Ponnambalam also accused the British of having established colonization in "traditional Tamil areas", and having favoured the Buddhists by the Buddhist temporalities act. The Soulbury Commission rejected the submissions by Ponnambalam and even criticized what they described as their unacceptable communal character. Sinhalese writers pointed to the large immigration of Tamils to the southern urban centres, especially after the opening of the Jaffna-Colombo railway. Meanwhile, Senanayake, Baron Jayatilleke, Oliver Gunatilleke and others lobbied the Soulbury Commission without confronting them officially. The unofficial submissions contained what was to later become the draft constitution of 1944. The close collaboration of the D. S. Senanayake government with the war-time British administration led to the support of Lord Louis Mountbatten. His dispatches and a telegram to the Colonial office supporting Independence for Ceylon have been cited by historians as having helped the Senanayake government to secure the independence of Sri Lanka. The shrewd cooperation with the British as well as diverting the needs of the war market to Ceylonese markets as a supply point, managed by Oliver Goonatilleke, also led to a very favourable fiscal situation for the newly independent government. The Second World War Sri Lanka was a front-line British base against the Japanese during World War II. Sri Lankan opposition to the war led by the Marxist organizations and the leaders of the LSSP pro-independence group were arrested by the Colonial authorities. On 5 April 1942, the Indian Ocean raid saw the Japanese Navy bomb Colombo. The Japanese attack led to the flight of Indian merchants, dominant in the Colombo commercial sector, which removed a major political problem facing the Senanayake government. Marxist leaders also escaped to India where they participated in the independence struggle there. The movement in Ceylon was minuscule, limited to the English-educated intelligentsia and trade unions, mainly in the urban centres. These groups were led by Robert Gunawardena, Philip's brother. In stark contrast to this "heroic" but ineffective approach to the war, the Senanayake government took advantage to further its rapport with the commanding elite. Ceylon became crucial to the British Empire in the war, with Lord Louis Mountbatten using Colombo as his headquarters for the Eastern Theatre. Oliver Goonatilleka successfully exploited the markets for the country's rubber and other agricultural products to replenish the treasury. Nonetheless, the Sinhalese continued to push for independence and the Sinhalese sovereignty, using the opportunities offered by the war, pushed to establish a special relationship with Britain. Meanwhile, the Marxists, identifying the war as an imperialist sideshow and desiring a proletarian revolution, chose a path of agitation disproportionate to their negligible combat strength and diametrically opposed to the "constitutionalist" approach of Senanayake and other ethnic Sinhalese leaders. A small garrison on the Cocos Islands manned by Ceylonese mutinied against British rule. It has been claimed that the LSSP had some hand in the action, though this is far from clear. Three of the participants were the only British colony subjects to be shot for mutiny during World War II. Two members of the Governing Party, Junius Richard Jayawardene and Dudley Senanayake, held discussions with the Japanese to collaborate in fighting the British. Sri Lankans in Singapore and Malaysia formed the 'Lanka Regiment' of the anti-British Indian National Army. The constitutionalists led by D. S. Senanayake succeeded in winning independence. The Soulbury constitution was essentially what Senanayake's board of ministers had drafted in 1944. The promise of Dominion status and independence itself had been given by the Colonial Office. Independence The Sinhalese leader Don Stephen Senanayake left the CNC on the issue of independence, disagreeing with the revised aim of 'the achieving of freedom', although his real reasons were more subtle. He subsequently formed the United National Party (UNP) in 1946, when a new constitution was agreed on, based on the behind-the-curtain lobbying of the Soulbury commission. At the elections of 1947, the UNP won a minority of seats in parliament, but cobbled together a coalition with the Sinhala Maha Sabha party of Solomon Bandaranaike and the Tamil Congress of G.G. Ponnambalam. The successful inclusions of the Tamil-communalist leader Ponnambalam, and his Sinhalese counterpart Bandaranaike were a remarkable political balancing act by Senanayake. The vacuum in Tamil Nationalist politics, created by Ponnamblam's transition to a moderate, opened the field for the Tamil Arasu Kachchi ("Federal party"), a Tamil sovereignty party led by S. J. V. Chelvanaykam who was the lawyer son of a Christian minister. Sri Lanka (1948–present) Dominion Dominion status followed on 4 February 1948 with military treaties with Britain, as the upper ranks of the armed forces were initially British, and British air and sea bases remaining intact. This was later raised to independence itself and Senanayake became the first Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. In 1949, with the concurrence of the leaders of the Ceylon Tamils, the UNP government disenfranchised the Indian Tamil plantation workers. This was the price that Senanayake had to pay to obtain the support of the Kandyan Sinhalese, who felt threatened by the demographics of the tea estates where the inclusion of the "Indian Tamils" would have meant electoral defeat for the Kandyan leaders. Senanayke died in 1952 after falling from a horse and was succeeded by his son Dudley Senanayake, the then minister of Agriculture. In 1953 he resigned following a massive Hartal ("general strike") by the Left parties against the UNP. He was followed by John Kotelawala, a senior politician and an uncle of Dudley Senanayke. Kotelawala did not have the enormous personal prestige or the adroit political acumen of D. S. Senanayake. He brought to the fore the issue of national languages that D. S. Senanayake had adroitly kept on the back burner, antagonising the Tamils and the Sinhalese by stating conflicting policies with regard to the status of Sinhala and Tamil as official languages. He also antagonized the Buddhist lobby by attacking politically active Buddhist Monks who were Bandaranaike's supporters. In 1956, the Senate was abolished and Sinhala was established as the official language, with Tamil as a second language. Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London were abolished and plantations were nationalised to fulfil the election pledges of the Marxist program and to "prevent the ongoing dis-investment by the owning companies". In 1956, the Sinhala Only Act came into being. This established Sinhala as the first and preferred language in commerce and education. The Act took effect immediately. As a consequence vast numbers of people mostly Burghers left the country to live abroad as they rightfully felt discriminated against. In 1958, the first major riots between Sinhalese and Tamils flared up in Colombo as a direct result of the government's language policy. 1971 Uprising The leftist Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna drew worldwide attention when it launched an insurrection against the Bandaranayake government in April 1971. Although the insurgents were young, poorly armed, and inadequately trained, they succeeded in seizing and holding major areas in Southern and Central provinces before they were defeated by the security forces. Their attempt to seize power created a major crisis for the government and forced a fundamental reassessment of the nation's security needs. The movement was started in the late 1960s by Rohana Wijeweera, who became a Maoist and participated in the pro-Beijing branch of the Ceylon Communist Party, He was increasingly at odds with party leaders and impatient with its lack of revolutionary purpose. His success in working with youth groups and his popularity as a public speaker led him to organize his own movement in 1967. Initially identified simply as the New Left, this group drew on students and unemployed youths from rural areas, most of them in the sixteen-to-twenty-five-age-group. Many of these new recruits were members of minority so called 'lower' castes (Karava and Durava) who felt that their economic interests had been neglected by the nation's leftist coalitions. The standard program of indoctrination, the so-called Five Lectures, included discussions of Indian imperialism, the growing economic crisis, the failure of the island's communist and socialist parties, and the need for a sudden, violent seizure of power. Between 1967 and 1970, the group expanded rapidly, gaining control of the student socialist movement at a number of major university campuses and winning recruits and sympathizers within the armed forces. Some of these latter supporters actually provided sketches of police stations, airports, and military facilities that were important to the initial success of the revolt. In order to draw the newer members more tightly into the organization and to prepare them for a coming confrontation, Wijeweera opened "education camps" in several remote areas along the south and southwestern coasts. These camps provided training in Marxism–Leninism and in basic military skills. While developing secret cells and regional commands, Wijeweera's group also began to take a more public role during the elections of 1970. His cadres campaigned openly for the United Front of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike, but at the same time they distributed posters and pamphlets promising violent rebellion if Bandaranaike did not address the interests of the proletariat. In a manifesto issued during this period, the group used the name Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna for the first time. Because of the subversive tone of these publications, the United National Party government had Wijeweera detained during the elections, but the victorious Bandaranaike ordered his release in July 1970. In the politically tolerant atmosphere of the next few months, as the new government attempted to win over a wide variety of unorthodox leftist groups, the JVP intensified both the public campaign and the private preparations for a revolt. Although their group was relatively small, the members hoped to immobilize the government by selective kidnapping and sudden, simultaneous strikes against the security forces throughout the island. Some of the necessary weapons had been bought with funds supplied by the members. For the most part, however, they relied on raids against police stations and army camps to secure weapons, and they manufactured their own bombs. Wijeweera was arrested and sent to Jaffna Prison, where he remained throughout the revolt. In response to his arrest and the growing pressure of police investigations, other JVP leaders decided to act immediately, and they agreed to begin the uprising at 11:00 P.M. on 5 April 1971. Rebel groups armed with shotguns, bombs, and Molotov cocktails launched simultaneous attacks against seventy- four police stations around the island and cut power to major urban areas. The attacks were most successful in the south. By 10 April, the rebels had taken control of Matara District and the city of Ambalangoda in Galle District and came close to capturing the remaining areas of Southern Province. The new government was ill-prepared for the crisis that confronted it. Bandaranaike was caught off guard by the scale of the uprising and was forced to call on India to provide basic security functions. Indian frigates patrolled the coast and Indian troops guarded Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayaka while Indian Air Force helicopters assisted the counteroffensive. Sri Lanka's all-volunteer army had no combat experience since World War II and no training in counterinsurgency warfare. Although the police were able to defend some areas unassisted, in many places the government deployed personnel from all three services in a ground force capacity. Royal Ceylon Air Force helicopters delivered relief supplies to beleaguered police stations while combined service patrols drove the insurgents out of urban areas and into the countryside. After two weeks of fighting, the government regained control of all but a few remote areas. In both human and political terms, the cost of the victory was high: an estimated 10,000 insurgents- -many of them in their teens—died in the conflict, and the army was widely perceived to have used excessive force. In order to win over an alienated population and to prevent a prolonged conflict, Bandaranaike offered amnesties in May and June 1971, and only the top leaders were actually imprisoned. Wijeweera, who was already in detention at the time of the uprising, was given a twenty-year sentence and the JVP was proscribed. Under the six years of emergency rule that followed the uprising, the JVP remained dormant. After the victory of the United National Party in the 1977 elections, however, the new government attempted to broaden its mandate with a period of political tolerance. Wijeweera was freed, the ban was lifted, and the JVP entered the arena of legal political competition. As a candidate in the 1982 presidential elections, Wijeweera finished fourth, with more than 250,000 votes (as compared with Jayewardene's 3.2 million). During this period, and especially as the Tamil conflict to the north became more intense, there was a marked shift in the ideology and goals of the JVP. Initially Marxist in orientation, and claiming to represent the oppressed of both the Tamil and Sinhalese communities, the group emerged increasingly as a Sinhalese nationalist organization opposing any compromise with the Tamil insurgency. This new orientation became explicit in the anti-Tamil riots of July 1983. Because of its role in inciting violence, the JVP was once again banned and its leadership went underground. The group's activities intensified in the second half of 1987 in the wake of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord. The prospect of Tamil autonomy in the north together with the presence of Indian troops stirred up a wave of Sinhalese nationalism and a sudden growth of antigovernment violence. During 1987 a new group emerged	the Chola kingdom and brought back captives as well as recovering the relic of the tooth of the Buddha. A Sangam Period classic, Manimekalai, attributes the origin of the first Pallava King from a liaison between the daughter of a Naga king of Manipallava named Pilli Valai (Pilivalai) with a Chola king, Killivalavan, out of which union was born a prince, who was lost in ship wreck and found with a twig (pallava) of Cephalandra Indica (Tondai) around his ankle and hence named Tondai-man. Another version states "Pallava" was born from the union of the Brahmin Ashvatthama with a Naga Princess also supposedly supported in the sixth verse of the Bahur plates which states "From Ashvatthama was born the king named Pallava". There was intense Roman trade with the ancient Tamil country (present day Southern India) and Sri Lanka, establishing trading settlements which remained long after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. During the reign of Mahasena (274–301) the Theravada (Maha Vihara) was persecuted and the Mahayanan branch of Buddhism appeared. Later the King returned to the Maha Vihara. Pandu (429) was the first of seven Pandiyan rulers, ending with Pithya in 455. Dhatusena (459–477) "Kalaweva" and his son Kashyapa (477–495) built the famous Sigiriya rock palace where some 700 rock graffiti give a glimpse of ancient Sinhala. Decline In 993, when Raja Raja Chola sent a large Chola army which conquered the Anuradhapura Kingdom, in the north, and added it to the sovereignty of the Chola Empire. The whole island was subsequently conquered and incorporated as a province of the vast Chola empire during the reign of his son Rajendra Chola. Polonnaruwa period (1056–1232) The Kingdom of Polonnaruwa was the second major Sinhalese kingdom of Sri Lanka. It lasted from 1055 under Vijayabahu I to 1212 under the rule of Lilavati. The Kingdom of Polonnaruwa came into being after the Anuradhapura Kingdom was invaded by Chola forces under Rajaraja I and led to formation of the Kingdom of Ruhuna, where the Sinhalese Kings ruled during Chola occupation. Decline Sadayavarman Sundara Pandyan I invaded Sri Lanka in the 13th century and defeated Chandrabanu the usurper of the Jaffna Kingdom in northern Sri Lanka. Sadayavarman Sundara Pandyan I forced Candrabhanu to submit to the Pandyan rule and to pay tributes to the Pandyan Dynasty. But later on when Candrabhanu became powerful enough he again invaded the Singhalese kingdom but he was defeated by the brother of Sadayavarman Sundara Pandyan I called Veera Pandyan I and Candrabhanu lost his life. Sri Lanka was invaded for the 3rd time by the Pandyan Dynasty under the leadership of Arya Cakravarti who established the Jaffna kingdom. Transitional period (1232–1505) Jaffna Kingdom Also known as the Aryacakravarti dynasty, was a northern kingdom centred around the Jaffna Peninsula. Kingdom of Dambadeniya After defeating Kalinga Magha, King Parakramabahu established his Kingdom in Dambadeniya. He built the Temple of The Sacred Tooth Relic in Dambadeniya. Kingdom of Gampola It was established by king Buwanekabahu IV, he is said to be the son of Sawulu Vijayabahu. During this time, a Muslim traveller and geographer named Ibn Battuta came to Sri Lanka and wrote a book about it. The Gadaladeniya Viharaya is the main building made in the Gampola Kingdom period. The Lankatilaka Viharaya is also a main building built in Gampola. Kingdom of Kotte After winning the battle, Parakramabahu VI sent an officer named Alagakkonar to check the new kingdom of Kotte. Kingdom of Sitawaka The kingdom of Sithawaka lasted for a short span of time during the Portuguese era. Vannimai Vannimai, also called Vanni Nadu, were feudal land divisions ruled by Vanniar chiefs south of the Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka. Pandara Vanniyan allied with the Kandy Nayakars led a rebellion against the British and Dutch colonial powers in Sri Lanka in 1802. He was able to liberate Mullaitivu and other parts of northern Vanni from Dutch rule. In 1803, Pandara Vanniyan was defeated by the British and Vanni came under British rule. Crisis of the Sixteenth Century (1505–1594) Portuguese intervention The first Europeans to visit Sri Lanka in modern times were the Portuguese: Lourenço de Almeida arrived in 1505 and found that the island, divided into seven warring kingdoms, was unable to fend off intruders. The Portuguese founded a fort at the port city of Colombo in 1517 and gradually extended their control over the coastal areas. In 1592, the Sinhalese moved their capital to the inland city of Kandy, a location more secure against attack from invaders. Intermittent warfare continued through the 16th century. Many lowland Sinhalese converted to Christianity due to missionary campaigns by the Portuguese while the coastal Moors were religiously persecuted and forced to retreat to the Central highlands. The Buddhist majority disliked the Portuguese occupation and its influences, welcoming any power who might rescue them. When the Dutch captain Joris van Spilbergen landed in 1602, the king of Kandy appealed to him for help. Dutch intervention Rajasinghe II, the king of Kandy, made a treaty with the Dutch in 1638 to get rid of the Portuguese who ruled most of the coastal areas of the island. The main conditions of the treaty were that the Dutch were to hand over the coastal areas they had captured to the Kandyan king in return for a Dutch trade monopoly over the island. The agreement was breached by both parties. The Dutch captured Colombo in 1656 and the last Portuguese strongholds near Jaffnapatnam in 1658. By 1660 they controlled the whole island except the land-locked kingdom of Kandy. The Dutch (Protestants) persecuted the Catholics and the remaining Portuguese settlers but left Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims alone. The Dutch levied far heavier taxes on the people than the Portuguese had done. Kandyan period (1594–1815) After the invasion of the Portuguese, Konappu Bandara (King Vimaladharmasuriya) intelligently won the battle and became the first king of the kingdom of Kandy. He built The Temple of the Sacred Tooth Relic. The monarch ended with the death of the last king, Sri Vikrama Rajasinha in 1832. Colonial Sri Lanka (1815–1948) During the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain, fearing that French control of the Netherlands might deliver Sri Lanka to the French, occupied the coastal areas of the island (which they called Ceylon) with little difficulty in 1796. In 1802, the Treaty of Amiens formally ceded the Dutch part of the island to Britain and it became a crown colony. In 1803, the British invaded the Kingdom of Kandy in the first Kandyan War, but were repulsed. In 1815 Kandy was annexed in the second Kandyan War, finally ending Sri Lankan independence. Following the suppression of the Uva Rebellion the Kandyan peasantry were stripped of their lands by the Crown Lands (Encroachments) Ordinance No. 12 of 1840 (sometimes called the Crown Lands Ordinance or the Waste Lands Ordinance), a modern enclosure movement, and reduced to penury. The British found that the uplands of Sri Lanka were very suitable for coffee, tea and rubber cultivation. By the mid-19th century, Ceylon tea had become a staple of the British market bringing great wealth to a small number of European tea planters. The planters imported large numbers of Tamil workers as indentured labourers from south India to work the estates, who soon made up 10% of the island's population. The British colonial administration favoured the semi-European Burghers, certain high-caste Sinhalese and the Tamils who were mainly concentrated to the north of the country. Nevertheless, the British also introduced democratic elements to Sri Lanka for the first time in its history and the Burghers were given degree of self-government as early as 1833. It was not until 1909 that constitutional development began, with a partly elected assembly, and not until 1920 that elected members outnumbered official appointees. Universal suffrage was introduced in 1931 over the protests of the Sinhalese, Tamil and Burgher elite who objected to the common people being allowed to vote. Independence movement Ceylon National Congress (CNC) was founded to agitate for greater autonomy, although the party was soon split along ethnic and caste lines. Historian K. M. de Silva has stated that the refusal of the Ceylon Tamils to accept minority status is one of the main causes of the break up of the Ceylon National congress. The CNC did not seek independence (or "Swaraj"). What may be called the independence movement broke into two streams: the "constitutionalists", who sought independence by gradual modification of the status of Ceylon; and the more radical groups associated with the Colombo Youth League, Labour movement of Goonasinghe, and the Jaffna Youth Congress. These organizations were the first to raise the cry of "Swaraj" ("outright independence") following the Indian example when Jawaharlal Nehru, Sarojini Naidu and other Indian leaders visited Ceylon in 1926. The efforts of the constitutionalists led to the arrival of the Donoughmore Commission reforms in 1931 and the Soulbury Commission recommendations, which essentially upheld the 1944 draft constitution of the Board of ministers headed by D. S. Senanayake. The Marxist Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), which grew out of the Youth Leagues in 1935, made the demand for outright independence a cornerstone of their policy. Its deputies in the State Council, N.M. Perera and Philip Gunawardena, were aided in this struggle by other less radical members like Colvin R. De Silva, Leslie Goonewardene, Vivienne Goonewardene, Edmund Samarkody and Natesa Iyer. They also demanded the replacement of English as the official language by Sinhala and Tamil. The Marxist groups were a tiny minority and yet their movement was viewed with great interest by the British administration. The ineffective attempts to rouse the public against the British Raj in revolt would have led to certain bloodshed and a delay in independence. British state papers released in the 1950s show that the Marxist movement had a very negative impact on the policy makers at the Colonial office. The Soulbury Commission was the most important result of the agitation for constitutional reform in the 1930s. The Tamil organization was by then led by G. G. Ponnambalam, who had rejected the "Ceylonese identity". Ponnamblam had declared himself a "proud Dravidian" and proclaimed an independent identity for the Tamils. He attacked the Sinhalese and criticized their historical chronicle known as the Mahavamsa. The first Sinhalese-Tamil riot came in 1939. Ponnambalam opposed universal franchise, supported the caste system, and claimed that the protection of minority rights requires that minorities (35% of the population in 1931) having an equal number of seats in parliament to that of the Sinhalese (65% of the population). This "50-50" or "balanced representation" policy became the hall mark of Tamil politics of the time. Ponnambalam also accused the British of having established colonization in "traditional Tamil areas", and having favoured the Buddhists by the Buddhist temporalities act. The Soulbury Commission rejected the submissions by Ponnambalam and even criticized what they described as their unacceptable communal character. Sinhalese writers pointed to the large immigration of Tamils to the southern urban centres, especially after the opening of the Jaffna-Colombo railway. Meanwhile, Senanayake, Baron Jayatilleke, Oliver Gunatilleke and others lobbied the Soulbury Commission without confronting them officially. The unofficial submissions contained what was to later become the draft constitution of 1944. The close collaboration of the D. S. Senanayake government with the war-time British administration led to the support of Lord Louis Mountbatten. His dispatches and a telegram to the Colonial office supporting Independence for Ceylon have been cited by historians as having helped the Senanayake government to secure the independence of Sri Lanka. The shrewd cooperation with the British as well as diverting the needs of the war market to Ceylonese markets as a supply point, managed by Oliver Goonatilleke, also led to a very favourable fiscal situation for the newly independent government. The Second World War Sri Lanka was a front-line British base against the Japanese during World War II. Sri Lankan opposition to the war led by the Marxist organizations and the leaders of the LSSP pro-independence group were arrested by the Colonial authorities. On 5 April 1942, the Indian Ocean raid saw the Japanese Navy bomb Colombo. The Japanese attack led to the flight of Indian merchants, dominant in the Colombo commercial sector, which removed a major political problem facing the Senanayake government. Marxist leaders also escaped to India where they participated in the independence struggle there. The movement in Ceylon was minuscule, limited to the English-educated intelligentsia and trade unions, mainly in the urban centres. These groups were led by Robert Gunawardena, Philip's brother. In stark contrast to this "heroic" but ineffective approach to the war, the Senanayake government took advantage to further its rapport with the commanding elite. Ceylon became crucial to the British Empire in the war, with Lord Louis Mountbatten using Colombo as his headquarters for the Eastern Theatre. Oliver Goonatilleka successfully exploited the markets for the country's rubber and other agricultural products to replenish the treasury. Nonetheless, the Sinhalese continued to push for independence and the Sinhalese sovereignty, using the opportunities offered by the war, pushed to establish a special relationship with Britain. Meanwhile, the Marxists, identifying the war as an imperialist sideshow and desiring a proletarian revolution, chose a path of agitation disproportionate to their negligible combat strength and diametrically opposed to the "constitutionalist" approach of Senanayake and other ethnic Sinhalese leaders. A small garrison on the Cocos Islands manned by Ceylonese mutinied against British rule. It has been claimed that the LSSP had some hand in the action, though this is far from clear. Three of the participants were the only British colony subjects to be shot for mutiny during World War II. Two members of the Governing Party, Junius Richard Jayawardene and Dudley Senanayake, held discussions with the Japanese to collaborate in fighting the British. Sri Lankans in Singapore and Malaysia formed the 'Lanka Regiment' of the anti-British Indian National Army. The constitutionalists led by D. S. Senanayake succeeded in winning independence. The Soulbury constitution was essentially what Senanayake's board of ministers had drafted in 1944. The promise of Dominion status and independence itself had been given by the Colonial Office. Independence The Sinhalese leader Don Stephen Senanayake left the CNC on the issue of independence, disagreeing with the revised aim of 'the achieving of freedom', although his real reasons were more subtle. He subsequently formed the United National Party (UNP) in 1946, when a new constitution was agreed on, based on the behind-the-curtain lobbying of the Soulbury commission. At the elections of 1947, the UNP won a minority of seats in parliament, but cobbled together a coalition with the Sinhala Maha Sabha party of Solomon Bandaranaike and the Tamil Congress of G.G. Ponnambalam. The successful inclusions of the Tamil-communalist leader Ponnambalam, and his Sinhalese counterpart Bandaranaike were a remarkable political balancing act by Senanayake. The vacuum in Tamil Nationalist politics, created by Ponnamblam's transition to a moderate, opened the field for the Tamil Arasu Kachchi ("Federal party"), a Tamil sovereignty party led by S. J. V. Chelvanaykam who was the lawyer son of a Christian minister. Sri Lanka (1948–present) Dominion Dominion status followed on 4 February 1948 with military treaties with Britain, as the upper ranks of the armed forces were initially British, and British air and sea bases remaining intact. This was later raised to independence itself and Senanayake became the first Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. In 1949, with the concurrence of the leaders of the Ceylon Tamils, the UNP government disenfranchised the Indian Tamil plantation workers. This was the price that Senanayake had to pay to obtain the support of the Kandyan Sinhalese, who felt threatened by the demographics of the tea estates where the inclusion of the "Indian Tamils" would have meant electoral defeat for the Kandyan leaders. Senanayke died in 1952 after falling from a horse and was succeeded by his son Dudley Senanayake, the then minister of Agriculture. In 1953 he resigned following a massive Hartal ("general strike") by the Left parties against the UNP. He was followed by John Kotelawala, a senior politician and an uncle of Dudley Senanayke. Kotelawala did not have the enormous personal prestige or the adroit political acumen of D. S. Senanayake. He brought to the fore the issue of national languages that D. S. Senanayake had adroitly kept on the back burner, antagonising the Tamils and the Sinhalese by stating conflicting policies with regard to the status of Sinhala and Tamil as official languages. He also antagonized the Buddhist lobby by attacking politically active Buddhist Monks who were Bandaranaike's supporters. In 1956, the Senate was abolished and Sinhala was established as the official language, with Tamil as a second language. Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London were abolished and plantations were nationalised to fulfil the election pledges of the Marxist program and to "prevent the ongoing dis-investment by the owning companies". In 1956, the Sinhala Only Act came into being. This established Sinhala as the first and preferred language in commerce and education. The Act took effect immediately. As a consequence vast numbers of people mostly Burghers left the country to live abroad as they rightfully felt discriminated against. In 1958, the first major riots between Sinhalese and Tamils flared up in Colombo as a direct result of the government's language policy. 1971 Uprising The leftist Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna drew worldwide attention when it launched an insurrection against the Bandaranayake government in April 1971. Although the insurgents were young, poorly armed, and inadequately trained, they succeeded in seizing and holding major areas in Southern and Central provinces before they were defeated by the security forces. Their attempt to seize power created a major crisis for the government and forced a fundamental reassessment of the nation's security needs. The movement was started in the late 1960s by Rohana Wijeweera, who became a Maoist and participated in the pro-Beijing branch of the Ceylon Communist Party, He was increasingly at odds with party leaders and impatient with its lack of revolutionary purpose. His success in working with youth groups and his popularity as a public speaker led him to organize his own movement in 1967. Initially identified simply as the New Left, this group drew on students and unemployed youths from rural areas, most of them in the sixteen-to-twenty-five-age-group. Many of these new recruits were members of minority so called 'lower' castes (Karava and Durava) who felt that their economic interests had been neglected by the nation's leftist coalitions. The standard program of indoctrination, the so-called Five Lectures, included discussions of Indian imperialism, the growing economic crisis, the failure of the island's communist and socialist parties, and the need for a sudden, violent seizure of power. Between 1967 and 1970, the group expanded rapidly, gaining control of the student socialist movement at a number of major university campuses and winning recruits and sympathizers within the armed forces. Some of these latter supporters actually provided sketches of police stations, airports, and military facilities that were important to the initial success of the revolt. In order to draw the newer members more tightly into the organization and to prepare them for a coming confrontation, Wijeweera opened "education camps" in several remote areas along the south and southwestern coasts. These camps provided training in Marxism–Leninism and in basic military skills. While developing secret cells and regional commands, Wijeweera's group also began to take a more public role during the elections of 1970. His cadres campaigned openly for the United Front of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike, but at the same time they distributed posters and pamphlets promising violent rebellion if Bandaranaike did not address the interests of the proletariat. In a manifesto issued during this period, the group used the name Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna for the first time. Because of the subversive tone of these publications, the United National Party government had Wijeweera detained during the elections, but the victorious Bandaranaike ordered his release in July 1970. In the politically tolerant atmosphere of the next few months, as the new government attempted to win over a wide variety of unorthodox leftist groups, the JVP intensified both the public campaign and the private preparations for a revolt. Although their group was relatively small, the members hoped to immobilize the government by selective kidnapping and sudden, simultaneous strikes against the security forces throughout the island. Some of the necessary weapons had been bought with funds supplied by the members. For the most part, however, they relied on raids against police stations and army camps to secure weapons, and they manufactured their own bombs. Wijeweera was arrested and sent to Jaffna Prison, where he remained throughout the revolt. In response to his arrest and the growing pressure of police investigations, other JVP leaders decided to act immediately, and they agreed to begin the uprising at 11:00 P.M. on 5 April 1971. Rebel groups armed with shotguns, bombs, and Molotov cocktails launched simultaneous attacks against seventy- four police stations around the island and cut power to major urban areas. The attacks were most successful in the south. By 10 April, the rebels had taken control of Matara District and
of this area is a high plateau, running north–south for approximately 65 kilometers. This area includes Sri Lanka's highest mountains. (Pidurutalagala is the highest at 2,524 m) At the plateau's southern end, mountain ranges stretch 50 kilometers to the west toward Adam's Peak (2,243 meters) and 50 kilometers to the east toward Namunakula (2,036 m). Flanking the high central ridges are two lower plateaus. On the west is the Hatton Plateau, a deeply dissected series of ridges sloping downward toward the north. On the east, the Uva Basin consists of rolling hills covered with grasses, traversed by some deep valleys and gorges. To the north, separated from the main body of mountains and plateaus by broad valleys, lies the Knuckles Massif: steep escarpments, deep gorges, and peaks rising to more than 1,800 meters. South of Adam's Peak lie the parallel ridges of the Rakwana Hills, with several peaks over 1,400 meters. The land descends from the Central Highlands to a series of escarpments and ledges at 400 to 500 meters above sea level before sloping down toward the coastal plains. Most of the island's surface consists of plains between 30 and 200 meters above sea level. In the southwest, ridges and valleys rise gradually to merge with the Central Highlands, giving a dissected appearance to the plain. Extensive erosion in this area has worn down the ridges and deposited rich soil for agriculture downstream. In the southeast, a red, lateritic soil covers relatively level ground that is studded with bare, monolithic hills. The transition from the plain to the Central Highlands is abrupt in the southeast, and the mountains appear to rise up like a wall. In the east and the north, the plain is flat, dissected by long, narrow ridges of granite running from the Central Highlands. A coastal belt about thirty meters above sea level surrounds the island. Much of the coast consists of scenic sandy beaches indented by coastal lagoons. In the Jaffna Peninsula, limestone beds are exposed to the waves as low-lying cliffs in a few places. In the northeast and the southwest, where the coast cuts across the stratification of the crystalline rocks, rocky cliffs, bays, and offshore islands can be found; these conditions have created one of the world's best natural harbors at Trincomalee on the northeast coast, and a smaller rock harbor at Galle on the southwestern coast. Sri Lanka's rivers rise in the Central Highlands and flow in a radial pattern toward the sea. Most of these rivers are short. There are 16 principal rivers longer than 100 kilometers in length, with twelve of them carrying about 75% of the mean river discharge in the entire country. The longest rivers are the Mahaweli Ganga (335 km) and the Malvathu River (170 km). In the highlands, river courses are frequently broken by discontinuities in the terrain, and where they encounter escarpments, numerous waterfalls and rapids have eroded a passage. Once they reach the plain, the rivers slow down and the waters meander across flood plains and deltas. The upper reaches of the rivers are wild and usually unnavigable, and the lower reaches are prone to seasonal flooding. Human intervention has altered the flows of some rivers in order to create hydroelectric, irrigation, and transportation projects. In the north, east, and southeast, the rivers feed numerous artificial lakes or reservoirs (tanks) that store water during the dry season. During the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale projects dammed the Mahaweli Ganga and neighboring streams to create large lakes along their courses. Several hundred kilometers of canals, most of which were built by the Dutch in the 18th century, link inland waterways in the southwestern part of Sri Lanka. Climate Sri Lanka's climate can be described as tropical, and quite hot. Its position between 5 and 10 north latitude endows the country with year-round warm weather, moderated by ocean winds and considerable moisture. The average temperature ranges from a low of in Nuwara Eliya in the Central Highlands (where frost may occur for several days in the winter) to a high of in Trincomalee on the northeast coast (where temperatures may reach ). The average yearly temperature for the country as a whole ranges from . Day and night temperatures may vary by 4 to 7 °C (7.2 to 12.6 °F). January is the coolest month, especially in the highlands, where overnight temperatures may fall to . May, the hottest period, precedes the summer monsoon rains. The rainfall pattern is influenced by the monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal and is marked by four seasons. The first is from mid-May to October, when winds originate in the southwest, bringing moisture from the Indian Ocean. When these winds encounter the slopes of the Central Highlands, they unload heavy rains on the mountain slopes and the southwestern sector of the island. Some of the windward slopes receive up to of rain per month, but the leeward slopes in the east and northeast receive little rain. The second season occurs in October and November, the intermonsoonal months. During this season, periodic squalls occur and sometimes tropical cyclones bring overcast skies and rains to the southwest, northeast, and eastern parts of the island. During the third season, December to March, monsoon winds come from the northeast, bringing moisture from the Bay of Bengal. The northeastern slopes of the mountains may be inundated with up to of rain during these months. Another intermonsoonal period occurs from March until mid-May, with light, variable winds and evening thundershowers. An increase in average rainfall coupled with heavier rainfall events has resulted in recurrent flooding and related damages to infrastructure, utility supply	the southwest monsoon (June to October). Its terrain is mostly low, flat to rolling plain, with mountains in the south-central interior. The highest point is Pidurutalagala at . Natural resources include limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, phosphates, clay Geology More than 90% of Sri Lanka's surface lies on Precambrian strata, some of it dating back 2 billion years. The granulite facies rocks of the Highland Series (gneisses, sillimanite-graphite gneisses, quartzite, marbles, and some charnockites) make up most of the island and the amphibolite facies gneisses, granites, and granitic gneisses of the Vinjayan Series occur in the eastern and southeastern lowlands. Jurassic sediments are present today in very small areas near the western coast and Miocene limestones underlie the northwestern part of the country and extend south in a relatively narrow belt along the west coast. The metamorphic rock surface was created by the transformation of ancient sediments under intense heat and pressure during mountain-building processes. The theory of plate tectonics suggests that these rocks and related rocks forming most of south India were part of a single southern landmass called Gondwanaland. Beginning about 200 million years ago, forces within the Earth's mantle began to separate the lands of the Southern Hemisphere, and a crustal plate supporting both India and Sri Lanka moved toward the northeast. About 45 million years ago, the Indian plate collided with the Asian landmass, raising the Himalayas in northern India, and continuing to advance slowly to the present time. Sri Lanka does not experience earthquakes or major volcanic events because it rides on the center of the plate. The island contains relatively limited strata of sedimentation surrounding its ancient uplands. Aside from recent deposits along river valleys, only two small fragments of Jurassic (140 to 190 million years ago) sediment occur in Puttalam District, while a more extensive belt of Miocene (5 to 20 million years ago) limestone is found along the northwest coast, overlain in many areas by Pleistocene (1 million years ago) deposits. The northwest coast is part of the deep Cauvery (Kaveri) River Basin of southeast India, which has been collecting sediments from the highlands of India and Sri Lanka since the breakup of Gondwanaland. Topography Extensive faulting and erosion over time have produced a wide range of topographic features. Three zones are distinguishable by elevation: the Central Highlands, the plains, and the coastal belt. The south-central part of Sri Lanka—the rugged Central Highlands—is the heart of the country. The core of this area is a high plateau, running north–south for approximately 65 kilometers. This area includes Sri Lanka's highest mountains. (Pidurutalagala is the highest at 2,524 m) At the plateau's southern end, mountain ranges stretch 50 kilometers to the west toward Adam's Peak (2,243 meters) and 50 kilometers to the east toward Namunakula (2,036 m). Flanking the high central ridges are two lower plateaus. On the west is the Hatton Plateau, a deeply dissected series of ridges sloping downward toward the north. On the east, the Uva Basin consists of rolling hills covered with grasses, traversed by some deep valleys and gorges. To the north, separated from the main body of mountains and plateaus by broad valleys, lies the Knuckles Massif: steep escarpments, deep gorges, and peaks rising to more than 1,800 meters. South of Adam's Peak lie the parallel ridges of the Rakwana Hills, with several peaks over 1,400 meters. The land descends from the Central Highlands to a series of escarpments and ledges at 400 to 500 meters above sea level before sloping down toward the coastal plains. Most of the island's surface consists of plains between 30 and 200 meters above sea level. In the southwest, ridges and valleys rise gradually to merge with the Central Highlands, giving a dissected appearance to the plain. Extensive erosion in this area has worn down the ridges and deposited rich soil for agriculture downstream. In the southeast, a red, lateritic soil covers relatively level ground that is studded with bare, monolithic hills. The transition from the plain to the Central Highlands is abrupt in the southeast, and the mountains appear to rise up like a wall. In the east and the north, the plain is flat, dissected by long, narrow ridges of granite running from the Central Highlands. A coastal belt about thirty meters above sea level surrounds the island. Much of the coast consists of scenic sandy beaches indented by coastal lagoons. In the Jaffna Peninsula, limestone beds are exposed to the waves as low-lying cliffs in a few places. In the northeast and the southwest, where the coast cuts across the stratification of the crystalline rocks, rocky cliffs, bays, and offshore islands can be found; these conditions have created one of the world's best natural harbors at Trincomalee on the northeast coast, and a smaller rock harbor at Galle on the southwestern coast. Sri Lanka's rivers rise in the Central Highlands and flow in a radial pattern toward the sea. Most of these rivers are short. There are 16 principal rivers longer than 100 kilometers in length, with twelve of them carrying about 75% of the mean river discharge in the entire country. The longest rivers are the Mahaweli Ganga (335 km) and the Malvathu River (170 km). In the highlands, river courses are frequently broken by discontinuities in the terrain, and where they encounter escarpments, numerous waterfalls and rapids have eroded a passage. Once they reach the plain, the rivers slow down and the waters meander across flood plains and deltas. The upper reaches of the rivers are wild and usually unnavigable, and the lower reaches are prone to seasonal flooding. Human intervention has altered the flows of some rivers in order to create hydroelectric, irrigation, and transportation projects. In the north, east, and southeast, the rivers feed numerous artificial lakes or reservoirs (tanks) that store water during the dry season. During the 1970s and 1980s, large-scale projects dammed the Mahaweli Ganga and neighboring streams to create large lakes along their courses. Several hundred kilometers of canals, most of which were built by the Dutch in the 18th century, link inland waterways in the southwestern part of Sri Lanka. Climate Sri Lanka's climate can be described as tropical, and quite hot. Its position between 5 and 10 north latitude endows the country with year-round warm weather, moderated by ocean winds and considerable moisture. The average temperature ranges from a low of in Nuwara Eliya in the Central Highlands (where frost may occur for several days in the winter) to a high of in Trincomalee on the northeast coast (where temperatures may reach ). The average yearly temperature for the country as a whole ranges from . Day and night temperatures may vary by 4 to 7 °C (7.2 to 12.6 °F). January is the coolest month, especially in the highlands, where overnight temperatures may fall to . May, the hottest period, precedes the summer monsoon rains. The rainfall pattern is influenced by the monsoon winds of the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal and is marked by four seasons. The first is from mid-May to October, when winds originate in the southwest, bringing moisture from the Indian Ocean. When these winds encounter the slopes of the Central Highlands, they unload heavy rains on the mountain slopes and the southwestern sector of the island. Some of the windward slopes receive up to of rain per month, but the leeward slopes in the east and northeast receive little rain. The second season occurs in October and November, the intermonsoonal months. During this season, periodic squalls occur and sometimes tropical cyclones bring overcast skies and rains to the southwest, northeast, and eastern parts of the island. During the third season, December to March, monsoon winds come from the northeast, bringing moisture from the Bay of Bengal. The northeastern slopes of the mountains may be inundated with up to of rain during these months.
demographic features of the population of Sri Lanka, including population density, ethnicity, education level, health of the populace, economic status, religious affiliations and other aspects of the population. Sri Lanka is an island in the Indian Ocean, also called Ceylon and many other names. It is about the size of Ireland. It is about 28 kilometres (18 mi.) off the south-eastern coast of India with a population of about 20 million. Density is highest in the south west where Colombo, the country's main port and industrial center, is located. The net population growth is about 0.7%. Sri Lanka is ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse. Overview According to the 2012 census the population of Sri Lanka was 20,359,439, giving a population density of 325/km2. The population had grown by 5,512,689 (37.1%) since the 1981 census (the last full census), equivalent to an annual growth rate of 1.1%. 3,704,470 (18.2%) lived in urban sectors - areas governed by municipal and urban councils. 5,131,666 (25.2%) of the population were aged 14 or under whilst 2,525,573 (12.4%) were aged 60 or over, leaving a working age (15-59) population of 12,702,700. The dependency ratio was 60.2%. The mean age was 32 years and the median age was 31 years. The sex ratio was 94 males per 100 females. The fertility rate for married females aged 15 or over was 2.65 live births. There were 5,264,282 households, of which 3,986,236 (75.7%) were headed by males and 1,278,046 (24.3%) were headed by females. Of the 15,227,773 aged 15 or over, 10,322,105 (67.8%) were married, 3,927,602 (25.8%) were never married, 792,947 (5.2%) were widowed and 185,119 (1.2%) were divorced or separated. Of those aged 15 or over, 7,857,370 (51.6%) were economically active, 4,199,558 (27.6%) did housework, 1,431,105 (9.4%) were students, 914,934 (6.0%) were unable to work and 346,084 (2.3%) were pensioners. 521,938 (6.6%) of the economically active were unemployed. 604,540 Sri Lankans were living aboard for more than six months but were intending to return to Sri Lanka, mostly in the Gulf states (373,050 61.7%). The overall literacy rate for those aged 10 and over was 95.7% but amongst those living in the estate sector it was only 86.1%. Of the 18,615,577 aged 5 or over, 499,563 (2.7%) had received a higher education qualification, 2,293,841 (12.3%) had passed G.C.E. A/L, 3,159,402 (17.0%) had passed G.C.E. O/L and 700,419 (3.8%) had no formal schooling. The remaining 11,962,352 (64.3%) had left school with no qualifications or were currently at school. Sri Lanka's population is aging faster than any other nation in South Asia and has the fifth highest rapidly growing population of older people in Asia after China, Thailand, South Korea and Japan. In 2015, Sri Lanka's population aged over 60 was 13.9%, by 2030 this will increase to 21% and by 2050 this number will reach 27.4%. Sri Lanka's rapidly growing older population has ignited concerns of the socio-economic challenges that the country will face because of this. Ethnicity The Sinhalese make up 74.9% of the population (according to 2012 census) and are concentrated in the densely populated south-west and central parts of the island. The Sri Lanka Tamils, who live predominantly in the north and east of the island, form the largest minority group at 11.1% (according to the 2012 census) of the population. The Moors, descendants of Arab traders that settled in Sri Lanka and married local women, form the third largest ethnic group at 9.3% of the population. They are mostly concentrated in urban areas in the southern parts of the island with substantial populations in the Central and Eastern provinces. During times	Presbyterian. The Veddas have Animist and Buddhist practices. The 1978 constitution, while assuring freedom of religion, gives "the foremost place" to Buddhism. Languages Sinhala, an Indo-Aryan language, is the first language of Sinhalese people. Tamil, a Dravidian language, is the first language of native Sri Lankan Tamils. Tamil is also the first language of the majority of Sri Lankan Moors and the Indian Tamils - according to the 2012 census 98% of Sri Lankan Moors could speak Tamil but only 59% could speak Sinhala. English is fluently spoken by approximately 23.8% of the Sri Lanka's population, and widely used for official and commercial purposes. Malays speak Sri Lanka Malay, a Creole language mixing Sinhala, Tamil and Malay. Many of the Burghers speak Sri Lankan Indo-Portuguese although its use has declined and the majority now speak Sinhala. The Veddas speak Vedda, a Creole language closely based on Sinhala. Use of English has declined since independence, but it continues to be spoken by many in the middle and upper middle classes, particularly in Colombo. According to the 2012 census 24% of the population could speak English. The government is seeking to reverse the decline in the use of English, mainly for economic but also for political reasons. According to the constitution Sinhala and Tamil are official languages whilst English is the link language. Vital statistics UN estimates: Fertility and births Total Fertility Rate (TFR) (Wanted Fertility Rate) and Crude Birth Rate (CBR): Births and deaths Life expectancy Source: UN World Population Prospects Population pyramid Provisional estimates (01/07/2013) : Immigrant stock by source country As of 2017, 40,018 foreign-born people lived in Sri Lanka per United Nations' population division. CIA World Factbook demographic statistics The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated: Population - 21,481,334 (July 2012 est.) Age structure - 0–14 years: 23.9% (male 2,594,815/female 2,493,002); 15–64 years: 68% (male 7,089,307/female 7,418,123); 65 years and over: 8.1% (male 803,172/female 926,372) (2010 est.) Median age - total: 31.1 years; male: 30.1 years; female: 32.2 years (2012 est.) Population growth rate - 0.913% (2012 est.) Birth rate - 17.04 births/1,000 population (2012 est.) Death rate - 5.96 deaths/1,000 population (July 2012 est.) Net migration rate - -1.95 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2012 est.) Urbanization - urban population: 14% of total population (2010); rate of urbanization: 1.1% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.) Sex ratio - at birth: 1.04 male(s)/female; under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female; 15–64 years: 0.96 male(s)/female; 65 years and over: 0.75 male(s)/female; total population: 0.96 male(s)/female (2011 est.) Infant mortality rate - total: 9.47 deaths/1,000 live births; male: 10.44 deaths/1,000 live births; female: 8.45 deaths/1,000 live births Life expectancy at birth - total population: 75.94 years; male: 72.43 years; female: 79.59 years (2012 est.) Total fertility rate - 2.17 children born/woman (2012 est.) Health expenditures - 4% of GDP (2009) Physicians density - 0.492 physicians/1,000 population (2006) Hospital bed density - 3.1 beds/1,000 population (2004) HIV/AIDS - adult prevalence rate - less than 0.1% (2009 est.) HIV/AIDS - people living with HIV/AIDS - 2,800 (2009 est.) HIV/AIDS - deaths - fewer than 200 (2009 est.) Major infectious diseases - degree of risk: high; food or waterborne diseases: bacterial diarrhea and hepatitis A; vectorborne disease: dengue fever and chikungunya; water contact disease: leptospirosis; animal contact disease: rabies (2009) Nationality - noun: Sri Lankan(s); adjective: Sri Lankan Ethnic group - Sinhalese 73.8%; Sri Lankan Tamil 11.15%; Sri Lankan Moors 7.2%; Indian Tamil 4.6%; other 0.5%; unspecified 2.75% (2001 census provisional data) Religion - Buddhism 70.19%; Hinduism 12.61%; Islam 9.71%; Christianity 7.45%; Other 0.05% (2012 provisional data) Languages - Sinhala 74%; Tamil 25%; other 1% Literacy - definition: age 15 and over can read and write; total population: 91.2%; male: 92.6%; female:90% (2010 census) Notes References External links Department of
to the constitution—the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to devolve some authority to the provinces. Provincial councils are directly elected for 5-year terms. The leader of the council majority serves as the province's Chief Minister with a board of ministers; a provincial governor is appointed by the president. The Provincial Councils have full statute making power with respect to the Provincial Council List, and shared statute making power respect to the Concurrent List. While all matters set out in the Reserved List are under the central government. Local government structure Below the provincial level are elected Municipal Councils and Urban Councils, responsible for municipalities and cities respectively, and below this level Pradeshiya Sabhas (village councils), again elected. There are 24 Municipal Councils, 41 Urban Councils and 276 Pradeshiya Sabhas. Judicial branch Sri Lanka's judiciary consists of a Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court, and a number of subordinate courts. Sri Lanka's legal system reflects diverse cultural influences. Criminal law is fundamentally British. Basic civil law is Roman-Dutch, but laws pertaining to marriage, divorce, and inheritance are communal, known as respectively as Kandyan, Thesavalamai (Jaffna Tamil) and Muslim (Roman-Dutch law applies to Low-country Sinhalese, Estate Tamils and others). Courts of law Supreme Court of Sri Lanka Court of Appeal of Sri Lanka High Court of Sri Lanka District Courts Magistrate's Courts Primary Courts Foreign relations of Sri Lanka Sri Lanka generally follows a non-aligned foreign policy but has been seeking closer relations with the United States since December 1977. It participates in multilateral diplomacy, particularly at the United Nations, where it seeks to promote sovereignty, independence, and development in the developing world. Sri Lanka was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It also is a member of the Commonwealth, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, and the Colombo Plan. Sri Lanka continues its active participation in the NAM, while also stressing the importance it places on regionalism by playing a strong role in SAARC. Sri Lanka is member of the IAEA, IBRD, ADB, C, CP, ESCAP, FAO, G-24, G-77, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, NAM, OAS (observer), OPCW, PCA, SAARC, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNU, UPU, WCL, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO. І The growing interest of other countries in making their claims to Sri Lanka's strategic assets has been generating heated discussion among national and international circles. Worth noting, China, India and Japan's involvement in Sri Lankan seaport developments is a direct consequence of the ongoing tussle among these three nations to get a firm foothold in this very strategically located island state of Sri Lanka. Political pressure groups Civil society participation in decision-making and opinion-shaping is very poor in Sri Lanka. Professionals, civil society groups, media etc. do not play a significant role in Sri Lankan politics and, as a result, many aspects of the lives of ordinary citizens are politicized. In addition, the vacuum created by the silence and inactivity of civil society has let in radical groups such as the ethnic/religion-based groups, Sri Lanka trade unions; and NGOs have taken lead roles as political pressure groups. See also List of rulers of Ceylon List of presidents of Sri Lanka List of prime ministers of Sri Lanka Sri Lanka leftist parties References Sources Hickman, J. 1999. "Explaining the Two-Party System in Sri Lanka's National Assembly." Contemporary South Asia, Volume 8, Number	the president may be removed from office by a two-thirds vote of Parliament with the concurrence of the Supreme Court. The President appoints and heads a cabinet of ministers responsible to Parliament. The President's deputy is the prime minister, who leads the ruling party in Parliament. A parliamentary no-confidence vote requires dissolution of the cabinet and the appointment of a new one by the President. Legislative branch The Parliament has 225 members, elected for a five-year term, 196 members elected in multi-seat constituencies and 29 by proportional representation. The primary modification is that the party that receives the largest number of valid votes in each constituency gains a unique "bonus seat" (see Hickman, 1999). The president may summon, suspend, or end a legislative session and can dissolve Parliament at any time after one year from the General Elections (except in a few limited circumstances). The President can also dissolve Parliament before the completion of one year, if requested to do so by resolution signed by at least half the MPs. Parliament reserves the power to make all laws. Since its independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has remained a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Political parties and elections In August 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that Presidential Elections would be held in November 2005, resolving a long-running dispute on the length of President Kumaratunga's term. Mahinda Rajapaksa was nominated the SLFP candidate and former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe UNP candidate. The Election was held on November 17, 2005, and Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected the fifth Executive President of Sri Lanka with a 50.3% of valid votes, compared to Ranil Wickremesinghe's 48.4%. Mahinda Rajapaksa took oath as president on November 19, 2005. Ratnasiri Wickremanayake was appointed the 22nd Prime Minister on November 21, 2005, to fill the post vacated by Mahinda Rajapaksa. He was previously Prime Minister from 2000 until 2001. President Mahinda Rajapaksa lost the 2015 presidential elections, ending his ten-year presidency. However, his successor as Sri Lankan President, Maithripala Sirisena, decided not to seek re-election in 2019. The Rajapaksa family regain power in November 2019 presidential elections. His younger brother and former wartime defence chief Gotabaya Rajapaksa won the election, and he was sworn in as the new president of Sri Lanka. Their firm grip of power consolidated in parliamentary elections in August 2020. The family's political party Sri Lanka People's Front (known by its Sinhala initials SLPP) got a lanslide victory and a clear majority in the parliament. Five members of the Rajapaksa family won a seat in the parliament. Former president Mahinda Rajapaksa became the new prime minister. 2019 presidential election 2020 parliamentary election Administrative divisions Local government is divided into two parallel structures, the civil service, which dates to colonial times, and the provincial councils, which were established in 1987. Civil Service Structure The country is divided into 25 districts, each of which has a district secretary (the GA, or Government Agent) who is appointed. Each district comprises 5–16 divisions, each with a DS, or divisional secretary, again, appointed. At a village level Grama Niladari (Village Officers), Samurdhi Niladari (Development Officers) and agriculture extension officers work for the DSs. Provincial Council structure Under the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of July 1987—and the resulting 13th amendment to the constitution—the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to devolve some authority to the provinces. Provincial councils are directly elected for 5-year terms. The leader of the council majority serves as the province's Chief Minister with a board of ministers; a provincial governor
gridlock. Following the steep rise in the deficit in 2020, central government debt rose to 101% of GDP. The debt to GDP ratio rose to 86.8% in 2019 from 77.9% in 2017. Budget deficit data controversy Sri Lanka's Ministry of Finance in 2020 changed its cash-basis accounting convention and charged some payment arrears to the previous year, reporting an 11.1% of GDP deficit for 2020 and revising up the 6.8 deficit in 2019 to 9.6%. Sri Lanka's main opposition charged that it was accounting fraud since arrears are always charged to the year it was paid under the country's cash-basis accounting convention. The deficit that was financed in 2020 was 14.0% of GDP. A Sri Lanka-based fact-checking portal, FactCheck.lk said the shift in numbers to 2019 "cannot be validated by an accounting standard." Credit rating and commercial borrowing Sri Lanka applied for credit ratings from international agencies in its efforts to apply for loans from international markets in 2005 after the election of Mahinda Rajapakse as president. Standard and Poor's gave Sri Lanka a "B+" speculative rating, four levels below investment grade and Fitch "BB-", three grades below investment grade. Standard and Poor's maintained Sri Lanka was constrained by providing widespread subsidies, a bloated public sector, transfers to loss-making state enterprises, and high interest local and international burdens . Standard and Poor's estimates public sector debt has reached 95% of GDP , in comparison to CIA estimates of 89% of GDP . Sri Lanka in mid-2007 sought to borrow $500 million from international markets to shore up the deteriorating exchange rate and reduce pressure on repayment of the domestic debt market . The head of the opposition UNP, Ranil Wickremasinghe has warned that such intense borrowing is unsustainable and will not repay these loans if elected to power . Sri Lanka's credit rating was progressively downgraded following a series of currency crises and output shocks. In December 2018 Fitch downgraded Sri Lanka to 'B' and in April 2020 to 'B-' amid a global Coronavirus pandemic. Moody's downgraded Sri Lanka to Caa1 in September 2020, which was disputed by the Finance Ministry. In November 2020, Fitch Ratings also downgraded Sri Lanka to CCC citing fiscal and external concerns. In December 2020, Standard and Poor's followed, downgrading to 'CCC+', citing high fiscal deficits and excessive domestic liquidity, which was also protested by the Finance Ministry. Investments Sri Lanka's investment to GDP ratio is around 31%, made up of about 24% private and 5% public investment. The private savings rate is about 24% and the government is a net dis-saver leaving a domestic savings investment gap of around 7% of GDP. In 2019 investment fell to 27.4% of GDP from 30.4% a year earlier with the domestic savings rate also falling to 21.3% of GDP from 23%. Sri Lanka's savings rate is undermined by government dis-saving (the revenue deficit), which rose from 1.2 to 2.7% in 2019. There are attempts to improve Sri Lanka's "Ease of Doing Business index' (Sri Lanka stood at 111 for 2018 down from 85th in 2014) and the overall tariff structure. In 1992, Sri Lanka's exports were on par with countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh (at US$2bn), which has only grown to US$12bn by end of 2017 compared to Vietnam's US$214bn and Bangladesh's US$36bn for 2017. Inflation in 2021 Colombo Consumer price inflation 2020 : 4.2% April 2021 : 3.9% Inflation in Sri Lanka measured by the Colombo Consumer Price Index grew 6.0% in the 12-months to August 2021 picking up from 5.7 percent in July. Inflation was 4.2% in the year to December 2020. In 2019 inflation was 4.8 percent. The Department of Census Statistics also compiles a National Consumer Price Index which is released with a delay. Inflation measured by the NCPI increased to 6.8% in July 2021 from 6.1% in June 2021, higher than the central banks target rate Sri Lanka's central bank is targeting inflation at 4-6 per cent in 2021, though the policy will be loose to promote growth. "The Central Bank is of the view that continued support through monetary and fiscal interventions is essential to provide adequate impetus to the economy amidst the challenging domestic and global macroeconomic conditions," Governor W D Lakshman said in January 2021. "Therefore, the Central Bank will continue the prevailing accommodative monetary policy stance in 2021 to ensure the envisaged recovery of economic activity. The Central Bank will continue to remain vigilant but is confident that inflation will remain within the targeted range of 4-6 per cent over the medium-term. But after worsening balance of payments trouble and inflation, rates were hiked in August and the statutory reserve ratio was also raised. Sri Lanka used a 'flexible inflation targeting' framework for monetary policy at least until 2019. In 2020 growth took a priority, Governor Lakshman has said as efforts are made to boost output amid a COVID-19 pandemic. Sri Lanka suffered a US$3.2bn balance of payments deficit in 2020 amid monetary easing. Interest rates - 1 year T bill market rate by June 2019 12 Month T bill to be at 10% by 30 June 2019 The CBSL has reduced its T bill holding significantly from April 2017 to date reversing any monetary stimulated inflationary actions. Thus the resultant liquidity levels in the money market broadly reflect natural market conditions compared to the market that was there a year ago, which reflected more realistic banking sector interest rates as of June 2018. Private sector credit growth declined from high levels of 29% YoY in July 2016 to 15% YoY levels in 1Q2018. Given the changes taking place in the private credit space (i.e. the retail tilt), and provided the CBSL's recent policy rate cut in April 2018, credit growth may still continue to move either horizontally (i.e. at a 15% level) or continue to reduce slightly given anticipated near term inflationary pressures, as the consumption-led borrowings may also tend to decline on account of the anticipated reduction in near term disposable income. This will however not add any excessive upward pressures on interest rates (including 12-month T bill yields) especially during 2H2018E. As a result, 12-month Treasury bill yields may in fact slightly decline from its June 2018 --> 9.4% to 9% levels by end of 2018E. However, given the International Sovereign Bond (ISB) bullet payments >US$3bn p.a. commencing from 2019E may likely add some upward pressure on interest rates, resulting in the 12-month T bill yields rising to at least 10% by 30 June 2019. The author of this segment (Sanjeewa Fernando) is a Lecturer at the University of Colombo for Master of Financial Economics External sector Trade account issues In the recent past, the Sri Lankan Government has identified some key focal areas to address the external imbalances of the economy, especially with regard to reducing its high trade deficit (~15% of GDP for 2012) in order to make the economy comply with the Marshall–Lerner condition. Sri Lanka's oil import bill accounts for an estimated 27% of total imports while its pro-growth policies have resulted in an investment goods import component of 24% of total imports. These inelastic import components have led to Sri Lanka's Export goods price elasticity + Import goods price elasticity totalling less than 1, resulting in the country not complying with the Marshall–Lerner condition. Some of the suggested proposals include: Import substitution of investment goods and consumer goods Tax concessions towards value-added exports Negotiating longer credit periods for oil imports Allowing the external value of the currency to be determined by market forces (with minimal central bank intervention). Capital account Within the capital account, borrowings still account for a significant proportion as opposed to Foreign direct investments. FDIs were estimated at ~US$800mn for FY2012 Overall balance (BOP) The economy ended with an overall positive balance of US$151mn for 2012 (vs. a US$1,061mn deficit in FY2011) Financial institutions The Central Bank of Sri Lanka is the monetary authority of Sri Lanka and was established in 1950. The Central Bank is responsible for the conduct of monetary policy in the country and also has supervisory powers over the financial system. The Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) is the main stock exchange in Sri Lanka. It is one of the most modern exchanges in South Asia, providing a fully automated trading platform. The vision of the CSE is to contribute to the wealth of the nation by creating value through securities. The headquarters of the CSE has been located at the World Trade Center Towers in Colombo since 1995 and it also has branches across the country in Kandy, Matara, Kurunegala, Negombo and Jaffna. In 2009, after the 30 years-long civil war came to an end, the CSE was the best performing stock exchange in the world. Economic infrastructure and resources Transportation and roads Most Sri Lankan cities and towns are connected by the Sri Lanka Railways, the state-run railway operator. The Sri Lanka Transport Board is the state-run agency responsible for operating public bus services across the island. The government has launched several highway projects to bolster the economy and national transport system, including the Colombo-Katunayake Expressway, the Colombo-Kandy (Kadugannawa) Expressway, the Colombo-Padeniya Expressway and the Outer Circular Highway to ease Colombo's traffic congestion. The government-sponsored Road Development Authority (RDA) has been involved in several large-scale projects all over the island in an attempt to improve the road network in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's commercial and economic centres, primarily the capitals of the nine provinces are connected by the "A-Grade" roads which are categorically organised and marked. Furthermore, "B-Grade" roads, also paved and marked, connect district capitals within provinces. The grand total of A, B and E grade roads are estimated at 12,379.49 km. Energy The energy policy is governed by the Ministry of Power and Energy, while the production and retailing of electricity is carried out by the Ceylon Electricity Board. Policy recommendations and planning comes under the oversight of the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka. Energy in Sri Lanka is mostly generated by hydroelectric power stations in the Central Province. Skilled Labor Sri Lanka has a well-established education system that has successfully created a vast supply of skilled labour. Sri Lanka's population has a literacy rate of 92%, higher than that expected for a third world country; it has the highest literacy rate in South Asia and overall, one of the highest literacy rates in Asia. Information technology literacy of the urban sector population is also satisfactory at 39.9 per cent and people around the country use web-based job boards to find skilled employment together with other sources such as newspapers and government gazette. In Sri Lanka, all persons above the age limit 15 years and above of either gender are identified as the working-age population. In the fourth quarter of 2017, Sri Lanka had an unemployment rate of 4.2 percent and is shown to reduce gradually over the years. Economic sectors Tourism Tourism is one of the main industries in Sri Lanka. Major tourist attractions are focused around the islands famous beaches located in the southern and the eastern parts of the country and ancient heritage sites located in the interior of the country and resorts located in the mountainous regions of the country. Also, due to precious stones such as rubies and sapphires being frequently found and mined in Ratnapura and its surrounding areas, they are a major tourist attraction. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the past civil war have reduced the tourist arrivals, as a civil war intensified. Foreign visitors fell from 566,202 in 2004 during a ceasefire with Tamil Tiger separatists to 447,890 by the end of the war in 2009. From then arrivals grew rapidly to 2,333,796 in 2019. The 2019 Easter Sunday bombings reduced arrivals to 1,913,702 though authorities acted quickly to round up the group and travel advisories were relaxed by key generating markets such as UK as early as June 2019. Lonely Planet named Sri Lanka the best destination to visit in 2019 and Travel+Leisure the best island. The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a major blow to the industry after airports were closed in March 2020. Tourism revenues were estimated to have fallen to US$956mn in 2020 from US$3.6bn in 2020 hurting over 300,000 said to be connected to the industry. The government has announced a number relief measures including a debt moratorium, which were then extended. In 2020 arrivals fell 70 percent to 507,704 from 1,913,702 in 2019, with almost all arrivals coming before airports closed in March. In December 2020, under what was called a 'pilot project' 393 package tourists came to Sri Lanka on a charter flights from Ukraine. On January 21 tourism resumed officially allowing independent travellers to also come subject to a series of health rules and Coronavirus tests. Tea industry The tea industry, operating under the Ministry of Public Estate Management and Development, is one of the main industries in Sri Lanka. It became the world's leading exporter in 1995 with a 23% share of global tea export, higher than Kenya's 22% share. The central highlands of the country have a low-temperature climate throughout the year and annual rainfall and humidity levels that are suitable for growing tea. The industry was introduced to the country in 1867 by James Taylor, a British planter who arrived in 1852. Recently, Sri Lanka has become one of the countries exporting fair trade tea to the UK and other countries. It is believed that such projects could reduce rural poverty. Apparel and textile industry The apparel industry of Sri Lanka mainly exports to the United States and Europe. There are about 900 factories throughout country serving companies such as Victoria's Secret, Liz Claiborne and Tommy Hilfiger. Textiles & Apparels, as categorized and reported by the Sri Lanka Export Development Board, made up to around 44% of Sri Lankan merchandise exports, in the year 2017. Agriculture The agricultural sector of the country produces mainly rice, coconut and grain, largely for domestic consumption and occasionally for export. The tea industry which has existed since 1867 is not usually regarded as part of the agricultural sector, which is mainly focused on export rather than domestic use in the country. Sri Lanka's agricultural and agri-allied manufacturing is likely affected by climate variations. There was a flood in May 2018 followed by floods in May 2016 and May 2017. Transition to biological agriculture In June 2021, Sri Lanka started the first "100% organic farming" program and imposed a countrywide ban on inorganic fertilizers and pesticides. The program was welcomed by its advisor Vandana Shiva, but ignored critical voices from scientific and farming community who warned about possible collapse of farming, including financial crisis due to devaluation of national currency pivoted around tea industry. By end of 2021 Sri-Lanka experienced massive drop in farming output by up to 50% and food shortages. The situation in the tea industry was described as critical, with farming under the organic program being described as 10x more expensive and producing half of the yield by the farmers. In September 2021 the government announced "economic emergency", as the situation was further aggravated by falling national currency exchange rate, inflation rising as result of high food prices, and pandemic restrictions in tourism which further decreased country's income. Sri Lanka wants to transition to 100% biological agriculture; the trade in chemical fertilizers and pesticides has been banned. This fact produced a severe economic crisis, since the population expects to remain without income and without food. The government cancelled some of these measures, but importing urea remains banned. Sri Lanka is seeking to introduce peacetime rationing of essential goods. In mid-October 2021 the ban was largely lifted "until the island was able to produce enough organic fertiliser". In November 2021, Sri Lanka abandoned its plan to become the world's first organic farming nation following rising food prices and weeks of protests against the plan. As of December 2021, the damage to the agricultural production was already done, with prices having risen substantially for vegetables in Sri Lanka, and time needed to recover from the crisis. The ban on fertilizer has been lifted for certain crops, but the price of urea has risen internationally due to the price for oil and gas. Jeevika Weerahewa, a senior lecturer at the University of Peradeniya, predicted that the ban would reduce the paddy harvest in 2022 by an unprecedented 50%. IT industry The export revenue of the Sri Lankan IT sector was US$1,089 million in 2019. Mining Sri Lanka is known for producing a variety of gemstones, including chrysoberyl, corundum, garnet, ruby, spinel, and tourmaline, and is a leading producer of the Ceylon Blue sapphire. The best known areas for gemstone mining in Sri Lanka were Balangoda, Elahera, Kamburupitiya, Moneragala, Okkampitiya, and Ratnapura. In addition Sri Lanka has a variety of industrial minerals, which include ball clay, kaolin, and other clays, calcite, dolomite, feldspar, graphite, limestone, Ilmenite, mica, rutile mineral sands, phosphate rock, quartz, zircon, dolomite and silica sand. Pulmoddai beach sand deposit is the most important non-ferrous mineral reserve in Sri Lanka as well as one of the world's most richest mineral sand deposits with heavy mineral concentrates of 50% to 60% and contain manyminerals including titanium. Sri Lanka is famous specially for its highly valued and high-purity vein graphite. As of 2014, graphite was produced at the two largest graphite mines in Sri Lanka, the Bogala and the Kahatagaha Mines. Major investors in graphite mining are Graphite Lanka Ltd., Bogala Graphite Lanka Plc, Bora Bora Resources Ltd. (BBR) of Australia, MRL Corp. Ltd. of Australia, and Saint Jean Carbon Inc. of Canada. Major companies Sri Lanka has developed several multi-national companies and international brands. The most notable companies include: Conglomerates Cargills, JKH, Hayleys, LOLC Holdings Apparel MAS Holdings, Brandix Energy LAUGFS Holdings Hospitality Aitken Spence Tea Dilmah, Island Tea Consumer Goods Ceylon Tobacco Company, Elephant House, DCSL, CBL, Maliban, GRI Tires Global economic relations Exports to the United States, Sri Lanka's most important market, were valued at $1.8 billion in 2002, or 38% of total exports. For many years, the United States has been Sri Lanka's largest market for garments, receiving more than 63% of the country's total garment exports. India is Sri Lanka's largest supplier, with imports worth $835 million in 2002. Japan, traditionally Sri Lanka's largest supplier, was its fourth-largest in 2002 with exports of $355 million. Other important suppliers include Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea. The United States is the 10th-largest supplier to Sri Lanka; US imports amounted to $218 million in 2002, according to Central Bank trade data. A new port is being built in Hambantota in Southern Sri Lanka, funded by the Chinese government as a part of the Chinese aid to Sri Lanka. This will ease the congestion in Sri Lankan ports, particularly in Colombo. In 2009, 4456 ships visited Sri Lankan ports. Trade agreements Foreign assistance Sri Lanka is highly dependent on foreign assistance, and several high-profile assistance projects were launched in	policy will be loose to promote growth. "The Central Bank is of the view that continued support through monetary and fiscal interventions is essential to provide adequate impetus to the economy amidst the challenging domestic and global macroeconomic conditions," Governor W D Lakshman said in January 2021. "Therefore, the Central Bank will continue the prevailing accommodative monetary policy stance in 2021 to ensure the envisaged recovery of economic activity. The Central Bank will continue to remain vigilant but is confident that inflation will remain within the targeted range of 4-6 per cent over the medium-term. But after worsening balance of payments trouble and inflation, rates were hiked in August and the statutory reserve ratio was also raised. Sri Lanka used a 'flexible inflation targeting' framework for monetary policy at least until 2019. In 2020 growth took a priority, Governor Lakshman has said as efforts are made to boost output amid a COVID-19 pandemic. Sri Lanka suffered a US$3.2bn balance of payments deficit in 2020 amid monetary easing. Interest rates - 1 year T bill market rate by June 2019 12 Month T bill to be at 10% by 30 June 2019 The CBSL has reduced its T bill holding significantly from April 2017 to date reversing any monetary stimulated inflationary actions. Thus the resultant liquidity levels in the money market broadly reflect natural market conditions compared to the market that was there a year ago, which reflected more realistic banking sector interest rates as of June 2018. Private sector credit growth declined from high levels of 29% YoY in July 2016 to 15% YoY levels in 1Q2018. Given the changes taking place in the private credit space (i.e. the retail tilt), and provided the CBSL's recent policy rate cut in April 2018, credit growth may still continue to move either horizontally (i.e. at a 15% level) or continue to reduce slightly given anticipated near term inflationary pressures, as the consumption-led borrowings may also tend to decline on account of the anticipated reduction in near term disposable income. This will however not add any excessive upward pressures on interest rates (including 12-month T bill yields) especially during 2H2018E. As a result, 12-month Treasury bill yields may in fact slightly decline from its June 2018 --> 9.4% to 9% levels by end of 2018E. However, given the International Sovereign Bond (ISB) bullet payments >US$3bn p.a. commencing from 2019E may likely add some upward pressure on interest rates, resulting in the 12-month T bill yields rising to at least 10% by 30 June 2019. The author of this segment (Sanjeewa Fernando) is a Lecturer at the University of Colombo for Master of Financial Economics External sector Trade account issues In the recent past, the Sri Lankan Government has identified some key focal areas to address the external imbalances of the economy, especially with regard to reducing its high trade deficit (~15% of GDP for 2012) in order to make the economy comply with the Marshall–Lerner condition. Sri Lanka's oil import bill accounts for an estimated 27% of total imports while its pro-growth policies have resulted in an investment goods import component of 24% of total imports. These inelastic import components have led to Sri Lanka's Export goods price elasticity + Import goods price elasticity totalling less than 1, resulting in the country not complying with the Marshall–Lerner condition. Some of the suggested proposals include: Import substitution of investment goods and consumer goods Tax concessions towards value-added exports Negotiating longer credit periods for oil imports Allowing the external value of the currency to be determined by market forces (with minimal central bank intervention). Capital account Within the capital account, borrowings still account for a significant proportion as opposed to Foreign direct investments. FDIs were estimated at ~US$800mn for FY2012 Overall balance (BOP) The economy ended with an overall positive balance of US$151mn for 2012 (vs. a US$1,061mn deficit in FY2011) Financial institutions The Central Bank of Sri Lanka is the monetary authority of Sri Lanka and was established in 1950. The Central Bank is responsible for the conduct of monetary policy in the country and also has supervisory powers over the financial system. The Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) is the main stock exchange in Sri Lanka. It is one of the most modern exchanges in South Asia, providing a fully automated trading platform. The vision of the CSE is to contribute to the wealth of the nation by creating value through securities. The headquarters of the CSE has been located at the World Trade Center Towers in Colombo since 1995 and it also has branches across the country in Kandy, Matara, Kurunegala, Negombo and Jaffna. In 2009, after the 30 years-long civil war came to an end, the CSE was the best performing stock exchange in the world. Economic infrastructure and resources Transportation and roads Most Sri Lankan cities and towns are connected by the Sri Lanka Railways, the state-run railway operator. The Sri Lanka Transport Board is the state-run agency responsible for operating public bus services across the island. The government has launched several highway projects to bolster the economy and national transport system, including the Colombo-Katunayake Expressway, the Colombo-Kandy (Kadugannawa) Expressway, the Colombo-Padeniya Expressway and the Outer Circular Highway to ease Colombo's traffic congestion. The government-sponsored Road Development Authority (RDA) has been involved in several large-scale projects all over the island in an attempt to improve the road network in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's commercial and economic centres, primarily the capitals of the nine provinces are connected by the "A-Grade" roads which are categorically organised and marked. Furthermore, "B-Grade" roads, also paved and marked, connect district capitals within provinces. The grand total of A, B and E grade roads are estimated at 12,379.49 km. Energy The energy policy is governed by the Ministry of Power and Energy, while the production and retailing of electricity is carried out by the Ceylon Electricity Board. Policy recommendations and planning comes under the oversight of the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka. Energy in Sri Lanka is mostly generated by hydroelectric power stations in the Central Province. Skilled Labor Sri Lanka has a well-established education system that has successfully created a vast supply of skilled labour. Sri Lanka's population has a literacy rate of 92%, higher than that expected for a third world country; it has the highest literacy rate in South Asia and overall, one of the highest literacy rates in Asia. Information technology literacy of the urban sector population is also satisfactory at 39.9 per cent and people around the country use web-based job boards to find skilled employment together with other sources such as newspapers and government gazette. In Sri Lanka, all persons above the age limit 15 years and above of either gender are identified as the working-age population. In the fourth quarter of 2017, Sri Lanka had an unemployment rate of 4.2 percent and is shown to reduce gradually over the years. Economic sectors Tourism Tourism is one of the main industries in Sri Lanka. Major tourist attractions are focused around the islands famous beaches located in the southern and the eastern parts of the country and ancient heritage sites located in the interior of the country and resorts located in the mountainous regions of the country. Also, due to precious stones such as rubies and sapphires being frequently found and mined in Ratnapura and its surrounding areas, they are a major tourist attraction. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the past civil war have reduced the tourist arrivals, as a civil war intensified. Foreign visitors fell from 566,202 in 2004 during a ceasefire with Tamil Tiger separatists to 447,890 by the end of the war in 2009. From then arrivals grew rapidly to 2,333,796 in 2019. The 2019 Easter Sunday bombings reduced arrivals to 1,913,702 though authorities acted quickly to round up the group and travel advisories were relaxed by key generating markets such as UK as early as June 2019. Lonely Planet named Sri Lanka the best destination to visit in 2019 and Travel+Leisure the best island. The COVID-19 pandemic dealt a major blow to the industry after airports were closed in March 2020. Tourism revenues were estimated to have fallen to US$956mn in 2020 from US$3.6bn in 2020 hurting over 300,000 said to be connected to the industry. The government has announced a number relief measures including a debt moratorium, which were then extended. In 2020 arrivals fell 70 percent to 507,704 from 1,913,702 in 2019, with almost all arrivals coming before airports closed in March. In December 2020, under what was called a 'pilot project' 393 package tourists came to Sri Lanka on a charter flights from Ukraine. On January 21 tourism resumed officially allowing independent travellers to also come subject to a series of health rules and Coronavirus tests. Tea industry The tea industry, operating under the Ministry of Public Estate Management and Development, is one of the main industries in Sri Lanka. It became the world's leading exporter in 1995 with a 23% share of global tea export, higher than Kenya's 22% share. The central highlands of the country have a low-temperature climate throughout the year and annual rainfall and humidity levels that are suitable for growing tea. The industry was introduced to the country in 1867 by James Taylor, a British planter who arrived in 1852. Recently, Sri Lanka has become one of the countries exporting fair trade tea to the UK and other countries. It is believed that such projects could reduce rural poverty. Apparel and textile industry The apparel industry of Sri Lanka mainly exports to the United States and Europe. There are about 900 factories throughout country serving companies such as Victoria's Secret, Liz Claiborne and Tommy Hilfiger. Textiles & Apparels, as categorized and reported by the Sri Lanka Export Development Board, made up to around 44% of Sri Lankan merchandise exports, in the year 2017. Agriculture The agricultural sector of the country produces mainly rice, coconut and grain, largely for domestic consumption and occasionally for export. The tea industry which has existed since 1867 is not usually regarded as part of the agricultural sector, which is mainly focused on export rather than domestic use in the country. Sri Lanka's agricultural and agri-allied manufacturing is likely affected by climate variations. There was a flood in May 2018 followed by floods in May 2016 and May 2017. Transition to biological agriculture In June 2021, Sri Lanka started the first "100% organic farming" program and imposed a countrywide ban on inorganic fertilizers and pesticides. The program was welcomed by its advisor Vandana Shiva, but ignored critical voices from scientific and farming community who warned about possible collapse of farming, including financial crisis due to devaluation of national currency pivoted around tea industry. By end of 2021 Sri-Lanka experienced massive drop in farming output by up to 50% and food shortages. The situation in the tea industry was described as critical, with farming under the organic program being described as 10x more expensive and producing half of the yield by the farmers. In September 2021 the government announced "economic emergency", as the situation was further aggravated by falling national currency exchange rate, inflation rising as result of high food prices, and pandemic restrictions in tourism which further decreased country's income. Sri Lanka wants to transition to 100% biological agriculture; the trade in chemical fertilizers and pesticides has been banned. This fact produced a severe economic crisis, since the population expects to remain without income and without food. The government cancelled some of these measures, but importing urea remains banned. Sri Lanka is seeking to introduce peacetime rationing of essential goods. In mid-October 2021 the ban was largely lifted "until the island
areas (2010), good international service (2010). The latest trend is the Fixed 4G LTE and 5G technologies, because of this technology many Sri Lankans who live in rural and remote areas can now access a good telephone and broadband internet service. Domestic The national trunk network consists mostly of digital microwave radio relay and fiber-optic links are now in use in the Colombo City and all major cities and towns International Two submarine cables to India and the Maldives; one Satellite earth stations - Intelsat (Indian Ocean) (2009) Broadband Internet access Fixed Broadband Service Providers Mobile Broadband Service Providers Internet The history of the internet in Sri Lanka began with the launch of the Lanka Education and Research Network (LEARN) in 1992. The network was only made available to educational and research communities. In the 1985/1986 period with the use of an old TRS 80 model which ran Xenix, computer engineers and scholars were able to demonstrate a remote login from University of Moratuwa (UoM) which connected a computer in University of Colombo for the first time. Fixed Broadband Subscriptions : 1,810,657 (June, 2020) Mobile Broadband Subscriptions : 11,684,649 (June, 2020) Internet Speed 4G LTE Mobile Broadband : Download : 21.57Mbit/s to 300Mbit/s Upload : 10.23Mbit/s to 45Mbit/s 4G LTE Fixed Broadband : Download : 28.65Mbit/s to 150Mbit/s Upload : 15.41Mbit/s to 30Mbit/s Fiber Optics : Download : 100Mbit/s to 1000Mbit/s Upload : 50Mbit/s to 500Mbit/s data capped Other Communication Postal Service: Sri Lanka Post Radio broadcast stations: AM 15, FM 54, SW 5 Television broadcast stations: 19 (2009) Satellite Earth Stations located: Padukka and Colombo Internet Service Providers: 9 Country code / Top-level	domain: +94/LK Telecommunications Regulatory Environment in Sri Lanka LIRNEasia's Telecommunications Regulatory Environment (TRE) index, which summarizes stakeholders’ perception on certain TRE dimensions, provides insight into how conducive the environment is for further development and progress. The most recent survey was conducted in July 2008 in eight Asian countries, including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. The tool measured seven dimensions: i) market entry; ii) access to scarce resources; iii) interconnection; iv) tariff regulation; v) anti-competitive practices; and vi) universal services; vii) quality of service, for the fixed, mobile and broadband sectors. In Sri Lanka, the mobile sector receives higher scores than the fixed sector for all dimensions excepting interconnection. The broadband sector lags behind both the fixed and mobile sectors in all but one of the parameters (regulation of anti-competitive practices). What also emerges in the results illustrated above is that all the sectors – other than mobile sector USOs – fall below the 5.00 average performance level. Telecommunication research in Sri Lanka Centre for Telecommunication Research, Padukka Centre for Telecommunication Research is a research-based institute at the Sri Lanka Technological Campus (SLTC) to carry out innovative, collaborative and industry-sponsored research works in wireless communications and networking. Research activities at the CTR, both fundamental and applied, mainly focus on technologies related to the physical, data-link and network layers of communication systems, and optical communication. Product Sri Lanka initiated to produce telecommunication, specially smartphones with the collaboration of foreign companies that already in the leading market. See also List of Sri Lanka Telephone Codes Centre for Telecommunication Research References External links Telecommunications Regulatory Commission
expressways. The main modes of transportation in Sri Lanka are Bus, Motorcycles and Passenger Cars which are also available as Taxi. Classification Sri Lanka's roads are graded E, A, B and C. Expressways The Colombo–Matara Expressway is a motorway linking Colombo, Galle and Matara which was built in 2011 to develop the economy of the Southern Province. The Colombo–Katunayake Expressway, Colombo-Kandy Expressway and Outer Circular Expressway (Colombo bypass road) are under construction, and a Colombo–Padeniya expressway has been proposed. The Sri Lankan government has proposed three elevated highways connecting the three main expressways: From Kirulapone to Kadawatha (about 19 km), connecting the Outer Circular Expressway at Kadawatha and the Colombo–Katunayake Expressway at Peliyagoda From Colombo Fort to Kottawa (about 21 km), connecting the Colombo–Matara and Outer Circular Expressways at Kottawa From Colombo Fort to the Peliyagoda interchange on the Colombo–Katunayake Expressway (about 5 km) National highways Sri Lanka's national highways are graded A or B. A-Grade roads are subdivided as AA, AB or AC. Road density is highest in the southwest, particularly the area around Colombo. Highways are in good condition, with a smooth bitumen surface and road markings; however, some rural roads are in poor condition. Heavily travelled roads are being upgraded and repaved. Public transport is widely available in many rural areas. Buses Buses are the principal mode of public transport. Service is provided by the state-run Sri Lanka Transport Board (SLTB) and privately owned buses. The SLTB has urban and rural routes; in many rural areas, it provides service which would be unprofitable for private operators. There is a website named vanuncle.lk which has been specialized to provide office transport and school transport in Sri Lanka. Many people can find an office transport very easily. Colombo has an extensive, bus-based public transport system, with the Central Bus Stand in Pettah as its hub. The city's road network consists of radial links (or arterial routes), which link the city and district centres, and orbital links intersecting the arterial routes. Most bus routes are on the radial links, without dedicated bus lanes due to high peak traffic volume. A BRT system for Colombo has been proposed but not yet implemented. Inter-city routes connect many of the country's major population centres. Some service is available on the E01 and E03 expressways, with modern Lanka Ashok Leyland buses. In 2011, the SLTB began introducing new buses to replace part of its aging fleet. The Volvo 8400 buses, from Volvo India, run on major routes in Colombo. The most popular model is the Lanka Ashok Leyland Viking, which is operated by the SLTB and several private companies. Rail Sri Lanka Railways consists of an intercity network connecting major population centres and commuter rail serving Colombo commuters. Sri Lanka Railways operates the country's railway network, which includes about of track. Colombo is its hub. Trains connect the main cities of the country's nine provinces. Most of the railways were developed during the British colonial period, with the first line (from Colombo to Kandy) opening on 26 April 1867. The railway was introduced as an economical means of transporting goods produced on the tea, rubber and coconut plantations to the main port in Colombo. After 1950s, the Sri Lankan economy became focused on industry rather than plantation agriculture. The road network also grew; with the introduction of lorries, a faster means of transporting goods, the amount of goods transported by rail declined. Since their network is more focused on plantation areas than on population and service centres, the railways	during the British colonial period, with the first line (from Colombo to Kandy) opening on 26 April 1867. The railway was introduced as an economical means of transporting goods produced on the tea, rubber and coconut plantations to the main port in Colombo. After 1950s, the Sri Lankan economy became focused on industry rather than plantation agriculture. The road network also grew; with the introduction of lorries, a faster means of transporting goods, the amount of goods transported by rail declined. Since their network is more focused on plantation areas than on population and service centres, the railways have generated large losses. Their potential for expansion was demonstrated when Minister of Transport Leslie Goonewardene extended the coastal line from Puttalam to Aruvakalu in 1974 to serve the cement factory there. The railway is modernising and extending that line to facilitate faster trains and improved efficiency. Electrification of the network's busiest sections was proposed in 2010 to improve energy efficiency and sustainability, but no work was done. The railway is extending the coastal line from Matara to Kataragama via Hambantota. The Sri Lankan rail network passes scenic landscapes—particularly the Colombo-Badulla main line, which hugs the country's steep highlands. The railways connect the cities of Kandy, Galle, Matara, Jaffna, Kankesanturai, Mannar, Anuradhapura, Gampaha, Negombo, Kurunegala, Avissawella, Kalutara, Polonnaruwa, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Badulla, Gampola, Nawalapitiya, Matale, Vavuniya, Puttalam and Chilaw with Colombo. The narrow-gauge Kelani Valley Line, from Colombo to Avissawella, was converted to broad gauge. The other narrow-gauge lines, from Nanu Oya to Nuwara Eliya, Avissawella to Yatiyantota and Avissawella to Ratnapura and Opanayaka, were dismantled due to financial losses. In 2007, the Sri Lankan government announced plans for Matara-Kataragama (113 km), Padukka-Hambantota-Ratnapura (210 km), Kurunegala-Dambulla-Habarana (80 km) and Panadura-Horana (18 km) lines by 2014. Air Sri Lankan Airlines SriLankan Airlines is the national airline. Founded in 1979 as Air Lanka, the airline changed its name when it received partial foreign ownership in 1998. It operates to Asia and Europe from its base at Bandaranaike International Airport in Colombo; the airline's main office is in the Airline Centre at the airport. The airline was scheduled to join the Oneworld alliance in 2013. SriLankan Airlines flies to 62 destinations in 34 countries. Airports Bandaranaike International Airport which is in Katunayake, north of Colombo is the first international airport which was opened by Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in 1967 and renamed in 1995. Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport is in Mattala, north of Hambantota was the second international airport opened to the public in March 2013 by President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Jaffna International Airport became Sri Lanka's third international airport on 17 October 2019 when it was opened to public by President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe. Domestic flights Flights connect the airport in Ratmalana to domestic destinations. Domestic operators are Deccan Aviation Lanka, Deccan Helicopters, FitsAir, Senok, Helitours and Cinnamon Air. Sri Lanka has 19 airports. Cinnamon Air actually flies from the main Katunayake Airport and from a lake near Colombo city centre, not from Ratmalana. Water Sri Lanka has of inland waterways (primarily on rivers in the southwest), navigable by shallow-draught boats. Ports and harbours Colombo Port Sri Lanka has deep-water ports at Colombo, Hambantota, Galle and Trincomalee. Colombo has the highest cargo volume, with an estimated capacity of 5.7 million TEUs. The port began a large-scale expansion project at a cost of US$1.2 billion in 2008 to increase its capacity and capabilities. The project, headed by the Sri Lanka Ports Authority and built by the Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company, was expected to be completed by 11 April 2012. It consists of four new terminals which can accommodate three berths each, alongside a depth of 18 m (59 ft) (which can be deepened to 23 m [75 ft]). The channel width of the harbour will be and its depth , with a harbour-basin depth of and a turning circle. The project was expected to increase the annual container-handling capacity to about 12 million TEUs and accommodate 12,000-TEU container vessels. Hambantota Port Construction of Magampura Mahinda Rajapaksa Port (also known as the Port
with agriculture. The population that resulted from this cultural and genetic mixing developed a social hierarchy over the next centuries which became the Kingdom of Kush (with the capital at Kerma) at 1700 BC. Anthropological and archaeological research indicate that during the predynastic period Nubia and Nagadan Upper Egypt were ethnically, and culturally nearly identical, and thus, simultaneously evolved systems of pharaonic kingship by 3300 BC. Kingdom of Kush (c. 1070 BC–350 AD) The Kingdom of Kush was an ancient Nubian state centered on the confluences of the Blue Nile and White Nile, and the Atbarah River and the Nile River. It was established after the Bronze Age collapse and the disintegration of the New Kingdom of Egypt, centered at Napata in its early phase. After King Kashta ("the Kushite") invaded Egypt in the eighth century BC, the Kushite kings ruled as pharaohs of the Twenty-fifth Dynasty of Egypt for nearly a century before being defeated and driven out by the Assyrians. At the height of their glory, the Kushites conquered an empire that stretched from what is now known as South Kordofan to the Sinai. Pharaoh Piye attempted to expand the empire into the Near East but was thwarted by the Assyrian king Sargon II. Between 800 BCE and 100 AD were built the Nubian pyramids, among them can be named El-Kurru, Kashta, Piye, Tantamani, Shabaka, Pyramids of Gebel Barkal, Pyramids of Meroe (Begarawiyah), the Sedeinga pyramids, and Pyramids of Nuri. The Kingdom of Kush is mentioned in the Bible as having saved the Israelites from the wrath of the Assyrians, although disease among the besiegers might have been one of the reasons for the failure to take the city. The war that took place between Pharaoh Taharqa and the Assyrian king Sennacherib was a decisive event in western history, with the Nubians being defeated in their attempts to gain a foothold in the Near East by Assyria. Sennacherib's successor Esarhaddon went further and invaded Egypt itself to secure his control of the Levant. This succeeded, as he managed to expel Taharqa from Lower Egypt. Taharqa fled back to Upper Egypt and Nubia, where he died two years later. Lower Egypt came under Assyrian vassalage but proved unruly, unsuccessfully rebelling against the Assyrians. Then, the king Tantamani, a successor of Taharqa, made a final determined attempt to regain Lower Egypt from the newly re-instated Assyrian vassal Necho I. He managed to retake Memphis killing Necho in the process and besieged cities in the Nile Delta. Ashurbanipal, who had succeeded Esarhaddon, sent a large army in Egypt to regain control. He routed Tantamani near Memphis and, pursuing him, sacked Thebes. Although the Assyrians immediately departed Upper Egypt after these events, weakened, Thebes peacefully submitted itself to Necho's son Psamtik I less than a decade later. This ended all hopes of a revival of the Nubian Empire, which rather continued in the form of a smaller kingdom centered on Napata. The city was raided by the Egyptian 590 BC, and sometime soon after to the late-3rd century BC, the Kushite resettled in Meroë. Medieval Christian Nubian kingdoms (c. 350–1500) On the turn of the fifth century the Blemmyes established a short-lived state in Upper Egypt and Lower Nubia, probably centered around Talmis (Kalabsha), but before 450 they were already driven out of the Nile Valley by the Nobatians. The latter eventually founded a kingdom on their own, Nobatia. By the 6th century there were in total three Nubian kingdoms: Nobatia in the north, which had its capital at Pachoras (Faras); the central kingdom, Makuria centred at Tungul (Old Dongola), about south of modern Dongola; and Alodia, in the heartland of the old Kushitic kingdom, which had its capital at Soba (now a suburb of modern-day Khartoum). Still in the sixth century they converted to Christianity. In the seventh century, probably at some point between 628 and 642, Nobatia was incorporated into Makuria. Between 639 and 641 the Muslim Arabs of the Rashidun Caliphate conquered Byzantine Egypt. In 641 or 642 and again in 652 they invaded Nubia but were repelled, making the Nubians one of the few who managed to defeat the Arabs during the Islamic expansion. Afterward the Makurian king and the Arabs agreed on a unique non-aggression pact that also included an annual exchange of gifts, thus acknowledging Makuria's independence. While the Arabs failed to conquer Nubia they began to settle east of the Nile, where they eventually founded several port towns and intermarried with the local Beja. From the mid 8th-mid 11th century the political power and cultural development of Christian Nubia peaked. In 747 Makuria invaded Egypt, which at this time belonged to the declining Umayyads, and it did so again in the early 960s, when it pushed as far north as Akhmim. Makuria maintained close dynastic ties with Alodia, perhaps resulting in the temporary unification of the two kingdoms into one state. The culture of the medieval Nubians has been described as "Afro-Byzantine", but was also increasingly influenced by Arab culture. The state organisation was extremely centralised, being based on the Byzantine bureaucracy of the 6th and 7th centuries. Arts flourished in the form of pottery paintings and especially wall paintings. The Nubians developed an own alphabet for their language, Old Nobiin, basing it on the Coptic alphabet, while also utilizing Greek, Coptic and Arabic. Women enjoyed high social status: they had access to education, could own, buy and sell land and often used their wealth to endow churches and church paintings. Even the royal succession was matrilineal, with the son of the king's sister being the rightful heir. From the late 11th/12th century, Makuria's capital Dongola was in decline, and Alodia's capital declined in the 12th century as well. In the 14th and 15th centuries Bedouin tribes overran most of Sudan, migrating to the Butana, the Gezira, Kordofan and Darfur. In 1365 a civil war forced the Makurian court to flee to Gebel Adda in Lower Nubia, while Dongola was destroyed and left to the Arabs. Afterwards Makuria continued to exist only as a petty kingdom. After the prosperous reign of king Joel ( 1463–1484) Makuria collapsed. Coastal areas from southern Sudan up to the port city of Suakin was succeeded by the Adal Sultanate in the fifteenth century. To the south, the kingdom of Alodia fell to either the Arabs, commanded by tribal leader Abdallah Jamma, or the Funj, an African people originating from the south. Datings range from the 9th century after the Hijra ( 1396–1494), the late 15th century, 1504 to 1509. An alodian rump state might have survived in the form of the kingdom of Fazughli, lasting until 1685. Islamic kingdoms of Sennar and Darfur (c. 1500–1821) In 1504 the Funj are recorded to have founded the Kingdom of Sennar, in which Abdallah Jamma's realm was incorporated. By 1523, when Jewish traveler David Reubeni visited Sudan, the Funj state already extended as far north as Dongola. Meanwhile, Islam began to be preached on the Nile by Sufi holymen who settled there in the 15th and 16th centuries and by David Reubeni's visit king Amara Dunqas, previously a Pagan or nominal Christian, was recorded to be Muslim. However, the Funj would retain un-Islamic customs like the divine kingship or the consumption of alcohol until the 18th century. Sudanese folk Islam preserved many rituals stemming from Christian traditions until the recent past. Soon the Funj came in conflict with the Ottomans, who had occupied Suakin around 1526 and eventually pushed south along the Nile, reaching the third Nile cataract area in 1583/1584. A subsequent Ottoman attempt to capture Dongola was repelled by the Funj in 1585. Afterwards, Hannik, located just south of the third cataract, would mark the border between the two states. The aftermath of the Ottoman invasion saw the attempted usurpation of Ajib, a minor king of northern Nubia. While the Funj eventually killed him in 1611/1612 his successors, the Abdallab, were granted to govern everything north of the confluence of Blue and White Niles with considerable autonomy. During the 17th century the Funj state reached its widest extent, but in the following century it began to decline. A coup in 1718 brought a dynastic change, while another one in 1761–1762 resulted in the Hamaj regency, where the Hamaj (a people from the Ethiopian borderlands) effectively ruled while the Funj sultans were their mere puppets. Shortly afterwards the sultanate began to fragment; by the early 19th century it was essentially restricted to the Gezira. The coup of 1718 kicked off a policy of pursuing a more orthodox Islam, which in turn promoted the Arabisation of the state. In order to legitimise their rule over their Arab subjects the Funj began to propagate an Umayyad descend. North of the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, as far downstream as Al Dabbah, the Nubians adopted the tribal identity of the Arab Jaalin. Until the 19th century Arabic had succeeded in becoming the dominant language of central riverine Sudan and most of Kordofan. West of the Nile, in Darfur, the Islamic period saw at first the rise of the Tunjur kingdom, which replaced the old Daju kingdom in the 15th century and extended as far west as Wadai. The Tunjur people were probably Arabised Berbers and, their ruling elite at least, Muslims. In the 17th century the Tunjur were driven from power by the Fur Keira sultanate. The Keira state, nominally Muslim since the reign of Sulayman Solong (r. 1660–1680), was initially a small kingdom in northern Jebel Marra, but expanded west- and northwards in the early 18th century and eastwards under the rule of Muhammad Tayrab (r. 1751–1786), peaking in the conquest of Kordofan in 1785. The apogee of this empire, now roughly the size of present-day Nigeria, would last until 1821. Turkiyah and Mahdist Sudan (1821–1899) In 1821, the Ottoman ruler of Egypt, Muhammad Ali of Egypt, had invaded and conquered northern Sudan. Although technically the Vali of Egypt under the Ottoman Empire, Muhammad Ali styled himself as Khedive of a virtually independent Egypt. Seeking to add Sudan to his domains, he sent his third son Ismail (not to be confused with Ismaʻil Pasha mentioned later) to conquer the country, and subsequently incorporate it into Egypt. With the exception of the Shaiqiya and the Darfur sultanate in Kordofan, he was met without resistance. The Egyptian policy of conquest was expanded and intensified by Ibrahim Pasha's son, Ismaʻil, under whose reign most of the remainder of modern-day Sudan was conquered. The Egyptian authorities made significant improvements to the Sudanese infrastructure (mainly in the north), especially with regard to irrigation and cotton production. In 1879, the Great Powers forced the removal of Ismail and established his son Tewfik Pasha in his place. Tewfik's corruption and mismanagement resulted in the 'Urabi revolt, which threatened the Khedive's survival. Tewfik appealed for help to the British, who subsequently occupied Egypt in 1882. Sudan was left in the hands of the Khedivial government, and the mismanagement and corruption of its officials. During the Khedivial period, dissent had spread due to harsh taxes imposed on most activities. Taxation on irrigation wells and farming lands were so high most farmers abandoned their farms and livestock. During the 1870s, European initiatives against the slave trade had an adverse impact on the economy of northern Sudan, precipitating the rise of Mahdist forces. Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abd Allah, the Mahdi (Guided One), offered to the ansars (his followers) and those who surrendered to him a choice between adopting Islam or being killed. The Mahdiyah (Mahdist regime) imposed traditional Sharia Islamic laws. From his announcement of the Mahdiyya in June 1881 until the fall of Khartoum in January 1885, Muhammad Ahmad led a successful military campaign against the Turco-Egyptian government of the Sudan, known as the Turkiyah. Muhammad Ahmad died on 22 June 1885, a mere six months after the conquest of Khartoum. After a power struggle amongst his deputies, Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, with the help primarily of the Baggara of western Sudan, overcame the opposition of the others and emerged as the unchallenged leader of the Mahdiyah. After consolidating his power, Abdallahi ibn Muhammad assumed the title of Khalifa (successor) of the Mahdi, instituted an administration, and appointed Ansar (who were usually Baggara) as emirs over each of the several provinces. Regional relations remained tense throughout much of the Mahdiyah period, largely because of the Khalifa's brutal methods to extend his rule throughout the country. In 1887, a 60,000-man Ansar army invaded Ethiopia, penetrating as far as Gondar. In March 1889, king Yohannes IV of Ethiopia marched on Metemma; however, after Yohannes fell in battle, the Ethiopian forces withdrew. Abd ar-Rahman an-Nujumi, the Khalifa's general, attempted an invasion of Egypt in 1889, but British-led Egyptian troops defeated the Ansar at Tushkah. The failure of the Egyptian invasion broke the spell of the Ansar's invincibility. The Belgians prevented the Mahdi's men from conquering Equatoria, and in 1893, the Italians repelled an Ansar attack at Agordat (in Eritrea) and forced the Ansar to withdraw from Ethiopia. In the 1890s, the British sought to re-establish their control over Sudan, once more officially in the name of the Egyptian Khedive, but in actuality treating the country as a British colony. By the early 1890s, British, French, and Belgian claims had converged at the Nile headwaters. Britain feared that the other powers would take advantage of Sudan's instability to acquire territory previously annexed to Egypt. Apart from these political considerations, Britain wanted to establish control over the Nile to safeguard a planned irrigation dam at Aswan. Herbert Kitchener led military campaigns against the Mahdist Sudan from 1896 to 1898. Kitchener's campaigns culminated in a decisive victory in the Battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899–1956) In 1899, Britain and Egypt reached an agreement under which Sudan was run by a governor-general appointed by Egypt with British consent. In reality, Sudan was effectively administered as a Crown colony. The British were keen to reverse the process, started under Muhammad Ali Pasha, of uniting the Nile Valley under Egyptian leadership and sought to frustrate all efforts aimed at further uniting the two countries. Under the Delimitation, Sudan's border with Abyssinia was contested by raiding tribesmen trading slaves, breaching boundaries of the law. In 1905 Local chieftain Sultan Yambio reluctant to the end gave up the struggle with British forces that had occupied the Kordofan region, finally ending the lawlessness. The continued British administration of Sudan fuelled an increasingly strident nationalist backlash, with Egyptian nationalist leaders determined to force Britain to recognise a single independent union of Egypt and Sudan. With a formal end to Ottoman rule in 1914, Sir Reginald Wingate was sent that December to occupy Sudan as the new Military Governor. Hussein Kamel was declared Sultan of Egypt and Sudan, as was his brother and successor, Fuad I. They continued upon their insistence of a single Egyptian-Sudanese state even when the Sultanate of Egypt was retitled as the Kingdom of Egypt and Sudan, but it was Saad Zaghloul who continued to be frustrated in the ambitions until his death in 1927. From 1924 until independence in 1956, the British had a policy of running Sudan as two essentially separate territories; the north and south. The assassination of a Governor-General of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in Cairo was the causative factor; it brought demands of the newly elected Wafd government from colonial forces. A permanent establishment of two battalions in Khartoum was renamed the Sudan Defence Force acting as under the government, replacing the former garrison of Egyptian army soldiers, saw action afterward during the Walwal Incident. The Wafdist parliamentary majority had rejected Sarwat Pasha's accommodation plan with Austen Chamberlain in London; yet Cairo still needed the money. The Sudanese Government's revenue had reached a peak in 1928 at £6.6 million, thereafter the Wafdist disruptions, and Italian borders incursions from Somaliland, London decided to reduce expenditure during the Great Depression. Cotton and gum exports were dwarfed by the necessity to import almost everything from Britain leading to a balance of payments deficit at Khartoum. In July 1936 the Liberal Constitutional leader, Muhammed Mahmoud was persuaded to bring Wafd delegates to London to sign the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, "the beginning of a new stage in Anglo-Egyptian relations", wrote Anthony Eden. The British Army was allowed to return to Sudan to protect the Canal Zone. They were able to find training facilities, and the RAF was free to fly over Egyptian territory. It did not, however, resolve the problem of Sudan: the Sudanese Intelligentsia agitated for a return to metropolitan rule, conspiring with Germany's agents. Mussolini made it clear that he could not invade Abyssinia without first conquering Egypt and Sudan; they intended unification of Libya with Italian East Africa. The British Imperial General Staff prepared for military defence of the region, which was thin on the ground. The British ambassador blocked Italian attempts to secure a Non-Aggression Treaty with Egypt-Sudan. But Mahmoud was a supporter of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem; the region was caught between the Empire's efforts to save the Jews, and moderate Arab calls to halt migration. The Sudanese Government was directly involved militarily in the East African Campaign. Formed in 1925, the Sudan Defence Force played an active part in responding to incursions early in World War Two. Italian troops occupied Kassala and other border areas from Italian Somaliland during 1940. In 1942, the SDF also played a part in the invasion of the Italian colony by British and Commonwealth forces. The last British governor-general was Robert George Howe. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 finally heralded the beginning of the march towards Sudanese independence. Having abolished the monarchy in 1953, Egypt's new leaders, Mohammed Naguib, whose mother was Sudanese, and later Gamal Abdel Nasser, believed the only way to end British domination in Sudan was for Egypt to officially abandon its claims of sovereignty. In addition, Nasser knew it would be difficult for Egypt to govern an impoverished Sudan after its independence. The British on the other hand continued their political and financial support for the Mahdist successor, Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, whom it was believed would resist Egyptian pressure for Sudanese independence. Rahman was capable of this, but his regime was plagued by political ineptitude, which garnered a colossal loss of support in northern and central Sudan. Both Egypt and Britain sensed a great instability fomenting, and thus opted to allow both Sudanese regions, north and south to have a free vote on whether they wished independence or a British withdrawal. Independence (1956–present) A polling process was carried out resulting in the composition of a democratic parliament and Ismail al-Azhari was elected first Prime Minister and led the first modern Sudanese government. On 1 January 1956, in a special ceremony held at the People's Palace, the Egyptian and British flags were lowered and the new Sudanese flag, composed of green, blue and yellow stripes, was raised in their place by the prime minister Ismail al-Azhari. Dissatisfaction culminated in a second coup d'état on 25 May 1969. The coup leader, Col. Gaafar Nimeiry, became prime minister, and the new regime abolished parliament and outlawed all political parties. Disputes between Marxist and non-Marxist elements within the ruling military coalition resulted in a briefly successful coup in July 1971, led by the Sudanese Communist Party. Several days later, anti-communist military elements restored Nimeiry to power. In 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement led to a cessation of the north–south civil war and a degree of self-rule. This led to ten years hiatus in the civil war but an end to American investment in the Jonglei Canal project. This had been considered absolutely essential to irrigate the Upper Nile region and to prevent an environmental catastrophe and wide-scale famine among the local tribes, most especially the Dinka. In the civil war that followed their homeland was raided, looted, pillaged, and burned. Many of the tribe were murdered in a bloody civil war that raged for over 20 years. Until the early 1970s, Sudan's agricultural output was mostly dedicated to internal consumption. In 1972, the Sudanese government became more pro-Western and made plans to export food and cash crops. However, commodity prices declined throughout the 1970s causing economic problems for Sudan. At the same time, debt servicing costs, from the money spent mechanizing agriculture, rose. In 1978, the IMF negotiated a Structural Adjustment Program with the government. This further promoted the mechanised export agriculture sector. This caused great hardship for the pastoralists of Sudan (see Nuba peoples). In 1976, the Ansars had mounted a bloody but unsuccessful coup attempt. But in July 1977, President Nimeiry met with Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi, opening the way for a possible reconciliation. Hundreds of political prisoners were released, and in August a general amnesty was announced for all oppositionists. Bashir Era (1989–2019) On 30 June 1989, Colonel Omar al-Bashir led a bloodless military coup. The new military government suspended political parties and introduced an Islamic legal code on the national level. Later al-Bashir carried out purges and executions in the upper ranks of the army, the banning of associations, political parties, and independent newspapers, and the imprisonment of leading political figures and journalists. On 16 October 1993, al-Bashir appointed himself "President" and disbanded the Revolutionary Command Council. The executive and legislative powers of the council were taken by al-Bashir. In the 1996 general election, he was the only candidate by law to run for election. Sudan became a one-party state under the National Congress Party (NCP). During the 1990s, Hassan al-Turabi, then Speaker of the National Assembly, reached out to Islamic fundamentalist groups, invited Osama bin Laden to the country. The United States subsequently listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. Following Al Qaeda's bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania the U.S. launched Operation Infinite Reach and targeted the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory which the U.S. government falsely believed was producing chemical weapons for the terrorist group. Al-Turabi's influence began to wane, others in favour of more pragmatic leadership tried to change Sudan's international isolation. The country worked to appease its critics by expelling members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and encouraging bin Laden to leave. Before the 2000 presidential election, al-Turabi introduced a bill to reduce the President's powers, prompting al-Bashir to order a dissolution and declare a state of emergency. When al-Turabi urged a boycott of the President's re-election campaign signing agreement with Sudan People's Liberation Army, al-Bashir suspected they were plotting to overthrow the government. Hassan al-Turabi was jailed later the same year. In February 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) groups in Darfur took up arms, accusing the Sudanese government of oppressing non-Arab Sudanese in favor of Sudanese Arabs, precipitating the War in Darfur. The conflict has since been described as a genocide, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague has issued two arrest warrants for al-Bashir. Arabic-speaking nomadic militias known as the Janjaweed stand accused of many atrocities. On 9 January 2005, the government signed the Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) with the objective of ending the Second Sudanese Civil War. The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established under the UN Security Council Resolution 1590 to support its implementation. The peace agreement was a prerequisite to the 2011 referendum: the result was a unanimous vote in favour of secession of South Sudan; the region of Abyei will hold its own referendum at a future date. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was the primary member of the Eastern Front, a coalition of rebel groups operating in eastern Sudan. After the peace agreement, their place was taken in February 2004 after the merger of the larger fulani and Beja Congress with the smaller Rashaida Free Lions. A peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the Eastern Front was signed on 14 October 2006, in Asmara. On 5 May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed, aiming at ending the three-year-long conflict. The Chad–Sudan Conflict (2005–2007) had erupted after the Battle of Adré triggered a declaration of war by Chad. The leaders of Sudan and Chad signed an agreement in Saudi Arabia on 3 May 2007 to stop fighting from the Darfur conflict spilling along their countries' border. In July 2007 the country was hit by devastating floods, with over 400,000 people being directly affected. Since 2009, a series of ongoing conflicts between rival nomadic tribes in Sudan and South Sudan have caused a large number of civilian casualties. Partition and rehabilitation The Sudanese conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile in the early 2010s between the Army of Sudan and the Sudan Revolutionary Front started as a dispute over the oil-rich region of Abyei in the months leading up to South Sudanese independence in 2011, though it is also related to civil war in Darfur that is nominally resolved. The events would later be known as the Sudanese Intifada, which would end only in 2013 after al-Bashir promised he would not seek re-election in 2015. He later broke his promise and sought re-election in 2015, winning through a boycott from the opposition who believed that the elections would not be free and fair. Voter turnout was at a low 46%. On 13 January 2017, US president Barack Obama signed an Executive Order that lifted many sanctions placed against Sudan and assets of its government held abroad. On 6 October 2017, the following US president Donald Trump lifted most of the remaining sanctions against the country and its petroleum, export-import, and property industries. 2019 Sudanese Revolution and transitional government of the former Prime Minister Hamdok On 19 December 2018, massive protests began after a government decision to triple the price of goods at a time when the country was suffering an acute shortage of foreign currency and inflation of 70 percent. In addition, President al-Bashir, who had been in power for more than 30 years, refused to step down, resulting in the convergence of opposition groups to form a united coalition. The government retaliated by arresting more than 800 opposition figures and protesters, leading to the death of approximately 40 people according to the Human Rights Watch, although the number was much higher than that according to local and civilian reports. The protests continued after the overthrow of his government on 11 April 2019 after a massive sit-in in front of the Sudanese Armed Forces main headquarters, after which the chiefs of staff decided to intervene and they ordered the arrest of President al-Bashir and declared a three-month state of emergency. Over 100 people died on 3 June after security forces dispersed the sit-in using tear gas and live ammunition in what is known as the Khartoum massacre, resulting in Sudan's suspension from the African Union. Sudan's youth had been reported to be driving the protests. The protests came to an end when the Forces for Freedom and Change (an alliance of groups organizing the protests) and Transitional Military Council (the ruling military government) signed the July 2019 Political Agreement and the August 2019 Draft Constitutional Declaration. The transitional institutions and procedures included the creation of a joint military-civilian Sovereignty Council of Sudan as head of state, a new Chief Justice of Sudan as head of the judiciary branch of power, Nemat Abdullah Khair, and a new prime minister. The former Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, a 61-year-old economist who worked previously for the UN Economic Commission for Africa, was sworn in on 21 August. He initiated talks with the IMF and World Bank aimed at stabilising the economy, which was in dire straits because of shortages of food, fuel and hard currency. Hamdok estimated that US$10bn over two years would suffice to halt the panic, and said that over 70% of the 2018 budget had been spent on civil war-related measures. The governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had invested significant sums supporting the military council since Bashir's ouster. On 3 September, Hamdok appointed 14 civilian ministers, including the first female foreign minister and the first Coptic Christian, also a woman. As of August 2021, the country was jointly led by Chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok. 2021 coup and the al-Burhan Regime The Sudanese government announced on 21 September 2021 that there was a failed attempt at a coup d’état from the military that had led to the arrest of 40 military officers. One month after the attempted coup, another military coup on 25 October 2021 resulted in the capture of the civilian government, including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. The coup was led by general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan who subsequently declared a state of emergency. On November 21, 2021, Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister after a political agreement was signed by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to restore the transition to civilian rule (although Burhan retained control). The 14-point deal called for the release of all political prisoners detained during the coup and stipulated that a 2019 constitutional declaration continued to be the basis for a political transition. On January 2, 2022, Hamdok announced his resignation from the position of Prime Minister following one of the most deadly protests to date. Geography Sudan is situated in northern Africa, with an coastline bordering the Red Sea. It has land borders with Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Libya. With an area of , it is the third-largest country on the continent (after Algeria and Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the fifteenth-largest in the world. Sudan lies between latitudes 8° and 23°N. The terrain is generally flat plains, broken by several mountain ranges. In the west, the Deriba Caldera (), located in the Marrah Mountains, is the highest point in Sudan. In the east are the Red Sea Hills. The Blue Nile and White Nile rivers meet in Khartoum to form the Nile, which flows northwards through Egypt to the Mediterranean Sea. The Blue Nile's course through Sudan is nearly long and is joined by the Dinder and Rahad Rivers between Sennar and Khartoum. The White Nile within Sudan has no significant tributaries. There are several dams on the Blue and White Niles. Among them are the Sennar and Roseires Dams on the Blue Nile, and the Jebel Aulia Dam on the White Nile. There is also Lake Nubia on the Sudanese-Egyptian border. Rich mineral resources are available in Sudan including asbestos, chromite, cobalt, copper, gold, granite, gypsum, iron, kaolin, lead, manganese, mica, natural gas, nickel, petroleum, silver, tin, uranium and zinc. Climate The amount of rainfall increases towards the south. The central and the northern part have extremely dry, desert areas such as the Nubian Desert to the northeast and the Bayuda Desert to the east; in the south, there are grasslands and tropical savanna. Sudan's rainy season lasts for about four months (June to September) in the north, and up to six months (May to October) in the south. The dry regions are plagued by sandstorms, known as haboob, which can completely block out the sun. In the northern and western semi-desert areas, people rely on the scant rainfall for basic agriculture and many are nomadic, travelling with their herds of sheep and camels. Nearer the River Nile, there are well-irrigated farms growing cash crops. The sunshine duration is very high all over the country but especially in deserts where it could soar to over 4,000 h per year. Environmental issues Desertification is a serious problem in Sudan. There is also concern over soil erosion. Agricultural expansion, both public and private, has proceeded without conservation measures. The consequences have manifested themselves in the form of deforestation, soil desiccation, and the lowering of soil fertility and the water table. The nation's wildlife is threatened by poaching. As of 2001, twenty-one mammal species and nine bird species are endangered, as well as two species of plants. Critically endangered species include: the waldrapp, northern white rhinoceros, tora hartebeest, slender-horned gazelle, and hawksbill turtle. The Sahara oryx has become extinct in the wild. Politics The politics of Sudan formally took place within the framework of a federal representative democratic republic until April 2019, when President Omar al-Bashir's regime was overthrown in a military	Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the World Bank. Also present is the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Since Sudan has experienced civil war for many years, many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are also involved in humanitarian efforts to help internally displaced people. The NGOs are working in every corner of Sudan, especially in the southern part and western parts. During the civil war, international nongovernmental organisations such as the Red Cross were operating mostly in the south but based in the capital Khartoum. The attention of NGOs shifted shortly after the war broke out in the western part of Sudan known as Darfur. The most visible organisation in South Sudan is the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) consortium. Some international trade organisations categorise Sudan as part of the Greater Horn of Africa Even though most of the international organisations are substantially concentrated in both South Sudan and the Darfur region, some of them are working in the northern part as well. For example, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization is successfully operating in Khartoum, the capital. It is mainly funded by the European Union and recently opened more vocational training. The Canadian International Development Agency is operating largely in northern Sudan. Human rights Since 1983, a combination of civil war and famine has taken the lives of nearly two million people in Sudan. It is estimated that as many as 200,000 people had been taken into slavery during the Second Sudanese Civil War. Sudan ranks 172 of 180 countries in terms of freedom of the press according to Reporters Without Borders. More curbs of press freedom to report official corruption are planned. Muslims who convert to Christianity can face the death penalty for apostasy, see Persecution of Christians in Sudan and the death sentence against Mariam Yahia Ibrahim Ishag (who actually was raised as Christian). According to a 2013 UNICEF report, 88% of women in Sudan had undergone female genital mutilation. Sudan's Personal Status law on marriage has been criticised for restricting women's rights and allowing child marriage. Evidence suggests that support for female genital mutilation remains high, especially among rural and less well educated groups, although it has been declining in recent years. Homosexuality is illegal; as of July 2020 it was no longer a capital offense, with the highest punishment being life imprisonment. A report published by Human Rights Watch in 2018 revealed that Sudan has made no meaningful attempts to provide accountability for past and current violations. The report documented human rights abuses against civilians in Darfur, southern Kordofan, and Blue Nile. During 2018, the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) used excessive force to disperse protests and detained dozens of activists and opposition members. Moreover, the Sudanese forces blocked United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation and other international relief and aid agencies to access to displaced people and conflict-ridden areas in Darfur. Darfur A letter dated 14 August 2006, from the executive director of Human Rights Watch found that the Sudanese government is both incapable of protecting its own citizens in Darfur and unwilling to do so, and that its militias are guilty of crimes against humanity. The letter added that these human-rights abuses have existed since 2004. Some reports attribute part of the violations to the rebels as well as the government and the Janjaweed. The U.S. State Department's human-rights report issued in March 2007 claims that "[a]ll parties to the conflagration committed serious abuses, including widespread killing of civilians, rape as a tool of war, systematic torture, robbery and recruitment of child soldiers." Over 2.8 million civilians have been displaced and the death toll is estimated at 300,000 killed. Both government forces and militias allied with the government are known to attack not only civilians in Darfur, but also humanitarian workers. Sympathisers of rebel groups are arbitrarily detained, as are foreign journalists, human-rights defenders, student activists and displaced people in and around Khartoum, some of whom face torture. The rebel groups have also been accused in a report issued by the U.S. government of attacking humanitarian workers and of killing innocent civilians. According to UNICEF, in 2008, there were as many as 6,000 child soldiers in Darfur. Disputed areas and zones of conflict In April 2012, the South Sudanese army captured the Heglig oil field from Sudan, soon the Sudanese army recaptured Heglig. Kafia Kingi and Radom National Park was a part of Bahr el Ghazal in 1956. Sudan has recognised South Sudanese independence according to the borders for 1 January 1956. The Abyei Area is disputed region between Sudan and South Sudan. It is currently under Sudanese rule. The states of South Kurdufan and Blue Nile are to hold "popular consultations" to determine their constitutional future within Sudan. The Hala'ib Triangle is disputed region between Sudan and Egypt. It is currently under Egyptian administration. Bir Tawil is a terra nullius occurring on the border between Egypt and Sudan, claimed by neither state. Administrative divisions Sudan is divided into 18 states (wilayat, sing. wilayah). They are further divided into 133 districts. Regional bodies and areas of conflict In addition to the states, there also exist regional administrative bodies established by peace agreements between the central government and rebel groups. The Darfur Regional Authority was established by the Darfur Peace Agreement to act as a co-ordinating body for the states that make up the region of Darfur. The Eastern Sudan States Coordinating Council was established by the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement between the Sudanese Government and the rebel Eastern Front to act as a coordinating body for the three eastern states. The Abyei Area, located on the border between South Sudan and the Republic of the Sudan, currently has a special administrative status and is governed by an Abyei Area Administration. It was due to hold a referendum in 2011 on whether to join an independent South Sudan or remain part of the Republic of the Sudan. Economy In 2010, Sudan was considered the 17th-fastest-growing economy in the world and the rapid development of the country largely from oil profits even when facing international sanctions was noted by The New York Times in a 2006 article. Because of the secession of South Sudan, which contained about 75 percent of Sudan's oilfields, Sudan entered a phase of stagflation, GDP growth slowed to 3.4 percent in 2014, 3.1 percent in 2015 and was projected to recover slowly to 3.7 percent in 2016 while inflation remained as high as 21.8% . Sudan's GDP fell from US$123.053 billion in 2017 to US$40.852 billion in 2018. Even with the oil profits before the secession of South Sudan, Sudan still faced formidable economic problems, and its growth was still a rise from a very low level of per capita output. The economy of Sudan has been steadily growing over the 2000s, and according to a World Bank report the overall growth in GDP in 2010 was 5.2 percent compared to 2009 growth of 4.2 percent. This growth was sustained even during the war in Darfur and period of southern autonomy preceding South Sudan's independence. Oil was Sudan's main export, with production increasing dramatically during the late 2000s, in the years before South Sudan gained independence in July 2011. With rising oil revenues, the Sudanese economy was booming, with a growth rate of about nine percent in 2007. The independence of oil-rich South Sudan, however, placed most major oilfields out of the Sudanese government's direct control and oil production in Sudan fell from around to under . Production has since recovered to hover around for 2014–15. In order to export oil, South Sudan relies on a pipeline to Port Sudan on Sudan's Red Sea coast, as South Sudan is a landlocked country, as well as the oil refining facilities in Sudan. In August 2012, Sudan and South Sudan agreed a deal to transport South Sudanese oil through Sudanese pipelines to Port Sudan. The People's Republic of China is one of Sudan's major trading partners, China owns a 40 percent share in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company. The country also sells Sudan small arms, which have been used in military operations such as the conflicts in Darfur and South Kordofan. While historically agriculture remains the main source of income and employment hiring of over 80 percent of Sudanese, and makes up a third of the economic sector, oil production drove most of Sudan's post-2000 growth. Currently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is working hand in hand with Khartoum government to implement sound macroeconomic policies. This follows a turbulent period in the 1980s when debt-ridden Sudan's relations with the IMF and World Bank soured, culminating in its eventual suspension from the IMF. According to the Corruptions Perception Index, Sudan is one of the most corrupt nations in the world. According to the Global Hunger Index of 2013, Sudan has an GHI indicator value of 27.0 indicating that the nation has an 'Alarming Hunger Situation.' It is rated the fifth hungriest nation in the world. According to the 2015 Human Development Index (HDI) Sudan ranked the 167th place in human development, indicating Sudan still has one of the lowest human development rates in the world. In 2014, 45% of the population lives on less than US$3.20 per day, up from 43% in 2009. Science and research Sudan has around 25–30 universities; instruction is primarily in Arabic or English. Education at the secondary and university levels has been seriously hampered by the requirement that most males perform military service before completing their education. In addition, the "Islamisation" encouraged by president Al-Bashir alienated many researchers: the official language of instruction in universities was changed from English to Arabic and Islamic courses became mandatory. Internal science funding withered. According to UNESCO, more than 3,000 Sudanese researchers left the country between 2002 and 2014. By 2013, the country had a mere 19 researchers for every 100,000 citizens, or 1/30 the ratio of Egypt, according to the Sudanese National Centre for Research. In 2015, Sudan published only about 500 scientific papers. In comparison, Poland, a country of similar population size, publishes on the order of 10,000 papers per year. Demographics In Sudan's 2008 census, the population of northern, western and eastern Sudan was recorded to be over 30 million. This puts present estimates of the population of Sudan after the secession of South Sudan at a little over 30 million people. This is a significant increase over the past two decades, as the 1983 census put the total population of Sudan, including present-day South Sudan, at 21.6 million. The population of Greater Khartoum (including Khartoum, Omdurman, and Khartoum North) is growing rapidly and was recorded to be 5.2 million. Aside from being a refugee-generating country, Sudan also hosts a large population of refugees from other countries. According to UNHCR statistics, more than 1.1 million refugees and asylum seekers lived in Sudan in August 2019. The majority of this population came from South Sudan (858,607 people), Eritrea (123,413), Syria (93,502), Ethiopia (14,201), the Central African Republic (11,713) and Chad (3,100). Apart from these, the UNHCR report 1,864,195 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's). Sudan is a party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Ethnic groups The Arab population is estimated at 70% of the national total. They are almost entirely Muslims and speak predominantly Sudanese Arabic. Other ethnicities include Beja, Fur, Nubians, Armenians and Copts. Non-Arab nations are often linguistically and to varying degrees culturally distinct. These include the Beja (over 2 million), Fur (over 1 million), Nuba (approx. 1 million), Masalit, Bornu, Tama, Fulani, Hausa, Nubians, Berta, Zaghawa, Nyimang, Ingessana, Daju, Koalib, Gumuz, Midob and Tagale. Hausa is used as a trade language. There is also a small but prominent Greek community. Some Arab tribes speak other forms of Arabic, such as the Awadia and Fadnia tribes and Bani Arak tribes, who speak Najdi Arabic; and the Beni Ḥassān, Al-Ashraf, Kawhla and Rashaida who speak Hejazi Arabic. A few Arab Bedouin of the northern Rizeigat speak Sudanese Arabic and share the same culture as the Sudanese Arabs. Some Baggara speak Chadian Arabic. Sudanese Arabs of northern and eastern Sudan descend primarily from migrants from the Arabian Peninsula and intermarriages with the pre-existing indigenous populations of Sudan, especially the Nubian people, who also share a common history with Egypt. Additionally, a few pre-Islamic Arabian tribes existed in Sudan from earlier migrations into the region from Western Arabia, although most Arabs in Sudan are dated from migrations after the 12th century. The vast majority of Arab tribes in Sudan migrated into the Sudan in the 12th century, intermarried with the indigenous Nubian and other African populations and introduced Islam. Languages Approximately 70 languages are native to Sudan. Sudan has multiple regional sign languages, which are not mutually intelligible. A 2009 proposal for a unified Sudanese Sign Language had been worked out. Prior to 2005, Arabic was the nation's sole official language. In the 2005 constitution, Sudan's official languages became Arabic and English. The literacy rate is 70.2% of total population, male: 79.6%, female: 60.8%. Urban areas Religion At the 2011 division which split off South Sudan, over 97% of the population in the remaining Sudan adheres to Islam. Most Muslims are divided between two groups: Sufi and Salafi Muslims. Two popular divisions of Sufism, the Ansar and the Khatmia, are associated with the opposition Umma and Democratic Unionist parties, respectively. Only the Darfur region has traditionally been bereft of the Sufi brotherhoods common in the rest of the country. Long-established groups of Coptic Orthodox and Greek Orthodox Christians exist in Khartoum and other northern cities. Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox communities also exist in Khartoum and eastern Sudan, largely made up of refugees and migrants from the past few decades. The Armenian Apostolic Church also has a presence serving the Sudanese-Armenians. The Sudan Evangelical Presbyterian Church also has membership. Religious identity plays a role in the country's political divisions. Northern and western Muslims have dominated the country's political and economic system since independence. The NCP draws much of its support from Islamists, Salafis/Wahhabis and other conservative Arab Muslims in the north. The Umma Party has traditionally attracted Arab followers of the Ansar sect of Sufism as well as non-Arab Muslims from Darfur and Kordofan. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) includes both Arab and non-Arab Muslims in the north and east, especially those in the Khatmia Sufi sect. Health Sudan has a life expectancy of 65.1 years according to the latest data for the year 2019 from macrotrends.net Infant mortality in 2016 was 44.8 per 1,000. UNICEF estimates that 87% of Sudanese females between the ages of 15 to 49 have had female genital mutilation performed on them. Education Education in Sudan is free and compulsory for children aged 6 to 13 years, although more than 40% of children do not go to schools due to the economic situation. Environmental and social factors also increase the difficulty of getting to school, especially for girls. Primary education consists of eight years, followed by three years of secondary education. The former educational ladder 6 + 3 + 3 was changed in 1990. The primary language at all levels is Arabic. Schools are concentrated in urban areas; many in the west have been damaged or destroyed by years of civil war. In 2001 the World Bank estimated that primary enrollment was 46 percent of eligible pupils and 21 percent of secondary students. Enrollment varies widely, falling below 20 percent in some provinces. The literacy rate is 70.2% of total population, male: 79.6%, female: 60.8%. Culture Sudanese culture melds the behaviors, practices, and beliefs of about 578 ethnic groups, communicating in 145 different languages, in a region microcosmic of Africa, with geographic extremes varying from sandy desert to tropical forest. Recent evidence suggests that while most citizens of the country identify strongly with both Sudan and their religion, Arab and African supranational identities are much more polarising and contested. Music Sudan has a rich and unique musical culture that has been through chronic instability and repression during the modern history of Sudan. Beginning with the imposition of strict Salafi interpretation of sharia law in 1989, many of the country's most prominent poets, like Mahjoub Sharif, were imprisoned while others, like Mohammed el Amin (returned to Sudan in the mid-1990s) and Mohammed Wardi (returned to Sudan 2003), fled to Cairo. Traditional music suffered too, with traditional Zār ceremonies being interrupted and drums confiscated . At the same time European militaries contributed to the development of Sudanese music by introducing new instruments and styles; military bands, especially the Scottish bagpipes, were renowned, and set traditional music to military march music. The march March Shulkawi No 1, is an example, set to the sounds of the Shilluk. Northern Sudan listens to different music than the rest of Sudan. A type of music called Aldlayib uses a musical instrument called the Tambur. The Tambur has five strings, is made from wood and makes music accompanied by the voices of human applause and singing artists. Cinema The cinema of Sudan began with cinematography by the British colonial presence in the early 20th century. After independence in 1956, a vigorous documentary film tradition was established, but financial pressures and serious constraints imposed by the Islamist government led to the decline of filmmaking from the 1990s onwards. Since the 2010s, several initiatives have shown an encouraging revival of filmmaking and public interest in film shows and festivals, albeit limited mainly to Khartoum. The use of photography in Sudan goes back to the 1880s and the Anglo-Egyptian rule. As in other countries, the growing importance of photography for mass media like newspapers, as well as for amateur photographers led to a wider photographic documentation and use of photographs in Sudan during the 20th century and beyond. In the 21st century, photography in Sudan has undergone important changes, mainly due to digital photography and distribution through social media and the internet. Clothing Most Sudanese wear either traditional or western attire. A traditional garb widely worn by Sudanese men is the galabiya, which is a loose-fitting, long-sleeved, collarless ankle-length garment also common to Egypt. The galabiya is often accompanied by a large turban and a scarf, and the garment may be white, colored, striped, and made of fabric varying in thickness, depending on the season of the year and personal preferences. The most common dress for Sudanese women is the thobe or thawb, pronounced tobe in Sudanese dialect. The thobe is a white or colorful long, one piece cloth that women wrap around their inner garments, usually covering their head and hair. Due to a 1991 penal code (Public Order Law), women were not allowed to wear trousers in public, because it was interpreted as an "obscene outfit." The punishment for wearing trousers could be up to 40 lashes, but after being found guilty in 2009, one woman was fined the equivalent of 200 U.S. dollars instead. Sport Since September 2019, there has been an official national league for women's football clubs that started on the basis of informal women's clubs since the beginning of the 2000s. In 2021, the Sudan women's national football team participated for the first time in the Arab Women's Cup, held in Cairo, Egypt. Sudan's national beach volleyball team competed at the 2018–2020 CAVB Beach Volleyball Continental Cup in both the women's and the men's section. See also Outline of Sudan References Bibliography Books Berry, LaVerle B., ed. (2015). Sudan: A Country Study. Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.) . Churchill, Winston (1899; 2000). The River War: An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan. Carroll & Graf (New York City). . Clammer, Paul (2005). Sudan: The Bradt Travel Guide. Bradt Travel Guides (Chalfont St. Peter); Globe Pequot Press. (Guilford, Connecticut). . Evans-Pritchard, Blake; Polese, Violetta (2008). Sudan: The City Trail Guide. City Trail Publishing. . El Mahdi, Mandour. (1965). A Short History of the Sudan. Oxford University Press. . Fadlalla, Mohamed H. (2005). The Problem of Dar Fur, iUniverse (New York City). . Fadlalla, Mohamed H. (2004). Short History of Sudan. iUniverse (New York City). . Fadlalla, Mohamed H. (2007). UN Intervention in Dar Fur, iUniverse (New York City). . Jok, Jok Madut (2007). Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence. Oneworld Publications (Oxford). . Köndgen, Olaf (2017). The Codification of Islamic Criminal Law in the Sudan. Penal Codes and Supreme Court Case Law under Numayri and al-Bashir. Brill (Leiden, Boston). . Mwakikagile, Godfrey (2001). Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan: The State Against Blacks, in The Modern African State: Quest for Transformation. Nova Science Publishers (Huntington, New York). . Peterson, Scott (2001). Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda—A Journalist Reports from the Battlefields of Africa. Routledge (London; New York City). . Prunier, Gérard (2005). Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. Cornell University Press (Ithaca, New York). . Zilfū, ʻIṣmat Ḥasan (translation: Clark, Peter) (1980). Karari: The Sudanese Account of the
a viceroy. Although Egypt's administrative control of Kush extended only down to the Fourth Cataract, Egyptian sources list tributary districts reaching to the Red Sea and upstream to the confluence of the Blue Nile and White Nile rivers. Egyptian authorities ensured the loyalty of local chiefs by drafting their children to serve as pages at the pharaoh's court. Egypt also expected tribute in gold and workers from local Kushite chiefs. Once Egypt had established political and military mastery over Kush, officials, priests, merchants, and artisans settled in the region. The Egyptian language became widely used in everyday activities. Many rich Kushites took to worshipping Egyptian gods and built temples for them. The temples remained centres of official religious worship until the coming of Christianity to the region during the sixth century. When Egyptian influence declined or succumbed to foreign domination, the Kushite elite regarded themselves as central powers and believed themselves as idols of Egyptian culture and religion. By the 11th century BC, the authority of the New Kingdom dynasties had diminished, allowing divided rule in Egypt, and ending Egyptian control of Kush. With the withdrawal of the Egyptians, there ceased to be any written record or information from Kush about the region's activities over the next three hundred years. In the early eighth century BC, however, Kush emerged as an independent kingdom ruled from Napata by an aggressive line of monarchs who slowly extended their influence into Egypt. Around 750 BC, a Kushite king called Kashta conquered Upper Egypt and became ruler of Thebes until approximately 740 BC. His successor, Piye, subdued the Nile Delta and conquered Egypt, thus initiating the Twenty-fifth Dynasty. Piye founded a line of kings who ruled Kush and Thebes for about a hundred years. The dynasty's interference with Assyria's sphere of influence in the Near East caused a confrontation between Egypt and the powerful Assyrian state, which controlled a vast empire comprising much of the Middle East, Anatolia, Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean Basin from their homeland in Upper Mesopotamia. Taharqa (688–663 BC), the last Kushite pharaoh, was defeated and driven out of the Near East by Sennacherib of Assyria. Sennacherib's successor Esarhaddon went further, launching a full-scale invasion of Egypt in 674 BC, defeating Taharqa and quickly conquering the land. Taharqa fled back to Nubia, and native Egyptian princes were installed by the Assyrians as vassals of Esarhaddon. However, Taharqa was able to return some years later and wrest back control of a part of Egypt as far as Thebes from the Egyptian vassal princes of Assyria. Esarhaddon died in his capital Nineveh while preparing to return to Egypt and once more eject the Kushites. Esarhaddon's successor Ashurbanipal sent a general with a small army which again defeated and ejected Taharqa from Egypt. Taharqa died in Nubia two years later. His successor, Tantamani, attempted to regain Egypt. He successfully defeated Necho I, the puppet ruler installed by Ashurbanipal, taking Thebes in the process. The Assyrians then sent a powerful army southwards. Tantamani was heavily routed, and the Assyrian army sacked Thebes to such an extent it never truly recovered. A native ruler, Psamtik I was placed on the throne, as a vassal of Ashurbanipal, thus ending the Kushite/Nubian Empire. Meroë Egypt's succeeding dynasty failed to reassert full control over Kush. Around 590 BC, however, an Egyptian army sacked Napata, compelling the Kushite court to move to a more secure location further south at Meroë near the Sixth Cataract. For several centuries thereafter, the Meroitic kingdom developed independently of Egyptian influence and domination, which passed successively under Iranian, Greek, and, finally, Roman domination. During the height of its power in the second and third centuries BC, Meroë extended over a region from the Third Cataract in the north to Soba, near present-day Khartoum, in the south. An Egyptian-influenced pharaonic tradition persisted among a line of rulers at Meroë, who raised stelae to record the achievements of their reigns and erected Nubian pyramids to contain their tombs. These objects and the ruins of palaces, temples, and baths at Meroë attest to a centralized political system that employed artisans' skills and commanded the labour of a large work force. A well-managed irrigation system allowed the area to support a higher population density than was possible during later periods. By the first century BC, the use of Egyptian hieroglyphs gave way to a Meroitic alphabet adapted for the Nubian-related language spoken by the region's people. Meroë's succession system was not necessarily hereditary; the matrilineal royal family member deemed most worthy often became king. The kandake or queen mother's role in the selection process was crucial to a smooth succession. The crown appears to have passed from brother to brother (or sister) and only when no siblings remained from father to son. Although Napata remained Meroë's religious centre, northern Kush eventually fell into disorder as it came under pressure from the Blemmyes, predatory nomads from east of the Nile. However, the Nile continued to give the region access to the Mediterranean world. Additionally, Meroë maintained contact with Arab and Indian traders along the Red Sea coast and incorporated Hellenistic and Indian cultural influences into its daily life. Inconclusive evidence suggests that metallurgical technology may have been transmitted westward across the savanna belt to West Africa from Meroë's iron smelteries. Relations between Meroë and Egypt were not always peaceful. As a response to Meroë's incursions into Upper Egypt, a Roman army moved south and razed Napata in 23 BC. The Roman commander quickly abandoned the area, however, deeming it too poor to warrant colonization. In the second century AD, the Nobatia occupied the Nile's west bank in northern Kush. They are believed to have been one of several well-armed bands of horse- and camel-borne warriors who sold their skills to Meroë for protection; eventually they intermarried and established themselves among the Meroitic people as a military aristocracy. Until nearly the fifth century, Rome subsidized the Nobatia and used Meroë as a buffer between Egypt and the Blemmyes. Meanwhile, the old Meroitic kingdom contracted because of the expansion of the powerful Kingdom of Aksum to the east. By 350, King Ezana of Axum had captured and destroyed the capital of Meroë, ending the kingdom's independent existence and conquering its territory. Medieval Nubia (c. 350–1500) On the turn of the fifth century, the Blemmyes established a short-lived state in Upper Egypt and Lower Nubia, probably centered around Talmis (Kalabsha), but before 450 they were already driven out of the Nile Valley by the Nobatians. The latter eventually founded a kingdom on their own, Nobatia. By the 6th century there were in total three Nubian kingdoms: Nobatia in the north, which had its capital at Pachoras (Faras); the central kingdom, Makuria centred at Tungul (Old Dongola), about south of modern Dongola; and Alodia, in the heartland of the old Kushitic kingdom, which had its capital at Soba (now a suburb of modern-day Khartoum). Still in the sixth century they converted to Christianity. In the seventh century, probably at some point between 628 and 642, Nobatia was incorporated into Makuria. Between 639 and 641 the Muslim Arabs of the Rashidun Caliphate conquered Byzantine Egypt. In 641 or 642 and again in 652 they invaded Nubia but were repelled, making the Nubians one of the few who managed to defeat the Arabs during the Islamic expansion. Afterwards the Makurian king and the Arabs agreed on a unique non-aggression pact that also included an annual exchange of gifts, thus acknowledging Makuria's independence. While the Arabs failed to conquer Nubia they began to settle east of the Nile, where they eventually founded several port towns and intermarried with the local Beja. From the mid 8th-mid 11th century Christian Nubia went through its Golden Age, when its political power and cultural development peaked. In 747 Makuria invaded Egypt, which at this time belonged to the declining Umayyads, and it did so again in the early 960s, when it pushed as far north as Akhmim. Makuria maintained close dynastic ties with Alodia, perhaps resulting in the temporary unification of the two kingdoms into one state. The culture of the Medieval Nubians has been described as "Afro-Byzantine", with the significance of the "African" component increasing over time. Increasing Arab influence has also been noted. The state organization was extremely centralized, being based on the Byzantine bureaucracy of the 6th and 7th centuries. Arts flourished in the form of pottery paintings and especially wall paintings. The Nubians developed an own alphabet for their language, Old Nobiin, basing it on the Coptic alphabet, while also utilizing Greek, Coptic and Arabic. Women enjoyed high social status: they had access to education, could own, buy and sell land and often used their wealth to endow churches and church paintings. Even the royal succession was matrilineal, with the son of the king's sister being the rightful heir. Since the late 11th/12th century, Makuria's capital Dongola was in decline, and Alodia's capital declined in the 12th century as well. In the 14th (the earliest recorded migration from Egypt to the Sudanese Nile Valley dates to 1324) and 15th century Bedouin tribes overran most of Sudan, migrating to the Butana, the Gezira, Kordofan and Darfur. In 1365 a civil war forced the Makurian court to flee to Gebel Adda in Lower Nubia, while Dongola was destroyed and left to the Arabs. Afterwards Makuria continued to exist only as a petty kingdom. The last known Makurian king was Joel, who is attested for the years 1463 and 1484 and under whom Makuria probably witnessed a brief renaissance. After his death the kingdom probably collapsed. To the south, the kingdom of Alodia fell to either the Arabs, commanded by tribal leader Abdallah Jamma, or the Funj, an African people originating from the south. Datings range from the 9th century after the Hijra ( 1396–1494), the late 15th century, 1504 to 1509. An Alodian rump state might have survived in the form of the kingdom of Fazughli, lasting until 1685. Islamic kingdoms (c. 1500–1821) In 1504 the Funj are recorded to have founded the kingdom of Sennar, in which Abdallah Jamma's realm was incorporated. By 1523, when Jewish traveller David Reubeni visited Sudan, the Funj state already extended as far north as Dongola. Meanwhile, Islam began to be preached on the Nile by Sufi holymen who settled there in the 15th and 16th centuries and by David Reubeni's visit king Amara Dunqas, previously a Pagan or nominal Christian, was recorded to be Muslim. However, the Funj would retain un-Islamic customs like the divine kingship or the consummation of alcohol until the 18th century. Sudanese folk Islam preserved many rituals stemming from Christian traditions until the recent past. Soon the Funj came in conflict with the Ottomans, who had occupied Suakin around 1526 and eventually pushed south along the Nile, reaching the third Nile cataract area in 1583/1584. A subsequent Ottoman attempt to capture Dongola was repelled by the Funj in 1585. Afterwards, Hannik, located just south of the third cataract, would mark the border between the two states. The aftermath of the Ottoman invasion saw the attempted usurpation of Ajib, a minor king of northern Nubia. While the Funj eventually killed him in 1611/12, his successors, the Abdallab, were granted the authority to govern everything north of the confluence of Blue and White Niles with considerable autonomy. During the 17th century the Funj state reached its widest extend, but in the following century it began to decline. A coup in 1718 brought a dynastic change, while another one in 1761-1762 resulted in the Hamaj regency, where the Hamaj (a people from the Ethiopian borderlands) effectively ruled while the Funj sultans were their mere puppets. Shortly afterwards the sultanate began to fragment; by the early 19th century it was essentially restricted to the Gezira. The coup of 1718 kicked off a policy of pursuing a more orthodox Islam, which in turn promoted the Arabization of the state. In order to legitimize their rule over their Arab subjects the Funj began to propagate an Umayyad descend. North of the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, as far downstream as Al Dabbah, the Nubians would adopt the tribal identity of the Arab Jaalin. Until the 19th century Arabic had succeeded in becoming the dominant language of central riverine Sudan and most of Kordofan. West of the Nile, in Darfur, the Islamic period saw at first the rise of the Tunjur kingdom, which replaced the old Daju kingdom in the 15th century and extended as far west as Wadai. The Tunjur people were probably Arabized Berbers and, their ruling elite at least, Muslims. In the 17th century the Tunjur were driven from power by the Fur Keira sultanate. The Keira state, nominally Muslim since the reign of Sulayman Solong (r. 1660–1680), was initially a small kingdom in northern Jebel Marra, but expanded west- and northwards in the early 18th century and eastwards under the rule of Muhammad Tayrab (r. 1751–1786), peaking in the conquest of Kordofan in 1785. The apogee of this empire, now roughly the size of present-day Nigeria, would last until 1821. 19th century Egyptian Conquest From 1805, Egypt underwent a period of rapid modernisation under Muhammad Ali Pasha, who declared himself Khedive in defiance of his nominal suzerain, the Ottoman Sultan. Within a matter of decades, Muhammad Ali transformed Egypt from a neglected Ottoman province to being a virtually independent state. Replicating the approach of his Mamluk predecessors in the medieval Sultanate of Egypt, Muhammad Ali sought to expand Egypt's frontiers southwards into Sudan, both as a means of guaranteeing Egypt's security, and to gain access to Sudan's natural resources. Between 1820–21, Egyptian forces under the command of Muhammad Ali's son conquered and unified the northern portion of the Sudan. Owing to Egypt's continuing de jure fealty to the Ottoman Sultan, the Egyptian administration was known as the Turkiyah. Historically, the pestilential swamps of the Sudd discouraged expansion into the deeper south of the country. Although Egypt claimed all of present day Sudan during most of the 19th century, and established a province Equatoria in southern Sudan to further this aim, it was unable to establish effective control over all of the area. In the later years of the Turkiyah, British missionaries travelled from modern-day Kenya into the Sudan to convert the local tribes to Christianity. Mahdism and condominium In 1881, a religious leader named Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself the Mahdi ("guided one") and began a war to unify the tribes in western and central Sudan. His followers took the name "Ansars" ("followers") which they continue to use today, in association with the single largest political grouping, the Umma Party (once led by a descendant of the Mahdi, Sadiq al Mahdi). Taking advantage of conditions resulting from Ottoman-Egyptian exploitation and maladministration, the Mahdi led a nationalist revolt culminating in the fall of Khartoum on 26 January 1885. The interim governor-general of the Sudan, the British Major-General Charles George Gordon, and many of the fifty thousand inhabitants of Khartoum were massacred. The Mahdi died in June 1885. He was followed by Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, known as the Khalifa, who began an expansion of Sudan's area into Ethiopia. Following his victories in eastern Ethiopia, he sent an army to invade Egypt, where it was defeated by the British at Toshky. The British become aware of the weakness of the Sudan. An Anglo-Egyptian force under Lord Kitchener in 1898 was sent to Sudan. Sudan was proclaimed a condominium in 1899 under British-Egyptian administration. The Governor-General of the Sudan, for example, was appointed by "Khedival Decree", rather than simply by the British Crown, but while maintaining the appearance of joint administration, the British Empire formulated policies, and supplied most of the top administrators. British control (1896–1955) In 1896, a Belgian expedition claimed portions of southern Sudan that became known as the Lado Enclave. The Lado Enclave was officially part of the Belgian Congo. An 1896 agreement between the United Kingdom and Belgium saw the enclave turned over to the British after the death of King Leopold II in December 1909. At the same time the French claimed several areas: Bahr el Ghazal, and the Western Upper Nile up to Fashoda. By 1896 they had a firm administrative hold on these areas and they planned on annexing them to French West Africa. An international conflict known as the Fashoda incident developed between France and the United Kingdom over these areas. In 1899, France agreed to cede the area to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. From 1898, the United Kingdom and Egypt administered all of present-day Sudan as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, but northern and southern Sudan were administered as separate provinces of the condominium. In the very early 1920s, the British passed the Closed Districts Ordinances which stipulated that passports were required for travel between the two zones, and permits were required to conduct business from one zone into the other, and totally separate administrations prevailed. In the south, English, Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Latuko, Shilluk, Azande and Pari (Lafon) were official languages, while in the north, Arabic and English were used as official languages. Islam was discouraged by the British in the south, where Christian missionaries were permitted to work. Condominium governors of south Sudan attended colonial conferences in East Africa, not in Khartoum, and the British hoped to add south Sudan to their East African colonies. Most of the British focus was on developing the economy and infrastructure of the north. Southern political arrangements were left largely as they had been prior to the arrival of the British. Until the 1920s, the British had limited authority in the south. In order to establish their authority in the north, the British promoted the power of Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, head of the Khatmiyya sect and Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, head of the Ansar sect. The Ansar sect essentially became the Umma party, and Khatmiyya became the Democratic Unionist Party. In 1943, the British began preparing the north for self-government, establishing a North Sudan Advisory Council to advise on the governance of the six North Sudanese provinces: Khartoum, Kordofan, Darfur, and Eastern, Northern, and Blue Nile provinces. Then, in 1946, the British administration reversed its policy and decided to integrate north and south Sudan under one government. The South Sudanese authorities were informed at the Juba Conference of 1947 that they would in future be governed by a common administrative authority with the north. From 1948, 13 delegates, nominated by the British authorities, represented the south on the Sudan Legislative Assembly. Many southerners felt betrayed by the British, because they were largely excluded from the new government. The language of the new government was Arabic, but the bureaucrats and politicians from southern Sudan had, for the most part, been trained in English. Of the eight hundred new governmental positions vacated by the British in 1953, only four were given to southerners. Also, the political structure in the south was not as organized in the north, so political groupings and parties from the south were not represented at the various conferences and talks that established the modern state of Sudan. As a result, many southerners did not consider Sudan to be a legitimate state. Independent Sudan (1956 to present) Independence and the First Civil War In February 1953, the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination. The transitional period toward independence began with the inauguration of the first parliament in 1954. On 18 August 1955 a revolt in the army in Torit Southern Sudan broke out, which although quickly suppressed, led to a low level guerrilla insurgency by former Southern rebels, and marked the beginning of the First Sudanese Civil War. On 15 December 1955 the Premier of Sudan Ismail al-Azhari announced that Sudan would unilaterally declare independence in four days time. On 19 December 1955 the Sudanese parliament, unilaterally and unanimously, declared Sudan's independence. The British and Egyptian governments recognized the independence of Sudan on 1 January 1956. The United States was among the first foreign powers to recognize the new state. However, the Arab-led Khartoum government reneged on promises to southerners to create a federal system, which led to a mutiny by southern army officers that sparked seventeen years of civil war (1955–1972). In the early period of the war, hundreds of northern bureaucrats, teachers, and other officials, serving in the south were massacred. The National Unionist Party (NUP), under Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari, dominated the first cabinet, which was soon replaced by a coalition of conservative political forces. In 1958, following a period of economic difficulties and political manoeuvring that paralysed public administration, Chief of Staff Major General Ibrahim Abboud overthrew the parliamentary regime in a bloodless coup d'état.	reassert full control over Kush. Around 590 BC, however, an Egyptian army sacked Napata, compelling the Kushite court to move to a more secure location further south at Meroë near the Sixth Cataract. For several centuries thereafter, the Meroitic kingdom developed independently of Egyptian influence and domination, which passed successively under Iranian, Greek, and, finally, Roman domination. During the height of its power in the second and third centuries BC, Meroë extended over a region from the Third Cataract in the north to Soba, near present-day Khartoum, in the south. An Egyptian-influenced pharaonic tradition persisted among a line of rulers at Meroë, who raised stelae to record the achievements of their reigns and erected Nubian pyramids to contain their tombs. These objects and the ruins of palaces, temples, and baths at Meroë attest to a centralized political system that employed artisans' skills and commanded the labour of a large work force. A well-managed irrigation system allowed the area to support a higher population density than was possible during later periods. By the first century BC, the use of Egyptian hieroglyphs gave way to a Meroitic alphabet adapted for the Nubian-related language spoken by the region's people. Meroë's succession system was not necessarily hereditary; the matrilineal royal family member deemed most worthy often became king. The kandake or queen mother's role in the selection process was crucial to a smooth succession. The crown appears to have passed from brother to brother (or sister) and only when no siblings remained from father to son. Although Napata remained Meroë's religious centre, northern Kush eventually fell into disorder as it came under pressure from the Blemmyes, predatory nomads from east of the Nile. However, the Nile continued to give the region access to the Mediterranean world. Additionally, Meroë maintained contact with Arab and Indian traders along the Red Sea coast and incorporated Hellenistic and Indian cultural influences into its daily life. Inconclusive evidence suggests that metallurgical technology may have been transmitted westward across the savanna belt to West Africa from Meroë's iron smelteries. Relations between Meroë and Egypt were not always peaceful. As a response to Meroë's incursions into Upper Egypt, a Roman army moved south and razed Napata in 23 BC. The Roman commander quickly abandoned the area, however, deeming it too poor to warrant colonization. In the second century AD, the Nobatia occupied the Nile's west bank in northern Kush. They are believed to have been one of several well-armed bands of horse- and camel-borne warriors who sold their skills to Meroë for protection; eventually they intermarried and established themselves among the Meroitic people as a military aristocracy. Until nearly the fifth century, Rome subsidized the Nobatia and used Meroë as a buffer between Egypt and the Blemmyes. Meanwhile, the old Meroitic kingdom contracted because of the expansion of the powerful Kingdom of Aksum to the east. By 350, King Ezana of Axum had captured and destroyed the capital of Meroë, ending the kingdom's independent existence and conquering its territory. Medieval Nubia (c. 350–1500) On the turn of the fifth century, the Blemmyes established a short-lived state in Upper Egypt and Lower Nubia, probably centered around Talmis (Kalabsha), but before 450 they were already driven out of the Nile Valley by the Nobatians. The latter eventually founded a kingdom on their own, Nobatia. By the 6th century there were in total three Nubian kingdoms: Nobatia in the north, which had its capital at Pachoras (Faras); the central kingdom, Makuria centred at Tungul (Old Dongola), about south of modern Dongola; and Alodia, in the heartland of the old Kushitic kingdom, which had its capital at Soba (now a suburb of modern-day Khartoum). Still in the sixth century they converted to Christianity. In the seventh century, probably at some point between 628 and 642, Nobatia was incorporated into Makuria. Between 639 and 641 the Muslim Arabs of the Rashidun Caliphate conquered Byzantine Egypt. In 641 or 642 and again in 652 they invaded Nubia but were repelled, making the Nubians one of the few who managed to defeat the Arabs during the Islamic expansion. Afterwards the Makurian king and the Arabs agreed on a unique non-aggression pact that also included an annual exchange of gifts, thus acknowledging Makuria's independence. While the Arabs failed to conquer Nubia they began to settle east of the Nile, where they eventually founded several port towns and intermarried with the local Beja. From the mid 8th-mid 11th century Christian Nubia went through its Golden Age, when its political power and cultural development peaked. In 747 Makuria invaded Egypt, which at this time belonged to the declining Umayyads, and it did so again in the early 960s, when it pushed as far north as Akhmim. Makuria maintained close dynastic ties with Alodia, perhaps resulting in the temporary unification of the two kingdoms into one state. The culture of the Medieval Nubians has been described as "Afro-Byzantine", with the significance of the "African" component increasing over time. Increasing Arab influence has also been noted. The state organization was extremely centralized, being based on the Byzantine bureaucracy of the 6th and 7th centuries. Arts flourished in the form of pottery paintings and especially wall paintings. The Nubians developed an own alphabet for their language, Old Nobiin, basing it on the Coptic alphabet, while also utilizing Greek, Coptic and Arabic. Women enjoyed high social status: they had access to education, could own, buy and sell land and often used their wealth to endow churches and church paintings. Even the royal succession was matrilineal, with the son of the king's sister being the rightful heir. Since the late 11th/12th century, Makuria's capital Dongola was in decline, and Alodia's capital declined in the 12th century as well. In the 14th (the earliest recorded migration from Egypt to the Sudanese Nile Valley dates to 1324) and 15th century Bedouin tribes overran most of Sudan, migrating to the Butana, the Gezira, Kordofan and Darfur. In 1365 a civil war forced the Makurian court to flee to Gebel Adda in Lower Nubia, while Dongola was destroyed and left to the Arabs. Afterwards Makuria continued to exist only as a petty kingdom. The last known Makurian king was Joel, who is attested for the years 1463 and 1484 and under whom Makuria probably witnessed a brief renaissance. After his death the kingdom probably collapsed. To the south, the kingdom of Alodia fell to either the Arabs, commanded by tribal leader Abdallah Jamma, or the Funj, an African people originating from the south. Datings range from the 9th century after the Hijra ( 1396–1494), the late 15th century, 1504 to 1509. An Alodian rump state might have survived in the form of the kingdom of Fazughli, lasting until 1685. Islamic kingdoms (c. 1500–1821) In 1504 the Funj are recorded to have founded the kingdom of Sennar, in which Abdallah Jamma's realm was incorporated. By 1523, when Jewish traveller David Reubeni visited Sudan, the Funj state already extended as far north as Dongola. Meanwhile, Islam began to be preached on the Nile by Sufi holymen who settled there in the 15th and 16th centuries and by David Reubeni's visit king Amara Dunqas, previously a Pagan or nominal Christian, was recorded to be Muslim. However, the Funj would retain un-Islamic customs like the divine kingship or the consummation of alcohol until the 18th century. Sudanese folk Islam preserved many rituals stemming from Christian traditions until the recent past. Soon the Funj came in conflict with the Ottomans, who had occupied Suakin around 1526 and eventually pushed south along the Nile, reaching the third Nile cataract area in 1583/1584. A subsequent Ottoman attempt to capture Dongola was repelled by the Funj in 1585. Afterwards, Hannik, located just south of the third cataract, would mark the border between the two states. The aftermath of the Ottoman invasion saw the attempted usurpation of Ajib, a minor king of northern Nubia. While the Funj eventually killed him in 1611/12, his successors, the Abdallab, were granted the authority to govern everything north of the confluence of Blue and White Niles with considerable autonomy. During the 17th century the Funj state reached its widest extend, but in the following century it began to decline. A coup in 1718 brought a dynastic change, while another one in 1761-1762 resulted in the Hamaj regency, where the Hamaj (a people from the Ethiopian borderlands) effectively ruled while the Funj sultans were their mere puppets. Shortly afterwards the sultanate began to fragment; by the early 19th century it was essentially restricted to the Gezira. The coup of 1718 kicked off a policy of pursuing a more orthodox Islam, which in turn promoted the Arabization of the state. In order to legitimize their rule over their Arab subjects the Funj began to propagate an Umayyad descend. North of the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, as far downstream as Al Dabbah, the Nubians would adopt the tribal identity of the Arab Jaalin. Until the 19th century Arabic had succeeded in becoming the dominant language of central riverine Sudan and most of Kordofan. West of the Nile, in Darfur, the Islamic period saw at first the rise of the Tunjur kingdom, which replaced the old Daju kingdom in the 15th century and extended as far west as Wadai. The Tunjur people were probably Arabized Berbers and, their ruling elite at least, Muslims. In the 17th century the Tunjur were driven from power by the Fur Keira sultanate. The Keira state, nominally Muslim since the reign of Sulayman Solong (r. 1660–1680), was initially a small kingdom in northern Jebel Marra, but expanded west- and northwards in the early 18th century and eastwards under the rule of Muhammad Tayrab (r. 1751–1786), peaking in the conquest of Kordofan in 1785. The apogee of this empire, now roughly the size of present-day Nigeria, would last until 1821. 19th century Egyptian Conquest From 1805, Egypt underwent a period of rapid modernisation under Muhammad Ali Pasha, who declared himself Khedive in defiance of his nominal suzerain, the Ottoman Sultan. Within a matter of decades, Muhammad Ali transformed Egypt from a neglected Ottoman province to being a virtually independent state. Replicating the approach of his Mamluk predecessors in the medieval Sultanate of Egypt, Muhammad Ali sought to expand Egypt's frontiers southwards into Sudan, both as a means of guaranteeing Egypt's security, and to gain access to Sudan's natural resources. Between 1820–21, Egyptian forces under the command of Muhammad Ali's son conquered and unified the northern portion of the Sudan. Owing to Egypt's continuing de jure fealty to the Ottoman Sultan, the Egyptian administration was known as the Turkiyah. Historically, the pestilential swamps of the Sudd discouraged expansion into the deeper south of the country. Although Egypt claimed all of present day Sudan during most of the 19th century, and established a province Equatoria in southern Sudan to further this aim, it was unable to establish effective control over all of the area. In the later years of the Turkiyah, British missionaries travelled from modern-day Kenya into the Sudan to convert the local tribes to Christianity. Mahdism and condominium In 1881, a religious leader named Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself the Mahdi ("guided one") and began a war to unify the tribes in western and central Sudan. His followers took the name "Ansars" ("followers") which they continue to use today, in association with the single largest political grouping, the Umma Party (once led by a descendant of the Mahdi, Sadiq al Mahdi). Taking advantage of conditions resulting from Ottoman-Egyptian exploitation and maladministration, the Mahdi led a nationalist revolt culminating in the fall of Khartoum on 26 January 1885. The interim governor-general of the Sudan, the British Major-General Charles George Gordon, and many of the fifty thousand inhabitants of Khartoum were massacred. The Mahdi died in June 1885. He was followed by Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, known as the Khalifa, who began an expansion of Sudan's area into Ethiopia. Following his victories in eastern Ethiopia, he sent an army to invade Egypt, where it was defeated by the British at Toshky. The British become aware of the weakness of the Sudan. An Anglo-Egyptian force under Lord Kitchener in 1898 was sent to Sudan. Sudan was proclaimed a condominium in 1899 under British-Egyptian administration. The Governor-General of the Sudan, for example, was appointed by "Khedival Decree", rather than simply by the British Crown, but while maintaining the appearance of joint administration, the British Empire formulated policies, and supplied most of the top administrators. British control (1896–1955) In 1896, a Belgian expedition claimed portions of southern Sudan that became known as the Lado Enclave. The Lado Enclave was officially part of the Belgian Congo. An 1896 agreement between the United Kingdom and Belgium saw the enclave turned over to the British after the death of King Leopold II in December 1909. At the same time the French claimed several areas: Bahr el Ghazal, and the Western Upper Nile up to Fashoda. By 1896 they had a firm administrative hold on these areas and they planned on annexing them to French West Africa. An international conflict known as the Fashoda incident developed between France and the United Kingdom over these areas. In 1899, France agreed to cede the area to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. From 1898, the United Kingdom and Egypt administered all of present-day Sudan as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, but northern and southern Sudan were administered as separate provinces of the condominium. In the very early 1920s, the British passed the Closed Districts Ordinances which stipulated that passports were required for travel between the two zones, and permits were required to conduct business from one zone into the other, and totally separate administrations prevailed. In the south, English, Dinka, Bari, Nuer, Latuko, Shilluk, Azande and Pari (Lafon) were official languages, while in the north, Arabic and English were used as official languages. Islam was discouraged by the British in the south, where Christian missionaries were permitted to work. Condominium governors of
central clay plains that stretch eastward from the Nuba Mountains to the Ethiopian frontier, broken only by the Ingessana Hills, and from Khartoum in the north to the far reaches of southern Sudan. Between the Dindar and the Rahad rivers, a low ridge slopes down from the Ethiopian highlands to break the endless skyline of the plains, and the occasional hill stands out in stark relief. The central clay plains provide the backbone of Sudan's economy because they are productive where settlements cluster around available water. Furthermore, in the heartland of the central clay plains lies the jazirah, the land between the Blue Nile and the White Nile (literally in Arabic "peninsula") where the great Gezira Scheme (a.k.a. Jazirah Scheme) was developed. This project grows cotton for export and has traditionally produced more than half of Sudan's revenue and export earnings. Northeast of the central clay plains lies eastern Sudan, which is divided between desert and semidesert and includes the Butana, the Qash Delta, the Red Sea Hills, and the coastal plain. The Butana is an undulating land between Khartoum and Kassala that provides good grazing for cattle, sheep, and goats. East of Al Butanah is a peculiar geological formation known as the Qash Delta. Originally a depression, it has been filled with sand and silt brought down by the flash floods of the Qash River, creating a delta above the surrounding plain. Extending 100 kilometers north of Kassala, the whole area watered by the Qash is a rich grassland with bountiful cultivation long after the river has spent its waters on the surface of its delta. Trees and bushes provide grazing for the camels from the north, and the rich moist soil provides an abundance of food crops and cotton. Northward beyond the Qash lie the more formidable Red Sea Hills. Dry, bleak, and cooler than the surrounding land, particularly in the heat of the Sudan summer, they stretch northward into Egypt, a jumbled mass of hills where life is hard and unpredictable for the hardy Beja inhabitants. Below the hills sprawls the coastal plain of the Red Sea, varying in width from about fifty-six kilometers in the south near Tawkar to about twenty-four kilometers near the Egyptian frontier. The coastal plain is dry and barren. It consists of rocks, and the seaward side is thick with coral reefs. Sudan includes islands located in the Nile (including Aba Island, Badien Island, Sai Island, and, at the confluence of the Blue and White Nile, Tuti Island) and in the Red Sea (including the Suakin Archipelago). Political geography Sudan is divided into 18 states and one area with special administrative status. The states of Sudan are: Khartoum North Kordofan Northern Kassala Blue Nile North Darfur South Darfur South Kordofan Gezira White Nile River Nile Red Sea Al Qadarif Sennar West Darfur Central Darfur East Darfur West Kordofan (disestablished in 2005; reestablished in 2013) As a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005, the Abyei Area was given special administrative status and following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, is considered to be simultaneously part of both the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, effectively a condominium. Soils The country's soils can be divided geographically into two categories. These are the sandy soils of the northern and west central areas, the clay soils of the central region, and the laterite soils of the south. Less extensive and widely separated, but of major economic importance, is a third group consisting of alluvial soils found along the lower reaches of the White Nile and Blue Nile rivers, along the main Nile to Lake Nubia, in the delta of the Qash River in the Kassala area, and in the Baraka Delta in the area of Tawkar near the Red Sea in Ash Sharqi State. Agriculturally, the most important soils are the clays in central Sudan that extend from west of Kassala and southern Kurdufan. Known as cracking soils because of the practice of allowing them to dry out and crack during the dry months to restore their permeability, they are used in the areas of Al Jazirah and Khashm al Qirbah for irrigated cultivation. East of the Blue Nile, large areas are used for mechanized rainfed crops. West of the White Nile, these soils are used by traditional cultivators to grow sorghum, sesame, peanuts, and (in the area around the Nuba Mountains) cotton. The southern part of the clay soil zone lies in the broad floodplain of the upper reaches of the White Nile and its tributaries, covering most of Aali an Nil and upper Bahr al Ghazal states. Subject to heavy rainfall during the rainy season, the floodplain proper is inundated for four to six months — a large swampy area, the Sudd in South Sudan, is permanently flooded — and adjacent areas are flooded for one or two months. In general this area is poorly suited to crop production, but the grasses it supports during dry periods are used for grazing. The sandy soils in the semiarid areas south of the desert in northern Kurdufan and northern Darfur states support vegetation used for grazing. In the southern part of these states and the western part of southern Darfur are the so-called qoz sands. Livestock raising is this area's major activity, but a significant amount of crop cultivation, mainly of pearl millet, also occurs. Peanuts and sesame are grown as cash crops. The qoz sands are the principal area from which gum arabic is obtained through tapping of Acacia senegal (known locally as hashab). This tree grows readily in the region, and cultivators occasionally plant hashab trees when land is returned to fallow. Hydrology Except for a small area in northeastern Sudan, where wadis discharge the sporadic runoff into the Red Sea or rivers from Eritrea flow into shallow evaporating ponds west of the Red Sea Hills, the entire country is drained by the Nile and its two main tributaries, the Blue Nile and the White Nile. The longest river in the world, the Nile flows for 6,737 kilometers from its farthest headwaters in central Africa to the Mediterranean. The importance	that provides good grazing for cattle, sheep, and goats. East of Al Butanah is a peculiar geological formation known as the Qash Delta. Originally a depression, it has been filled with sand and silt brought down by the flash floods of the Qash River, creating a delta above the surrounding plain. Extending 100 kilometers north of Kassala, the whole area watered by the Qash is a rich grassland with bountiful cultivation long after the river has spent its waters on the surface of its delta. Trees and bushes provide grazing for the camels from the north, and the rich moist soil provides an abundance of food crops and cotton. Northward beyond the Qash lie the more formidable Red Sea Hills. Dry, bleak, and cooler than the surrounding land, particularly in the heat of the Sudan summer, they stretch northward into Egypt, a jumbled mass of hills where life is hard and unpredictable for the hardy Beja inhabitants. Below the hills sprawls the coastal plain of the Red Sea, varying in width from about fifty-six kilometers in the south near Tawkar to about twenty-four kilometers near the Egyptian frontier. The coastal plain is dry and barren. It consists of rocks, and the seaward side is thick with coral reefs. Sudan includes islands located in the Nile (including Aba Island, Badien Island, Sai Island, and, at the confluence of the Blue and White Nile, Tuti Island) and in the Red Sea (including the Suakin Archipelago). Political geography Sudan is divided into 18 states and one area with special administrative status. The states of Sudan are: Khartoum North Kordofan Northern Kassala Blue Nile North Darfur South Darfur South Kordofan Gezira White Nile River Nile Red Sea Al Qadarif Sennar West Darfur Central Darfur East Darfur West Kordofan (disestablished in 2005; reestablished in 2013) As a result of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005, the Abyei Area was given special administrative status and following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, is considered to be simultaneously part of both the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan, effectively a condominium. Soils The country's soils can be divided geographically into two categories. These are the sandy soils of the northern and west central areas, the clay soils of the central region, and the laterite soils of the south. Less extensive and widely separated, but of major economic importance, is a third group consisting of alluvial soils found along the lower reaches of the White Nile and Blue Nile rivers, along the main Nile to Lake Nubia, in the delta of the Qash River in the Kassala area, and in the Baraka Delta in the area of Tawkar near the Red Sea in Ash Sharqi State. Agriculturally, the most important soils are the clays in central Sudan that extend from west of Kassala and southern Kurdufan. Known as cracking soils because of the practice of allowing them to dry out and crack during the dry months to restore their permeability, they are used in the areas of Al Jazirah and Khashm al Qirbah for irrigated cultivation. East of the Blue Nile, large areas are used for mechanized rainfed crops. West of the White Nile, these soils are used by traditional cultivators to grow sorghum, sesame, peanuts, and (in the area around the Nuba Mountains) cotton. The southern part of the clay soil zone lies in the broad floodplain of the upper reaches of the White Nile and its tributaries, covering most of Aali an Nil and upper Bahr al Ghazal states. Subject to heavy rainfall during the rainy season, the floodplain proper is inundated for four to six months — a large swampy area, the Sudd in South Sudan, is permanently flooded — and adjacent areas are flooded for one or two months. In general this area is poorly suited to crop production, but the grasses it supports during dry periods are used for grazing. The sandy soils in the semiarid areas south of the desert in northern Kurdufan and northern Darfur states support vegetation used for grazing. In the southern part of these states and the western part of southern Darfur are the so-called qoz sands. Livestock raising is this area's major activity, but a significant amount of crop cultivation, mainly of pearl millet, also occurs. Peanuts and sesame are grown as cash crops. The qoz sands are the principal area from which gum arabic is obtained through tapping of Acacia senegal (known locally as hashab). This tree grows readily in the region, and cultivators occasionally plant hashab trees when land is returned to fallow. Hydrology Except for a small area in northeastern Sudan, where wadis discharge the sporadic runoff into the Red Sea or rivers from Eritrea flow into shallow evaporating ponds west of the Red Sea Hills, the entire country is drained by the Nile and its two main tributaries, the Blue Nile and the White Nile. The longest river in the world, the Nile flows for 6,737 kilometers from its farthest headwaters in central Africa to the Mediterranean. The importance of the Nile has been recognized since biblical times; for centuries the river has been a lifeline for Sudan. The Blue Nile flows out of the Ethiopian highlands to meet the White Nile at Khartoum.
of South Sudan is now in question. 250,000 refugees from Syria live in Sudan. Vital statistics The vital statistics below include South Sudan. Life expectancy at birth (only North Sudan) Ethnic groups Sudanese Arabs (approximately 70%) Fur people Beja people Nuba people Nubian people Languages The most widely spoken languages in Sudan are: Arabic language: Sudanese Arabic. Najdi and Hejazi Arabic, (mainly in mid-north and mid-east regions). Chadian Arabic in western region, (mainly spoken by Baggara and various Arabized African tribes). Nubian language in far north, (mainly spoken by Nubians of Mahas, Dongola and Halfa). Beja language knows as Bedawit in far east alongside Red sea, (mainly spoken by Beja of Hadandawa, Ababda and Bisharin). Before 2005, only Arabic was the official language. In the 2005 constitution, Sudan's official languages became Arabic and English: The working constitution of the post-2019 Revolution transitional period specifies no national language. Religion 97% of the population adheres to Islam, with the overwhelming majority being adherents of the Sunni Sufi branch and the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence. The remainder of the population follows either animist and indigenous beliefs or Christianity, especially in Khartoum and in southern regions of the country bordering South Sudan. Christians in Sudan which are refugees or immigrants from the south belong to various churches including the Roman Catholic Church, small Melkite and Maronite communities in the north, as well as Anglicans followers in the Episcopal Church of Sudan and the recently formed Reformed Episcopal Church. There are significant but long-established groups of Coptic Orthodox and Greek Orthodox Christians in Khartoum and other northern cities. There are also Ethiopian and Eritrean Orthodox communities in Khartoum and eastern Sudan, largely made up of refugees and migrants from the past few decades. Other Christian groups with smaller followings in the country include the Africa Inland Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Sudan Church of Christ, the Sudan Interior Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Sudan Pentecostal Church, the Sudan Evangelical Presbyterian Church (in the North). Religious identity plays a role in the country's political divisions. Northern and western Muslims have dominated the country's political and economic system since independence. The NCP draws much of its support from Islamists, Salafis/Wahhabis and other conservative Arab Muslims in the north. The Umma Party has traditionally attracted Arab followers of the Ansar sect of Sufism as well	and Fallata. When counted as one people Sudanese Arabs are by far the largest ethnic group in Sudan, however African ethnic groups are a large minority if counted as one group. They are almost entirely Muslim; while the majority speak Sudanese Arabic; some other Arab tribes speak different Arabic dialects like Awadia and Fadnia and Bani Arak tribes who speak Najdi Arabic; Bani Hassan, Al-Ashraf, Kinanah and Rashaida who speak Hejazi Arabic. In addition, Arab tribes like the Baggara and other Darfurians, both who speak Chadian Arabic. Sudanese Arabs of northern and eastern parts descend primarily from migrants from the Arabian Peninsula and some of the pre-existing indigenous populations of Sudan, most predominately the Nubian people who also share a common history with Egypt. Additionally, a few pre-Islamic Arabian tribes existed in Sudan from earlier migrations into the region from Western Arabia, although most Arabs in Sudan are dated from migrations after the 12th century. The vast majority of Arab tribes in Sudan migrated into the Sudan in the 12th century, intermarried with the indigenous African populations and introduced Islam. Population statistics Achieving good counts of the population is difficult in Sudan, because conducting a census has been difficult due to various conflicts and wars in the southern, eastern and western regions of Sudan over the past few decades. The government of South Sudan (led by the former SPLM resistance movement) has in the past accused Sudan of deliberately manipulating the census in oil-rich regions such as the Abyei district, on the border between Sudan and South Sudan. The population count is a determining factor for the share of wealth and power each part of Sudan receives after the secession of South Sudan (See: Naivasha Agreement). Another complication is the Southern Sudanese refugees present in the north, whose citizenship in Sudan after the secession of South Sudan is now in question. 250,000 refugees from Syria live in Sudan. Vital statistics The vital statistics below include South Sudan. Life expectancy at birth (only North Sudan) Ethnic groups Sudanese Arabs (approximately 70%) Fur people Beja people Nuba people Nubian people Languages The most widely spoken languages in Sudan are: Arabic language: Sudanese Arabic. Najdi and Hejazi Arabic, (mainly in mid-north and mid-east regions). Chadian Arabic in western region, (mainly spoken by Baggara and various Arabized African tribes). Nubian language in far north, (mainly spoken by Nubians of Mahas, Dongola and Halfa). Beja language knows as Bedawit in far east alongside Red sea, (mainly spoken by Beja of Hadandawa, Ababda and Bisharin). Before 2005, only Arabic was the official language. In the 2005 constitution, Sudan's official languages became Arabic and English: The working constitution of the post-2019 Revolution transitional period specifies no national language. Religion 97% of the population adheres to Islam, with the overwhelming majority being adherents of the Sunni Sufi branch and the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence. The remainder of the population follows either animist and indigenous beliefs or Christianity, especially in Khartoum and in southern regions of the country bordering South Sudan. Christians in Sudan which are refugees or immigrants from the south belong to various churches including the Roman Catholic Church, small Melkite and Maronite communities in the north, as well as Anglicans followers in the Episcopal Church of Sudan and the recently formed Reformed Episcopal Church. There are
SPLM/A granted Southern Sudan autonomy for six years, to be followed by a referendum about independence in 2011. According to the new 2005 constitution, the bicameral National Legislature is the official Sudanese parliament, and is divided between two chambers; the National Assembly, a lower house with 450 seats, and the Council of States, an upper house with 50 seats. Thus the parliament consists of 500 appointed members altogether, where all are indirectly elected by state legislatures to serve six-year terms. Despite his international arrest warrant, Omar al-Bashir was re-elected in the 2010 Sudanese presidential election, the first democratic election with multiple political parties participating in nine years. His political rival was Vice President Salva Kiir Mayardit, current leader of the SPLA. In December 1999, a power struggle climaxed between president Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, NIF founder, Islamist ideologue and speaker of parliament. Al-Turabi was stripped of his posts in the ruling party and the government, parliament was disbanded, the constitution suspended, and a state of national emergency declared by presidential decree. Parliament resumed in February 2001 after the December 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections, but the national emergency laws remain in effect. Around the same time the Black Book, a manuscript by dissident Westerners detailing the domination of the northern peoples, was published. Al-Turabi was arrested in February 2001, and charged with being a threat to national security and the constitutional order for signing a memorandum of understanding with the SPLM/A. He was placed in a maximum-security prison until freed in 2005. As part of the agreement ending the Second Sudanese Civil War, nine members of the SPLM/A and 16 members of the government were sworn in as Ministers on 22 September 2005, forming the first post war government of national unity. The inauguration was delayed over arguments over who would get various portfolios and as a result of the death of vice president John Garang. The National Congress Party kept control of the key energy, defense, interior and finance posts, while an SPLM appointee became foreign minister. Vice President Salva Kiir was reported to have backed down in the argument over who would have control of the vital Ministry of Energy and Mining, which handles the output of Sudan's oil fields. On April 11, 2019, al-Bashir and his government were overthrown in a military coup lead by his First Vice President and Defense Minister, who then established the now ruling military junta. The next day Auf handed power to Lt. General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan. Sudan’s Sovereign Council, the military-civilian body that is the highest power in the transitional government, has ruled Sudan since the fall of Omar al-Bashir. Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok is the civilian leader of the cabinet. In October 2020, Sudan made an agreement to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, as part of the agreement the United States removed Sudan from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. As of August 2021, the country was jointly led by Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok. On 25 October 2021, the Sovereignty Council and the Sudanese government were dissolved after being overthrown in the 2021 Sudan coup. Executive branch and then \|- \|Head of Sudan \|Abdel Fattah al-Burhan \|(military) \|25 October 2021 \|- \|Prime Minister \|Vacant \|} President al-Bashir's government was dominated by members of Sudan's National Islamic Front (NIF), a fundamentalist political organization formed from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1986; in 1998, the NIF founded the National Congress as its legal front; the National Congress/NIF dominates much of Khartoum's overall domestic and foreign policies; President al-Bashir named a new cabinet on April 20, 1996 which includes members of the National Islamic Front, serving and retired military officers, and civilian technocrats; on March 8, 1998, he reshuffled the cabinet and brought in several former rebel and opposition members as ministers; he reshuffled his cabinet again on January 24, 2000 but announced few changes. A government of national unity was sworn in on 22 September, with 16 members from the National Congress, nine from the SPLM and two from the northern opposition National Democratic Alliance, which left the seats vacant in protest over how the posts were allocated. The Darfur rebels were not represented. Al-Bashir, as chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC), assumed power on June 30, 1989 and served concurrently as chief of state, chairman of the RCC, prime minister, and minister of defense until 16 October 1993 when he was appointed president by the RCC; upon its dissolution on 16 October 1993, the RCC's executive and legislative powers were devolved to the president and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), Sudan's appointed legislative body, which has since been replaced by the National Assembly elected in March 1996; on December 12, 1999 Bashir dismissed the National Assembly during an internal power struggle between the president and speaker of the Parliament Hasan al-Turabi On April 11, 2019, al-Bashir was ousted in a coup led by Vice President and Defense Minister Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, with his government then being dissolved afterwards. On April 12, 2019, Auf, who still served as Minister of Defense, handed power to Lt. General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, general inspector of the armed forces. Auf would also	by members of Sudan's National Islamic Front (NIF), a fundamentalist political organization formed from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1986; in 1998, the NIF founded the National Congress as its legal front; the National Congress/NIF dominates much of Khartoum's overall domestic and foreign policies; President al-Bashir named a new cabinet on April 20, 1996 which includes members of the National Islamic Front, serving and retired military officers, and civilian technocrats; on March 8, 1998, he reshuffled the cabinet and brought in several former rebel and opposition members as ministers; he reshuffled his cabinet again on January 24, 2000 but announced few changes. A government of national unity was sworn in on 22 September, with 16 members from the National Congress, nine from the SPLM and two from the northern opposition National Democratic Alliance, which left the seats vacant in protest over how the posts were allocated. The Darfur rebels were not represented. Al-Bashir, as chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCC), assumed power on June 30, 1989 and served concurrently as chief of state, chairman of the RCC, prime minister, and minister of defense until 16 October 1993 when he was appointed president by the RCC; upon its dissolution on 16 October 1993, the RCC's executive and legislative powers were devolved to the president and the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), Sudan's appointed legislative body, which has since been replaced by the National Assembly elected in March 1996; on December 12, 1999 Bashir dismissed the National Assembly during an internal power struggle between the president and speaker of the Parliament Hasan al-Turabi On April 11, 2019, al-Bashir was ousted in a coup led by Vice President and Defense Minister Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, with his government then being dissolved afterwards. On April 12, 2019, Auf, who still served as Minister of Defense, handed power to Lt. General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, general inspector of the armed forces. Auf would also give up his position as Minister of Defense on April 14, 2019. On October 25, 2021, Burhan dissolved the Sudanese government and the Sovereignty Council which ruled Sudan in the aftermath of al-Bashir's downfall following another successful coup. Legislative branch The country was recently in an interim (transitional) period following the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 that officially ended the civil war between the Sudanese Government (based in Khartoum) and the southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) rebel group. The newly formed National Legislature, whose members were chosen in mid-2005, had two chambers. The National Assembly (Majlis Watani) consisted of 450 appointed members who represent the government, former rebels, and other opposition political parties. The Council of States (Majlis Welayat) had 50 members who are indirectly elected by state legislatures. All members of the National Legislature served six-year terms. However, the National Legislature was dissolved during the April 2019 coup as well. Political parties and elections Judicial branch Supreme Court; Special Revolutionary Court Legal system The legal system is based on Islamic law; as of January 20, 1991, the now defunct Revolutionary Command Council imposed Islamic law in the northern states; Islamic law applies to all residents of the northern states regardless of their religion; some separate religious courts; accepts compulsory International Court of Justice jurisdiction, with reservations. Administrative divisions Sudan is divided into twenty-six states, each of which were governed by a governor and council of ministers, each member of each state of council of ministers were appointed by the president of the country. The elections of governors was different from others, the president picks three people who he decided will be running against each other, the one who wins at least 50% popular vote is the governor of that state. If no one wins at least 50% popular vote, the person with the fewest votes is disqualified from the campaign and they redo the election and then someone has to have at least 50% popular vote. The following are the states of Sudan. (wilayat, singular wilayah): A'ali an Nil, Al Bahr al Ahmar, Al Buhayrat, Al Jazirah, Al Khartum, Al Qadarif, Al Wahdah, An Nil al Abyad, An Nil al Azraq, Ash Shamaliyah, Bahr al Jabal, Gharb al Istiwa'iyah, Gharb Bahr al Ghazal, Gharb Darfur, Gharb Kurdufan, Janub Darfur, Janub Kurdufan, Junqali, Kassala, Nahr an Nil, Shamal Bahr al Ghazal, Shamal Darfur, Shamal Kurdufan, Sharq al Istiwa'iyah, Sinnar, Warab. However, state governments and their legislative councils were also dissolved during the April 2019 coup as well. International organization participation African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States African Development Bank African Union Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development Arab League, formally the League of Arab States Arab Monetary Fund Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Council of Arab Economic Unity Food and Agriculture Organization Group of 77 (G77) Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Atomic Energy Agency International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Civil Aviation Organization International Criminal Court International Criminal Police Organization - Interpol International Development Association International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies International Finance Corporation International Fund for Agricultural Development International Labour Organization International Maritime Organization International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Olympic Committee (IOC) International Organization for Migration International Organization for Standardization (ISO) International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement International Telecommunications Satellite Organization International Telecommunication Union Inter-Parliamentary Union Islamic Development Bank Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency Non-Aligned Movement Organisation of African Unity Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Permanent Court of Arbitration UNESCO UNICEF United Nations United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) United Nations University Universal Postal Union (UPU) World Customs Organization World Health Organization World Intellectual Property Organization World Meteorological Organization World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) World Trade Organization (observer) State and local government Relations between the central government and local authorities have been a persistent problem in Sudan. According to the Interim National Constitution, each state had its own legislative, executive, and judicial organs. The state-empowered local government and state constitutions
capital flight led to a serious foreign-exchange crisis and increased shortages of imported inputs and commodities. More significantly, the 1989 revolution caused many donors in Europe, the U.S., and Canada to suspend official development assistance, but not humanitarian aid. However, as Sudan became the world's largest debtor to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund by 1993, its relationship with the international financial institutions soured in the mid-1990s and has yet to be fully rehabilitated. The government fell out of compliance with an IMF standby program and accumulated substantial arrearages on repurchase obligations. A 4-year economic reform plan was announced in 1988 but was not pursued. An economic reform plan was announced in 1989 and began implementing a 3-year economic restructuring program designed to reduce the public sector deficit, end subsidies, privatize state enterprises, and encourage new foreign and domestic investment. In 1993, the IMF suspended Sudan's voting rights and the World Bank suspended Sudan's right to make withdrawals under effective and fully disbursed loans and credits. Lome Funds and EU agricultural credits, totaling more than one billion euros, also were suspended. Sectors Agriculture Primary resources are agricultural, including cotton, peanuts, gum arabic, and sesame seeds. Although the country is trying to diversify its cash crops, cotton and peanuts remain its major agricultural exports. Grain sorghum (dura) is the principal food crop, and wheat is grown for domestic consumption. Sesame seeds and peanuts are cultivated for domestic consumption and increasingly for export. Three main agricultural sub-sectors are active in Sudan: pastoral livestock, cropping and fish production. Livestock production has vast potential, and many animals, particularly cows, sheep, and camels, are exported to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. However, Sudan remains a net importer of food. Problems of investment finance, production and transportation remain the greatest constraints to a more dynamic agricultural economy. A major problem which has been growing for decades is the continual loss of open lands previously used for animal grazing to mechanized drylands and irrigated farming. Sudan has 84 million hectares of arable land and less than 20% is cultivated. Major agricultural projects such as the Gezera Scheme in Gezira state are underway in order to make Sudan food self-sufficient. Sudan is one of the world's potential breadbaskets and Sudan is nicknamed as the Arab world food basket as it accounts for 45% of arable land in the Arab world. In 1998 there was an estimated 16.9 million hectares (41.8 million acres) of arable land and approximately 1.9 million hectares (4.7 million acres) set aside for irrigation, primarily in the north of the country along the banks of the Nile and other rivers. Cash crops (as of 1999) grown under irrigation in these areas include cotton and cottonseed, which is of primary importance to the economy with 172,000 tons and 131,000 tons produced annually respectively, sesame (220,000 tons), sugarcane (5,950,000 tons), peanuts (980,000 tons), dates (176,000 tons), citrus fruits, yams (136,000 tons), tomatoes (240,000 tons), mangoes, coffee, and tobacco. The main subsistence crops produced in Sudan are sorghum (3,045,000 tons), millet (1,499,000 tons), wheat (168,000 tons), cowpeas, beans, pulses, corn (65,000), and barley. Cotton is the principal export crop and an integral part of the country's economy and Sudan is the world's third largest producer of sesame after India and China. Industry Sudan's rapid industrial development consists of agricultural processing, electronics assembly, plastics manufacturing, furniture, tanning, sugar production, meat processing and various light industries located in any of the 10 Industrial areas in Khartoum. due to the many countries depending on Sudan for medicines and medical services, Sudan is now concentrating on becoming a hub for the medical industry in East Africa, providing facilities and concessions for medical investments and succeeding in covering about 70% of needs and exporting to many neighboring nations. In recent years, the Giad Industrial Complex in Al Jazirah state introduced the assembly of small autos and trucks, and some heavy military equipment such as armored personnel carriers and the “Bashir” and "Zubair" main battle tanks as well as handguns, light and heavy machineguns and howitzers and, recently, drone production. Sudan is reputed to have great mineral resources, and exploration has started extensively for gold, of which is	on repurchase obligations. A 4-year economic reform plan was announced in 1988 but was not pursued. An economic reform plan was announced in 1989 and began implementing a 3-year economic restructuring program designed to reduce the public sector deficit, end subsidies, privatize state enterprises, and encourage new foreign and domestic investment. In 1993, the IMF suspended Sudan's voting rights and the World Bank suspended Sudan's right to make withdrawals under effective and fully disbursed loans and credits. Lome Funds and EU agricultural credits, totaling more than one billion euros, also were suspended. Sectors Agriculture Primary resources are agricultural, including cotton, peanuts, gum arabic, and sesame seeds. Although the country is trying to diversify its cash crops, cotton and peanuts remain its major agricultural exports. Grain sorghum (dura) is the principal food crop, and wheat is grown for domestic consumption. Sesame seeds and peanuts are cultivated for domestic consumption and increasingly for export. Three main agricultural sub-sectors are active in Sudan: pastoral livestock, cropping and fish production. Livestock production has vast potential, and many animals, particularly cows, sheep, and camels, are exported to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. However, Sudan remains a net importer of food. Problems of investment finance, production and transportation remain the greatest constraints to a more dynamic agricultural economy. A major problem which has been growing for decades is the continual loss of open lands previously used for animal grazing to mechanized drylands and irrigated farming. Sudan has 84 million hectares of arable land and less than 20% is cultivated. Major agricultural projects such as the Gezera Scheme in Gezira state are underway in order to make Sudan food self-sufficient. Sudan is one of the world's potential breadbaskets and Sudan is nicknamed as the Arab world food basket as it accounts for 45% of arable land in the Arab world. In 1998 there was an estimated 16.9 million hectares (41.8 million acres) of arable land and approximately 1.9 million hectares (4.7 million acres) set aside for irrigation, primarily in the north of the country along the banks of the Nile and other rivers. Cash crops (as of 1999) grown under irrigation in these areas include cotton and cottonseed, which is of primary importance to the economy with 172,000 tons and 131,000 tons produced annually respectively, sesame (220,000 tons), sugarcane (5,950,000 tons), peanuts (980,000 tons), dates (176,000 tons), citrus fruits, yams (136,000 tons), tomatoes (240,000 tons), mangoes, coffee, and tobacco. The main subsistence crops produced in Sudan are sorghum (3,045,000 tons), millet (1,499,000 tons), wheat (168,000 tons), cowpeas, beans, pulses, corn (65,000), and barley. Cotton is the principal export crop and an integral part of the country's economy and Sudan is the world's third largest producer of sesame after India and China. Industry Sudan's rapid industrial development consists of agricultural processing, electronics assembly, plastics manufacturing, furniture, tanning, sugar production, meat processing and various light industries located in any of the 10 Industrial areas in Khartoum. due to the many countries depending on Sudan for medicines and medical services, Sudan is now concentrating on becoming a hub for the medical industry in East Africa, providing facilities and concessions for medical investments and succeeding in covering about 70% of needs and exporting to many neighboring nations. In recent years, the Giad Industrial Complex in Al Jazirah state introduced the assembly of small autos and trucks, and some heavy military equipment such as armored personnel carriers and the “Bashir” and "Zubair" main battle tanks as well as handguns, light and heavy machineguns and howitzers and, recently, drone production. Sudan is reputed to have great mineral resources, and exploration has started extensively for gold, of which is produced nearly 30 tons annually providing a great boost to the foreign exchange reserves of the nation, with the participation of many investment companies from all over the world. Quantities of asbestos, chromium, mica, kaolin and copper are now exploited commercially, especially for export to China. Petroleum Extensive petroleum exploration first began in Sudan in the mid-1970s. Significant finds were made in the Upper Nile region and commercial quantities of oil began to be exported in October 2000, reducing Sudan's outflow of foreign exchange for imported petroleum products. Today, oil is an important export industry in Sudan. Estimates suggest that oil accounts for between 70% and 90% of Sudan's total exports. The primary importers of Sudanese oil are Japan, China, South Korea, Indonesia, and India. Most of Sudan's oil reserves are located in the Muglad and Melut rift basins in the south of the country. Oil fields in the south, such as those at Heglig and in the South Sudanese state of Unity, formerly part of Sudanese territory, are linked to the country's refineries via pipelines. The two largest oil pipelines are the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which travels 1,600 kilometres from the Unity oil field to Port Sudan on the Red Sea via Khartoum, and the PetroDar pipeline, which extends 1,380 kilometres from the Palogue oil field in the Melut Basin to Port Sudan. Crude oil from the Muglad Basin is known as "Nile Blend" and is refined at the Khartoum crude oil refinery. In 2006, the China National Petroleum Corporation upgraded the Khartoum refinery, doubling its capacity to . Oil from the Melud Basin is known as "Dar Blend" and is refined at the Port Sudan Refinery, which has a capacity of . In 2005, the Sudanese government contracted Petronas to build a new refinery at Port Sudan. Mining The mining industry