Split (1)

train · 6.46M rows

Subsets and Splits

No community queries yet

The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.

sentence1 stringlengths 1 133k	sentence2 stringlengths 1 131k
Valens Ronnie Hudson 3AM Zapp Band vixen ent Nate Dogg Bizzy Bone Adolfo Bad Mouth Candy Man Daphee (singer) "I Like My Hair Like This" Deja Destinee DJ Flash DJ King Assassin Domino Don Cisco El Chicano Hispanic MC's Jodi V Joe Moses Jonny Z Jorge G J.V. Katalina Kid Frost Lawless Beer Run Bobby Pepe Marquez Lighter Shade of Brown Lil' Cuete Lonzo MC Magic Mr. Capone-E Mr. Patron Namek Paperboy Rush Wun Rocky Padilla ShawnP Suave MC & Baby G Sugar Style The S.O.G. Crew Thoughts Tierra Tommy Gunn World Class Wreckin' Cru See also List of record labels Chicano Rock	Flash DJ King Assassin Domino Don Cisco El Chicano Hispanic MC's Jodi V Joe Moses Jonny Z Jorge G J.V. Katalina Kid Frost Lawless Beer Run Bobby Pepe Marquez Lighter Shade of Brown Lil' Cuete Lonzo MC Magic Mr. Capone-E Mr. Patron Namek Paperboy Rush Wun Rocky Padilla ShawnP Suave MC & Baby G Sugar Style The S.O.G. Crew Thoughts Tierra Tommy Gunn World Class Wreckin' Cru See also List of record labels Chicano Rock Brown-eyed soul Gangsta Rap G-Funk Santana Urban Kings Music Group(Chicano label) References External links Official site American record labels Latin American
reconciling belief in an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God, with the existence of evil and suffering in the world. These arguments all begin with the assumption that a being such as a possible God would agree with human perspectives and want to eliminate evil as humans see and define it. This, in turn, assumes that God is a personal being, though not all theodicists would agree; that God interacts, or at least has interacted with the world at some point, and is willing to continue to do so, which also has a lack of complete agreement; and that humans can recognize and agree upon evil as something that can be rendered intelligible and, therefore, discussed. The problem may be described either experientially or theoretically. The experiential problem is the difficulty in believing in a concept of a loving God when confronted by evil and suffering in the real world, such as from epidemics, or wars, or murder, or natural disasters where innocent people become victims. The problem of evil is also a theoretical one, usually described and studied by religion scholars in two varieties: the logical problem and the evidential problem. Logical problem of evil Possibly originating with Greek philosopher Epicurus, Hume summarizes Epicurus's version of the problem as follows: "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then from whence comes evil?" The logical argument from evil is as follows: P1. If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god exists, then evil does not. P2. There is evil in the world. C1. Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god does not exist. This argument is of the form modus tollens: If its premise (P1) is true, the conclusion (C1) follows of necessity. To show that the first premise is plausible, subsequent versions tend to expand on it, such as this modern example: P1a. God exists. P1b. God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient. P1c. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence. P1d. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils. P1e. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence, and knows every way in which those evils could be prevented. P1f. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil. P1. If there exists an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient God, then no evil exists. P2. Evil exists (logical contradiction). Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the 'logical' problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed premises lead to a logical contradiction that cannot all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the suggestion that God would want to prevent all evils and therefore cannot coexist with any evils (premises P1d and P1f), but there are existing responses to every premise (such as Plantinga's response to P1c), with defenders of theism (for example, St. Augustine and Leibniz) arguing that God could exist and allow evil if there were good reasons. If God lacks any one of these qualities—omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolence — then the logical problem of evil can be resolved. Process theology and open theism are modern positions that limit God's omnipotence or omniscience (as defined in traditional theology) based on free will in others. Most philosophers accept Plantinga's free-will defense and see the logical problem of evil as having been fully rebutted. Evidential problem of evil The evidential problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version of the problem) seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism. Both absolute versions and relative versions of the evidential problems of evil are presented below. A version by William L. Rowe: There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Another by Paul Draper: Gratuitous evils exist. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists. Skeptical theism is an example of a theistic challenge to the premises in these arguments. Problem of evil and animal suffering The problem of evil has also been extended beyond human suffering, to include suffering of animals from cruelty, disease and evil. One version of this problem includes animal suffering from natural evil, such as the violence and fear faced by animals from predators, natural disasters, over the history of evolution. This is also referred to as the Darwinian problem of evil, after Charles Darwin who wrote in 1856 "What a book a Devil's chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering low & horridly cruel works of nature!", and in his later autobiography said "A being so powerful and so full of knowledge as a God who could create the universe, is to our finite minds omnipotent and omniscient, and it revolts our understanding to suppose that his benevolence is not unbounded, for what advantage can there be in the sufferings of millions of the lower animals throughout almost endless time? This very old argument from the existence of suffering against the existence of an intelligent first cause seems to me a strong one". The second version of the problem of evil applied to animals, and avoidable suffering experienced by them, is one caused by some human beings, such as from animal cruelty or when they are shot or slaughtered. This version of the problem of evil has been used by scholars including John Hick to counter the responses and defenses to the problem of evil such as suffering being a means to perfect the morals and greater good because animals are innocent, helpless, amoral but sentient victims. Scholar Michael Almeida said this was "perhaps the most serious and difficult" version of the problem of evil. The problem of evil in the context of animal suffering, states Almeida, can be stated as: God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. The evil of extensive animal suffering exists. Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world. Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world only if God does actualize an evolutionary perfect world. Necessarily, God actualized an evolutionary perfect world. If #1 is true then either #2 or #5 is true, but not both. This is a contradiction, so #1 is not true. Evolutionary theodicy is a theistic response. Secular responses While the problem of evil is usually considered to be a theistic one, Peter Kivy says there is a secular problem of evil that exists even if one gives up belief in a deity; that is, the problem of how it is possible to reconcile "the pain and suffering human beings inflict upon one another". Kivy writes that all but the most extreme moral skeptics agree that humans have a duty to not knowingly harm others. This leads to the secular problem of evil when one person injures another through "unmotivated malice" with no apparent rational explanation or justifiable self-interest. There are two main reasons used to explain evil, but according to Kivy, neither are fully satisfactory. The first explanation is psychological egoism – that everything humans do is from self-interest. Bishop Butler has countered this asserting pluralism: human beings are motivated by self-interest, but they are also motivated by particulars – that is particular objects, goals or desires – that may or may not involve self-interest but are motives in and of themselves and may, occasionally, include genuine benevolence. For the egoist, "man's inhumanity to man" is "not explainable in rational terms", for if humans can be ruthless for ruthlessness sake, then egoism is not the only human motive. Pluralists do not fare better simply by recognizing three motives: injuring another for one of those motives could be interpreted as rational, but hurting for the sake of hurting, is as irrational to the pluralist as the egoist. Amélie Rorty offers a few examples of secular responses to the problem of evil: Evil as necessary According to Michel de Montaigne and Voltaire, while character traits such as wanton cruelty, partiality and egoism are an innate part of the human condition, these vices serve the "common good" of the social process. For Montaigne, the idea of evil is relative to the limited knowledge of human beings, not to the world itself or to God. He adopts what philosophers Graham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis refer to as a "neo-Stoic view of an orderly world" where everything is in its place. This secular version of the early coherentist response to the problem of evil, (coherentism asserts that acceptable belief must be part of a coherent system), can be found, according to Rorty, in the writings of Bernard de Mandeville and Sigmund Freud. Mandevile says that when vices like greed and envy are suitably regulated within the social sphere, they are what "spark[s] the energy and productivity that make progressive civilization possible". Rorty asserts that the guiding motto of both religious and secular coherentists is: 'Look for the benefits gained by harm and you will find they outweigh the damage'." Economic theorist Thomas Malthus stated in a 1798 essay on the question of population over-crowding, its impact on food availability, and food's impact on population through famine and death, that it was: "Necessity, that imperious, all pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds ... and man cannot by any means of reason escape from it". He adds, "Nature will not, indeed cannot be defeated in her purposes." According to Malthus, nature and the God of nature, cannot be seen as evil in this natural and necessary process. Evil as the absence of good Paul Elmer More says that, to Plato, evil resulted from the human failure to pay sufficient attention to finding and doing good: evil is an absence of good where good should be. More says Plato directed his entire educational program against the "innate indolence of the will" and the neglect of a search for ethical motives "which are the true springs of our life". Plato asserted that it is the innate laziness, ignorance and lack of attention to pursuing good that, in the beginning, leads humans to fall into "the first lie, of the soul" that then often leads to self-indulgence and evil. According to Joseph Kelly, Clement of Alexandria, a neo-Platonist in the 2nd-century, adopted Plato's view of evil. The fourth-century theologian Augustine of Hippo also adopted Plato's view. In his Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, Augustine maintained that evil exists as an "absence of the good". Schopenhauer emphasized the existence of evil and its negation of the good. Therefore, according to Mesgari Akbar and Akbari Mohsen, he was a pessimist. He defined the "good" as coordination between an individual object and a definite effort of the will, and he defined evil as the absence of such coordination. Deny problem exists Theophrastus, the Greek Peripatetic philosopher and author of Characters, a work that explores the moral weaknesses and strengths of 30 personality types in the Greece of his day, thought that the nature of 'being' comes from, and consists of, contraries, such as eternal and perishable, order and chaos, good and evil; the role of evil is thereby limited, he said, since it is only a part of the whole which is overall, good. According to Theophrastus, a world focused on virtue and vice was a naturalistic social world where the overall goodness of the universe as a whole included, of necessity, both good and evil, rendering the problem of evil non-existent. David Hume traced what he asserted as the psychological origins of virtue but not the vices. Rorty says "He dispels the superstitious remnants of a Manichean battle: the forces of good and evil warring in the will" concluding instead that human beings project their own subjective disapproval onto events and actions. Evil as illusory A modern version of this view is found in Christian Science which asserts that evils such as suffering and disease only appear to be real, but in truth are illusions. The theologians of Christian Science, states Stephen Gottschalk, posit that the Spirit is of infinite might; mortal human beings fail to grasp this and focus instead on evil and suffering that have no real existence as "a power, person or principle opposed to God". The illusion theodicy has been critiqued for denying the reality of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain to the victim. Further, adds Millard Erickson, the illusion argument merely shifts the problem to a new problem, as to why God would create this "illusion" of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain; and why God does not stop this "illusion". Moral rationalism "In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rationalism about morality was repeatedly used to reject strong divine command theories of ethics". Such moral rationalism asserts that morality is based on reason. Rorty refers to Immanuel Kant as an example of a "pious rationalist". According to Shaun Nichols, "The Kantian approach to moral philosophy is to try to show that ethics is based on practical reason". The problem of evil then becomes, "how is it possible for a rational being of good will to be immoral"? Kant wrote an essay on theodicy criticizing it for attempting too much without recognizing the limits of human reason. Kant did not think he had exhausted all possible theodicies, but did assert that any successful one must be based on nature rather than philosophy. While a successful philosophical theodicy had not been achieved in his time, added Kant, he asserted there was no basis for a successful anti-theodicy either. Evil God challenge One resolution to the problem of evil is that God is not good. The Evil God Challenge thought experiment explores whether the hypothesis that God might be evil has symmetrical consequences to a good God, and whether it is more likely that God is good, evil, or non-existent. Dystheism is the belief that God is not wholly good. Peter Forrest has stated:The anti-God that I take seriously is the malicious omnipotent omniscient being, who, it is said, creates so that creatures will suffer, because of the joy this suffering gives It. This may be contrasted with a different idea of anti-God, that of an evil being that seeks to destroy things of value out of hatred or envy. An omni-potent omniscient being would not be envious. Moreover, destructive hatred cannot motivate creation. For these two reasons I find that rather implausible. My case holds, however, against that sort of anti-God as well as the malicious one. The variety of anti-Gods alerts us to the problem of positing any character to God, whether benign, indifferent, or malicious. There are many such character traits we could hypothesize. Why not a God who creates as a jest? Or a God who loves drama? Or a God who, adapting Haldane's quip, is fond of beetles? Or, more seriously, a God who just loves creating regardless of the joy or suffering of creatures? Disavowal of Theodicy This position argues from a number of different directions that the theodicy project is objectionable. Toby Betenson writes that the central theme of all anti-theodocies is that "Theodicies mediate a praxis that sanctions evil". A theodicy may harmonize God with the existence of evil, but it can be said that it does so at the cost of nullifying morality. Most theodicies assume that whatever evil there is exists for the sake of some greater good. But if that is so, then it appears humans have no duty to prevent it, for in preventing evil we would also prevent the greater good for which the evil is required. Even worse, it seems that any action can be rationalized, for if one succeeds in performing an evil act, then God has permitted it, and so it must be for the greater good. From this line of thought one may conclude that, as these conclusions violate our basic moral intuitions, no greater good theodicy is true, and God does not exist. Alternatively, one may point out that greater good theodicies lead us to see every conceivable state of affairs as compatible with the existence of God, and in that case the notion of God's goodness is rendered meaningless. Betenson also says there is a "rich theological tradition of anti‐theodicy". For many theists, there is no seamless theodicy that provides all answers, nor do twenty-first century theologians think there should be. As Felix Christen, Fellow at Goethe University, Frankfurt, says, "When one considers human lives that have been shattered to the core, and, in the face of these tragedies [ask] the question “Where is God?” ... we would do well to stand with [poet and Holocaust survivor] Nelly Sachs as she says, 'We really don't know'.” Contemporary theodiceans, such as Alvin Plantinga, describe having doubts about the enterprise of theodicy "in the sense of providing an explanation of precise reasons why there is evil in the world". Plantinga's ultimate response to the problem of evil is that it is not a problem that can be solved. Christians simply cannot claim to know the answer to the “Why?” of evil. Plantinga stresses that this is why he does not proffer a theodicy but only a defense of the logic of theistic belief. Atheistic viewpoint From an atheistic viewpoint, the problem of evil is solved trivially and thereby in accordance with the principle of Occam's razor: the existence of evil and suffering is reconciled with the assumption that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God exists by assuming that no God exists. David Hume's formulation of the problem of evil in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is this: "[God's] power we allow [is] infinite: Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal are happy: Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?" Theistic arguments The problem of evil is acute for monotheistic religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism that believe in a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent; but the question of "why does evil exist?" has also been studied in religions that are non-theistic or polytheistic, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism. According to John Hick, theism has traditionally responded to the problem within three main categories: the classic and most common freewill theodicy, the soul making theodicy, and process theology. Animal suffering Christopher Southgate uses three methods of analyzing good and harm to produce his evolutionary theodicy addressing the problem of animal suffering: property consequence: the consequence of the existence of good includes the consequence of the same property causing harm (i.e., freewill) developmental: the good is a goal that can only develop through a process that includes harm (i.e., soul making) constitutive: the existence of good is inherently and constitutively inseparable from the experience of harm or suffering. Evolutionary theodicy In response to arguments concerning natural evil and animal suffering, Christopher Southgate, a trained research biochemist and a Senior Lecturer of Theology and Religion at the University of Exeter, has developed a "compound evolutionary theodicy." Robert John Russell summarizes it as beginning with an assertion of the goodness of creation and all sentient creatures. Next Southgate argues that Darwinian evolution was the only way God could create such goodness. "A universe with the sort of beauty, diversity, sentience and sophistication of creatures that the biosphere now contains" could only come about by the natural processes of evolution. Michael Ruse points out that Richard Dawkins has made the same claim concerning evolution.Dawkins ...argues strenuously that selection and only selection can [produce adaptedness]. No one — and presumably this includes God — could have gotten adaptive complexity without going the route of natural selection... The Christian positively welcomes Dawkins's understanding of Darwinism. Physical evil exists, and Darwinism explains why God had no choice but to allow it to occur. He wanted to produce design like effects (including humankind) and natural selection is the only option open. According to Russell and Southgate, the goodness of creation is intrinsically linked to the evolutionary processes by which such goodness is achieved, and these processes, in turn, inevitably come with pain and suffering as intrinsic to them. In this scenario, natural evils are an inevitable consequence of developing life. Russell goes on to say that the physical laws that undergird biological development, such as thermodynamics, also contribute to "what is tragic" and "what is glorious" about life. "Gravity, geology, and the specific orbit of the moon lead to the tidal patterns of the Earth's oceans and thus to both the environment in which early life evolved and in which tsunamis bring death and destruction to countless thousands of people". Holmes Rolston III says nature embodies 'redemptive suffering' as exemplified by Jesus. "The capacity to suffer through to joy is a supreme emergent and an essence of Christianity... The whole evolutionary upslope is a lesser calling of this kind". He calls it the 'cruciform creation' where life is constantly struggling through its pain and suffering toward something higher. Rolston says that within this process, there is no real waste as life and its components are "forever conserved, regenerated, redeemed". Bethany N. Sollereder, Research Fellow at the Laudato Si' Research Institute at Campion Hall, specializes in theology concerning evolution; she writes that evolving life has become increasingly complex, skilled and interdependent. As it has become more intelligent and has increased its ability to relate emotionally, the capacity to suffer has also increased. Southgate describes this using Romans 8:22 which says "the whole creation has been groaning as in the pains of childbirth" since its beginning. He says God responds to this reality by "co-suffering" with “every sentient being in creation". Southgate's theodicy rejects any 'means to an end' argument that says the evolution of any species justifies the suffering and extinction of any prior species that led to it, and he affirms that "all creatures which have died, without their full potential having been realized, must be given fulfillment elsewhere". Russell asserts that the only satisfactory understanding of that “elsewhere” is the eschatological hope that the present creation will be transformed by God into the New Creation, with its new heaven and new earth. Critique Heaven In what Russell describes as a "blistering attack by Wesley Wildman" on Southgate's theodicy, Wildman asserts that "if God really is to create a heavenly world of 'growth and change and relationality, yet no suffering', that world and not this world would be the best of all possible worlds, and a God that would not do so would be 'flagrantly morally inconsistent'." Southgate has responded with what he calls an extension of the original argument: "that this evolutionary environment, full as it is of both competition and decay, is the only type of creation that can give rise to creaturely selves". That means "our guess must be that though heaven can eternally preserve those selves subsisting in suffering-free relationship, it could not give rise to them in the first place". Randomness offers a two point critique: "The first is the problem of purpose: can evolutionary processes, in which chance plays so prominent a role, be understood as the context of God's purposive action? The second is the problem of the pervasiveness of suffering and death in evolution". John Polkinghorne addresses Tracy's objections by discussing chance as a necessary aspect of evolution. According to Polkinghorne, the existence of chance does not negate the power and purposes of a Creator because "it is entirely possible that contingent processes can, in fact, lead to determined ends": too much deterministic order and there is no new life, too much chaos and life cannot adapt. But in Polkinghorne's view, God is not a "Puppetmaster pulling every string". Francisco J. Ayala adds that this means "God is not the explicit designer of each facet of evolution". For Polkinghorne, it is sufficient theologically to assume that "the emergence of some form of self-conscious, God-conscious being" was an aspect of divine purpose from the beginning whether God purposed humankind specifically or not. Polkinghorne links the existence of human freedom to the flexibility created by randomness in the quantum world. Richard W. Kropf asserts that free will has its origins in the "evolutionary ramifications" of the existence of chance as part of the process, thereby providing a "causal connection" between natural evil and the possibility of human freedom: one cannot exist without the other. Polkinghorne writes this means that "there is room for independent action in order for creatures to be themselves and "make themselves" in evolution. Other responses to animal suffering and natural evil Others have argued: that natural evils are the result of the fall of man, which corrupted the perfect world created by God that forces of nature are neither "goods" nor "evils". They just are. Nature produces actions vital to some forms of life and lethal to others. Other life forms cause diseases, but for the disease, hosts provide food, shelter and a place to reproduce which are necessary things for life and are not by their nature evil. that natural evils are the result of natural laws Williams points out that	is omnibenevolent, he acts according to what is best, but if there is no best available, God attempts, if possible, to bring about states of affairs that are creatable and are optimal within the limitations of physical reality. Defenses and Theodicies Responses to the problem of evil have occasionally been classified as defences or theodicies although authors disagree on the exact definitions. Generally, a defense refers to attempts to address the logical argument of evil that says "it is logically impossible — not just unlikely — that God exists". This does not require a full explanation of evil, and it need not be true, or even probable, it need only be possible, since possibility invalidates the logic of impossibility. A theodicy, on the other hand, is more ambitious, since it attempts to provide a plausible justification – a morally or philosophically sufficient reason – for the existence of evil. This is intended to weaken the evidential argument which uses the reality of evil to argue that the existence of God is unlikely. Secularism In emeritus professor of philosophy at Whitworth University Forrest E. Baird's view, one can have a secular problem of evil whenever humans seek to explain why evil exists and its relationship to the world. He adds that any experience that "calls into question our basic trust in the order and structure of our world" can be seen as evil, therefore, according to Peter L. Berger, humans need explanations of evil "for social structures to stay themselves against chaotic forces". Formulation The problem of evil refers to the challenge of reconciling belief in an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God, with the existence of evil and suffering in the world. These arguments all begin with the assumption that a being such as a possible God would agree with human perspectives and want to eliminate evil as humans see and define it. This, in turn, assumes that God is a personal being, though not all theodicists would agree; that God interacts, or at least has interacted with the world at some point, and is willing to continue to do so, which also has a lack of complete agreement; and that humans can recognize and agree upon evil as something that can be rendered intelligible and, therefore, discussed. The problem may be described either experientially or theoretically. The experiential problem is the difficulty in believing in a concept of a loving God when confronted by evil and suffering in the real world, such as from epidemics, or wars, or murder, or natural disasters where innocent people become victims. The problem of evil is also a theoretical one, usually described and studied by religion scholars in two varieties: the logical problem and the evidential problem. Logical problem of evil Possibly originating with Greek philosopher Epicurus, Hume summarizes Epicurus's version of the problem as follows: "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then from whence comes evil?" The logical argument from evil is as follows: P1. If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god exists, then evil does not. P2. There is evil in the world. C1. Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god does not exist. This argument is of the form modus tollens: If its premise (P1) is true, the conclusion (C1) follows of necessity. To show that the first premise is plausible, subsequent versions tend to expand on it, such as this modern example: P1a. God exists. P1b. God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient. P1c. An omnipotent being has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence. P1d. An omnibenevolent being would want to prevent all evils. P1e. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence, and knows every way in which those evils could be prevented. P1f. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil. P1. If there exists an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient God, then no evil exists. P2. Evil exists (logical contradiction). Both of these arguments are understood to be presenting two forms of the 'logical' problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed premises lead to a logical contradiction that cannot all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the suggestion that God would want to prevent all evils and therefore cannot coexist with any evils (premises P1d and P1f), but there are existing responses to every premise (such as Plantinga's response to P1c), with defenders of theism (for example, St. Augustine and Leibniz) arguing that God could exist and allow evil if there were good reasons. If God lacks any one of these qualities—omniscience, omnipotence, or omnibenevolence — then the logical problem of evil can be resolved. Process theology and open theism are modern positions that limit God's omnipotence or omniscience (as defined in traditional theology) based on free will in others. Most philosophers accept Plantinga's free-will defense and see the logical problem of evil as having been fully rebutted. Evidential problem of evil The evidential problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version of the problem) seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism. Both absolute versions and relative versions of the evidential problems of evil are presented below. A version by William L. Rowe: There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. Another by Paul Draper: Gratuitous evils exist. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists. Skeptical theism is an example of a theistic challenge to the premises in these arguments. Problem of evil and animal suffering The problem of evil has also been extended beyond human suffering, to include suffering of animals from cruelty, disease and evil. One version of this problem includes animal suffering from natural evil, such as the violence and fear faced by animals from predators, natural disasters, over the history of evolution. This is also referred to as the Darwinian problem of evil, after Charles Darwin who wrote in 1856 "What a book a Devil's chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering low & horridly cruel works of nature!", and in his later autobiography said "A being so powerful and so full of knowledge as a God who could create the universe, is to our finite minds omnipotent and omniscient, and it revolts our understanding to suppose that his benevolence is not unbounded, for what advantage can there be in the sufferings of millions of the lower animals throughout almost endless time? This very old argument from the existence of suffering against the existence of an intelligent first cause seems to me a strong one". The second version of the problem of evil applied to animals, and avoidable suffering experienced by them, is one caused by some human beings, such as from animal cruelty or when they are shot or slaughtered. This version of the problem of evil has been used by scholars including John Hick to counter the responses and defenses to the problem of evil such as suffering being a means to perfect the morals and greater good because animals are innocent, helpless, amoral but sentient victims. Scholar Michael Almeida said this was "perhaps the most serious and difficult" version of the problem of evil. The problem of evil in the context of animal suffering, states Almeida, can be stated as: God is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good. The evil of extensive animal suffering exists. Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world. Necessarily, God can actualize an evolutionary perfect world only if God does actualize an evolutionary perfect world. Necessarily, God actualized an evolutionary perfect world. If #1 is true then either #2 or #5 is true, but not both. This is a contradiction, so #1 is not true. Evolutionary theodicy is a theistic response. Secular responses While the problem of evil is usually considered to be a theistic one, Peter Kivy says there is a secular problem of evil that exists even if one gives up belief in a deity; that is, the problem of how it is possible to reconcile "the pain and suffering human beings inflict upon one another". Kivy writes that all but the most extreme moral skeptics agree that humans have a duty to not knowingly harm others. This leads to the secular problem of evil when one person injures another through "unmotivated malice" with no apparent rational explanation or justifiable self-interest. There are two main reasons used to explain evil, but according to Kivy, neither are fully satisfactory. The first explanation is psychological egoism – that everything humans do is from self-interest. Bishop Butler has countered this asserting pluralism: human beings are motivated by self-interest, but they are also motivated by particulars – that is particular objects, goals or desires – that may or may not involve self-interest but are motives in and of themselves and may, occasionally, include genuine benevolence. For the egoist, "man's inhumanity to man" is "not explainable in rational terms", for if humans can be ruthless for ruthlessness sake, then egoism is not the only human motive. Pluralists do not fare better simply by recognizing three motives: injuring another for one of those motives could be interpreted as rational, but hurting for the sake of hurting, is as irrational to the pluralist as the egoist. Amélie Rorty offers a few examples of secular responses to the problem of evil: Evil as necessary According to Michel de Montaigne and Voltaire, while character traits such as wanton cruelty, partiality and egoism are an innate part of the human condition, these vices serve the "common good" of the social process. For Montaigne, the idea of evil is relative to the limited knowledge of human beings, not to the world itself or to God. He adopts what philosophers Graham Oppy and N. N. Trakakis refer to as a "neo-Stoic view of an orderly world" where everything is in its place. This secular version of the early coherentist response to the problem of evil, (coherentism asserts that acceptable belief must be part of a coherent system), can be found, according to Rorty, in the writings of Bernard de Mandeville and Sigmund Freud. Mandevile says that when vices like greed and envy are suitably regulated within the social sphere, they are what "spark[s] the energy and productivity that make progressive civilization possible". Rorty asserts that the guiding motto of both religious and secular coherentists is: 'Look for the benefits gained by harm and you will find they outweigh the damage'." Economic theorist Thomas Malthus stated in a 1798 essay on the question of population over-crowding, its impact on food availability, and food's impact on population through famine and death, that it was: "Necessity, that imperious, all pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds ... and man cannot by any means of reason escape from it". He adds, "Nature will not, indeed cannot be defeated in her purposes." According to Malthus, nature and the God of nature, cannot be seen as evil in this natural and necessary process. Evil as the absence of good Paul Elmer More says that, to Plato, evil resulted from the human failure to pay sufficient attention to finding and doing good: evil is an absence of good where good should be. More says Plato directed his entire educational program against the "innate indolence of the will" and the neglect of a search for ethical motives "which are the true springs of our life". Plato asserted that it is the innate laziness, ignorance and lack of attention to pursuing good that, in the beginning, leads humans to fall into "the first lie, of the soul" that then often leads to self-indulgence and evil. According to Joseph Kelly, Clement of Alexandria, a neo-Platonist in the 2nd-century, adopted Plato's view of evil. The fourth-century theologian Augustine of Hippo also adopted Plato's view. In his Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, Augustine maintained that evil exists as an "absence of the good". Schopenhauer emphasized the existence of evil and its negation of the good. Therefore, according to Mesgari Akbar and Akbari Mohsen, he was a pessimist. He defined the "good" as coordination between an individual object and a definite effort of the will, and he defined evil as the absence of such coordination. Deny problem exists Theophrastus, the Greek Peripatetic philosopher and author of Characters, a work that explores the moral weaknesses and strengths of 30 personality types in the Greece of his day, thought that the nature of 'being' comes from, and consists of, contraries, such as eternal and perishable, order and chaos, good and evil; the role of evil is thereby limited, he said, since it is only a part of the whole which is overall, good. According to Theophrastus, a world focused on virtue and vice was a naturalistic social world where the overall goodness of the universe as a whole included, of necessity, both good and evil, rendering the problem of evil non-existent. David Hume traced what he asserted as the psychological origins of virtue but not the vices. Rorty says "He dispels the superstitious remnants of a Manichean battle: the forces of good and evil warring in the will" concluding instead that human beings project their own subjective disapproval onto events and actions. Evil as illusory A modern version of this view is found in Christian Science which asserts that evils such as suffering and disease only appear to be real, but in truth are illusions. The theologians of Christian Science, states Stephen Gottschalk, posit that the Spirit is of infinite might; mortal human beings fail to grasp this and focus instead on evil and suffering that have no real existence as "a power, person or principle opposed to God". The illusion theodicy has been critiqued for denying the reality of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain to the victim. Further, adds Millard Erickson, the illusion argument merely shifts the problem to a new problem, as to why God would create this "illusion" of crimes, wars, terror, sickness, injury, death, suffering and pain; and why God does not stop this "illusion". Moral rationalism "In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries rationalism about morality was repeatedly used to reject strong divine command theories of ethics". Such moral rationalism asserts that morality is based on reason. Rorty refers to Immanuel Kant as an example of a "pious rationalist". According to Shaun Nichols, "The Kantian approach to moral philosophy is to try to show that ethics is based on practical reason". The problem of evil then becomes, "how is it possible for a rational being of good will to be immoral"? Kant wrote an essay on theodicy criticizing it for attempting too much without recognizing the limits of human reason. Kant did not think he had exhausted all possible theodicies, but did assert that any successful one must be based on nature rather than philosophy. While a successful philosophical theodicy had not been achieved in his time, added Kant, he asserted there was no basis for a successful anti-theodicy either. Evil God challenge One resolution to the problem of evil is that God is not good. The Evil God Challenge thought experiment explores whether the hypothesis that God might be evil has symmetrical consequences to a good God, and whether it is more likely that God is good, evil, or non-existent. Dystheism is the belief that God is not wholly good. Peter Forrest has stated:The anti-God that I take seriously is the malicious omnipotent omniscient being, who, it is said, creates so that creatures will suffer, because of the joy this suffering gives It. This may be contrasted with a different idea of anti-God, that of an evil being that seeks to destroy things of value out of hatred or envy. An omni-potent omniscient being would not be envious. Moreover, destructive hatred cannot motivate creation. For these two reasons I find that rather implausible. My case holds, however, against that sort of anti-God as well as the malicious one. The variety of anti-Gods alerts us to the problem of positing any character to God, whether benign, indifferent, or malicious. There are many such character traits we could hypothesize. Why not a God who creates as a jest? Or a God who loves drama? Or a God who, adapting Haldane's quip, is fond of beetles? Or, more seriously, a God who just loves creating regardless of the joy or suffering of creatures? Disavowal of Theodicy This position argues from a number of different directions that the theodicy project is objectionable. Toby Betenson writes that the central theme of all anti-theodocies is that "Theodicies mediate a praxis that sanctions evil". A theodicy may harmonize God with the existence of evil, but it can be said that it does so at the cost of nullifying morality. Most theodicies assume that whatever evil there is exists for the sake of some greater good. But if that is so, then it appears humans have no duty to prevent it, for in preventing evil we would also prevent the greater good for which the evil is required. Even worse, it seems that any action can be rationalized, for if one succeeds in performing an evil act, then God has permitted it, and so it must be for the greater good. From this line of thought one may conclude that, as these conclusions violate our basic moral intuitions, no greater good theodicy is true, and God does not exist. Alternatively, one may point out that greater good theodicies lead us to see every conceivable state of affairs as compatible with the existence of God, and in that case the notion of God's goodness is rendered meaningless. Betenson also says there is a "rich theological tradition of anti‐theodicy". For many theists, there is no seamless theodicy that provides all answers, nor do twenty-first century theologians think there should be. As Felix Christen, Fellow at Goethe University, Frankfurt, says, "When one considers human lives that have been shattered to the core, and, in the face of these tragedies [ask] the question “Where is God?” ... we would do well to stand with [poet and Holocaust survivor] Nelly Sachs as she says, 'We really don't know'.” Contemporary theodiceans, such as Alvin Plantinga, describe having doubts about the enterprise of theodicy "in the sense of providing an explanation of precise reasons why there is evil in the world". Plantinga's ultimate response to the problem of evil is that it is not a problem that can be solved. Christians simply cannot claim to know the answer to the “Why?” of evil. Plantinga stresses that this is why he does not proffer a theodicy but only a defense of the logic of theistic belief. Atheistic viewpoint From an atheistic viewpoint, the problem of evil is solved trivially and thereby in accordance with the principle of Occam's razor: the existence of evil and suffering is reconciled with the assumption that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God exists by assuming that no God exists. David Hume's formulation of the problem of evil in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is this: "[God's] power we allow [is] infinite: Whatever he wills is executed: But neither man nor any other animal are happy: Therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: He is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end: But the course of nature tends not to human or animal felicity: Therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men?" Theistic arguments The problem of evil is acute for monotheistic religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism that believe in a God who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent; but the question of "why does evil exist?" has also been studied in religions that are non-theistic or polytheistic, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism. According to John Hick, theism has traditionally responded to the problem within three main categories: the classic and most common freewill theodicy, the soul making theodicy, and process theology. Animal suffering Christopher Southgate uses three methods of analyzing good and harm to produce his evolutionary theodicy addressing the problem of animal suffering: property consequence: the consequence of the existence of good includes the consequence of the same property causing harm (i.e., freewill) developmental: the good is a goal that can only develop through a process that includes harm (i.e., soul making) constitutive: the existence of good is inherently and constitutively inseparable from the experience of harm or suffering. Evolutionary theodicy In response to arguments concerning natural evil and animal suffering, Christopher Southgate, a trained research biochemist and a Senior Lecturer of Theology and Religion at the University of Exeter, has developed a "compound evolutionary theodicy." Robert John Russell summarizes it as beginning with an assertion of the goodness of creation and all sentient creatures. Next Southgate argues that Darwinian evolution was the only way God could create such goodness. "A universe with the sort of beauty, diversity, sentience and sophistication of creatures that the biosphere now contains" could only come about by the natural processes of evolution. Michael Ruse points out that Richard Dawkins has made the same claim concerning evolution.Dawkins ...argues strenuously that selection and only selection can [produce adaptedness]. No one — and presumably this includes God — could have gotten adaptive complexity without going the route of natural selection... The Christian positively welcomes Dawkins's understanding of Darwinism. Physical evil exists, and Darwinism explains why God had no choice but to allow it to occur. He wanted to produce design like effects (including humankind) and natural selection is the only option open. According to Russell and Southgate, the goodness of creation is intrinsically linked to the evolutionary processes by which such goodness is achieved, and these processes,
bad) if it is good (or bad) in its consequences". Hinduism defines evil in terms of its effect saying "the evils that afflict people (and indeed animals) in the present life are the effects of wrongs committed in a previous life." Some contemporary philosophers argue a focus on the effects of evil is inadequate as a definition since evil can observe without actively causing the harm, and it is still evil. Pseudo-Dionysus defines evil by those aspects that show an absence of good. Writers in this tradition saw things as belonging to 'forms' and evil as an absence of being a good example of their form: as a deficit of goodness where goodness ought to have been present. In this same line of thinking, St. Augustine also defined evil as an absence of good, as did theologian and monk Thomas Aquinas who said: "... a man is called bad insofar as he lacks a virtue, and an eye is called bad insofar as it lacks the power of sight." Bad as an absence of good resurfaces in Hegel, Heidegger and Barth. Very similar are the Neoplatonists, such as Plotinus and contemporary philosopher Denis O'Brien, who say evil is a privation. Immanuel Kant was the first to offer a purely secular theory of evil, giving an evaluative definition of evil based on its cause as having a will that is not fully good. Kant has been an important influence on philosophers like Hannah Arendt, Claudia Card, and Richard Bernstein. "...Hannah Arendt... uses the term [radical evil] to denote a new form of wrongdoing which cannot be captured by other moral concepts." Claudia Card says evil is excessive wrongdoing; others like Hillel Steiner say evil is qualitatively not quantitatively distinct from mere wrongdoing. Locke, Hobbes and Leibniz define good and evil in terms of pleasure and pain. Others such as Richard Swinburne find that definition inadequate, saying, "the good of individual humans...consists...in their having free will...the ability to develop ...character..., to show courage and loyalty, to love, to be of use, to contemplate beauty and discover truth... All that [good]...cannot be achieved without ... suffering along the way." Some theorists define evil by what emotions are connected to it. "For example, Laurence Thomas believes that evildoers take delight in causing harm or feel hatred toward their victims (Thomas 1993, 76–77)." Buddhism defines various types of evil, one type defines as behavior resulting from a failure to emotionally detach from the world. Christian theologians generally define evil in terms of both human responsibility and the nature of God: "If we take the essentialist view of Christian ethics... evil is anything contrary to God's good nature...(character or attributes)." The Judaic view, while acknowledging the difference between the human and divine perspective of evil, is rooted in the nature of creation itself and the limitation inherent in matter's capacity to be perfected; the action of free will includes the potential for perfection from individual effort and leaves the responsibility for evil in human hands. "[It is] deeply central to the whole tradition of Christian (and other western) religion that God is loving toward his creation and that involves him behaving in morally good ways toward it." Within Christianity "God is supposed to be in some way personal... a being who is essentially eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, Creator and sustainer of the universe, and perfectly good. An omnipotent being is one who can do anything logically possible... such a being could not make me exist and not exist at the same time but he could eliminate the stars... An omniscient being is one who knows everything logically possible for him to know... he will not necessarily know everything that will happen [i.e. humans with free will] unless it is predetermined that it will happen..." "God's perfect goodness is moral goodness." "Western religion has always held that there is a deep problem about why there is pain and suffering—which there would not be if God were not supposed to be morally good... a personal being who was not morally good would not be the great being God is supposed to be... [Since theodicy is concerned with] the existence (or not) of the sort of God with which Western religion is concerned, this understanding of the definition of God must stand." Reasons for theodicy The German philosopher Max Weber interpreted theodicy as a social problem and viewed theodicy as a "problem of meaning". Weber argued that, as human society became increasingly rational, the need to explain why good people suffered and evil people prospered became more important because religion casts the world as a "meaningful cosmos". Weber framed the problem of evil as the dilemma that the good can suffer and the evil can prosper, which became more important as religion became more sophisticated. He identified two purposes of theodicy: to explain why good people suffer (a theodicy of suffering), and why people prosper (a theodicy of good fortune). A theodicy of good fortune seeks to justify the good fortune of people in society; Weber believed that those who are successful are not satisfied unless they can justify why they deserve to be successful. For theodicies of suffering, Weber argued that three different kinds of theodicy emerged—predestination, dualism, and karma—all of which attempt to satisfy the human need for meaning, and he believed that the quest for meaning, when considered in light of suffering, becomes the problem of suffering. The sociologist Peter L. Berger characterised religion as the human attempt to build order out of a chaotic world. He believed that humans could not accept that anything in the world was meaningless and saw theodicy as an assertion that the cosmos has meaning and order, despite evidence to the contrary. Berger presented an argument similar to that of Weber, but suggested that the need for theodicy arose primarily out of the situation of human society. He believed that theodicies existed to allow individuals to transcend themselves, denying the individual in favour of the social order. The philosopher Richard Swinburne says "most theists need a theodicy, [they need] an account of reasons why God might allow evil to occur. Without a theodicy evil counts against the existence of God." History The term theodicy was coined by the German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz in his 1710 work, written in French, Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal (Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil). Leibniz's Théodicée was a response to skeptical Protestant philosopher Pierre Bayle, who wrote in his work Dictionnaire Historique et Critique that, after rejecting three attempts to solve it, he saw no rational solution to the problem of evil. Bayle argued that, because the Bible asserts the coexistence of God and evil, this state of affairs must simply be accepted. French philosopher Voltaire criticised Leibniz's concept of theodicy in his Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne (Poem on the Lisbon disaster), suggesting that the massive destruction of innocent lives caused by the Lisbon earthquake demonstrated that God was not providing the "best of all possible worlds". Voltaire also includes the earthquake/theodicy theme in his novel Candide. In The Catholic Encyclopedia (1914), Constantine Kempf argued that, following Leibniz's work, philosophers called their works on the problem of evil "theodicies", and philosophy about God was brought under the discipline of theodicy. He argued that theodicy began to include all of natural theology, meaning that theodicy came to consist of the human knowledge of God through the systematic use of reason. In 1966, British philosopher John Hick published Evil and the God of Love, in which he surveyed various Christian responses to the problem of evil, before developing his own. In his work, Hick identified and distinguished between three types of theodicy: Plotinian, which was named after Plotinus, Augustinian, which had dominated Western Christianity for many centuries, and Irenaean, which was developed by the Eastern Church Father Irenaeus, a version of which Hick subscribed to himself. In his dialogue "Is God a Taoist?", published in 1977 in his book The Tao is Silent, Raymond Smullyan claims to prove that it is logically impossible to have sentient beings without allowing "evil", even for God, just as it is impossible for him to create a triangle in the Euclidean plane having an angular sum other than 180°. So the capability of feeling implies free will, which in turn may produce "evil", understood here as hurting other sentient beings. The problem of evil happening to good or innocent people is not addressed directly here, but both reincarnation and karma are hinted at. Ancient religions "Writings and discourses on theodicy by Jews, Greeks, Christians, and Eastern religions have graced our planet for thousands of years." In the Middle Kingdom of Egypt (2000 BC to 1700 BC) as "in Ancient Mesopotamian and Israelite literature," theodicy was an important issue. Philip Irving Mitchell of the Dallas Baptist University notes that some philosophers have cast the pursuit of theodicy as a modern one, as earlier scholars used the problem of evil to support the existence of one particular god over another, explain wisdom, or explain a conversion, rather than to justify God's goodness. Sarah Iles Johnston argues that ancient civilizations, such as the ancient Mesopotamians, Greeks, Romans, and Egyptians held polytheistic beliefs that may have enabled them to deal with the concept of theodicy differently. These religions taught the existence of many gods and goddesses who controlled various aspects of daily life. These early religions may have avoided the question of theodicy by endowing their deities with the same flaws and jealousies that plagued humanity. No one god or goddess was fundamentally good or evil; this explained that bad things could happen to good people if they angered a deity because the gods could exercise the same free will that humankind possesses. Such religions taught that some gods were more inclined to be helpful and benevolent, while others were more likely to be spiteful and aggressive. In this sense, the evil gods could be blamed for misfortune, while the good gods could be petitioned with prayer and sacrifices to make things right. There was still a sense of justice in that individuals who were right with the gods could avoid punishment. The "Epicurean trilemma" however was already raised by Epicurus: according to David Hume in 1779. According to Hume, the trilemma describe the problem of reconciling an omnipotent deity with their benevolence and the existence of evil. However, if Epicurus did write a discussion on the specific problems that Hume attributes to him, it would not have been tied with the question of an omnibenevolent and omniscient God, as Hume assumes (for Hume does not cite, nor make any implication that he had knowledge of Epicurus's writings on this matter that held any greater weight than academic hearsay or legend). Biblical theodicy The biblical account of the justification of evil and suffering in the presence of God has both similarities and contrasts in the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament. For the Hebrew Bible, the Book of Job is often quoted as the authoritative source of discussion. It is generally accepted that God's responsive speeches in Job do not directly answer Job's complaints; God does not attempt to justify himself or reveal the reason for Job's suffering to him; instead Yahweh's speeches focus on increasing Job's overall understanding of his relationship with God. This exemplifies Biblical theodicy. There is general agreement among Bible scholars that the Bible "does not admit of a singular perspective on evil.... Instead we encounter a variety of perspectives... Consequently [the Bible focuses on] moral and spiritual remedies, not rational or logical [justifications].... It is simply that the Bible operates within a cosmic, moral and spiritual landscape rather than within a rationalist, abstract, ontological landscape." This is in evidence in Yahweh's first and second speech in Job. Yahweh's first speech concerns human ignorance and God's authority. Job had seen himself at the center of events, lamenting that God has singled him out to oppress; Yahweh responds that Job is not the center, God is; his kingdom is complex, he governs on a large scale. Since Yahweh is in dominion over all the earth, Job cannot conceivably condemn him, unless Job were to prove that he can do all the things God can. Yahweh's second speech is against human self-righteousness. Job has vehemently accused God of thwarting justice as "the omnipotent tyrant, the cosmic thug". Some scholars interpret Yahweh's response as an admission of failure on his part, but he goes on to say he has the power and in his own timing will bring justice in the end. "Isaiah is generally recognized as one of the most progressive books of the prophetic corpus." Hebrew Bible scholar Marvin A. Sweeney says "...a unified reading of [Isaiah] places the question of theodicy at the forefront... [with] three major dimensions of the question...: Yahweh's identification with the conqueror, Yahweh's decree of judgment against Israel without possibility of repentance, and the failure of Yahweh's program to be realized by the end of the book." Christian theologians read some passages in Isaiah differently. "In either case, suffering is understood as having transcendent meaning... human agency can give particular instances of suffering a mystical significance that transforms it into something productive." Theodicy in the book of Ezekiel (and also in Jeremiah 31:29-30) confronts the concept of personal moral responsibility. "The main point is stated at the beginning and at the end—"the soul that sins shall die"—and is explicated by a case history of a family traced through three generations." It is not about heredity but is about understanding divine justice in a world under divine governance. "Theodicy in the Minor Prophets differs little from that in Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel." For example, the first chapter of Habakuk raises questions about Yahweh's justice, laments God's inaction in punishing injustice, and looks for God's action in response—then objects to what God chooses. Instead of engaging in debate, God gives Habakuk a vision of the future which includes five oracles that form a theodicy: (1) God has a plan and has appointed a time for judgment. It may be slow in coming as humans see things, but it will come. (2) The woe oracles confront the prevalence of evil in the world and the justice those acts have earned (3) The vision of the manifestation of God is a recognition of God's power to address these issues (4) God as a warrior will fight for his people (5) The song of triumph says the faithful will prevail by holding to trust and hope. Joel and the other minor prophets demonstrate that theodicy and eschatology are connected in the Bible. Psalm 73 presents the internal struggle created by personal suffering and the prosperity of the wicked. The writer gains perspective when he "enters the sanctuary of God (16-17)" seeing that God's justice will eventually prevail. He reaffirms his relationship with Yahweh, is ashamed of his resentment, and chooses trust. Psalm 77 contains real outspokenness to God as well as determination to hold onto faith and trust. For the Christian, the Scriptures assure him or her that the allowance of evil is for a good purpose based on relationship with God. "Some of the good ... cannot be achieved without delay and suffering, and the evil of this world is indeed necessary for the achievement of those good purposes. ... God has the right to allow such evils to occur, so long as the 'goods' are facilitated and the 'evils' are limited and compensated in the way that various other Christian doctrines (of human free will, life after death, the end of the world, etc.) affirm.... the 'good states' which (according to Christian doctrine) God seeks are so good that they outweigh the accompanying evils." This is somewhat illustrated in the Book of Exodus when Pharaoh is described as being raised up that God's name be known in all the earth Exodus 9:16. This is mirrored in Romans' ninth chapter, where Paul appeals to God's sovereignty as sufficient explanation, with God's goodness experientially known to the Christian. Augustinian theodicy The Protestant and Reformed reading of Augustinian theodicy, as promoted primarily by John Hick, is based on the writings of Augustine of Hippo, a Christian philosopher and theologian who lived from AD	[Isaiah] places the question of theodicy at the forefront... [with] three major dimensions of the question...: Yahweh's identification with the conqueror, Yahweh's decree of judgment against Israel without possibility of repentance, and the failure of Yahweh's program to be realized by the end of the book." Christian theologians read some passages in Isaiah differently. "In either case, suffering is understood as having transcendent meaning... human agency can give particular instances of suffering a mystical significance that transforms it into something productive." Theodicy in the book of Ezekiel (and also in Jeremiah 31:29-30) confronts the concept of personal moral responsibility. "The main point is stated at the beginning and at the end—"the soul that sins shall die"—and is explicated by a case history of a family traced through three generations." It is not about heredity but is about understanding divine justice in a world under divine governance. "Theodicy in the Minor Prophets differs little from that in Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel." For example, the first chapter of Habakuk raises questions about Yahweh's justice, laments God's inaction in punishing injustice, and looks for God's action in response—then objects to what God chooses. Instead of engaging in debate, God gives Habakuk a vision of the future which includes five oracles that form a theodicy: (1) God has a plan and has appointed a time for judgment. It may be slow in coming as humans see things, but it will come. (2) The woe oracles confront the prevalence of evil in the world and the justice those acts have earned (3) The vision of the manifestation of God is a recognition of God's power to address these issues (4) God as a warrior will fight for his people (5) The song of triumph says the faithful will prevail by holding to trust and hope. Joel and the other minor prophets demonstrate that theodicy and eschatology are connected in the Bible. Psalm 73 presents the internal struggle created by personal suffering and the prosperity of the wicked. The writer gains perspective when he "enters the sanctuary of God (16-17)" seeing that God's justice will eventually prevail. He reaffirms his relationship with Yahweh, is ashamed of his resentment, and chooses trust. Psalm 77 contains real outspokenness to God as well as determination to hold onto faith and trust. For the Christian, the Scriptures assure him or her that the allowance of evil is for a good purpose based on relationship with God. "Some of the good ... cannot be achieved without delay and suffering, and the evil of this world is indeed necessary for the achievement of those good purposes. ... God has the right to allow such evils to occur, so long as the 'goods' are facilitated and the 'evils' are limited and compensated in the way that various other Christian doctrines (of human free will, life after death, the end of the world, etc.) affirm.... the 'good states' which (according to Christian doctrine) God seeks are so good that they outweigh the accompanying evils." This is somewhat illustrated in the Book of Exodus when Pharaoh is described as being raised up that God's name be known in all the earth Exodus 9:16. This is mirrored in Romans' ninth chapter, where Paul appeals to God's sovereignty as sufficient explanation, with God's goodness experientially known to the Christian. Augustinian theodicy The Protestant and Reformed reading of Augustinian theodicy, as promoted primarily by John Hick, is based on the writings of Augustine of Hippo, a Christian philosopher and theologian who lived from AD 354 to 430. The Catholic (pre-reformation) formulation of the same issue is substantially different and is outlined below. In Hick's approach, this form of theodicy argues that evil does not exist except as a privation—or corruption—of goodness, and therefore God did not create evil. Augustinian scholars have argued that God created the world perfectly, with no evil or human suffering. Evil entered the world through the disobedience of Adam and Eve and the theodicy casts the existence of evil as a just punishment for this original sin. The theodicy argues that humans have an evil nature in as much as it is deprived of its original goodness, form, order, and measure due to the inherited original sin of Adam and Eve, but still ultimately remains good due to existence coming from God, for if a nature was completely evil (deprived of the good), it would cease to exist. It maintains that God remains blameless and good. In the Roman Catholic reading of Augustine, the issue of just war as developed in his book The City of God substantially established his position concerning the positive justification of killing, suffering and pain as inflicted upon an enemy when encountered in war for a just cause. Augustine asserted that peacefulness in the face of a grave wrong that could only be stopped by violence would be a sin. Defense of one's self or others could be a necessity, especially when authorized by a legitimate authority. While not elaborating the conditions necessary for war to be just, Augustine nonetheless originated the very phrase, itself, in his work The City of God. In essence, the pursuit of peace must include the option of fighting with all of its eventualities in order to preserve peace in the long-term. Such a war could not be pre-emptive, but defensive, to restore peace. Thomas Aquinas, centuries later, used the authority of Augustine's arguments in an attempt to define the conditions under which a war could be just. Irenaean theodicy Irenaeus (died c. 202), born in the early second century, expressed ideas which explained the existence of evil as necessary for human development. Irenaeus argued that human creation comprised two parts: humans were made first in the image, then in the likeness, of God. The image of God consists of having the potential to achieve moral perfection, whereas the likeness of God is the achievement of that perfection. To achieve moral perfection, Irenaeus suggested that humans must have free will. To achieve such free will, humans must experience suffering and God must be at an epistemic distance (a distance of knowledge) from humanity. Therefore, evil exists to allow humans to develop as moral agents. In the twentieth century, John Hick collated the ideas of Irenaeus into a distinct theodicy. He argued that the world exists as a "vale of soul-making" (a phrase that he drew from John Keats), and that suffering and evil must therefore occur. He argued that human goodness develops through the experience of evil and suffering. Origenian theodicy In direct response to John Hick's description of theodicy, Mark Scott has indicated that neither Augustine of Hippo nor Irenaeus of Lyons provide an appropriate context for the discussion of Hick's theistic version of theodicy. As a theologian among the Church Fathers who articulated a theory of apokatastasis (or universal reconciliation), Origen of Alexandria provides a more direct theological comparison for the discussion of Hick's presentation of universal salvation and theodicy. Neither Irenaeus nor Augustine endorsed a theology of universal salvation in any form comparable to that of John Hick. Relatively minor theodicies Michael Martin summarizes what he calls "relatively minor" theodicies. The Finite God Theodicy maintains that God is all-good (omnibenevolent) but not all-powerful (omnipotent). The Best of all Possible Worlds Theodicy, a traditional theology, argues that the creation is the best of all possible worlds. The Original Sin Theodicy holds that evil came into the world because of humanity's original sin. The Ultimate Harmony Theodicy justifies evil as leading to "good long-range consequences". The Degree of Desirability of a Conscious State Theodicy has been reckoned a "complex theodicy." It argues that a person's state is deemed evil only when it is undesirable to the person. However, because God is unable to make a person's state desirable to the person, the theodic problem does not exist. The Reincarnation Theodicy believes that people suffer evil because of their wrong-doing in a previous life. The Contrast Theodicy holds that evil is needed to enable people to appreciate or understand good. The Warning Theodicy rationalizes evil as God's warning to people to mend their ways. Islamic world Mu'tazila theologians approached the problem of theodicy within a framework of moral realism, according to which the moral value of acts is accessible to unaided reason, so that humans can make moral judgments about divine acts. They argued that the divine act of creation is good despite existence of suffering, because it allows humans a compensation of greater reward in the afterlife. They posited that individuals have free will to commit evil and absolved God of responsibility for such acts. God's justice thus consists of punishing wrongdoers. Following the demise of Mu'tazila as a school, their theodicy was adopted in the Zaydi and Twelver branches of Shia Islam. Most Sunni theologians analyzed theodicy from an anti-realist metaethical standpoint. Ash'ari theologians argued that ordinary moral judgments stem from emotion and social convention, which are inadequate to either condemn or justify divine actions. Ash'arites hold that God creates everything, including human actions, but distinguish creation (khalq) from acquisition (kasb) of actions. They allow individuals the latter ability, though they do not posit existence of free will in a fuller sense of the term. In the words of Al-Shahrastani (1086–1153): Ash'ari theology insists on ultimate divine transcendence and teaches that human knowledge regarding it is limited to what has been revealed through the prophets, so that on the question of God's creation of evil, revelation has to accepted bila kayfa (without [asking] how). Maturidi, in contrast to Ash'arites, holds that human mind is able to grasp good and evil independent from revelation. Contrary to the Mu'tazilites, he disagrees that God's wisdom entails creating only good. Since rights couldn't exist before God created anything, God is not bound to responsibilities for creations. Instead, God's wisdom means that God puts everything in its proper place. He cites Surah Al Imran verse 178, to point out that God doesn't regard believers and unbelievers as equal; God would increase the sin of the sinners (and guide the believers). He criticizes believing that God only creates good as remnants of Persian dualistic religions, improper for God. Ibn Sina, the most influential Muslim philosopher, analyzed theodicy from a purely ontological, neoplatonic standpoint, aiming to prove that God, as the absolutely good First Cause, created a good world. Ibn Sina argued that evil refers either to a cause of an entity (such as burning in a fire), being a quality of another entity, or to its imperfection (such as blindness), in which case it does not exist as an entity. According to Ibn Sina, such qualities are necessary attributes of the best possible order of things, so that the good they serve is greater than the harm they cause. Philosophical Sufi theologians such as Ibn Arabi were influenced by the neoplatonic theodicy of Ibn Sina. Al-Ghazali anticipated the optimistic theodicy of Leibniz in his dictum "There is nothing in possibility more wonderful than what is." Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, who represented the mainstream Sunni view, challenged Ibn Sina's analysis and argued that it merely sidesteps the real problem of evil, which is rooted in the human experience of suffering in a world that contains more pain than pleasure. The Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya, whose writings became influential in Wahhabism, argued that, while God creates human acts, humans are responsible for their deeds as the agents of their acts. He held that divine creation is good from a causal standpoint, as God creates all things for wise purposes. Thus apparent evil is in actuality good in view of its purpose, and pure evil does not exist. This analysis was developed further with practical illustrations by Ibn al-Qayyim. Alternatives Jewish anti-theodicy In 1998, Jewish theologian Zachary Braiterman coined the term anti-theodicy in his book (God) After Auschwitz to describe Jews, both in a biblical and post-Holocaust context, whose response to the problem of evil is protest and refusal to investigate the relationship between God and suffering. An anti-theodicy acts in opposition to a theodicy and places full blame for all experience of evil onto God, but must rise from an individual's belief in and love of God. Anti-theodicy has been likened to Job's protests in the Book of Job. Braiterman wrote that an anti-theodicy rejects the idea that there is a meaningful relationship between God and evil or that God could be justified for the experience of evil. The Holocaust prompted a reconsideration of theodicy in some Jewish circles. French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, who had himself been a prisoner of war in Nazi Germany, declared theodicy to be "blasphemous", arguing that it is the "source of all immorality", and demanded that the project of theodicy be ended. Levinas asked whether the idea of absolutism survived after the Holocaust, which he proposed it did. He argued that humans are not called to justify God in the face of evil, but to attempt to live godly lives; rather than considering whether God was present during the Holocaust, the duty of humans is to build a world where goodness will prevail. Professor of theology David R. Blumenthal, in his book Facing the Abusing God, supports the "theology of protest", which he saw as presented in the play, The Trial of God. He supports the view that survivors of the Holocaust cannot forgive God and so must protest about it. Blumenthal believes that a similar theology is presented in the book of Job, in which Job does not question God's existence or power, but his morality and justice. Other prominent voices in the Jewish tradition commenting on the justification of God in the presence of the Holocaust have been the Nobel prize winning author Elie Wiesel and Richard L. Rubinstein in his book The Cunning of History. Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the seventh Rebbe of Chabad Lubavitch, sought to elucidate how faith (or trust, emunah) in God defines the full, transcendental preconditions of anti-theodicy. Endorsing the attitude of "holy protest" found in the stories of Job and Jeremiah, but also in those of Abraham (Genesis 18) and Moses (Exodus 33), Rabbi Schneerson argued that a phenomenology of protest, when carried through to its logical limits, reveals a profound conviction in cosmic justice such, as we first find in Abraham's question: "Will the Judge of the whole earth not do justice?" (Genesis 18:25). Recalling Kant's 1791 essay on the failure of all theoretical attempts in theodicy, a viable practical theodicy is identified with messianism. This faithful anti-theodicy is worked out in a long letter of 26 April 1965 to Elie Wiesel. Christian alternatives to theodicy A number of Christian writers oppose theodicies. Todd Billings deems constructing theodicies to be a "destructive practice". In the same vein, Nick Trakakis observes that "theodical discourse can only add to the world's evils, not remove or illuminate them." As an alternative to theodicy, some theologians have advocated "reflection on tragedy" as a more befitting reply to evil. For example, Wendy Farley believes that "a desire for justice" and "anger and pity at suffering" should replace "theodicy's cool justifications of evil". Sarah K. Pinnock opposes abstract theodicies that would legitimize evil and suffering. However, she endorses theodicy discussions in which people ponder God, evil, and suffering from a practical faith perspective. Karl Barth viewed the evil of human suffering as ultimately in the "control of divine providence". Given this view, Barth deemed it impossible for humans to devise a theodicy that establishes "the idea of the goodness of God". For Barth, only the crucifixion could establish the goodness of God. In the crucifixion, God bears and suffers what humanity suffers. This suffering by God Himself makes human theodicies anticlimactic. Barth found a "twofold justification" in the crucifixion: the justification of sinful humanity and "the justification in which God justifies Himself". Christian Science offers a solution to the problem by denying that evil ultimately exists. Mary Baker Eddy and Mark Twain had some contrasting views on theodicy and suffering, which are well-described by Stephen Gottschalk. Redemptive suffering based in Pope John Paul II's theology of the body embraces suffering as having value in and of itself. Eleonore Stump in Wandering in Darkness uses psychology, narrative and exegesis to demonstrate that redemptive suffering, as found in Thomistic theodicy, can constitute a consistent and cogent defence for the problem of suffering. Free-will defense As an alternative to a theodicy, a defense may be offered as a response to the problem of evil. A defense attempts to show that God's existence is not made logically impossible by the existence of evil; it does not need to be true or plausible, merely logically possible. American philosopher Alvin Plantinga offers a free-will defense which argues that human free will sufficiently explains
independence In Soviet times, supporters of Tajikistan independence were harshly persecuted by the KGB, and most were either shot dead or jailed for many years. After the beginning of the Perestroika era, declared by Mikhail Gorbachev throughout the USSR, supporters of the independence of the republics began to speak openly and freely. In Tajikistan SSR, the independence movement had been active since 1987. Supporters of independence were the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the national democratic Rastokhez (Revival) Movement. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, the population of Tajikistan SSR was divided into two camps. The first wanted independence for Tajikistan, the restoration of Tajik culture and language, the restoration of political and cultural relations with Iran and Afghanistan and other countries, and the second part of the population opposed independence, considering it the best option to remain part of the USSR. During the 1991 Soviet Union Referendum (the first internationally observed referendum in the country's history) on continuing the Soviet system and the Soviet Union itself, nearly 97% of voters in Tajikistan approved of Question 1: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, which will be fully ensured of human rights and freedoms of any nationality?", though by dissolution in December of the same year, a significant proportion of Tajikistan's population supported what was by then the fait accompli of independence for the union-level republics of the Soviet Union. In February 1990, riots and strikes in Dushanbe and other cities of began due to the difficult socio-economic situation, lack of housing, and youth unemployment. The nationalist and democratic opposition and supporters of independence joined the strikes and began to demand the independence of the republic and democratic reforms. Islamists also began to hold strikes to demand respect for their rights and independence of the republic. The Soviet leadership introduced Internal Troops in Dushanbe to eliminate the unrest. Independence Almost immediately following independence, the nation fell into civil war among various factions; often distinguished by clan loyalties. More than 500,000 residents fled during this time because of persecution, increased poverty and better economic opportunities in the West or in other former Soviet republics. Emomali Rahmon came to power in 1992, defeating former prime minister Abdumalik Abdullajanov in a November presidential election with 58% of the vote. The elections took place shortly after the end of the war, and Tajikistan was in a state of complete devastation. The estimated dead numbered over 100,000. Around 1.2 million people were refugees inside and outside of the country. In 1997, a ceasefire was reached between Rahmon and opposition parties under the guidance of Gerd D. Merrem, Special Representative to the Secretary General, a result widely praised as a successful United Nations peacekeeping initiative. The ceasefire guaranteed 30% of ministerial positions would go to the opposition. Elections were held in 1999, though they were criticised by opposition parties and foreign observers as unfair and Rahmon was re-elected with 98% of the vote. Elections in 2006 were again won by Rahmon (with 79% of the vote) and he began his third term in office. Several opposition parties boycotted the 2006 election and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) criticised it, although observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States claimed the elections were legal and transparent. Rahmon's administration came under further criticism from the OSCE in October 2010 for its censorship and repression of the media. The OSCE claimed that the Tajik Government censored Tajik and foreign websites and instituted tax inspections on independent printing houses that led to the cessation of printing activities for a number of independent newspapers. Russian border troops were stationed along the Tajik–Afghan border until summer 2005. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, French troops have been stationed at Dushanbe Airport in support of air operations of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. United States Army and Marine Corps personnel periodically visit Tajikistan to conduct joint training missions of up to several weeks duration. The Government of India rebuilt the Ayni Air Base, a military airport located 15 km southwest of Dushanbe, at a cost of $70 million, completing the repairs in September 2010. It is now the main base of the Tajikistan air force. There have been talks with Russia concerning use of the Ayni facility, and Russia continues to maintain a large base on the outskirts of Dushanbe. In 2010, there were concerns among Tajik officials that Islamic militarism in the east of the country was on the rise following the escape of 25 militants from a Tajik prison in August, an ambush that killed 28 Tajik soldiers in the Rasht Valley in September, and another ambush in the valley in October that killed 30 soldiers, followed by fighting outside Gharm that left 3 militants dead. To date the country's Interior Ministry asserts that the central government maintains full control over the country's east, and the military operation in the Rasht Valley was concluded in November 2010. However, fighting erupted again in July 2012. In 2015, Russia sent more troops to Tajikistan. In May 2015, Tajikistan's national security suffered a serious setback when Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov, commander of the special-purpose police unit (OMON) of the Interior Ministry, defected to the Islamic State. In 2021, following the Fall of Kabul, Tajikistan allegedly got involved in the Panjshir conflict against the Taliban on the side of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. Politics Almost immediately after independence, Tajikistan was plunged into a civil war that saw various factions fighting one another. These factions were supported by foreign countries including Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Russia. Russia and Iran focused on keeping peace in the warring nation to decrease the chances of U.S. or Turkish involvement. Most notably, Russia backed the pro-government faction and deployed troops from the Commonwealth of Independent States to guard the Tajikistan-Afghan border. All but 25,000 of the more than 400,000 ethnic Russians, who were mostly employed in industry, fled to Russia. By 1997, the war had ended after a peace agreement between the government and the Islamist-led opposition, a central government began to take form, with peaceful elections in 1999. "Longtime observers of Tajikistan often characterize the country as profoundly averse to risk and skeptical of promises of reform, a political passivity they trace to the country's ruinous civil war," Ilan Greenberg wrote in a news article in The New York Times just before the country's November 2006 presidential election. Tajikistan is officially a republic, and holds elections for the presidency and parliament, operating under a presidential system. It is, however, a dominant-party system, where the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan routinely has a vast majority in Parliament. Emomali Rahmon has held the office of President of Tajikistan continuously since November 1994. The Prime Minister is Kokhir Rasulzoda, the First Deputy Prime Minister is Matlubkhon Davlatov and the two Deputy Prime Ministers are Murodali Alimardon and Ruqiya Qurbanova. The parliamentary elections of 2005 aroused many accusations from opposition parties and international observers that President Emomali Rahmon corruptly manipulates the election process and unemployment. The most recent elections, in February 2010, saw the ruling PDPT lose four seats in Parliament, yet still maintain a comfortable majority. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe election observers said the 2010 polling "failed to meet many key OSCE commitments" and that "these elections failed on many basic democratic standards." The government insisted that only minor violations had occurred, which would not affect the will of the Tajik people. The Tajik government has reportedly clamped down on facial hair as part of a crackdown on Islamic influence and due to its perceived associations with Islamic extremism, which is prevalent in bordering Afghanistan. The presidential election held on 6 November 2006 was boycotted by "mainline" opposition parties, including the 23,000-member Islamic Renaissance Party. Four remaining opponents "all but endorsed the incumbent", Rahmon. Freedom of the press is ostensibly officially guaranteed by the government, but independent press outlets remain restricted, as does a substantial amount of web content. According to the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, access is blocked to local and foreign websites including avesta.tj, Tjknews.com, ferghana.ru, centrasia.org and journalists are often obstructed from reporting on controversial events. In practice, no public criticism of the regime is tolerated and all direct protest is severely suppressed and does not receive coverage in the local media. In the Economist's democracy index report of 2020, Tajikistan is placed 160th, just after Saudi Arabia, as an "authoritarian regime". In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Tajikistan, signed a joint letter to the UNHRC defending China's treatment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region. In October 2020, Tajikistan's authoritarian President Emomali Rahmon was re-elected for next seven-year period with 90 per cent of the votes, following a tightly controlled and largely ceremonial election. In late April 2021, a conflict over water escalated into one of the most serious border clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan since independence. In July 2021, Tajikistan appealed to members of a Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of ex-Soviet states for help in dealing with security challenges emerging from neighboring Afghanistan. The safety concerns emerged as foreign troops such as the US and British army exited the country, causing over 1,000 Afghan civilians and servicemen to flee to neighboring Tajikistan after Taliban insurgents took control of many parts of Afghanistan. Geography Tajikistan is landlocked, and is the smallest nation in Central Asia by area. It lies mostly between latitudes 36° and 41° N, and longitudes 67° and 75° E. It is covered by mountains of the Pamir range, and most of the country is over above sea level. The only major areas of lower land are in the north (part of the Fergana Valley), and in the southern Kofarnihon and Vakhsh river valleys, which form the Amu Darya. Dushanbe is located on the southern slopes above the Kofarnihon valley. The Amu Darya and Panj rivers mark the border with Afghanistan, and the glaciers in Tajikistan's mountains are the major source of runoff for the Aral Sea. There are over 900 rivers in Tajikistan longer than 10 kilometres. Administrative divisions Tajikistan consists of 4 administrative divisions. These are the provinces (viloyat) of Sughd and Khatlon, the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan (abbreviated as GBAO), and the Region of Republican Subordination (RRP – Raiony Respublikanskogo Podchineniya in transliteration from Russian or NTJ – Ноҳияҳои тобеи ҷумҳурӣ in Tajik; formerly known as Karotegin Province). Each region is divided into several districts (, nohiya or raion), which in turn are subdivided into jamoats (village-level self-governing units) and then villages (qyshloqs). , there were 58 districts and 367 jamoats in Tajikistan. Lakes About 2% of the country's area is covered by lakes, the best known of which are the following: Kayrakum (Qairoqqum) Reservoir (Sughd) Iskanderkul (Fann Mountains) Kulikalon (Kul-i Kalon) (Fann Mountains) Nurek Reservoir (Khatlon) Karakul (Kyrgyz: Кара-Көл; eastern Pamir) Sarez (Pamir) Shadau Lake (Pamir) Zorkul (Pamir) Biodiversity Tajikistan contains five terrestrial ecoregions: Alai-Western Tian Shan steppe, Gissaro-Alai open woodlands, Pamir alpine desert and tundra, Badghyz and Karabil semi-desert, and Paropamisus xeric woodlands. Economy In 2019, nearly 29% of Tajikistan's GDP came from immigrant remittances (mostly from Tajiks working in Russia), one of the highest rates in the world. The current economic situation remains fragile, largely owing to corruption, uneven economic reforms, and economic mismanagement. With foreign revenue precariously dependent upon remittances from migrant workers overseas and exports of aluminium and cotton, the economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. In FY 2000, international assistance remained an essential source of support for rehabilitation programs that reintegrated former civil war combatants into the civilian economy, which helped keep the peace. International assistance also was necessary to address the second year of severe drought that resulted in a continued shortfall of food production. On 21 August 2001, the Red Cross announced that a famine was striking Tajikistan, and called for international aid for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; however, access to food remains a problem today. In January 2012, 680,152 of the people living in Tajikistan were living with food insecurity. Out of those, 676,852 were at risk of Phase 3 (Acute Food and Livelihoods Crisis) food insecurity, and 3,300 were at risk of Phase 4 (Humanitarian Emergency). Those with the highest risk of food insecurity were living in the remote Murghob District of GBAO. Tajikistan's economy grew substantially after the war. The GDP of Tajikistan expanded at an average rate of 9.6% over the period of 2000–2007 according to the World Bank data. This improved Tajikistan's position among other Central Asian countries (namely Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), which seem to have degraded economically ever since. The primary sources of income in Tajikistan are aluminium production, cotton growing and remittances from migrant workers. Cotton accounts for 60% of agricultural output, supporting 75% of the rural population, and using 45% of irrigated arable land. The aluminium industry is represented by the state-owned Tajik Aluminum Company – the biggest aluminium plant in Central Asia and one of the biggest in the world. Tajikistan's rivers, such as the Vakhsh and the Panj, have great hydropower potential, and the government has focused on attracting investment for projects for internal use and electricity exports. Tajikistan is home to the Nurek Dam, the second highest dam in the world. Lately, Russia's RAO UES energy giant has been working on the Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric power station (670 MW capacity) commenced operations on 18 January 2008. Other projects at the development stage include Sangtuda-2 by Iran, Zerafshan by the Chinese company SinoHydro, and the Rogun power plant that, at a projected height of , would supersede the Nurek Dam as highest in the world if it is brought to completion. A planned project, CASA-1000, will transmit 1000 MW of surplus electricity from Tajikistan to Pakistan with power transit through Afghanistan. The total length of transmission line is 750 km while the project is planned to be on Public-Private Partnership basis with the support of WB, IFC, ADB and IDB. The project cost is estimated to be around US$865 million. Other energy resources include sizeable coal deposits and smaller, relatively unexplored reserves of natural gas and petroleum. In 2014 Tajikistan was the world's most remittance-dependent economy with remittances accounting for 49% of GDP and expected to fall by 40% in 2015 due to the economic crisis in the Russian Federation. Tajik migrant workers abroad, mainly in the Russian Federation, have become by far the main source of income for millions of Tajikistan's people and with the 2014–2015 downturn in the Russian economy the World Bank has predicted large numbers of young Tajik men will return home and face few economic prospects. According to some estimates about 20% of the population lives on less than US$1.25 per day. Migration from Tajikistan and the consequent remittances have been unprecedented in their magnitude and economic impact. In 2010, remittances from Tajik labour migrants totalled an estimated $2.1 billion US dollars, an increase from 2009. Tajikistan has achieved transition from a planned to a market economy without substantial and protracted recourse to aid (of which it by now receives only negligible amounts), and by purely market-based means, simply by exporting its main commodity	took place, especially in the southern region. Soviet collectivisation policy brought violence against peasants and forced resettlement occurred throughout Tajikistan. Consequently, some peasants fought collectivization and revived the Basmachi movement. Some small scale industrial development also occurred during this time along with the expansion of irrigation infrastructure. Two rounds of Stalin's purges (1927–1934 and 1937–1938) resulted in the expulsion of nearly 10,000 people, from all levels of the Communist Party of Tajikistan. Ethnic Russians were sent in to replace those expelled and subsequently Russians dominated party positions at all levels, including the top position of first secretary. Between 1926 and 1959 the proportion of Russians among Tajikistan's population grew from less than 1% to 13%. Bobojon Ghafurov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan from 1946 to 1956, was the only Tajik politician of significance outside of the country during the Soviet Era. He was followed in office by Tursun Uljabayev (1956–61), Jabbor Rasulov (1961–1982), and Rahmon Nabiyev (1982–1985, 1991–1992). Tajiks began to be conscripted into the Soviet Army in 1939 and during World War II around 260,000 Tajik citizens fought against Germany, Finland and Japan. Between 60,000 (4%) and 120,000 (8%) of Tajikistan's 1,530,000 citizens were killed during World War II. Following the war and Stalin's reign, attempts were made to further expand the agriculture and industry of Tajikistan. During 1957–58 Nikita Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Campaign focused attention on Tajikistan, where living conditions, education and industry lagged behind the other Soviet Republics. In the 1980s, Tajikistan had the lowest household saving rate in the USSR, the lowest percentage of households in the two top per capita income groups, and the lowest rate of university graduates per 1000 people. By the late 1980s Tajik nationalists were calling for increased rights. Real disturbances did not occur within the republic until 1990. The following year, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Tajikistan declared its independence on 9 September 1991, a day which is now celebrated as the country's Independence Day. Gaining independence In Soviet times, supporters of Tajikistan independence were harshly persecuted by the KGB, and most were either shot dead or jailed for many years. After the beginning of the Perestroika era, declared by Mikhail Gorbachev throughout the USSR, supporters of the independence of the republics began to speak openly and freely. In Tajikistan SSR, the independence movement had been active since 1987. Supporters of independence were the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the national democratic Rastokhez (Revival) Movement. On the eve of the collapse of the USSR, the population of Tajikistan SSR was divided into two camps. The first wanted independence for Tajikistan, the restoration of Tajik culture and language, the restoration of political and cultural relations with Iran and Afghanistan and other countries, and the second part of the population opposed independence, considering it the best option to remain part of the USSR. During the 1991 Soviet Union Referendum (the first internationally observed referendum in the country's history) on continuing the Soviet system and the Soviet Union itself, nearly 97% of voters in Tajikistan approved of Question 1: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, which will be fully ensured of human rights and freedoms of any nationality?", though by dissolution in December of the same year, a significant proportion of Tajikistan's population supported what was by then the fait accompli of independence for the union-level republics of the Soviet Union. In February 1990, riots and strikes in Dushanbe and other cities of began due to the difficult socio-economic situation, lack of housing, and youth unemployment. The nationalist and democratic opposition and supporters of independence joined the strikes and began to demand the independence of the republic and democratic reforms. Islamists also began to hold strikes to demand respect for their rights and independence of the republic. The Soviet leadership introduced Internal Troops in Dushanbe to eliminate the unrest. Independence Almost immediately following independence, the nation fell into civil war among various factions; often distinguished by clan loyalties. More than 500,000 residents fled during this time because of persecution, increased poverty and better economic opportunities in the West or in other former Soviet republics. Emomali Rahmon came to power in 1992, defeating former prime minister Abdumalik Abdullajanov in a November presidential election with 58% of the vote. The elections took place shortly after the end of the war, and Tajikistan was in a state of complete devastation. The estimated dead numbered over 100,000. Around 1.2 million people were refugees inside and outside of the country. In 1997, a ceasefire was reached between Rahmon and opposition parties under the guidance of Gerd D. Merrem, Special Representative to the Secretary General, a result widely praised as a successful United Nations peacekeeping initiative. The ceasefire guaranteed 30% of ministerial positions would go to the opposition. Elections were held in 1999, though they were criticised by opposition parties and foreign observers as unfair and Rahmon was re-elected with 98% of the vote. Elections in 2006 were again won by Rahmon (with 79% of the vote) and he began his third term in office. Several opposition parties boycotted the 2006 election and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) criticised it, although observers from the Commonwealth of Independent States claimed the elections were legal and transparent. Rahmon's administration came under further criticism from the OSCE in October 2010 for its censorship and repression of the media. The OSCE claimed that the Tajik Government censored Tajik and foreign websites and instituted tax inspections on independent printing houses that led to the cessation of printing activities for a number of independent newspapers. Russian border troops were stationed along the Tajik–Afghan border until summer 2005. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, French troops have been stationed at Dushanbe Airport in support of air operations of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. United States Army and Marine Corps personnel periodically visit Tajikistan to conduct joint training missions of up to several weeks duration. The Government of India rebuilt the Ayni Air Base, a military airport located 15 km southwest of Dushanbe, at a cost of $70 million, completing the repairs in September 2010. It is now the main base of the Tajikistan air force. There have been talks with Russia concerning use of the Ayni facility, and Russia continues to maintain a large base on the outskirts of Dushanbe. In 2010, there were concerns among Tajik officials that Islamic militarism in the east of the country was on the rise following the escape of 25 militants from a Tajik prison in August, an ambush that killed 28 Tajik soldiers in the Rasht Valley in September, and another ambush in the valley in October that killed 30 soldiers, followed by fighting outside Gharm that left 3 militants dead. To date the country's Interior Ministry asserts that the central government maintains full control over the country's east, and the military operation in the Rasht Valley was concluded in November 2010. However, fighting erupted again in July 2012. In 2015, Russia sent more troops to Tajikistan. In May 2015, Tajikistan's national security suffered a serious setback when Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov, commander of the special-purpose police unit (OMON) of the Interior Ministry, defected to the Islamic State. In 2021, following the Fall of Kabul, Tajikistan allegedly got involved in the Panjshir conflict against the Taliban on the side of the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. Politics Almost immediately after independence, Tajikistan was plunged into a civil war that saw various factions fighting one another. These factions were supported by foreign countries including Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Russia. Russia and Iran focused on keeping peace in the warring nation to decrease the chances of U.S. or Turkish involvement. Most notably, Russia backed the pro-government faction and deployed troops from the Commonwealth of Independent States to guard the Tajikistan-Afghan border. All but 25,000 of the more than 400,000 ethnic Russians, who were mostly employed in industry, fled to Russia. By 1997, the war had ended after a peace agreement between the government and the Islamist-led opposition, a central government began to take form, with peaceful elections in 1999. "Longtime observers of Tajikistan often characterize the country as profoundly averse to risk and skeptical of promises of reform, a political passivity they trace to the country's ruinous civil war," Ilan Greenberg wrote in a news article in The New York Times just before the country's November 2006 presidential election. Tajikistan is officially a republic, and holds elections for the presidency and parliament, operating under a presidential system. It is, however, a dominant-party system, where the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan routinely has a vast majority in Parliament. Emomali Rahmon has held the office of President of Tajikistan continuously since November 1994. The Prime Minister is Kokhir Rasulzoda, the First Deputy Prime Minister is Matlubkhon Davlatov and the two Deputy Prime Ministers are Murodali Alimardon and Ruqiya Qurbanova. The parliamentary elections of 2005 aroused many accusations from opposition parties and international observers that President Emomali Rahmon corruptly manipulates the election process and unemployment. The most recent elections, in February 2010, saw the ruling PDPT lose four seats in Parliament, yet still maintain a comfortable majority. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe election observers said the 2010 polling "failed to meet many key OSCE commitments" and that "these elections failed on many basic democratic standards." The government insisted that only minor violations had occurred, which would not affect the will of the Tajik people. The Tajik government has reportedly clamped down on facial hair as part of a crackdown on Islamic influence and due to its perceived associations with Islamic extremism, which is prevalent in bordering Afghanistan. The presidential election held on 6 November 2006 was boycotted by "mainline" opposition parties, including the 23,000-member Islamic Renaissance Party. Four remaining opponents "all but endorsed the incumbent", Rahmon. Freedom of the press is ostensibly officially guaranteed by the government, but independent press outlets remain restricted, as does a substantial amount of web content. According to the Institute for War & Peace Reporting, access is blocked to local and foreign websites including avesta.tj, Tjknews.com, ferghana.ru, centrasia.org and journalists are often obstructed from reporting on controversial events. In practice, no public criticism of the regime is tolerated and all direct protest is severely suppressed and does not receive coverage in the local media. In the Economist's democracy index report of 2020, Tajikistan is placed 160th, just after Saudi Arabia, as an "authoritarian regime". In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Tajikistan, signed a joint letter to the UNHRC defending China's treatment of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region. In October 2020, Tajikistan's authoritarian President Emomali Rahmon was re-elected for next seven-year period with 90 per cent of the votes, following a tightly controlled and largely ceremonial election. In late April 2021, a conflict over water escalated into one of the most serious border clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan since independence. In July 2021, Tajikistan appealed to members of a Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of ex-Soviet states for help in dealing with security challenges emerging from neighboring Afghanistan. The safety concerns emerged as foreign troops such as the US and British army exited the country, causing over 1,000 Afghan civilians and servicemen to flee to neighboring Tajikistan after Taliban insurgents took control of many parts of Afghanistan. Geography Tajikistan is landlocked, and is the smallest nation in Central Asia by area. It lies mostly between latitudes 36° and 41° N, and longitudes 67° and 75° E. It is covered by mountains of the Pamir range, and most of the country is over above sea level. The only major areas of lower land are in the north (part of the Fergana Valley), and in the southern Kofarnihon and Vakhsh river valleys, which form the Amu Darya. Dushanbe is located on the southern slopes above the Kofarnihon valley. The Amu Darya and Panj rivers mark the border with Afghanistan, and the glaciers in Tajikistan's mountains are the major source of runoff for the Aral Sea. There are over 900 rivers in Tajikistan longer than 10 kilometres. Administrative divisions Tajikistan consists of 4 administrative divisions. These are the provinces (viloyat) of Sughd and Khatlon, the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan (abbreviated as GBAO), and the Region of Republican Subordination (RRP – Raiony Respublikanskogo Podchineniya in transliteration from Russian or NTJ – Ноҳияҳои тобеи ҷумҳурӣ in Tajik; formerly known as Karotegin Province). Each region is divided into several districts (, nohiya or raion), which in turn are subdivided into jamoats (village-level self-governing units) and then villages (qyshloqs). , there were 58 districts and 367 jamoats in Tajikistan. Lakes About 2% of the country's area is covered by lakes, the best known of which are the following: Kayrakum (Qairoqqum) Reservoir (Sughd) Iskanderkul (Fann Mountains) Kulikalon (Kul-i Kalon) (Fann Mountains) Nurek Reservoir (Khatlon) Karakul (Kyrgyz: Кара-Көл; eastern Pamir) Sarez (Pamir) Shadau Lake (Pamir) Zorkul (Pamir) Biodiversity Tajikistan contains five terrestrial ecoregions: Alai-Western Tian Shan steppe, Gissaro-Alai open woodlands, Pamir alpine desert and tundra, Badghyz and Karabil semi-desert, and Paropamisus xeric woodlands. Economy In 2019, nearly 29% of Tajikistan's GDP came from immigrant remittances (mostly from Tajiks working in Russia), one of the highest rates in the world. The current economic situation remains fragile, largely owing to corruption, uneven economic reforms, and economic mismanagement. With foreign revenue precariously dependent upon remittances from migrant workers overseas and exports of aluminium and cotton, the economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. In FY 2000, international assistance remained an essential source of support for rehabilitation programs that reintegrated former civil war combatants into the civilian economy, which helped keep the peace. International assistance also was necessary to address the second year of severe drought that resulted in a continued shortfall of food production. On 21 August 2001, the Red Cross announced that a famine was striking Tajikistan, and called for international aid for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; however, access to food remains a problem today. In January 2012, 680,152 of the people living in Tajikistan were living with food insecurity. Out of those, 676,852 were at risk of Phase 3 (Acute Food and Livelihoods Crisis) food insecurity, and 3,300 were at risk of Phase 4 (Humanitarian Emergency). Those with the highest risk of food insecurity were living in the remote Murghob District of GBAO. Tajikistan's economy grew substantially after the war. The GDP of Tajikistan expanded at an average rate of 9.6% over the period of 2000–2007 according to the World Bank data. This improved Tajikistan's position among other Central Asian countries (namely Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), which seem to have degraded economically ever since. The primary sources of income in Tajikistan are aluminium production, cotton growing and remittances from migrant workers. Cotton accounts for 60% of agricultural output, supporting 75% of the rural population, and using 45% of irrigated arable land. The aluminium industry is represented by the state-owned Tajik Aluminum Company – the biggest aluminium plant in Central Asia and one of the biggest in the world. Tajikistan's rivers, such as the Vakhsh and the Panj, have great hydropower potential, and the government has focused on attracting investment for projects for internal use and electricity exports. Tajikistan
range of the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya (Oxus) River and some areas of current south Tajikistan. During different periods, Bactria was a center of various Kingdoms or Empires, and is probably where Zoroastrianism originated. The "Avesta"—the holy book of Zoroastrianism—was written in the old-Bactrian dialect; it is also thought that Zoroaster was most likely born in Bactria. Some authors have also suggested that in the 7th and 6th century BCE parts of modern Tajikistan, including territories in the Zeravshan valley, formed part of Kambojas, which were referenced in the Mahabharata epic as the Parama Kamboja, before it became part of the Achaemenid Empire.Linguistic evidence, combined with ancient literary and inscriptional evidence suggest the Kambojas originally emigrated from Central Asia. Achaemenid Period (550 BC – 329 BC) During the Achaemenid period, Sogdiana and Bactria were part of the Achaemenid empire. Sogdians and Bactrians occupied important positions in the administration and military of the Achaemenid Empire Hellenistic Period (329 BC – 90 BC) After the Achaemenid Empire was defeated by Alexander the Great, Bactria, Sogdiana and Merv, being part of Persian Empire, had to defend themselves from new invaders. In fact, the Macedonians faced very stiff resistance under the leadership of Sogdian ruler Spitamenes. Alexander the Great managed to marry Roxana, the daughter of a local ruler, and inherited his land. Following Alexander's brief occupation, the Hellenistic successor states of the Seleucids and Greco-Bactrians controlled the area for another 200 years in what is known as the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom. During the time period from 90 BC to 30 BC, Yuezhi destroyed the last Hellenistic successor states and, together with the Tokhari, (to whom they were closely related) created a Kushan Empire around 30 AD. Kushan Empire (30 BC – 410 AD) For another 400 years, until 410 AD, the Kushan Empire was a major power in the region along with the Roman Empire, the Parthian Empire and the Han Empire (China). Notable contact was made with local peoples when the envoys of the Han Dynasty journeyed to this area in the 2nd century BC. At the end of the Kushan period, the Empire became much smaller and would have to defend itself from the powerful Sassanid Empire that replaced the Parthian Empire. The famous Kushan king Kanishka promoted Buddhism and during this time Buddhism was exported from Central Asia to China. The Sassanids, Hephthalites, and Gokturks (224–710) The Sassanids once controlled much of what is now Tajikistan, but lost the territory to the Hephthalites (possibly also of Iranian descent) during the time of Peroz I. They created a powerful empire that succeeded in making Iran a tributary state around 483–485. Shah of Persia Peroz fought three wars with Hephthalites. During the first war he was captured by Hephthalite army and later was released after Byzantine emperor paid a ransom for him. During the second war Peroz was captured again and was released after paying a huge contribution to the Hephthalite king. During the third war Peroz was killed. The Hephthalites were subjugated in 565 by a combination of Sassanid and Kök-Turk forces. Subsequently, present Tajikistan was ruled by Göktürks and Sassanids, however when the Sassanid Empire fell the Turks kept control of Tajikistan but they later lost it to the Chinese people, however, they later managed to take control of Tajikistan once again, only to lose it to the Arabs in 710. Medieval history (710–1506) Arab Caliphate (710–867) The Transoxiana principalities never formed a viable confederacy. Beginning in 651, the Arabs organized periodic marauding raids deep into the territory of Transoxania, but it was not until the appointment of Ibn Qutaiba as Governor of Khorasan in 705, during the reign of Walid I, that the Caliphate adopted the policy of annexing the lands beyond the Oxus. In 715, the task of annexation was accomplished. The entire region thus came under the control of the Caliph and of Islam, but the Arabs continued to rule through local Soghdian Kings and dihqans. The ascension of the Abbasids to rule the Caliphate (750 - 1258) opened a new era in the history of Central Asia. While their predecessors the Umayyads (661 - 750) were little more than leaders of a loose confederation of Arab tribes, the Abbasids set out to build a huge multi-ethnic centralized state that would emulate and perfect the Sassanian government machine. They gave the Near East and Transoxiana a unity, which they had been lacking since the time of Alexander the Great. Samanid Empire (819–999) The Samanid dynasty ruled (819–1005) in Khorasan (including Eastern Iran and Transoxiana) and was founded by Saman Khuda. The Samanids were one of the first purely indigenous dynasties to rule in Persia after the Muslim Arab conquest. During the reign (892–907) of Saman Khuda's great-grandson, Ismail I (known as Ismail Samani), Samanids expanded in Khorasan. In 900, Ismail defeated the Saffarids in Khorasan (area of current Northwest Afghanistan and northeastern Iran), while his brother was the governor of Transoxiana. Thus, Samanid rule was acclaimed over the combined regions. The cities of Bukhara (the Samanid capital) and Samarkand became centres of art, science, and literature; industries included pottery making and bronze casting. After 950, Samanid power weakened, but was briefly revitalized under Nuh II, who ruled from 976 to 997. However, with the oncoming encroachment of Muslim Turks, the Samanids lost their domains south of the Oxus river which were taken by Ghaznavids. In 999, Bukhara was taken by the Qarakhanids. The Samanid Isma'il Muntasir (died 1005) tried to restore the dynasty (1000–1005), until he was assassinated by an Arab bedouin chieftain. The attack of the Qarakhanid Turks ended the Samanid dynasty in 999 and dominance in Transoxiana passed on to Turkic rulers. Qarakhanids (999–1211) and Khwarezmshahs (1211–1218) After the collapse of Samanid Dynasty, Central Asia became the battleground of many Asian invaders who came from the north-east. Mongol rule (1218–1370) The Mongol Empire swept through Central Asia, invaded Khwarezmian Empire and sacked the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand, looting and massacring people everywhere. Timurid Empire (1370–1506) Timur, founder of the Timurid Empire, was born on 8 April 1336 in Kesh near Samarkand. He was a member of the Turkicized Barlas tribe, a Mongol subgroup that had settled in Transoxiana after taking part in Genghis Khan's son Chagatai's campaigns in that region. Timur began his life as a bandit leader. During this period, he received an arrow-wound in the leg, as a result of which he was nicknamed Timur-e Lang (in Dari) or Timur the Lame. Although the last Timurid ruler of Herat, Badi az Zaman finally fell to the armies of the Uzbek Muhammad Shaibani Khan in 1506, the Timurid ruler of Ferghana, Zahir-ud-Din Babur, survived the collapse of the dynasty and re-established the Timurid dynasty in India in 1526 where they became known as the Mughals. Early modern history (1506–1868) Turkic rule (1506–1598) The Shaybanid state was divided into appanages between all male members (sultans) of the dynasty, who would designate the supreme ruler (Khan), the oldest member of clan. The seat of Khan was first Samarkand, the capital of the Timurids, but some of the Khans preferred to remain in their former appanages. Thus Bukhara became the seat of the khan for the first time under Ubaid Allah Khan (r. 1533–1539). The period of political expansion and economical prosperity was short-lived. Soon after the death of Abd Allah Khan the Shaibanid dynasty died out and was replaced by the Janid or Astrakhanid (Ashtarkhanid) dynasty, another branch of the descendants of Jöchi, whose founder Jani Khan was related to Abd Allah Khan Through his marriage to Abdullah Khan's Sister. The Astrakhanids are also said to be connected to the Hashemites due to Imam Quli Khan's status as a Sayyid. Their descendants today live in India. In 1709, eastern part of Khanate of Bukhara seceded and formed Khanate of Kokand. Thus, the eastern part of present Tajikistan passed to the Khanate of Kokand, while the western one remained part of the Khanate of Bukhara. Iranian and Bukharan rule (1740–1868) In 1740, the Janid khanate was conquered by Nader Shah, the Afsharid ruler of Iran. The Janid khan Abu al Faiz retained his throne, becoming Nadir's vassal. After the death of Nader Shah in 1747, the chief of the Manghit tribe, Muhammad Rahim Biy Azaliq, overcame his rivals from other tribes and consolidated his rule in the Khanate of Bukhara. His successor, however, ruled in the name of puppet khans of Janid origin. In 1785 Shah Murad formalized the family's dynastic rule (Manghit dynasty), and the khanate became the Emirate of Bukhara Modern History (1868—1991) Russian Vassalage (1868–1920) Russian Imperialism led to the Russian Empire's conquest of Central	of political expansion and economical prosperity was short-lived. Soon after the death of Abd Allah Khan the Shaibanid dynasty died out and was replaced by the Janid or Astrakhanid (Ashtarkhanid) dynasty, another branch of the descendants of Jöchi, whose founder Jani Khan was related to Abd Allah Khan Through his marriage to Abdullah Khan's Sister. The Astrakhanids are also said to be connected to the Hashemites due to Imam Quli Khan's status as a Sayyid. Their descendants today live in India. In 1709, eastern part of Khanate of Bukhara seceded and formed Khanate of Kokand. Thus, the eastern part of present Tajikistan passed to the Khanate of Kokand, while the western one remained part of the Khanate of Bukhara. Iranian and Bukharan rule (1740–1868) In 1740, the Janid khanate was conquered by Nader Shah, the Afsharid ruler of Iran. The Janid khan Abu al Faiz retained his throne, becoming Nadir's vassal. After the death of Nader Shah in 1747, the chief of the Manghit tribe, Muhammad Rahim Biy Azaliq, overcame his rivals from other tribes and consolidated his rule in the Khanate of Bukhara. His successor, however, ruled in the name of puppet khans of Janid origin. In 1785 Shah Murad formalized the family's dynastic rule (Manghit dynasty), and the khanate became the Emirate of Bukhara Modern History (1868—1991) Russian Vassalage (1868–1920) Russian Imperialism led to the Russian Empire's conquest of Central Asia during the late 19th century's Imperial Era. Between 1864 and 1885 Russia gradually took control of the entire territory of Russian Turkestan, the Tajikistan portion of which had been controlled by the Emirate of Bukhara and Khanate of Kokand ( from today's border with Kazakhstan in the north to the Caspian Sea in the west and the border with Afghanistan in the south). Tashkent was conquered in 1865 and in 1867 the Turkestan Governor-Generalship was created with Konstantin Petrovich Von Kaufman as the first Governor-General. The expansion was motivated by Russia's economic interests and was connected with the American Civil War in the early 1860s, which severely interrupted the supply of cotton fiber to the Russian industry and forced Russia to turn to Central Asia as an alternative source of cotton supply as well as a market for Russian made goods. The Russian regime in the 1870s attempted to switch cultivation in the region from grain to cotton (a strategy later copied and expanded by the Soviets). By 1885 Tajikistan's territory was either ruled by the Russian Empire or its vassal state, the Emirate of Bukhara, nevertheless Tajiks felt little Russian influence. Russian Empire, being a much bigger state with a huge population and having an advanced military, had little difficulty in conquering the regions inhabited by Tajiks, meeting fierce resistance only at Jizzakh, Ura-Tyube, and when their garrison in Samarkand was besieged in 1868 by forces from Shahr-e Sabz and the inhabitants of the city. The army of the Emirate of Bukhara was utterly defeated in three battles, and on 18 June 1868 Emir Mozaffar al-Din (r. 1860–1885) signed a peace treaty with the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan Von Kaufman. Samarkand and the Upper Zeravshan were annexed by Russia and the country was opened to Russian merchants. The emir retained his throne as a vassal of Russia and with Russian help he established control over Shahr-e Sabz, the mountainous regions in the upper Zeravshan Valley(1870) and the principalities of the western Pamir (1895). During the late 19th century the Jadidists established themselves as an Islamic social movement throughout the region. Although the Jadidists were pro-modernization and not necessarily anti-Russian the Russians viewed the movement as a threat. Russian troops were required to restore order during uprisings against the Khanate of Kokand between 1910 and 1913. Further violence occurred in July 1916 when demonstrators attacked Russian soldiers in Khujand over the threat of forced conscription during World War I. Despite Russian troops quickly bringing Khujand back under control, clashes continued throughout the year in various locations in Tajikistan. At the end of August 1920 the last emir, Sayyid Alim Khan, was overthrown by Soviet troops. On 6 October 1920 the emirate was abolished and the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic was proclaimed. Basmachi movement (1916-1924) The Basmachi movement or Basmachi Revolt was an uprising against Russian Imperial and Soviet rule that arose after the Russian Revolution of 1917 guerrillas throughout Central Asia. The movement's roots lay in the anti-conscription violence of 1916 that erupted when the Russian Empire began to draft Muslims for army service during World War I. In the months following the October 1917 Revolution the Bolsheviks seized power in many parts of the Russian Empire and the Russian Civil War began. Turkestani Muslim political movements attempted to form an autonomous government in the city of Kokand, in the Ferghana Valley. The Bolsheviks launched an assault on Kokand in February 1918 and carried out a general massacre of up to 25,000 people. The massacre rallied support to the Basmachi movements who waged a guerrilla war and a conventional war that seized control of large parts of the Ferghana Valley and much of Turkestan. The fortunes of the decentralized movement fluctuated throughout the early 1920s but by 1923 the Red Army's extensive campaigns dealt the Basmachis many defeats. After major Red Army campaigns and concessions regarding economic and Islamic practices in the mid-1920s, the military fortunes and popular support of the Basmachi declined. Resistance to Soviet/Russian rule did flare up again to a lesser extent in response to collectivization campaigns in the pre-WWII Era. Soviet Rule (1920–1991) In 1924, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was created as a part of Uzbekistan, but when national borders were drawn in 1928 (during the administrative delimitation) the ancient Tajik cities of Bukhara and Samarkand were placed outside the Tajikistan SSR. As citizens of the newly established Uzbek SSR, many Tajiks came under pressure to conform to their newly ascribed "Uzbek" identity, and under threat of exile, many were forced to change their identity and sign in passports as "Uzbeks". Tajik schools were closed and Tajiks were not appointed to leadership positions simply because of their ethnicity. Between 1927 and 1934 collectivization of agriculture and a rapid expansion of cotton production took place, especially in the southern region. Soviet collectivization policy brought violence against peasants and forced resettlement occurred throughout Tajikistan. Consequently, some peasants fought collectivization and revived the Basmachi movement. Some small scale industrial development also occurred during this time along with the expansion of irrigation infrastructure. Two rounds of Soviet purges directed by Moscow (1927–1934 and 1937–1938) resulted in the expulsion of nearly 10,000 people, from all levels of the Communist Party of Tajikistan. Ethnic Russians were sent in to replace those expelled and subsequently Russians dominated party positions at all levels, including the top position of first secretary. Between 1926 and 1959 the proportion of Russians among Tajikistan's population grew from less than 1% to 13%. Bobojon Ghafurov, Tajikistan's First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan from 1946–1956 was the only Tajikistani politician of significance outside the country during the Soviet Era. He was followed in office by Tursun Uljabayev (1956–61), Jabbor Rasulov (1961–1982), and Rahmon Nabiyev (1982–1985, 1991–1992). Tajiks began to be conscripted into the Soviet Army in 1939 and during World War II around 260,000 Tajik citizens fought against Germany, Finland and Japan. Between 60,000(4%) and 120,000(8%) of Tajikistan's 1,530,000 citizens were killed during World War II. Following the war and Stalin's reign attempts were made to further expand the agriculture and industry of Tajikistan. During 1957–58 Nikita Khrushchev's Virgin Lands Campaign focused attention on Tajikistan, where living conditions, education and industry lagged behind the other Soviet Republics. In the 1980s, Tajikistan had the lowest household saving rate in the USSR, the lowest percentage of households in the two top per capita income groups, and the lowest rate of university graduates per 1000 people. Living standards were undermined during the tenure of Kahar Mahkamov as first secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan from 1985. Mahkamov's attempted marketisation of the Tajik economy aggravated the poor living conditions and unemployment. On the eve of the Soviet collapse Tajikistan was suffering from a declining economy and dim prospects for recovery. The glasnost policy of openness initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev offered disgruntled Tajiks a chance to voice their grievances. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Tajikistan declared its independence. Republic of Tajikistan (1991 to present) The Tajikistan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was among the last republics of the Soviet Union to declare its independence. On September 9 (1991), following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Tajikistan declared its independence. During this time, use of the Tajik language, an official language of the Tajikistan SSR next to Russian, was increasingly promoted. Ethnic Russians, who had held many governing posts, lost much of their influence and more Tajiks became politically active. The nation almost immediately fell into a civil war that involved various factions fighting one another; these factions were often distinguished by clan loyalties. The non-Muslim population, particularly Russians and Jews, fled the country during this time because of persecution, increased poverty and better economic opportunities in the West or in other former Soviet republics. Emomali Rahmon came to power in 1994, and continues to rule to this day. Ethnic cleansing was controversial during the civil war in Tajikistan. By the end of the war Tajikistan was in a state of complete devastation. The estimated dead numbered over 100,000. Around 1.2 million people were refugees inside and outside the country. In 1997, a ceasefire was reached between Rahmon and opposition parties (United Tajik Opposition). Peaceful elections were held in 1999, but they were reported by the opposition as unfair, and Rahmon was re-elected by almost unanimous vote. Russian troops were stationed in southern Tajikistan, in order to guard the border with Afghanistan, until summer 2005. Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, American, Indian and French troops have also been stationed in the country. In October 2020, President Emomali Rahmon was re-elected for next seven-year period with 90 per cent of the votes, following a tightly controlled and largely ceremonial election. See also Guzel Maitdinova Dissolution of the Soviet Union History of Central Asia Politics of Tajikistan Soviet Central Asia References Footnotes Sources and further reading Asimov, M.S. Tadzhikskaya Sovetskaya Sotsialisticheskaya Respublika(The
Fergana Valley in the far north and in Khatlon Province in the southwest, are well above sea level. In the Turkestan range, highest of the western chains, the maximum elevation is . The highest elevations of this range are in the east, near the border with Kyrgyzstan. That region is dominated by the peaks of the Pamir-Alay mountain system, including two of the three highest elevations in the former Soviet Union: Mount Lenin — and Ismoil Somoni Peak — . Several other peaks in the region also exceed . The mountains contain numerous glaciers, the largest of which, Fedchenko Glacier, covers more than and is the largest glacier in the world outside the polar regions. Because Tajikistan lies in an active seismic belt, severe earthquakes are common. Fergana Valley The Fergana Valley, the most densely populated region in Central Asia irrigated by the Syr Darya in its upper course, spreads across the north-eastern arm of Uzbekistan and Northern Tajikistan. This long valley, which lies between two mountain ranges — the Kuramin Range in the north and the Turkestan Range in the south, reaches its lowest elevation of at Khujand on the Syr Darya. Rivers bring rich soil deposits into the Fergana Valley from the surrounding mountains, creating a series of fertile oases that have long been prized for agriculture. Drainage In Tajikistan's dense river network, the largest rivers are the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya; the largest tributaries are the Vakhsh and the Kofarnihon, which form valleys from northeast to southwest across western Tajikistan. The Amu Darya carries more water than any other river in Central Asia. The upper course of the Amu Darya, called the Panj River, is long. The river's name changes at the confluence of the Panj, the Vakhsh, and the Kofarnihon rivers in far southwestern Tajikistan. The Vakhsh, called the Kyzyl-Suu ("red water" in Turkic languages) upstream in Kyrgyzstan and the Surkhob in its middle course in north-central Tajikistan, is the second largest river in southern Tajikistan after the Amu-Panj system. In the Soviet era, the Vakhsh was dammed at several points for irrigation and electric power generation, most notably at Norak (Nurek), east of Dushanbe, where one of the world's highest dams forms the Nurek Reservoir. Numerous factories also were built along the Vakhsh to draw upon its waters and potential for electric power generation. Due to the uneven distribution of water throughout Central Asia, the Soviets created a system in which Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan provided water to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in summer, and these three countries provided oil and gas to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during winter. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, this system fell apart and a new resource-sharing plan has yet to be put in place. According to research conducted by the International Crisis Group, this is due to corruption and lack of political will; failure to solve this issue could lead to irreversible regional destabilization. The two most important rivers in northern Tajikistan are the Syr Darya and the Zeravshan (Zarafshan). The former, the second longest river in Central Asia with a total length of , stretches across the Fergana Valley in far-northern Tajikistan. The Zeravshan River, with a total length of , runs for through the north-center of Tajikistan. Tajikistan's rivers reach high-water levels twice a year: in the spring, fed by the rainy season and melting mountain snow, and in the summer, fed by melting glaciers. The summer freshets are the more useful for irrigation, especially in the Fergana Valley and the valleys of southeastern Tajikistan. Most of Tajikistan's lakes are of glacial origin and are located in the Pamir region in the eastern half of the country. The largest, the Karakul (Qarokul) Lake, is a salt lake devoid of life, lying at an elevation of . Tajikistan's second largest water body is the Kayrakum Reservoir, a long artificial lake in the heart of the Fergana Valley, not far from the city of Khujand in Sughd Province. The lake is fed by the Syr Darya. Another well-known natural lake of glacial origin is Iskanderkul. It is smaller than the Kayrakum Reservoir and lies in the Fann Mountains in western Tajikistan. Climate Tajikistan's climate is continental, subtropical, and semiarid, with some desert areas. The climate changes drastically according to elevation, however. The Fergana Valley and other lowlands are shielded by mountains from Arctic air masses, but temperatures in that region still drop below freezing for more than 100 days a year. In the subtropical southwestern lowlands, which have the highest average temperatures, the climate is arid, although some sections now are irrigated for farming. At Tajikistan's lower elevations, the average temperature range is in July and in January. In the eastern Pamirs, the average July temperature is , and the average January temperature is . Tajikistan is the wettest of the Central Asian republics, with the average annual precipitation for the Kafernigan and Vakhsh valleys in the south being around , and up to in the mountains. At the Fedchenko Glacier, as much as of snow falls each year. Only in the northern Fergana Valley and in the rain shadow areas of the eastern Pamirs is precipitation as low as in other parts of Central Asia: in the eastern Pamirs less than falls per year. Most precipitation occurs in the winter and spring. Environmental problems Most of Tajikistan's environmental problems are related to the agricultural policies imposed on the country during the Soviet period. By 1991 heavy use of mineral fertilizers and agricultural chemicals was a major cause of pollution in the republic. Among those chemicals were DDT, banned by international convention, and several defoliants and herbicides. In addition to the damage they have done to the air, land, and water, the chemicals have contaminated the cottonseeds whose oil is used widely for cooking. Cotton farmers and their families are at particular risk from the overuse of agricultural chemicals, both from direct physical contact in the field and from the use of the branches of cotton plants at home for fuel. All of these toxic sources are believed to contribute to a high incidence of maternal and child mortality and birth defects. In 1994 the infant mortality rate was 43.2 per 1,000 births, the second highest rate among former Soviet republics. The rate in 1990 had been 40.0 infant deaths per 1,000 births. Cotton requires particularly intense irrigation. In Tajikistan's cotton-growing regions, farms were established in large, semiarid tracts and in tracts reclaimed from the desert, but cotton's growing season is summer, when the region receives virtually no rainfall. The 50 percent increase in cotton cultivation mandated by Soviet and post-Soviet agricultural planners	of glacial origin is Iskanderkul. It is smaller than the Kayrakum Reservoir and lies in the Fann Mountains in western Tajikistan. Climate Tajikistan's climate is continental, subtropical, and semiarid, with some desert areas. The climate changes drastically according to elevation, however. The Fergana Valley and other lowlands are shielded by mountains from Arctic air masses, but temperatures in that region still drop below freezing for more than 100 days a year. In the subtropical southwestern lowlands, which have the highest average temperatures, the climate is arid, although some sections now are irrigated for farming. At Tajikistan's lower elevations, the average temperature range is in July and in January. In the eastern Pamirs, the average July temperature is , and the average January temperature is . Tajikistan is the wettest of the Central Asian republics, with the average annual precipitation for the Kafernigan and Vakhsh valleys in the south being around , and up to in the mountains. At the Fedchenko Glacier, as much as of snow falls each year. Only in the northern Fergana Valley and in the rain shadow areas of the eastern Pamirs is precipitation as low as in other parts of Central Asia: in the eastern Pamirs less than falls per year. Most precipitation occurs in the winter and spring. Environmental problems Most of Tajikistan's environmental problems are related to the agricultural policies imposed on the country during the Soviet period. By 1991 heavy use of mineral fertilizers and agricultural chemicals was a major cause of pollution in the republic. Among those chemicals were DDT, banned by international convention, and several defoliants and herbicides. In addition to the damage they have done to the air, land, and water, the chemicals have contaminated the cottonseeds whose oil is used widely for cooking. Cotton farmers and their families are at particular risk from the overuse of agricultural chemicals, both from direct physical contact in the field and from the use of the branches of cotton plants at home for fuel. All of these toxic sources are believed to contribute to a high incidence of maternal and child mortality and birth defects. In 1994 the infant mortality rate was 43.2 per 1,000 births, the second highest rate among former Soviet republics. The rate in 1990 had been 40.0 infant deaths per 1,000 births. Cotton requires particularly intense irrigation. In Tajikistan's cotton-growing regions, farms were established in large, semiarid tracts and in tracts reclaimed from the desert, but cotton's growing season is summer, when the region receives virtually no rainfall. The 50 percent increase in cotton cultivation mandated by Soviet and post-Soviet agricultural planners between 1964 and 1994 consequently overtaxed the regional water supply. Poorly designed irrigation networks led to massive runoff, which increased soil salinity and carried toxic agricultural chemicals downstream to other fields, the Aral Sea, and populated areas of the region. By the 1980s, nearly 90 percent of water use in Central Asia was for agriculture. Of that quantity, nearly 75 percent came from the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, the chief tributaries of the Aral Sea on the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border to the northwest of Tajikistan. As the desiccation of the Aral Sea came to international attention in the 1980s, water-use policy became a contentious issue between Soviet republics such as Tajikistan, where the main rivers rise, and those farther downstream, including Uzbekistan. By the end of the Soviet era, the central government had relinquished central control of water-use policy for Central Asia, but the republics had not agreed on an allocation policy. Industry also causes pollution problems. A major offender is the production of nonferrous metals. One of Tajikistan's leading industrial sites, the aluminum plant at Tursunzoda (formerly known as Regar), west of Dushanbe near the border with Uzbekistan, generates large amounts of toxic waste gases that have been blamed for a sharp increase in the number of birth defects among people who live within range of its emissions. In 1992 the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan established a Ministry of Environmental Protection. However, the enforcement activity of the ministry was limited severely by the political upheavals that plagued Tajikistan in its first years of independence. The only registered private environmental group in Tajikistan in the early 1990s was a chapter of the Social-Ecological Alliance, the largest informal environmental association in the former Soviet Union. The Tajik branch's main functions have been to conduct environmental research and to organize protests against the Roghun Hydroelectric Plant project. Natural hazards: Earthquakes are of varying degrees and are frequent. Flooding and landslides sometimes occur during the annual Spring thaw. Environment - current issues: inadequate sanitation facilities; increasing levels of soil salinity; industrial pollution; excessive pesticides; part of the basin of the shrinking Aral Sea suffers from severe overutilization of available water for irrigation and associated pollution. Environment - international agreements: party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Environmental Modification, Ozone Layer Protection Pamir Mountains Tajikistan is home to some of the highest mountains in the world, including the Pamir and Alay ranges. 93% of Tajikistan is mountainous with altitudes ranging from to almost , and nearly 50% of Tajikistan's territory is above . The massive mountain ranges are cut by hundreds of canyons and gorges at the bottom of which run streams that flow into larger river valleys where the majority of the country's population lives and works. The Pamirs in particular are heavily glaciated, and Tajikistan is home to the largest non-polar glacier in the world, the Fedchenko Glacier. The Pamir Mountains in Tajikistan lie in Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province (GBAO) in the east half of the country.
ancestry to the Lost Tribes of Israel taken captive by the Babylonians in the 7th century BC, but almost no Bukharian Jews are left in Tajikistan. CIA World Factbook demographic statistics The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated. Ethnic groups Tajik 84.3% Uzbek 13.8% Other 2% (includes Kyrgyz, Russian, Turkmen, Tatar, Arab) Ethnic makeup according to the population censuses from 1926 to 2010 (in thousands) Note: The category Tajiks also includes approximately 135,000 ethnic Pamiris, of which 65% are Shughni speakers, 13% are Rushani speakers, 12% speak Wakhi, 5% are Bartangi speakers, 3% are Yazgulyami speakers, 1.5% speak Khufi, and 0.8% are Ishkashimi speakers. In addition there are 5,000 speakers of Yagnobi. According to the 2000 census, excluding the people whose native languages are Pamiri or Yagnobi, Tajiks account for 77.6% of the population. Languages Several dialects of Persian (Central Asian dialects of Persian) are spoken in Tajikistan and it is one of the two official languages of Tajikistan (officially referred to as Tajik). Russian is the official interethnic language and is widely used in both government and business. The different ethnic minorities speak different languages, for instance Uzbek, Turkmen, Kyrgyz and Khowar. In the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, Shughni as well as other Pamir languages are spoken. In the northern Yaghnob valley, the Yaghnobi language is still spoken. Religion Sunni Islam 95% Shia Islam 3% others 2% Population 9,275,787 (2019 est.) According to Worldmeters Age structure 0–14 years: 34.3% (male 1,282,681/female 1,238,607) 15–64 years: 62.1% (male 2,260,552/female 2,303,034) 65 years	languages of Tajikistan (officially referred to as Tajik). Russian is the official interethnic language and is widely used in both government and business. The different ethnic minorities speak different languages, for instance Uzbek, Turkmen, Kyrgyz and Khowar. In the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province, Shughni as well as other Pamir languages are spoken. In the northern Yaghnob valley, the Yaghnobi language is still spoken. Religion Sunni Islam 95% Shia Islam 3% others 2% Population 9,275,787 (2019 est.) According to Worldmeters Age structure 0–14 years: 34.3% (male 1,282,681/female 1,238,607) 15–64 years: 62.1% (male 2,260,552/female 2,303,034) 65 years and over: 3.6% (male 112,334/female 151,937) (2009 est.) Population growth rate 1.88% (2009 est.) 2.21% (2013-2014 est.) (source:www.stat.tj) Net migration rate -1.28 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2009 est.) Sex ratio at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female under 15 years: 1.04 male(s)/female 15–64 years: 0.98 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.74 male(s)/female total population: 0.99 male(s)/female (2009 est.) Life expectancy at birth total population: 65.33 years male: 62.29 years female: 68.52 years (2009 est.) Education Education is required through high school (11 years of schooling) but completion rate is under 90%; Literacy definition: age 15 and over can read and write total population: 99.5% male: 99.7% female: 99.2% (2000 census) Vital statistics UN estimates Births and deaths Life Expectancy Fertility rate Fertility Rate (TFR) (Wanted Fertility Rate) and CBR (Crude Birth Rate): Population pyramids Estimates (01/07/2012) : Estimates (01/07/2013) : Birth rate There were slightly over 224 thousand births in Tajikistan in 2017, down from 230 thousand in 2016. Most births occurred in Khatlon Region (89 thousand
them, had far-reaching demands: the banning of the Communist party and the nationalization of its assets, the resignation of the entire government, the dissolution of the legislature and new elections. During this turmoil Tajikistan declared its independence from Soviet Union, on September 9, 1991 and promptly fell into a civil war from 1992–1997 between old-guard regits, and Islamists loosely organized as the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Other combatants and armed bands that flourished in this civil chaos simply reflected the breakdown of central authority rather than loyalty to a political faction. The height of hostilities occurred between 1992-93. By 1997, the predominantly Kulyabi-led Tajik government and the UTO successfully negotiated a power-sharing peace accord and implemented it by 2000. Tajikistan is slowly rebuilding itself with an integrated government and continues to permit a Russian military presence to guard their border with Afghanistan and the basing of the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division that never left Tajikistan when it became independent. Most of these Russian-led forces, however, are local Tajik non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Both Tajikistan's presidential and parliamentary elections, in 1999 and 2000, respectively, were widely considered to be flawed and unfair but peaceful. The inclusion of an Islamist party committed to secular government (Islamic Renaissance Party) and several other parties in the Parliamentary elections represented an improvement in the Tajik people's right to choose their government. Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country in which a religiously affiliated political party is represented in Parliament. President Emomali Rahmon, while no longer specifically obliged—as he was under the peace accords—to allocate one-third of government positions to the UTO, has kept some former UTO officials in senior cabinet-level positions. While the government and the now incorporated former opposition continue to distrust each other, they have often found a way to work with each other and are committed to peacefully resolving their differences. Prior to the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, the civil war in Afghanistan produced cross-border effects that threatened to destabilize Tajikistan's fragile and hard-won peace. In the summers of 1999 and 2000, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan used Tajikistan as a staging ground for an insurgency campaign against the government of Uzbekistan. At the same time, Taliban advances in northern Afghanistan threatened to inundate Tajikistan with thousands of refugees. A constant flow of illegal narcotics continues to transit Tajikistan from Afghanistan on its way to Russian and European markets, leaving widespread violent crime, corruption, increased HIV incidence, and economic distortions in its wake. During 2002, stability in the country continued to increase, and the year was largely free of the assassinations and outbreaks of violence perpetrated by unreformed opposition members that plagued the country in previous years. Executive branch The sections that follow incorporate text from the Library of Congress Country Study: Tajikistan Country Profile (January 2007), which is a United States government publication in the public domain. \|President \|Emomali Rahmon \|People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan \|16 November 1994 \|- \|Prime Minister \|Kokhir Rasulzoda \|People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan \|23 November 2013 \|} The president, who is directly elected, is both the head of state and the head of government. The president appoints the prime minister and all the members of the government, without the need of parliamentary approval. Tajikistan is thus a presidential republic. Tajikistan held a constitutional referendum on 22 June 2003 and the 2003 Constitution, among other amendments, set a limit of two	November through end of June), and the 33-seat National Assembly (Majlisi milli), which meets at least twice per year. The bicameral legislature was introduced in the September 1999 Constitution and prior to that Tajikistan had a unicameral legislature. The members of the Assembly of Representatives are chosen by direct popular election for a five-year term. Of the 63 members of the Assembly of Representatives, 22 are elected by party, in proportion to the number of votes received by each party gaining at least 5 percent of total votes, and the remaining members are elected from single-member constituencies. In the National Assembly, three-fourths of the members are chosen by the deputies of the local representative assemblies (majlisi) in the country's four main administrative divisions and in the cities subordinated directly to central government; each of these subnational jurisdictions is entitled to equal representation. The remaining members are appointed directly by the president. The pro-government People’s Democratic Party continued to control both houses of the parliament after the elections of 2005; that party gained 52 of the 63 seats in the Assembly of Representatives. In 2006, 11 women sat in the Assembly of Representatives, and five sat in the National Assembly. Opposition factions in the Supreme Assembly have clashed with pro-government members over some issues. Judicial branch The constitution provides for an independent judiciary. The Supreme Court is the highest court. Other high courts include the Supreme Economic Court and the Constitutional Court, which decides questions of constitutionality. The president appoints the judges of these three courts, with the approval of the legislature. There is also a Military Court. The judges of all courts are appointed to 10-year terms. Though the judiciary is nominally independent, the executive branch and criminal groups have considerable influence on judicial functions. Bribery of judges, who are poorly paid and poorly trained, is commonplace. The court system has local, district, regional, and national levels, with each higher court serving as an appellate court for the level below. Appeals of court decisions are rare because the populace generally does not trust the judicial system. Constitutional guarantees to the right to an attorney and to a prompt and public trial often are ignored. The Soviet-era presumption of the guilt of the defendant remains in force. The procurator’s office conducts all criminal investigations. Trials are heard by juries except in cases of national security. The Republic Bar Association (also called the Bar Association of the Republic of Tajikistan) gained its independence in 1995. Yet, according to a source, it was not until 1998 that "the concept of a lawyer-attorney was introduced [in Tajikistan], being defined as a business person providing legal services on the basis of a license issued by the Ministry of Justice." While there is evidence of female lawyers on account of the League of Women Lawyers of Tajikistan's existence, there is no indication as to how women have fared in the legal field once the country declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Administrative divisions Tajikistan consists of 4 administrative divisions. These are the provinces (viloyat) of Sughd and Khatlon, the autonomous province (viloyati mukhtor) of Gorno-Badakhshan (in Tajik: Viloyati Mukhtori Kuhistoni Badakhshon), and the Region of Republican Subordination (Raiony Respublikanskogo Podchineniya in transliteration from Russian or in ; formerly known as Karotegin Province). The capital of Sughd is Khujand (formerly Leninabad), the capital of Khatlon is Bokhtar (formerly Qurghonteppa), and the capital of Gorno-Badakhshan is Khorugh (formerly Khorog). The national capital Dushanbe is also the administrative center of the Region of Republican Subordination. Each region is divided into several districts (, nohiya or raion), which in turn are subdivided into jamoats (village-level self-governing units). As of 2008, there were 58 districts and 367 jamoats in Tajikistan. In addition, subregional units included 17 towns and 54 urban-type settlements (). Provincial and local government Local government is divided into representative and executive branches. The representative branch in provinces, towns, and districts is the assembly (majlis) of people's deputies, who are elected locally for a five-year term. The executive power in provinces, towns, and districts is vested in the head of local administration, who is directly appointed by the President, with the approval of the local majlis''. Electoral system Suffrage
Iran, Zerafshan by Chinese SinoHydro and Rogun power plant, which, at , is projected to supersede the Nurek Dam as tallest in the world if completed. The Rogun Dam was originally planned to be built by Russia's Inter RAO UES, but following disagreements, Russia pulled out. In 2010, production resumed with Iranian investment and Chinese assistance. Besides hydropower, other energy resources include sizable coal deposits and smaller reserves of natural gas and petroleum. In December 2010, Russian Gazprom announced discovery of significant natural gas reserves in Sarykamish field with 60 bcm of natural gas, enough for 50 years of Tajikistan's domestic consumption. The national power company is Barqi Tojik. Tajikistan is a partner country of the EU INOGATE energy programme, which has four key topics: enhancing energy security, convergence of member state energy markets on the basis of EU internal energy market principles, supporting sustainable energy development, and attracting investment for energy projects of common and regional interest. Services Throughout the early 2000s, the overall output of the services sector has increased steadily. The banking system has improved significantly because of strengthened oversight by the National Bank of Tajikistan, relaxed restrictions on participation by foreign institutions, and regulatory reform. The system includes 16 commercial banks and the central bank, or National Bank. The state controls the system, although in principle most banks have been privatized. An internationally assisted restructuring program was completed in 2003. Banks provide a narrow range of services, concentrating on providing credit to state-owned enterprises. Only an estimated 10% of the capital in Tajikistan moves through the banking system, and small businesses rarely borrow from banks. Abdujabbor Shirinov, Chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan announced 142 credit organizations, including 16 banks and 299 their branches, two non-bank financial institutions and 124 microfinance organizations functioned in Tajikistan at the first of 2013. Tourism The tourism industry of Tajikistan was eliminated by the civil war, but has begun to re-establish itself in recent years. In 2018, the British Backpacker Society ranked Tajikistan as the 7th best adventure travel destination on earth. The Tajik Committee on Tourism Development responded to this accolade by stating that "the inclusion of Tajikistan in the British Backpacker Society’s top 20 adventure travel destinations testifies the development of tourism in [the] country." Labor In 2003 Tajikistan’s active labor force was estimated at 3.4 million, of whom 64% were employed in agriculture, 24% in services, and 10% in industry and construction. After declining in the early 2000s, the real wages of state employees were raised in 2004 and 2005. Because of the continued dominance of state farms, the majority of workers are government employees, although only a small number rely completely on wages. Driven by high unemployment, in 2006 an estimated 700,000 workers found seasonal or permanent employment in Russia and other countries. Their remittances, estimated at US$600 million in 2005, are an important economic resource in Tajikistan; in 2004 an estimated 15% of households depended mainly on those payments. In May 2009 remittances to Tajiks had fallen to $525 million, a 34% decline from the previous year. Immediately before the 2008 financial crisis there were an estimated 1.5 million foreign workers sending remittances back to Tajikistan. In 2006 the average wage was US$27 per month. The national unemployment rate was estimated unofficially as high as 40% in 2006, but in rural areas, unemployment has exceeded 60%. Unemployment has been higher in the southern Khatlon Province than in the northern Soghd Province. Mean wages were $0.66 per man-hour in 2009. Tajikistan's informal employment sector has been reported to use both child labor and forced labor in the country's cotton industry according to the U.S. Department of Labor's List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor. Currency, exchange rate, and inflation The somoni was introduced in 2000 to replace the Tajikistani ruble, which had been the currency since 1991. In December 2015, some 7 somoni equaled US$1. Throughout the post-Soviet era, inflation has been a serious obstacle to economic growth and improvement of the standard of living. For the years 2001–3, Tajikistan’s inflation rates were 33%, 12.2%, and 16.3%, respectively, but in 2004 the rate fell to 6.8%, and the rate for 2005 was 7.1%. In late 2006, inflation approached the 10% level. The official forecast for 2007 is 7%. Government budget The year 2004 was the first year of budget deficit after three consecutive years of budget surpluses, which in turn had followed four years of deficits between 1997 and 2000. In 2005 revenues totaled US$442 million (aided by improvements in tax collection), and expenditures were US$542 million, a deficit of US$100 million. The approved 2007 state budget calls for revenues of US$926 million and expenditures of US$954 million, leaving a deficit of US$28 million. Foreign economic relations In the post-Soviet era, Tajikistan has substantially shifted its markets away from the former Soviet republics; in 2005, more than 80% of total exports went to customers outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including more than 70% to countries of the European Union (EU) and Turkey. However, because most of Tajikistan’s food and energy are imported from CIS countries, in 2005 only about 53% of total trade activity was outside the CIS. In 2005, the top overall buyers of Tajikistan’s exports, in order of value, were the Netherlands, Turkey, Russia, Uzbekistan, Latvia, and Iran. Besides aluminum, which accounts for more than half of export value, the main export commodities are cotton, electric power, fruits, vegetable oils, and textiles. In 2005 the largest suppliers of Tajikistan’s imports, in order of value, were Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, China, and Ukraine. Those import rankings are determined largely by the high value of fuels and electric power that Tajikistan buys from its neighbors. Another significant import is alumina (aluminum oxide) to supply the aluminum industry. The major suppliers of alumina are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Tajikistan has suffered trade deficits throughout the post-Soviet era. In 2003, the deficit was US$97 million, based on exports of US$705 million and imports of US$802 million. In 2004, exports were worth US$736 million and imports, US$958 billion, creating a trade deficit of US$222 million. The deficit increased again in 2005, to US$339 million, mainly because cotton exports decreased and domestic demand for goods increased. In 2005, the current account deficit was US$86 million, having shown a general downward trend since the late 1990s. The estimated current account deficit for both 2006 and 2007 is 4.5% of GDP, or about US$90 million in 2006. In 2005 the overall balance of payments was US$14 million. The estimated overall balance of payments for 2006 is US$8 million. At the end of 2006, Tajikistan’s external debt was estimated at US$830 million, most of which was long-term international debt. This amount grew steadily through the 1990s and early 2000s because of state borrowing policy. In 2004 Tajikistan eliminated about 20% of its external debt by exchanging debt to Russia for Russian ownership of the Nurek space tracking station, and by 2006, rescheduling negotiations had reduced the debt by about two-thirds as a percentage of gross domestic product. In the early 2000s, foreign direct investment has remained low because of political and economic instability, corruption, the poor domestic financial system, and Tajikistan’s geographic isolation. The establishment of businesses nearly always requires bribing officials and often encounters resistance from entrepreneurs with government connections. To attract foreign investment and technology, Tajikistan has offered to establish free economic zones in which firms receive advantages on taxes, fees, and customs. In 2004, the parliament passed a law on free economic zones and in 2008 passed a decree creating two zones: the Panj Free Economic Zone and the Sughd Free Economic Zone. In 2003 foreign direct investment totaled US$41 million; it increased to US$272 million in 2004 because of the debt-reduction transaction with Russia. In the first half of 2005, the figure was US$16 million. Beginning in 2005, the Russian Rusal aluminum company resumed operations to complete the hydroelectric station at Rogun on the Vakhsh River and	thousand tons of cucumber; 116 thousand tons of cabbage; 108 thousand tons of barley; 90 thousand tons of rice; In addition to smaller productions of other agricultural products, like apricot (31 thousand tons). Forestry 3% of Tajikistan is forested, mainly at elevations between 1,000 and 3,000 meters. No forest region is classified as commercially usable; most are under state protection. Wood production is negligible, but local inhabitants harvest non-wood forest products. Fishing Streams and lakes produce a limited amount of fish, and some fish is produced by aquaculture. In 2003 some 158 tons of fish were caught and 167 tons raised on fish farms. Mining and minerals Tajikistan has rich deposits of gold, silver, and antimony. The largest silver deposits are in Sughd Province, where Tajikistan’s largest gold mining operation also is located. Russia’s Norilsk nickel company has explored a large new silver deposit at Bolshoy Kanimansur. Tajikistan also produces strontium, salt, lead, zinc, fluorspar, and mercury. Uranium, an important mineral in the Soviet era, remains in some quantity but no longer is extracted. Fossil fuel deposits are limited to coal, of which about 30,000 tons are mined annually. Tajikistan’s extensive aluminium processing industry depends entirely on imported ore. Industry and manufacturing The output of most industries declined sharply during the mid-1990s; despite widespread privatization, in the early 2000s industry rallied very slowly. In 2006 an estimated one-third of Tajikistan’s 700 major industrial enterprises were completely idle, and the remainder were operating at 20 or 25% of capacity. The causes are outmoded equipment, low investment levels, and lack of markets. To revitalize the sector, in 2006 the government was considering renationalizing some enterprises. Tajikistan’s only major heavy industries are aluminum processing and chemical production. The former, which provided 40% of industrial production in 2005, is centered at the Tursunzoda processing plant, the latter in Dushanbe, Qurghonteppa, and Yavan. Aluminum production increased by 6% in 2005. Some small light industrial plants produce textiles and processed foods, using mainly domestic agricultural products. The textile industry processes about 20% of domestically grown cotton. The expansion of light industry output contributed significantly to GDP growth in 2005. The construction industry, about half of which is state-owned, has suffered from low investment in capital projects and from shoddy workmanship that has discouraged international contracts. However, new infrastructure projects and increased housing construction brought a 60% increase in output from 2004 to 2005. As of 2009, one third of industrial plants and factories are inactive, according to Tajikistan's Institute of Economic Studies. Industrial output has fallen by 13% in the first six months of 2009, leading to a fall in export revenues of 48%. Energy The rivers of Tajikistan, such as the Vakhsh and the Panj, have great hydropower potential, and the government has focused on attracting investment for projects for internal use and electricity exports. Tajikistan is home to the hydroelectric power station Nurek, the second highest dam in the world. Sangtuda 1 Hydroelectric Power Plant of 670 megawatts (MW) capacity, operated by Russian Inter RAO UES, commenced operations on 18 January 2008 and was officially commissioned on 31 July 2009. Other projects at the development stage include Sangduta 2 by Iran, Zerafshan by Chinese SinoHydro and Rogun power plant, which, at , is projected to supersede the Nurek Dam as tallest in the world if completed. The Rogun Dam was originally planned to be built by Russia's Inter RAO UES, but following disagreements, Russia pulled out. In 2010, production resumed with Iranian investment and Chinese assistance. Besides hydropower, other energy resources include sizable coal deposits and smaller reserves of natural gas and petroleum. In December 2010, Russian Gazprom announced discovery of significant natural gas reserves in Sarykamish field with 60 bcm of natural gas, enough for 50 years of Tajikistan's domestic consumption. The national power company is Barqi Tojik. Tajikistan is a partner country of the EU INOGATE energy programme, which has four key topics: enhancing energy security, convergence of member state energy markets on the basis of EU internal energy market principles, supporting sustainable energy development, and attracting investment for energy projects of common and regional interest. Services Throughout the early 2000s, the overall output of the services sector has increased steadily. The banking system has improved significantly because of strengthened oversight by the National Bank of Tajikistan, relaxed restrictions on participation by foreign institutions, and regulatory reform. The system includes 16 commercial banks and the central bank, or National Bank. The state controls the system, although in principle most banks have been privatized. An internationally assisted restructuring program was completed in 2003. Banks provide a narrow range of services, concentrating on providing credit to state-owned enterprises. Only an estimated 10% of the capital in Tajikistan moves through the banking system, and small businesses rarely borrow from banks. Abdujabbor Shirinov, Chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan announced 142 credit organizations, including 16 banks and 299 their branches, two non-bank financial institutions and 124 microfinance organizations functioned in Tajikistan at the first of 2013. Tourism The tourism industry of Tajikistan was eliminated by the civil war, but has begun to re-establish itself in recent years. In 2018, the British Backpacker Society ranked Tajikistan as the 7th best adventure travel destination on earth. The Tajik Committee on Tourism Development responded to this accolade by stating that "the inclusion of Tajikistan in the British Backpacker Society’s top 20 adventure travel destinations testifies the development of tourism in [the] country." Labor In 2003 Tajikistan’s active labor force was estimated at 3.4 million, of whom 64% were employed in agriculture, 24% in services, and 10% in industry and construction. After declining in the early 2000s, the real wages of state employees were raised in 2004 and
in the post-Soviet era. there were 340,000 telephone lines in use, a ratio of one per 21 people. Many towns are not connected to the national network. In the early 2000s, the state telecommunications agency, Tajiktelekom, received international aid to upgrade the telephone system. In 2007 there were 3.5 million mobile telephones in use, compared with only 47,300 in 2003. This makes Tajikistan the 90th most cellular-capable country in the world. Among several cellular networks, the Babilon Mobile Company, a US-Tajik joint venture, claimed to have 40 percent of the market in 2006. The June 2006 launch	in use, a ratio of one per 21 people. Many towns are not connected to the national network. In the early 2000s, the state telecommunications agency, Tajiktelekom, received international aid to upgrade the telephone system. In 2007 there were 3.5 million mobile telephones in use, compared with only 47,300 in 2003. This makes Tajikistan the 90th most cellular-capable country in the world. Among several cellular networks, the Babilon Mobile Company, a US-Tajik joint venture, claimed to have 40 percent of the market in 2006. The June 2006 launch of the KazSat communications satellite from Kazakhstan was expected to reduce the dependence of all the Central Asian countries on European and U.S. telecommunications satellites. Launch of a second KazSat is planned for 2009. The country's international calling code is 992. Radio There are 20 radio broadcast stations: 8 AM, 10 FM, and 2 shortwave as of 2009. Only 10 are estimated to be transmitting. There were an estimated 1.291 million radios in Tajikistan in 1991, approximately 1 for every 3.9
area of the country. Passenger transit through Tajikistan has been hindered by periodic failures of Tajik Railways to pay transit tariffs and by safety issues. Most international freight traffic is carried by train. It is hoped that a 2009 agreement between the heads of state of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan will modernize parts of Tajikistan's rail system to allow more trade between Central Asian countries. Stations served Highways This section needs updating! The total length of roads in the country is 27,800 kilometers, nearly all of which were built before 1991. Automobiles account for more than 90% of the total volume of passenger transportation and more than 80% of domestic freight transportation. As of 2014 many highway and tunnel construction projects were underway or recently completed. Major projects include rehabilitation of the Dushanbe – Chanak (Uzbek border), Dushanbe – Kulma (Chinese border), Kurgan-Tube – Nizhny Pyanj (Afghan border) highways and construction of tunnels under the mountain passes of Anzob, Shakhristan, Shar-Shar and Chormazak. These were supported by international donor countries. China has invested approximately $720 million for infrastructure improvements in Tajikistan, including the rebuilding, widening and improvement of the road between Dushanbe and Khujand which as of August 2007 is proceeding using equipment, labor, and oversight from China. In mid-2005 construction began on a bridge across the Panj River to Afghanistan which was funded by the United States and opened in August 2007 and plans called for construction of several other bridges ultimately connecting Tajikistan to warm-water ports to the south. The Pakistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan Highway, a new long road is planned to pass through the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province and Dushanbe and in 2013 Tajikistan announced	railroad system totals only of track, all of it broad gauge. The principle segments are in the southwestern region and connect the capital with the industrial areas of the Gissar and Vakhsh valleys and with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. In 2000 a new line, the Bokhtar – Kulyab railway, was completed and connected the Kulyab District with the central area of the country. Passenger transit through Tajikistan has been hindered by periodic failures of Tajik Railways to pay transit tariffs and by safety issues. Most international freight traffic is carried by train. It is hoped that a 2009 agreement between the heads of state of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan will modernize parts of Tajikistan's rail system to allow more trade between Central Asian countries. Stations served Highways This section needs updating! The total length of roads in the country is 27,800 kilometers, nearly all of which were built before 1991. Automobiles account for more than 90% of the total volume of passenger transportation and more than 80% of domestic freight transportation. As of 2014 many highway and tunnel construction projects were underway or recently completed. Major projects include rehabilitation of the Dushanbe – Chanak (Uzbek border), Dushanbe – Kulma (Chinese border), Kurgan-Tube – Nizhny Pyanj (Afghan border) highways and construction of tunnels under the mountain passes of Anzob, Shakhristan, Shar-Shar and Chormazak. These were supported by international donor countries. China has invested approximately $720 million for infrastructure improvements in Tajikistan, including the rebuilding, widening and improvement of the road between Dushanbe and Khujand which as of August 2007 is proceeding using equipment, labor, and oversight from China. In mid-2005 construction began on a bridge across the Panj River to
conscription Tajik men aged 18–27 are eligible to be drafted in the armed forces, and are expected to serve up to two years. Public servants such as educators have been exempt from the conscription since the early 2000s. The Armed Forces annually has two training sessions. Regional areas The National Army has five Territorial Defense Zones (), divided among the Regions of Tajikistan and Dushanbe: Khatlon Territorial Defense Zone Territorial Defense Zone for Districts of Republican Subordination Sughd Territorial Defense Zone Dushanbe Territorial Defense Zone Gorno-Badakhshan Territorial Defense Zone They are led by their elected governors. Facilities Fakhrabad Training Ground Chorrukh-Dayron Training Center Nurafshon Training Ground (near the city of Isfara and the Sughd suburbs) Mumirak Military Base Military Justice Military courts are run by the Ministry of Defense and the National Guard. They are established on a territorial basis at the location of garrisons. Their activity is aimed at protecting the rights and freedoms of servicemen, as well as the interests of military units. A military court consists of the chairman, deputy chairman, judges and people's deputies. Military awards Medal of the Valiant Border Guard of Tajikistan Medal "For 15 years of Impeccable Service" Medal "5 years of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan" Medal "10 years of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan" Medal "15 years of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan" Medal "5 Years of the Presidential Guard" Branches Army During the Tajik civil war (1992–1993), the Russian government had around 22,000 to 25,000 troops stationed in Tajikistan to help the regime as part of a defense agreement, which is why the Tajik government was able to survive the war. The war was often thought to have been started by Islamic fundamentalists, but more accurately, it was a war between the regional clans and ethnic groups. By the mid-1990s, the National Army numbered to around 3,000. The majority of the officer corps were Russian, mostly veterans of the war in Afghanistan. The Ministry of Defense of Russia continued providing material support for the National Army. It was especially difficult for the Army to create its own military force due to the fact that many Tajiks preferred to serve in the Russian Army, due to the higher pay. Because of military opposition in the country, the regime had the largest military buildup in the Central Asian region. As of 1997, Tajikistan had two motorized rifle brigades (one of them is a training brigade), a special operations brigade and detachment (all primarily intended for the protection of the ruling regime), and a combined aviation squadron. Tajikistan further had a basic set of units and sub-units that provide operational, technical, and logistic support. The Tajikistan army in 2007 had two motorized rifle brigades, one mountain brigade, one artillery brigade, one airborne assault brigade, one airborne assault detachment, and one surface-to-air missile regiment. Air Force Throughout the 1990s, the military did not have an air force and relied on the Russian Air Force for air defense, however, the government planned on making one aviation squadron. In 2007, the Air Force had 800 troops and 12 helicopters. The organizational structure of the Air Force is unknown. Tajik airspace is patrolled by the Russian Air Force. The Tajik Air Force remains small as Dushanbe doesn't expect an attack on Tajikistan from the air, and that Russian Air Force units at Gissar in Tajikistan and other such Russian contingents in Kazakhstan would detect any such assault. Tajikistan is also patrolled by Russian aircraft as part of the Joint CIS Air Defense System. The air force is mostly used for search and rescue missions, transportation, and the occasional attack on militant groups. For funding, the government relied upon modest foreign funds. In February 2013, a 20th anniversary parade occurred in Dushanbe, celebrating the creation of the armed forces. During the parade, 20 helicopters flew over the city. India made a deal in which the Tajik and Russian Air Forces share an air base. The base is commanded jointly by Indian, Tajik, and Russian personnel, who rotate units there periodically. Because of the civil war, air force development was slow. The first equipment to arrive was 10 MI-8MTBs and 5 MI-24 in 1993 based at Dushanbe. The first transport aircraft were AN-24s(?) and AN-26s(?) were supplied in 1996. A plan from the 1990s to acquire SU-25s from Belarus to form an attack squadron did not occur. However, Moscow did help bolster the Tajik's helicopter contingents in 2006–07 by giving them six Mil Mi-8 and Mil Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters. It also provided four L-39 Albatros. An accident occurred on 6 October 2010 when a Mi-8, military helicopter from the Tajik National Guard crashed in the Rasht Valley close to Ezgand and Tavildara. The helicopter got caught in some power lines while attempting to land. The helicopter caught fire and crashed without survivors. This is the deadliest accident in Tajik aviation since 1997. Mobile Forces The Mobile Forces are the airborne troops of the armed forces. Similar to the Russian Airborne Troops, whom they perform training with, the Mobile Forces were created with no increase in military personnel by transferring a unit of the National Army. Although they are called paratroopers, the Mobile Forces often deploy out of helicopters, as the Tajik Air Force has few planes. On 4 August 2007, the Ministry of Defence created a Paratroopers' Day to celebrate the Mobile Forces. Security Forces National Guard The Tajik National Guard is a special task force under direct command of the President of Tajikistan. Formed on 4 December 1992, it was originally a special forces unit known as the Brigade of Special Mission during the 16th session of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan, under the Tajik Interior Ministry. During its first years, the Guard underwent serious testing, which earned the trust of the President and the people. It was the reason why the President changed it from the Special Mission to the Presidential National Guard. Their primary task is ensuring public safety and security. Within two years, four additional units were formed in the towns of Chkalovsk, Kalinin, and Obigarm. They had a similar structure to the rest of the military. Worthy of note is the honesty that the National Guard has exhibited. The Rapid Reaction Force, also called the First Brigade, under Colonel Mahmud Khudoiberdiyev, took part in the Tajik civil war, as part of the Guard and the regular Army. The colonel and his men fled into Uzbekistan. On 26 January 2004, the Presidential Guard was transformed into the National Guard. Border Troops The Border Troops of Tajikistan are responsible for border security and operate often with the Afghan Border Police. Development of the border guard is overseen by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. A Border Troops Academy is located in Dushanbe, while a Border Troops Training Centre is found to the south in the Rudaki District. In 2011, the Border Troops, along with the National Army and Mobile Forces, took part in a joint war game with Kyrgyzstan on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. The operation involved eliminating two	For a long period a CIS peacekeeping force, built around the 201st MRD, were in place in the country. Establishment and the Civil War On 18 December 1992, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon signed the Resolution "On the Establishment of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan" on the basis of the Popular Front and the forces supporting the constitutional government. The Popular Front sported paramilitary formations who were armed by former President Rahmon Nabiyev. On 23 February 1993, in the center of Dushanbe, the first military parade of militants of the Popular Front was held, which has since been considered the day the military formed. Due to the presence of Russian forces in the country and the Tajikistani Civil War, Tajikistan only formally legalised the existence of its armed forces in April 1994. During the 1990s, the armed forces were often suffered from a poor commanded structure and poor discipline while their equipment was under-maintained. Draft-dodging and desertion was commonplace. Reflecting the fragmented militia group origin of the army's units, in late 1995 the 1st (led by Mahmud Khudoiberdiyev) and 11th Brigades (led by Faizali Saidov) of the Army exchanged fire several times, and fighting again broke out between the Army Rapid Reaction Brigade (formerly the Mahmud Brigade) and the Presidential Guard in June 1996. Colonel Khudoiberdiev, commander of the Rapid Reaction Brigade was relieved of his command as a result. Post-war to present Following a 1997 treaty between the Rahmon government and the United Tajik Opposition, several UTO units became part of the National Army, becoming some of its most experienced units. Popular Front units also were incorporated into the Tajik regular army, although many units, such as the First Brigade, maintained its autonomy. Russian military advisors formed a committee in the Ministry of Defense that year that established a system of operational training throughout the armed forces. In 1999, the first military exercises of the Armed Forces were held in the Khatlon Garrison. In 2001, military regulations were introduced. In October 2005, a military doctrine was also introduced. In September 2013, the Russian government has given the Tajik military $200 million worth of weapons and hardware, in return for letting them continue to use the 201st base. In late April 2021, forces of the military fought the Kyrgyz military on the Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan border near Kök-Tash, utilizing heavy artillery. The Kyrgyz Prosecutor General's Office on 30 April accused the Tajik Armed Forces of invading the country and seizing their sovereign territory. In July, the Tajik military held its largest training exercise in response to the Taliban offensive coming near their borders. It is reported by Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan Igor Lyakin-Frolov that at the end of 2021, large-scale supplies of Russian military hardware, equipment, weapons and munitions were made to Tajikistan. Overview Command The Security Council advises the President of Tajikistan on matters of national security. As Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President of Tajikistan is entitled to use the Center for the Management of the Armed Forces (opened on National Army Day in 2018), which would serve as the main military command center for the president, similarly to the Russian Armed Forces National Defense Management Center. The main body of operational command and control of troops is the General Staff, which is responsible for developing mobilization plans and proposals on the military doctrine of the Republic. The plan for the deployment of troops is also developed by the General Staff in agreement with the Government. Personnel Military education Russia provided much support toward the creation of the national army, and trained command and engineer personnel. An institute of higher military education was created in Tajikistan. Despite the large budget and the adequate training of personnel, the national army was still far from a professional service. Currently, over 100 Tajik military cadets have undergone training at National Defense Academy and the Indian Military Academy in India. Tajiks also study in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, China, Pakistan, and the Czech Republic to study, retrain, and improve their professional skills. The following are higher military educational institutions that are part of the Ministry of Defence and/or other militarized institutions: Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense of Tajikistan Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan Border Troops Academy Military faculties operate in the armed forces: Military Faculty of the Tajik National University Department of Military Medicine of Avicenna Tajik State Medical University The following is for mid-tier officers: Karatag National Training Center – Established in 2010 with American assistance. It is located about 30 miles from the capital and is administered by the Tajik National Guard. Border Troops Training Centre Training Center "Poytakht" National Guard Training Center Secondary institutions: Mastibek Tashmukhamedov Military Lyceum of the Ministry of Defense of Tajikistan Cyrus the Great Border Troops Military Gymnasium Personnel training and conscription Tajik men aged 18–27 are eligible to be drafted in the armed forces, and are expected to serve up to two years. Public servants such as educators have been exempt from the conscription since the early 2000s. The Armed Forces annually has two training sessions. Regional areas The National Army has five Territorial Defense Zones (), divided among the Regions of Tajikistan and Dushanbe: Khatlon Territorial Defense Zone Territorial Defense Zone for Districts of Republican Subordination Sughd Territorial Defense Zone Dushanbe Territorial Defense Zone Gorno-Badakhshan Territorial Defense Zone They are led by their elected governors. Facilities Fakhrabad Training Ground Chorrukh-Dayron Training Center Nurafshon Training Ground (near the city of Isfara and the Sughd suburbs) Mumirak Military Base Military Justice Military courts are run by the Ministry of Defense and the National Guard. They are established on a territorial basis at the location of garrisons. Their activity is aimed at protecting the rights and freedoms of servicemen, as well as the interests of military units. A military court consists of the chairman, deputy chairman, judges and people's deputies. Military awards Medal of the Valiant Border Guard of Tajikistan Medal "For 15 years of Impeccable Service" Medal "5 years of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan" Medal "10 years of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan" Medal "15 years of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Tajikistan" Medal "5 Years of the Presidential Guard" Branches Army During the Tajik civil war (1992–1993), the Russian government had around 22,000 to 25,000 troops stationed in Tajikistan to help the regime as part of a defense agreement, which is why the Tajik government was able to survive the war. The war was often thought to have been started by Islamic fundamentalists, but more accurately, it was a war between the regional clans and ethnic groups. By the mid-1990s, the National Army numbered to around 3,000. The majority of the officer corps were Russian, mostly veterans of the war in Afghanistan. The Ministry of Defense of Russia continued providing material support for the National Army. It was especially difficult for the Army to create its own military force due to the fact that many Tajiks preferred to serve in the Russian Army, due to the higher pay. Because of military
January 1993 – 27 January 1993 – 4 February 1993 – 27 February 1993 – 1 April 1993 – 12 June 1993 – 14 June 1993 – 6 October 1993 – 15 October 1993 – 2 November 1993 – 22 December 1993 – 27 December 1993 – 11 May 1994 – 4 August 1994 – 27 August 1994 – 14 October 1994 / December 2004 – 13 December 1994 – 15 December 1994 – 31 March 1995 – 20 May 1995 – 31 October 1995 – 8 November 1995 – 29 November 1995 – 30 November 1995 – 8 December 1995 – 18 December 1995 – 4 January 1996 – 29 March 1996 – 15 June 1996 – 21 June 1996 –9 August 1996 – 5 September 1996 – 12 January 1997 – 25 February 1997 – 10 June 1997 – 1 October 1997 – 27 April 1998 – 1 October 1998 – 1 April 1999 – 7 April 1999 – 29 September 1999 – 21 January 2000 – 18 June 2000 – 28 February 2001 – 26 April 2001 – 1 June 2001 – 14 September 2001 – 4 April 2002 – 2 June 2004 – 28 July 2004 – 8 September 2005 – 13 September 2005 – 17 September 2005 – 19 September 2005 – 4 October 2005 – 5 October 2005 – 5 October 2005 – 14 February 2006 – 23 February 2006 – 3 March 2006 – 19 June 2006 – 3 August 2006 – 22 August 2006 – 30 August 2007 – 25 September 2007 – 9 November 2007 – 15 November 2007 – 28 January 2008 – 18 February 2010 – 25 May 2010 – 20 July 2010 – 12 April 2011 – 13 April 2011 – 1 September 2011 – 12 January 2012 – 13 January 2012 – 21 February 2012 – 3 July 2012 – 5 October 2012 – 24 January 2013 – 5 September 2013 – 8 July 2014 – 2 March 2016 – 2 March 2016 – 9 March 2016 – 30 March 2016 – 12 July 2016 – 13 January 2017 – 17 March 2017 – 10 May 2017	desire to secure foreign investment and promote regional security while ensuring Tajikistan's independence. Sirodjidin Aslov is the current Foreign’s Minister of Tajikistan. Disputes Outstanding boundary negotiations include talks begun with Uzbekistan to demine and delimit border; however, disputes in Isfara Valley delay completion of delimitation with Kyrgyzstan. Diplomatic relations List of countries which Tajikistan has diplomatic relations with: – 15 July 1989 / 15 July 1992 – 26 December 1991 – 1 January 1992 / 28 March 1992 – 4 January 1992 – 9 January 1992 – 14 January 1992 – 15 January 1992 – 21 January 1992 – 29 January 1992 – 2 February 1992 – 5 February 1992 – 11 February 1992 – 14 February 1992 – 22 February 1992 – 26 February 1992 – 28 February 1992 – February 1992 – 1 March 1992 – 1 March 1992 – 6 March 1992 – 11 March 1992 – 25 March 1992 – 25 March 1992 – 25 March 1992 – 26 March 1992 – 29 March 1992 – 8 April 1992 – 24 April 1992 – 24 April 1992 – 27 April 1992 – 29 April 1992 – 5 May 1992 –15 May 1992 – 22 May 1992 – 29 May 1992 – 5 June 1992 – 5 June 1992 – 10 June 1992 – 2 July 1992 –14 July 1992 – 20 July 1992 – 27 July 1992 – 4 August 1992 – 4 August 1992 – 5 August 1992 – 13 August
with plains and arable land. The eastern shore is hot and humid, with the Zanzibar Archipelago just offshore. Kalambo Falls in the southwestern region of Rukwa is the second highest uninterrupted waterfall in Africa, and is located near the southeastern shore of Lake Tanganyika on the border with Zambia. The Menai Bay Conservation Area is Zanzibar's largest marine protected area. Climate Climate varies greatly within Tanzania. In the highlands, temperatures range between during cold and hot seasons respectively. The rest of the country has temperatures rarely falling lower than . The hottest period extends between November and February () while the coldest period occurs between May and August (). Annual temperature is . The climate is cool in high mountainous regions. Tanzania has two major rainfall periods: one is uni-modal (October–April) and the other is bi-modal (October–December and March–May). The former is experienced in southern, central, and western parts of the country, and the latter is found in the north from Lake Victoria extending east to the coast. The bi-modal rainfall is caused by the seasonal migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone. Climate change in Tanzania is resulting in rising temperatures with a higher likelihood of intense rainfall events (resulting in flooding) and of dry spells (resulting in droughts). Climate change is already impacting the sectors in Tanzania of agriculture, water resources, health and energy. Sea level rise and changes in the quality of water are expected to impact fisheries and aquaculture. Tanzania produced a National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) in 2007 as mandated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 2012, Tanzania produced a National Climate Change Strategy in response to the growing concern of the negative impacts of climate change and climate variability on the country's social, economic and physical environment. Wildlife and conservation Tanzania contains around 20% of the species of Africa's enormous warm-blooded animal populace, found over its 21 National parks, reserves, 1 conservation area, and 3 marine parks. Spread over a zone of in excess of 42,000 square kilometres (16,000 sq. mi) and shaping around 38% of the nation's area. Tanzania has 21 national parks, plus a variety of game and forest reserves, including the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. In western Tanzania, Gombe Stream National Park is the site of Jane Goodall's ongoing study of chimpanzee behaviour, which started in 1960. Tanzania is highly biodiverse and contains a wide variety of animal habitats. On Tanzania's Serengeti plain, white-bearded wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus mearnsi), other bovids and zebra participate in a large-scale annual migration. Tanzania is home to about 130 amphibian and over 275 reptile species, many of them strictly endemic and included in the International Union for Conservation of Nature's Red Lists of countries. Tanzania has the largest lion population in the world. Tanzania had a 2019 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 7.13/10, ranking it 54th globally out of 172 countries. Politics Government Tanzania is a one-party dominant state with the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party in power. From its formation until 1992, it was the only legally permitted party in the country. This changed on 1 July 1992, when the constitution was amended. It has held power since independence in 1961, and is the longest-serving ruling party in Africa. John Magufuli won the October 2015 presidential election and secured a two-thirds majority in parliament. The main opposition party in Tanzania since multiparty politics in 1992 is called Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) (Swahili for "Party for Democracy and Progress"). The leader of Chadema party is Freeman Mbowe. In Zanzibar, the country's semi-autonomous state, The Alliance for Change and Transparency-Wazalendois (ACT-Wazalendo) is considered the main opposition political party. The constitution of Zanzibar requires the party that comes in second in the polls to join a coalition with the winning party. ACT-Wazalendo joined a coalition government with the islands' ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi in December 2020 after Zanzibar disputed elections. In November 2020, Magufuli once again was declared the winner for his second term as president. Election fraud was suspected. The national electoral commission announced that Magufuli received 84%, or about 12.5 million votes and the top opposition candidate, Tundu Lissu received 13%, about 1.9 million votes. In March 2021, it was announced that Magufuli had died whilst serving in office, meaning that his vice president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, became the country's president. Executive The president of Tanzania and the members of the National Assembly are elected concurrently by direct popular vote for five-year terms. The vice-president is elected for a five-year term at the same time as the president and on the same ticket. Neither the president nor the vice-president may be a member of the National Assembly. The president appoints a prime minister, subject to confirmation by the assembly, to serve as the government's leader in the assembly. The president selects her cabinet from assembly members. Legislature All legislative power relating to mainland Tanzania and union matters is vested in the National Assembly, which is unicameral and has a maximum of 357 members. These include members elected to represent constituencies, the attorney general, five members elected by the Zanzibar house of representatives from among its own members, the special women's seats that constitute at least 30% of the seats that any party has in the assembly, the speaker of the assembly (if not otherwise a member of the assembly), and the persons (not more than ten) appointed by the president. The Tanzania Electoral Commission demarcates the mainland into constituencies in the number determined by the commission with the consent of the president. Judiciary Tanzania's legal system is based on English common law. Tanzania has a four-level judiciary. The lowest-level courts on the Tanzanian mainland are the Primary Courts. In Zanzibar, the lowest-level courts are the Kadhi's Courts for Islamic family matters and the Primary Courts for all other cases. On the mainland, appeal is to either the District Courts or the Resident Magistrates Courts. In Zanzibar, appeal is to the Kadhi's Appeal Courts for Islamic family matters and the Magistrates Courts for all other cases. From there, appeal is to the High Court of Mainland Tanzania or Zanzibar. No appeal regarding Islamic family matters can be made from the High Court of Zanzibar. Otherwise, the final appeal is to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. The High Court of mainland Tanzania has three divisions – commercial, labour, and land – and 15 geographic zones. The High Court of Zanzibar has an industrial division, which hears only labour disputes. Mainland and union judges are appointed by the Chief Justice of Tanzania, except for those of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, who are appointed by the president of Tanzania. Tanzania is a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Zanzibar The legislative authority in Zanzibar over all non-union matters is vested in the House of Representatives (per the Tanzania constitution) or the Legislative Council (per the Zanzibar constitution). The Legislative Council has two parts: the president of Zanzibar and the House of Representatives. The president is Zanzibar's head of government and the chairman of the Revolutionary Council, in which the executive authority of Zanzibar is invested. Zanzibar has two vice-presidents, with the first being from the main opposition party in the house. The second is from the party in power and is the leader of government business in the House. The president and the members of the House of Representatives have five-year terms and can be elected for a second term. The president selects ministers from members of the House of Representatives, with the ministers allocated according to the number of House seats won by political parties. The Revolutionary Council consists of the president, both vice-presidents, all ministers, the attorney general of Zanzibar, and other house members deemed fit by the president. The House of Representatives is composed of elected members, ten members appointed by the president, all the regional commissioners of Zanzibar, the attorney general, and appointed female members whose number must be equal to 30 per cent of the elected members. The House determines the number of its elected members with the Zanzibar Electoral Commission determining the boundaries of each election constituency. In 2013, the House had 81 members: fifty elected members, five regional commissioners, the attorney general, ten members appointed by the president, and fifteen appointed female members. Administrative subdivisions In 1972, local government on the mainland was abolished and replaced with direct rule from the central government. Local government, however, was reintroduced in the beginning of the 1980s, when the rural councils and rural authorities were re-established. Local government elections took place in 1983, and functioning councils started in 1984. In 1999, a Local Government Reform Programme was enacted by the National Assembly, setting "a comprehensive and ambitious agenda ... [covering] four areas: political decentralization, financial decentralization, administrative decentralization and changed central-local relations, with the mainland government having overriding powers within the framework of the Constitution." As of 2016, Tanzania is divided into thirty-one regions (mkoa), twenty-six on the mainland and five in Zanzibar (three on Unguja, two on Pemba). In 2012, the thirty former regions were divided into 169 districts (wilaya), also known as local government authorities. Of those districts, 34 were urban units, which were further classified as three city councils (Arusha, Mbeya, and Mwanza), nineteen municipal councils, and twelve town councils. The urban units have an autonomous city, municipal, or town council and are subdivided into wards and mtaa. The non-urban units have an autonomous district council but are subdivided into village councils or township authorities (first level) and then into vitongoji. The city of Dar es Salaam is unique because it has a city council whose area of jurisdiction overlaps three municipal councils. The mayor of the city council is elected by that council. The twenty-member city council is composed of eleven persons elected by the municipal councils, seven members of the National Assembly, and "Nominated members of parliament under 'Special Seats' for women". Each municipal council also has a mayor. "The City Council performs a coordinating role and attends to issues cutting across the three municipalities", including security and emergency services. The city of Mwanza has a city council whose areal jurisdiction overlaps two municipal councils. Foreign relations Bilateral relations Apart from its border dispute with Malawi, Tanzania had cordial relations with its neighbours in 2012. Relations between Tanzania and Malawi have been tense because of a dispute over the countries' Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi) border. An unsuccessful mediation regarding this issue took place in March 2014. The two countries agreed in 2013 to ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve the dispute should mediation be unsuccessful. Malawi, but not Tanzania, has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Relations between Tanzania and Rwanda deteriorated in 2013 when Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete said that if the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) could negotiate with some of its enemies, Rwanda should be able to do the same. Rwandan President Paul Kagame then expressed "contempt" for Kikwete's statement. The tension was renewed in May 2014 when, in a speech to the Tanzanian National Assembly, Foreign Affairs Minister Bernard Membe renewed his claim that Rwandans were causing instability in the DRC. Rwandan Foreign Affairs Minister Louise Mushikiwabo responded, "As for Tanzania's foreign minister whose anti-Rwanda rant in parliament I heard, he would benefit from a lesson in the history of the region." Tanzania has maintained strong relations with the United Kingdom since its independence; Britain remains the largest non-African importer of Tanzanian tea and other raw materials are exchanged. Britain remains a high contributor of tourists to Tanzania. Both are members of the Commonwealth of Nations and engage in strategic union in defence, security and ceremonial affairs; the Tanzanian High Commission is in London and the British have a High Commission in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania–China relations have strengthened in recent years as trade between the two countries and Chinese investment in Tanzanian infrastructure have increased rapidly. Relations with the United States are well, with President Barack Obama visiting Tanzania in 2013. Tanzania's relations with other donor countries, including Japan and members of the European Union, are generally good, though donors are concerned about Tanzania's commitment to reducing government corruption. Multilateral relations Tanzania is a member of the East African Community (EAC), along with Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan. According to the East African Common Market Protocol of 2010, the free trade and free movement of people is guaranteed, including the right to reside in another member country for purposes of employment. This protocol, however, has not been implemented because of work permit and other bureaucratic, legal, and financial obstacles. Tanzania is also a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The EAC, the SADC, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa agreed in June 2011 to negotiate the creation of a Tripartite Free Trade Area spanning 26 African countries, with a goal to complete the first phase of negotiations within 36 months. As of 31 October 2014, Tanzania was contributing 2,253 soldiers and other personnel to various United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Tanzanian military is participating along with South African and Malawian militaries in the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The United Nations Security Council authorised the force on 28 March 2013 to conduct targeted offensive operations to neutralise groups that threaten peace in the DRC. Tanzania was also participating in peacekeeping missions in the Darfur Region of Sudan (UNAMID); Abyei, control of which is contested between South Sudan and Sudan (UNISFA); the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); Lebanon (UNIFIL); and South Sudan (UNMISS). In 2019, Tanzania signed the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Military The Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) (Kiswahili: Jeshi la Wananchi wa Tanzania (JWTZ)) is the armed forces of Tanzania, operating as a people's force under civilian control. It is composed of five branches or commands: Land Force (army), Air Force, Naval Command, National Service, Headquarter (MMJ). Tanzanian citizens are able to volunteer for military service from 15 years of age, and 18 years of age for compulsory military service upon graduation from secondary school. Conscript service obligation was 2 years as of 2004. Human rights Throughout Tanzania, sex acts between men are illegal and carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. According to a 2007 Pew Research Centre survey, 95 percent of Tanzanians believed that homosexuality should not be accepted by society. People with albinism living in Tanzania are often attacked, killed or mutilated because of superstitions related to the black-magical practice known as muti that say body parts of albinos have magical properties. Tanzania has the highest occurrence of this human rights violation among 27 African countries where muti is known to be practised. In December 2019, Amnesty International reported that the Tanzanian government annulled the right of NGOs as well as individuals to directly file any case against it at the Arusha-based African Court for Human and Peoples' Rights. Economy and infrastructure , according to the IMF, Tanzania's gross domestic product (GDP) was an estimated $71 billion (nominal), or $218.5 billion on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis. GDP per capita (PPP) was $3,574. From 2009 through to 2013, Tanzania's per capita GDP (based on constant local currency) grew an average of 3.5% per year, higher than any other member of the East African Community (EAC) and exceeded by only nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Tanzania's largest trading partners in 2017 for its US$5.3 billion in exports were India, Vietnam, South Africa, Switzerland, and China. Its imports totalled US$8.17 billion, with India, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, China, and the United Arab Emirates being the biggest partners. Tanzania weathered the Great Recession, which began in late 2008 or early 2009, relatively well. Strong gold prices, bolstering the country's mining industry, and Tanzania's poor integration into global markets helped to insulate the country from the downturn. Since the recession ended, the Tanzanian economy has expanded rapidly thanks to strong tourism, telecommunications, and banking sectors. According to the United Nations Development Programme, however, recent growth in the national economy has benefited only the "very few", leaving out the majority of the population. Tanzania's 2013 Global Hunger Index was worse than any other country in the EAC except Burundi. The proportion of persons who were undernourished in 2010–12 was also worse than any other EAC country except Burundi. In 2020, the World Bank declared the rise of the Tanzanian economy from low income to lower middle income country, as its GNI per capita increased from US$1,020 in 2018 to US$1,080 in 2019. Hunger and poverty Tanzania has made some progress towards reducing extreme hunger and malnutrition. The Global Hunger Index ranked the situation as "alarming" with a score of 42 in the year 2000; since then the GHI has declined to 29.5. Children in rural areas suffer substantially higher rates of malnutrition and chronic hunger, although urban-rural disparities have narrowed as regards both stunting and underweight. Low rural sector productivity arises mainly from inadequate infrastructure investment; limited access to farm inputs, extension services and credit; limited technology as well as trade and marketing support; and heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources. Approximately 68 per cent of Tanzania's 61.1 million citizens live below the poverty line of $1.25 a day. 32 per cent of the population are malnourished. The most prominent challenges Tanzania faces in poverty reduction are unsustainable harvesting of its natural resources, unchecked cultivation, climate change and water- source encroachment, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). There are very few resources for Tanzanians in terms of credit services, infrastructure or availability to improved agricultural technologies, which further exacerbates hunger and poverty in the country according to the UNDP. Tanzania ranks 159 out of 187 countries in poverty according to the United Nation's Human Development Index (2014). The 2019 World Bank report showed that in the last 10 years, poverty has reduced by 8 percentage points, from 34.4% in 2007 to 26.4% in 2018. A further report showed a reduction to 25.7% in 2020. Agriculture The Tanzanian economy is heavily based on agriculture, which in 2013 accounted for 24.5 per cent of gross domestic product, provides 85% of exports, and accounted for half of the employed workforce; The agricultural sector grew 4.3 per cent in 2012, less than half of the Millennium Development Goal target of 10.8%. 16.4 per cent of the land is arable, with 2.4 per cent of the land planted with permanent crops. Tanzania's economy relies on farming, but climate change has impacted their farming. Maize was the largest food crop on the Tanzania mainland in 2013 (5.17 million tonnes), followed by cassava (1.94 million tonnes), sweet potatoes (1.88 million tonnes), beans (1.64 million tonnes), bananas (1.31 million tonnes), rice (1.31 million tonnes), and millet (1.04 million tonnes). Sugar was the largest cash crop on the mainland in 2013 (296,679 tonnes), followed by cotton (241,198 tonnes), cashew nuts (126,000 tonnes), tobacco (86,877 tonnes), coffee (48,000 tonnes), sisal (37,368 tonnes), and tea (32,422 tonnes). Beef was the largest meat product on the mainland in 2013 (299,581 tonnes), followed by lamb/mutton (115,652 tonnes), chicken (87,408 tonnes), and pork (50,814 tonnes). According to the 2002 National Irrigation Master Plan, 29.4 million hectares in Tanzania are suitable for irrigation farming; however, only 310,745 hectares were actually being irrigated in June 2011. Industry, energy and construction Industry and construction is a major and growing component of the Tanzanian economy, contributing 22.2 per cent of GDP in 2013. This component includes mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity and natural gas, water supply, and construction. Mining contributed 3.3 per cent of GDP in 2013. The vast majority of the country's mineral export revenue comes from gold, accounting for 89 per cent of the value of those exports in 2013. It also exports sizeable quantities of gemstones, including diamonds and tanzanite. All of Tanzania's coal production, which totalled 106,000 short tons in 2012, is used domestically. Only 15 per cent of Tanzanians had access to electric power in 2011, however rising to 35.2 per cent in 2018. The government-owned Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (TANESCO) dominates the electric supply industry in Tanzania. The country generated 6.013 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity in 2013, a 4.2 per cent increase over the 5.771 billion kWh generated in 2012. Generation increased by 63 per cent between 2005 and 2012; Almost 18 per cent of the electricity generated in 2012 was lost because of theft and transmission and distribution problems. The electrical supply varies, particularly when droughts disrupt hydropower electric generation; rolling blackouts are implemented as necessary. The unreliability of the electrical supply has hindered the development of Tanzanian industry. In 2013, 49.7 per cent of Tanzania's electricity generation came from natural gas, 28.9 per cent from hydroelectric sources, 20.4 per cent from thermal sources, and 1.0 per cent from outside the country. The government has built a gas pipeline from Mnazi Bay to Dar es Salaam. This pipeline was expected to allow the country to double its electricity generation capacity to 3,000 megawatts by 2016. The government's goal is to increase capacity to at least 10,000 megawatts by 2025. According to PFC Energy, 25 to 30 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas resources have been discovered in Tanzania since 2010, bringing the total reserves to over 43 trillion cubic feet by the end of 2013. The value of natural gas actually produced in 2013 was US$52.2 million, a 42.7 per cent increase over 2012. Commercial production of gas from the Songo Songo Island field in the Indian Ocean commenced in 2004, thirty years after it was discovered there. Over 35 billion cubic feet of gas was produced from this field in 2013, with proven, probable, and possible reserves totalling 1.1 trillion cubic feet. The gas is transported by pipeline to Dar es Salaam. As of 27 August 2014, TANESCO owed the operator of this field, Orca Exploration Group Inc. A newer natural gas field in Mnazi Bay in 2013 produced about one-seventh of the amount produced near Songo Songo Island but has proven, probable, and possible reserves of 2.2 trillion cubic feet. Virtually all of that gas is being used for electricity generation in Mtwara. The Ruvuma and Nyuna regions of Tanzania have been explored mostly by the discovery company that holds a 75 per cent interest, Aminex, and has shown to hold in excess of 3.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. A pipeline connecting offshore natural gas fields to Tanzania's commercial capital Dar es Salaam was completed at the end of April 2015. Tourism Travel and tourism contributed 17.5 per cent of Tanzania's gross domestic product in 2016 and employed 11.0 per cent of the country's labour force (1,189,300 jobs) in 2013. Overall receipts rose from US$1.74 billion in 2004 to US$4.48 billion in 2013, and receipts from international tourists rose from US$1.255 billion in 2010 to US$2 billion in 2016. In 2016, 1,284,279 tourists arrived at Tanzania's borders compared to 590,000 in 2005. The vast majority of tourists visit Zanzibar or a "northern circuit" of Serengeti National Park, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tarangire National Park, Lake Manyara National Park, and Mount Kilimanjaro. In 2013, the most visited national park was Serengeti (452,485 tourists), followed by Manyara (187,773) and Tarangire (165,949). Banking The Bank of Tanzania is the central bank of Tanzania and is primarily responsible for maintaining price stability, with a subsidiary responsibility for issuing Tanzanian shilling notes and coins. At the end of 2013, the total assets of the Tanzanian banking industry were 19.5 trillion Tanzanian shillings, a 15 per cent increase over 2012. Transport Most transport in Tanzania is by road, with road transport constituting over 75 per cent of the country's freight traffic and 80 per cent of its passenger traffic. The road system is in generally poor condition. Tanzania has two railway companies: TAZARA, which provides service between Dar es Salaam and Kapiri Mposhi (in a copper-mining district in Zambia), and Tanzania Railways Limited, which connects Dar es Salaam with central and northern Tanzania. Rail travel in Tanzania often entails slow journeys with frequent cancellations or delays, and the railways have a deficient safety record. In Dar es Salaam, there is a huge project of rapid buses, Dar Rapid Transit (DART) which connects suburbs of Dar es Salaam city. The development of the DART system consists of six phases and is funded by the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the Government of Tanzania. The first phase began in April 2012, and it was completed in December 2015 and launched operations in May 2016. Tanzania has four international airports, along with over 120 small airports or landing strips. Airport infrastructure tends to be in poor condition. Airlines in Tanzania include Air Tanzania, Precision Air, Fastjet, Coastal Aviation, and ZanAir. Communications In 2013, the communications sector was the fastest growing in Tanzania, expanding 22.8 per cent; however, the sector accounted for only 2.4 per cent of gross domestic product that year. As of 2011, Tanzania had 56 mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants, a rate slightly above the sub-Saharan average. Very few Tanzanians have fixed-line telephones. Approximately 12 per cent of Tanzanians used the internet , though this number is growing rapidly. The country has a fibre-optic cable network that replaced unreliable satellite service, but internet bandwidth remains very low. Water supply and sanitation Water supply and sanitation in Tanzania has been characterised by decreasing access to improved water sources in the 2000s (especially in urban areas), steady access to some form of sanitation (around 93 per cent since the 1990s), intermittent water supplies, and generally low quality of service. Many utilities are barely able to cover their operation and maintenance costs through revenues because of low tariffs and poor efficiency. There are significant regional differences, with the best performing utilities being Arusha, Moshi, and Tanga. The government of Tanzania has embarked on a major sector reform process since 2002. An ambitious National Water Sector Development Strategy that promotes Integrated Water Resources Management and the development of urban and rural water supply was adopted in 2006. Decentralisation has meant that responsibility for water and sanitation service provision has shifted to local government authorities and is carried out by 20 urban utilities and about 100 district utilities, as well as by Community Owned Water Supply Organisations in rural areas. These reforms have been backed by a significant increase of the budget starting in 2006, when the water sector was included among the priority sectors of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. The Tanzanian water sector remains heavily dependent on external donors, with 88 per cent of the available funds being provided by external donor organisations. Results have been mixed. For example, a report by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit noted that "despite heavy investments brought in by the World Bank and the European Union, (the utility serving Dar es Salaam) has remained one of the worst performing water entities in Tanzania." Economic statistics controversy Two articles in the Economist in July 2020 raised doubts about official claims of economic growth: "If Tanzania's economy grew by almost 7% in the fiscal year to the end of June 2019, why did tax revenue fall by 1%? And why has bank lending to companies slumped? Private data are bad, too. In 2019 sales at the biggest brewer fell by 5%. Sales of cement by the two biggest producers were almost flat. None of these things is likely if growth is storming ahead. The discrepancies are so large that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the government is lying." Tim Staermose, a proponent of African investment, took issue with these data: "Some of these statements by The Economist, based on the evidence I have gathered from primary sources – namely, the statutory financial reports that listed companies in Tanzania are legally obligated to release – are simply not true. Bank lending to companies as far as I can see has not, 'slumped.' The two biggest banks in Tanzania, which between them account for approximately 40% of the banking sector, both reported strong loan growth in 2019. ... As for cement sales being 'almost flat,' again, this is total nonsense. ... In 2019 Twiga sold 6% more cement by volume than it did in 2018. In the first six months of 2020, Twiga already sold 8% more cement than it had done by the same stage in 2019. Again, these numbers are very consistent with an economy that's reported to be growing at around 7% per annum. ... [On] the 5% fall in beer sales in 2019 ... the published 2019 annual report by Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL) will tell you there were one-off circumstances that largely drove the decline ... [which] resulted in sales falling. But TBL's profits actually rose in 2019." Food and nutrition Poor nutrition remains a persistent problem within Tanzania and varies hugely throughout the country's regions. USAID reports that 16% of children are underweight and 34% experience stunted growth as a result of malnutrition. 10 regions house 58% of children suffering from stunted growth while 50% of acutely malnourished children can be found in 5 regions. Over a 5-year period, the Mara district of Tanzania saw a 15% reduction in stunting in children under 5 years old, falling from 46% to 31% in 2005 and 2010 respectively. Dodoma, on the other hand saw a 7% increase in the prevalence of stunting in this age group, rising from 50% in 2005 to 57% in 2010. Overall availability of food does not necessarily contribute to overall stunting figures. Iringa, Mbeya and Rukwa regions, where overall availability of food is considered acceptable still experience stunting incidences in excess of 50%. In some areas where food shortages are common such as in the Tabora and Singida regions, stunting incidences remain comparatively less than those seen in Iringa, Mbeya and Rukwa. The Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre attributes these discrepancies to variance in maternal malnutrition, poor infant feeding practices, hygiene practices and poor healthcare services. Periods of drought can have significant impacts on the production of crops in Tanzania. Drought in East	on the border with Zambia. The Menai Bay Conservation Area is Zanzibar's largest marine protected area. Climate Climate varies greatly within Tanzania. In the highlands, temperatures range between during cold and hot seasons respectively. The rest of the country has temperatures rarely falling lower than . The hottest period extends between November and February () while the coldest period occurs between May and August (). Annual temperature is . The climate is cool in high mountainous regions. Tanzania has two major rainfall periods: one is uni-modal (October–April) and the other is bi-modal (October–December and March–May). The former is experienced in southern, central, and western parts of the country, and the latter is found in the north from Lake Victoria extending east to the coast. The bi-modal rainfall is caused by the seasonal migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone. Climate change in Tanzania is resulting in rising temperatures with a higher likelihood of intense rainfall events (resulting in flooding) and of dry spells (resulting in droughts). Climate change is already impacting the sectors in Tanzania of agriculture, water resources, health and energy. Sea level rise and changes in the quality of water are expected to impact fisheries and aquaculture. Tanzania produced a National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) in 2007 as mandated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In 2012, Tanzania produced a National Climate Change Strategy in response to the growing concern of the negative impacts of climate change and climate variability on the country's social, economic and physical environment. Wildlife and conservation Tanzania contains around 20% of the species of Africa's enormous warm-blooded animal populace, found over its 21 National parks, reserves, 1 conservation area, and 3 marine parks. Spread over a zone of in excess of 42,000 square kilometres (16,000 sq. mi) and shaping around 38% of the nation's area. Tanzania has 21 national parks, plus a variety of game and forest reserves, including the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. In western Tanzania, Gombe Stream National Park is the site of Jane Goodall's ongoing study of chimpanzee behaviour, which started in 1960. Tanzania is highly biodiverse and contains a wide variety of animal habitats. On Tanzania's Serengeti plain, white-bearded wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus mearnsi), other bovids and zebra participate in a large-scale annual migration. Tanzania is home to about 130 amphibian and over 275 reptile species, many of them strictly endemic and included in the International Union for Conservation of Nature's Red Lists of countries. Tanzania has the largest lion population in the world. Tanzania had a 2019 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 7.13/10, ranking it 54th globally out of 172 countries. Politics Government Tanzania is a one-party dominant state with the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party in power. From its formation until 1992, it was the only legally permitted party in the country. This changed on 1 July 1992, when the constitution was amended. It has held power since independence in 1961, and is the longest-serving ruling party in Africa. John Magufuli won the October 2015 presidential election and secured a two-thirds majority in parliament. The main opposition party in Tanzania since multiparty politics in 1992 is called Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) (Swahili for "Party for Democracy and Progress"). The leader of Chadema party is Freeman Mbowe. In Zanzibar, the country's semi-autonomous state, The Alliance for Change and Transparency-Wazalendois (ACT-Wazalendo) is considered the main opposition political party. The constitution of Zanzibar requires the party that comes in second in the polls to join a coalition with the winning party. ACT-Wazalendo joined a coalition government with the islands' ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi in December 2020 after Zanzibar disputed elections. In November 2020, Magufuli once again was declared the winner for his second term as president. Election fraud was suspected. The national electoral commission announced that Magufuli received 84%, or about 12.5 million votes and the top opposition candidate, Tundu Lissu received 13%, about 1.9 million votes. In March 2021, it was announced that Magufuli had died whilst serving in office, meaning that his vice president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, became the country's president. Executive The president of Tanzania and the members of the National Assembly are elected concurrently by direct popular vote for five-year terms. The vice-president is elected for a five-year term at the same time as the president and on the same ticket. Neither the president nor the vice-president may be a member of the National Assembly. The president appoints a prime minister, subject to confirmation by the assembly, to serve as the government's leader in the assembly. The president selects her cabinet from assembly members. Legislature All legislative power relating to mainland Tanzania and union matters is vested in the National Assembly, which is unicameral and has a maximum of 357 members. These include members elected to represent constituencies, the attorney general, five members elected by the Zanzibar house of representatives from among its own members, the special women's seats that constitute at least 30% of the seats that any party has in the assembly, the speaker of the assembly (if not otherwise a member of the assembly), and the persons (not more than ten) appointed by the president. The Tanzania Electoral Commission demarcates the mainland into constituencies in the number determined by the commission with the consent of the president. Judiciary Tanzania's legal system is based on English common law. Tanzania has a four-level judiciary. The lowest-level courts on the Tanzanian mainland are the Primary Courts. In Zanzibar, the lowest-level courts are the Kadhi's Courts for Islamic family matters and the Primary Courts for all other cases. On the mainland, appeal is to either the District Courts or the Resident Magistrates Courts. In Zanzibar, appeal is to the Kadhi's Appeal Courts for Islamic family matters and the Magistrates Courts for all other cases. From there, appeal is to the High Court of Mainland Tanzania or Zanzibar. No appeal regarding Islamic family matters can be made from the High Court of Zanzibar. Otherwise, the final appeal is to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. The High Court of mainland Tanzania has three divisions – commercial, labour, and land – and 15 geographic zones. The High Court of Zanzibar has an industrial division, which hears only labour disputes. Mainland and union judges are appointed by the Chief Justice of Tanzania, except for those of the Court of Appeal and the High Court, who are appointed by the president of Tanzania. Tanzania is a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Zanzibar The legislative authority in Zanzibar over all non-union matters is vested in the House of Representatives (per the Tanzania constitution) or the Legislative Council (per the Zanzibar constitution). The Legislative Council has two parts: the president of Zanzibar and the House of Representatives. The president is Zanzibar's head of government and the chairman of the Revolutionary Council, in which the executive authority of Zanzibar is invested. Zanzibar has two vice-presidents, with the first being from the main opposition party in the house. The second is from the party in power and is the leader of government business in the House. The president and the members of the House of Representatives have five-year terms and can be elected for a second term. The president selects ministers from members of the House of Representatives, with the ministers allocated according to the number of House seats won by political parties. The Revolutionary Council consists of the president, both vice-presidents, all ministers, the attorney general of Zanzibar, and other house members deemed fit by the president. The House of Representatives is composed of elected members, ten members appointed by the president, all the regional commissioners of Zanzibar, the attorney general, and appointed female members whose number must be equal to 30 per cent of the elected members. The House determines the number of its elected members with the Zanzibar Electoral Commission determining the boundaries of each election constituency. In 2013, the House had 81 members: fifty elected members, five regional commissioners, the attorney general, ten members appointed by the president, and fifteen appointed female members. Administrative subdivisions In 1972, local government on the mainland was abolished and replaced with direct rule from the central government. Local government, however, was reintroduced in the beginning of the 1980s, when the rural councils and rural authorities were re-established. Local government elections took place in 1983, and functioning councils started in 1984. In 1999, a Local Government Reform Programme was enacted by the National Assembly, setting "a comprehensive and ambitious agenda ... [covering] four areas: political decentralization, financial decentralization, administrative decentralization and changed central-local relations, with the mainland government having overriding powers within the framework of the Constitution." As of 2016, Tanzania is divided into thirty-one regions (mkoa), twenty-six on the mainland and five in Zanzibar (three on Unguja, two on Pemba). In 2012, the thirty former regions were divided into 169 districts (wilaya), also known as local government authorities. Of those districts, 34 were urban units, which were further classified as three city councils (Arusha, Mbeya, and Mwanza), nineteen municipal councils, and twelve town councils. The urban units have an autonomous city, municipal, or town council and are subdivided into wards and mtaa. The non-urban units have an autonomous district council but are subdivided into village councils or township authorities (first level) and then into vitongoji. The city of Dar es Salaam is unique because it has a city council whose area of jurisdiction overlaps three municipal councils. The mayor of the city council is elected by that council. The twenty-member city council is composed of eleven persons elected by the municipal councils, seven members of the National Assembly, and "Nominated members of parliament under 'Special Seats' for women". Each municipal council also has a mayor. "The City Council performs a coordinating role and attends to issues cutting across the three municipalities", including security and emergency services. The city of Mwanza has a city council whose areal jurisdiction overlaps two municipal councils. Foreign relations Bilateral relations Apart from its border dispute with Malawi, Tanzania had cordial relations with its neighbours in 2012. Relations between Tanzania and Malawi have been tense because of a dispute over the countries' Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi) border. An unsuccessful mediation regarding this issue took place in March 2014. The two countries agreed in 2013 to ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve the dispute should mediation be unsuccessful. Malawi, but not Tanzania, has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Relations between Tanzania and Rwanda deteriorated in 2013 when Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete said that if the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) could negotiate with some of its enemies, Rwanda should be able to do the same. Rwandan President Paul Kagame then expressed "contempt" for Kikwete's statement. The tension was renewed in May 2014 when, in a speech to the Tanzanian National Assembly, Foreign Affairs Minister Bernard Membe renewed his claim that Rwandans were causing instability in the DRC. Rwandan Foreign Affairs Minister Louise Mushikiwabo responded, "As for Tanzania's foreign minister whose anti-Rwanda rant in parliament I heard, he would benefit from a lesson in the history of the region." Tanzania has maintained strong relations with the United Kingdom since its independence; Britain remains the largest non-African importer of Tanzanian tea and other raw materials are exchanged. Britain remains a high contributor of tourists to Tanzania. Both are members of the Commonwealth of Nations and engage in strategic union in defence, security and ceremonial affairs; the Tanzanian High Commission is in London and the British have a High Commission in Dar es Salaam. Tanzania–China relations have strengthened in recent years as trade between the two countries and Chinese investment in Tanzanian infrastructure have increased rapidly. Relations with the United States are well, with President Barack Obama visiting Tanzania in 2013. Tanzania's relations with other donor countries, including Japan and members of the European Union, are generally good, though donors are concerned about Tanzania's commitment to reducing government corruption. Multilateral relations Tanzania is a member of the East African Community (EAC), along with Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan. According to the East African Common Market Protocol of 2010, the free trade and free movement of people is guaranteed, including the right to reside in another member country for purposes of employment. This protocol, however, has not been implemented because of work permit and other bureaucratic, legal, and financial obstacles. Tanzania is also a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The EAC, the SADC, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa agreed in June 2011 to negotiate the creation of a Tripartite Free Trade Area spanning 26 African countries, with a goal to complete the first phase of negotiations within 36 months. As of 31 October 2014, Tanzania was contributing 2,253 soldiers and other personnel to various United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Tanzanian military is participating along with South African and Malawian militaries in the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The United Nations Security Council authorised the force on 28 March 2013 to conduct targeted offensive operations to neutralise groups that threaten peace in the DRC. Tanzania was also participating in peacekeeping missions in the Darfur Region of Sudan (UNAMID); Abyei, control of which is contested between South Sudan and Sudan (UNISFA); the Central African Republic (MINUSCA); Lebanon (UNIFIL); and South Sudan (UNMISS). In 2019, Tanzania signed the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Military The Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) (Kiswahili: Jeshi la Wananchi wa Tanzania (JWTZ)) is the armed forces of Tanzania, operating as a people's force under civilian control. It is composed of five branches or commands: Land Force (army), Air Force, Naval Command, National Service, Headquarter (MMJ). Tanzanian citizens are able to volunteer for military service from 15 years of age, and 18 years of age for compulsory military service upon graduation from secondary school. Conscript service obligation was 2 years as of 2004. Human rights Throughout Tanzania, sex acts between men are illegal and carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. According to a 2007 Pew Research Centre survey, 95 percent of Tanzanians believed that homosexuality should not be accepted by society. People with albinism living in Tanzania are often attacked, killed or mutilated because of superstitions related to the black-magical practice known as muti that say body parts of albinos have magical properties. Tanzania has the highest occurrence of this human rights violation among 27 African countries where muti is known to be practised. In December 2019, Amnesty International reported that the Tanzanian government annulled the right of NGOs as well as individuals to directly file any case against it at the Arusha-based African Court for Human and Peoples' Rights. Economy and infrastructure , according to the IMF, Tanzania's gross domestic product (GDP) was an estimated $71 billion (nominal), or $218.5 billion on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis. GDP per capita (PPP) was $3,574. From 2009 through to 2013, Tanzania's per capita GDP (based on constant local currency) grew an average of 3.5% per year, higher than any other member of the East African Community (EAC) and exceeded by only nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Tanzania's largest trading partners in 2017 for its US$5.3 billion in exports were India, Vietnam, South Africa, Switzerland, and China. Its imports totalled US$8.17 billion, with India, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, China, and the United Arab Emirates being the biggest partners. Tanzania weathered the Great Recession, which began in late 2008 or early 2009, relatively well. Strong gold prices, bolstering the country's mining industry, and Tanzania's poor integration into global markets helped to insulate the country from the downturn. Since the recession ended, the Tanzanian economy has expanded rapidly thanks to strong tourism, telecommunications, and banking sectors. According to the United Nations Development Programme, however, recent growth in the national economy has benefited only the "very few", leaving out the majority of the population. Tanzania's 2013 Global Hunger Index was worse than any other country in the EAC except Burundi. The proportion of persons who were undernourished in 2010–12 was also worse than any other EAC country except Burundi. In 2020, the World Bank declared the rise of the Tanzanian economy from low income to lower middle income country, as its GNI per capita increased from US$1,020 in 2018 to US$1,080 in 2019. Hunger and poverty Tanzania has made some progress towards reducing extreme hunger and malnutrition. The Global Hunger Index ranked the situation as "alarming" with a score of 42 in the year 2000; since then the GHI has declined to 29.5. Children in rural areas suffer substantially higher rates of malnutrition and chronic hunger, although urban-rural disparities have narrowed as regards both stunting and underweight. Low rural sector productivity arises mainly from inadequate infrastructure investment; limited access to farm inputs, extension services and credit; limited technology as well as trade and marketing support; and heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture and natural resources. Approximately 68 per cent of Tanzania's 61.1 million citizens live below the poverty line of $1.25 a day. 32 per cent of the population are malnourished. The most prominent challenges Tanzania faces in poverty reduction are unsustainable harvesting of its natural resources, unchecked cultivation, climate change and water- source encroachment, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). There are very few resources for Tanzanians in terms of credit services, infrastructure or availability to improved agricultural technologies, which further exacerbates hunger and poverty in the country according to the UNDP. Tanzania ranks 159 out of 187 countries in poverty according to the United Nation's Human Development Index (2014). The 2019 World Bank report showed that in the last 10 years, poverty has reduced by 8 percentage points, from 34.4% in 2007 to 26.4% in 2018. A further report showed a reduction to 25.7% in 2020. Agriculture The Tanzanian economy is heavily based on agriculture, which in 2013 accounted for 24.5 per cent of gross domestic product, provides 85% of exports, and accounted for half of the employed workforce; The agricultural sector grew 4.3 per cent in 2012, less than half of the Millennium Development Goal target of 10.8%. 16.4 per cent of the land is arable, with 2.4 per cent of the land planted with permanent crops. Tanzania's economy relies on farming, but climate change has impacted their farming. Maize was the largest food crop on the Tanzania mainland in 2013 (5.17 million tonnes), followed by cassava (1.94 million tonnes), sweet potatoes (1.88 million tonnes), beans (1.64 million tonnes), bananas (1.31 million tonnes), rice (1.31 million tonnes), and millet (1.04 million tonnes). Sugar was the largest cash crop on the mainland in 2013 (296,679 tonnes), followed by cotton (241,198 tonnes), cashew nuts (126,000 tonnes), tobacco (86,877 tonnes), coffee (48,000 tonnes), sisal (37,368 tonnes), and tea (32,422 tonnes). Beef was the largest meat product on the mainland in 2013 (299,581 tonnes), followed by lamb/mutton (115,652 tonnes), chicken (87,408 tonnes), and pork (50,814 tonnes). According to the 2002 National Irrigation Master Plan, 29.4 million hectares in Tanzania are suitable for irrigation farming; however, only 310,745 hectares were actually being irrigated in June 2011. Industry, energy and construction Industry and construction is a major and growing component of the Tanzanian economy, contributing 22.2 per cent of GDP in 2013. This component includes mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity and natural gas, water supply, and construction. Mining contributed 3.3 per cent of GDP in 2013. The vast majority of the country's mineral export revenue comes from gold, accounting for 89 per cent of the value of those exports in 2013. It also exports sizeable quantities of gemstones, including diamonds and tanzanite. All of Tanzania's coal production, which totalled 106,000 short tons in 2012, is used domestically. Only 15 per cent of Tanzanians had access to electric power in 2011, however rising to 35.2 per cent in 2018. The government-owned Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (TANESCO) dominates the electric supply industry in Tanzania. The country generated 6.013 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity in 2013, a 4.2 per cent increase over the 5.771 billion kWh generated in 2012. Generation increased by 63 per cent between 2005 and 2012; Almost 18 per cent of the electricity generated in 2012 was lost because of theft and transmission and distribution problems. The electrical supply varies, particularly when droughts disrupt hydropower electric generation; rolling blackouts are implemented as necessary. The unreliability of the electrical supply has hindered the development of Tanzanian industry. In 2013, 49.7 per cent of Tanzania's electricity generation came from natural gas, 28.9 per cent from hydroelectric sources, 20.4 per cent from thermal sources, and 1.0 per cent from outside the country. The government has built a gas pipeline from Mnazi Bay to Dar es Salaam. This pipeline was expected to allow the country to double its electricity generation capacity to 3,000 megawatts by 2016. The government's goal is to increase capacity to at least 10,000 megawatts by 2025. According to PFC Energy, 25 to 30 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas resources have been discovered in Tanzania since 2010, bringing the total reserves to over 43 trillion cubic feet by the end of 2013. The value of natural gas actually produced in 2013 was US$52.2 million, a 42.7 per cent increase over 2012. Commercial production of gas from the Songo Songo Island field in the Indian Ocean commenced in 2004, thirty years after it was discovered there. Over 35 billion cubic feet of gas was produced from this field in 2013, with proven, probable, and possible reserves totalling 1.1 trillion cubic feet. The gas is transported by pipeline to Dar es Salaam. As of 27 August 2014, TANESCO owed the operator of this field, Orca Exploration Group Inc. A newer natural gas field in Mnazi Bay in 2013 produced about one-seventh of the amount produced near Songo Songo Island but has proven, probable, and possible reserves of 2.2 trillion cubic feet. Virtually all of that gas is being used for electricity generation in Mtwara. The Ruvuma and Nyuna regions of Tanzania have been explored mostly by the discovery company that holds a 75 per cent interest, Aminex, and has shown to hold in excess of 3.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. A pipeline connecting offshore natural gas fields to Tanzania's commercial capital Dar es Salaam was completed at the end of April 2015. Tourism Travel and tourism contributed 17.5 per cent of Tanzania's gross domestic product in 2016 and employed 11.0 per cent of the country's labour force (1,189,300 jobs) in 2013. Overall receipts rose from US$1.74 billion in 2004 to US$4.48 billion in 2013, and receipts from international tourists rose from US$1.255 billion in 2010 to US$2 billion in 2016. In 2016, 1,284,279 tourists arrived at Tanzania's borders compared to 590,000 in 2005. The vast majority of tourists visit Zanzibar or a "northern circuit" of Serengeti National Park, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, Tarangire National Park, Lake Manyara National Park, and Mount Kilimanjaro. In 2013, the most visited national park was Serengeti (452,485 tourists), followed by Manyara (187,773) and Tarangire (165,949). Banking The Bank of Tanzania is the central bank of Tanzania and is primarily responsible for maintaining price stability, with a subsidiary responsibility for issuing Tanzanian shilling notes and coins. At the end of 2013, the total assets of the Tanzanian banking industry were 19.5 trillion Tanzanian shillings, a 15 per cent increase over 2012. Transport Most transport in Tanzania is by road, with road transport constituting over 75 per cent of the country's freight traffic and 80 per cent of its passenger traffic. The road system is in generally poor condition. Tanzania has two railway companies: TAZARA, which provides service between Dar es Salaam and Kapiri Mposhi (in a copper-mining district in Zambia), and Tanzania Railways Limited, which connects Dar es Salaam with central and northern Tanzania. Rail travel in Tanzania often entails slow journeys with frequent cancellations or delays, and the railways have a deficient safety record. In Dar es Salaam, there is a huge project of rapid buses, Dar Rapid Transit (DART) which connects suburbs of Dar es Salaam city. The development of the DART system consists of six phases and is funded by the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the Government of Tanzania. The first phase began in April 2012, and it was completed in December 2015 and launched operations in May 2016. Tanzania has four international airports, along with over 120 small airports or landing strips. Airport infrastructure tends to be in poor condition. Airlines in Tanzania include Air Tanzania, Precision Air, Fastjet, Coastal Aviation, and ZanAir. Communications In 2013, the communications sector was the fastest growing in Tanzania, expanding 22.8 per cent; however, the sector accounted for only 2.4 per cent of gross domestic product that year. As of 2011, Tanzania had 56 mobile telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants, a rate slightly above the sub-Saharan average. Very few Tanzanians have fixed-line telephones. Approximately 12 per cent of Tanzanians used the internet , though this number is growing rapidly. The country has a fibre-optic cable network that replaced unreliable satellite service, but internet bandwidth remains very low. Water supply and sanitation Water supply and sanitation in Tanzania has been characterised by decreasing access to improved water sources in the 2000s (especially in urban areas), steady access to some form of sanitation (around 93 per cent since the 1990s), intermittent water supplies, and generally low quality of service. Many utilities are barely able to cover their operation and maintenance costs through revenues because of low tariffs and poor efficiency. There are significant regional differences, with the best performing utilities being Arusha, Moshi, and Tanga. The government of Tanzania has embarked on a major sector reform process since 2002. An ambitious National Water Sector Development Strategy that promotes Integrated Water Resources Management and the development of urban and rural water supply was adopted in 2006. Decentralisation has meant that responsibility for water and sanitation service provision has shifted to local government authorities and is carried out by 20 urban utilities and about 100 district utilities, as well as by Community Owned Water Supply Organisations in rural areas. These reforms have been backed by a significant increase of the budget starting in 2006, when the water sector was included among the priority sectors of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. The Tanzanian water sector remains heavily dependent on external donors, with 88 per cent of the available funds being provided by external donor organisations. Results have been mixed. For example, a report by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit noted that "despite heavy investments brought in by the World Bank and the European Union, (the utility serving Dar es Salaam) has remained one of the worst performing water entities in Tanzania." Economic statistics controversy Two articles in the Economist in July 2020 raised doubts about official claims of economic growth: "If Tanzania's economy grew by almost 7% in the fiscal year to the end of June 2019, why did tax revenue fall by 1%? And why has bank lending to companies slumped? Private data are bad, too. In 2019 sales at the biggest brewer fell by 5%. Sales of cement by the two biggest producers were almost flat. None of these things is likely if growth is storming ahead. The discrepancies are so large that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the government is lying." Tim Staermose, a proponent of African investment, took issue with these data: "Some of these statements by The Economist, based on the evidence I have gathered from primary sources – namely, the statutory financial reports that listed companies in Tanzania are legally obligated to release – are simply not true. Bank lending to companies as far as I can see has not, 'slumped.' The two biggest banks in Tanzania, which between them account for approximately 40% of the banking sector, both reported strong loan growth in 2019. ... As for cement sales being 'almost flat,' again, this is total nonsense. ... In 2019 Twiga sold 6% more cement by volume than it did in 2018. In the first six months of 2020, Twiga already sold 8% more cement than it had done by the same stage in 2019. Again, these numbers are very consistent with an economy that's reported to be growing at around 7% per annum. ... [On] the 5% fall in beer sales in 2019 ... the published 2019 annual report by Tanzania Breweries Limited (TBL) will tell you there were one-off circumstances that largely drove the decline ... [which] resulted in sales falling. But TBL's profits actually rose in 2019." Food and nutrition Poor nutrition remains a persistent problem within Tanzania and varies hugely throughout the country's regions. USAID reports that 16% of children are underweight and 34% experience stunted growth as a result of malnutrition. 10 regions house 58% of children suffering from stunted growth while 50% of
an irrigation and cultivation system. Early coastal history Travellers and merchants from the Persian Gulf and Western India have visited the East African coast since early in the first millennium CE. Greek texts such as the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea and Ptolemy's Geography list a string of market places (emporia) along the coast. Finds of Roman-era coins along the coast confirm the existence of trade, and Ptolomey's Geography refers to a town of Rhapta as "metropolis" of a political entity called Azania. Archaeologists have not yet succeeded in identifying the location of Rhapta, though many believe it lies deeply buried in the silt of the delta of the Rufiji River. A long documentary silence follows these ancient texts, and it is not until Arab geographical treatises were written about the coast that our information resumes. Remains of those towns' material culture demonstrate that they arose from indigenous roots, not from foreign settlement. And the language that was spoken in them, Swahili (now Tanzania's national language), is a member of the Bantu language family that spread from the northern Kenya coast well before significant Arab presence was felt in the region. By the beginning of the second millennium CE the Swahili towns conducted a thriving trade that linked Africans in the interior with trade partners throughout the Indian Ocean. From c. 1200 to 1500 CE, the town of Kilwa, on Tanzania's southern coast, was perhaps the wealthiest and most powerful of these towns, presiding over what some scholars consider the "golden age" of Swahili civilization. In the early 14th century, Ibn Battuta, a Berber traveller from North Africa, visited Kilwa and proclaimed it one of the best cities in the world. Islam was practised on the Swahili coast as early as the eighth or ninth century CE. In 1498, Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama became the first known European to reach the African Great Lakes coast; he stayed for 32 days. In 1505 the Portuguese captured the island of Zanzibar. Portuguese control lasted until the early 18th century, when Arabs from Oman established a foothold in the region. Assisted by Omani Arabs, the indigenous coastal dwellers succeeded in driving the Portuguese from the area north of the Ruvuma River by the early 18th century. Claiming the coastal strip, Omani Sultan Seyyid Said moved his capital to Zanzibar City in 1840. He focused on the island and developed trade routes that stretched as far as Lake Tanganyika and Central Africa. During this time, Zanzibar became the centre for the Indian Ocean slave trade. Due to the Arab and Persian domination at this later time, many Europeans misconstrued the nature of Swahili civilization as a product of Arab colonization. However, this misunderstanding has begun to dissipate over the past 40 years as Swahili civilization is becoming recognized as principally African in origin. Tanganyika (1850–1890) Tanganyika as a geographical and political entity did not take shape before the period of High Imperialism; its name only came into use after German East Africa was transferred to the United Kingdom as a mandate by the League of Nations in 1920. What is referred to here, therefore, is the history of the region that was to become Tanzania. A part of the Great Lakes region, namely the western shore of Lake Victoria consisted of many small kingdoms, most notably Karagwe and Buzinza, which were dominated by their more powerful neighbors Rwanda, Burundi, and Buganda. European exploration of the interior began in the mid-19th century. In 1848 the German missionary Johannes Rebmann became the first European to see Mount Kilimanjaro. British explorers Richard Burton and John Speke crossed the interior to Lake Tanganyika in June 1857. In January 1866, the Scottish explorer and missionary David Livingstone, who crusaded against the slave trade, went to Zanzibar, from where he sought the source of the Nile, and established his last mission at Ujiji on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. After having lost contact with the outside world for years, he was "found" there on 10 November 1871. Henry Morton Stanley, who had been sent in a publicity stunt to find him by the New York Herald newspaper, greeted him with the now famous words "Dr Livingstone, I presume?" In 1877, the first of a series of Belgian expeditions arrived on Zanzibar. In the course of these expeditions, in 1879 a station was founded in Kigoma on the eastern bank of Lake Tanganyika, soon to be followed by the station of Mpala on the opposite western bank. Both stations were founded in the name of the Comite D'Etudes Du Haut Congo, a predecessor organization of the Congo Free State. German colonial interests were first advanced in 1884. Karl Peters, who formed the Society for German Colonization, concluded a series of treaties by which tribal chiefs ceded territory to the society. Prince Otto von Bismarck's government in 1885 granted imperial protection to the German East Africa Company established by Peters with Bismark's encouragement. At the Berlin Conference of 1885, the fact that Kigoma had been established and supplied from Zanzibar and Bagamoyo led to the inclusion of German East Africa into the territory of the Conventional Basin of the Congo, to Belgium's advantage. At the table in Berlin, contrary to widespread perception, Africa was not partitioned; rather, rules were established among the colonial powers and prospective colonial powers as how to proceed in the establishment of colonies and protectorates. While the Belgian interest soon concentrated on the Congo River, the British and Germans focused on Eastern Africa and in 1886 partitioned continental East Africa between themselves; the Sultanate of Zanzibar, now reduced to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, remained independent, for the moment. The Congo Free State was eventually to give up its claim on Kigoma (its oldest station in Central Africa) and on any territory to the east of Lake Tanganyika, to Germany. German East Africa All resistance to the Germans in the interior ceased and they could now set out to organize German East Africa. They continued brutally to exercise their authority with disregard and contempt for existing local structures and traditions. While the German colonial administration brought cash crops, railroads, and roads to Tanganyika, European rule provoked African resistance. Between 1891 and 1894, the Hehe—led by Chief Mkwawa—resisted German expansion, but were eventually defeated. After a period of guerrilla warfare, Mkwawa was cornered and committed suicide in 1898. Maji Maji resistance Widespread discontent re-emerged, and in 1902 a movement against forced labour for a cotton scheme rejected by the local population started along the Rufiji River. The tension reached a breaking point in July 1905 when the Matumbi of Nandete led by Kinjikitile Ngwale revolted against the local administrators (akida) and suddenly the revolt grew wider from Dar Es Salaam to the Uluguru Mountains, the Kilombero Valley, the Mahenge and Makonde plateaux, the Ruvuma in the southernmost part and Kilwa, Songea, Masasi, and from Kilosa to Iringa down to the eastern shores of Lake Nyasa. The resistance culminated in the Maji Maji Resistance of 1905–1907. The resistance, which temporarily united a number of southern tribes ended only after an estimated 120,000 Africans had died from fighting or starvation. Research has shown that traditional hostilities played a large part in the resistance. Germans had occupied the area since 1897 and totally altered many aspects of everyday life. They were actively supported by the missionaries who tried to destroy all signs of indigenous beliefs, notably by razing the 'mahoka' huts where the local population worshiped their ancestors' spirits and by ridiculing their rites, dances and other ceremonies. This would not be forgotten or forgiven; the first battle which broke out at Uwereka in September 1905 under the Governorship of Count Gustav Adolf von Götzen turned instantly into an all-out war with indiscriminate murders and massacres perpetrated by all sides against farmers, settlers, missionaries, planters, villages, indigenous people and peasants. Known as the Maji-Maji war with the main brunt borne by the Ngoni people, this was a merciless rebellion and by far the bloodiest in Tanganyika. World War I Before the outbreak of the war, German East Africa had been prepared to resist any attack that could be made without extensive preparation. For the first year of hostilities, the Germans were strong enough to conduct offensive operations in their neighbours' territories by, for example, repeatedly attacking railways in British East Africa. The strength of German forces at the beginning of the war is uncertain. Lieutenant-General Jan Smuts, the commander of British forces in east Africa beginning in 1916, estimated them at 2,000 Germans and 16,000 Askaris. The white adult male population in 1913 numbered over 3,500 (exclusive of the German garrison). In addition, the indigenous population of over 7,000,000 formed a reservoir of manpower from which a force might be drawn, limited only by the supply of German officers and equipment. "There is no reason to doubt that the Germans made the best of this material during the ... nearly eighteen months which separated the outbreak of war from the invasion in force of their territory." The geography of German East Africa also was a severe impediment to British and allied forces. The coastline offered few suitable points for landing and was backed by unhealthy swamps. The line of lakes and mountains to the west proved to be impenetrable. Belgian forces from the Belgian Congo had to be moved through Uganda. On the south, the Ruvuma River was fordable only its upper reaches. In the north, only one practicable pass about five miles wide existed between the Pare Mountains and Mount Kilimanjaro, and here the German forces had been digging in for eighteen months. Germany commenced hostilities in 1914 by unsuccessfully attacking from the town of Tanga. The British then attacked the town in November 1914 but were thwarted by General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces at the Battle of Tanga. The British Royal Navy occupied Mafia Island in January 1915. However, the "attack on Tanga and the numerous smaller engagements that followed [showed] the strength ... of [German forces] and made it evident that a powerful force must be organized before the conquest of [German East Africa] could be ... undertaken. Such an enterprise had ... to await more favourable conditions on European battlefields and elsewhere. But in July, 1915, the last German troops in S.W. Africa capitulated ... and the nucleus of the requisite force ... became available." British forces from the northeast and southwest and Belgian forces from the northwest steadily attacked and defeated German forces beginning in January 1916. In October 1916, General Smuts wrote, "With the exception of the Mahenge Plateau [the Germans] have lost every healthy or valuable part of their Colony". Cut-off from Germany, General Von Lettow by necessity conducted a guerilla campaign throughout 1917, living off the land and dispersing over a wide area. In December, the remaining German forces evacuated the colony by crossing the Ruvuma River into Portuguese Mozambique. Those forces were estimated at 320 German troops and 2,500 Askaris. 1,618 Germans and 5,482 Askaris were killed or captured during the last six months of 1917. In November 1918, his remaining force surrendered near present-day Mbala, Zambia consisting of 155 Europeans, 1,165 Askaris, 2,294 African porters etc., and 819 African women. Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany relinquished all her overseas possessions, including German East Africa. Britain lost 3,443 men in battle plus 6,558 men to disease. The equivalent numbers for Belgium were 683 and 1,300. Germany lost 734 Europeans and 1,798 Africans. Von Lettow's scorched earth policy and the requisition of buildings meant a complete collapse of the Government's education system, though some mission schools managed to retain a semblance of instruction. Unlike the Belgian, British, French and Portuguese colonial masters in central Africa, Germany had developed an educational program for her Africans that involved elementary, secondary and vocational schools. "Instructor qualifications, curricula, textbooks, teaching materials, all met standards unmatched anywhere in tropical Africa." In 1924, ten years after the beginning of the First World War and six years into British rule, the visiting American Phelps-Stokes Commission reported: In regards to schools, the Germans have accomplished marvels. Some time must elapse before education attains the standard it had reached under the Germans. But by 1920, the Education Department consisted of 1 officer and 2 clerks with a budget equal to 1% of the country's revenue—less than the amount appropriated for the maintenance of Government House. British administration after World War I In 1919, the population was estimated at 3,500,000. The first British civilian administrator after the end of World War I was Sir Horace Archer Byatt CMG, appointed by Royal Commission on 31 January 1919. The colony was renamed Tanganyika Territory in January 1920. In September 1920 by the Tanganyika Order in Council, 1920, the initial boundaries of the territory, the Executive Council, and the offices of governor and commander-in-chief were established. The governor legislated by proclamation or ordinance until 1926. Britain and Belgium signed an agreement regarding the border between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi in 1924. The administration of the Territory continued to be carried out under the terms of the mandate until its transfer to the Trusteeship System under the Charter of the United Nations by the Trusteeship Agreement of 13 December 1946. British rule through indigenous authorities Governor Byatt took measures to revive African institutions by encouraging limited local rule. He authorized the formation in 1922 of political clubs such as the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association, which in 1929 became the Tanganyika African Association and later constituted the core of the nationalist movement. Under the Native Authority Ordinances of 1923, limited powers were granted to certain recognized chiefs who could also exercise powers granted by local customary law. Sir Donald Cameron became the governor of Tanganyika in 1925. "His work ... was of great significance in the development of colonial administrative policy, being associated especially with the vigorous attempt to establish a system of 'Indirect Rule' through the traditional indigenous authorities." He was a major critic of Governor Byatt's policies about indirect rule, as evidenced by his Native Administration Memorandum No. 1, Principles of Native Administration and their Application. In 1926, the Legislative Council was established with seven unofficial (including two Indians) and thirteen official members, whose function was to advise and consent to ordinances issued by the governor. In 1945, the first Africans were appointed to the council. The council was reconstituted in 1948 under Governor Edward Twining, with 15 unofficial members (7 Europeans, 4 Africans, and 4 Indians) and 14 official members. Julius Nyerere became one of the unofficial members in 1954. The council was again reconstituted in 1955 with 44 unofficial members (10 Europeans, 10 Africans, 10 Indians, and 14 government representatives) and 17 official members. Governor Cameron in 1929 enacted the Native Courts Ordinance No. 5, which removed those courts from the jurisdiction of the colonial courts and provided for a system of appeals with final resort to the governor himself. Railway development In 1928, the Tabora to Mwanza railway line was opened to traffic. The line from Moshi to Arusha opened in 1930. 1931 census In 1931 a census established the population of Tanganyika at 5,022,640 natives, in addition to 32,398 Asians and 8,228 Europeans. Health and education initiatives Under British rule, efforts were undertaken to fight the Tsetse fly (a carrier of sleeping sickness), and to fight malaria and bilharziasis; more hospitals were built. In 1926, the colonial administration provided subsidies to schools run by missionaries, and at the same time established its authority to exercise supervision and to establish guidelines. Yet in 1935, the education budget for the entire country of Tanganyika amounted to only US$290,000, although it is unclear how much this represented at the time in terms of purchasing power parity. Tanganyika wheat scheme The British Government decided to develop wheat growing to help feed a war-ravaged and severely rationed Britain and eventually Europe at the hoped-for Allied victory at the end of the Second World War. An American farmer in Tanganyika, Freddie Smith, was in charge, and David Gordon Hines was the accountant responsible for the finances. The scheme had on the Ardai plains just outside Arusha; on Mount Kilimanjaro; and towards Ngorongoro to the west. All the machinery was lend/lease from the US, including 30 tractors, 30 ploughs, and 30 harrows. There were western agricultural and engineering managers. Most of the workers were Italian prisoners of war from Somalia and Ethiopia: excellent, skilled engineers and mechanics. The Ardai plains were too arid to be successful, but there were good crops in the Kilimanjaro and Ngorongoro areas. World War II Two days after Nazi Germany invaded Poland, the United Kingdom declared war and the British forces in Tanganyika were ordered to intern the German males living in Tanganyika. The British government feared that these Axis country citizens would attempt to help the Axis forces and some of the Germans living in Dar es Salaam did attempt to flee the country but were stopped and later interned by Roald Dahl and a small group of Tanganyikan soldiers of the King's African Rifles. During the war about 100,000 people from Tanganyika joined the Allied forces. and were part of the 375,000 British colonial troops who fought against the Axis forces. Tanganyikans fought in units of the King's African Rifles and fought in the East African Campaign in Somalia and Abyssinia against the Italians, in Madagascar against the Vichy French during the Madagascar Campaign, and in Burma against the Japanese during the Burma Campaign. Tanganyika became an important source of food and Tanganyika's export income greatly increased	for the entire country of Tanganyika amounted to only US$290,000, although it is unclear how much this represented at the time in terms of purchasing power parity. Tanganyika wheat scheme The British Government decided to develop wheat growing to help feed a war-ravaged and severely rationed Britain and eventually Europe at the hoped-for Allied victory at the end of the Second World War. An American farmer in Tanganyika, Freddie Smith, was in charge, and David Gordon Hines was the accountant responsible for the finances. The scheme had on the Ardai plains just outside Arusha; on Mount Kilimanjaro; and towards Ngorongoro to the west. All the machinery was lend/lease from the US, including 30 tractors, 30 ploughs, and 30 harrows. There were western agricultural and engineering managers. Most of the workers were Italian prisoners of war from Somalia and Ethiopia: excellent, skilled engineers and mechanics. The Ardai plains were too arid to be successful, but there were good crops in the Kilimanjaro and Ngorongoro areas. World War II Two days after Nazi Germany invaded Poland, the United Kingdom declared war and the British forces in Tanganyika were ordered to intern the German males living in Tanganyika. The British government feared that these Axis country citizens would attempt to help the Axis forces and some of the Germans living in Dar es Salaam did attempt to flee the country but were stopped and later interned by Roald Dahl and a small group of Tanganyikan soldiers of the King's African Rifles. During the war about 100,000 people from Tanganyika joined the Allied forces. and were part of the 375,000 British colonial troops who fought against the Axis forces. Tanganyikans fought in units of the King's African Rifles and fought in the East African Campaign in Somalia and Abyssinia against the Italians, in Madagascar against the Vichy French during the Madagascar Campaign, and in Burma against the Japanese during the Burma Campaign. Tanganyika became an important source of food and Tanganyika's export income greatly increased from the pre-war years of the Great Depression. However, despite the additional income, the war caused inflation within the country. Transition to independence In 1947, Tanganyika became a United Nations trust territory under British control. "Its geography, topography, climate, geopolitics, patterns of settlement and history made Tanganyika the most significant of all UN Trust Territories." But two-thirds of the population lived in one-tenth of the territory because of water shortages, soil erosion, unreliable rainfall, tsetse fly infestations, and poor communications and transportation infrastructures. Multi-ethnic population In 1957, only 15 towns had over 5,000 inhabitants, with the capital Dar es Salaam having the nation's highest population of 128,742. Tanganyika was a multi-racial territory, which made it unique in the trusteeship world. Its total non-African population in 1957 was 123,310 divided as follows: 95,636 Asians and Arabs (subdivided as 65,461 Indians, 6,299 Pakistanis, 4,776 Goans, and 19,100 Arabs), 3,114 Somalis, and 3,782 "coloured" and "other" individuals. The white population, which included the Europeans (British, Italians, Greeks, and Germans) and white South Africans, totalled 20,598 individuals. Tanganyika's ethnic and economic make-up posed problems for the British. Their policy was geared to ensuring the continuance of the European presence as necessary to support the country's economy. But the British also had to remain responsive to the political demands of the Africans. Many Africans were government servants, business employees, labourers, and producers of important cash crops during this period. But the vast majority were subsistence farmers who produced barely enough to survive. The standards of housing, clothing, and other social conditions were "equally quite poor." The Asians and Arabs were the middle class and tended to be wholesale and retail traders. The white population were missionaries, professional and government servants, and owners and managers of farms, plantations, mines, and other businesses. "White farms were of primary importance as producers of exportable agricultural crops." Co-operative farming started Britain, through its colonial officer David Gordon Hines, encouraged the development of farming co-operatives to help convert subsistence farmers to cash husbandry. The subsistence farmers sold their produce to Indian traders at poor prices. By the early 1950s, there were over 400 co-operatives nationally. Co-operatives formed "unions" for their areas and developed cotton ginneries, coffee factories, and tobacco dryers. A major success for Tanzania was the Moshi coffee auctions that attracted international buyers after the annual Nairobi auctions. The disastrous Tanganyika groundnut scheme began in 1946 and was abandoned in 1951. UN trust territory After Tanganyika became a UN trust territory, the British felt extra pressure for political progress. The British principle of "gradualism" was increasingly threatened and was abandoned entirely during the last few years before independence. Five UN missions visited Tanganyika, the UN received several hundred written petitions, and a handful of oral presentations made it to the debating chambers in New York City between 1948 and 1960. The UN and the Africans who used the UN to achieve their purposes were very influential in driving Tanganyika towards independence. The Africans attended public gatherings in Tanganyika with UN representatives. There were peasants, urban workers, government employees, and local chiefs and nobles who personally approached the UN about local matters needing immediate action. And finally, there were Africans at the core of the political process who had the power to mould the future. Their goal was political advancement for Africans, with many supporting the nationalist movement, which had its roots in the African Association (AA). It was formed in 1929 as a social organization for African government servants in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar. The AA was renamed the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in 1948 and ceased being concerned with events in Zanzibar. African nationalism Beginning in 1954, African nationalism centered on the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which was a political organization formed by Julius Nyerere in that year as the successor to the TAA. The TANU won the Legislative Council elections in 1958, 1959, and 1960, with Nyerere becoming chief minister after the 1960 election. Internal self-government started on 1 May 1961 followed by independence on 9 December 1961. Zanzibar Zanzibar today refers to the island of that name, also known as Unguja, and the neighboring island of Pemba. Both islands fell under Portuguese domination in the 16th and early 17th centuries but were retaken by Omani Arabs in the early 18th century. The height of Arab rule came during the reign of Sultan Seyyid Said, who moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar, established a ruling Arab elite, and encouraged the development of clove plantations, using the island's slave labor. Zanzibar and Pemba were world-famous for their trade in spices and became known as the Spice Islands; in the early 20th century, they produced approximately 90% of the world's supply of cloves. Zanzibar was also a major transit point in the African Great Lakes and Indian Ocean slave trade. Zanzibar attracted ships from as far away as the United States, which established a consulate in 1833. The United Kingdom's early interest in Zanzibar was motivated by both commerce and the determination to end the slave trade. In 1822, the British signed the first of a series of treaties with Sultan Said to curb this trade, but not until 1876 was the sale of slaves finally prohibited. The Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty of 1890 made Zanzibar and Pemba a British protectorate, and the Caprivi Strip in Namibia became a German protectorate. British rule through a Sultan remained largely unchanged from the late 19th century until 1957, when elections were held for a largely advisory Legislative Council. Independence and Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar In 1954, Julius Nyerere, a school teacher who was then one of only two Tanganyikans educated to university level, organized a political party—the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). On 9 December 1961, Tanganyika became independent, though retaining the British monarch as Queen of Tanganyika, and Nyerere became Prime Minister, under a new constitution. On 9 December 1962, a republican constitution was implemented with Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere as Tanganyika's first president. Zanzibar received its independence from the United Kingdom on 10 December 1963, as a constitutional monarchy under its Sultan. On 12 January 1964, the African majority revolted against the sultan and a new government was formed with the ASP leader, Abeid Karume, as President of Zanzibar and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council. In the first few days of what would come to be known as the Zanzibar Revolution, between 5,000 and 15,000 Arabs and Indians were murdered. During a series of riots, followers of the radical John Okello carried out thousands of rapes and destroyed homes and other property. Within a few weeks, a fifth of the population had died or fled. It was at this time that the Tanganyika army revolted and Britain was asked by Julius Nyerere to send in troops. Royal Marines Commandos were sent by air from England via Nairobi and 40 Commando came ashore from the aircraft carrier HMS Bulwark. Several months were spent with Commandos touring the country disarming military outposts. When the successful operation ended, the Royal Marines left to be replaced by Canadian troops. On 26 April 1964, Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The country was renamed the United Republic of Tanzania on 29 October of that year. The name Tanzania is a blend of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and previously had no significance. Under the terms of this union, the Zanzibar Government retains considerable local autonomy. Recent history To form a sole ruling party in both parts of the union, Julius Nyerere merged TANU with the Zanzibar ruling party, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar to form the CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi-CCM Revolutionary Party), on February 5, 1977. The merger was reinforced by principles enunciated in the 1982 union constitution and reaffirmed in the constitution of 1984. Nyerere believed multiple political parties, in a nation with hundreds of ethnic groups, were a threat to national unity and therefore sought ways to ensure a one party system. In a post-colonial and unstable social environment, Nyerere 'well aware of the divisiveness of
Mount Meru, an active volcano, Mount Kilimanjaro, a dormant volcano, and the Usambara and Pare mountain ranges. Kilimanjaro attracts thousands of tourists each year. West of those mountains is the Gregory Rift, which is the eastern arm of the Great Rift Valley. On the floor of the rift are a number of large salt lakes, including Natron in the north, Manyara in the south, and Eyasi in the southwest. The rift also encompasses the Crater Highlands, which includes the Ngorongoro Conservation Area and the Ngorongoro Crater. Just to the south of Lake Natron is Ol Doinyo Lengai with an elevation of , the world's only active volcano to produce natrocarbonatite lava. To the west of the Crater Highlands lies Serengeti National Park, which is famous for its lions, leopards, elephants, rhinoceroses, and buffalo plus the annual migration of millions of white bearded wildebeest. Just to the southeast of the park is Olduvai Gorge, where many of the oldest hominid fossils and artifacts have been found. Further northwest is Lake Victoria on the Kenya–Uganda–Tanzania border. This is the largest lake in Africa by surface area and is traditionally named as the source of the Nile River. Southwest of this, separating Tanzania from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is Lake Tanganyika. This lake is estimated to be the second deepest lake in the world after Lake Baikal in Siberia. The western portion of the country between Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, and Malawi consists of flat land that has been categorised by the World Wildlife Fund as part of the Central Zambezian miombo woodlands ecoregion. Just upstream from the Kalambo Falls, there is one of the most important archaeological sites in Africa. Tanzania's Southern Highlands are in the southwestern part of the country, around the northern end of Lake Malawi. Mbeya is the largest city in the Southern Highlands. The centre of Tanzania is a large plateau, which is part of the East African Plateau. The southern half of this plateau is grassland within the Eastern miombo woodlands ecoregion, the majority of which is covered by the huge Selous National Park. Further north the plateau is arable land and includes the national capital, Dodoma. The eastern coast contains Tanzania's largest city and former capital, Dar es Salaam. Just north of this city lies the Zanzibar Archipelago, a semi-autonomous territory of Tanzania which is famous for its spices. The coast is home to areas of East African mangroves, mangrove swamps that are an important habitat for wildlife on land and in the water. A recent global remote sensing analysis suggested that there were 1,256km² of tidal flats in Tanzania, making it the 26th ranked country in terms of tidal flat area. Watersheds Eastern and central Tanzania are drained by rivers that empty into the Indian Ocean. The major rivers are, from north to south, the Pangani, Wami, Ruvu, Rufiji, Matandu, Mbwemkuru, and the Ruvuma River, which forms the southern border with Mozambique. Most of Northern Tanzania drains into Lake Victoria, which empties into the Nile River. The western portion of Tanzania is in the watershed of Lake Tanganyika, which drains into the Congo	Seasonal rainfall is driven mainly by the migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone. It migrates southwards through Tanzania in October to December, reaching the south of the country in January and February, and returning northwards in March, April, and May. This causes the north and east of Tanzania to experience two distinct wet periods – the short rains (or "Vuli") in October to December and the long rains (or "Masika") from March to May – while the southern, western, and central parts of the country experience one wet season that continues October through to April or May. Some inland areas of Tanaznia have a hot semi-arid climate. Across Tanzania, the onset of the long rains averages 25 March and the cessation averages 21 May. A warmer-than-normal South Atlantic Ocean coupled with a cooler-than-normal Eastern Indian Ocean often causes the onset to be delayed. Climate change Statistics Location: Eastern Africa, bordering the Indian Ocean, between Kenya and Mozambique. Geographic coordinates: Continent: Africa Area: note: includes the islands of Mafia, Pemba, and Unguja total: land: water: Land boundaries: total: border countries: Burundi , Kenya , Malawi , Mozambique , Rwanda , Uganda , Zambia , Democratic Republic of the Congo Coastline: Maritime claims: exclusive economic zone: and territorial sea: Terrain: plains along coast; central plateau; highlands in north, south Elevation extremes: lowest point: Indian Ocean 0 m highest point: Mount Kilimanjaro Natural resources: hydropower, tin, phosphates, iron ore, coal, diamonds, gemstones, gold, natural gas, nickel Land use: arable land: 12.25% permanent crops: 1.79% other: 85.96% (2011) Irrigated land: (2003) Total renewable water resources: (2011) Natural hazards: flooding on the central plateau during the rainy season; drought volcanism: limited volcano activity; Ol Doinyo Lengai (elevation ) has emitted lava in recent years; other historically active volcanoes include Kieyo and Meru Environment - current issues: soil degradation; deforestation; desertification; destruction of coral reef threatens marine habitats; recent droughts affected marginal agriculture; wildlife threatened by illegal hunting and trade, especially for ivory 'Environment - international agreements:party to:'' Biodiversity United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat Specific geographic regions Menai Bay Conservation Area Mount Kilimanjaro Mount Meru Olduvai Gorge Umba Valley Extreme points This is a list of the extreme points of Tanzania, the points that are farther north, south, east or west than any other location. Northernmost point - unnamed point on the border with Uganda in the Kagera river immediately east of the Ugandan town of Kikagati, Kagera Region Easternmost point - Mnazi, Mtwara Region Easternmost point (mainland) - unnamed headland immediately east of the town of Mwambo, Mtwara Region Southernmost point - unnamed location on the border with Mozambique in the Ruvuma River, Ruvuma Region Westernmost point - unnamed headland immediately west
complete. The Population Department of the United Nations prepared the following estimates. Births and deaths Life expectancy Population Source: Fertility and Births (Demographic and Health Surveys) Total Fertility Rate (TFR) (Wanted Fertility Rate) and Crude Birth Rate (CBR): Total fertility rate in Tanzania Fertility rates are estimated by Surveys (TDHS) and Census in different times. TDHS surveys estimated these fertility rates :6.3 (1991–92), 5.8 (1996), 5.7 (2004–05), 5.4 (2010) and 2002 Census said 6.3 Other demographic statistics The following demographic statistics of Tanzania in 2019 are from the World Population Review. One birth every 14 seconds One death every 1 minutes One net migrant every 13 minutes Net gain of one person every 17 seconds The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated. Population 55,451,343 (July 2018 est.) 48,261,942 (July 2013 est.) Age structure 0-14 years: 43.4% (male 12,159,482 /female 11,908,654) 15-24 years: 20.03% (male 5,561,922 /female 5,543,788) 25-54 years: 30.02% (male 8,361,460 /female 8,284,229) 55-64 years: 3.51% (male 872,601 /female 1,074,480) 65 years and over: 3.04% (male 706,633 /female 978,094) (2018 est.) Median age total: 17.9 years. Country comparison to the world: 215th male: 17.6 years female: 18.2 years (2018 est.) total: 17.3 years male: 17.0 years female: 17.6 years (2013 est.) Birth rate 35.3 births/1,000 population (2018 est.) Country comparison to the world: 19th Death rate 7.5 deaths/1,000 population (2018 est.) Country comparison to the world: 112nd Total fertility rate 4.71 children born/woman (2018 est.) Country comparison to the world: 20th Population growth rate 2.74% (2018 est.) Country comparison to the world: 14th Mother's mean age at first birth 19.8 years (2015/16 est.) note: median age at first birth among women 25-29 Contraceptive prevalence rate 38.4% (2015/16) Net migration rate -0.5 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2018 est.) Country comparison to the world: 127th Dependency ratios total dependency ratio: 93.4 (2015 est.) youth dependency ratio: 87.4 (2015 est.) elderly dependency ratio: 6 (2015 est.) potential support ratio: 16.6 (2015 est.) Urbanization urban population: 33.8% of total population (2018) rate of urbanization: 5.22% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.) Ethnic groups mainland - African 99% (of which 95% are Bantu consisting of more than 130 tribes), other 1% (consisting of Asian, European, and Arab); Zanzibar - Arab, African, mixed Arab and African. Around 100,000 people living in Tanzania are from Europe or Asia. Religions Christian 61.4%, Muslim 35.2%, folk religion 1.8%, other 0.2%, unaffiliated 1.4% (2010 est.) note: Zanzibar is almost entirely Muslim Sex ratio at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female 0-14 years: 1.02 male(s)/female 15–54 years: 1.00 male(s)/female 55-64 years: 0.75 male(s)/female 65 years and over:	migration rate -0.5 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2018 est.) Country comparison to the world: 127th Dependency ratios total dependency ratio: 93.4 (2015 est.) youth dependency ratio: 87.4 (2015 est.) elderly dependency ratio: 6 (2015 est.) potential support ratio: 16.6 (2015 est.) Urbanization urban population: 33.8% of total population (2018) rate of urbanization: 5.22% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.) Ethnic groups mainland - African 99% (of which 95% are Bantu consisting of more than 130 tribes), other 1% (consisting of Asian, European, and Arab); Zanzibar - Arab, African, mixed Arab and African. Around 100,000 people living in Tanzania are from Europe or Asia. Religions Christian 61.4%, Muslim 35.2%, folk religion 1.8%, other 0.2%, unaffiliated 1.4% (2010 est.) note: Zanzibar is almost entirely Muslim Sex ratio at birth: 1.03 male(s)/female 0-14 years: 1.02 male(s)/female 15–54 years: 1.00 male(s)/female 55-64 years: 0.75 male(s)/female 65 years and over: 0.76 male(s)/female total population: 0.99 male(s)/female (2013 estimate) Life expectancy at birth total population: 63.1 years male: 61.6 years female: 64.6 years (2018 est.) total population: 60.76 years male: 59.48 years female: 62.09 years (2013 estimate) HIV/AIDS Age 15-49 HIV infection rates: 4.5 percent overall, with 6.2 percent of women and 3.8 percent of men being infected. People living with HIV/AIDS: 1.5 million (2017 est.) Deaths: 32,000 (2017 est.) Languages Kiswahili or Swahili or Kiunguja (in Zanzibar) (official) English (official) Arabic (widely spoken in Zanzibar) Literacy definition: age 15 and over can read and write Swahili, English, or Arabic total population: 77.9% male: 83.2% female: 73.1% (2015 est.) total population: 69.4% male: 77.5% female: 62.2% (2003 est.) School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education) total: 8 years male: 8 years female: 8 years (2013) Unemployment, youth ages 15-24 total: 3.9% male: 3.1% female: 4.6% (2014 est.) Religions Most Tanzanians are nowadays Christians and Muslims. The numerical relationship between followers of the two religions is regarded as politically sensitive and questions about religious affiliation have not been included in census questionnaires since 1967. For many years estimates have been repeated that about a third of the population each follows Islam, Christianity and traditional religions. As there is likely no longer such a large percentage of traditional religionists, a range of competing estimates has been published giving one side or the other a large share or trying to show equal shares. Estimates from the Pew Report Islam and Christianity (2010) were 60% Christian and 36% Muslim. The remainder of the population are Hindus, Buddhists, animists, and unaffiliated. Most Christians are Roman Catholic, Lutheran or
association and assembly. On 19 March 2021, Vice President Samia Suluhu Hassan became the new president after the sudden death of President John Magufuli. She is the first female President of Tanzania. Executive branch \|President \| Samia Suluhu \| Chama Cha Mapinduzi \| 19 March 2021 \|- \|Prime Minister \|Majaliwa Kassim Majaliwa \|Chama Cha Mapinduzi \|20 November 2015 \|- \|Vice-President of Tanzania \|Philip Mpango \|Chama Cha Mapinduzi \|31 March 2021 \|} Tanzania's president is elected by direct popular vote for a 5-year term. The president appoints a prime minister who serves as the government's leader in the National Assembly. The president selects his cabinet from among National Assembly members. The Constitution also empowers him to nominate 10 non-elected members of Parliament, who also are eligible to become cabinet members. Legislative branch The unicameral National Assembly of Tanzania or Bunge has 393 seats — 264 elected by popular vote, 113 allocated to women chosen by their parties in proportion to their share of the electoral vote, 10 nominated by the president, five members chosen by the Zanzibar House of Representatives, and the Attorney General as an ex officio member — all members serving five-year terms. In addition to enacting laws that apply to the entire United Republic of Tanzania, the Assembly enacts laws that apply only to the mainland. Zanzibar has its own House of Representatives to make laws especially for Zanzibar (the Zanzibar House of Representatives has 70 seats, directly elected by universal suffrage to serve five-year terms). Wikipedia has a list of current members of the Bunge arranged in two ways, alphabetically by member and alphabetically by constituency. Tanzania's National Assembly members are elected concurrently by direct popular vote for 5-year terms. The unicameral National Assembly elected in 2000 had 295 members. These 295 members included the Attorney General, five members elected from the Zanzibar House of Representatives to participate in the Parliament, the 48 special women's seats which were made up of 20% of the seats a particular party had in the House, 181 constituents seats of members of Parliament from the mainland, and 50 seats from Zanzibar, as well as seats for the 10 members of Parliament nominated by the President. The ruling CCM holds about 86% of the seats in the Assembly elected in 2005, and held 93% of seats in the previous Assembly elected in 2000. Laws passed by the National Assembly are valid for Zanzibar only in specifically designated union matters. Zanzibar's House of Representatives has jurisdiction over all non-union matters. There are currently 76 members in the House of Representatives in Zanzibar, including 50 elected by the people, 10 appointed by the president of Zanzibar, 5 exofficio members, and an attorney general appointed by the president. In May 2002, the government increased the number of special seats allocated to women from 10 to 15, which will increase the number of House of Representatives members to 81. Ostensibly, Zanzibar's House of Representatives can make laws for Zanzibar without the approval of the union government as long as it does not involve union-designated matters. The terms of office for Zanzibar's president and House of Representatives also are 5 years. The semiautonomous relationship between Zanzibar and the union is a relatively unique system of government. Political parties and elections Chama Cha Mapinduzi or CCM (Revolutionary Party) - Benjamin Mkapa Civic United Front or CUF - Seif Shariff Hamad Chama cha Democracia na Maendeleo or CHADEMA - Freeman Aikaeli Mbowe (chairman) Tanzania Labour Party or TLP - Augustine Lyatonga Mrema United Democratic Party or UDP - John Cheyo Democratic Party (unregistered) - Reverend	acclaimed vision of education. From independence in 1961 until the mid-1980s, Tanzania was a one-party state, with a socialist model of economic development. Beginning in the mid-1980s, under the administration of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Tanzania undertook a number of political and economic reforms. In January and February 1992, the government decided to adopt multiparty democracy. Legal and constitutional changes led to the registration of 11 political parties. Two parliamentary by-elections in early 1994, both won by Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), were the first-ever multiparty elections in Tanzanian history. In October 2000, Tanzania held its second multi-party general elections. The ruling CCM party’s candidate, Benjamin W. Mkapa, defeated his three main rivals, winning the presidential election with 71% of the vote. In the parliamentary elections, CCM won 202 of the 232 elected seats. In the Zanzibar presidential election, Abeid Amani Karume, the son of former President Abeid Karume, defeated CUF candidate Seif Shariff Hamad. The election was marred by irregularities, and subsequent political violence claimed at least 23 lives in January 2001, mostly on Pemba island, where police used tear gas and bullets against demonstrators. Hundreds were injured, and state forces were reported to have attacked boats of refugees fleeing to Kenya. Also, 16 CUF members were expelled from the Union Parliament after boycotting the legislature to protest the Zanzibar election results. In October 2001, the CCM and the CUF parties signed a reconciliation agreement which called for electoral reforms and set up a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the deaths that occurred in January 2001 on Pemba. The agreement also led to President appointment of an additional CUF official to become a member of the Union Parliament. Changes to the Zanzibar Constitution in April 2002 allowed both the CCM and CUF parties to nominate members to the Zanzibar Electoral Commission. In May 2003, the Zanzibar Electoral Commission conducted by-elections to fill vacant seats in the parliament, including those seats vacated by the CUF boycott. Observers considered these by-elections, the first major test of the reconciliation agreement, to be free, fair, and peaceful. President Mkapa, Vice President Ali Mohamed Shein, Prime Minister Frederick Sumaye, and National Assembly members will serve until the next general elections in 2005. Similarly, Zanzibar President Karume and members of the Zanzibar House of Representatives also will complete their terms of office in 2005. Tanzania was ranked Partly Free by Freedom House. The 2011 Democracy Index marked Tanzania as a "hybrid regime", ranking it 90th out of 167, an improvement from 92nd the year before, but preceding a decline on a number of metrics as shown in subsequent Freedom House studies. By 2018, many of the factors taken into account by Freedom House had undergone a small but significant decline, with the most recent reports citing a marked deterioration in the rights of civil society and reduced the abilities of political opposition to criticize the Magufuli regime. Tanzania remains in the "Partly free" category as of 2018. According to Human Rights Watch since the election of President John Magufuli in December 2015, Tanzania has witnessed a marked decline in respect for free expression, association and assembly. On 19 March 2021, Vice President Samia Suluhu Hassan became the new president after the sudden death of President John Magufuli. She is the first female President of Tanzania. Executive branch \|President \| Samia Suluhu \| Chama Cha Mapinduzi \| 19 March 2021 \|- \|Prime Minister \|Majaliwa Kassim Majaliwa \|Chama Cha Mapinduzi \|20 November 2015 \|- \|Vice-President of Tanzania \|Philip Mpango \|Chama Cha Mapinduzi \|31 March 2021 \|} Tanzania's president is elected by direct popular vote for a 5-year term. The president appoints a prime minister who serves as the government's leader in the National Assembly. The president selects his cabinet from among National Assembly members. The Constitution also empowers him to nominate 10 non-elected members of Parliament, who also are eligible to become cabinet members. Legislative branch The unicameral National Assembly of Tanzania or Bunge has 393 seats — 264 elected by popular vote, 113 allocated to women chosen by their parties in proportion to their share of the electoral vote, 10 nominated by the president, five members chosen by the Zanzibar House of Representatives, and the Attorney General as an ex officio member — all members serving five-year terms. In addition to enacting laws that apply to the entire United Republic of Tanzania, the Assembly enacts laws that apply only to the
An initial investment of around USD $38 million has been made since exploration began in 2006, and nickel should start being mined at the end of 2015. Chinese firms have been showing major interest in Tanzania's mineral deposits; an announcement was made in late 2011 of a plan by the Sichuan Hongda Group, to invest about USD3 billion to develop the Mchuchuma coal and Liganga iron ore projects in the south of the country. It was also announced in August 2012 that China National Gold Corp are in talks to purchase mining assets in Tanzania from African Barrick Gold, in a deal that could be worth more than £2 billion. In November 2012, the Tanzanian government announced investigations into allegations that mining investors in the country were harassing and on some occasions, killing residents around mining sites. Electricity The government-owned Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (TANESCO) dominates the electric supply industry in Tanzania. The country generated 6.013 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity in 2013, a 4.2 percent increase over the 5.771 billion kWh generated in 2012. Generation increased by 63 percent between 2005 and 2012; however, only 15 percent of Tanzanians had access to electric power in 2011. Almost 18 percent of the electricity generated in 2012 was lost because of theft and transmission and distribution problems. The electrical supply varies, particularly when droughts disrupt hydropower electric generation; rolling blackouts are implemented as necessary. The unreliability of the electrical supply has hindered the development of Tanzanian industry. In 2013, 49.7 percent of Tanzania's electricity generation came from natural gas, 28.9 percent from hydroelectric sources, 20.4 percent from thermal sources, and 1.0 percent from outside the country. The government is building a gas pipeline from Mnazi Bay to Dar es Salaam, with a scheduled completion in 2015. This pipeline is expected to allow the country to double its electricity generation capacity to 3,000 megawatts by 2016. The government's goal is to increase capacity to at least 10,000 megawatts by 2025. Natural gas According to PFC Energy, 25 to 30 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas resources have been discovered in Tanzania since 2010. The value of natural gas actually produced in 2013 was US$52.2 million, a 42.7 percent increase over 2012. Commercial production of gas from the Songo Songo Island field in the Indian Ocean commenced in 2004, thirty years after it was discovered there. Over 35 billion cubic feet of gas was produced from this field in 2013, with proven, probable, and possible reserves totalling 1.1 trillion cubic feet. The gas is transported by pipeline to Dar es Salaam. As of 27 August 2014, TANESCO owed the operator of this field, Orca Exploration Group Inc., US$50.4 million, down from US$63.8 million two months earlier. A newer natural gas field in Mnazi Bay in 2013 produced about one-seventh of the amount produced near Songo Songo Island but has proven, probable, and possible reserves of 2.2 trillion cubic feet. Virtually all of that gas is being used for electricity generation in Mtwara. The Indian Ocean, off the coast of Mozambique and Tanzania, is proving to be a rich hunting ground for natural gas exploration. According to US Geological Survey estimates, the combined gas reserves of Mozambique and Tanzania could be as high as 250 trillion cubic feet. In Mozambique alone, proven gas reserves have increased dramatically from a mere 4.6 trillion cubic feet in 2013 to 98.8 trillion cubic feet as of mid-2015. Given continued offshore discoveries and the size of discoveries to date, continued growth in proven gas reserves is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. New exploration on more frontier blocks, however, will likely be slowed as oil and gas prices fall and companies apply increasing caution to investing in frontier markets with nascent industries, poor infrastructure and long lead times. External trade and investment Tanzania's history of political stability has encouraged foreign direct investment. The government has committed itself to improve the investment climate including redrawing tax codes, floating the exchange rate, licensing foreign banks, and creating an investment promotion center to cut red tape. Tanzania has mineral resources and a largely untapped tourism sector, which might make it a viable market for foreign investment. The stock market capitalisation of listed companies in Tanzania was valued at $588 million in 2005 by the World Bank. Zanzibar Zanzibar's economy is based primarily on the production of cloves (90% grown on the island of Pemba), the principal foreign exchange earner. Exports have suffered from the downturn in the clove market. The Government of Zanzibar has been more aggressive than its mainland counterpart in instituting economic reforms and has legalized foreign exchange bureaus on the islands. This has loosened up the economy and dramatically increased the availability of consumer commodities. Furthermore, with external funding, the government plans to make the port of Zanzibar a	the last 5 years have seen the slowest growth since 2000. The medium-term outlook is so far positive, with growth projected at 6 percent in 2020/21, which is supported by large infrastructure spending. The World Bank (WB) expects the economic growth of Tanzania to slow to 2.5% in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic which has affected the labor market, the production capacity, and productivity. Tourism has halted, and exports of manufacturing and agricultural goods slumped. On 7 September 2021, the IMF approved USD 567.25 million in emergency financial assistance to support Tanzania’s efforts in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic by addressing the urgent health, humanitarian, and economic costs. The IMF projects a GDP growth for Tanzania of +4.0% and +5.1% in 2021 and 2022, and 6.0% in 2026. However, the AfDB estimates that Tanzania’s GDP will grow by 2.8% in 2021, and projecting a strong rebound for 2022 and 2023 with 4.9% and 6.3% economic growth respectively. History Significant measures have been taken to liberalize the Tanzanian economy along market lines and encourage both foreign and domestic private investment. Beginning in 1986, the Government of Tanzania embarked on an adjustment program to dismantle the socialist (Ujamaa) economic controls and encourage more active participation of the private sector in the economy. The program included a comprehensive package of policies which reduced the budget deficit and improved monetary control, substantially depreciated the overvalued exchange rate, liberalized the trade regime, removed most price controls, eased restrictions on the marketing of food crops, freed interest rates, and initiated a restructuring of the financial sector. Current GDP per capita of Tanzania grew more than 40 percent between 1998 and 2007. In May 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved an Exogenous Shock Facility for Tanzania to help the country cope with the global economic crisis Tanzania is also engaged in a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) with the IMF, which commenced in February 2007 after Tanzania completed its second three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), the first having been completed in August 2003. The PRGF was the successor program to the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, which Tanzania also participated in from 1996 to 1999. The IMF's PSI program provides policy support and signaling to participating low-income countries and is intended for countries that have usually achieved a reasonable growth performance, low underlying inflation, an adequate level of official international reserves, and have begun to establish external and net domestic debt sustainability. Tanzania also embarked on a major restructuring of state-owned enterprises. The program has so far divested 335 out of some 425 parastatal entities. Overall, real economic growth has averaged about 4 percent a year, much better than the previous 20 years, but not enough to improve the lives of average Tanzanians. Also, the economy remains overwhelmingly donor-dependent. Moreover, Tanzania has an external debt of $7.9 billion. The servicing of this debt absorbs about 40 percent of total government expenditures. Tanzania has qualified for debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. Debts worth over $6 billion were canceled following implementation of the Paris Club 7 Agreement. Height measure studies for Tanzania show that welfare increased through the years of colonization, with an decline during the 1930s. This is due to epidemics in that period of time. Macro-economic trend This is a chart of trend of gross domestic product of Tanzania at market prices estimated by the International Monetary Fund with figures in millions of Tanzanian Shillings. Mean wages were $0.52 per man-hour in 2009. The economy saw continuous real GDP growth of at least 5% since 2007. The following table shows the main economic indicators in 1980–2017. Inflation below 5% is in green. Agriculture The Tanzanian economy is heavily based on agriculture, which accounts for 28.7 percent of gross domestic product, provides 85 percent of exports, and accounts for half of the employed workforce; The agricultural sector grew 4.3 percent in 2012, less than half of the Millennium Development Goal target of 10.8 percent. 16.4 percent of the land is arable, with 2.4 percent of the land planted with permanent crops. This strong dependence on agriculture, makes Tanzania's economy highly vulnerable to weather shocks and fluctuating commodity prices. 76% of Tanzania's population subsist thanks to agriculture and, due to the lack of knowledge and infrastructure to develop and implement some kind of agricultural technology, any droughts, floods, or temperature shocks can severely damage the living standards of those people and create huge increases in unemployment, hunger, and malnutrition rates, as well as, in really severe case, mortality rates due to starvation. Tanzania produced in 2018: 5.9 million tons of maize; 5 million tons of cassava (12th largest producer in the world); 3.8 million tons of sweet potato (4th largest producer in the world, second only to China, Malawi and Nigeria); 3.4 million tons of banana (10th largest producer in the world, 13th adding plantain production); 3 million tons of rice; 3 million tons of sugarcane; 1.7 million tons of potato; 1.2 million tons of beans (6th largest producer in the world); 940 thousand tons of peanut (7th largest producer in the world); 930 thousand tons of sunflower seed (12th largest producer in the world); 808 thousand tons of sorghum; 561 thousand tons of sesame seed (5th largest producer in the world, losing only to Sudan, Myanmar, India and Nigeria); 546 thousand tons of coconut (11th largest producer in the world); 454 thousand tons of mango (including mangosteen and guava); 389 thousand tons of pineapple; 373 thousand tons of orange; 356 thousand tons of tomato; 238 thousand tons of cotton; 171 thousand tons of cashew nuts (6th largest producer in the world); In addition to smaller productions of other agricultural products, like tobacco (107 thousand tons, 8th largest producer in the world), coffee (55 thousand tons), tea (36 thousand tons) and sisal (33 thousand tons). Industry Industries are a major and growing component of the Tanzanian economy, contributing 22.2 percent of GDP in 2013. This component includes mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity and natural gas, water supply, and construction. Mining Mining contributed 3.3 percent of GDP in 2013. The vast majority of the country's mineral export revenue comes from gold, accounting for 89 percent of the value of those exports in 2013. It also exports sizable quantities of gemstones, including diamonds and tanzanite. All of Tanzania's coal production, which totalled 106,000 short tons in 2012, is used domestically. Minerals Other minerals exploited in Tanzania include; Pozzolana Salt Gypsum Kaolinite Silver ore Copper Phosphate Tanzanite Tin Graphite Bauxite. Modern gold mining in Tanzania started in the German colonial period, beginning with gold discoveries near Lake Victoria in 1894. The first gold mine in what was then Tanganyika, the Sekenke Gold Mine, began operation in 1909, and gold mining in Tanzania experienced a boom between 1930 and World War II. By 1967, gold production in the country had dropped to insignificance but was revived in the mid-1970s, when the gold price rose once more.
communication. At the end of 2013 there were: 21 network facility operators: 8 international and national, 11 national, and 2 regional; 17 network service operators: 8 international and national, 6 national, and 3 regional; 91 application service operators: 1 international, 15 international and national, 62 national, 11 regional, and 2 district; 85 radio content service operators: 6 national + commercial, 10 regional + commercial, 7 regional + non-commercial, 30 district + commercial, and 29 district + non-commercial; 30 television content service operators: 5 national + commercial, 4 regional + commercial, 1 regional + non-commercial, 6 district + commercial, and 17 district + non-commercial. A complete list of licensed operators and contractors is available from the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA) website. Radio and television A state-owned national radio station and more than 40 privately owned radio stations are in operation (2007). A state-owned TV station and multiple privately owned TV stations are in operation (2007). The transmissions of several international broadcasters are available (2007). There are government restrictions on broadcasting in tribal languages. The semiautonomous Zanzibari government controls the content of all public and private radio and television broadcasts in its islands. Even in the case of state television broadcast from the mainland, there was a delay in the feed, allowing Zanzibari censors to intervene. However, Zanzibari radio stations operate relatively independently, often reading the content of national dailies, including articles critical of the Zanzibari government. Telephones Calling code: +255 International call prefix: 000 Main lines: 161,100 lines in use, 133rd in the world (2011). Mobile cellular: 27.2 million lines, 39th in the world (2012). Telephone system: telecommunications services are marginal; fixed-line telephone network inadequate with less than 1 connection per 100 persons; system operating below capacity and being modernized for better service; Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) system under construction; mobile-cellular service, aided by multiple providers, is increasing rapidly and in 2011 exceeded a subscriber base of 50 telephones per 100 persons; trunk service provided by open-wire, microwave radio relay, tropospheric scatter, and fiber-optic cable; some links being made digital (2010). Communications cables:	facilitate the arrival of telephone services over cable television networks, television services over telecommunications networks, and Internet services over all types of networks. Under the Converged Licensing Framework four categories of license are available: Network facility, the provision of any element or combination of physical infrastructure used principally for, or in connection with, the provision of Content services and other Application services, but not including customer premises equipment; Network service, a service for carrying information in the form of speech or other sound, data, text or images, by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy, but not including services provided solely on the customer side of the network boundary; Application service, the reselling of electronic communication services to end users; and Content service, a service offered for sound, data, text or images whether still or moving except where transmitted on private communication. At the end of 2013 there were: 21 network facility operators: 8 international and national, 11 national, and 2 regional; 17 network service operators: 8 international and national, 6 national, and 3 regional; 91 application service operators: 1 international, 15 international and national, 62 national, 11 regional, and 2 district; 85 radio content service operators: 6 national + commercial, 10 regional + commercial, 7 regional + non-commercial, 30 district + commercial, and 29 district + non-commercial; 30 television content service operators: 5 national + commercial, 4 regional + commercial, 1 regional + non-commercial, 6 district + commercial, and 17 district + non-commercial. A complete list of licensed operators and contractors is available from the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA) website. Radio and television A state-owned national radio station and more than 40 privately owned radio stations are in operation (2007). A state-owned TV station and multiple privately owned TV stations are in operation (2007). The transmissions of several international broadcasters are available (2007). There are government restrictions on broadcasting in tribal languages. The semiautonomous Zanzibari government controls the content of all public and private radio and television broadcasts in its islands. Even in the case of state television broadcast from the mainland, there was a delay in the feed, allowing Zanzibari censors to intervene. However, Zanzibari radio stations operate relatively independently, often reading the content of national dailies, including articles critical of the Zanzibari government. Telephones Calling code: +255 International call prefix: 000 Main lines: 161,100 lines in use, 133rd in the world (2011). Mobile cellular: 27.2 million lines, 39th in the world (2012). Telephone system: telecommunications services are marginal; fixed-line telephone network inadequate with less than 1 connection per 100 persons; system operating below capacity and being modernized for better service; Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) system under
using numbers starting with "T" but so far the "A" designations are visible if at all. Regional roads Mtwara Region: Paved roads link Mtwara and Masasi and from there almost to Nangoma. An unpaved road then leads to Mtambaswala and the modern Unity Bridge on the Mozambique border. The African Development Bank in April 2012 approved a loan to Tanzania to pave this road, followed in April 2013 with an additional loan of 7.659 billion yen (US $77.9 million) from Japan. Western regions are the most poorly served, with no paved highways except locally in Kigoma and Ujiji. Only one dirt road runs down the western side of the country, it is just a track between Kasulu and Sumbawanga and prone to flooding south of Mpanda. Between Tunduma in the south-west and Nyakanyazi junction near Kibondo in the north-west, a distance of nearly 1000 km, there are no highways in the centre of the country. International highways The Cairo-Cape Town Highway, Highway 4 in the Trans-African Highway network, runs between the northern town of Namanga on the Kenyan border and the Zambian border town of Tunduma in the southwest, via Arusha, Dodoma, Iringa, and Mbeya. The section between the entrance to Tarangire National Park and Iringa has been recently paved between Babati-Kondoa-Dodoma-Iringa. There is no longer a need to traverse a longer eastern route from Arusha to Iringa via Moshi and Morogoro is paved. This route is versus for the Arusha-Dodoma-Iringa route. In the southwest, from Iringa to Tunduma, the Cairo-Cape Town Highway follows the Tanzam Highway linking Zambia and Dar es Salaam. Rail transport In 2008 Tanzania had of rail, ranking it 46th in the world by length It includes of Metre gauge and of gauge track. On 31 March 2015 the Tanzanian government announced it would use $14.2 billion of commercial loans to build new rail infrastructure across the country before 2021 and make the country a regional transport hub. Tanzania Railways Proposals have been made for a railway to link Mtwara to iron ore deposits in the west, possibly connecting to Mbeya. The central line between Kigoma and Dar es Salaam carries international freight and passengers in transit from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda to the Indian Ocean, and the branch from Tabora to Mwanza carries freight and passengers between Uganda and the Indian Ocean. Isaka Dry Port is a small town and station on the Mwanza Line at its intersection with the paved highway to Kigali. It has been developed into a so-called 'dry port' for trans-shipping Burundian and Rwandan road freight onto freight trains for the seaport of Dar es Salaam. There are proposals to build a railway from Isaka to Rwanda/Burundi. TAZARA Railway The Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA), formerly also called TanZam Railway operates of narrow gauge track (matching Zambian/Southern African networks) between Dar es Salaam and Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia, of which is in Tanzania and in Zambia). It is not a part of Tanzania Railways Corporation, and because of the difference in gauge there is no rail connection between the networks. There is a container trans-shipment yard to transfer freight containers between TAZARA and Tanzania Railways Corporation at Kidatu near Morogoro. This allows containers to be shipped from as far as Uganda and Kenya via the Lake Victoria train ferries and the Kidatu yard to the Southern African rail network via Zambia. Dar es Salaam - ocean port - 8 km from TRC line Kidatu - break of gauge connection with Tanzania Railways Corporation, with a container trans-shipment facility Mbeya Tunduma - Zambian border Urban rail Air transport Airports Air travel is regulated by the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority. The Tanzania Airports Authority operates 25 airports out of the 58 aerodromes on the Tanzania mainland. Kilimanjaro International is managed by the state-owned Kilimanjaro Airport Development Company, whilst airports in the semi-autonomous Zanzibar Archipelago are under the jurisdiction of the Zanzibar Airports Authority. Fifteen airports offer the airport of entry service. Air services, both chartered and scheduled, are provided by local airlines such as the flag carrier Air Tanzania, Precision Air and Coastal Aviation. Prior to the launch of Fastjet, a low-cost carrier, air travel was and still is unaffordable for the vast majority due to high fares. The lowest fare offered by Fastjet for a single journey is US$20 (excluding tax) and its domestic route network is limited to only five destinations as the Airbus A319 requires of runway for takeoff. The government is cognizant of the importance of air travel to the economy and has therefore rehabilitated airports at strategic locations such as Kigoma to capture the market from neighboring countries. It intends to construct Kajunguti International Airport in the northwest to serve the African Great Lakes region. Other major airports under planning and consideration are Msalato International and Serengeti International, which will serve the capital Dodoma and the Serengeti National Park respectively. Airstrips There are a considerable number of both public and private airstrips. Tanzania Airports Authority manages 32 airstrips, such as Morogoro and Singida. The Tanzania National Parks Authority operates 26 airstrips in national parks. Seronera Airstrip is the busiest in the country. Sixty-one airstrips are operated by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Private organisations own 93 aerodromes such as the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation operating Songo Songo Airstrip. Maritime transport Ports and harbours There is an abundance of coastal	Rwanda at Rusomo Falls ( (entirely paved): From Nzega in the Tabora Region, the B-3 road leads to the Rwandan border (). Kigoma and the border with Burundi at Manyovu: The road is entirely paved. Mwanza and Musoma ( entirely paved): The B-6 road connects these cities and then proceeds north to the Kenyan border. Arusha and Namanga on the Kenyan border (: The A-104 road is entirely paved. Iringa and Mbeya ( entirely paved): The A-104 road links these cities, with its terminus in Tunduma on the Zambian border. Trunk roads in Tanzania were marked by numbers following the two-tier number system with prefixes A- and B-, as is practiced in the rest of East Africa. Following is the list of Tanzanian trunk roads. Meanwhile Tanzania has introduced a numbering system for trunk roads using numbers starting with "T" but so far the "A" designations are visible if at all. Regional roads Mtwara Region: Paved roads link Mtwara and Masasi and from there almost to Nangoma. An unpaved road then leads to Mtambaswala and the modern Unity Bridge on the Mozambique border. The African Development Bank in April 2012 approved a loan to Tanzania to pave this road, followed in April 2013 with an additional loan of 7.659 billion yen (US $77.9 million) from Japan. Western regions are the most poorly served, with no paved highways except locally in Kigoma and Ujiji. Only one dirt road runs down the western side of the country, it is just a track between Kasulu and Sumbawanga and prone to flooding south of Mpanda. Between Tunduma in the south-west and Nyakanyazi junction near Kibondo in the north-west, a distance of nearly 1000 km, there are no highways in the centre of the country. International highways The Cairo-Cape Town Highway, Highway 4 in the Trans-African Highway network, runs between the northern town of Namanga on the Kenyan border and the Zambian border town of Tunduma in the southwest, via Arusha, Dodoma, Iringa, and Mbeya. The section between the entrance to Tarangire National Park and Iringa has been recently paved between Babati-Kondoa-Dodoma-Iringa. There is no longer a need to traverse a longer eastern route from Arusha to Iringa via Moshi and Morogoro is paved. This route is versus for the Arusha-Dodoma-Iringa route. In the southwest, from Iringa to Tunduma, the Cairo-Cape Town Highway follows the Tanzam Highway linking Zambia and Dar es Salaam. Rail transport In 2008 Tanzania had of rail, ranking it 46th in the world by length It includes of Metre gauge and of gauge track. On 31 March 2015 the Tanzanian government announced it would use $14.2 billion of commercial loans to build new rail infrastructure across the country before 2021 and make the country a regional transport hub. Tanzania Railways Proposals have been made for a railway to link Mtwara to iron ore deposits in the west, possibly connecting to Mbeya. The central line between Kigoma and Dar es Salaam carries international freight and passengers in transit from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda to the Indian Ocean, and the branch from Tabora to Mwanza carries freight and passengers between Uganda and the Indian Ocean. Isaka Dry Port is a small town and station on the Mwanza Line at its intersection with the paved highway to Kigali. It has been developed into a so-called 'dry port' for trans-shipping Burundian and Rwandan road freight onto freight trains for the seaport of Dar es Salaam. There are proposals to build a railway from Isaka to Rwanda/Burundi. TAZARA Railway The Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA), formerly also called TanZam Railway operates of narrow gauge track (matching Zambian/Southern African networks) between Dar es Salaam and Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia, of which is in Tanzania and in Zambia). It is not a part of Tanzania Railways Corporation, and because of the difference in gauge there is no rail connection between the networks. There is a container trans-shipment yard to transfer freight containers between TAZARA and Tanzania Railways Corporation at Kidatu near Morogoro. This allows containers to be shipped from as far as Uganda and Kenya via the Lake Victoria train ferries and the Kidatu yard
the United Republic of Tanzania, enjoys good relations with its neighbours in the region and in recent years has been an active participant in efforts to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. Tanzania is helping to broker peace talks to end conflict in Burundi and supports the Lusaka agreement concerning the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In March 1996, Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya revived discussion of economic and regional cooperation. These talks culminated with the signing of an East African Cooperation Treaty in September 1999, which should in time lead to economic integration through the development of the East African Community. Tanzania is the only country in East Africa which also is a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Historically, Tanzania has played an	partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Bilateral relations Africa Americas Asia Europe Oceania International organisation participation AU, ACP, AfDB, C, EAC, EADB, ECA, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICCt, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, ITUC, MONUC, NAM, OAU, OPCW, PMAESA SADC, United Nations (see Permanent Representative of Tanzania to the United Nations), UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UPU, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTO Tanzania and the Commonwealth of Nations Tanzania has been a republic in the Commonwealth of Nations since 1964, when the Republic of Tanganyika and
jailed for three to fifteen years. After the 2014 Thai coup d'état, Thailand had the highest number of lèse-majesté prisoners in the nation's history. In 2017, the military court in Thailand sentenced a man to 35 years in prison for violating the country's lèse-majesté law. Human rights in Thailand has been rated not free on the Freedom House Index since 2014. Administrative divisions Thailand is a unitary state; the administrative services of the executive branch are divided into three levels by National Government Organisation Act, BE 2534 (1991): central, provincial and local. Thailand is composed of 76 provinces (, changwat), which are first-level administrative divisions. There are also two specially governed districts: the capital Bangkok and Pattaya. Bangkok is at provincial level and thus often counted as a province. Each province is divided into districts (, amphoe) and the districts are further divided into sub-districts (, tambons). The name of each province's capital city (, mueang) is the same as that of the province. For example, the capital of Chiang Mai Province (Changwat Chiang Mai) is Mueang Chiang Mai or Chiang Mai. All provincial governors and district chiefs, which are administrators of provinces and districts respectively, are appointed by the central government. Thailand's provinces are sometimes grouped into four to six regions, depending on the source. Foreign relations In 2000s period, Thailand participated fully in international and regional organisations. It is a major non-NATO ally and Priority Watch List Special 301 Report of the United States. The country remains an active member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thailand has developed increasingly close ties with other ASEAN members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam, whose foreign and economic ministers hold annual meetings. Regional co-operation is progressing in economic, trade, banking, political, and cultural matters. In 2003, Thailand served as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) host. Supachai Panitchpakdi, the former Deputy Prime Minister, served as Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In 2005 Thailand attended the inaugural East Asia Summit. Thailand had taken an active role on the international stage. When East Timor gained independence from Indonesia, contributed troops to the international peacekeeping effort. As part of its effort to increase international ties, Thailand had reached out to such regional organisations as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Thailand had contributed troops to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Thaksin Shinawatra premiership, he initiated negotiations for several free trade agreements with China, Australia, Bahrain, India, and the US. The latter especially was criticised, with claims that uncompetitive Thai industries could be wiped out. Thaksin also announced that Thailand would forsake foreign aid, and work with donor countries to assist in the development of neighbours in the Greater Mekong Sub-region. Thaksin sought to position Thailand as a regional leader, initiating various development projects in poorer neighbouring countries like Laos. More controversially, he established close, friendly ties with the Burmese dictatorship. Thailand joined the US-led invasion of Iraq, sending a humanitarian contingent. It withdrew its troops on 10 September 2004. Two Thai soldiers died in Iraq in an insurgent attack. In April 2009, the Cambodian–Thai border dispute brought troops on territory immediately adjacent to the 900-year-old ruins of Cambodia's Preah Vihear Hindu temple near the border. The Cambodian government claimed its army had killed at least four Thais and captured 10 more, although the Thai government denied that any Thai soldiers were killed or injured. Two Cambodian and three Thai soldiers were killed. Both armies blamed the other for firing first and denied entering the other's territory. Armed forces The Royal Thai Armed Forces (กองทัพไทย; ) constitute the military of the Kingdom of Thailand. It consists of the Royal Thai Army (กองทัพบกไทย), the Royal Thai Navy (กองทัพเรือไทย), and the Royal Thai Air Force (กองทัพอากาศไทย). It also incorporates various paramilitary forces. The Thai Armed Forces have a combined manpower of 306,000 active duty personnel and another 245,000 active reserve personnel. The head of the Thai Armed Forces (จอมทัพไทย, Chom Thap Thai) is the king, although this position is only nominal. The armed forces are managed by the Ministry of Defence of Thailand, which is headed by the Minister of Defence (a member of the cabinet of Thailand) and commanded by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, which in turn is headed by the Chief of Defence Forces of Thailand. Thai annual defense budget almost tripled from 78 billion baht in 2005 to 207 billion baht in 2016, accounting for approximately 1.5% of 2019 Thai GDP. Thailand ranked 16th worldwide in the Military Strength Index based on the Credit Suisse report in September 2015. The military is also tasked with humanitarian missions, such as escorting Rohingya to Malaysia or Indonesia, ensuring security and welfare for refugees during Indochina refugee crisis. According to the constitution, serving in the armed forces is a duty of all Thai citizens. Thailand still use active draft system for males over the age of 21. They are subjected to varying lengths of active service depending on the duration of reserve training as Territorial Defence Student and their level of education. Those who have completed three years or more of reserve training will be exempted entirely. The practice has long been criticized, as some media question its efficacy and value. It is alleged that conscripts end up as servants to senior officers or clerks in military cooperative shops. In a report issued in March 2020, Amnesty International charged that Thai military conscripts face institutionalised abuse systematically hushed up by military authorities. Critics observed that Thai military's main objective is to deal with internal rather than external threats. Internal Security Operations Command is called the political arm of the Thai military, which has overlapping social and political functions with civilian bureaucracy. It also has anti-democracy mission. The military is also notorious for numerous corruption incidents, such as accusation of human trafficking, and nepotism in promotion of high-ranking officers. The military is deeply entrenched in politics. Most recently, the appointed senators include more than 100 active and retired military. In 2017, Thailand signed and ratified the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Economy The economy of Thailand is heavily export-dependent, with exports accounting for more than two-thirds of gross domestic product (GDP). Thailand exports over US$105 billion worth of goods and services annually. Major exports include cars, computers, electrical appliances, rice, textiles and footwear, fishery products, rubber, and jewellery. Thailand is an emerging economy and is considered a newly industrialised country. Thailand had a 2017 GDP of US$1.236 trillion (on a purchasing power parity basis). Thailand is the 2nd largest economy in Southeast Asia after Indonesia. Thailand ranks midway in the wealth spread in Southeast Asia as it is the 4th richest nation according to GDP per capita, after Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia. Thailand functions as an anchor economy for the neighbouring developing economies of Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. In the third quarter of 2014, the unemployment rate in Thailand stood at 0.84% according to Thailand's National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB). Recent economic history Thailand experienced the world's highest economic growth rate from 1985 to 1996 – averaging 12.4% annually. In 1997 increased pressure on the baht, a year in which the economy contracted by 1.9%, led to a crisis that uncovered financial sector weaknesses and forced the Chavalit Yongchaiyudh administration to float the currency. Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh was forced to resign after his cabinet came under fire for its slow response to the economic crisis. The baht was pegged at 25 to the US dollar from 1978 to 1997. The baht reached its lowest point of 56 to the US dollar in January 1998 and the economy contracted by 10.8% that year, triggering the Asian financial crisis. Thailand's economy started to recover in 1999, expanding 4.2–4.4% in 2000, thanks largely to strong exports. Growth (2.2%) was dampened by the softening of the global economy in 2001, but picked up in the subsequent years owing to strong growth in Asia, a relatively weak baht encouraging exports, and increased domestic spending as a result of several mega projects and incentives of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, known as Thaksinomics. Growth in 2002, 2003, and 2004 was 5–7% annually. Growth in 2005, 2006, and 2007 hovered around 4–5%. Due both to the weakening of the US dollar and an increasingly strong Thai currency, by March 2008 the dollar was hovering around the 33 baht mark. While Thaksinomics has received criticism, official economic data reveals that between 2001 and 2011, Isan's GDP per capita more than doubled to US$1,475, while, over the same period, GDP in the Bangkok area increased from US$7,900 to nearly US$13,000. With the instability surrounding major 2010 protests, the GDP growth of Thailand settled at around 4–5%, from highs of 5–7% under the previous civilian administration. Political uncertainty was identified as the primary cause of a decline in investor and consumer confidence. The IMF predicted that the Thai economy would rebound strongly from the low 0.1% GDP growth in 2011, to 5.5% in 2012 and then 7.5% in 2013, due to the monetary policy of the Bank of Thailand, as well as a package of fiscal stimulus measures introduced by the former Yingluck Shinawatra government. Following the Thai military coup of 22 May 2014. In 2017, Concluded with information on the Thai economy's grew an inflation-adjusted 3.9%, up from 3.3% in 2016, marking its fastest expansion since 2012. Income, poverty and wealth Thais have median wealth per one adult person of $1,469 in 2016, increasing from $605 in 2010. In 2016, Thailand was ranked 87th in Human Development Index, and 70th in the inequality-adjusted HDI. In 2017, Thailand's median household income was ฿26,946 per month. Top quintile households had a 45.0% share of all income, while bottom quintile households had 7.1%. There were 26.9 million persons who had the bottom 40% of income earning less than ฿5,344 per person per month. During 2013–2014 Thai political crisis, a survey found that anti-government PDRC mostly (32%) had a monthly income of more than ฿50,000, while pro-government UDD mostly (27%) had between ฿10,000 and ฿20,000. In 2014, Credit Suisse reported that Thailand was the world's third most unequal country, behind Russia and India. The top 10% richest held 79% of the country's assets. The top 1% richest held 58% of the assets. Thai 50 richest families had a total net worth accounting to 30% of GDP. In 2016, 5.81 million people lived in poverty, or 11.6 million people (17.2% of population) if "near poor" is included. Proportion of the poor relative to total population in each region was 12.96% in the Northeast, 12.35% in the South, and 9.83% in the North. In 2017, there were 14 million people who applied for social welfare (yearly income of less than ฿100,000 was required). At the end of 2017, Thailand's total household debt was ฿11.76 trillion. In 2010, 3% of all household were bankrupt. In 2016, there were estimated 30,000 homeless persons in the country. Exports and manufacturing The economy of Thailand is heavily export-dependent, with exports accounting for more than two-thirds of gross domestic product (GDP). Thailand exports over US$105 billion worth of goods and services annually. Major exports include cars, computers, electrical appliances, rice, textiles and footwear, fishery products, rubber, and jewellery. Substantial industries include electric appliances, components, computer components, and vehicles. Thailand's recovery from the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis depended mainly on exports, among various other factors. , the Thai automotive industry was the largest in Southeast Asia and the 9th largest in the world. The Thailand industry has an annual output of near 1.5 million vehicles, mostly commercial vehicles. Most of the vehicles built in Thailand are developed and licensed by foreign producers, mainly Japanese and American. The Thai car industry takes advantage of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to find a market for many of its products. Eight manufacturers, five Japanese, two US, and Tata of India, produce pick-up trucks in Thailand. As of 2012, Due to its favorable taxation for 2-door pick-ups at only 3-12% against 17-50% for passenger cars, Thailand was the second largest consumer of pick-up trucks in the world, after the US. In 2014, pick-ups accounted for 42% of all new vehicle sales in Thailand. Tourism Tourism makes up about 6% of the country's economy. Thailand was the most visited country in Southeast Asia in 2013, according to the World Tourism Organisation. Estimates of tourism receipts directly contributing to the Thai GDP of 12 trillion baht range from 9 percent (1 trillion baht) (2013) to 16 percent. When including the indirect effects of tourism, it is said to account for 20.2 percent (2.4 trillion baht) of Thailand's GDP. Asian tourists primarily visit Thailand for Bangkok and the historical, natural, and cultural sights in its vicinity. Western tourists not only visit Bangkok and surroundings, but in addition many travel to the southern beaches and islands. The north is the chief destination for trekking and adventure travel with its diverse ethnic minority groups and forested mountains. The region hosting the fewest tourists is Isan. To accommodate foreign visitors, a separate tourism police with offices were set up in the major tourist areas and an emergency telephone number. Thailand ranks 5th biggest medical tourism destination of inbound medical tourism spending, according to World Travel and Tourism Council, attracting over 2.5 million visitors in 2018. The country is also Asia's number one. The country is popular for the growing practice of sex reassignment surgery (SRS) and cosmetic surgery. In 2010–2012, more than 90% of medical tourists travelled to Thailand for SRS. Prostitution in Thailand and sex tourism also form a de facto part of the economy. Campaigns promote Thailand as exotic to attract tourists. One estimate published in 2003 placed the trade at US$4.3 billion per year or about 3% of the Thai economy. It is believed that at least 10% of tourist dollars are spent on the sex trade. Agriculture and natural resources Forty-nine per cent of Thailand's labour force is employed in agriculture. This is down from 70% in 1980. Rice is the most important crop in the country and Thailand had long been the world's leading exporter of rice, until recently falling behind both India and Vietnam. Thailand has the highest percentage of arable land, 27.25%, of any nation in the Greater Mekong Subregion. About 55% of the arable land area is used for rice production. Agriculture has been experiencing a transition from labour-intensive and transitional methods to a more industrialised and competitive sector. Between 1962 and 1983, the agricultural sector grew by 4.1% per year on average and continued to grow at 2.2% between 1983 and 2007. The relative contribution of agriculture to GDP has declined while exports of goods and services have increased. Furthermore, access to biocapacity in Thailand is lower than world average. In 2016, Thailand had 1.2 global hectares of biocapacity per person within its territory, a little less than world average of 1.6 global hectares per person. In contrast, in 2016, they used 2.5 global hectares of biocapacity – their ecological footprint of consumption. This means they use about twice as much biocapacity as Thailand contains. As a result, Thailand is running a biocapacity deficit. Informal economy Thailand has a diverse and robust informal labour sector—in 2012, it was estimated that informal workers comprised 62.6% of the Thai workforce. The Ministry of Labour defines informal workers to be individuals who work in informal economies and do not have employee status under a given country's Labour Protection Act (LPA). The informal sector in Thailand has grown significantly over the past 60 years over the course of Thailand's gradual transition from an agriculture-based economy to becoming more industrialised and service-oriented. Between 1993 and 1995, ten percent of the Thai labour force moved from the agricultural sector to urban and industrial jobs, especially in the manufacturing sector. It is estimated that between 1988 and 1995, the number of factory workers in the country doubled from two to four million, as Thailand's GDP tripled. While the Asian Financial Crisis that followed in 1997 hit the Thai economy hard, the industrial sector continued to expand under widespread deregulation, as Thailand was mandated to adopt a range of structural adjustment reforms upon receiving funding from the IMF and World Bank. These reforms implemented an agenda of increased privatisation and trade liberalisation in the country, and decreased federal subsidisation of public goods and utilities, agricultural price supports, and regulations on fair wages and labour conditions. These changes put further pressure on the agricultural sector, and prompted continued migration from the rural countryside to the growing cities. Many migrant farmers found work in Thailand's growing manufacturing industry, and took jobs in sweatshops and factories with few labour regulations and often exploitative conditions. Those that could not find formal factory work, including illegal migrants and the families of rural Thai migrants that followed their relatives to the urban centres, turned to the informal sector to provide the extra support needed for survival—under the widespread regulation imposed by the structural adjustment programs, one family member working in a factory or sweatshop made very little. Scholars argue that the economic consequences and social costs of Thailand's labour reforms in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis fell on individuals and families rather than the state. This can be described as the "externalisation of market risk", meaning that as the country's labour market became increasingly deregulated, the burden and responsibility of providing an adequate livelihood shifted from employers and the state to the workers themselves, whose families had to find jobs in the informal sector to make up for the losses and subsidise the wages being made by their relatives in the formal sector. The weight of these economic changes hit migrants and the urban poor especially hard, and the informal sector expanded rapidly as a result. Today, informal labour in Thailand is typically broken down into three main groups: subcontracted/self employed/home-based workers, service workers (including those that are employed in restaurants, as street vendors, masseuses, taxi drivers, and as domestic workers), and agricultural workers. Not included in these categories are those that work in entertainment, nightlife, and the sex industry. Individuals employed in these facets of the informal labour sector face additional vulnerabilities, including recruitment into circles of sexual exploitation and human trafficking. In general, education levels are low in the informal sector. A 2012 study found that 64% of informal workers had not completed education beyond primary school. Many informal workers are also migrants, only some of which have legal status in the country. Education and citizenship are two main barriers to entry for those looking to work in formal industries, and enjoy the labour protections and social security benefits that come along with formal employment. Because the informal labour sector is not recognised under the Labour Protection Act (LPA), informal workers are much more vulnerable labour to exploitation and unsafe working conditions than those employed in more formal and federally recognised industries. While some Thai labour laws provide minimal protections to domestic and agricultural workers, they are often weak and difficult to enforce. Furthermore, Thai social security policies fail to protect against the risks many informal workers face, including workplace accidents and compensation as well as unemployment and retirement insurance. Many informal workers are not legally contracted for their employment, and many do not make a living wage. As a result, labour trafficking is common in the region, affecting children and adults, men and women, and migrants and Thai citizens alike. Science and technology In modern times, Thai scientists have made many significant contributions in various fields of study. For example, In chemistry, Krisana Kraisintu as known as the "Gypsy pharmacist". She developed one of the first generic ARV fixed-dose combinations and dedicated her life to making medicines more affordable and accessible. Her efforts have saved countless lives in Africa, GPO-VIR has now been chosen by World Health Organization as the first regimen treatment for HIV/AIDS patients in poor countries. In Thailand, this drug (GPO-VIR) is used in the national HIV/AIDS treatment programme, making it free of charge for 100,000 patients. while Pongrama Ramasoota, He discoveries production of therapeutic human monoclonal antibodies against dengue virus and the world's first Dengue fever medication, include DNA vaccine development for dengue and Canine parvovirus. Thailand has also made significant advances technology in the development of Medical Robotics. Medical robots have been used and promoted in Thailand in many areas, including surgery, diagnosis, rehabilitation and services. and their use has been increasing. such as, an elderly care robot made by Thai manufacturer that Japanese nursing homes are widely using. In surgery, in 2021, Mahidol University's "BART LAB" team successfully researched the invention of the robot-assisted surgery (Minimal Invasive Surgery). back in 2019, The Medical Services Department has unveiled Thailand's robot created to help surgeons in brain surgery on patients afflicted with epilepsy. back in 2017, Ramathibodi Hospital, a leading government hospital in Bangkok and a reputable medical school, successfully performed the first robot-assisted brain surgery in Asia. For rehabilitation and therapy robots, were developed to help patients with arm and leg injuries perform practiced movements aided by the robots is the first prize winner of the i-MEDBOT Innovation Contest 2018 held by Thailand Center of Excellence for Life Sciences (TCELS). According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Thailand devoted 1% of its GDP to science research and development in 2017. Between 2014 and 2016, Research and development workforce in Thailand increased from 84,216 people to 112,386 people. Thailand was ranked 44th in the Global Innovation Index in 2020, down from 43rd in 2019. The Thai government is developing new growth hubs by starting with the Eastern Economic Corridor of Innovation (EECi) to accelerating human resource and research development. The National Science and Technology Development Agency is an agency of the government of Thailand which supports research in science and technology and its application in the Thai economy. By December 2020 with 308.35 Mbit/s Thailand had become world leader in terms of Internet fixed broadband internet speed, with Switzerland and France in Europe in positions 5 and 8 respectively, with the US at position 10 with 173.67 Mbit/s. Infrastructure Transportation The State Railway of Thailand (SRT) operates all of Thailand's national rail lines. Bangkok Railway Station (Hua Lamphong Station) is the main terminus of all routes. Phahonyothin and ICD Lat Krabang are the main freight terminals. SRT had of track, all of it meter gauge except the Airport Link. Nearly all is single-track (4,097 km), although some important sections around Bangkok are double () or triple-tracked () and there are plans to extend this. Rail transport in Bangkok includes long-distance services, and some daily commuter trains running from and to the outskirts of the city during the rush hour, but passenger numbers have remained low. There are also three rapid transit rail systems in the capital. Thailand has of highways. According to the BBC Thailand has 462,133 roads and many multi-lane highways. Thailand has 37 million registered vehicles, 20 million of them motorbikes. A number of undivided two-lane highways have been converted into divided four-lane highways. A Bangkok – Chon Buri motorway (Route 7) now links to the new airport and Eastern Seaboard. There are 4,125 public vans operating on 114 routes from Bangkok alone. Other forms of road transport includes tuk-tuks, taxis—as of November 2018, Thailand has 80,647 registered taxis nationwide—vans (minibus), motorbike taxis and songthaews. , Thailand had 103 airports with 63 paved runways, in addition to 6 heliports. The busiest airport in the county is Bangkok's Suvarnabhumi Airport. Energy 75% of Thailand's electrical generation is powered by natural gas in 2014. Coal-fired power plants produce an additional 20% of electricity, with the remainder coming from biomass, hydro, and biogas. Thailand produces roughly one-third of the oil it consumes. It is the second largest importer of oil in SE Asia. Thailand is a large producer of natural gas, with reserves of at least 10 trillion cubic feet. After Indonesia, it is the largest coal producer in SE Asia, but must import additional coal to meet domestic demand. Demographics Thailand had a population of 69,799,978 as of 2020. Thailand's population is largely rural, concentrated in the rice-growing areas of the central, northeastern and northern regions. About 45.7% of Thailand's population lived in urban areas , concentrated mostly in and around the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. Thailand's government-sponsored family planning program resulted in a dramatic decline in population growth from 3.1% in 1960 to around 0.4% today. In 1970, an average of 5.7 people lived in a Thai household. At the time of the 2010 census, the average Thai household size was 3.2 people. Ethnic groups Thai nationals make up the majority of Thailand's population, 95.9% in 2010. The remaining 4.1% of the population are Burmese (2.0%), others 1.3%, and unspecified 0.9%. According to the Royal Thai Government's 2011 Country Report to the UN Committee responsible for the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, available from the Department of Rights and Liberties Promotion of the Thai Ministry of Justice, 62 ethnic communities are officially recognised in Thailand. Twenty million Central Thai (together with approximately 650,000 Khorat Thai) make up approximately 20,650,000 (34.1 percent) of the nation's population of 60,544,937 at the time of completion of	in the Malay peninsula, but failed to conquer the Malacca Sultanate which was supported by the Chinese Ming Dynasty. European contact and trade started in the early-16th century, with the envoy of Portuguese duke Afonso de Albuquerque in 1511, Portugal became an allied and ceded some soldiers to King Rama Thibodi II. The Portuguese were followed in the 17th century by the French, Dutch, and English. Rivalry for supremacy over Chiang Mai and the Mon people pitted Ayutthaya against the Burmese Kingdom. Several wars with its ruling dynasty Taungoo Dynasty starting in the 1540s in the reign of Tabinshwehti and Bayinnaung were ultimately ended with the capture of the capital in 1570. Then was a brief period of vassalage to Burma until Naresuan proclaimed independence in 1584. Ayutthaya then sought to improve relations with European powers for many successive reigns. The kingdom especially prospered during cosmopolitan Narai's reign (1656–1688) when some European travelers regarded Ayutthaya as an Asian great power, alongside China and India. However, growing French influence later in his reign was met with nationalist sentiment and led eventually to the Siamese revolution of 1688. However, overall relations remained stable, with French missionaries still active in preaching Christianity. After a bloody period of dynastic struggle, Ayutthaya entered into what has been called the Siamese "golden age", a relatively peaceful episode in the second quarter of the 18th century when art, literature, and learning flourished. There were seldom foreign wars, apart from conflict with the Nguyễn Lords for control of Cambodia starting around 1715. The last fifty years of the kingdom witnessed bloody succession crises, where there were purges of court officials and able generals for many consecutive reigns. In 1765, a combined 40,000-strong force of Burmese armies invaded it from the north and west. The Burmese under the new Alaungpaya dynasty quickly rose to become a new local power by 1759. After a 14-month siege, the capital city's walls fell and the city was burned in April 1767. Thonburi Kingdom The capital and much territories lied in chaos after the war. The former capital was occupied by the Burmese garrison army and five local leaders declared themselves overlords, including the lords of Sakwangburi, Phitsanulok, Pimai, Chanthaburi, and Nakhon Si Thammarat. Chao Tak, a capable military leader, proceeded to make himself a lord by right of conquest, beginning with the legendary sack of Chanthaburi. Based at Chanthaburi, Chao Tak raised troops and resources, and sent a fleet up the Chao Phraya to take the fort of Thonburi. In the same year, Chao Tak was able to retake Ayutthaya from the Burmese only seven months after the fall of the city. Chao Tak then crowned himself as Taksin and proclaimed Thonburi as temporary capital in the same year. He also quickly subdued the other warlords. His forces engaged in wars with Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, which successfully drove the Burmese out of Lan Na in 1775, captured Vientiane in 1778 and tried to install a pro-Thai king in Cambodia in the 1770s. In his final years there was a coup, caused supposedly by his "insanity", and eventually Taksin and his sons were executed by his longtime companion General Chao Phraya Chakri (the future Rama I). He was the first king of the ruling Chakri Dynasty and founder of the Rattanakosin Kingdom on 6 April 1782. Modernisation and centralisation Under Rama I (1782–1809), Rattanakosin successfully defended against Burmese attacks and put an end to Burmese incursions. He also created suzerainty over large portions of Laos and Cambodia. In 1821, Briton John Crawfurd was sent to negotiate a new trade agreement with Siam – the first sign of an issue which was to dominate 19th century Siamese politics. Bangkok signed the Burney Treaty in 1826, after the British victory in the First Anglo-Burmese War. Anouvong of Vientiane, who mistakenly held the belief that Britain was about to launch an invasion of Bangkok, started the Lao rebellion in 1826 which was suppressed. Vientiane was destroyed and a large number of Lao people were relocated to Khorat Plateau as a result. Bangkok also waged several wars with Vietnam, where Siam successfully regained hegemony over Cambodia. From the late-19th century, Siam tried to rule the ethnic groups in the realm as colonies. In the reign of Mongkut (1851–1868), who recognised the potential threat Western powers posed to Siam, his court contacted the British government directly to defuse tensions. A British mission led by Sir John Bowring, Governor of Hong Kong, led to the signing of the Bowring Treaty, the first of many unequal treaties with Western countries. This, however, brought trade and economic development to Siam. The unexpected death of Mongkut from malaria led to the reign of underage Prince Chulalongkorn, with Somdet Chaophraya Sri Suriwongse (Chuang Bunnag) acting as regent. Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910) initiated centralisation, set up a privy council, and abolished slavery and the corvée system. The Front Palace crisis of 1874 stalled attempts at further reforms. In the 1870s and 1880s, he incorporated the protectorates up north into the kingdom proper, which later expanded to the protectorates in the northeast and the south. He established twelve krom in 1888, which were equivalent to present-day ministries. The crisis of 1893 erupted, caused by French demands for Laotian territory east of Mekong. Thailand is the only Southeast Asian nation never to have been colonised by a Western power, in part because Britain and France agreed in 1896 to make the Chao Phraya valley a buffer state. Not until the 20th century could Siam renegotiate every unequal treaty dating from the Bowring Treaty, including extraterritoriality. The advent of the monthon system marked the creation of the modern Thai nation-state. In 1905, there were unsuccessful rebellions in the ancient Patani area, Ubon Ratchathani, and Phrae in opposition to an attempt to blunt the power of local lords. The Palace Revolt of 1912 was a failed attempt by Western-educated military officers to overthrow the Siamese monarchy. Vajiravudh (r. 1910–1925) responded by propaganda for the entirety of his reign, which promoted the idea of the Thai nation. In 1917, Siam joined the First World War on the side of the Allies. In the aftermath Siam had a seat at the Paris Peace Conference, and gained freedom of taxation and the revocation of extraterritoriality. Constitutional monarchy, World War II and Cold War A bloodless revolution took place in 1932, in which Prajadhipok was forced to grant the country's first constitution, thereby ending centuries of feudal and absolute monarchy. The combined results of economic hardships brought on by the Great Depression, sharply falling rice prices, and a significant reduction in public spending caused discontent among aristocrats. In 1933, a counter-revolutionary rebellion occurred which aimed to reinstate absolute monarchy, but failed. Prajadhipok's conflict with the government eventually led to abdication. The government selected Ananda Mahidol, who was studying in Switzerland, to be the new king. Later that decade, the army wing of Khana Ratsadon came to dominate Siamese politics. Plaek Phibunsongkhram who became premier in 1938, started political oppression and took an openly anti-royalist stance. His government adopted nationalism and Westernisation, anti-Chinese and anti-French policies. In 1939, there was a decree changing the name of the country from "Siam" to "Thailand". In 1941, Thailand was in a brief conflict with Vichy France resulting in Thailand gaining some Lao and Cambodian territories. On 8 December 1941, the Empire of Japan launched an invasion of Thailand, and fighting broke out shortly before Phibun ordered an armistice. Japan was granted free passage, and on 21 December Thailand and Japan signed a military alliance with a secret protocol, wherein the Japanese government agreed to help Thailand regain lost territories. The Thai government declared war on the United States and the United Kingdom. The Free Thai Movement was launched both in Thailand and abroad to oppose the government and Japanese occupation. After the war ended in 1945, Thailand signed formal agreements to end the state of war with the Allies. The main Allied powers had ignored Thailand's declaration of war. In June 1946, young King Ananda was found dead under mysterious circumstances. His younger brother Bhumibol Adulyadej ascended to the throne. Thailand joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to become an active ally of the United States in 1954. Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat launched a coup in 1957, which removed Khana Ratsadon from politics. His rule (premiership 1959–1963) was autocratic; he built his legitimacy around the god-like status of the monarch and by channelling the government's loyalty to the king. His government improved the country's infrastructure and education. After the United States joined the Vietnam War in 1961, there was a secret agreement wherein the U.S. promised to protect Thailand. The period brought about increasing modernisation and Westernisation of Thai society. Rapid urbanisation occurred when the rural populace sought work in growing cities. Rural farmers gained class consciousness and were sympathetic to the Communist Party of Thailand. Economic development and education enabled the rise of a middle class in Bangkok and other cities. In October 1971, there was a large demonstration against the dictatorship of Thanom Kittikachorn (premiership 1963–1973), which led to civilian casualties. Bhumibol installed Sanya Dharmasakti (premiership 1973–1975) to replace him, making it the first time that the king intervened in Thai politics directly since 1932. The aftermath of the event marked a short-lived parliamentary democracy, often called the "era when democracy blossomed" (ยุคประชาธิปไตยเบ่งบาน). Contemporary history Constant unrest and instability, as well as fear of a communist takeover after the fall of Saigon, made some ultra-right groups brand leftist students as communists. This culminated in the Thammasat University massacre in October 1976. A coup d'état on that day brought Thailand a new ultra-right government, which cracked down on media outlets, officials, and intellectuals, and fuelled the communist insurgency. Another coup the following year installed a more moderate government, which offered amnesty to communist fighters in 1978. Fueled by Indochina refugee crisis, Vietnamese border raids and economic hardships, Prem Tinsulanonda became the Prime Minister from 1980 to 1988. The communists abandoned the insurgency by 1983. Prem's premiership was dubbed "semi-democracy" because the Parliament was composed of all elected House and all appointed Senate. The 1980s also saw increasing intervention in politics by the monarch, who rendered two coups in 1981 and 1985 attempts against Prem failed. Thailand had its first elected prime minister in 1988. Suchinda Kraprayoon, who was the coup leader in 1991 and said he would not seek to become prime minister, was nominated as one by the majority coalition government after the 1992 general election. This caused a popular demonstration in Bangkok, which ended with a bloody military crackdown. Bhumibol intervened in the event and signed an amnesty law, Suchinda then resigned. The 1997 Asian financial crisis originated in Thailand and ended the country's 40 years of uninterrupted economic growth. Chuan Leekpai's government took an IMF loan with unpopular provisions. The populist Thai Rak Thai party, led by prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, governed from 2001 until 2006. His policies were successful in reducing rural poverty and initiated universal healthcare in the country. A South Thailand insurgency escalated starting from 2004. The 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami hit the country, mostly in the south. Massive protests against Thaksin led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) started in his second term as prime minister and his tenure ended with a coup d'état in 2006. The junta installed a military government which lasted a year. In 2007, a civilian government led by the Thaksin-allied People's Power Party (PPP) was elected. Another protest led by PAD ended with the dissolution of PPP, and the Democrat Party led a coalition government in its place. The pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) protested both in 2009 and in 2010, the latter of which ended with a violent military crackdown causing more than 70 civilian deaths. After the general election of 2011, the populist Pheu Thai Party won a majority and Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin's younger sister, became prime minister. The People's Democratic Reform Committee organised another anti-Shinawatra protest after the ruling party proposed an amnesty bill which would benefit Thaksin. Yingluck dissolved parliament and a general election was scheduled, but was invalidated by the Constitutional Court. The crisis ended with another coup d'état in 2014. The country had been led by the National Council for Peace and Order, a military junta led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha until 2019. Civil and political rights were restricted, and the country saw a surge in lèse-majesté cases. Political opponents and dissenters were sent to "attitude adjustment" camps, academics mentioned as the rise of fascism. Bhumibol, the longest-reigning Thai king, died in 2016, and his son Vajiralongkorn ascended to the throne. The referendum and adoption of Thailand's current constitution happened under the junta's rule. The junta also bound future governments to a 20-year national strategy 'road map' it laid down, effectively locking the country into military-guided democracy. In 2019, the junta agreed to schedule a general election in March. Prayut continued his premiership with the support of Palang Pracharath Party-coalition in the House and junta-appointed Senate, amid allegations of election fraud. The ongoing pro-democracy protests were triggered by increasing royal prerogative, democratic and economic regression from the Military supported by the Monarchy staging 2014 Thai coup d'état, dissolution of the pro-democracy Future Forward Party, distrust in the 2019 general election and the current political system, forced disappearance and deaths of political activists including Wanchalearm Satsaksit, political corruption scandals, which brought forward unprecedented demands to reform the monarchy and the highest sense of republicanism in the country. Geography Totalling , Thailand is the 50th-largest country by total area. It is slightly smaller than Yemen and slightly larger than Spain. Thailand comprises several distinct geographic regions, partly corresponding to the provincial groups. The north of the country is the mountainous area of the Thai highlands, with the highest point being Doi Inthanon in the Thanon Thong Chai Range at above sea level. The northeast, Isan, consists of the Khorat Plateau, bordered to the east by the Mekong River. The centre of the country is dominated by the predominantly flat Chao Phraya river valley, which runs into the Gulf of Thailand. Southern Thailand consists of the narrow Kra Isthmus that widens into the Malay Peninsula. Politically, there are six geographical regions which differ from the others in population, basic resources, natural features, and level of social and economic development. The diversity of the regions is the most pronounced attribute of Thailand's physical setting. The Chao Phraya and the Mekong River are the indispensable water courses of rural Thailand. Industrial scale production of crops use both rivers and their tributaries. The Gulf of Thailand covers and is fed by the Chao Phraya, Mae Klong, Bang Pakong, and Tapi Rivers. It contributes to the tourism sector owing to its clear shallow waters along the coasts in the southern region and the Kra Isthmus. The eastern shore of the Gulf of Thailand is an industrial centre of Thailand with the kingdom's premier deepwater port in Sattahip and its busiest commercial port, Laem Chabang. The Andaman Sea is a precious natural resource as it hosts popular and luxurious resorts. Phuket, Krabi, Ranong, Phang Nga and Trang, and their islands, all lay along the coasts of the Andaman Sea and, despite the 2004 tsunami, they remain a tourist magnet. Climate Thailand's climate is influenced by monsoon winds that have a seasonal character (the southwest and northeast monsoon). Most of the country is classified as Köppen's tropical savanna climate. The majority of the south as well as the eastern tip of the east have a tropical monsoon climate. Parts of the south also have a tropical rainforest climate. Thailand is divided into three seasons. The first is the rainy or southwest monsoon season (mid–May to mid–October), which is caused by southwestern wind from Indian Ocean. Rainfall is also contributed by Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and tropical cyclones. August and September being the wettest period of the year. The country receives a mean annual rainfall of . Winter or the northeast monsoon occurs from mid–October until mid–February. Most of Thailand experiences dry weather with mild temperatures. Summer or the pre–monsoon season runs from mid–February until mid–May. Due to its inland nature and latitude, the north, northeast, central and eastern parts of Thailand experience a long period of warm weather, where temperatures can reach up to during March to May, in contrast to close to or below in some areas in winter. Southern Thailand is characterised by mild weather year-round with less diurnal and seasonal variations in temperatures due to maritime influences. It receives abundant rainfall, particularly during October to November. Thailand is among the world's ten countries that are most exposed to climate change. In particular, it is highly vulnerable to rising sea levels and extreme weather events. Environment and wildlife Thailand has a mediocre but improving performance in the global Environmental Performance Index (EPI) with an overall ranking of 91 out of 180 countries in 2016. The environmental areas where Thailand performs worst (i.e., highest ranking) are air quality (167), environmental effects of the agricultural industry (106), and the climate and energy sector (93), the later mainly because of a high CO2 emission per KWh produced. Thailand performs best (i.e., lowest ranking) in water resource management (66), with some major improvements expected for the future, and sanitation (68). The country had a 2019 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 6.00/10, ranking it 88th globally out of 172 countries. The population of elephants, the country's national symbol, has fallen from 100,000 in 1850 to an estimated 2,000. Poachers have long hunted elephants for ivory and hides, and now increasingly for meat. Young elephants are often captured for use in tourist attractions or as work animals, where there have been claims of mistreatment. However, their use has declined since the government banned logging in 1989. Poaching of protected species remains a major problem. Tigers, leopards, and other large cats are hunted for their pelts. Many are farmed or hunted for their meat, which supposedly has medicinal properties. Although such trade is illegal, the well-known Bangkok market Chatuchak is still known for the sale of endangered species. The practice of keeping wild animals as pets affects species such as Asiatic black bear, Malayan sun bear, white-handed lar, pileated gibbon, and binturong. Politics Prior to 1932, Thai kings were feudal or absolute monarchs. During Sukhothai Kingdom, the king was seen as a Dharmaraja or 'king who rules in accordance with Dharma'. The system of government was a network of tributaries ruled by local lords. Modern absolute monarchy and statehood was established by Chulalongkorn when he transformed the decentralized protectorate system into a unitary state. On 24 June 1932, Khana Ratsadon (People's Party) carried out a bloodless revolution which marked the beginning of constitutional monarchy. Thailand has had 20 constitutions and charters since 1932, including the latest and current 2017 Constitution. Throughout this time, the form of government has ranged from military dictatorship to electoral democracy. Thailand has had the fourth-most coups in the world. "Uniformed or ex-military men have led Thailand for 55 of the 83 years" between 1932 and 2009. Most recently, the National Council for Peace and Order ruled the country between 2014 and 2019. The politics of Thailand is conducted within the framework of a constitutional monarchy, whereby a hereditary monarch serves as head of state. The current King of Thailand is Vajiralongkorn (or Rama X), who has reigned since October 2016. The powers of the king are limited by the constitution and he is primarily a symbolic figurehead. The monarch is head of the armed forces and is required to be Buddhist as well as the Defender of the Faith. He has the power to appoint his heirs, the power to grant pardons, and the royal assent. The king is aided in his duties by the Privy Council of Thailand. However, the monarch still occasionally intervenes in Thai politics, as all constitutions pave the way for customary royal rulings. Some academics outside Thailand, including Duncan McCargo and Federico Ferrara, noted extraconstitutional role of the monarch through a "network monarchy" behind the political scenes. The monarchy is protected by the severe lèse majesté law, even though the people's attitude towards the institution varies from one reign to another. Government is separated into three branches: The legislative branch: the National Assembly is composed of the Senate, the 250-member fully appointed upper house, and House of Representatives, the 500-member lower house. Its most recent election is the 2019 general election. The coalition led by Palang Pracharath Party currently holds the majority. The executive branch consisting of the Prime Minister of Thailand who was elected by the National Assembly and other cabinet members of up to 35 people. The cabinet was appointed by the king on the advice of the prime minister. The prime minister is the head of government. The judiciary is supposed to be independent of the executive and the legislative branches, although judicial rulings are suspected of being based on political considerations rather than on existing law. Military and bureaucratic aristocrats fully controlled political parties between 1946 and 1980s. Most parties in Thailand are short-lived. Between 1992 and 2006, Thailand had a two-party system. Since 2000, two political parties dominated Thai general elections: one was the Pheu Thai Party (which was a successor of People's Power Party and the Thai Rak Thai Party), and the other was the Democrat Party. The political parties which support Thaksin Shinawatra won the most representatives every general election since 2001. The 2007 constitution was partially abrogated by the military dictatorship that came to power in May 2014. Later constitutions created a multi-party system where a single party cannot gain a majority in the house. The kings are protected by lèse-majesté laws which allow critics to be jailed for three to fifteen years. After the 2014 Thai coup d'état, Thailand had the highest number of lèse-majesté prisoners in the nation's history. In 2017, the military court in Thailand sentenced a man to 35 years in prison for violating the country's lèse-majesté law. Human rights in Thailand has been rated not free on the Freedom House Index since 2014. Administrative divisions Thailand is a unitary state; the administrative services of the executive branch are divided into three levels by National Government Organisation Act, BE 2534 (1991): central, provincial and local. Thailand is composed of 76 provinces (, changwat), which are first-level administrative divisions. There are also two specially governed districts: the capital Bangkok and Pattaya. Bangkok is at provincial level and thus often counted as a province. Each province is divided into districts (, amphoe) and the districts are further divided into sub-districts (, tambons). The name of each province's capital city (, mueang) is the same as that of the province. For example, the capital of Chiang Mai Province (Changwat Chiang Mai) is Mueang Chiang Mai or Chiang Mai. All provincial governors and district chiefs, which are administrators of provinces and districts respectively, are appointed by the central government. Thailand's provinces are sometimes grouped into four to six regions, depending on the source. Foreign relations In 2000s period, Thailand participated fully in international and regional organisations. It is a major non-NATO ally and Priority Watch List Special 301 Report of the United States. The country remains an active member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thailand has developed increasingly close ties with other ASEAN members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam, whose foreign and economic ministers hold annual meetings. Regional co-operation is progressing in economic, trade, banking, political, and cultural matters. In 2003, Thailand served as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) host. Supachai Panitchpakdi, the former Deputy Prime Minister, served as Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In 2005 Thailand attended the inaugural East Asia Summit. Thailand had taken an active role on the international stage. When East Timor gained independence from Indonesia, contributed troops to the international peacekeeping effort. As part of its effort to increase international ties, Thailand had reached out to such regional organisations as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Thailand had contributed troops to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Thaksin Shinawatra premiership, he initiated negotiations for several free trade agreements with China, Australia, Bahrain, India, and the US. The latter especially was criticised, with claims that uncompetitive Thai industries could be wiped out. Thaksin also announced that Thailand would forsake foreign aid, and work with donor countries to assist in the development of neighbours in the Greater Mekong Sub-region. Thaksin sought to position Thailand as a regional leader, initiating various development projects in poorer neighbouring countries like Laos. More controversially, he established close, friendly ties with the Burmese dictatorship. Thailand joined the US-led invasion of Iraq, sending a humanitarian contingent. It withdrew its troops on 10 September 2004. Two Thai soldiers died in Iraq in an insurgent attack. In April 2009, the Cambodian–Thai border dispute brought troops on territory immediately adjacent to the 900-year-old ruins of Cambodia's Preah Vihear Hindu temple near the border. The Cambodian government claimed its army had killed at least four Thais and captured 10 more, although the Thai government denied that any Thai soldiers were killed or injured. Two Cambodian and three Thai soldiers were killed. Both armies blamed the other for firing first and denied entering the other's territory. Armed forces The Royal Thai Armed Forces (กองทัพไทย; ) constitute the military of the Kingdom of Thailand. It consists of the Royal Thai Army (กองทัพบกไทย), the Royal Thai Navy (กองทัพเรือไทย), and the Royal Thai Air Force (กองทัพอากาศไทย). It also incorporates various paramilitary forces. The Thai Armed Forces have a combined manpower of 306,000 active duty personnel and another 245,000 active reserve personnel. The head of the Thai Armed Forces (จอมทัพไทย, Chom Thap Thai) is the king, although this position is only nominal. The armed forces are managed by the Ministry of Defence of Thailand, which is headed by the Minister of Defence (a member of the cabinet of Thailand) and commanded by the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, which in turn is headed by the Chief of Defence Forces of Thailand. Thai annual defense budget almost tripled from 78 billion baht in 2005 to 207 billion baht in 2016, accounting for approximately 1.5% of 2019 Thai GDP. Thailand ranked 16th worldwide in the Military Strength Index based on the Credit Suisse report in September 2015. The military is also tasked with humanitarian missions, such as escorting Rohingya to Malaysia or Indonesia, ensuring security and welfare for refugees during Indochina refugee crisis. According to the constitution, serving in the armed forces is a duty of all Thai citizens. Thailand still use active draft system for males over the age of 21. They are subjected to varying lengths of active service depending on the duration of reserve training as Territorial Defence Student and their level of education. Those who have completed three years or more of reserve training will be exempted entirely. The practice has long been criticized, as some media question its efficacy and value. It is alleged that conscripts end up as servants to senior officers or clerks in military cooperative shops. In a report issued in March 2020, Amnesty International charged that Thai military conscripts face institutionalised abuse systematically hushed up by military authorities. Critics observed that Thai military's main objective is to deal with internal rather than external threats. Internal Security Operations Command is called the political arm of the Thai military, which has overlapping social and political functions with civilian bureaucracy. It also has anti-democracy mission. The military is also notorious for numerous corruption incidents, such as accusation of human trafficking, and nepotism in promotion of high-ranking officers. The military is deeply entrenched in politics. Most recently, the appointed senators include more than 100 active and retired military.
king of Tambralinga invaded and took Lavo and installed a Malay prince on the Lavo throne. The Malay prince was married to a Khmer princess who had fled an Angkorian dynastic bloodbath. The son of the couple contested the Khmer throne and became Suryavarman I, thus bringing Lavo under Khmer domination through the marital union. Suryavarman I also expanded into the Khorat Plateau (later styled "Isan"), constructing many temples. Suryavarman, however, had no male heirs and again Lavo was independent. After the death of King Narai of Lavo, however, Lavo was plunged into bloody civil war and the Khmer under Suryavarman II took advantage by invading Lavo and installing his son as the King of Lavo. The repeated but discontinued Khmer domination eventually Khmerized Lavo. Lavo was transformed from a Theravadin Mon Dvaravati city into a Hindu Khmer one. Lavo became the entrepôt of Khmer culture and power of the Chao Phraya river basin. The bas-relief at Angkor Wat shows a Lavo army as one of the subordinates to Angkor. One interesting note is that a Tai army was shown as a part of Lavo army, a century before the establishment of the "Sukhothai Kingdom". Southern Thailand Below the Kra Isthmus was the place of Malay civilisations. Primordial Malay kingdoms are described as tributaries to Funan by second-century Chinese sources, though most of them proved to be tribal organisations instead of full-fledged kingdoms. From the sixth century on, two major mandalas ruled southern Thailand, the Kanduli and the Langkasuka. Kanduli centred on what is now Surat Thani Province and Langasuka in Pattani Province. Southern Thailand was the centre of Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism. The Tang monk Yijing stopped at Langkasuka to study Pali grammar and Mahayana during his journey to India around 800. At that time, the kingdoms of Southern Thailand quickly fell under the influences of the Malay kingdom of Srivijaya from Sumatra. Rajendra Chola I of the Chola dynasty invaded the Tambralinga Kingdom in southern Thailand in the 11th century. Northern Thailand According to the Cāmadevivaṃsa, the city of Hariphunchai (modern Lamphun) was founded by hermits. Camadevi, a princess of the Lavo Kingdom, was invited to rule the city around 700. However, this date is considered too early for the foundation of Hariphunchai as Camadevi brought no dharmachakras to the north. Hariphunchai may be a later (10th century) offshoot of the Lavo Kingdom or instead related to the Thaton Kingdom. Hariphunchai was the centre of Theravada in the north. The kingdom flourished during the reign of King Attayawong who built Wat Phra That Hariphunchai in 1108. The kingdom had strong relations with the Mon Kingdom of Thaton. During the 11th century, Hariphunchai waged lengthy wars with the Tai Ngoenyang Kingdom of Chiang Saen. Weakened by Tai invasions, Hariphunchai eventually fell in 1293 to Mangrai, king of Lan Na, the successor state of the Ngoenyang Kingdom. Arrival of the Tais The most recent and accurate theory about the origin of the Tai people stipulates that Guangxi in China is really the Tai motherland instead of Yunnan. A large number of Tai people known as the Zhuang still live in Guangxi today. Around 700 AD, Tai people who did not come under Chinese influence settled in what is now Điện Biên Phủ in modern Vietnam according to the Khun Borom legend. Based on layers of Chinese loanwords in proto-Southwestern Tai and other historical evidence, Pittayawat Pittayaporn (2014) proposed that this migration must have taken place sometime between the 8th–10th centuries. Tai speaking tribes migrated southwestward along the rivers and over the lower passes into Southeast Asia, perhaps prompted by the Chinese expansion and suppression. Chinese historical texts record that, in 722, 400,000 'Lao' rose in revolt behind a leader who declared himself the king of Nanyue in Guangdong. After the 722 revolt, some 60,000 were beheaded. In 726, after the suppression of a rebellion by a 'Lao' leader in the present-day Guangxi, over 30,000 rebels were captured and beheaded. In 756, another revolt attracted 200,000 followers and lasted four years. In the 860s, many local people in what is now North Vietnam sided with attackers from Nanchao, and in the aftermath, some 30,000 of them were beheaded. In the 1040s, a powerful matriarch-shamaness by the name of A Nong, her chiefly husband, and their son, Nong Zhigao, raised a revolt, took Nanning, besieged Guangzhou for fifty seven days, and slew the commanders of five Chinese armies sent against them before they were defeated, and many of their leaders were killed. As a result of these three bloody centuries, the Tai began to migrate southwestward. The Simhanavati legend tells us that a Tai chief named Simhanavati drove out the native Wa people and founded the city of Chiang Saen around 800 CE. For the first time, the Tai people made contact with the Indianized civilisations of Southeast Asia. Through Hariphunchai, the Tais of Chiang Saen adopted Theravada Buddhism and Sanskrit royal names. Wat Phrathat Doi Tong, constructed around 850, signified the piety of Tai people on the Theravada religion. Around 900, major wars were fought between Chiang Saen and Hariphunchai. Mon forces captured Chiang Saen and its king fled. In 937, Prince Prom the Great took Chiang Saen back from the Mon and inflicted severe defeats on Hariphunchai. Around 1000 CE, Chiang Saen was destroyed by an earthquake with many inhabitants killed. A council was established to govern the kingdom for a while, and then a local Wa man known as Lavachakkaraj was elected king of the new city of Chiang Saen or Ngoenyang. The Lavachakkaraj dynasty would rule over the region for about 500 years. Overpopulation might have encouraged the Tais to seek their fortune further southwards. By 1100 CE, the Tai had established themselves as Po Khuns (ruling fathers) at Nan, Phrae, Songkwae, Sawankhalok, and Chakangrao on the upper Chao Phraya River. These southern Tai princes faced Khmer influence from the Lavo Kingdom. Some of them became subordinates to it. Sukhothai Kingdom (1238–1438) Thai city-states gradually became independent of the weakened Khmer Empire. It is said that Sukhothai Kingdom was established as a strong sovereign kingdom by Sri Indraditya in 1238. A political feature which "classic" Thai historians call "father governs children" existed at this time. Everybody could bring their problems to the king directly, as there was a bell in front of the palace for this purpose. The city briefly dominated the area under King Ram Khamhaeng, who tradition and legend states established the Thai alphabet, but after his death in 1365, Sukhothai fell into decline and became subject to another emerging Thai state, the Ayutthaya Kingdom in the lower Chao Phraya area. Another Thai state that coexisted with Sukhothai was the eastern state of Lan Na centred in Chiang Mai. King Mangrai was its founder. This city-state emerged in the same period as Sukhothai. Evidently, Lan Na became closely allied with Sukhothai. After the Ayutthaya Kingdom had emerged and expanded its influence from the Chao Phraya valley, Sukhothai was finally subdued. Fierce battles between Lan Na and Ayutthaya also constantly took place and Chiang Mai was eventually subjugated, becoming Ayutthaya's vassal. Lan Na's independent history ended in 1558, when it finally fell to the Burmese. It was dominated by Burma until the late-18th century. Local leaders then rose up against the Burmese with the help of the rising Thai kingdom of Thonburi of King Taksin. The "Northern City-States" then became vassals of the lower Thai kingdoms of Thonburi and Bangkok. In the early 20th century they were annexed and became part of modern Siam, the country that is now called "Thailand". Ayutthaya period (1351–1767) The city of Ayutthaya was on a small island, encircled by three rivers. Due to its defensible location, Ayutthaya quickly became powerful, politically, and economically. Ayutthaya's name is derived from Ayodhya, an Indian holy city. The first ruler of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, King Uthong (r. 1351–1369), made two important contributions to Thai history: the establishment and promotion of Theravada Buddhism as the official religion to differentiate his kingdom from the neighbouring Hindu kingdom of Angkor and the compilation of the Dharmaśāstra, a legal code based on Hindu sources and traditional Thai custom. The Dharmaśāstra remained a tool of Thai law until late in the 19th century. In 1511 Duke Afonso de Albuquerque dispatched Duarte Fernandes as an envoy to the Ayutthaya Kingdom, known then to Europeans as the "Kingdom of Siam". This contact with the West during the 16th century led to a period of economic growth as lucrative trade routes were established. Ayutthaya became one of the most prosperous cities in Southeast Asia. According to George Modelski, Ayutthaya is estimated to have been the largest city in the world in 1700 CE, with a population around one million. Trade flourished, with the Dutch and Portuguese among the most active foreigners in the kingdom, together with the Chinese and Malayans. The Ayutthaya Period is known as the golden age of Thai literature, Art and Trade with the eastern and western world. In Ayutthaya period was also considered as "golden age of medicine in Thailand" due to progress in the field of medicine at that time. Burmese wars Starting in the middle of the 16th century, the kingdom came under repeated attacks by the Taungoo Dynasty of Burma. The Burmese–Siamese War (1547–49) began with a Burmese invasion and a failed siege of Ayutthaya. A second siege (1563–64) led by King Bayinnaung forced King Maha Chakkraphat to surrender in 1564. The royal family was taken to Bago, Burma, with the king's second son Mahinthrathirat installed as a vassal king. In 1568, Mahinthrathirat revolted when his father managed to return from Bago as a Buddhist monk. The ensuing third siege captured Ayutthaya in 1569 and Bayinnaung made Mahathammarachathirat his vassal king. After Bayinnaung's death in 1581, Uparaja Naresuan proclaimed Ayutthaya's independence in 1584. The Thai fought off repeated Burmese invasions (1584–1593), capped by an elephant duel between King Naresuan and Burmese heir-apparent Mingyi Swa in 1593 during the fourth siege of Ayutthaya in which Naresuan famously slew Mingyi Swa. The Burmese–Siamese War (1594–1605) was a Thai attack on Burma, resulting in the capture of the Tanintharyi Region as far as Mottama in 1595 and Lan Na in 1602. Naresuan even invaded mainland Burma as far as Taungoo in 1600, but was driven back. Ayutthaya expanded its sphere of influence over a considerable area, ranging from the Islamic states on the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman seaports of present-day India, the Angkor kingdom of Cambodia, to states in northern Thailand. In the 18th century, the power of the Ayutthaya Kingdom gradually declined as fighting between princes and officials plagued its politics. Outlying principalities became more and more independent, ignoring the capital's orders and decrees. In the 18th century, the last phase of the kingdom arrived. The Bamar people, who had taken control of Lan Na and had also unified their kingdom under the powerful Konbaung Dynasty, launched several blows against Ayutthaya in the 1750s and 1760s. Finally, in 1767, after several months of siege, the Burmese broke through Ayutthaya's outer and inner walls, sacked the city, and burned it down. The royal family fled the city and Ayutthaya's last king, Ekkathat, died of starvation ten days later while in hiding. Thonburi and Early Rattanakosin period (1767–1851) Unification under Taksin After more than 400 years of power, in 1767, the Kingdom of Ayutthaya was brought down by invading Burmese armies, its capital burned, and the territory split. Despite its complete defeat and occupation by Burma, Siam made a rapid recovery. The resistance to Burmese rule was led by a noble of Chinese descent, Taksin, a capable military leader. Initially based at Chanthaburi in the southeast, within a year he had defeated the Burmese occupation army and re-established a Siamese state with its capital at Thonburi on the west bank of the Chao Phraya, 20 km from the sea. In 1767 he was crowned as King Taksin (now officially known as "Taksin the Great"). After the sacking of Ayutthaya, the country had fallen apart, due to the disappearance of the central authority. Besides King Taksin, who had organised his force in the southeastern provinces, Prince Teppipit, King Boromakot's son, who had been unsuccessful in a diversionary action against the Burmese in 1766, had set himself up as the ruler of Phimai holding sway over the eastern provinces including Nakhon Ratchasima or Khorat, while the Governor of Phitsanulok, whose first name was Ruang (Thai:เรือง), had proclaimed himself independent, with the territory under his control extending to the province of Nakhon Sawan. North of Phitsanulok was the town of Sawangburi (known as Fang in Uttaradit Province), where a Buddhist monk named Ruan had made himself a prince, appointing fellow monks as army commanders. He had himself pursued Buddhist studies at Ayutthaya with such excellent results that he had been appointed the chief monk of Sawangburi by King Boromakot. The southern provinces as far north as Chumphon, a Pra Palad who was the acting Governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat declared his independence and raised himself to a princely rank. Having firmly established his power at Thonburi, King Taksin set out to reunify the old kingdom, crushing regional rivals. After a temporary repulse by the Governor of Phitsanulok, he concentrated on the defeat of the weakest one first. Prince Teppipit of Phimai was quelled and executed in 1768. Chao Narasuriyawongse, one of Taksin's nephews, was substituted for him as governor. The last so-called ruler who still challenged the King was the Prince of Sawangburi or Chao Pra Fang, as he had just annexed Phitsanulok on the death of its Governor. King Taksin himself led an expedition against him and took it, but the prince disappeared and could not be found again. In dealing with the Prince of Nakhon Si Thammarat, who was taken prisoner by the loyal Governor of Pattani, the king not only pardoned him but also favoured him with a residence at Thonburi. In Thonburi period, the beginning of the Chinese mass immigration fell to Siam. Through the availability of Chinese workers, trade, agriculture and craftsmen flourished. However, the first Chinese rebellions had to be suppressed. However, later due to stress and many factors, King Taksin went mad. After a coup d'état removing Taksin from power was restored by General Chakri (later becoming Rama I), Taksin was sentenced to death on Wednesday, 10 April 1782. Restoration under Rama I A noble of Mon descent, General Chakri succeeded Taksin in 1782 as Rama I, the first king of the Chakri dynasty. In the same year he founded a new capital city across the Chao Phraya River in an area known as Rattanakosin Island. (While settlements on both banks were commonly called Bangkok, both the Burney Treaty of 1826 and the Roberts Treaty of 1833 refer to the capital as the City of Sia-Yut'hia.) In the 1790s, Burma was defeated and driven out of Siam, as it was then called. Lan Na also became free of Burmese occupation, but was reduced to the Kingdom of Chiang Mai. The king of the new dynasty was installed as a tributary ruler of the Chakri monarch. After the coup of removing Taksin, it is probable that Chakri and his family had planned the ascent to the throne already during his predecessor Taksin. After his coronation, he operated a systematic bloody extermination of the followers of Taksin, which corresponds to the typical approach of the usurpers in Thai history. The new dynasty moved the capital of Thonburi to Rattanakosin, today's Bangkok. Bangkok had previously been a small settlement with a fort, but it was strategically located on the eastern shores of the Chao Phraya river and was known among the foreign traders as the 'key to Siam'. New palaces and temples were built. The Emerald Buddha and Wat Phra Kaeo were founded. The king's goal was to transfer the old splendor of Ayutthaya to the new capital. In his new capital, Rama I crowned himself in 1785 in a splendid ceremony. During the reign of Rama I, the foreign policy was still focused on the threat represented by Burma. Burma's new king Bodawpaya ordered the nine Burmese armies in a surprise attack against Siam, while in 1786 the Burmese army invaded the Three Pagoda Pass. It came to the "Nine Armies' Wars". In all cases, the Siamese remained victorious after the fighting. In 1805 Lanna (North Thailand) was largely brought under control of Bangkok. Rama I also attempted unsuccessfully to conquer the important trading ports of Tenasserim. At the time of Rama I, Cambodia was practically administered as a province of Siam, as rival Vietnam had to deal with internal problems. Only when the new Vietnamese emperor Gia Long had ascended to the throne was the influence of Siam in Cambodia again contested. Relations with Vietnam took on a prominent place in this epoch. There were no significant relations with the European colonial powers during the reign of Rama I. One of the most important achievements of Rama I was the codification of all the country's laws into a work of 1,700 pages called the Three Seals Law. This law remained valid in its basic traits until the beginning of the twentieth century. Siam also had a high level of cultural achievement. The Buddhist canon (Pāli Canon) was collected and reformulated within the framework of a Grand Council. The arts were promoted, as well as the construction of new palaces and temples in the capital. Literature and theatre also thrived; in this epoch were produced works such as the important, 3,000-page Ramakian. Works from Chinese, Mon, Javanese, Persian, and Indian languages were translated into Thai. Rama I, the first king of the Chakri dynasty, continued the traditions of Ayutthaya in many respects. However, the new empire was still more tightly centralised than its predecessors. A particularly important innovation was the stronger emphasis on rationality in the relationship between the monarch and his subjects. Rama I was the first king in the history of the country who justified his decisions before the highest officials. Maintaining the status quo under Rama II and Rama III King Rama II (Phra Phutthaloetla) was the son of Rama I. His accession to the throne was accompanied by a plot, during which 40 people were killed. The calmness of the interior and the exterior, which during the reign of Rama II and his successor Rama III (Phra Nang Klao), prevailed mainly through giving in to conflicts and building good relations with influential clans in the country. During Rama II's reign, the kingdom saw a cultural renaissance after the massive wars that plagued his predecessor's reign; particularly in the fields of arts and literature. Poets employed by Rama II included Sunthorn Phu the drunken writer (Phra Aphai Mani) and Narin Dhibet (Nirat Narin). Foreign relations were initially dominated by relations with the neighbouring states, while those with European colonial powers started to enter in the background. In Cambodia and Laos, Vietnam gained the supremacy, a fact which Rama II initially accepted. When a rebellion broke out in Vietnam under Rama III in 1833–34, he tried to subdue the Vietnamese militarily, but this led to a costly defeat for the Siamese troops. In the 1840s, however, the Khmer themselves succeeded in expelling the Vietnamese, which subsequently led to the greater influence of Siam in Cambodia. At the same time, Siam kept sending tribute to China. There was a serious touch with British colonial interests when Siam conquered the Sultanate Kedah on the Malay Peninsula in 1821. Kedah belonged to the sphere of interest of Great Britain. In the following year, Siam had to recognise the pre-conquest status after tough negotiations with the British envoy John Crawfurd. There was also the cautious resumption of trade and missionary activity in this epoch. In particular, British traders such as Robert Hunter ("discoverer" of the conjoined brothers Chang and Eng, the original "Siamese twins") or James Hayes, but also missionaries from Europe and the United States like Jacob Tomlin, Karl Gützlaff, Dan Beach Bradley and Jean-Baptiste Pallegoix became active in Siam. In 1825 an agreement was signed with British emissary Henry Burney; Siam recognised British colonial possessions on the Malay Peninsula and made commercial concessions. This agreement was due not least to the rapid British success in the First Anglo-Burmese War. A potentially dangerous event occurred with the Anouvong's Rebellion in 1827, when the troops of the tributary King Anouvong of the Kingdom of Vientiane advanced towards Bangkok. They were, however, destroyed, which strengthened the position of Siam in Laos. The Lao-population of the areas west of the Mekong were relocated to Thai provinces in Isan. Under Rama II and Rama III, culture, dance, poetry and above all the theatre reached a climax. The temple Wat Pho was built by Rama III, known as the first university of the country. The reign of Rama III. was finally marked by a division of the aristocracy with regard to foreign policy. A small group of advocates of the takeover of Western technologies and other achievements were opposed by conservative circles, which proposed a stronger isolation instead. Since the kings Rama II and Rama III, the conservative-religious circles largely stuck with their isolationist tendency. The death of Rama III in 1851 also signified the end of the old traditional Siamese monarchy: there were already clear signs of profound changes, which were implemented by the two successors of the king. Modernization under Rama IV and Rama V (1851–1910) When King Mongkut ascended the Siamese throne, he was severely threatened by the neighbouring states. The colonial powers of Britain and France had already advanced into territories which originally belonged to the Siamese sphere of influence. Mongkut and his successor Chulalongkorn (Rama V) recognised this situation and tried to strengthen the defence forces of Siam by modernisation, to absorb Western scientific	the Lavo throne. The Malay prince was married to a Khmer princess who had fled an Angkorian dynastic bloodbath. The son of the couple contested the Khmer throne and became Suryavarman I, thus bringing Lavo under Khmer domination through the marital union. Suryavarman I also expanded into the Khorat Plateau (later styled "Isan"), constructing many temples. Suryavarman, however, had no male heirs and again Lavo was independent. After the death of King Narai of Lavo, however, Lavo was plunged into bloody civil war and the Khmer under Suryavarman II took advantage by invading Lavo and installing his son as the King of Lavo. The repeated but discontinued Khmer domination eventually Khmerized Lavo. Lavo was transformed from a Theravadin Mon Dvaravati city into a Hindu Khmer one. Lavo became the entrepôt of Khmer culture and power of the Chao Phraya river basin. The bas-relief at Angkor Wat shows a Lavo army as one of the subordinates to Angkor. One interesting note is that a Tai army was shown as a part of Lavo army, a century before the establishment of the "Sukhothai Kingdom". Southern Thailand Below the Kra Isthmus was the place of Malay civilisations. Primordial Malay kingdoms are described as tributaries to Funan by second-century Chinese sources, though most of them proved to be tribal organisations instead of full-fledged kingdoms. From the sixth century on, two major mandalas ruled southern Thailand, the Kanduli and the Langkasuka. Kanduli centred on what is now Surat Thani Province and Langasuka in Pattani Province. Southern Thailand was the centre of Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism. The Tang monk Yijing stopped at Langkasuka to study Pali grammar and Mahayana during his journey to India around 800. At that time, the kingdoms of Southern Thailand quickly fell under the influences of the Malay kingdom of Srivijaya from Sumatra. Rajendra Chola I of the Chola dynasty invaded the Tambralinga Kingdom in southern Thailand in the 11th century. Northern Thailand According to the Cāmadevivaṃsa, the city of Hariphunchai (modern Lamphun) was founded by hermits. Camadevi, a princess of the Lavo Kingdom, was invited to rule the city around 700. However, this date is considered too early for the foundation of Hariphunchai as Camadevi brought no dharmachakras to the north. Hariphunchai may be a later (10th century) offshoot of the Lavo Kingdom or instead related to the Thaton Kingdom. Hariphunchai was the centre of Theravada in the north. The kingdom flourished during the reign of King Attayawong who built Wat Phra That Hariphunchai in 1108. The kingdom had strong relations with the Mon Kingdom of Thaton. During the 11th century, Hariphunchai waged lengthy wars with the Tai Ngoenyang Kingdom of Chiang Saen. Weakened by Tai invasions, Hariphunchai eventually fell in 1293 to Mangrai, king of Lan Na, the successor state of the Ngoenyang Kingdom. Arrival of the Tais The most recent and accurate theory about the origin of the Tai people stipulates that Guangxi in China is really the Tai motherland instead of Yunnan. A large number of Tai people known as the Zhuang still live in Guangxi today. Around 700 AD, Tai people who did not come under Chinese influence settled in what is now Điện Biên Phủ in modern Vietnam according to the Khun Borom legend. Based on layers of Chinese loanwords in proto-Southwestern Tai and other historical evidence, Pittayawat Pittayaporn (2014) proposed that this migration must have taken place sometime between the 8th–10th centuries. Tai speaking tribes migrated southwestward along the rivers and over the lower passes into Southeast Asia, perhaps prompted by the Chinese expansion and suppression. Chinese historical texts record that, in 722, 400,000 'Lao' rose in revolt behind a leader who declared himself the king of Nanyue in Guangdong. After the 722 revolt, some 60,000 were beheaded. In 726, after the suppression of a rebellion by a 'Lao' leader in the present-day Guangxi, over 30,000 rebels were captured and beheaded. In 756, another revolt attracted 200,000 followers and lasted four years. In the 860s, many local people in what is now North Vietnam sided with attackers from Nanchao, and in the aftermath, some 30,000 of them were beheaded. In the 1040s, a powerful matriarch-shamaness by the name of A Nong, her chiefly husband, and their son, Nong Zhigao, raised a revolt, took Nanning, besieged Guangzhou for fifty seven days, and slew the commanders of five Chinese armies sent against them before they were defeated, and many of their leaders were killed. As a result of these three bloody centuries, the Tai began to migrate southwestward. The Simhanavati legend tells us that a Tai chief named Simhanavati drove out the native Wa people and founded the city of Chiang Saen around 800 CE. For the first time, the Tai people made contact with the Indianized civilisations of Southeast Asia. Through Hariphunchai, the Tais of Chiang Saen adopted Theravada Buddhism and Sanskrit royal names. Wat Phrathat Doi Tong, constructed around 850, signified the piety of Tai people on the Theravada religion. Around 900, major wars were fought between Chiang Saen and Hariphunchai. Mon forces captured Chiang Saen and its king fled. In 937, Prince Prom the Great took Chiang Saen back from the Mon and inflicted severe defeats on Hariphunchai. Around 1000 CE, Chiang Saen was destroyed by an earthquake with many inhabitants killed. A council was established to govern the kingdom for a while, and then a local Wa man known as Lavachakkaraj was elected king of the new city of Chiang Saen or Ngoenyang. The Lavachakkaraj dynasty would rule over the region for about 500 years. Overpopulation might have encouraged the Tais to seek their fortune further southwards. By 1100 CE, the Tai had established themselves as Po Khuns (ruling fathers) at Nan, Phrae, Songkwae, Sawankhalok, and Chakangrao on the upper Chao Phraya River. These southern Tai princes faced Khmer influence from the Lavo Kingdom. Some of them became subordinates to it. Sukhothai Kingdom (1238–1438) Thai city-states gradually became independent of the weakened Khmer Empire. It is said that Sukhothai Kingdom was established as a strong sovereign kingdom by Sri Indraditya in 1238. A political feature which "classic" Thai historians call "father governs children" existed at this time. Everybody could bring their problems to the king directly, as there was a bell in front of the palace for this purpose. The city briefly dominated the area under King Ram Khamhaeng, who tradition and legend states established the Thai alphabet, but after his death in 1365, Sukhothai fell into decline and became subject to another emerging Thai state, the Ayutthaya Kingdom in the lower Chao Phraya area. Another Thai state that coexisted with Sukhothai was the eastern state of Lan Na centred in Chiang Mai. King Mangrai was its founder. This city-state emerged in the same period as Sukhothai. Evidently, Lan Na became closely allied with Sukhothai. After the Ayutthaya Kingdom had emerged and expanded its influence from the Chao Phraya valley, Sukhothai was finally subdued. Fierce battles between Lan Na and Ayutthaya also constantly took place and Chiang Mai was eventually subjugated, becoming Ayutthaya's vassal. Lan Na's independent history ended in 1558, when it finally fell to the Burmese. It was dominated by Burma until the late-18th century. Local leaders then rose up against the Burmese with the help of the rising Thai kingdom of Thonburi of King Taksin. The "Northern City-States" then became vassals of the lower Thai kingdoms of Thonburi and Bangkok. In the early 20th century they were annexed and became part of modern Siam, the country that is now called "Thailand". Ayutthaya period (1351–1767) The city of Ayutthaya was on a small island, encircled by three rivers. Due to its defensible location, Ayutthaya quickly became powerful, politically, and economically. Ayutthaya's name is derived from Ayodhya, an Indian holy city. The first ruler of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, King Uthong (r. 1351–1369), made two important contributions to Thai history: the establishment and promotion of Theravada Buddhism as the official religion to differentiate his kingdom from the neighbouring Hindu kingdom of Angkor and the compilation of the Dharmaśāstra, a legal code based on Hindu sources and traditional Thai custom. The Dharmaśāstra remained a tool of Thai law until late in the 19th century. In 1511 Duke Afonso de Albuquerque dispatched Duarte Fernandes as an envoy to the Ayutthaya Kingdom, known then to Europeans as the "Kingdom of Siam". This contact with the West during the 16th century led to a period of economic growth as lucrative trade routes were established. Ayutthaya became one of the most prosperous cities in Southeast Asia. According to George Modelski, Ayutthaya is estimated to have been the largest city in the world in 1700 CE, with a population around one million. Trade flourished, with the Dutch and Portuguese among the most active foreigners in the kingdom, together with the Chinese and Malayans. The Ayutthaya Period is known as the golden age of Thai literature, Art and Trade with the eastern and western world. In Ayutthaya period was also considered as "golden age of medicine in Thailand" due to progress in the field of medicine at that time. Burmese wars Starting in the middle of the 16th century, the kingdom came under repeated attacks by the Taungoo Dynasty of Burma. The Burmese–Siamese War (1547–49) began with a Burmese invasion and a failed siege of Ayutthaya. A second siege (1563–64) led by King Bayinnaung forced King Maha Chakkraphat to surrender in 1564. The royal family was taken to Bago, Burma, with the king's second son Mahinthrathirat installed as a vassal king. In 1568, Mahinthrathirat revolted when his father managed to return from Bago as a Buddhist monk. The ensuing third siege captured Ayutthaya in 1569 and Bayinnaung made Mahathammarachathirat his vassal king. After Bayinnaung's death in 1581, Uparaja Naresuan proclaimed Ayutthaya's independence in 1584. The Thai fought off repeated Burmese invasions (1584–1593), capped by an elephant duel between King Naresuan and Burmese heir-apparent Mingyi Swa in 1593 during the fourth siege of Ayutthaya in which Naresuan famously slew Mingyi Swa. The Burmese–Siamese War (1594–1605) was a Thai attack on Burma, resulting in the capture of the Tanintharyi Region as far as Mottama in 1595 and Lan Na in 1602. Naresuan even invaded mainland Burma as far as Taungoo in 1600, but was driven back. Ayutthaya expanded its sphere of influence over a considerable area, ranging from the Islamic states on the Malay Peninsula, the Andaman seaports of present-day India, the Angkor kingdom of Cambodia, to states in northern Thailand. In the 18th century, the power of the Ayutthaya Kingdom gradually declined as fighting between princes and officials plagued its politics. Outlying principalities became more and more independent, ignoring the capital's orders and decrees. In the 18th century, the last phase of the kingdom arrived. The Bamar people, who had taken control of Lan Na and had also unified their kingdom under the powerful Konbaung Dynasty, launched several blows against Ayutthaya in the 1750s and 1760s. Finally, in 1767, after several months of siege, the Burmese broke through Ayutthaya's outer and inner walls, sacked the city, and burned it down. The royal family fled the city and Ayutthaya's last king, Ekkathat, died of starvation ten days later while in hiding. Thonburi and Early Rattanakosin period (1767–1851) Unification under Taksin After more than 400 years of power, in 1767, the Kingdom of Ayutthaya was brought down by invading Burmese armies, its capital burned, and the territory split. Despite its complete defeat and occupation by Burma, Siam made a rapid recovery. The resistance to Burmese rule was led by a noble of Chinese descent, Taksin, a capable military leader. Initially based at Chanthaburi in the southeast, within a year he had defeated the Burmese occupation army and re-established a Siamese state with its capital at Thonburi on the west bank of the Chao Phraya, 20 km from the sea. In 1767 he was crowned as King Taksin (now officially known as "Taksin the Great"). After the sacking of Ayutthaya, the country had fallen apart, due to the disappearance of the central authority. Besides King Taksin, who had organised his force in the southeastern provinces, Prince Teppipit, King Boromakot's son, who had been unsuccessful in a diversionary action against the Burmese in 1766, had set himself up as the ruler of Phimai holding sway over the eastern provinces including Nakhon Ratchasima or Khorat, while the Governor of Phitsanulok, whose first name was Ruang (Thai:เรือง), had proclaimed himself independent, with the territory under his control extending to the province of Nakhon Sawan. North of Phitsanulok was the town of Sawangburi (known as Fang in Uttaradit Province), where a Buddhist monk named Ruan had made himself a prince, appointing fellow monks as army commanders. He had himself pursued Buddhist studies at Ayutthaya with such excellent results that he had been appointed the chief monk of Sawangburi by King Boromakot. The southern provinces as far north as Chumphon, a Pra Palad who was the acting Governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat declared his independence and raised himself to a princely rank. Having firmly established his power at Thonburi, King Taksin set out to reunify the old kingdom, crushing regional rivals. After a temporary repulse by the Governor of Phitsanulok, he concentrated on the defeat of the weakest one first. Prince Teppipit of Phimai was quelled and executed in 1768. Chao Narasuriyawongse, one of Taksin's nephews, was substituted for him as governor. The last so-called ruler who still challenged the King was the Prince of Sawangburi or Chao Pra Fang, as he had just annexed Phitsanulok on the death of its Governor. King Taksin himself led an expedition against him and took it, but the prince disappeared and could not be found again. In dealing with the Prince of Nakhon Si Thammarat, who was taken prisoner by the loyal Governor of Pattani, the king not only pardoned him but also favoured him with a residence at Thonburi. In Thonburi period, the beginning of the Chinese mass immigration fell to Siam. Through the availability of Chinese workers, trade, agriculture and craftsmen flourished. However, the first Chinese rebellions had to be suppressed. However, later due to stress and many factors, King Taksin went mad. After a coup d'état removing Taksin from power was restored by General Chakri (later becoming Rama I), Taksin was sentenced to death on Wednesday, 10 April 1782. Restoration under Rama I A noble of Mon descent, General Chakri succeeded Taksin in 1782 as Rama I, the first king of the Chakri dynasty. In the same year he founded a new capital city across the Chao Phraya River in an area known as Rattanakosin Island. (While settlements on both banks were commonly called Bangkok, both the Burney Treaty of 1826 and the Roberts Treaty of 1833 refer to the capital as the City of Sia-Yut'hia.) In the 1790s, Burma was defeated and driven out of Siam, as it was then called. Lan Na also became free of Burmese occupation, but was reduced to the Kingdom of Chiang Mai. The king of the new dynasty was installed as a tributary ruler of the Chakri monarch. After the coup of removing Taksin, it is probable that Chakri and his family had planned the ascent to the throne already during his predecessor Taksin. After his coronation, he operated a systematic bloody extermination of the followers of Taksin, which corresponds to the typical approach of the usurpers in Thai history. The new dynasty moved the capital of Thonburi to Rattanakosin, today's Bangkok. Bangkok had previously been a small settlement with a fort, but it was strategically located on the eastern shores of the Chao Phraya river and was known among the foreign traders as the 'key to Siam'. New palaces and temples were built. The Emerald Buddha and Wat Phra Kaeo were founded. The king's goal was to transfer the old splendor of Ayutthaya to the new capital. In his new capital, Rama I crowned himself in 1785 in a splendid ceremony. During the reign of Rama I, the foreign policy was still focused on the threat represented by Burma. Burma's new king Bodawpaya ordered the nine Burmese armies in a surprise attack against Siam, while in 1786 the Burmese army invaded the Three Pagoda Pass. It came to the "Nine Armies' Wars". In all cases, the Siamese remained victorious after the fighting. In 1805 Lanna (North Thailand) was largely brought under control of Bangkok. Rama I also attempted unsuccessfully to conquer the important trading ports of Tenasserim. At the time of Rama I, Cambodia was practically administered as a province of Siam, as rival Vietnam had to deal with internal problems. Only when the new Vietnamese emperor Gia Long had ascended to the throne was the influence of Siam in Cambodia again contested. Relations with Vietnam took on a prominent place in this epoch. There were no significant relations with the European colonial powers during the reign of Rama I. One of the most important achievements of Rama I was the codification of all the country's laws into a work of 1,700 pages called the Three Seals Law. This law remained valid in its basic traits until the beginning of the twentieth century. Siam also had a high level of cultural achievement. The Buddhist canon (Pāli Canon) was collected and reformulated within the framework of a Grand Council. The arts were promoted, as well as the construction of new palaces and temples in the capital. Literature and theatre also thrived; in this epoch were produced works such as the important, 3,000-page Ramakian. Works from Chinese, Mon, Javanese, Persian, and Indian languages were translated into Thai. Rama I, the first king of the Chakri dynasty, continued the traditions of Ayutthaya in many respects. However, the new empire was still more tightly centralised than its predecessors. A particularly important innovation was the stronger emphasis on rationality in the relationship between the monarch and his subjects. Rama I was the first king in the history of the country who justified his decisions before the highest officials. Maintaining the status quo under Rama II and Rama III King Rama II (Phra Phutthaloetla) was the son of Rama I. His accession to the throne was accompanied by a plot, during which 40 people were killed. The calmness of the interior and the exterior, which during the reign of Rama II and his successor Rama III (Phra Nang Klao), prevailed mainly through giving in to conflicts and building good relations with influential clans in the country. During Rama II's reign, the kingdom saw a cultural renaissance after the massive wars that plagued his predecessor's reign; particularly in the fields of arts and literature. Poets employed by Rama II included Sunthorn Phu the drunken writer (Phra Aphai Mani) and Narin Dhibet (Nirat Narin). Foreign relations were initially dominated by relations with the neighbouring states, while those with European colonial powers started to enter in the background. In Cambodia and Laos, Vietnam gained the supremacy, a fact which Rama II initially accepted. When a rebellion broke out in Vietnam under Rama III in 1833–34, he tried to subdue the Vietnamese militarily, but this led to a costly defeat for the Siamese troops. In the 1840s, however, the Khmer themselves succeeded in expelling the Vietnamese, which subsequently led to the greater influence of Siam in Cambodia. At the same time, Siam kept sending tribute to China. There was a serious touch with British colonial interests when Siam conquered the Sultanate Kedah on the Malay Peninsula in 1821. Kedah belonged to the sphere of interest of Great Britain. In the following year, Siam had to recognise the pre-conquest status after tough negotiations with the British envoy John Crawfurd. There was also the cautious resumption of trade and missionary activity in this epoch. In particular, British traders such as Robert Hunter ("discoverer" of the conjoined brothers Chang and Eng, the original "Siamese twins") or James Hayes, but also missionaries from Europe and the United States like Jacob Tomlin, Karl Gützlaff, Dan Beach Bradley and Jean-Baptiste Pallegoix became active in Siam. In 1825 an agreement was signed with British emissary Henry Burney; Siam recognised British colonial possessions on the Malay Peninsula and made commercial concessions. This agreement was due not least to the rapid British success in the First Anglo-Burmese War. A potentially dangerous event occurred with the Anouvong's Rebellion in 1827, when the troops of the tributary King Anouvong of the Kingdom of Vientiane advanced towards Bangkok. They were, however, destroyed, which strengthened the position of Siam in Laos. The Lao-population of the areas west of the Mekong were relocated to Thai provinces in Isan. Under Rama II and Rama III, culture, dance, poetry and above all the theatre reached a climax. The temple Wat Pho was built by Rama III, known as the first university of the country. The reign of Rama III. was finally marked by a division of the aristocracy with regard to foreign policy. A small group of advocates of the takeover of Western technologies and other achievements were opposed by conservative circles, which proposed a stronger isolation instead. Since the kings Rama II and Rama III, the conservative-religious circles largely stuck with their isolationist tendency. The death of Rama III in 1851 also signified the end of the old traditional Siamese monarchy: there were already clear signs of profound changes, which were implemented by the two successors of the king. Modernization under Rama IV and Rama V (1851–1910) When King Mongkut ascended the Siamese throne, he was severely threatened by the neighbouring states. The colonial powers of Britain and France had already advanced into territories which originally belonged to the Siamese sphere of influence. Mongkut and his successor Chulalongkorn (Rama V) recognised this situation and tried to strengthen the defence forces of Siam by modernisation, to absorb Western scientific and technical achievements, thus avoiding colonisation. The two monarchs, who ruled in this epoch, were the first with Western formation. King Mongkut had lived 26 years as a wandering monk and later as an abbot of Wat Bowonniwet Vihara. He was not only skilled in the traditional culture and Buddhist sciences of Siam, but he had also dealt extensively with modern western science, drawing on the knowledge of European missionaries and his correspondence with Western leaders and the Pope. He was the first Siamese monarch to speak English. As early as 1855, John Bowring, the British governor in Hong Kong, appeared on a warship at the mouth of the Chao Phraya River. Under the influence of Britain's achievements in neighbouring Burma, King Mongkut signed the so-called "Bowring Treaty", which abolished the royal foreign trade monopoly, abolished import duties, and granted Britain a most favourable clause. The Bowring Treaty meant the integration of Siam into the world economy, but at the same time, the royal house lost its most important sources of income. Similar treaties were concluded with all Western powers in the following years, such as in 1862 with Prussia and 1869 with Austria-Hungary. From the Prussian emissary Count Friedrich Albrecht zu Eulenburg comes a much-respected travel report about Siam. The survival diplomacy, which Siam had cultivated abroad for a long time, reached its climax in this epoch. The integration into the global economy meant to Siam that it became a sales market for Western industrial goods and an investment for Western capital. The export of agricultural and mineral raw materials began, including the three products rice, pewter and teakwood, which were used to produce 90% of the export turnover. King Mongkut actively promoted the expansion of agricultural land by tax incentives, while the construction of traffic routes (canals, roads and later also railways) and the influx of Chinese immigrants allowed the agricultural development of new regions. Mongkut's son, Chulalongkorn (Rama V), ascended to the throne in 1868. He was the first Siamese king to have a full Western education, having been taught by a British governess, Anna Leonowens, whose place in Siamese history has been fictionalised as The King and I. At first Rama V's reign was dominated by the conservative regent, Somdet Chaophraya Sri Suriwongse, but when the king came of age in 1873 he soon took control. He created a Privy Council and a Council of State, a formal court system and budget office. He announced that slavery would be gradually abolished and debt-bondage restricted. Western colonialism and cessation of protectorates Two kings, Mongkut and Chulalongkorn, witnessed the expansion of both France and Great Britain to increase their colonial territories in Southeast Asia and encircle Siam. From the west, the British conquered India, Burma and Malaya, and from the east, the French conquered South Vietnam, Vietnam and claimed to be "protecting" Cambodia, while Siam lost its extraterritorial rights in these areas to the new conquerors. The construction of Kra Isthmus Canal, planned by a group of entrepreneurs led by the engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps, was not constructed after the British conquered Kongbaung-ruled Burma in the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885. A major event was the Paknam incident, when, on 13 July 1893, French cannon boats entered the Chao Phraya River toward Bangkok and were fired upon from a Siamese coastal fort, leading to the Franco-Siamese War. In the same year, Siam was compelled to conclude a treaty with France, in which the territory of Laos, located east of the Mekong, was annexed to French Indochina. The French forced Siam to refrain from any influence on its former vassal state. In 1887, the Indo-Chinese Union was founded. In 1896, British and French concluded a treaty which made a border between their colonies, with Siam defined as a buffer state. After the Franco-Siamese War of 1893, King Chulalongkorn realised the threat of the western colonial powers, and accelerated extensive reforms in the administration, military, economy and society of Siam, completing the development of the nation from a traditional feudalist structure based on personal domination and dependencies, whose peripheral areas were only indirectly bound to the central power (the King), to a centrally-governed national state with established borders and modern political institutions. The Entente Cordiale of 8 April 1904 ended the rivalry between Great Britain and France over Siam. French and British zones of influence in Siam, were outlined, with the eastern territories, adjacent to French Indochina, becoming a French zone, and the western, adjacent to Burmese Tenasserim, a British zone. The British recognised a French sphere of influence to the east of the River Menam's basin; in turn, the French recognised British influence over the territory to the west of the Menam basin. Both parties disclaimed any idea of annexing Siamese territory. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 defined the modern border between Siam and British Malaya. The treaty stated that Siam relinquished their claims over Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis to Great Britain, which were previously part of the semi-independent Malay sultanates of Pattani and Kedah. A series of treaties with France fixed the country's current eastern border with Laos and Cambodia. In 1904, 1907 and 1909, there were new border corrections in favour of France and Great Britain. When King Chulalongkorn died in 1910, Siam had achieved the borders of today's Thailand. In 1910 he was peacefully succeeded by his son Vajiravudh, who reigned as Rama VI. He had been educated at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and University of Oxford and was an anglicised Edwardian gentleman. Indeed, one of Siam's problems was the widening gap between the Westernised royal family and upper aristocracy and the rest of the country. It took another 20 years for Western education to extend to the rest of the bureaucracy and the army. Nation formation under Vajiravudh and Prajadhipok (1910–1932) The successor of King Chulalongkorn was King Rama VI in October 1910, better known as Vajiravudh. He had studied law and history as the Siamese crown prince in Great Britain. After his ascension to the throne, he forgave important officials for his devoted friends, who were not part of the nobility, and even less qualified than their predecessors, an action which had hitherto been unprecedented in Siam. In his reign (1910–1925) many changes were made, which brought Siam closer to modern countries. For example, the Gregorian Calendar was introduced, all the citizens of his country had to accept Family names, women were encouraged to wear skirts and long hair fringements and a citizenship law, Principle of the "Ius sanguinis" was adopted. In 1917 the Chulalongkorn University was founded and school education was introduced for all 7 to 14-year-olds. King Vajiravudh was a favour of literature, theatre, he translated many foreign literatures into Thai. He created the spiritual foundation for a kind of Thai nationalism, a phenomenon unknown in Siam. He was based on the unity of nation, Buddhism, and kingship, and demanded loyalty from his subjects to all these three institutions. King Vajiravudh also took refuge in an irrational and contradictory anti-Sinicism. As a result of the mass immigration, in contrast to previous immigration waves from China, women and entire families had also come into the country, which meant that the Chinese were less assimilated and retained their cultural independence. In an article published by King Vajiravudh under a pseudonym, he described the Chinese minority as Jews of the East. King Vajiravudh also created some new social associations, for example, the Wild Tiger Corps (1911), a kind of Scout movement. In 1912, a Palace revolt, plotted by young military officers, tried unsuccessfully to overthrow and replace the king. Their goals were to change the system of government, overthrowing the ancien régime and replacing it with a modern, Westernised constitutional system, and perhaps to replace Rama VI with a prince more sympathetic to their beliefs., but the king went against the conspirators, and sentenced many of them to long prison sentences. The members of the conspiracy consisted of military and the navy, the status of the monarchy, had become challenged. World War I In 1917 Siam declared war on German Empire and Austria-Hungary, mainly to gain favour with the British and the French. Siam's token participation in World War I secured it a seat at the Versailles Peace Conference, and Foreign Minister Devawongse used this opportunity to argue for the repeal of the 19th-century unequal treaties and the restoration of full Siamese sovereignty. The United States obliged in 1920, while France and Britain followed in 1925. This victory gained the king some popularity, but it was soon undercut by discontent over other issues, such as his extravagance, which became more noticeable when a sharp postwar recession hit Siam in 1919. There was also the fact that the king had no son. He obviously preferred the company of men to women (a matter which of itself did not much concern Siamese opinion, but which did undermine the stability of the monarchy due to the absence of heirs). Thus when Rama VI died suddenly in 1925, aged only 44, the monarchy was already in a weakened state. He was succeeded by his younger brother Prajadhipok. By 1925–1926, Siamese extraterritorial rights were restored a period of five years thereafter. Early years of constitutional monarchy (1932–1945) Revolution and difficult compromise A small circle from the rising bourgeoisie of former students (all of whom had completed their studies in Europe – mostly Paris), supported by some military men, seized power from the absolute monarchy on 24 June 1932 in an almost nonviolent revolution. This was also called the "Siamese Revolution". The group, which called themselves Khana Ratsadon or sponsors, gathered officers, intellectuals and bureaucrats, who represented the idea of the refusal of the absolute monarchy. The Khana Ratsadon installed a constitutional monarchy with Prajadhipok as king at the top – a corresponding constitution was proclaimed on 10 December of the year. On the same day, the experienced and rather conservative lawyer Phraya Manopakorn Nititada, was appointed as first Siamese Prime Minister. By selecting a non-party head of government, the Khana Ratsadon wanted to avoid the suspicion that the coup had only been carried out in order to come to power itself. However, the overthrow of the monarchy did not lead to free elections, political unions were forbidden. Bureaucracy and the military shared the power in the National Assembly. The constitution was annexed to the monarchist ideology ("nation, religion, king") as a fourth pillar. In the following period it became clear how heterogeneous the group of Khana Ratsadon was, and it fell into several rival wings, especially those of the high officers, the younger officers and the civilians. For the predecessor of the liberal and civilian wing, Pridi Phanomyong it was not done with the mere change of government form. He sought a profound transformation of the country's social and economic system. To this end, he presented an economic plan in January 1933, which became known as a "Yellow Cover Dossier" (). Among other things, he proposed the nationalisation of farmland, Industrialization by Public Company, general health care and pension insurance. The King, the rather conservative Prime Minister Phraya Manopakorn, but also the high-ranking officers in the Khana Ratsadon around Phraya Songsuradet and even Pridi's friend and co-worker Prayun Phamonmontri. Fearing that Pridis's liberal wing, who had the majority in the National Assembly, would decide to take a decision, Phraya Manopakorn dissolved the parliament in April, imposed the emergency, and rescinded the constitutional part, which had not yet been a year old. He imposed a law against Communist activities, which was directed not so much against the almost insignificant Communist Party of Thailand, but rather against the alleged Communist projects Pridis. However, the younger officers of the Khana Ratsadon resisted and countered the oppressive actions of Phraya Manopakorn lead to another coup d'état only one year later, in June 1933, resulting in the appointment of Phraya Phahon as Siam's second prime minister. Khana Ratsadon's rise After the fall of Phraya Manopakorn, Phraya Phahon became the new Prime Minister. Pridi Phanomyong was expelled from the charge of communism, but his economic plan was largely ignored. Only a few of his ideas, such as the expansion of primary schools and industrialisation with state enterprises, were gradually implemented. In 1933, Pridis founded the Thammasat University in Bangkok, which with its liberal self-image has remained a symbol of freedom and democracy. At the same time, the nationalist group led by Phibunsongkhram strengthened in the People's Party, oriented to the totalitarian ideas of Italy, Germany, Japan, but also the "young Turks" (Kemal Atatürk). The many unsettled constitutional roles of the crown and the dissatisfaction with Khana Ratsadon, especially Pridi's post in the new government, culminated in October 1933 in a reactionary Boworadet Rebellion staged by royalist factions. The royalists were led by Prince Boworadet, Prajadhipok's minister of defence. His forces who mobilised from provincial garrisons captured the Don Muang Aerodrome and led Siam into small-scale civil War. After heavy fighting in the outskirts of Bangkok, the royalists were finally defeated and Prince Boworadet left for exile in French Indochina. After the Boworadet rebellion and some other disagreements with Khana Khana Ratsadon thereafter, King Prajadhipok abdicated the throne and exiled himself. He was replaced as king by his nine-year-old nephew Prince Ananda Mahidol (King Rama VIII), who at that time was attending school in Lausanne, Switzerland. Plaek Phibunsongkhram's popularity increased from his role in leading anti-rebellion forces. During this time, Pridi played an important role in modernising Thai public administration: completed Thai legal codes, created the local government system. Dictatorship of Phibunsongkhram When Phibulsonggram succeeded Phraya Phahon as Prime Minister in September 1938, the military and civilian wings of Khana Ratsadon diverged even further, and military domination became more overt. Phibunsongkhram began moving the government towards militarism, and totalitarianism, as well as building personality cult around himself. The defeat of France in Battle of France was the catalyst for Thai leadership to begin an attack on French Indochina. This began with smaller conflicts in 1940 and resulted in the Franco-Thai War in 1941. It suffered a heavy defeat in the sea Battle of Ko Chang, but it dominated on land and in the air. The Empire of Japan, already the dominant power in the Southeast Asian region, took over the role of the mediator. The negotiations ended the conflict with Thai territorial gains in the French colonies Laos and Cambodia. By 1942 he had issued a series of cultural decrees' '(ratthaniyom)' or Thai cultural mandates, which reflected the desire for social modernisation, but also an authoritarian and exaggerated nationalist spirit. First, in 1939 he changed the country's name of Siam to Thailand (Prathet
steep river valleys and upland areas that border the central plain. Most rivers, including the Nan, Ping, Wang, and Yom, unite in the lowlands of the lower-north region and the upper-central region. The Ping River and the Nan River unite to form the Chao Phraya River. The northeastern part is drained by rivers flowing into the Mekong basin, like the Kok and Ing. Traditionally, these natural features made possible several different types of agriculture, including wet-rice farming in the valleys and shifting cultivation in the uplands. The forested mountains also promoted a spirit of regional independence. Forests, including stands of teak and other economically useful hardwoods that once dominated the north and parts of the northeast, had diminished by the 1980s to 130,000 km2. In 1961 they covered 56% of the country, but by the mid-1980s forestland had been reduced to less than 30% of Thailand's total area. Northeastern Thailand The northeast, with its poor soils, also is not favoured agriculturally. However, sticky rice, the staple food of the region, which requires flooded, poorly drained paddy fields, thrives and where fields can be flooded from nearby streams, rivers and ponds, often two harvests are possible each year. Cash crops such as sugar cane and manioc are cultivated on a vast scale, and to a lesser extent, rubber. Silk production is an important cottage industry and contributes significantly to the economy. The region consists mainly of the dry Khorat Plateau which in some parts is extremely flat, and a few low but rugged and rocky hills, the Phu Phan Mountains. The short monsoon season brings heavy flooding in the river valleys. Unlike the more fertile areas of Thailand, the northeast has a long dry season, and much of the land is covered by sparse grasses. Mountains ring the plateau on the west and the south, and the Mekong delineates much of the northern and eastern rim. Some varieties of traditional medicinal herbs, particularly of the Genus Curcuma, family Zingiberaceae, are indigenous to the region. Central Thailand The "heartland", central Thailand, is a natural self-contained basin often termed "the rice bowl of Asia". The complex irrigation system developed for wet-rice agriculture in this region provided the necessary economic support to sustain the development of the Thai state from the 13th century Sukhothai Kingdom to contemporary Bangkok. Here the rather flat unchanging landscape facilitated inland water and road transport. The fertile area was able to sustain a dense population, 422 people per square kilometre in 1987, compared with an average of 98 for the country as a whole. The terrain of the region is dominated by the Chao Phraya and its tributaries and by the cultivated paddy fields. Metropolitan Bangkok, the focal point of trade, transport, and industrial activity, is on the southern edge of the region at the head of the Gulf of Thailand and includes part of the Chao Phraya delta. Eastern Thailand Eastern Thailand lies between the Sankamphaeng Range, which forms the border of the northeastern plateau to the north, and the Gulf of Thailand to the south. The western end of the Cardamom Mountains, known in Thailand as Thio Khao Banthat, extends into eastern Thailand. The geography of the region is characterised by short mountain ranges alternating with small basins of short rivers which drain into the Gulf of Thailand. Fruit is a major component of agriculture in the area, and tourism plays a strong part in the economy. The region's coastal location has helped promote the Eastern Seaboard industrial development, a major factor in the economy of the region. Western Thailand Thailand's long mountainous border with Myanmar continues south from the north into western Thailand with the Tenasserim Hills, known in Thailand as Thio Khao Tanaosi (เทือกเขาตะนาวศรี). The geography of the western region of Thailand, like the north, is characterised by high mountains and steep river valleys. Western Thailand hosts much of Thailand's less-disturbed forest areas. Water and minerals are also important natural resources. The region is home to many of the country's major dams, and mining is an important industry in the area. Southern Thailand Southern Thailand, part of a narrow peninsula, is distinctive in climate, terrain, and resources. Its economy is based on tourism, and palm oil and rubber plantations. In Krabi Province, for example, palm plantations occupy 980,000 rai (1,568 km2), or 52% of the province's farmland. Other sources of income include coconut plantations, tin mining. Rolling and mountainous terrain and the absence of large rivers are conspicuous features of the south. North-south mountain barriers and impenetrable tropical forest caused the early isolation and separate political development of this region. International access through the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand made the south a crossroads for both Theravada Buddhism, centered at Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Islam, especially in the former Pattani Kingdom on the border with Malaysia. Provinces Thailand's regions are divided politically into a total of 76 provinces plus Bangkok, which is a special administrative area. Climate Thailand's climate is influenced by monsoon winds that have a seasonal character (the southwest and northeast monsoon). The southwest monsoon, which lasts from May until October is characterized by movement of warm, moist air from the Indian Ocean to Thailand, causing abundant rain over most of the country. The northeast monsoon, active from October till February brings cold and dry air from China over most of Thailand. In southern Thailand, the northeast monsoon brings mild weather and abundant rainfall on the eastern coast of that region. Most of Thailand has a "tropical wet and dry or savanna climate" type (Köppen's Tropical savanna climate). The majority of the south as well as the eastern tip of the east have a tropical monsoon climate. Parts of the south also have a tropical rainforest climate. Thailand has three seasons. The first is the rainy or southwest monsoon season (mid-May to mid-October) which prevails over most of the country. This season is characterized by abundant rain with August and September being the wettest period of the year. This can occasionally lead to floods. In addition to rainfall caused by the southwest monsoon, the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and tropical cyclones also contribute to producing heavy rainfall during the rainy season. Nonetheless, dry spells commonly occur for one to two weeks from June to early-July. This is due to the northward movement of the ITCZ to southern China. Winter or the northeast monsoon starts from mid-October until mid-February. Most of Thailand experiences dry weather during this season with mild temperatures. An exception is the southern part of Thailand which receives abundant rainfall, particularly during October to November. Summer, or the pre–monsoon season, runs from mid-February until mid-May and	known in Thailand as Thio Khao Banthat, extends into eastern Thailand. The geography of the region is characterised by short mountain ranges alternating with small basins of short rivers which drain into the Gulf of Thailand. Fruit is a major component of agriculture in the area, and tourism plays a strong part in the economy. The region's coastal location has helped promote the Eastern Seaboard industrial development, a major factor in the economy of the region. Western Thailand Thailand's long mountainous border with Myanmar continues south from the north into western Thailand with the Tenasserim Hills, known in Thailand as Thio Khao Tanaosi (เทือกเขาตะนาวศรี). The geography of the western region of Thailand, like the north, is characterised by high mountains and steep river valleys. Western Thailand hosts much of Thailand's less-disturbed forest areas. Water and minerals are also important natural resources. The region is home to many of the country's major dams, and mining is an important industry in the area. Southern Thailand Southern Thailand, part of a narrow peninsula, is distinctive in climate, terrain, and resources. Its economy is based on tourism, and palm oil and rubber plantations. In Krabi Province, for example, palm plantations occupy 980,000 rai (1,568 km2), or 52% of the province's farmland. Other sources of income include coconut plantations, tin mining. Rolling and mountainous terrain and the absence of large rivers are conspicuous features of the south. North-south mountain barriers and impenetrable tropical forest caused the early isolation and separate political development of this region. International access through the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand made the south a crossroads for both Theravada Buddhism, centered at Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Islam, especially in the former Pattani Kingdom on the border with Malaysia. Provinces Thailand's regions are divided politically into a total of 76 provinces plus Bangkok, which is a special administrative area. Climate Thailand's climate is influenced by monsoon winds that have a seasonal character (the southwest and northeast monsoon). The southwest monsoon, which lasts from May until October is characterized by movement of warm, moist air from the Indian Ocean to Thailand, causing abundant rain over most of the country. The northeast monsoon, active from October till February brings cold and dry air from China over most of Thailand. In southern Thailand, the northeast monsoon brings mild weather and abundant rainfall on the eastern coast of that region. Most of Thailand has a "tropical wet and dry or savanna climate" type (Köppen's Tropical savanna climate). The majority of the south as well as the eastern tip of the east have a tropical monsoon climate. Parts of the south also have a tropical rainforest climate. Thailand has three seasons. The first is the rainy or southwest monsoon season (mid-May to mid-October) which prevails over most of the country. This season is characterized by abundant rain with August and September being the wettest period of the year. This can occasionally lead to floods. In addition to rainfall caused by the southwest monsoon, the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) and tropical cyclones also contribute to producing heavy rainfall during the rainy season. Nonetheless, dry spells commonly occur for one to two weeks from June to early-July. This is due to the northward movement of the ITCZ to southern China. Winter or the northeast monsoon starts from mid-October until mid-February. Most of Thailand experiences dry weather during this season with mild temperatures. An exception is the southern part of Thailand which receives abundant rainfall, particularly during October to November. Summer, or the pre–monsoon season, runs from mid-February until mid-May and is characterized by warmer weather. Due to its inland nature and latitude, the north, northeast, central, and eastern parts of Thailand experience a long period of warm weather. During the hottest time of the year (March to May), temperatures usually reach up to or more with the exception of coastal areas where sea breezes moderate afternoon temperatures. In contrast, outbreaks of cold air from China can bring colder temperatures; in some cases (particularly the north and northeast) close to or below . Southern Thailand is characterized by mild weather year-round with less diurnal and seasonal variations in temperatures due to maritime influences. Most of the country receives a mean annual rainfall of . However, certain areas on the windward sides of mountains such as Ranong Province on the west coast of southern Thailand and eastern parts of Trat Province receive more than of rainfall per year. The driest areas are the leeward sides of the central valleys and the northernmost portion of south Thailand where mean annual rainfall is less than . Most of Thailand (north, northeast, central, and east) is characterized by dry weather during the northeast monsoon and abundant rainfall during the southwest monsoon. In the southern parts of Thailand, abundant rainfall occurs in both the northeast and southwest monsoon seasons with a peak in September for the western coast and a peak in November–January on the eastern coast. Resources and land use Natural resources Tin, rubber, natural gas, tungsten, tantalum, timber, lead, fish, gypsum, lignite, fluorite, arable land. Land use Arable land: 30.7% Permanent crops: 8.8% Other: 60.5% (2011) Land ownership Pattamawadee Pochanukul, a lecturer from the Faculty of Economics at Thammasat University, estimates that about 59% of all arable land in Thailand belongs to the state. the Treasury Department owned 176,467 plots of land, consisting of about 9.9 million rai (15,769.6 km2). The Ministry of Defence owns about 2.6 million rai (4,230 km2) or about 21.2% of total public land. Information from the Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) shows that members of the house of representatives in 2013 owned a total of 35,786 rai of land (about 57.3 km2). Irrigated land Total: 64,150 km² (2007) Total renewable water resources Total: 438.6 km3 (2011) Environmental concerns Natural hazards: Land subsidence in Bangkok, resulting from the depletion of the water table; droughts (see also 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and 2011 Thai floods). Thailand is highly exposed to the effects of climate change such as the rising sea levels and extreme weather events. Drought: Droughts are a persistent feature of Thailand's climate. Droughts appear to be worsening: the drought of 2020 is expected to be the worst in four decades, according to the Thai Meteorological Department. and drought hazard mapping. Air pollution Water pollution from organic and factory wastes Deforestation Soil erosion Wildlife populations threatened by illegal hunting International environmental agreements Party to: biodiversity, climate change, climate change-Kyoto Protocol, desertification, endangered species, hazardous wastes, marine life conservation, Ozone layer protection, tropical timber 83, tropical timber 94, wetlands Signed, but not ratified: Law of the Sea Territorial disputes History Thailand shares boundaries with Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and Myanmar. Although neither China nor Vietnam border Thailand, their territories lie within 100 km of Thai territory. Many parts of Thailand's boundaries follow natural features, such as the Mekong. Most borders were stabilized and demarcated in the late-19th and early-20th centuries in accordance with treaties forced on Thailand and its neighbors by Britain and France. In some areas, however, exact boundaries, especially along Thailand's eastern borders with Laos and Cambodia, are still disputed. Adding to general border tensions were the activities
(also known as Suay) (0.7 percent), and i) 350,000 Karen (0.6 percent). Thailand's Ministry of Social Development and Human Security's 2015 Master Plan for the Development of Ethnic Groups in Thailand 2015-2017 omitted the larger, ethnoregional ethnic communities, including the Central Thai majority; it therefore covers only 9.7% of the population. There is a significant number of Thai-Chinese in Thailand. Chinese origins as evidenced by surname were erased in the 1920s by royal decree. Fourteen percent of Thais may have Chinese origins. One scholar estimated that the Sino-Thai population, itself around 14 per cent of the total, was composed of around 56 percent Teochew, 16 percent Hakka, 12 percent Hainanese, 7 percent Hokkien, 7 percent Cantonese and 2 percent other. Significant intermixing has taken place such that there are few pure ethnic Chinese, and those of partially mixed Chinese ancestry account for as much as a third to a half of the Thai population. Those assigned Thai ethnicity in the census process made up the vast majority of the population in 2010 (95.9 percent); two percent were Burmese, 1.3 percent other, and 0.9 percent unspecified. Thus, the ethnosocial and genetic makeup situation is very different from that which is reported or self-claimed. The vast majority of the Isan people, one-third of Thailand's population, are of ethnic Lao with some belonging to the Khmer minority. They speak the Isan language. Additionally there have been more recent waves of immigration from Vietnam and Cambodia across porous borders due to wars and subsequent poverty over the last few decades, whose immigrants have tried to keep a low profile and blend in. In more recent years the Isan people began mixing with the rest of the nation as urbanization and mobility increase. Myanmar's numerous ethnic wars between the army and tribes who speak more than 40 languages and control large fiefdoms or states, has led to waves of immigrants seeking refuge or work in Thailand. The makeup of Myanmar nationals is complex and includes, for example, people of Nepali ethnicity who escaped Nepal, entered Myanmar, and then emigrated to Thailand. Following the 2014 Thai coup d'état, Thailand's Department of Employment released figures showing that 408,507 legal workers from Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia worked in Thailand. An additional 1,630,279 Myanmar nationals of all ethnicities, 40,546 Laotians, and 153,683 Cambodians were without legal work authorization, but also worked and resided in Thailand. Some 180,000 Cambodians were said to have left Thailand post-coup due to crackdown rumors, indicating government figures were an under count. These statistics are merely a single snapshot and hardly authoritative as there is constant movement and much eluding of authority. The language of the central Thai population is the educational and administrative language. Other dialects of Thai exist, most notably the Southern Thai language. Several other small Tai (not Thai) groups include the Shan, Lue, and Phu Thai. Malay- and Yawi-speaking Muslims of the south are another significant minority group (2.3 percent), yet there are a substantial number of ethnic Malays who speak only Thai. Other groups include the Khmer; the Mon, who are substantially assimilated with the Thai, and the Vietnamese. Smaller mountain-dwelling tribes, such as the Hmong and Mien, as well as the Karen, number about 788,024. Some 300,000 Hmong were to have received citizenship in 2010. Thailand is also home to more than 200,000 foreigners—retirees, extended tourists, and workers from, for example, Europe, North America, and elsewhere. Languages Thailand is dominated by languages of the Southwestern Tai family. Karen languages are spoken along the border with Burma, Khmer is spoken near Cambodia (and previously throughout central Thailand), and Malay in the south near Malaysia. The Thai hill tribes speak numerous small languages, many Chinese retain varieties of Chinese, and there are half a dozen sign languages. Thailand has 73 living languages. The following table shows first languages in Thailand with 400,000 or more speakers according to the Royal Thai Government's 2011 Country Report to the Committee Responsible for the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The following table employs 2000 census data. Caution should be exercised with Thai census data on first language. In Thai censuses, the four largest Tai-Kadai languages of Thailand (in order, Central Thai, Isan (majority Lao), Kam Mueang, Pak Tai) are not provided as options for language or ethnic group. People declaring one of these as a first language, including Lao, are assigned to "Thai". This explains the disparity between the two tables. For instance, self-reporting as Lao has been prohibited, due to the prohibition of the Lao ethnonym in the context of describing Thai citizens for approximately one hundred years. This was due to the promotion of "Thai" national identity to cement Siamese claims over the Lao city-states of what is now northern and northeast Thailand following the 1893 Franco-Siamese War and subsequent threats posed by French Indochina to the Lao tributary states of Siam. The birth of a homogenizing Thai ethnocentric national identity sufficient to begin transforming Siam from an absolute monarchy into a modern nation-state was achieved by assimilating the Lao with this Thai "identity", equivalent to what is now known as the Tai–Kadai languages, under a "Greater Thai Empire", and can be traced back to at least 1902. This homogenization began affecting the Thai census from 1904 onwards. The 2011 UN report data is therefore more comprehensive and better differentiates between the large Tai-Kadai languages of Thailand. As a country submission to a UN convention ratified by Thailand, it is also arguably more authoritative. Religion	areas. Thailand's successful government-sponsored family planning program has resulted in a decline in population growth from 3.1 percent in 1960 to around 0.4 percent in 2015. The World Bank forecasts a contraction of the working-age population of about 10 percent between 2010 and 2040. In 1970, an average of 5.7 people lived in a Thai household. At the time of the 2010 census, the figure was down to 3.2. Even though Thailand has one of the better social security systems in Asia, the increasing population of elderly people is a challenge for the country. Life expectancy has risen, a reflection of Thailand's efforts to implement effective public health policies. The Thai AIDS epidemic had a major impact on the Thai population. Today, over 700,000 Thai are HIV or AIDS positive, approximately two percent of adult men and 1.5 percent of adult women. Every year, 30,000–50,000 Thai die from HIV or AIDS-related illnesses. Ninety percent of them are ages 20–24, the youngest range of the workforce. An aggressive public education campaign begun in the early-1990s reduced the number of new HIV infections from 150,000 to under 10,000 annually. The leading cause of death among the age cohort under 15 years of age: drowning. A study by the Child Safety Promotion and Injury Prevention Centre of Ramathibodi Hospital revealed that more than 1,400 youths under 15 years old died from drowning each year, or an average four deaths a day, becoming the top cause of deaths of children, even exceeding that of motorbike deaths. Thailand's Disease Control Department estimates that only 23 percent of Thai children under 15 can swim. The Public Health Ministry said that from 2006 to 2015, 10,923 children drowned. Of the 8.3 million children aged 5–14 nationwide, only two million can swim, according to the Public Health Ministry. The United Nations classifies Thailand as an "aging society" (one-tenth of the population above 60), on track to become an "aged society" (one-fifth of the population above 60) by 2025. The Fiscal Policy Office projects that the number of Thais aged 60-plus will increase from 14 percent in 2016 to 17.5 percent in 2020, 21.2 percent in 2025, and 25.2 percent in 2030. it is estimated that there are 94,000 employees aged 60 years or more in the workforce. Ethnic groups Thailand's ethnic origins are diverse and continue to evolve. The nation's ethnic makeup is obscured by the pressures of Thaification, Thai nationalism, and social pressure, which is intertwined with a caste-like mentality assigning some groups higher social status than others. In its report to the United Nations for the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Thai government officially recognized 62 ethnic communities. Twenty million Central Thai (together with approximately 650,000 Khorat Thai) make up approximately 20,650,000 million (34.1 percent) of the nation's population of 60,544,937 at the time of completion of the Mahidol University Ethnolinguistic Maps of Thailand data (1997). Thailand's report to the UN provided population numbers for mountain peoples and ethnic communities in the northeast. Thus, though over 3.288 million people in the northeast alone could not be categorised, the population and percentages of other ethnic communities c. 1997 are known and constitute minimum populations. In descending order, the largest (equal to or greater than 400,000) are a) 15,080,000 Lao (24.9 percent) consisting of the Thai Lao (14 million) and other smaller Lao groups, namely the Thai Loei (400-500,000), Lao Lom (350,000), Lao Wiang/Klang (200,000), Lao Khrang (90,000), Lao Ngaew (30,000), and Lao Ti (10,000); b) six million Khon Muang (9.9 percent, also called Northern Thais); c) 4.5 million Pak Tai (7.5 percent, also called Southern Thais); d) 1.4 million Khmer Leu (2.3 percent, also called Northern Khmer); e) 900,000 Malay (1.5%); f) 500,000 Nyaw (0.8 percent); g) 470,000 Phu Thai (0.8 percent); h) 400,000 Kuy/Kuay (also known as Suay) (0.7 percent), and i) 350,000 Karen (0.6 percent). Thailand's Ministry of Social Development and Human Security's 2015 Master Plan for the Development of Ethnic Groups in Thailand 2015-2017 omitted the larger, ethnoregional ethnic communities, including the Central Thai majority; it therefore covers
Yongyuth Tiyapairat, who pressured local officers to support his party in the previous election, would subject the party to dissolution. The Administrative Court also ruled that his government seriously violated the constitution and might have prejudiced national sovereignty in negotiating over the sovereignty of territory immediately adjacent to the Preah Vihear Temple with Cambodia. The case brought the resignation of his first foreign minister, Nopadon Patama. Several other ministers found wrongfully informing the Anti-corruption Board or Election Governing Board of important information, were discharged when this was discovered. Previously Thaksin and Pojaman's three lawyers were caught red-handed attempting to bribe Supreme Court judges and were given jail sentences. That was an ominous sign for Thaksin. Later a criminal court returned a verdict of tax evasion against Pojaman. He was to be jailed for three years. Days later, Thaksin and Pojaman jumped bail and issued a statement from London announcing through Thai TV his decision to seek political asylum in the UK in an attempt to avoid what he called "biased" treatment under Thailand's current judicial system. Thaksin and his family fled to Great Britain on 11 August 2008, to apply for political asylum after his wife was convicted of tax evasion. PM Samak Sundaravej, through his parliament, was able to complete budget bills for mega-projects which cost so much that the King of Thailand spoke out in protest and to thank the head of the Bank of Thailand (under threats from the government) for warning that the country was on the brink of disaster because of high expenditures. On 26 August 2008, 30,000 protesters, led by PAD, occupied Sundaravej's Government House compound in central Bangkok, forcing he and his advisers to work at Don Mueang International Airport. Riot police entered the occupied compound and delivered a court order for the eviction of the PAD protesters. Chamlong Srimuang, a leader of PAD, ordered 45 PAD guards to break into the main government building on Saturday. Three regional airports were closed for a short period and 35 trains between Bangkok and the provinces were canceled. Protesters raided the Phuket International Airport tarmac on the resort island of Phuket Province resulting to 118 flights canceled or diverted, affecting 15,000 passengers. Protesters also blocked the entrances of the airports in Krabi and Hat Yai (which were later re-opened). Police issued arrest warrants for Sondhi Limthongkul and eight other PAD leaders on charges of insurrection, conspiracy, unlawful assembly and refusing orders to disperse. Meanwhile, General Anupong Paochinda stated: "The army will not stage a coup. The political crisis should be resolved by political means". Samak and the ruling coalition called for an urgent parliamentary debate and session for 31 August. PM Samak Sundaravej tried using legal means involving civil charges, criminal charges, and police action to remove PAD protesters from government offices on 29 August. However, PAD managed to get temporary relief from the courts enabling them to legally continue the siege of the government office. One person died and 40 people were wounded in a clash which occurred when the DAAD (NohPohKoh) protesters, supported by Thaksin and the PPP moved toward PAD at about 03:00, 2 September without adequate police intervention. By the second half of September 2008, PM Samak Sundaravej was the subject of several court cases for his past actions. He faced an appeals court judgement of slander and a pending ruling from the Constitutional Court as to whether he had a conflict of interest by being a private employee while holding the premiership. The Anti-Corruption Board contemplated bringing a charge of abuse of power in the Preah Vihear case to the Constitutional Court. These legal difficulties ended PM Samak's political role. Ex-PM Thaksin and Pojaman also faced verdicts from the Supreme Court. People Power Party's deputy spokesman Kuthep Suthin Klangsang, on 12 September 2008 announced: "Samak has accepted his nomination for prime minister. Samak said he is confident that parliament will find him fit for office, and that he is happy to accept the post. A majority of party members voted on Thursday to reappoint Samak. Samak is the leader of our party so he is the best choice." Despite objections from its five coalition partners, the PPP, in an urgent meeting, unanimously decided to renominate Samak Sundaravej. Five coalition parties, namely Chart Thai, Matchima Thipataya, Pracharaj, Puea Pandin, and Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana, unanimously agreed to support the PPP to set up the new government and vote for the person who should be nominated as the new prime minister. Chart Thai deputy leader Somsak Prissananantakul and Ruam Jai Thai Chart Pattana leader Chettha Thanajaro said the next prime minister was nominated. Caretaker prime minister Somchai Wongsawat said PPP secretary-general Surapong Suebwonglee would notify the five parties who the PPP nominated, to take office again. Some lawmakers, however, said they would propose an alternate candidate. Meanwhile, Thailand's army chief General Anupong Paochinda said he backed the creation of a national unity government that would include all the country's parties, and he also asked for the lifting of a state of emergency that Samak imposed on 2 September. Embattled Samak Sundaravej abandoned his bid to regain the premiership, and he also resigned from the PPP's leadership. Meanwhile, PPP's chief party spokesmen, Kudeb Saikrachang and Kan Thiankaew, announced on 13 September that caretaker prime minister Somchai Wongsawat, caretaker justice minister Sompong Amornwiwat, and PPP Secretary-General Surapong Suebwonglee were PPP's candidates for premiership. However, Suriyasai Katasila of People's Alliance for Democracy (a group of royalist businessmen, academics and activists) vowed to continue its occupation of Government House if a PPP candidate were nominated: "We would accept anyone as prime minister, as long as he is not from the People's Power Party." On 14 September the state of emergency was lifted. The ruling People Power Party, on 15 September 2008, named Somchai Wongsawat, candidate for prime minister to succeed Samak Sundaravej. The PPP will endorse Somchai, and his nomination will be set for a parliamentary vote on Wednesday. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled on Wednesday in a corruption case against Thaksin and his wife, to be promulgated after the parliament vote for the new prime minister. On 4 October 2008, Chamlong Srimuang and rally organiser Chaiwat Sinsuwongse of the People's Alliance for Democracy were detained by the Thai police led by Col. Sarathon Pradit, by virtue of 27 August arrest warrant for insurrection, conspiracy, illegal assembly, and refusing orders to disperse (treason) against him and eight other protest leaders. At Government House, Sondhi Limthongkul, however, stated demonstrations would continue: "I am warning you, the government and police, that you are putting fuel on the fire. Once you arrest me, thousands of people will tear you apart." Srimuang's wife, Ying Siriluck visited him at the Border Patrol Police Region 1, Pathum Thani. Other PAD members still wanted by police included Sondhi, activist MP Somkiat Pongpaibul, and PAD leaders Somsak Kosaisuk and Pibhop Dhongchai. On 7 October 2008, Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh resigned and admitted partial responsibility for violence due to police tear gas clearance of the blockade of the parliament, causing injuries to 116 protesters, 21 seriously. His resignation letter stated: "Since this action did not achieve what I planned, I want to show my responsibility for this operation." After being dispersed, 5,000 demonstrators returned and blocked all four entries to the parliament building. The protesters attempted to hold 320 MPs and senators as hostages inside the parliament building, cutting off the power supply, and forcing Somchai Wongsawat to escape by jumping a back fence after his policy address. But other trapped MPs failed to leave and flee from the mob. The siege on the area beside the near prime minister's office forced the government to transfer its activities to Don Mueang Airport. On 26 November 2008, the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) issued a statement saying that the current crisis was a watershed moment for democracy and rule of law in Thailand. It contains harsh critique of PAD and the criminal justice system of Thailand. 2009–2010 protests and crackdowns Abhisit's rise to power was controversial and opposed from the beginning. In April 2009, anti-government protesters, known as "red shirts", began a demonstration aimed at the resignation of the prime minister and fresh elections. The major site of the demonstration was Bangkok. From 8 April, the demonstrators spread their activities to significant locations such as major intersections. Streets were blocked and barricaded. The demonstration took place at the same time as the ASEAN summit in Pattaya. Demonstrators moved there to protest, aiming at disrupting the summit. Protesters stormed the site of the summit, causing its cancellation. In Bangkok, the protest became fiercer because of the arrest of the leaders of the Pattaya protest. Protesters blocked the entrances of the Criminal Court, calling for the release of their leaders. Prime Minister Abhisit, at The Ministry of Interior, declared a state of emergency. Protesters blocked the entrance of the ministry, to seize the premier and other ministers. However, the premier escaped. The government began to deploy anti-riot troops. Armored vehicles were deployed in downtown Bangkok. Anti-riot actions took place in the early morning of the next day. Anti-riot troops, armed with shields, batons, and M-16s with live ammo, started dispersing and shooting protesters on Bangkok's streets. Protesters charged that the government was killing protesters. The government denied the charge. Although two bodies were found, the government found no evidence that it was involved in the killings. On major avenues and streets, burning buses were seen, as well as wounded people were carried to the hospitals, but the government reported no serious cases. By the afternoon of 14 April, the military controlled all main streets. The leaders of the protest decided to suspend their activities. Thai politics after the pro-Thaksin protest has so far been the stage of the two opposing factions: the Democrat Party-led government allied with their coalition partners, who also have the tacit support of the PAD, the military, and the police, against the Thaksin loyalists, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). Both sides have claimed the fighting as the struggle for democracy and the nation. Resolution to conflict On 3 May the Thai Prime Minister announced he was willing to hold elections on 14 November should the opposition red shirts accept the offer. The following day red shirt leaders accepted the proposal to leave the occupied parts of Bangkok in return for an election on the scheduled date. However, one week later, 10 May, protesters had yet to disband despite accepting the road map proposed by the prime minister for early elections. They placed new demands upon the prime minister that Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, who was in charge of security operations during the clash of 10 April, must first turn himself in for prosecution before they dispersed. On 11 May, Suthep presented himself to the Department of Special Investigation. The red shirt protesters, however, were not satisfied and demanded Suthep be formally charged instead by police. The red shirts failure to disperse was taken as a decline of the conciliatory road map and Prime Minister Abhisit's proposal of early parliamentary elections were withdrawn. This was followed by a warning issued from the prime minister that protesters must disperse or face imminent military action. The red shirts led another protest on 19 May. The army killed over 90 protesters in the ensuing military crackdown. Army tactics were been heavily criticised for failing to abide by international standards and using lethal force on unarmed protesters. At least six people including nurses and medics were shot by snipers inside a Buddhist temple set up as a safe area. Between 2001 and 2011, Isan's GDP per capita more than doubled to US$1,475. Over the same period, GDP in the Bangkok area soared from US$7,900 to nearly US$13,000. 2013 political crisis Following the announcement of a proposed amnesty bill by the Yingluck government, protests resurfaced in October 2013. The bill would allow former prime minister Thaksin to re-enter Thailand. Protesters perceived the Yingluck administration as corrupt, illegitimate, and a proxy for her brother. The protest movement was led by Suthep Thaugsuban and was supported by the People's Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). Prime Minister Yingluck dissolved the Thai parliament following the recommencement of protests and announced a new election in accordance with the Thai constitution. The constitution states that elections must be held 45 to 60 days from the date that parliament is dissolved. The protest movement opposed the election announcement and the PDRC stated that it would boycott the process, with Suthep calling for the appointment of an unelected council to lead the country until reforms can be implemented. Protesters marched to the Thai-Japanese sports stadium, the venue of the registration process,	president of the government, consulted with his councillors, mainly his relatives. Though significant reforms had occurred in Rama V's reign, the kingdom still had no national assembly. Men of royal blood held positions in the government as ministers. The situation became tense after the World War I. An economic crisis bedeviled the country. A young generation of students and intellectuals studying in Europe began criticizing the crown's government as backward, corrupt, and ineffective. On 24 June 1932, troops in Bangkok seized government buildings and some key ministers. The 1932 revolution took place. Its leaders were both bureaucrats and young military officers, urging national reforms, including the first written constitution. After negotiation with the king, Rama VII, and the kingdom's elite, changes took place, ending absolute rule by the king. The king remained the titular head of state, but the constitutional government ruled the country with the prime minister at its head. A general election was held for the creation of the first national assembly. The election was the first in which women were permitted to vote. Despite the efforts of many democrats in the past including Pridi Banomyong, Western, democratic-style of government was alien to the kingdom. It was claimed that Siam had insufficient time to educate its population in preparation for Western political, industrial, and economic changes. Since becoming a Western-style constitutional democratic monarchy in 1932, most of the time the country has been ruled by military governments. The disputes and struggles among the elites old and new, civilians, politicians, and military have occurred regularly since 1932. The first military coup staged by the 1932 revolutionary, military wing itself, occurred in 1933. The military became a tool for political stability. Political freedom, freedom of speech, and basic human rights were strongly compromised in the first three-quarters of the 20th century. Due to the pressure of outside events during the Vietnam War, the politics of the kingdom became even more tense. The military government, with the support of the US, tightened its control over the country's politics, while intellectuals and leftist students strongly opposed the junta. The Communist Party of Thailand staged armed struggle in the countryside in the 1960s. Communist and radical ideas attracted a handful of intellectuals. The communist movement was seen as congruent with the independence movements in other Indochinese countries, waging war against the US. In response, the military junta tightened its grip. Student-led uprisings in October 1973 led to a new vision of liberating the country from military government for a short period. The media received more freedom to criticize politicians and governments, while revolutionary and socialist movements became more apparent. The new civilian government officially shut US bases amid the fear of communist victory in the Indochinese countries in 1975. In 1976, Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryu, the armed forces commander, staged a massacre and coup that brought hard-line anti-communists to power and reversed these reforms. At the end of the Indochina War, investment by foreign businesses helped alleviate poor infrastructure and social problems. The middle classes constituted only 10 per cent of the 60 million inhabitants. They enjoyed wealth and increasing freedom, leaving the majority poor in the rural areas and slums. The system of rule fluctuated between unstable civilian governments and interludes of military takeover. During democratic periods, the middle class in the cities ignored the poor in the rural areas. The media accepted bribes. To corrupt bureaucrats and politicians became well-accepted business practice. Every time a coup was staged, scapegoats or excuses were found to justify it. Eventually, the ensuing junta government would hand the government back to elected officials. As a result, there have been 18 coups and 18 constitutions in the history of Thai politics. From 1932, bureaucrats, generals, and businessmen have run most of the political parties. While the grassroots are always the target of the political parties, no grassroots party has ever led the country. Money seems to be the major factor in gaining power in the country. The Black May uprising, in 1992, lead to more reform when promulgating the 1997 constitution aiming to create checks and balance of powers between strengthened government, separately elected senators, and anti-corruption agencies. Administrative courts, constitutional courts, and election-control committees were established to strengthen the checks and balance of politics. The 2007 constitution, following Thaksin's ousting, was particularly designed to be tighter in its control of corruptions and conflicts of interests while reducing the authority of the government. It was repealed in the 22 May 2014 coup d'état. Government Thailand categorizes itself as a constitutional monarchy, the king has little direct power under the constitution and exercises power through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, and the Courts in accordance with the 2017 constitution. The king, as the head of state, is the symbol of national identity and unity. The head of government is the prime minister. The Prime Minister is elected by both houses of the National Assembly. Under section 151 of the constitution, members of the House of Representative constituting at least one-fifth of the existing total Members of the house have the right to submit a vote of no-confidence of a single Minister or the Council of Ministers en masse. The National Assembly of Thailand, as the bicameral legislative branch of the government, consists of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representatives is the lower house of the National Assembly and consists of 500 members sitting for four years; 350 members are elected from a constituency basis and 150 members are elected from a party-list proportional representation. The Senate consists of 250 senators that hold a five-year term. Under section 107 of the 2017 constitution, senators are selected from professional and social groups, having the knowledge, expertise, and experience in various areas of society. Corruption Corruption has plagued Thailand for much of its modern history, with both the private and government sectors partaking in various forms of corruption. Corruption is embedded within Thai society due to its history and culture, where patronage plays a huge role and those with connections thrive. Research shows that the cost of bureaucratic corruption alone in 2018 amounted up to a 100 billion Thai baht, with state officials at various levels embezzling funds from large and small governmental projects. As of 2018, Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International has ranked Thailand as the 99th least corrupt. A year after the 2014 Thai coup d'état, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) declared a war on corruption, a common mission by all military dictatorships following the numerous coup in Thailand's history. However, the junta was also entangled with various embarrassing corruption scandals itself. Foreign relations Thailand is an active participant in international and regional organizations, and maintains a particularly close and longstanding security relationship with the United States. Thailand's foreign policy includes support for ASEAN and it has developed increasingly close ties with the organisation's other members, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, and Vietnam. Thailand also attends the annual meetings held by the foreign and economic ministers of the ASEAN nations, including the inaugural East Asia Summit that was held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. Regional cooperation is progressing for Thailand in economic, trade, banking, political, and cultural matters. In 2003, Thailand served as an APEC host and formulated the meeting's theme: "A World of Differences: Partnership for the Future". Supachai Panitchpakdi, the former Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand, served as Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO) between 2002 and 2005. Political parties and elections Voting Rights The issue of voting rights in Thailand is addressed under Section 95 of the 2017 constitution. A person must have the following qualifications in order to vote: Must be of Thai nationality, those that have acquired citizenship through naturalisation must hold the Thai nationality for at least 5 years. Must not be less than 18 years of age on the day of election. Must have their name listed in the household register in the constituency for at least 90 days on the date of election. Results of 2019 Thai General Election The 2019 General Election was held on 24 March 2019; it was the first election held in accordance with the new 2017 constitution and also the first election held since the 2014 coup. The election selected 500 members of the House of Representatives, in which 350 were elected from a constituency basis and 150 were elected from a party-list proportional representation. The National Assembly convened on 5 June to elect the new prime minister, in which the incumbent prime minister and coup leader Prayut Chan-o-cha won. Political history of the democratic era Transition to democracy after 1932 Following the Siamese revolution of 1932, which imposed constitutional limits on the monarchy, Thai politics were dominated for around fifty years by a military and bureaucratic elite, with the support of businessmen and entrepreneurs. Changes of government were affected primarily by a long series of mostly bloodless coups. The popular uprising of 14 October 1973 resulted in the end of the ruling military dictatorship of anti-communist Thanom Kittikachorn. Notably, it highlighted the growing influence of Thai university students in politics. Only three years later left-wing movements were crackdowned by extremely violent suppression of right wings and ultra royalists in 6 October 1976 massacre event, following by the coup to strengthen the monarchy and military status in Cold War period, including increase of lèse-majesté law jail terms. Beginning with a brief experiment in democracy during the mid-1980s, led by Prem Tinsulanonda, civilian democratic political institutions slowly gained greater authority, culminating in 1988 when Chatichai Choonhavan,leader of the Chart Thai Party, assumed office as the country's first democratically elected prime minister in more than a decade. Three years later, another bloodless coup, 1991 Thai coup d'état ended his term and the military junta National Peace Keeping Council was formed. Shortly thereafter, the royally appointed Anand Panyarachun, a businessman and former diplomat, headed a largely civilian interim government and promised to hold elections in the near future. However, following inconclusive March 1992 Thai general election, former army commander Suchinda Kraprayoon was appointed prime minister. Thais, more than 200,000 people led by Chamlong Srimuang reacted to the appointment by demanding an end to military influence in government, but demonstrations were violently suppressed by the military in Black May events. An estimated 52 to 100 protesters were killed, 696 were injured, and 175 had "disappeared", it had not been concluded until today. Shortly, Suchinda regime received sweeping amnesty, signed by Bhumibol Adulyadej. Domestic and international reactions to the violence forced Suchinda to resign, and the nation once again turned to Anand, who was appointed interim prime minister until new elections were held in September 1992. In the September 1992 elections, political parties that had opposed the military in May 1992 won by a narrow majority and Chuan Leekpai, a leader of the Democrat Party, became prime minister at the head of a five-party coalition. Following the defection of a coalition partner, Chuan dissolved parliament in May 1995, and the Chart Thai Party won the largest number of parliamentary seats in the subsequent election. Party leader Banharn Silpa-archa became prime minister, but held the office for little more than a year. Following elections held in November 1996, Chavalit Youngchaiyudh formed a coalition government and became prime minister. However, the onset of the Asian financial crisis caused a loss of confidence in the Chavalit government and forced him to hand over power to Chuan Leekpai in November 1997. Chuan formed a coalition government based on the themes of economic crisis management. The 1997 Constitution was introduced as the first constitution to be drafted by a popularly elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly, hence was popularly called the People's Constitution. The 1997 Constitution created a bicameral legislature. For the first time in Thai history, both houses were directly elected. 2001–2006, Thaksin Shinawatra In the January 2001 elections, telecommunications multimillionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, who had relations with the 1990s junta, and his Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT) won an overwhelming victory on a populist platform of economic growth and development. Thaksin also marginally escaped (8:7) a guilty verdict in the Constitutional Court, where he was charged by the Board of Anti-Corruption of hiding shares worth hundreds of millions of baht. A decade later, a Supreme Court ruling in another case accepted the possibility of bribery in the Constitutional Court case. After absorbing several smaller parties, TRT gained an absolute majority in the lower house of parliament, controlling 296 of 500 seats. In a cabinet reshuffle of October 2002, the Thaksin administration further put its stamp on the government. A package of bureaucratic reform legislation created six new ministries in an effort to streamline the bureaucratic process and increase efficiency and accountability. The general election held on 6 February 2005 resulted in another landslide victory for Thaksin and TRT, which controlled 374 seats in parliament's lower house. Thaksin's populist policies found great favour in rural areas. Thaksin introduced government programs which greatly benefited rural areas of the country. These programs included debt relief for farmers still reeling from the Asian financial crisis and a new healthcare program that brought coverage to all Thais for 30 baht per visit (equivalent to about US$1). During the 2013–2014 Thai political crisis older residents of the Baan Dong Yaang village in Udon Thani Province stated: "Before Thaksin, no politicians came here. Thaksin understood our situation and helped us." Despite the majority and surging popularity among rural Thais, Thaksin came under severe questioning for selling telecommunication shares to Temasek, a Singapore investor, for about 70,000 million baht without paying any tax. More complex and high-level corruption and conspiracies were discovered and exposed by Sonthi Limthongkul, Manager Media Group owner, who reached the middle class in the capital and the cities through the only small satellite and internet media channel, ASTV. Thaksin refused to publicly answer the questions of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a large group of middle class Thais and a coalition of anti-Thaksin protesters led by Sonthi Limthongkul. Due to an inability to clear himself of the corruption allegations, Thaksin's regime fell apart during public protests led by PAD, which led to widespread calls for his resignation and impeachment. PAD gathered in Bangkok and demanded that Thaksin resign as prime minister so that the king could directly appoint someone else. Thaksin refused and protests continued for weeks. Thaksin consequently dissolved parliament on 24 February 2006 and called a snap election for 2 April 2006. The election was boycotted by the opposition parties, leading to unopposed TRT candidates for 38 seats failing to obtain the necessary quorum of 20 per cent of eligible votes. As the Thai constitution requires all seats to be filled from the beginning of parliament, this produced a constitutional crisis. After floating several suggestions on 4 April 2006, Thaksin announced that he would step down as prime minister as soon as parliament had selected a successor. In a televised speech to senior judges, King Bhumibol requested that they execute their duty justly. Criminal charges and allegations of administrative abuse cases were brought against the Election Committee. The courts voided the election results, jailed the committee for abuse of power, and ordered a new round of elections for 15 October 2006. Thaksin continued to work as caretaker prime minister. Civil movements in Thailand were active in the 2000s, with some groups perceiving the Thaksin government as authoritarian, citing extrajudicial killings in his war on drugs, special security laws passed by the administration, and the government's increasingly hardline responses to the insurgency in the southern provinces. Thaksin's government was facing mounting opposition from the urban middle classes, while continuing to remain popular in the predominantly poor and rural north and northeastern regions. However, the most severe critic of Thaksin seemed to be Sondhi Limthongkul, a media tycoon and former colleague. 2006 coup While Thaksin was in New York City to make a speech at UN Headquarters, the military seized power on 19 September 2006. The Council for Democratic Reform under
"...the government will have to allow the import of foreign specialists to help bring forward Thailand 4.0," said Somchai Jitsuchon, research director for inclusive development at the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). "...that won't be easy as local professional associations will oppose the idea as they want to reserve those professional careers for Thais only". He went on to point out that only 56 percent of Thailand's population has access to the Internet, an obstacle to the creation of a high-tech workforce. A major thrust of Thailand 4.0 is encouraging a move to robotic manufacturing. But Thailand's membership in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), makes cheap workers from neighbouring countries even more readily available, which will make it harder to make the economic case to switch to robots. Somchai also pointed out that the bureaucratic nature of the Thai government will make realisation of Thailand 4.0 difficult. Every action plan calls for results from several ministries, "all of which are big, clumsily-run organisations" slow to perform. COVID-19 In September 2020, World Bank forecast that Thai economy would contract 8.9% by the end of the year due to COVID-19 pandemic. The Thai government cut jet fuel tax since February 2020. Macroeconomic trends Gross domestic product (GDP) Below is a table showing the trend of Thai gross domestic product (GDP) from 1980 to 2012: Source: With the exception of the 2012 data, all data above are from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database (April 2013). Over the past 32 years, the economy of Thailand has expanded. The GDP at current prices shows that from 1980 to 2012 the Thai economy has expanded nearly sixteen-fold when measured in baht, or nearly eleven-fold when measured in dollars. This makes Thailand the 32nd-biggest economy in the world, according to the IMF. With regard to GDP, Thailand has undergone five periods of economic growth. From 1980 to 1984, the economy has grown by an average of 5.4 percent per year. Regional businesses account for 70 percent of GDP, with Bangkok contributing 30 percent. After the 1984 baht devaluation and the 1985 Plaza Accord, a significant amount of foreign direct investment (mainly from Japan) raised the average growth rate per year to 8.8 percent from 1985 to 1996 before slumping to −5.9 percent per year from 1997 to 1998. From 1999 to 2006, Thailand averaged a growth rate of 5.0 percent per year. Since 2007, the country has faced a number of challenges: a military coup in late 2006, political turmoil from 2008 to 2011, the US financial crisis reaching its peak from 2008 to 2009, floods in 2010 and 2011, and the 2012 Eurozone crisis. As a result, from 2007 to 2012 the average GDP growth rate was 3.25 percent per year. In June 2019, the Monetary Policy Committee forecasted a GDP growth of 3.3% in 2019, which had earlier been estimated at 3.8%. Per capita GDP The table below shows the Thai GDP per capita in comparison with other East and Southeast Asian economies. All data, unless otherwise stated, are in US dollars (US$). Note: According to the NESDC, the Thai nominal GDP per capita stands at 167,508 baht (US$5,390). The data shown in the above table (including the Thai nominal GDP per capita of US$7,664) are taken from the IMF. Source: Adapted from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database (Retrieved 12/2016). Thailand suffers by comparison with neighboring countries in terms of GDP per capita. In 2011, China's nominal GDP per capita surpassed Thailand's, giving the latter the lowest nominal GDP per capita of its peers. According to the IMF, in 2012 Thailand ranked 92nd in the world in its nominal GDP per capita. Poverty and inequality The number of Thailand's poor declined from 7.1 million people in 2014, 10.5 percent of the population, to 4.9 million people in 2015, or 7.2 percent of the population. Thailand's 2014 poverty line was defined as an income of 2,647 baht per month. For 2015 it was 2,644 baht per month. According to the NESDC in a report entitled, Poverty and Inequality in Thailand, the country's growth in 2014 was 0.8 percent and 2.8 percent in 2015. NESDC Secretary-General Porametee Vimolsiri said that the growth was due to the effect of governmental policies. The report also noted that 10 percent of the Thai population earned 35 percent of Thailand's aggregate income and owned 61.5 percent of its land. Thailand was ranked as the world's third most unequal nation, behind Russia and India, in the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2016 (companion volume to the Global Wealth Report 2016), with one percent of the Thai population estimated to own 58 percent of Thailand's wealth. Industries SMEs Virtually all of Thailand's firms, 99.7 percent, or 2.7 million enterprises, are classed as being small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). , SMEs account for 80.3 percent (13 million) of Thailand's total employment. In sheer numbers SMEs predominate, but their contribution to the nation's GDP decreased from 41.3 percent of GDP in 2002 to 37.4 percent in 2013. Their declining contribution is reflected in their turnover rate: seventy percent fail within "...a few years". Agriculture, forestry and fishing Developments in agriculture since the 1960s have supported Thailand's transition to an industrialised economy. As recently as 1980, agriculture supplied 70 percent of employment. In 2008, agriculture, forestry and fishing contributed 8.4 percent to GDP; in rural areas, farm jobs supply half of employment. Rice is the most important crop in the country and Thailand had long been the world's number one exporter of rice, until recently falling behind both India and Vietnam. It is a major exporter of shrimp. Other crops include coconuts, corn, rubber, soybeans, sugarcane and tapioca. Thailand is the world's third-largest seafood exporter. Overall fish exports were worth around US$3 billion in 2014, according to the Thai Frozen Foods Association. Thailand's fishing industry employs more than 300,000 persons. In 1985, Thailand designated 25 percent of its land area for forest protection and 15 percent for timber production. Forests have been set aside for conservation and recreation, and timber forests are available for the forestry industry. Between 1992 and 2001, exports of logs and sawn timber increased from 50,000 to 2,000,000 cubic meters per year. The regional avian-flu outbreak contracted Thailand's agricultural sector in 2004, and the tsunami of 26 December devastated the Andaman Sea fishing industry. In 2005 and 2006, agricultural GDP was reported to have contracted by 10 percent. Thailand is the world's second-largest exporter of gypsum (after Canada), although government policy limits gypsum exports to support prices. In 2003 Thailand produced more than 40 different minerals, with an annual value of about US$740 million. In September 2003, to encourage foreign investment in mining the government relaxed its restrictions on mining by foreign companies and reduced mineral royalties owed to the state. Industry and manufacturing In 2007 industry contributed 43.9 percent of GDP, employing 14 percent of the workforce. Industry expanded at an average annual rate of 3.4 percent from 1995 to 2005. The most important sub-sector of industry is manufacturing, which accounted for 34.5 percent of GDP in 2004. Electrical and electronics Electrical and electronics (E&E) equipment is Thailand's largest export sector, amounting to about 15 percent of total exports. In 2014 Thailand's E&E exports totalled US$55 billion. The E&E sector employed approximately 780,000 workers in 2015, representing 12.2 per cent of the total employment in manufacturing. , Thailand is the largest exporter of computers and computer components in ASEAN. Thailand is the world's second-biggest maker of hard disk drives (HDDs) after China, with Western Digital and Seagate Technology among the biggest producers. But problems may loom for Thailand's high-tech sector. In January 2015, the country's manufacturing index fell for the 22nd consecutive month, with production of goods like televisions and radios down 38 percent year-on-year. Manufacturers are relocating to nations where labour is cheaper than Thailand. In April 2015, production will cease at an LG Electronics factory in Rayong Province. Production is being moved to Vietnam, where labour costs per day are US$6.35 versus US$9.14 in Thailand. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. will site two large smartphone factories in Vietnam. It made around US$11 billion worth of investment pledges to the Vietnamese economy in 2014. As technologies evolve, e.g., as HDDs are replaced by solid-state drives (SSDs), manufacturers are reexamining where best to produce these latest technologies. In addition, 74 percent of salaried workers in the sector face a high risk of being replaced by robots, as these positions consist of "repetitive, non-cognitive tasks". Automotive Thailand is the ASEAN leader in automotive production and sales. The sector employed approximately 417,000 workers in 2015, representing 6.5 per cent of total employment across all manufacturing industries and accounting for roughly 10 percent of the country's GDP. In 2014, Thailand exported US$25.8 billion in automotive goods. As many as 73 percent of automotive sector workers in Thailand face a high risk of job loss due to automation. Source: Federation of Thai Industries Gems and jewelry Gem and jewelry exports are Thailand's third-largest export category by value, trailing automotive and parts and computer components. In 2019, gem and jewelry exports, including gold, exceeded US$15.7 billion, up 30.3% from 2018 (486 billion baht, up 26.6%). Key export markets included ASEAN, India, the Middle East, and Hong Kong. The industry employs more than 700,000 workers according to the Gem and Jewelry Institute of Thailand (GIT). Energy Thailand's 2004 energy consumption was estimated at 3.4 quadrillion British thermal units, representing about 0.7 percent of total world energy consumption. Thailand is a net importer of oil and natural gas; however, the government is promoting ethanol to reduce imports of petroleum and the gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether. In 2005 Thailand's daily oil consumption of exceeded its production of . Thailand's four oil refineries have a combined capacity of . The government is considering a regional oil-processing and transportation hub serving south-central China. In 2004, Thailand's natural-gas consumption of exceeded its production of . Thailand's 2004 estimated coal consumption of 30.4 million short tons exceeded its production of 22.1 million. As of January 2007, proven oil reserves totaled and proven natural-gas reserves were . In 2003, recoverable coal reserves totalled 1,493 million short tons. In 2005, Thailand used about 118 billion kilowatt hours of electricity. Consumption rose by 4.7 percent in 2006, to 133 billion kWh. According to the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (the national electricity utility), power consumption by residential users is increasing due to more favorable rates for residential customers than for the industry and business sectors. Thailand's electric utility and petroleum companies (also state-controlled) are being restructured. Services In 2007 the service sector (which includes tourism, banking and finance), contributed 44.7 percent of GDP and employed 37 percent of the workforce. Thailand's service industry is competitive, contributing to its export growth. Banking and finance Dangerous levels of non-performing assets at Thai banks helped trigger an attack on the baht by currency speculators which led to the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998. By 2003, nonperforming assets had been cut in half (to about 30 percent). Despite a return to profitability, Thailand's banks continue to struggle with unrealized losses and inadequate capital. The government is considering reforms, including an integrated financial regulatory agency which would enable the Bank of Thailand to focus on monetary policy. In addition, the government is attempting to strengthen the financial sector through the consolidation of commercial, state- and foreign-owned institutions. The 2004 Financial Sector Reform Master Plan provides tax breaks to financial institutions engaging in mergers and acquisitions. The reform program has been deemed successful by outside experts. In 2007 there were three state-owned commercial banks, five state-owned specialized banks, fifteen Thai commercial banks, and seventeen foreign banks in Thailand. The Bank of Thailand sought to stem the flow of foreign funds into the country in December 2006, leading to the largest one-day drop in stock prices on the Stock Exchange of Thailand since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The sell-off by foreign investors amounted to more than US$708 million. In 2019, the Bank of Thailand kept its benchmark interest rate unchanged for a fourth straight meeting, with the concerns of high household debt and financial stability risks. Retail Retail employs more than six million Thai workers. Most are employed by small businesses. Large multinational and national retail players (such as Tesco Lotus, 7-Eleven, Siam Makro, Big C, Villa Market, Central Group and Mall Group) are estimated to employ fewer than 400,000 workers. This accounts for less than seven percent of Thailand's total employment in retail. Tourism In 2016, tourism revenue, 2.53 trillion baht, accounted for 17.7 percent of Thailand's GDP, up from 16.7 percent in 2015. It is expected to generate 2.71 trillion baht in 2017. The global average for GDP contribution from tourism is nine percent. Cryptocurrencies Thailand's Ministry of Finance approved four licensed brokers and dealers of cryptocurrencies in the country: Bx, Bitkub, Coins and Satang Pro. The country still did not elaborated regulation for ICOs, though it announced in late 2018 to loosen the rules. Labour Thailand's labour force has been estimated at from 36.8 million employed (of 55.6 million adults of working age) to 38.3 million (1Q2016). About 49 percent were employed in agriculture, 37 percent in the service sector and 14 percent in industry. In 2005 women constituted 48 percent of the labour force, and held an increased share of professional jobs. Thailand's unemployment rate was 0.9 percent as of 2014, down from two percent in 2004. A World Bank survey showed that 83.5 percent of the Thai workforce is unskilled. A joint study by the Quality Learning Foundation (QLF), Dhurakij Pundit University (DPU), and the World Bank suggests that 12 million Thais may lose their jobs to automation over the next 20 years, wiping out one-third of the positions in the workforce. The World Bank estimates that Thai workers are two times and five times less productive than Malaysian and Singaporean workers respectively. The report assesses the average output of Thai workers at US$25,000 (879,200 baht) in 2014 compared to Malaysia's US$50,000 and US$122,000 for Singapore. A 2016 report by the International Labor Office (ILO) estimates that over 70 percent of Thai workers are in danger of being displaced by automation. Factories in Thailand are estimated to be adding from 2,500–4,500 industrial robots per year. In fiscal year 2015, 71,000 Thais worked abroad in foreign countries. Taiwan employed the most Thai employees overall with 59,220 persons, followed by South Korea at 24,228, Israel at 23,479, Singapore at 20,000, and the UAE at 14,000. Most employees work in metal production, agriculture, textile manufacturing, and electronic part manufacturing fields. As of 2020, Thai migrant labourers overseas generate remittances	China. The rise of Ayutthaya during the 14th century was connected to renewed Chinese commercial activity, and the kingdom became one of the most prosperous trade centers in Asia. When the capital of the kingdom moved to Bangkok during the 19th century, foreign trade (particularly with China) became the focus of the government. Chinese merchants came to trade; some settled in the country and received official positions. A number of Chinese merchants and migrants became high dignitaries in the court. From the mid-19th century onward, European merchants were increasingly active. The Bowring Treaty, signed in 1855, guaranteed the privileges of British traders. The Harris Treaty of 1856, which updated the Roberts Treaty of 1833, extended the same guarantees to American traders. The domestic market developed slowly, with serfdom a possible cause of domestic stagnation. Most of the male population in Siam was in the service of court officials, while their wives and daughters may have traded on a small scale in local markets. Those who were heavily indebted might sell themselves as slaves. King Rama V abolished serfdom and slavery in 1901 and 1905 respectively. From the early 20th century to the end of World War II, Siam's economy gradually became globalized. Major entrepreneurs were ethnic Chinese who became Siamese nationals. Exports of agricultural products (especially rice) were very important and Thailand has been among the top rice exporters in the world. The Siamese economy suffered greatly from the Great Depression, a cause of the Siamese revolution of 1932. Significant investment in education in the 1930s (and again in the 1950s) laid the basis for economic growth, as did a liberal approach to trade and investment. After 1945 1945–1955 Postwar domestic and international politics played significant roles in Thai economic development for most of the Cold War era. From 1945 to 1947 (when the Cold War had not yet begun), the Thai economy suffered because of the Second World War. During the war, the Thai government (led by Field Marshal Luang Phibulsongkram) allied with Japan and declared war against the Allies. After the war Thailand had to supply 1.5 million tons of rice to Western countries without charge, a burden on the country's economic recovery. The government tried to solve the problem by establishing a rice office to oversee the rice trade. During this period a multiple-exchange-rate system was introduced amid fiscal problems, and the kingdom experienced a shortage of consumer goods. In November 1947, a brief democratic period was ended by a military coup and the Thai economy regained its momentum. In his dissertation, Somsak Nilnopkoon considers the period from 1947 to 1951 one of prosperity. By April 1948 junta Phibulsongkram, the wartime prime minister, returned to his previous office. He, however, was caught in a power struggle between his subordinates. To preserve his power, Phibulsongkram began an anti-communist campaign to seek support from the United States. As a result, from 1950 onward Thailand received military and economic aid from the US. The Phibulsongkram government established many state enterprises, which were seen as economic nationalism. The state (and its bureaucrats) dominated capital allocation in the kingdom. Ammar Siamwalla, one of Thailand's most prominent economists, calls it the period of "bureaucratic capitalism". 1955–1985 In 1955, Thailand began to see a change in its economy fueled by domestic and international politics. The power struggle between the two main factions of the Phibul regime—led by Police General Phao Sriyanond and General (later, Field Marshal) Sarit Thanarat—increased, causing Sriyanonda to unsuccessfully seek support from the US for a coup against Phibulsongkram regime. Luang Phibulsongkram attempted to democratize his regime, seeking popular support by developing the economy. He again turned to the US, asking for economic rather than military aid. The US responded with unprecedented economic aid to the kingdom from 1955 to 1959. The Phibulsongkram government also made important changes to the country's fiscal policies, including scrapping the multiple-exchange-rate system in favor of a fixed, unified system which was in use until 1984. The government also neutralized trade and conducted secret diplomacy with the People's Republic of China, displeasing the United States. Despite his attempts to maintain power, Luang Phibulsongkram was deposed (with Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan and Police General Phao Sriyanond) on 16 September 1957 in a coup led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The Thanarat regime (in power from 1957 to 1973) maintained the course set by the Phibulsongkram regime with US support after severing all ties with the People's Republic of China and supporting US operations in Indochina. It developed the country's infrastructure and privatized state enterprises unrelated to that infrastructure. During this period a number of economic institutions were established, including the Bureau of Budget, the NESDC, and the Thailand Board of Investment (BOI). The National Economic and Social Development Plan was implemented in 1961. During this period, the market-oriented Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI) led to economic expansion in the kingdom during the 1960s. According to former President Richard M. Nixon's 1967 Foreign Affairs article, Thailand entered a period of rapid growth in 1958 (with an average growth rate of seven percent a year). From the 1970s to 1984, Thailand suffered from many economic problems: decreasing US investment, budget deficits, oil-price spikes, and inflation. Domestic politics were also unstable. With the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia on 25 December 1978, Thailand became the front-line state in the struggle against communism, surrounded by three communist countries and a socialist Burma under General Ne Win. Successive governments tried to solve the economic problems by promoting exports and tourism, still important for the Thai economy. One of the best-known measures to deal with the economic problems of that time was implemented under General Prem Tinsulanonda's government, in power from 1980 to 1988. Between 1981 and 1984 the government devalued the national currency, the Thai baht (THB), three times. On 12 May 1981, it was devalued by 1.07 percent, from THB20.775/US$ to THB21/US$. On 15 July 1981 it was again devalued, this time by 8.7 percent (from THB21/US$ to THB23/US$). The third devaluation, on 5 November 1984, was the most significant: 15 percent, from THB23/US$ to THB27/US$. The government also replaced the country's fixed exchange rate (where it was pegged to the US dollar) with a "multiple currency basket peg system" in which the US dollar bore 80 percent of the weight. Calculated from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database, in the period 1980–1984 the Thai economy had an average GDP growth rate of 5.4 percent. 1985–1997 Concurrent with the third devaluation of the Thai baht, on 22 September 1985, Japan, the US, the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany signed the Plaza Accord to depreciate the US dollar in relation to the yen and the Deutsche Mark. Since the dollar accounted for 80 percent of the Thai currency basket, the baht was depreciated further, making Thailand's exports more competitive and the country more attractive to foreign direct investment (FDI) (especially from Japan, whose currency had appreciated since 1985). In 1988 Prem Tinsulanonda resigned and was succeeded by Chatichai Choonhavan, the first democratically elected prime minister of Thailand since 1976. The Cambodian-Vietnamese War was ending; Vietnam gradually retreated from Cambodia by 1989, enhancing Thai economic development. After the 1984 baht devaluation and the 1985 Plaza Accord, although the public sector struggled due to fiscal constraints, the private sector grew. The country's improved foreign trade and an influx of foreign direct investment (mainly from Japan) triggered an economic boom from 1987 to 1996. Although Thailand had previously promoted its exports, during this period the country shifted from import-substitution (ISI) to export-oriented industrialization (EOI). During this decade the Thai GDP (calculated from the IMF World Economic Outlook database) had an average growth rate of 9.5 percent per year, with a peak of 13.3 percent in 1988. In the same period, the volume of Thai exports of goods and services had an average growth rate of 14.8 percent, with a peak of 26.1 percent in 1988. Economic problems persisted. From 1987 to 1996 Thailand experienced a current account deficit averaging −5.4 percent of GDP per year, and the deficit continued to increase. In 1996, the current account deficit accounted for −7.887 percent of GDP (US$14.351 billion). A shortage of capital was another problem. The first Chuan Leekpai government, in office from September 1992 to May 1995, tried to solve this problem by granting Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) licenses to Thai banks in 1993. This allowed BIBF banks to benefit from Thailand's high-interest rate by borrowing from foreign financial institutions at low interest and loaning to Thai businesses. By 1997 foreign debt had risen to US$109,276 billion (65% of which was short-term debt), while Thailand had US$38,700 billion in international reserves. Many loans were backed by real estate, creating an economic bubble. By late 1996, there was a loss of confidence in the country's financial institutions; the government closed 18 trust companies and three commercial banks. The following year, 56 financial institutions were closed by the government. Another problem was foreign speculation. Aware of Thailand's economic problems and its currency basket exchange rate, foreign speculators (including hedge funds) were certain that the government would again devalue the baht, under pressure on both the spot and forward markets. In the spot market, to force devaluation, speculators took out loans in baht and made loans in dollars. In the forward market, speculators (believing that the baht would soon be devalued) bet against the currency by contracting with dealers who would give dollars in return for an agreement to repay a specific amount of baht several months in the future. In the government, there was a call from Virapong Ramangkul (one of Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's economic advisers) to devalue the baht, which was supported by former Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda. Yongchaiyudh ignored them, relying on the Bank of Thailand (led by Governor Rerngchai Marakanond, who spent as much as US$24,000 billion – about two-thirds of Thailand's international reserves) to protect the baht. On 2 July 1997 Thailand had US$2,850 billion remaining in international reserves, and could no longer protect the baht. That day Marakanond decided to float the baht, triggering the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. 1997–2006 Source: Adapted from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database, April 2012. The Thai economy collapsed as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Within a few months, the value of the baht floated from THB25/US$ (its lowest point) to THB56/US$. The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) dropped from a peak of 1,753.73 in 1994 to a low of 207.31 in 1998. The country's GDP dropped from THB3.115 trillion at the end of 1996 to THB2.749 trillion at the end of 1998. In dollar terms, it took Thailand as long as 10 years to regain its 1996 GDP. The unemployment rate went up nearly threefold: from 1.5 percent of the labor force in 1996 to 4.4 percent in 1998. A sharp decrease in the value of the baht abruptly increased foreign debt, undermining financial institutions. Many were sold, in part, to foreign investors while others went bankrupt. Due to low international reserves from the Bank of Thailand's currency-protection measures, the government had to accept a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Overall, Thailand received US$17.2 billion in aid. The crisis impacted Thai politics. One direct effect was that Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh resigned under pressure on 6 November 1997, succeeded by opposition leader Chuan Leekpai. The second Leekpai government, in office from November 1997 to February 2001, tried to implement economic reforms based on IMF-guided neo-liberal capitalism. It pursued strict fiscal policies (keeping interest rates high and cutting government spending), enacting 11 laws it called "bitter medicine" and critics called "the 11 nation-selling laws". The Thai government and its supporters maintained that with these measures, the Thai economy improved. In 1999 Thailand had a positive GDP growth rate for the first time since the crisis. Many critics, however, mistrusted the IMF and maintained that government-spending cuts harmed the recovery. Unlike economic problems in Latin America and Africa, they asserted, the Asian financial crisis was born in the private sector and the IMF measures were inappropriate. The positive growth rate in 1999 was because the country's GDP had gone down for two consecutive years, as much as −10.5 percent in 1998 alone. In terms of the baht, it was not until 2002 (in dollar terms, not until 2006) that Thailand would regain its 1996 GDP. An additional 1999 loan from the Miyazawa Plan made the question of whether (or to what extent) the Leekpai government helped the Thai economy controversial. An indirect effect of the financial crisis on Thai politics was the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra. In reaction to the government's economic policies, Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai Party won a landslide victory over Leekpai's Democrat Party in the 2001 general election and took office in February 2001. Although weak export demand held the GDP growth rate to 2.2 percent in the first year of his administration, the first Thaksin Shinawatra government performed well from 2002 to 2004 with growth rates of 5.3, 7.1 and 6.3 percent respectively. His policy was later called Thaksinomics. During Thaksin's first term, Thailand's economy regained momentum and the country paid its IMF debt by July 2003 (two years ahead of schedule). Despite criticism of Thaksinomics, Thaksin's party won another landslide victory over the Democrat Party in the 2005 general election. The official economic data related to Thanksinomics reveals that between 2001 and 2011, Isan's GDP per capita more than doubled to US$1,475, while, over the same period, GDP in the Bangkok area rose from US$7,900 to nearly US$13,000. Thaksin's second term was less successful. On 26 December 2004, the Indian Ocean tsunami occurred. In addition to the human toll, it impacted the first-quarter Thai GDP in 2005. The Yellow Shirts, a coalition of protesters against Thaksin, also emerged in 2005. In 2006, Thaksin dissolved the parliament and called for a general election. The April 2006 general election was boycotted by the main opposition parties. Thaksin's party won again, but the election was declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. Another general election, scheduled for October, was cancelled. On 19 September a group of soldiers calling themselves the Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy and led by Sonthi Boonyaratglin organized a coup, ousting Thaksin while he was in New York preparing for a speech at the United Nations General Assembly. During the last year of the second Thaksin government, the Thai GDP grew by 5.1 percent. Under his governments, Thailand's overall ranking in the IMD Global Competitiveness Scoreboard rose from 31st in 2002 to 25th in 2005 before falling to 29th in 2006. 2006 to 2011 After the coup, Thailand's economy again suffered. From the last quarter of 2006 through 2007 the country was ruled by a military junta led by General Surayud Chulanont, who was appointed prime minister in October 2006. The 2006 GDP growth rate slowed from 6.1, 5.1 and 4.8 percent year-over-year in the first three-quarters to 4.4 percent (YoY) in Q4. Thailand's ranking on the IMD Global Competitiveness Scoreboard fell from 26th in 2005 to 29th in 2006 and 33rd in 2007. Thaksin's plan for massive infrastructure investments was unmentioned until 2011, when his younger sister Yingluck Shinawatra entered office. In 2007, the Thai economy grew by 5 percent. On 23 December 2007, the military government held a general election. The pro-Thaksin People's Power Party, led by Samak Sundaravej, won a landslide victory over Abhisit Vejjajiva's Democrat Party. Under the People's Power Party-led government the country fell into political turmoil. This, combined with the financial crisis of 2007–2008 cut the 2008 Thai GDP growth rate to 2.5%. Before the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the Yellow Shirts reconvened in March 2008, the GDP grew by 6.5 percent (YoY) in the first quarter of the year. Thailand's ranking on the IMD World Competitiveness Scoreboard rose from 33rd in 2007 to 27th in 2008. The Yellow Shirts occupied the Government House of Thailand in August 2008, and on 9 September the Constitutional Court delivered a decision removing Samak Sundaravej from the prime ministership. Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin's brother-in-law, succeeded Samak Sundaravej as prime minister on 18 September. In the US the financial crisis reached its peak while the Yellow Shirts were still in Government House, impeding government operations. GDP growth dropped from 5.2 percent (YoY) in Q2 2008 to 3.1 percent (YoY) and −4.1 percent (YoY) in Q3 and Q4. From 25 November to 3 December 2008 the Yellow Shirts, protesting Somchai Wongsawat's prime ministership, seized the two Bangkok airports, (Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueang), and damaged Thailand's image and economy. On 2 December the Thai Constitutional Court issued a decision dissolving the People's Power Party, ousting Somchai Wongsawat as prime minister. By the end of 2008, a coalition government led by Abhisit Vejjajiva's Democrat Party was formed: "[The] legitimacy of the Abhisit government has been questioned since the first day that the Democrat party took the office in 2008 as it was allegedly formed by the military in a military camp". The government was under pressure from the US financial crisis and the Red Shirts,
operate or offer services to public. Liberalisation took place in the 1990s and 2000s. State enterprises, the Telephone Organization of Thailand, Communications Authority of Thailand, and Mass Communication Organization of Thailand, were corporatised in 2003 and 2004. The Constitution of 1997 prompted the institutional changes when it declared that all the spectrum is a "national communication resource for public welfare". The 1997 Constitution further requires the establishment of "an independent regulator" who shall be authorized to allocate spectra and monitor and regulate communications in Thailand. In 1998, to comply with the constitutional mandate, the parliament passed a law establishing two independent regulators, the National Telecommunication Commission (NTC) and the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC). The regulatory practice began in Thailand when the NTC was appointed by the king through the complex nomination procedure in 2005. The inception of NTC automatically terminates and transfers all power and authority in telecommunication sector from the Post and Telegraph Department (PTD) to the newly established independent commission. In September 2006, the military wrested control from a civilian government and merged the telecommunications and broadcasting regulators into a convergence regulator. The task had not been completed when a civilian government came into power and introduced the new bill. The new law dubbed the Act on Spectrum Allocation Authority, Regulatory & Control over Radio & TV Broadcast and Telecommunications of 2010 (aka NRA Act of 2010), eliminated the NTC and created a new "convergence regulator" to manage both telecommunications and broadcast in Thailand. The new law also requires that the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission which was established in 2010 as an independent regulator, must allocate all commercial spectrum licenses via auction. In 2012, in order to license the 3G spectrum and services, the Telecom Commission (TC) hosted a spectrum auction which resulted in three new licenses for 2.1 GHz to three incumbents (AIS, True, and DTAC). In 2013, the Broadcast Commission (BC) auctioned 42 new DTTV licenses. Both auctions together earned record sums for money paid to the public sector via auction. Later the record was beaten by another auction by sister agency, the Broadcast Commission who launched the DTTV auction in December 2013. The NBTC Act in force then allowed NBTC to keep the proceeds of the DTTV auction. But when the military took over the country, it amended the NBTC Act to require return of auction proceeds to the treasury. On 22 May 2014 when the coup d'état took place, the military decided that it would scrutinize the regulatory practices of both sectors. The government, led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, announced that his government would move Thailand into the "digital economy" and would transform the Ministry of Information and Telecommunications into a Digital Economy Ministry. NBTC reform would be a part of the plan. In June 2014, the junta issued two new orders demanding that a) all the proceeds from spectrum auctions must be returned to the public purse and, b) all community radio stations must comply with a new junta order which would require examination and investigation of compliance before offering programming to the public. Temporary licenses were issued in September 2014 to compliant radio stations that signed voluntary memoranda of understanding (MOU) as "a condition precedent" to be able to broadcast while awaiting more thorough vetting from BC before issuance of the de juré license. The time required to an investigation was ambiguous. New community radio licenses must be in compliance with a junta order that supersedes the Radio and Television Act of 2008. The mobile network market is dominated by three large operators who have a market penetration rate of 100 percent. All main mobile operators now utilise GSM/3GPP family technologies including GSM, EDGE, UMTS, and LTE. Thailand has six analogue terrestrial television channels, and 24 commercial digital terrestrial channels began broadcasting in 2014. Under the Trade Competition Act 2017, which became effective in October 2017, the trade competition authority relinquished its authority to regulate specific sectors including broadcasting and telecommunications businesses. In other words, since the Trade Competition Act 2017 became effective, the broadcasting and telecom sectors that used to be regulated by specific legislation on trade competition have been exempted from complying with general competition laws and are only subject to sectoral regulations on competition. Telephone Fixed-line There are three fixed-line telephone operators in Thailand: state-owned TOT Public Company Limited, True Corporation, and TT&T (Currently name "3BB"). As of 2014, there were 5,687,038 fixed-line subscriptions. That number has been in decline since 2008. The first fixed-line telephone system was installed in Thailand (Siam) under the Ministry of Defence in 1881, and later its operation was transferred to the Post and Telegraph Department. The Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) was established in 1954 to manage the telephone system. The penetration of telephone remained relatively limited for most of the 20th century. In 1992, the ratio of telephone lines per population was 3.3 lines per 100 population. In 1991, two private corporations were given concessions to build and operate telephone lines: Telecom-Asia (later renamed True Corporation) for the Bangkok Metropolitan Region and Thai Telephone & Telecommunications (TT&T) for the provinces. Mobile networks As of 2014, there were 97.6 million mobile subscribers in Thailand, a penetration rate of 146 percent of the total population. The Thai market is predominantly prepaid with 84.8 million prepaid subscribers. More than 99 percent of the market share belongs to three large operators (including their subsidiaries): Advanced Info Service (AIS), 46.52 percent market share, DTAC, 28.50 percent market share, and Truemove, 24.26 percent. Other operators include the state enterprises TOT Public	NBTC Act to require return of auction proceeds to the treasury. On 22 May 2014 when the coup d'état took place, the military decided that it would scrutinize the regulatory practices of both sectors. The government, led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, announced that his government would move Thailand into the "digital economy" and would transform the Ministry of Information and Telecommunications into a Digital Economy Ministry. NBTC reform would be a part of the plan. In June 2014, the junta issued two new orders demanding that a) all the proceeds from spectrum auctions must be returned to the public purse and, b) all community radio stations must comply with a new junta order which would require examination and investigation of compliance before offering programming to the public. Temporary licenses were issued in September 2014 to compliant radio stations that signed voluntary memoranda of understanding (MOU) as "a condition precedent" to be able to broadcast while awaiting more thorough vetting from BC before issuance of the de juré license. The time required to an investigation was ambiguous. New community radio licenses must be in compliance with a junta order that supersedes the Radio and Television Act of 2008. The mobile network market is dominated by three large operators who have a market penetration rate of 100 percent. All main mobile operators now utilise GSM/3GPP family technologies including GSM, EDGE, UMTS, and LTE. Thailand has six analogue terrestrial television channels, and 24 commercial digital terrestrial channels began broadcasting in 2014. Under the Trade Competition Act 2017, which became effective in October 2017, the trade competition authority relinquished its authority to regulate specific sectors including broadcasting and telecommunications businesses. In other words, since the Trade Competition Act 2017 became effective, the broadcasting and telecom sectors that used to be regulated by specific legislation on trade competition have been exempted from complying with general competition laws and are only subject to sectoral regulations on competition. Telephone Fixed-line There are three fixed-line telephone operators in Thailand: state-owned TOT Public Company Limited, True Corporation, and TT&T (Currently name "3BB"). As of 2014, there were 5,687,038 fixed-line subscriptions. That number has been in decline since 2008. The first fixed-line telephone system was installed in Thailand (Siam) under the Ministry of Defence in 1881, and later its operation was transferred to the Post and Telegraph Department. The Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT) was established in 1954 to manage the telephone system. The penetration of telephone remained relatively limited for most of the 20th century. In 1992, the ratio of telephone lines per population was 3.3 lines per 100 population. In 1991, two private corporations were given concessions to build and operate telephone lines: Telecom-Asia (later renamed True Corporation) for the Bangkok Metropolitan Region and Thai Telephone & Telecommunications (TT&T) for the provinces. Mobile networks As of 2014, there were 97.6 million mobile subscribers in Thailand, a penetration rate of 146 percent of the total population. The Thai market is predominantly prepaid with 84.8 million prepaid subscribers. More than 99 percent of the market share belongs to three large operators (including their subsidiaries): Advanced Info Service (AIS), 46.52 percent market share, DTAC, 28.50 percent market share, and Truemove, 24.26 percent. Other operators include the state enterprises TOT Public Company Limited (TOT) with 0.57 percent market share, and CAT Telecom with 0.15 percent market share and Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs). In 1980s and 1990s, private mobile operators were given concessions from TOT and CAT. TOT and CAT were corporatised in 2002–2003, and the Thai telecommunications landscape transitioned towards spectrum allocation by independent regulator. The 2007 constitution and the Act on Organization to Assign Radio Frequency and to Regulate the Broadcasting and Telecommunications Services include the provisions that a national independent regulator is established and frequencies for commercial activities must be allocated via auction. The first successful spectrum auction by the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission was organised in 2012, allocating 45 MHz of IMT (2100) frequency band to three mobile phone operators. Legislation that governs the Mobile networks includes the Act on the Organisation to Assign Radio Frequency and to Regulate Broadcasting and Telecommunications Services 2010 (the NBTC Act) and the Telecommunications Business Act 2001 (the Telecommunications Business Act). Additionally, any operator wishing to issue telephone numbers shall obtain a separate licence from the NBTC, subject to a Telecommunications Numbering Plan issued by the NBTC. In 2015 the NBTC arranged two rounds of auctions for 1800 MHz and 900Mhz. In November, Advance Info Service and True Corporation won the 1800 MHz license in the auction which takes nearly 33 hours to complete. In December, True Corporation and Jasmine International won the 900 MHz auction. The significance of this auction is the establishment of Jasmine International in the telecommunication business which didn't have a new player for many years. There are many rumours following this auction questioning Jasmine International on its ability to pay the license fee to NBTC. In 2017, the number of mobile subscribers has reached 121.53 million, and
this. By comparison, Thailand has 390,000 km (242,335 miles) of highways. The SRT has long been perceived by the public as inefficient and resistant to change. Trains are usually late, and most of its equipment is old and poorly maintained. The worst financially performing state enterprise, the SRT consistently operates at a loss despite being endowed with large amounts of property and receiving large government budgets; it reported a preliminary loss of 7.58 billion baht in 2010. Recurring government attempts at restructuring and/or privatization throughout the 2000s have always been strongly opposed by the union and have not made any progress. There are two active rail links to adjacent countries. The line to Malaysia uses the same gauge, as does the line to Laos across the Mekong River on the First Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge. The line to Cambodia is currently disused and is being rebuilt, while the line to Myanmar is defunct (see Death Railway). A projected extension will rebuild the route and in 2011 a link was also proposed from Kanchanaburi to Port Dawei. Rail transport in Bangkok includes long-distance services, and some daily commuter trains running from and to the outskirts of the city during the rush hour, but passenger numbers have remained low. There are also three rapid transit rail systems in the capital. Rail rapid transit systems Bangkok Metropolitan Region Bangkok is served by three rail rapid transit systems: MRT, with two lines. Bangkok Skytrain or BTS, with two lines. Suvarnabhumi Airport Link or ARL, with one line. Khon Kaen In March 2016, the Thai government approved the first LRT project in Khon Kaen province, to be built by the private sector. The first phase of the project will be a 26 km North-South route. Previously, this corridor was intended to be served by a bus rapid transit route. The Office of Transport and Traffic Policy (OTP) will fund an 8-month project study for Khon Kaen University with 38 million baht. The Khon-Kaenpattanmong or Khon Kaen Think Tank, a private company, will be the main investor in the project and responsible for the operation of the network. The Phase 1 budget is estimated at 1.5 billion baht. As of 2020, construction has yet to start. Other Provinces Several other rapid transit systems have been proposed but have not been approved : Chiang Mai monorail, Pattaya LRT, Phuket LRT and Hat Yai monorail. Road transport Thailand has 390,000 km (242,335 miles) of highways. According to the BBC, Thailand has 462,133 roads and many multi-lane highways. Thailand had 37 million registered vehicles, 20 million of them two or three-wheeled motorbikes, and millions more that are unregistered. It also had one million "heavy trucks", 158,000 buses, and 624,000 "other" vehicles. By mid-2019 the number of registered vehicles in Thailand had risen to 40,190,328. The majority—21,051,977—are motorbikes. Private automobiles with up to seven seats numbered 9,713,980. Road safety According to the World Health Organization's, Global Status Report on Road Safety 2018, Thailand had an estimated traffic fatality rate (all vehicle types) of 32.7 persons per 100,000 population in 2016. The only nations exceeding Thailand's death toll were Liberia; Saint Lucia (population: 178,000); Burundi; Zimbabwe; Dominican Republic; Democratic Republic of Congo; Venezuela; and the Central African Republic. Thailand's death rate for operators and passengers of motorized two- and three-wheeled motorbikes was the world's highest in 2016 at 74.4 fatalities per 100,000 population. Sixty-six persons die every day on Thai roads, one every 22 minutes, seven of them children. In 2015, Thailand's roads were the second deadliest in the world in 2015. Among public transport options, passenger vans, with a monthly average of 19.5 accidents resulting in a monthly average of 9.4 deaths, rank as the most dangerous of all public transport services involved in road accidents. Regular tour buses on fixed routes were in second place with a total of 141 accidents, resulting in 56 deaths and 1,252 injuries. Third on the list were irregular tour buses, involved in 52 accidents, resulting in 47 deaths and 576 injuries. Taxis were fourth with 77 accidents, resulting in seven deaths and 84 injuries. Ordinary buses were involved in 48 accidents with 10 deaths and 75 injuries. , there were 156,089 legally registered public transport vehicles in Thailand, 42,202 of which were passenger vans, including 16,002 regular vans, 24,136 irregular vans, and 1,064 private vans. From 2013–2017, an average of 17,634 children between the ages of 10–19 died on Thailand's roads. Most of the fatalities involved motorbikes. The two most dangerous travel periods in Thailand are at the New Year and at Songkran. Songkran 2016 (11-17 April) saw 442 deaths and 3,656 injuries. New Year 2017's death toll for the seven-day period between 29 December 2016 and 4 January 2017 was 478 compared to the previous year's record of 380. A total of 4,128 people were injured in road accidents during the period. The Centre for the Prevention and Reduction of Road Accidents said that the death toll in 2016 was the highest of the last ten years. Death toll records from road accidents for the last ten New Year periods are: 449 deaths in 2007, 401 in 2008, 357 in 2009, 347 in 2010, 358 in 2011, 321 in 2012, 365 in 2013, 366 in 2014, 341 in 2015, 380 in 2016. Lax enforcement of traffic laws appears to be a major contributor to traffic accidents: the World Health Organization's Collaborating Centre for Injury Prevention and Safety Promotion found that only 20 percent of traffic violators on Thai roads are given tickets and only four percent of those cited pay their traffic fines. Government attempts to reduce the toll of deaths and injuries have proven ineffectual. In 2011 the government declared the following ten years to be Thailand's "decade of action on road safety". It named 2012 as the year of 100 percent helmet use on motorbikes. In 2015, about 1.3 million school-age children in Thailand regularly traveled on the back of motorcycles each day but only seven percent wore helmets. In 2018, the WHO reported that motorcycle helmet use was 51 percent by operators and 20 percent by passengers. In 2015 the Interior Ministry's Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation's (DDPM) Road Safety Collaboration Centre announced a target of reducing road deaths by 80 percent. According to the New York Times, in 2015, Thailand vowed at a United Nations forum to halve traffic deaths by 2020. But DDPM's published mandate makes no mention of road safety. Road safety falls under the purview of the Ministry of Interior's DDPM. Responsibility for roads falls under the Ministry of Transport. Thailand has no laws requiring child safety features or a rear seating position in vehicles. National speed limits The maximum rural speed limit is 90 km/h. For motorways it is 120 km/h. The maximum urban speed limit is 80 km/h, far above the best practice limit of 50 km/h recommended by the WHO. Public bus service Buses are a major method of transportation for people, freight, and small parcels, and are the most popular means of long distance travel. Tour and VIP class long-distance buses tend to be luxurious, while city- and other-class buses are often very colorful with paint schemes and advertising. There are fundamentally two types of long-distance buses in Thailand: those run by The Transport Company, Ltd., (TCL), the state-owned bus company. Known to Thais by the initials บขส (pronounced baw-kaw-saw), this 80-year-old company was formed by the government to ensure that citizens in even the most far-flung localities had access to the capital city, Bangkok. TCL buses are easily identified by the large golden coat of arms appliqued to each side of the bus. those operated by private bus companies offer hundreds of routes in various service categories (express, VIP, local,	unregistered. It also had one million "heavy trucks", 158,000 buses, and 624,000 "other" vehicles. By mid-2019 the number of registered vehicles in Thailand had risen to 40,190,328. The majority—21,051,977—are motorbikes. Private automobiles with up to seven seats numbered 9,713,980. Road safety According to the World Health Organization's, Global Status Report on Road Safety 2018, Thailand had an estimated traffic fatality rate (all vehicle types) of 32.7 persons per 100,000 population in 2016. The only nations exceeding Thailand's death toll were Liberia; Saint Lucia (population: 178,000); Burundi; Zimbabwe; Dominican Republic; Democratic Republic of Congo; Venezuela; and the Central African Republic. Thailand's death rate for operators and passengers of motorized two- and three-wheeled motorbikes was the world's highest in 2016 at 74.4 fatalities per 100,000 population. Sixty-six persons die every day on Thai roads, one every 22 minutes, seven of them children. In 2015, Thailand's roads were the second deadliest in the world in 2015. Among public transport options, passenger vans, with a monthly average of 19.5 accidents resulting in a monthly average of 9.4 deaths, rank as the most dangerous of all public transport services involved in road accidents. Regular tour buses on fixed routes were in second place with a total of 141 accidents, resulting in 56 deaths and 1,252 injuries. Third on the list were irregular tour buses, involved in 52 accidents, resulting in 47 deaths and 576 injuries. Taxis were fourth with 77 accidents, resulting in seven deaths and 84 injuries. Ordinary buses were involved in 48 accidents with 10 deaths and 75 injuries. , there were 156,089 legally registered public transport vehicles in Thailand, 42,202 of which were passenger vans, including 16,002 regular vans, 24,136 irregular vans, and 1,064 private vans. From 2013–2017, an average of 17,634 children between the ages of 10–19 died on Thailand's roads. Most of the fatalities involved motorbikes. The two most dangerous travel periods in Thailand are at the New Year and at Songkran. Songkran 2016 (11-17 April) saw 442 deaths and 3,656 injuries. New Year 2017's death toll for the seven-day period between 29 December 2016 and 4 January 2017 was 478 compared to the previous year's record of 380. A total of 4,128 people were injured in road accidents during the period. The Centre for the Prevention and Reduction of Road Accidents said that the death toll in 2016 was the highest of the last ten years. Death toll records from road accidents for the last ten New Year periods are: 449 deaths in 2007, 401 in 2008, 357 in 2009, 347 in 2010, 358 in 2011, 321 in 2012, 365 in 2013, 366 in 2014, 341 in 2015, 380 in 2016. Lax enforcement of traffic laws appears to be a major contributor to traffic accidents: the World Health Organization's Collaborating Centre for Injury Prevention and Safety Promotion found that only 20 percent of traffic violators on Thai roads are given tickets and only four percent of those cited pay their traffic fines. Government attempts to reduce the toll of deaths and injuries have proven ineffectual. In 2011 the government declared the following ten years to be Thailand's "decade of action on road safety". It named 2012 as the year of 100 percent helmet use on motorbikes. In 2015, about 1.3 million school-age children in Thailand regularly traveled on the back of motorcycles each day but only seven percent wore helmets. In 2018, the WHO reported that motorcycle helmet use was 51 percent by operators and 20 percent by passengers. In 2015 the Interior Ministry's Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation's (DDPM) Road Safety Collaboration Centre announced a target of reducing road deaths by 80 percent. According to the New York Times, in 2015, Thailand vowed at a United Nations forum to halve traffic deaths by 2020. But DDPM's published mandate makes no mention of road safety. Road safety falls under the purview of the Ministry of Interior's DDPM. Responsibility for roads falls under the Ministry of Transport. Thailand has no laws requiring child safety features or a rear seating position in vehicles. National speed limits The maximum rural speed limit is 90 km/h. For motorways it is 120 km/h. The maximum urban speed limit is 80 km/h, far above the best practice limit of 50 km/h recommended by the WHO. Public bus service Buses are a major method of transportation for people, freight, and small parcels, and are the most popular means of long distance travel. Tour and VIP class long-distance buses tend to be luxurious, while city- and other-class buses are often very colorful with paint schemes and advertising. There are fundamentally two types of long-distance buses in Thailand: those run by The Transport Company, Ltd., (TCL), the state-owned bus company. Known to Thais by the initials บขส (pronounced baw-kaw-saw), this 80-year-old company was formed by the government to ensure that citizens in even the most far-flung localities had access to the capital city, Bangkok. TCL buses are easily identified by the large golden coat of arms appliqued to each side of the bus. those operated by private bus companies offer hundreds of routes in various service categories (express, VIP, local, air conditioned) Public bus service in Bangkok In Bangkok, the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority or BMTA, is the main operator of public transit buses within the Greater Bangkok area. The Bangkok Mass Transit Authority offers bus and van routes throughout the city and its suburban provinces. Many bus routes in Bangkok are served by several private companies, sometimes duplicating those from BMTA. Examples include orange minibuses, and cream-blue buses. The buses have the BMTA symbol on them, mostly seen below the driver's side window. These often follow slightly different routings from the main big BMTA bus or do not run along the whole route. BMTA currently operates bus routes in Bangkok and its metropolitan area namely Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon and Nakhon Pathom. Local buses and Bangkok city buses come in various sizes, types, and prices, from half size, full size, double length, open window, fan, and air conditioned. Bus rapid transit system in Bangkok The Bangkok BRT is a bus rapid transit system in Bangkok. Of five routes that were originally planned, only one line has been operating since 2010. The route has twelve stations in the centre of the road that give at-grade access to the right-hand side of the buses. Both terminals connect to the Silom Line of the BTS Skytrain; at Chong Nonsi (S3) and Talat Phlu (S10). The buses used are all Sunlong SLK6125CNG buses. The flat fare is five baht. Highway network The Thai highway network links every part of Thailand. Most highways are in good state of repair, greatly enhancing safety and speed. The four-lane highways often have overhead concrete pedestrian crossings interspersed about every 250 meters in populated areas. There are few on and off ramps on eight-lane highways, most highways are separated by medians with breakage for U-turns, except on major roads where ramp style U-turns predominate. A number of undivided two-lane highways have been converted into divided four-lane highways. A Bangkok - Chon Buri motorway (Route 7) now links to the new airport and Eastern Seaboard. Motorway network The Thai motorway network is small. Coupled with Bangkok's extensive expressway network, the motorways provide a relief from regular traffic in Bangkok. The Thai Government is planning infrastructure investment in various "megaprojects", including motorway expansion to approximately 4,500 kilometers. Expressway network Thailand uses the expressway term for the toll road or highway network. Most expressways are elevated with some sections at ground level. The current expressway network covers major parts of Bangkok and suburban areas. Expressways are used to avoid heavy traffic jams in Bangkok and reduce traffic time but are sometimes congested in rush hour. Utility cycling The Thai state has failed at promoting utility cycling as a mode of transport. Officials regard bicycles as toys, and cycling as a leisure activity, not as a means of transport that could help solve traffic and environmental problems. Their attitude was on display at Bangkok's celebration of World Car-Free Day 2018, celebrated on 22 September. Bangkok's Deputy Governor, Sakoltee Phattiyakul, who presided over the event, arrived in his official automobile, as did his entourage. He then mounted a bicycle for a ceremonial ride. Prior to the event, which encouraged the non-use of cars, the BMA announced there would be extensive free automobile parking spaces available for participants who were to ride bicycles in the parade. In his
19th centuries. It refers to the military forces of the Sukhothai Kingdom, the Ayutthaya Kingdom, the Thonburi Kingdom and the early Rattanakosin Kingdom in chronological order. The Siamese army was one of the dominant armed forces in Southeast Asia. As Thailand has never been colonized by a European power, the Royal Thai Armed Forces boasts one of the longest and uninterrupted military traditions in Asia. The army was organized into a small standing army of a few thousand, which defended the capital and the palace, and a much larger conscription-based wartime army. Conscription was based on the "ahmudan" system, which required local chiefs to supply, in times of war, a predetermined quota of men from their jurisdiction on the basis of population. The wartime army also consisted of elephantry, cavalry, artillery, and naval units. In 1852, the Royal Siamese Armed Forces came into existence as permanent force at the behest of King Mongkut, who needed a European trained military force to thwart any Western threat and any attempts at colonialisation. By 1887, during the next reign of King Chulalongkorn, a permanent military command in the Kalahom Department was established. The office of Kalahom, as a permanent office of war department, was established by King Borommatrailokkanat (1431–1488) in the mid-15th century during the Ayutthaya Kingdom. Siam's history of organized warfare is thus one of Asia's longest and uninterrupted military traditions. However, since 1932, when the military, with the help of civilians, overthrew the system of absolute monarchy and instead created a constitutional system, the military has dominated and been in control of Thai politics, providing it with many prime ministers and carrying out many coups d'état, the most recent being in 2014. Conflicts The Royal Thai Armed Forces were involved in many conflicts throughout its history, including global, regional and internal conflicts. However, most these were within Southeast Asia. The only three foreign incursions into Thai territory were the Franco-Siamese War, the Japanese invasion of Thailand in December 1941, and in the 1980s with Vietnamese incursions into Thailand that led to several battles with the Thai Army. Operations on foreign territory were either territorial wars (such as the Laos Civil War) or conflicts mandated by the United Nations. Franco-Siamese War (1893) With the rapid expansion of the French Empire into Indochina, conflicts necessarily occurred. War became inevitable when a French mission led by Auguste Pavie to King Chulalongkorn to try to bring Laos under French rule ended in failure. The French colonialists invaded Siam from the northeast and sent two warships to fight their way past the river forts and train their guns on the Grand Palace in Bangkok (the Paknam Incident). The French also declared a blockade around Bangkok, which almost brought them into conflict with the United Kingdom. Siam was forced to accept the French ultimatum and surrendered Laos to France, also allowing French troops to occupy the Thai province of Chantaburi for several decades. World War I (1917–1918) King Vajiravudh on 22 July 1917 declared war on the Central Powers and joined the Entente Powers on the Western Front. He sent a volunteer corps, the Siamese Expeditionary Force, composed of 1,233 modern-equipped and trained men commanded by Field Marshal Prince Chakrabongse Bhuvanath. The force included air and medical personnel, the medical units actually seeing combat. Siam became the only independent Asian nation with forces in Europe during the Great War. Although Siam's participation militarily was minimal, it enabled the revision or complete cancellation of so-called "unequal treaties" with the Western powers. The Expeditionary Force was given the honour of marching in the victory parade under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. Nineteen Siamese soldiers died during the conflict, and their ashes are interred in the World War I monument at the north end of Bangkok's Pramane Grounds. Franco-Thai War (1940–1941) The Franco-Thai War began in October 1940, when the country under the rule of Field Marshal Prime Minister Plaek Phibunsongkhram followed up border clashes by invading a French Indo-China, under the Vichy regime (after the Nazi occupation of Paris) to regain lost land and settle territorial disputes. The war also bolstered Phibun's program of promoting Thai nationalism. The war ended indecisively, with Thai victories on land and a naval defeat at sea. However, the disputed territories in French Indochina were ceded to Thailand. World War II (1942–1945) To attack British India, British Burma and British Malaya, the Empire of Japan needed to use bases in Thailand. By playing both nations against one another, Prime Minister Phibunsongkhram was able to maintain a degree of neutrality for some time. However, this ended in the early hours of 8 December 1941, when Japan launched a surprise attack on Thailand at nine places along the coastline and from French Indo-China. The greatly outnumbered Thai forces put up resistance, but were soon overwhelmed. By 07:30, Phibun ordered an end to hostilities, though resistance continued for at least another day until all units could be notified. Phibun signed an armistice with Japan that allowed the empire to move its troops through Thai territory. Impressed by Japan's easy conquest of British Malaya, Phibun formally made Thailand part of the Axis by declaring war on the United Kingdom and the United States, though the Regent refused to sign it in the young king's name. (The Thai ambassador to Washington refused to deliver the declaration, and the United States continued to consider Thailand an occupied country.) An active and foreign-assisted underground resistance movement, the Free Thai, was largely successful and helped Thailand to viewed positively in the eyes of the victorious Allies after the war and be treated as an occupied nation rather than a defeated enemy. Korean War (1950–1953) During the United Nations-mandated conflict in the Korean peninsula, Thailand provided the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment, Some 65,000 Thais served in Korea during the war. Thai foot soldiers took part in the 1953 Battle of Pork Chop Hill. During the war the battalion was attached at various times to U.S. 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the British 29th Infantry Brigade. The kingdom also provided four naval vessels, the HTMS Bangprakong, Bangpako, Tachin, and Prasae, and an air transport unit to the UN command structure. The Thai contingent was actively engaged and suffered heavy casualties, including 139 dead and more than 300 wounded. They remained in South Korea after the cease fire, returning to Thailand in 1955. Vietnam War (1955–1975) Due to its proximity to Thailand, Vietnam's conflicts were closely monitored by Bangkok. Thai involvement did not become official until the total involvement of the United States in support of South Vietnam in 1963. The Thai government then allowed the United States Air Force in Thailand to use its air and naval bases. At the height of the war, almost 50,000 American military personnel were stationed in Thailand, mainly airmen. In October 1967 a regiment-size Thai unit, the Queen's Cobras, were sent to Camp Bearcat at Bien Hoa, to fight alongside the Americans, Australians, New Zealanders and South Vietnamese. About 40,000 Thai military would serve in South Vietnam, with 351 killed in action and 1,358 wounded. Thai troops earned a reputation for bravery and would serve in Vietnam until 1971, when the men of the Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division (Black Panthers) returned home. Thailand was also involved in the Laotian Civil War, supporting covert operations against the communist Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese from 1964 to 1972. By 1975 relations between Bangkok and Washington had soured, and the government of Kukrit Pramoj requested the withdrawal of all US military personnel and the closure of all US bases. This was completed by March 1976. Communist insurgency (1976–1980s) The communist victory in Vietnam in 1975 emboldened the communist movement in Thailand, which had been in existence since the 1920s. After the Thammasat University massacre of leftist student demonstrators in 1976 and the repressive policies of right-wing Prime Minister Tanin Kraivixien, sympathies for the movement increased. By the	in the Royal Gazette on 22 November 2019, sees external geo-political threats to the country as insignificant in the years ahead. The plan, in effect from 19 November 2019 to 30 September 2022, views domestic issues, especially declining faith in the monarchy and political divisions, as greater concerns. In a report issued in March 2020, Amnesty International charged that Thai military conscripts face institutionalised abuse systematically hushed up by military authorities. According to Amnesty, the practice has "long been an open secret in Thai society". One of infamous cases was in 2011 which 10 officers torturing Wichian Pueksom to death. Until today there is still no verdict to the offcials Budget The defence budget nearly tripled from 78.1 billion baht in 2005 to 207 billion baht for FY2016 (1 October 2015 – 30 September 2016), amounting to roughly 1.5% of GDP. The budget for FY2017 is 214 billion baht (US$6.1 billion)—including funds for a submarine purchase—a nominal increase of three percent. The proposed budget again represents around 1.5% of GDP and eight percent of total government spending for FY2017. The FY2018 defence budget is 220 billion baht, 7.65% of the total budget. According to Jane's Defence Budgets, the Royal Thai Army generally receives 50% of defense expenditures while the air force and navy receive 22% each. The Ministry of Defense budget for FY2021 is 223,464 million baht, down from 231,745M baht in FY2020. History Ancient military forces The Royal Siamese Armed Forces' was the military arm of the Siamese monarchy from the 12th to the 19th centuries. It refers to the military forces of the Sukhothai Kingdom, the Ayutthaya Kingdom, the Thonburi Kingdom and the early Rattanakosin Kingdom in chronological order. The Siamese army was one of the dominant armed forces in Southeast Asia. As Thailand has never been colonized by a European power, the Royal Thai Armed Forces boasts one of the longest and uninterrupted military traditions in Asia. The army was organized into a small standing army of a few thousand, which defended the capital and the palace, and a much larger conscription-based wartime army. Conscription was based on the "ahmudan" system, which required local chiefs to supply, in times of war, a predetermined quota of men from their jurisdiction on the basis of population. The wartime army also consisted of elephantry, cavalry, artillery, and naval units. In 1852, the Royal Siamese Armed Forces came into existence as permanent force at the behest of King Mongkut, who needed a European trained military force to thwart any Western threat and any attempts at colonialisation. By 1887, during the next reign of King Chulalongkorn, a permanent military command in the Kalahom Department was established. The office of Kalahom, as a permanent office of war department, was established by King Borommatrailokkanat (1431–1488) in the mid-15th century during the Ayutthaya Kingdom. Siam's history of organized warfare is thus one of Asia's longest and uninterrupted military traditions. However, since 1932, when the military, with the help of civilians, overthrew the system of absolute monarchy and instead created a constitutional system, the military has dominated and been in control of Thai politics, providing it with many prime ministers and carrying out many coups d'état, the most recent being in 2014. Conflicts The Royal Thai Armed Forces were involved in many conflicts throughout its history, including global, regional and internal conflicts. However, most these were within Southeast Asia. The only three foreign incursions into Thai territory were the Franco-Siamese War, the Japanese invasion of Thailand in December 1941, and in the 1980s with Vietnamese incursions into Thailand that led to several battles with the Thai Army. Operations on foreign territory were either territorial wars (such as the Laos Civil War) or conflicts mandated by the United Nations. Franco-Siamese War (1893) With the rapid expansion of the French Empire into Indochina, conflicts necessarily occurred. War became inevitable when a French mission led by Auguste Pavie to King Chulalongkorn to try to bring Laos under French rule ended in failure. The French colonialists invaded Siam from the northeast and sent two warships to fight their way past the river forts and train their guns on the Grand Palace in Bangkok (the Paknam Incident). The French also declared a blockade around Bangkok, which almost brought them into conflict with the United Kingdom. Siam was forced to accept the French ultimatum and surrendered Laos to France, also allowing French troops to occupy the Thai province of Chantaburi for several decades. World War I (1917–1918) King Vajiravudh on 22 July 1917 declared war on the Central Powers and joined the Entente Powers on the Western Front. He sent a volunteer corps, the Siamese Expeditionary Force, composed of 1,233 modern-equipped and trained men commanded by Field Marshal Prince Chakrabongse Bhuvanath. The force included air and medical personnel, the medical units actually seeing combat. Siam became the only independent Asian nation with forces in Europe during the Great War. Although Siam's participation militarily was minimal, it enabled the revision or complete cancellation of so-called "unequal treaties" with the Western powers. The Expeditionary Force was given the honour of marching in the victory parade under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. Nineteen Siamese soldiers died during the conflict, and their ashes are interred in the World War I monument at the north end of Bangkok's Pramane Grounds. Franco-Thai War (1940–1941) The Franco-Thai War began in October 1940, when the country under the rule of Field Marshal Prime Minister Plaek Phibunsongkhram followed up border clashes by invading a French Indo-China, under the Vichy regime (after the Nazi occupation of Paris) to regain lost land and settle territorial disputes. The war also bolstered Phibun's program of promoting Thai nationalism. The war ended indecisively, with Thai victories on land and a naval defeat at sea. However, the disputed territories in French Indochina were ceded to Thailand. World War II (1942–1945) To attack British India, British Burma and British Malaya, the Empire of Japan needed to use bases in Thailand. By playing both nations against one another, Prime Minister Phibunsongkhram was able to maintain a degree of neutrality for some time. However, this ended in the early hours of 8 December 1941, when Japan launched a surprise attack on Thailand at nine places along the coastline and from French Indo-China. The greatly outnumbered Thai forces put up resistance, but were soon overwhelmed. By 07:30, Phibun ordered an end to hostilities, though resistance continued for at least another day until all units could be notified. Phibun signed an armistice with Japan that allowed the empire to move its troops through Thai territory. Impressed by Japan's easy conquest of British Malaya, Phibun formally made Thailand part of the Axis by declaring war on the United Kingdom and the United States, though the Regent refused to sign it in the young king's name. (The Thai ambassador to Washington refused to deliver the declaration, and the United States continued to consider Thailand an occupied country.) An active and foreign-assisted underground resistance movement, the Free Thai, was largely successful and helped Thailand to viewed positively in the eyes of the victorious Allies after the war and be treated as an occupied nation rather than a defeated enemy. Korean War (1950–1953) During the United Nations-mandated conflict in the Korean peninsula, Thailand provided the reinforced 1st Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment, Some 65,000 Thais served in Korea during the war. Thai foot soldiers took part in the 1953 Battle of Pork Chop Hill. During the war the battalion was attached at various times to U.S. 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the British 29th Infantry Brigade. The kingdom also provided four naval vessels, the HTMS Bangprakong, Bangpako, Tachin, and Prasae, and an air transport unit to the UN command structure. The Thai contingent was actively engaged and suffered heavy casualties, including 139 dead and more than 300 wounded. They remained in South Korea after the cease fire, returning to Thailand in 1955. Vietnam War (1955–1975) Due to its proximity to Thailand, Vietnam's conflicts were closely monitored by Bangkok. Thai involvement did not become official until the total involvement of the United States in support of South Vietnam in 1963. The Thai government then allowed the United States Air Force in Thailand to use its air and naval bases. At the height of the war, almost 50,000 American military personnel were stationed in Thailand, mainly airmen. In October 1967 a regiment-size Thai unit, the Queen's Cobras, were sent to Camp Bearcat at Bien Hoa, to fight alongside the Americans, Australians, New Zealanders and South Vietnamese. About 40,000 Thai military would serve in South Vietnam, with 351 killed in action and 1,358 wounded. Thai troops earned a reputation for bravery and would serve in Vietnam until 1971, when the men of the Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division (Black Panthers) returned home. Thailand was also involved in the Laotian Civil War, supporting covert operations against the communist Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese from 1964 to 1972. By 1975 relations between Bangkok and Washington had soured, and the government of Kukrit Pramoj requested the withdrawal of all US military personnel and the closure of all US bases. This was completed by March 1976. Communist insurgency (1976–1980s) The communist victory in Vietnam in 1975 emboldened the communist movement in Thailand, which had been in existence since the 1920s. After the Thammasat University massacre of leftist student demonstrators in 1976 and the repressive policies of right-wing Prime Minister Tanin Kraivixien, sympathies for the movement increased. By the late-1970s, it is estimated that the movement had as many as 12,000 armed insurgents, mostly based in the northeast along the Laotian border and receiving foreign support. By the 1980s, however, all insurgent activities had been defeated. In 1982 Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda issued a general amnesty for all former communist insurgents. Vietnamese border raids (1979–1988) With the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, communist Vietnam had a combined force of about 300,000 in Laos and Cambodia. This posed a massive potential threat to the Thais, as they could no longer rely on Cambodia to act as a buffer state. Small encounters occasionally took place when Vietnamese forces crossed into Thailand in pursuit of fleeing Khmer
railroad and highway routes to the sea. The Mekong River, which both sides have an interest in making a "river of true peace and friendship" — as their respective prime ministers called for in 1976 – also provides a north–south artery during the rainy season. Malaysia Thailand has an embassy in Kuala Lumpur, and consulate-general offices in George Town and Kota Bharu. Malaysia maintains an embassy in Bangkok. Recently, Thai-Malay relations have soured considerably due to the ethnically Malay Pattani separatists in three southern provinces of Thailand. There have been claims by some Thai politicians that certain parties in Malaysia has taken an interest in the cause of their opponents in the war, which is vehemently disputed by the latter. Myanmar Pakistan In August 2013, the Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra visited Pakistan in the first visit in a decade. Palestine Thailand officially recognised Palestine as an independent state on 18 January 2012. Philippines Thai-Philippines relations continue to be friendly. Relations with Thailand were established 14 June 1949. Thailand is one of the Philippines major trading partners and one of the Philippines' rice suppliers. Relations continues to be strengthened through talks and agreements on economic, security, and cultural matters including concerns on rice trading, and combatting drugs and human trafficking. Saudi Arabia Relations Saudi Arabia and Thailand were established in 1957 and hundreds of thousands of Thais went to Saudi Arabia to work. However, relations have been severely strained for the past 20 years due to fallout from the Blue Diamond Affair. Diplomatic missions were downgraded to chargé d'affaires level and the number of Thai workers in Saudi Arabia plummeted. Saudi Arabia does not issue working visas for Thais and discourages its citizens from visiting the country. South Korea Both countries established diplomatic relations on 1 October 1958. The year 2008 is the 50th year of bilateral relations with two nations. During the Korean War, Thailand was the second nation sending troops for supporting South Korea just after the United States. In October 2003, South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun visited Thailand while Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra went to Seoul in November 2005. South Korean is the 10th largest trade partner, which is about to reach the scale of 10 billion dollars. Vietnam Diplomatic relations between the two countries have existed since 1976, and are very friendly both economically and politically nowadays. Yet, relations between the two countries had always been marred by discord, which resulted from bitter rivalry to gain control of the area of what is today Laos and Cambodia. In the 19th century, Thailand (then known as Siam) had fought a series of wars with the Nguyễn dynasty which then ruled over Vietnam over control of Cambodia. This rivalry will only temporarily subside when French colonists stepped in and gradually building an establishment in Southeast Asia, known as French Indochina. During the Vietnam War, Thailand was aligned with South Vietnam and the United States and the U Tapao Air Base was used as a base for USAF aircraft. During the Fall of Saigon in 1975, fleeing South Vietnamese pilots arrived at U Tapao before fleeing to other countries. In 1979, when the Khmer Rouge government in neighbouring Cambodia was toppled, this had raised concerns in Thailand and the Thai government quickly allied itself with the Khmer Rouge, later the CGDK, in fear of Vietnamese expansionism. In fact, Thailand was foremost among the ASEAN, of which it is part of, in opposing the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Cambodian refugees soon stayed at border camps straddling the Thai-Cambodian border, and these camps are often controlled by the Khmer Rouge or the CGDK. In the years that followed, Vietnam launched a series of raids on the camps and Vietnamese troops often penetrated into Thai territory and shelled Thai border villages and towns. Americas Europe Oceania Thai diplomatic missions Royal Thai embassies and consulates Permanent missions Thailand economic and trade office International organization participation APEC, AsDB, ASEAN, BIMSTEC, CP, ESCAP, FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICFTU, ICRM, IDA, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, Inmarsat, Intelsat, Interpol, IOC, IOM, ISO, ITU, NAM, OAS (observer), OPCW, PCA, UN, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNIKOM, UNITAR, UNMIBH, UNTAET, UNU, UPU, WCL, WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO See also List of diplomatic missions in Thailand References Further reading Busbarat, Pongphisoot. "Thailand's foreign policy towards neighbouring countries and ASEAN." in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand (Routledge, 2019) pp. 431–446. Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and his foreign policy (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). Chambers, Paul, and Poowin Bunyavejchewin. "Thailand's foreign economic policy toward mainland Southeast Asia." (2019). online Guan, Ang Cheng. Southeast	January 2004. Thailand is a key country in Bangladesh's "Look East" policy and relations have begun to increase and diversify into different areas. They seek not to intervene in each other's internal matters as shown by their response to the events occurring in their own respective countries in 2006 such as the 2006 Thai coup d'état and 2006–2008 Bangladeshi political crisis. Both have considerable cooperation in summits organised by BIMSTEC and the ASEAN regional forum. Upper class and upper middle class Bangladeshis often go to Thailand for medical treatment and operations that the country's medical infrastructure cannot provide. Brunei Brunei has an embassy in Bangkok, and Thailand has an embassy in Bandar Seri Begawan. The relations have always been close and cordial. Cambodia Parts of Cambodia's border with Thailand are indefinite, and the maritime boundary with Thailand is not clearly defined. On 5 November 2009 Thailand recalled its ambassador from Cambodia in protest of the Cambodian government's appointment of Thai ex-leader Thaksin Shinawatra as an economic adviser. Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva stated that this was "the first diplomatic retaliation measure" against the appointment. He also said that Cambodia was interfering in Thai internal affairs and as a result bi-lateral co-operation agreements would be reviewed. The Cambodian government has stated that it would refuse any extradition request from Thailand for Thaksin as it considered him to be a victim of political persecution. In the months leading up to the Cambodian decision, troops from both nations had clashed over territory claimed by both countries immediately adjacent to Cambodia's Preah Vihear temple, leading to a deterioration in relations. At 20:30 on 5 November Cambodia announced that it was withdrawing its ambassador from Thailand as a retaliatory measure. Sok An, a member of the Council of Ministers and Deputy Prime Minister of Cambodia, said that the appointment of Thaksin is a decision internal to Cambodia and that it "conforms to international practice". The mutual withdrawal of ambassadors is the most severe diplomatic action to have occurred between the two countries. China Thailand established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 1 July 1975. It remains as a key regional ally of China, with growing cooperation between both countries. For an evaluation of Sino-Siamese relations, see Siamese Inter-State Relations in the Late Nineteenth Century: From An Asian Regional Perspective. India Diplomatic relations between India and Thailand were established in 1947, soon after India gained independence. Thailand maintains three diplomatic posts in India: in Mumbai, in New Delhi, and in Calcutta. India maintains three enclaves in Thailand: in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and A Muang. The end of the Cold War led to a significant enhancement in the substance and pace of bilateral interactions. Indian Look East policy from 1993 and Thailand's Look West policy since 1996 set the stage for a substantive consolidation of bilateral relations. The past few years since 2001 have witnessed growing warmth, increasing economic and commercial links, exchange of high-level visits on both sides, and the signing of a large number of Agreements leading to a further intensification of relations. Thailand and India are cooperating in various multilateral fora like India's dialogue partnership with ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit, the sub-regional grouping BIMSTEC involving Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan, and trilateral transport linkages with Thailand, Myanmar and India. India is a member of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) initiated by Thailand in 2002 and of the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC), a group of six countries. Indonesia Indonesia and Thailand are viewed as natural allies. The nations established diplomatic ties in 1950 and have enjoyed a cordial relationship since. Both countries have established embassies. Indonesia has its embassy in Bangkok and a consulate in Songkhla, while Thailand has its embassy in Jakarta. State visits have been conducted for years. Both nations are the founders of ASEAN and the members of Non-Aligned Movement and APEC. Indonesia is also appointed as observer in Cambodian–Thai border dispute. Iran Israel Israel and Thailand have had official relations since June 1954. The Israeli embassy in Bangkok was established in 1958. Since 1996, Thailand has had
period from the 11th century to the 16th century, various tribes entered the region from all directions: the Ewé from the west, and the Mina and Gun from the east. Most of them settled in coastal areas. The Atlantic slave trade began in the 16th century, and for the next two hundred years the coastal region was a major trading centre for Europeans in search of slaves, earning Togo and the surrounding region the name "The Slave Coast". Colonial era (1884–1960) In 1884, a paper was signed at Togoville with King Mlapa III, whereby Germany claimed a protectorate over a stretch of territory along the coast and gradually extended its control inland. Its borders were defined after the capture of hinterland by German forces and signing agreements with France and Britain. In 1905, this became the German colony of Togoland. The local population was forced to work, cultivate cotton, coffee, and cocoa and pay high taxes. A railway and the port of Lomé were built for export of agricultural products. The Germans introduced modern techniques of cultivation of cocoa, coffee and cotton and developed the infrastructure. During the First World War, Togoland was invaded by Britain and France, proclaiming the Anglo-French condominium. On 7 December 1916, the condominium collapsed and Togo was divided into British and French zones. On 20 July 1922, Great Britain received the League of Nations mandate to govern the western part of Togo and France to govern the eastern part. In 1945, the country received the right to send three representatives to the French parliament. After World War II, these mandates became UN Trust Territories. The residents of British Togoland voted to join the Gold Coast as part of the new independent nation of Ghana in 1957. French Togoland became an autonomous republic within the French Union in 1959, while France retained the right to control the defense, foreign relations, and finances. Independence to present day (1960–present) The Togolese Republic was proclaimed on 27 April 1960. In the first presidential elections in 1961, Sylvanus Olympio became the first president, gaining 100% of the vote in elections boycotted by the opposition. On 9 April 1961, the Constitution of the Togolese Republic was adopted, according to which the supreme legislative body was the National Assembly of Togo. In December 1961, leaders of opposition parties were arrested because they were accused of the preparation of an anti-government conspiracy. A decree was issued on the dissolution of the opposition parties. Olympio tried to reduce dependence on France by establishing cooperation with the United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany. He also rejected the efforts of French soldiers who were demobilized after the Algerian War and tried to get a position in the Togolese army. These factors eventually led to a military coup on 13 January 1963, during which he was assassinated by a group of soldiers under the direction of Sergeant Gnassingbé Eyadéma. A state of emergency was declared in Togo. The military handed over power to an interim government led by Nicolas Grunitzky. In May 1963, Grunitzky was elected President of the Republic. The new leadership pursued a policy of developing relations with France. His main aim was to dampen the divisions between north and south, promulgate a new constitution, and introduce a multiparty system. Exactly four years later, on 13 January 1967, Eyadéma Gnassingbé overthrew Grunitzky in a bloodless coup and assumed the presidency. He created the Rally of the Togolese People Party, banned activities of other political parties and introduced a one-party system in November 1969. He was reelected in 1979 and 1986. In 1983, the privatization program launched and in 1991 other political parties were allowed. In 1993, the EU froze the partnership, describing Eyadema's re-election in 1993, 1998 and 2003, as a seizure of power. In April 2004, in Brussels, talks were held between the European Union and Togo on the resumption of cooperation. Eyadéma Gnassingbé suddenly died on 5 February 2005, after 38 years in power, the longest rule of any dictator in Africa. The military's immediate installation of his son, Faure Gnassingbé, as president provoked widespread international condemnation, except from France. Some democratically elected African leaders such as Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria supported the move, thereby creating a rift within the African Union. Gnassingbé left power and held elections, which he won two months later. The opposition declared that the election results were fraudulent. The events of 2005 led to questions regarding the government's commitment to democracy that had been made in an attempt to normalize relations with the EU, which cut off aid in 1993 due to questions about Togo's human rights situation. In addition, up to 400 people were killed in the violence surrounding the presidential elections, according to the UN. Around 40,000 Togolese fled to neighboring countries. Gnassingbé was reelected in 2010 and 2015. In late 2017, anti-government protests erupted in Togo, the biggest since those after the 2005 election. Protesters demanded the resignation of Gnassingbé, who is part of a family they alleged has been in power too long. The UN condemned the resulting crackdown by Togolese security forces, and Gambia's foreign minister, Ousainou Darboe, had to issue a correction after saying that Gnassingbé should resign. In the February 2020, presidential elections, Faure Gnassingbé won his fourth presidential term in office as the president of Togo. According to the official result, he won with a margin of around 72% of the vote share. This enabled him to defeat his closest challenger, the former prime minister Agbeyome Kodjo who had 18%. On May 4, 2020, Bitala Madjoulba, the commander of a Togolese military battalion, was found dead in his office. The day of Madjoulba's death came right after the recently re-elected Faure Gnassingbé had his investiture. An investigation has been opened for this case and all individuals around his death are being questioned. Geography Togo has an area equal to and is one of the smallest countries in Africa. It borders the Bight of Benin in the south; Ghana lies to the west; Benin to the east; and to the north, Togo is bound by Burkina Faso. Togo lies mostly between latitudes 6° and 11°N, and longitudes 0° and 2°E. The coast of Togo in the Gulf of Guinea is 56 km (35 miles) long and consists of lagoons with sandy beaches. In the north, the land is characterized by a gently rolling savanna in contrast to the center of the country, which is characterized by hills. The south of Togo is characterized by a savanna and woodland plateau which reaches a coastal plain with extensive lagoons and marshes. The highest mountain of the country is the Mont Agou at 986 metres (3235') above sea level. The longest river is the Mono River with a length of 400 km (250 miles). It runs from north to south. Climate The climate is generally tropical with average temperatures ranging from on the coast to about in the northernmost regions, with a dry climate and characteristics of a tropical savanna. To the south, there are two seasons of rain (the first between April and July and the second between September and November), even though the average rainfall is not very high. Flora and fauna Togo contains three terrestrial ecoregions: Eastern Guinean forests, Guinean forest-savanna mosaic, and West Sudanian savanna. The coast of Togo is characterized by marshes and mangroves. High human population growth is leading to rapid deforestation, endangering many species. The country had a 2019 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 5.88/10, ranking it 92nd globally out of 172 countries. At least five parks and reserves have been established: Abdoulaye Faunal Reserve, Fazao Malfakassa National Park, Fosse aux Lions National Park, Koutammakou, and Kéran National Park. The most frequently observed animals are giraffes, cape buffalo, hyenas, and lions. Few elephants remain. Common birds are storks and cranes. Government The president is elected by universal and direct suffrage for 5 years. He is also the commander of the armed forces and has the right to initiate legislation and dissolve parliament. Executive power is exercised by the president and the government. The head of government is the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the president. Togo's transition to democracy is stalled. Its democratic institutions remain nascent and fragile. President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who ruled Togo under a one-party system, died of a heart attack on 5 February 2005. Gravely ill, he was being transported by plane to a foreign country for care. He died in transit while over Tunisia. Under the Togolese Constitution, the President of the Parliament, Fambaré Ouattara Natchaba, should have become president of the country, pending a new presidential election to be called within sixty days. Natchaba was out of the country, returning on an Air France plane from Paris. The Togolese army, known as Forces Armées Togolaises (FAT), or Togolese Armed Forces, closed the nation's borders, forcing the plane to land in nearby Benin. With an engineered power vacuum, the Parliament voted to remove the constitutional clause that would have required an election within sixty days and declared that Eyadema's son, Faure Gnassingbé, would inherit the presidency and hold office for the rest of his father's term. Faure was sworn in on 7 February 2005, despite international criticism of the succession. The African Union described the takeover as a military coup d'état. International pressure also came from the United Nations. Within Togo, opposition to the takeover culminated in riots in which several hundred died. There were uprisings in many cities and towns, mainly located in the southern part of the country. In the town of Aného reports of a general civilian uprising followed by a large scale massacre by government troops went largely unreported. In response, Faure Gnassingbé agreed to hold elections and on 25 February, Gnassingbé resigned as president, but soon afterward accepted the nomination to run for the office in April. On 24 April 2005, Gnassingbé was elected president of Togo, receiving over 60% of the vote according to official results. His main rival in the race had been Emmanuel Bob-Akitani from the Union des Forces du Changement (UFC) or Union of Forces for Change. However, electoral fraud was suspected, due to a lack of European Union or other independent oversight. Parliament designated Deputy President, Bonfoh Abbass, as interim president until the inauguration. On 3 May 2005, Faure Gnassingbé was sworn in as the new president and the European Union suspended aid to Togo in support of the opposition claims, unlike the African Union and the United States which declared the vote "reasonably fair." The Nigerian president and Chair of the AU, Olusẹgun Ọbasanjọ, sought to negotiate between the incumbent government and the opposition to establish a coalition government, but rejected an AU Commission appointment of former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, as special AU envoy to Togo. In June, President Gnassingbé named opposition leader Edem Kodjo as the prime minister. In October 2007, after several postponements, elections were held under proportional representation. This allowed the less populated north to seat as many MPs as the more populated south. The president-backed party Rally of the Togolese People (RPT) won an outright majority with the UFC coming second and the other parties claiming inconsequential representation. Again vote rigging accusations were leveled at the RPT supported by the civil and military security apparatus. Despite the presence of an EU observer mission, canceled ballots and illegal voting took place, the majority of which in RPT strongholds. The election was declared fair by the international community and praised as a model with little intimidation and few violent acts for the first time since a multiparty system	Its borders were defined after the capture of hinterland by German forces and signing agreements with France and Britain. In 1905, this became the German colony of Togoland. The local population was forced to work, cultivate cotton, coffee, and cocoa and pay high taxes. A railway and the port of Lomé were built for export of agricultural products. The Germans introduced modern techniques of cultivation of cocoa, coffee and cotton and developed the infrastructure. During the First World War, Togoland was invaded by Britain and France, proclaiming the Anglo-French condominium. On 7 December 1916, the condominium collapsed and Togo was divided into British and French zones. On 20 July 1922, Great Britain received the League of Nations mandate to govern the western part of Togo and France to govern the eastern part. In 1945, the country received the right to send three representatives to the French parliament. After World War II, these mandates became UN Trust Territories. The residents of British Togoland voted to join the Gold Coast as part of the new independent nation of Ghana in 1957. French Togoland became an autonomous republic within the French Union in 1959, while France retained the right to control the defense, foreign relations, and finances. Independence to present day (1960–present) The Togolese Republic was proclaimed on 27 April 1960. In the first presidential elections in 1961, Sylvanus Olympio became the first president, gaining 100% of the vote in elections boycotted by the opposition. On 9 April 1961, the Constitution of the Togolese Republic was adopted, according to which the supreme legislative body was the National Assembly of Togo. In December 1961, leaders of opposition parties were arrested because they were accused of the preparation of an anti-government conspiracy. A decree was issued on the dissolution of the opposition parties. Olympio tried to reduce dependence on France by establishing cooperation with the United States, United Kingdom, and West Germany. He also rejected the efforts of French soldiers who were demobilized after the Algerian War and tried to get a position in the Togolese army. These factors eventually led to a military coup on 13 January 1963, during which he was assassinated by a group of soldiers under the direction of Sergeant Gnassingbé Eyadéma. A state of emergency was declared in Togo. The military handed over power to an interim government led by Nicolas Grunitzky. In May 1963, Grunitzky was elected President of the Republic. The new leadership pursued a policy of developing relations with France. His main aim was to dampen the divisions between north and south, promulgate a new constitution, and introduce a multiparty system. Exactly four years later, on 13 January 1967, Eyadéma Gnassingbé overthrew Grunitzky in a bloodless coup and assumed the presidency. He created the Rally of the Togolese People Party, banned activities of other political parties and introduced a one-party system in November 1969. He was reelected in 1979 and 1986. In 1983, the privatization program launched and in 1991 other political parties were allowed. In 1993, the EU froze the partnership, describing Eyadema's re-election in 1993, 1998 and 2003, as a seizure of power. In April 2004, in Brussels, talks were held between the European Union and Togo on the resumption of cooperation. Eyadéma Gnassingbé suddenly died on 5 February 2005, after 38 years in power, the longest rule of any dictator in Africa. The military's immediate installation of his son, Faure Gnassingbé, as president provoked widespread international condemnation, except from France. Some democratically elected African leaders such as Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria supported the move, thereby creating a rift within the African Union. Gnassingbé left power and held elections, which he won two months later. The opposition declared that the election results were fraudulent. The events of 2005 led to questions regarding the government's commitment to democracy that had been made in an attempt to normalize relations with the EU, which cut off aid in 1993 due to questions about Togo's human rights situation. In addition, up to 400 people were killed in the violence surrounding the presidential elections, according to the UN. Around 40,000 Togolese fled to neighboring countries. Gnassingbé was reelected in 2010 and 2015. In late 2017, anti-government protests erupted in Togo, the biggest since those after the 2005 election. Protesters demanded the resignation of Gnassingbé, who is part of a family they alleged has been in power too long. The UN condemned the resulting crackdown by Togolese security forces, and Gambia's foreign minister, Ousainou Darboe, had to issue a correction after saying that Gnassingbé should resign. In the February 2020, presidential elections, Faure Gnassingbé won his fourth presidential term in office as the president of Togo. According to the official result, he won with a margin of around 72% of the vote share. This enabled him to defeat his closest challenger, the former prime minister Agbeyome Kodjo who had 18%. On May 4, 2020, Bitala Madjoulba, the commander of a Togolese military battalion, was found dead in his office. The day of Madjoulba's death came right after the recently re-elected Faure Gnassingbé had his investiture. An investigation has been opened for this case and all individuals around his death are being questioned. Geography Togo has an area equal to and is one of the smallest countries in Africa. It borders the Bight of Benin in the south; Ghana lies to the west; Benin to the east; and to the north, Togo is bound by Burkina Faso. Togo lies mostly between latitudes 6° and 11°N, and longitudes 0° and 2°E. The coast of Togo in the Gulf of Guinea is 56 km (35 miles) long and consists of lagoons with sandy beaches. In the north, the land is characterized by a gently rolling savanna in contrast to the center of the country, which is characterized by hills. The south of Togo is characterized by a savanna and woodland plateau which reaches a coastal plain with extensive lagoons and marshes. The highest mountain of the country is the Mont Agou at 986 metres (3235') above sea level. The longest river is the Mono River with a length of 400 km (250 miles). It runs from north to south. Climate The climate is generally tropical with average temperatures ranging from on the coast to about in the northernmost regions, with a dry climate and characteristics of a tropical savanna. To the south, there are two seasons of rain (the first between April and July and the second between September and November), even though the average rainfall is not very high. Flora and fauna Togo contains three terrestrial ecoregions: Eastern Guinean forests, Guinean forest-savanna mosaic, and West Sudanian savanna. The coast of Togo is characterized by marshes and mangroves. High human population growth is leading to rapid deforestation, endangering many species. The country had a 2019 Forest Landscape Integrity Index mean score of 5.88/10, ranking it 92nd globally out of 172 countries. At least five parks and reserves have been established: Abdoulaye Faunal Reserve, Fazao Malfakassa National Park, Fosse aux Lions National Park, Koutammakou, and Kéran National Park. The most frequently observed animals are giraffes, cape buffalo, hyenas, and lions. Few elephants remain. Common birds are storks and cranes. Government The president is elected by universal and direct suffrage for 5 years. He is also the commander of the armed forces and has the right to initiate legislation and dissolve parliament. Executive power is exercised by the president and the government. The head of government is the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the president. Togo's transition to democracy is stalled. Its democratic institutions remain nascent and fragile. President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who ruled Togo under a one-party system, died of a heart attack on 5 February 2005. Gravely ill, he was being transported by plane to a foreign country for care. He died in transit while over Tunisia. Under the Togolese Constitution, the President of the Parliament, Fambaré Ouattara Natchaba, should have become president of the country, pending a new presidential election to be called within sixty days. Natchaba was out of the country, returning on an Air France plane from Paris. The Togolese army, known as Forces Armées Togolaises (FAT), or Togolese Armed Forces, closed the nation's borders, forcing the plane to land in nearby Benin. With an engineered power vacuum, the Parliament voted to remove the constitutional clause that would have required an election within sixty days and declared that Eyadema's son, Faure Gnassingbé, would inherit the presidency and hold office for the rest of his father's term. Faure was sworn in on 7 February 2005, despite international criticism of the succession. The African Union described the takeover as a military coup d'état. International pressure also came from the United Nations. Within Togo, opposition to the takeover culminated in riots in which several hundred died. There were uprisings in many cities and towns, mainly located in the southern part of the country. In the town of Aného reports of a general civilian uprising followed by a large scale massacre by government troops went largely unreported. In response, Faure Gnassingbé agreed to hold elections and on 25 February, Gnassingbé resigned as president, but soon afterward accepted the nomination to run for the office in April. On 24 April 2005, Gnassingbé was elected president of Togo, receiving over 60% of the vote according to official results. His main rival in the race had been Emmanuel Bob-Akitani from the Union des Forces du Changement (UFC) or Union of Forces for Change. However, electoral fraud was suspected, due to a lack of European Union or other independent oversight. Parliament designated Deputy President, Bonfoh Abbass, as interim president until the inauguration. On 3 May 2005, Faure Gnassingbé was sworn in as the new president and the European Union suspended aid to Togo in support of the opposition claims, unlike the African Union and the United States which declared the vote "reasonably fair." The Nigerian president and Chair of the AU, Olusẹgun Ọbasanjọ, sought to negotiate between the incumbent government and the opposition to establish a coalition government, but rejected an AU Commission appointment of former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, as special AU envoy to Togo. In June, President Gnassingbé named opposition leader Edem Kodjo as the prime minister. In October 2007, after several postponements, elections were held under proportional representation. This allowed the less populated north to seat as many MPs as the more populated south. The president-backed party Rally of the Togolese People (RPT) won an outright majority with the UFC coming second and the other parties claiming inconsequential representation. Again vote rigging accusations were leveled at the RPT supported by the civil and military security apparatus. Despite the presence of an EU observer mission, canceled ballots and illegal voting took place, the majority of which in RPT strongholds. The election was declared fair by the international community and praised as a model with little intimidation and few violent acts for the first time since a multiparty system was reinstated. On 3 December 2007 Komlan Mally of the RPT was appointed to prime minister succeeding Agboyibor. However, on 5 September 2008, after only 10 months in office, Mally resigned as prime minister of Togo. Faure Gnassingbé won re-election in the March 2010 presidential election, taking 61% of the vote against Jean-Pierre Fabre from the UFC, who had been backed by an opposition coalition called FRAC (Republican Front for Change). Though the March 2010 election was largely peaceful, electoral observers noted "procedural errors" and technical problems, and the opposition did not recognize the results, claiming irregularities had affected the outcome. Periodic protests against Faure Gnassingbé followed the election. In May 2010, long-time opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio announced that he would enter into a power-sharing deal with the government, a coalition arrangement which provides the UFC with eight ministerial posts. In June 2012, electoral reforms prompted protesters to take to the street in Lomé for several days; protesters sought a return to the 1992 constitution that would re-establish presidential term limits. July 2012, saw the surprise resignation of the prime minister, Gilbert Houngbo. Days later, the commerce minister, Kwesi Ahoomey-Zunu, was named to lead the new government. In the same month, the home of opposition leader Jean Pierre Fabre was raided by security forces, and thousands of protesters again rallied publicly against the government crackdown. In April 2015, President Faure Gnassingbe was re-elected for a third term. In February 2020, Faure Gnassingbé was again re-elected for his fourth presidential term. The opposition had a lot of accusations of fraud and irregularities. Gnassingbé family has ruled Togo since 1967, meaning it is Africa's longest lasting dynasty. Administrative divisions Togo is divided into five regions, which are subdivided in turn into 30 prefectures. From north to south the regions are Savanes, Kara, Centrale, Plateaux and Maritime. Foreign relations Although Togo's foreign policy is nonaligned, it has strong historical and cultural ties with western Europe, especially France and Germany. Togo recognizes the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and Cuba. It re-established relations with Israel in 1987. Togo pursues an active foreign policy and participates in many international organizations. It is particularly active in West African regional affairs and in the African Union. Relations between Togo and neighboring states are generally good. In 2017, Togo signed the UN treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Military The military of Togo, in French FAT (, "Togolese armed forces"), consists of the army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie. Total military expenditures during the fiscal year of 2005 totalled 1.6% of the country's GDP. Military bases exist in Lomé, Temedja, Kara, Niamtougou, and Dapaong. The current Chief of the General Staff is Brigadier General Titikpina Atcha Mohamed, who took office on 19 May 2009. The air force is equipped with Alpha jets. Human rights record Togo was labeled "Not Free" by Freedom House from 1972 to 1998, and again from 2002 to 2006, and has been categorized as "Partly Free" from 1999 to 2001 and again from 2007 to the present. It has very serious and longstanding human-rights problems. According to a U.S. State Department report based on conditions in 2010, these include "security force use of excessive force, including torture, which resulted in deaths and injuries; official impunity; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrests and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; executive influence over the judiciary; infringement of citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedoms of press, assembly, and movement; official corruption; discrimination and violence against women; child abuse, including female genital mutilation (FGM), and sexual exploitation of children; regional and ethnic discrimination; trafficking in persons, especially women and children; societal discrimination against persons with disabilities; official and societal discrimination against homosexual persons; societal discrimination against persons with HIV; and forced labor, including by children." Same-sex sexual activity is illegal in Togo,
colony was drawn into the conflict. It was invaded and quickly overrun by British and French forces during the Togoland campaign and placed under military rule. In 1916 the territory was divided into separate British and French administrative zones, and this was formalized in 1922 with the creation of British Togoland and French Togoland. League of Nations mandates On August 8, 1914, French and British forces invaded Togoland and the German forces there surrendered on 26 August. In 1916, Togoland was divided into French and British administrative zones. Following the war, Togoland formally became a League of Nations mandate divided for administrative purposes between France and the United Kingdom. After World War I, newly founded Czechoslovakia was also interested in this colony but this idea did not succeed. Lome was initially allocated to the British zone but after negotiations transferred to France 1 October 1920. After World War II, the mandate became a UN trust territory administered by the United Kingdom and France. During the mandate and trusteeship periods, western Togo was administered as part of the British Gold Coast. In December 1956, the residents of British Togoland voted to join the Gold Coast as part of the new independent nation of Ghana. In the Representative Assembly elections in 1946, there were two parties, the Committee of Togolese Unity (CUT) and the Togolese Party of Progress (PTP). The CUT was overwhelmingly successful, and Sylvanus Olympio, the CUT leader became Council leader. However, the CUT was defeated in the 1951 Representative Assembly elections and the 1952 Territorial Assembly elections, and refused to participate in further French supervised elections because it claimed that the PTP was receiving French support. By statute in 1955, French Togoland became an autonomous republic within the French union, although it retained its UN trusteeship status. Following elections to the Territorial Assembly on 12 June 1955, which were boycotted by CUT, considerable power over internal affairs was granted, with an elected executive body headed by a Prime Minister responsible to the legislature. These changes were embodied in a constitution approved in a 1956 referendum. On 10 September 1956, Nicolas Grunitzky became Prime Minister of the Republic of Togo. However, due to irregularities in the plebiscite, a UN-supervised parliamentary election was held on 27 April 1958, the first held in Togo with universal suffrage, which was won by the opposition pro-independence CUT and its leader Sylvanus Olympio, who became Prime Minister. On 13 October 1958 the French government announced that full independence would be granted. On 14 November 1958 the United Nations’ General Assembly took note of the French government's declaration according to which Togo which was under French administration would gain independence in 1960, thus marking an end to the trusteeship period. On 5 December 1959 the United Nations’ General Assembly resolved that the UN Trusteeship Agreement with France for Cameroon would end when Togo became independent on 27 April 1960. On 27 April 1960, in a smooth transition, Togo severed its constitutional ties with France, shed its UN trusteeship status, and became fully independent under a provisional constitution with Olympio as president. Independence and turmoil A new constitution adopted by referendum in 1961 established an executive president, elected for 7 years by universal suffrage and a weak National Assembly. The president was empowered to appoint ministers and dissolve the assembly, holding a monopoly of executive power. In elections that year, from which Grunitzky's party was disqualified, Olympio's party won 100% of the vote and all 51 National Assembly seats, and he became Togo's first elected president. During this period, four principal political parties existed in Togo: the leftist Juvento, the Democratic Union of the Togolese People (UDPT), the PTP, founded by Grunitzky but having limited support, and the Party of Togolese Unity, the party of President Olympio. Rivalries between elements of these parties had begun as early as the 1940s, and they came to a head with Olympio dissolving the opposition parties in January 1962 because of alleged plots against the majority party government. The reign of Olympio was marked by the terror of his militia, the Ablode Sodjas. Many opposition members, including Grunitzky and Meatchi, were jailed or fled to avoid arrest. On 13 January 1963 Olympio was overthrown and killed in a coup d'état led by army non-commissioned officers dissatisfied with conditions following their discharge from the French army. Grunitzky returned from exile 2 days later to head a provisional government with the title of prime minister. On 5 May 1963, the Togolese adopted a new constitution by referendum, which reinstated a multi-party system. They also voted in a general election to choose deputies from all political parties for the National Assembly, and elected Grunitzky as president and Antoine Meatchi as vice president. Nine days later, President Grunitzky formed a government in which all parties were represented. During the next several years, the Grunitzky government's power became insecure. On 21 November 1966, an attempt to overthrow Grunitzky, inspired principally by civilian political opponents in the UT party, was unsuccessful. Grunitzky then tried to lessen his reliance on the army, but on 13 January 1967, a coup led by Lt. Col. Étienne Eyadéma (later Gen. Gnassingbé Eyadéma) and Kléber Dadjo ousted President Grunitzky without bloodshed. Following the coup, political parties were banned, and all constitutional processes were suspended. Dadjo became the chairman of the "committee of national reconciliation", which ruled the country until 14 April, when Eyadéma assumed the presidency. In late 1969, a single national political party, the Rally of the Togolese People (RPT), was created, and President Eyadéma was elected party president on 29 November 1969. In 1972, a referendum, in which Eyadéma ran unopposed, confirmed his role as the country's president. Eyadéma's rule The third republic In late 1979, Eyadéma declared a third republic and a transition to greater civilian rule with a mixed civilian and military cabinet. He garnered 99.97% of the vote in uncontested presidential elections held in late 1979 and early 1980. A new constitution also provided for a national assembly to serve primarily as a consultative body. Eyadéma was reelected to a third consecutive 7-year term in December 1986 with 99.5% of the vote in an uncontested election. On 23 September 1986, a group of some 70 armed Togolese dissidents crossed into Lomé from Ghana in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Eyadéma government. Opposition In 1989 and 1990, Togo, like many other countries, was affected by the winds of democratic change sweeping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On 5 October 1990, the trial of students who handed out antigovernment tracts sparked riots in Lomé. Antigovernment demonstrations and violent clashes with the security forces marked the months that followed. In April 1991, the government began negotiations with newly formed opposition groups and agreed to a general amnesty that permitted exiled political opponents to return to Togo. After a general strike and further demonstrations, the government and opposition signed an agreement to hold a "national forum" on 12 June 1991. The national forum, dominated by opponents of President Eyadéma, opened in July 1991 and immediately declared itself to be a sovereign "National Conference." Although subjected to severe harassment from the government, the conference drafted an interim constitution calling for a 1-year transitional regime tasked with organizing free elections for a new government. The conference selected Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, a lawyer and human rights group head, as transitional prime minister but kept President Eyadéma as chief of state for the transition, although with limited powers. A test of wills between the president and his opponents followed over the next 3 years during which President Eyadéma gradually gained the upper hand. Frequent political paralysis and intermittent violence marked this period. Following a vote by the transitional legislature (High Council of the Republic) to dissolve the President's political party—the RPT—in November 1991, the army attacked the prime minister's office on 3 December and captured the prime minister. Koffigoh then formed a second transition government in January 1992 with substantial participation by ministers from the President's party. Opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio, son of the slain president Sylvanus Olympio, was ambushed and seriously wounded apparently by soldiers on 5 May 1992. In July and August 1992, a commission composed of presidential and opposition representatives negotiated a new political agreement. On 27 September, the public overwhelmingly approved the text of a new, democratic constitution, formally initiating Togo's fourth republic. Powerless legislature and political violence The democratic process was set back in October 1991, when elements of the army	opponents of President Eyadéma, opened in July 1991 and immediately declared itself to be a sovereign "National Conference." Although subjected to severe harassment from the government, the conference drafted an interim constitution calling for a 1-year transitional regime tasked with organizing free elections for a new government. The conference selected Joseph Kokou Koffigoh, a lawyer and human rights group head, as transitional prime minister but kept President Eyadéma as chief of state for the transition, although with limited powers. A test of wills between the president and his opponents followed over the next 3 years during which President Eyadéma gradually gained the upper hand. Frequent political paralysis and intermittent violence marked this period. Following a vote by the transitional legislature (High Council of the Republic) to dissolve the President's political party—the RPT—in November 1991, the army attacked the prime minister's office on 3 December and captured the prime minister. Koffigoh then formed a second transition government in January 1992 with substantial participation by ministers from the President's party. Opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio, son of the slain president Sylvanus Olympio, was ambushed and seriously wounded apparently by soldiers on 5 May 1992. In July and August 1992, a commission composed of presidential and opposition representatives negotiated a new political agreement. On 27 September, the public overwhelmingly approved the text of a new, democratic constitution, formally initiating Togo's fourth republic. Powerless legislature and political violence The democratic process was set back in October 1991, when elements of the army held the interim legislature hostage for 24 hours. This effectively put an end to the interim legislature. In retaliation, on 16 November, opposition political parties and labor unions declared a general strike intended to force President Eyadéma to agree to satisfactory conditions for elections. The general strike largely shut down Lomé for months and resulted in severe damage to the economy. In January 1993, President Eyadéma declared the transition at an end and reappointed Koffigoh as prime minister under Eyadéma's authority. This set off public demonstrations, and, on 25 January, members of the security forces fired on peaceful demonstrators, killing at least 19. In the ensuing days, several security force members were waylaid and injured or killed by civilian oppositionists. On 30 January 1993, elements of the military went on an 8-hour rampage throughout Lomé, firing indiscriminately and killing at least 12 people. This incident provoked more than 300,000 Togolese to flee Lomé for Benin, Ghana, or the interior of Togo. Although most had returned by early 1996, some still remain abroad. On 25 March 1993, armed Togolese dissident commandos based in Ghana attacked Lomé's main military camp and tried unsuccessfully to kill President Eyadéma. They inflicted significant casualties, however, which set off lethal reprisals by the military against soldiers thought to be associated with the attackers. Negotiating with the opposition Under substantial domestic and foreign pressure and the burden of the general strike, the presidential faction entered negotiations with the opposition in early 1993. Four rounds of talks led to the 11 July Ouagadougou agreement setting forth conditions for upcoming presidential and legislative elections and ending the general strike as of 3 August 1993. The presidential elections were set for 25 August, but hasty and inadequate technical preparations, concerns about fraud, and the lack of effective campaign organization by the opposition led the chief opposition candidates—former minister and Organization of African Unity Secretary General Edem Kodjo and lawyer Yawovi Agboyibo—to drop out of the race before election day and to call for a boycott. President Eyadéma won the elections by a 96.42% vote against token opposition. About 36% of the voters went to the polls; the others boycotted. Ghana-based armed dissidents launched a new commando attack on military sites in Lomé in January 1994. President Eyadéma was unhurt, and the attack and subsequent reaction by the Togolese armed forces resulted in hundreds of deaths, mostly civilians. The government went ahead with legislative elections on 6 February and 20 February 1994. In generally free and fair polls as witnessed by international observers, the allied opposition parties UTD and CAR together won a narrow majority in the National Assembly. Edem Kodjo named as Prime Minister On April 22, President Eyadéma named Edem Kodjo, the head of the smaller opposition party, the UTD, as prime minister instead of Yawovi Agboyibo, whose CAR party had far more seats. Kodjo's acceptance of the post of prime minister provoked the CAR to break the opposition alliance and refuse to join the Kodjo government. Kodjo was then forced to form a governing coalition with the RPT. Kodjo's government emphasized economic recovery, building democratic institutions and the rule of law and the return of Togolese refugees abroad. In early 1995, the government made slow progress toward its goals, aided by the CAR's August 1995 decision to end a 9-month boycott of the National Assembly. However, Kodjo was forced to reshuffle his government in late 1995, strengthening the representation by Eyadéma's RPT party, and he resigned in August 1996. Since then, Eyadéma has reemerged with a sure grip on power, controlling most aspects of government. In the June 1998 presidential election, the government prevented citizens from effectively exercising the right to vote. The Interior Ministry declared Eyadéma the winner with 52% of the vote in the 1998 election; however, serious irregularities in the government's conduct of the election strongly favored the incumbent and appear to have affected the outcome materially. Although the government did not obstruct the functioning of political opponents openly, the President used the strength of the military and his government allies to intimidate and harass citizens and opposition groups. The government and the state remained highly centralized: President Eyadéma's national government appointed the officials and controlled the budgets of all subnational government entities, including prefectures and municipalities, and influenced the selection of traditional chiefs. National Assembly elections The second multi-party legislative elections of Eyadéma's 33-year rule were held on 21 March 1999. However, the opposition boycotted the election, in which the ruling party won 79 of the 81 seats in the National Assembly. Those two seats went to candidates from little-known independent parties. Procedural problems and significant fraud, particularly misrepresentation of voter turnout marred the legislative elections. After the legislative election, the government announced that it would continue to pursue dialog with the opposition. In June 1999, the RPT and opposition parties met in Paris, in the presence of facilitators representing France, Germany, the European Union, and La Francophonie (an international organization of French-speaking countries), to agree on security measures for formal negotiations in Lomé. In July 1999, the government and the opposition began discussions, and on 29 July 1999, all sides signed an accord called the "Lomé Framework Agreement", which included a pledge by President Eyadéma that he would respect the constitution and not seek another term as president after his current one expires in 2003. The accord also called for the negotiation of a legal status for opposition leaders, as well as for former heads of state (such as their immunity from prosecution for acts in office). In addition, the accord addressed the rights and duties of political parties and the media, the safe return of refugees, and the security of all citizens. The accord also contained a provision for compensating victims of political violence. The President also agreed to dissolve the National Assembly in March and hold new legislative elections, which would be supervised by an independent national election commission () and which would use the single-ballot method to protect against some of the abuses of past elections. However, the March 2000 date passed without presidential action, and new legislative elections were ultimately rescheduled for October 2001. Because of funding problems and disagreements between the government and opposition, the elections were again delayed, this time until March 2002. In May 2002 the government scrapped CENI, blaming the opposition for its inability to function. In its stead, the government appointed seven magistrates to oversee preparations for legislative elections. Not surprisingly, the opposition announced it would boycott them. Held in October,
east, with of border; Burkina Faso to the north, with of border; and Ghana, with of border. To the south Togo has of coastline along the Bight of Benin of the Gulf of Guinea in the North Atlantic Ocean. Togo stretches north from the Gulf and is only wide at the broadest point. In total, Togo has an area of , of which is land and is water. Togo is commonly divided into six geographic regions. In the south are low-lying sandy beaches. The coastal region is narrow and followed by tidal flats and shallow lagoons. There are also a number of lakes, the largest of which is Lake Togo. Land use Natural resources: phosphates, limestone, marble, arable land Land use: arable land: 44.2% permanent crops: 3.7% other: 52.1% (2011) Irrigated land: 73 km2 (2003) Total renewable water resources: 14.7 km2 Natural hazards: hot, dry Harmattan wind can reduce visibility in north during winter; periodic droughts. Physical geography The country consists primarily of two savanna plains regions separated by a southwest–northeast range of hills (the Chaîne du Togo). In the north lies the Ouatchi Plateau. This plateau is about wide and located at an altitude of above sea level. Terre de Barre is another name for this region, in use because of the reddish leached soil which is rich in iron. This southern area of Togo has been categorised by the World Wildlife Fund as part of the Guinean forest-savanna mosaic ecoregion. Northeast of the Ouatchi Plateau lies a tableland. At its highest this region is about above sea level. The area is drained by the Mono River and its tributaries, including the Ogou River. To the west and the southwest of the tableland lie the Togo Mountains. These mountains run across the central region of Togo, ranging from the southwest to the northeast. The mountain range reaches into Benin where it is known as the Atakora Mountains and Ghana where it is known as the Akwapim Hills. The highest mountain in Togo is Mount Agou with a height of . North of the Togo Mountains lies a sandstone	Land use Natural resources: phosphates, limestone, marble, arable land Land use: arable land: 44.2% permanent crops: 3.7% other: 52.1% (2011) Irrigated land: 73 km2 (2003) Total renewable water resources: 14.7 km2 Natural hazards: hot, dry Harmattan wind can reduce visibility in north during winter; periodic droughts. Physical geography The country consists primarily of two savanna plains regions separated by a southwest–northeast range of hills (the Chaîne du Togo). In the north lies the Ouatchi Plateau. This plateau is about wide and located at an altitude of above sea level. Terre de Barre is another name for this region, in use because of the reddish leached soil which is rich in iron. This southern area of Togo has been categorised by the World Wildlife Fund as part of the Guinean forest-savanna mosaic ecoregion. Northeast of the Ouatchi Plateau lies a tableland. At its highest this region is about above sea level. The area is drained by the Mono River and its tributaries, including the Ogou River. To the west and the southwest of the tableland lie the Togo Mountains. These mountains run across the central region of Togo, ranging from the southwest to the northeast. The mountain range reaches into Benin where it is known as the Atakora Mountains and
the country, in the strip between Atakpame and Tchamba, the Bassar in the Centre-West, the Tchamba in the Centre-East and the Konkombas in the upper region of Bassar, the Lambas in the Kandé region, the Hausa, the Tamberma, the Losso and the Ouachi. Indians have a presence in Togo. White African settlers descended from the original French and German colonials make up less than 1% of the total population along with Togo's minute Lebanese community. The remaining 99% are indigenous: most people in this category hail from one of thirty-seven different tribes. Population Population distribution is very uneven due to soil and terrain variations. The population is generally concentrated in the south and along the major north-south highway connecting the coast to the Sahel. Age distribution is also uneven; nearly one-half of Togolese are less than fifteen years old. French, the official language, is used in administration and documentation. The public primary schools combine French with Ewe or Kabye as languages of instruction, depending on the region. English is spoken in neighboring Ghana and is taught in Togolese secondary schools. As a result, many Togolese, especially in the south and along the Ghana border, speak some English. According to the total population was in , compared to only 1 395 000 in 1950. The proportion of children below the age of 15 in 2010 was 39.6%, 56.9% was between 15 and 65 years of age, while 3.4% was 65 years or older . Vital statistics Registration of vital events is in Togo not complete. The Population Departement of the United Nations prepared the following estimates. Fertility and births Total Fertility Rate (TFR) (Wanted Fertility Rate) and Crude Birth Rate (CBR): Fertility data as of 2013-2014 and 2017 (DHS Program): Life expectancy at birth Other demographic statistics The following demographic statistics of Togo in 2019 are from the World Population Review. One birth every 2 minutes One death every 8 minutes One net migrant every 288 minutes Net gain of one person every 3 minutes The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated. Population 8,176,449 (July 2018 est.) Age structure 0-14 years: 40.13% (male 1,646,438 /female 1,634,609) 15-24 years: 19.1% (male 779,774 /female 782,192) 25-54 years:	seek employment. Their historical means of social advancement has been through the military and law enforcement forces, and they continue to dominate these services. Other groups include the Akposso on the Central Plateau, the Ana people who are related to the Yoruba, and live in the center of the country, in the strip between Atakpame and Tchamba, the Bassar in the Centre-West, the Tchamba in the Centre-East and the Konkombas in the upper region of Bassar, the Lambas in the Kandé region, the Hausa, the Tamberma, the Losso and the Ouachi. Indians have a presence in Togo. White African settlers descended from the original French and German colonials make up less than 1% of the total population along with Togo's minute Lebanese community. The remaining 99% are indigenous: most people in this category hail from one of thirty-seven different tribes. Population Population distribution is very uneven due to soil and terrain variations. The population is generally concentrated in the south and along the major north-south highway connecting the coast to the Sahel. Age distribution is also uneven; nearly one-half of Togolese are less than fifteen years old. French, the official language, is used in administration and documentation. The public primary schools combine French with Ewe or Kabye as languages of instruction, depending on the region. English is spoken in neighboring Ghana and is taught in Togolese secondary schools. As a result, many Togolese, especially in the south and along the Ghana border, speak some English. According to the total population was in , compared to only 1 395 000 in 1950. The proportion of children below the age of 15 in 2010 was 39.6%, 56.9% was between 15 and 65 years of age, while 3.4% was 65 years or older . Vital statistics Registration of vital events is in Togo not complete. The Population Departement of the United Nations prepared the following estimates. Fertility and births Total Fertility Rate (TFR) (Wanted Fertility Rate) and Crude Birth Rate (CBR): Fertility data as of 2013-2014 and 2017 (DHS Program): Life expectancy at birth Other demographic statistics The following demographic statistics of Togo in 2019 are from the World Population Review. One birth every 2 minutes One death every 8 minutes One net migrant every 288 minutes Net gain of one person every 3 minutes The following demographic statistics are from the CIA World Factbook, unless otherwise indicated. Population 8,176,449 (July 2018 est.) Age structure 0-14 years: 40.13% (male 1,646,438 /female 1,634,609) 15-24 years: 19.1% (male 779,774 /female 782,192) 25-54 years: 32.96% (male 1,339,150 /female 1,356,020) 55-64 years: 4.34% (male 167,575 /female 187,432) 65 years and over: 3.46% (male 122,175 /female 161,084) (2018 est.) Median age total: 19.9 years. Country comparison to the world: 196th male: 19.6 years female: 20.1 years (2018 est.) Birth rate 32.8
garnering 60% of the vote according to official results. Disquiet has continued however with the opposition declaring the voting rigged, claiming the military stole ballot boxes from various polling stations in the South, as well as other election irregularities, such as telecommunication shutdown. The European Union has suspended aid in support of the opposition claims, while the African Union and the United States have declared the vote "reasonably fair" and accepted the outcome. The Nigerian president and Chair of the AU, Olusẹgun Ọbasanjọ, sought to negotiate between the incumbent government and the opposition to establish a coalition government, but surprisingly rejected an AU Commission appointment of former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, as special AU envoy to Togo. Later in June, President Gnassingbe named opposition leader Edem Kodjo as the prime Minister. From April 2006 onwards, reconciliation talks between the government and the opposition were held, which were suspended after Eyadema's death in 2005. In August the government and the opposition signed an accord providing for the participation of opposition parties in a transitional government. In 2017, protests erupted against Faure Gnassingbé's continued rule. As the only African country without official presidential term limits, the opposition demands two-term limits for presidents to be applied retroactively in order to prevent Gnassingbe from standing in the 2020 and 2025 elections. Clashes between protesters and police have led to the death of 16 people since the start of the protests in September. International rights groups have called on the government to "end the bloody repression" and engage in dialogue with the opposition. Gnassingbé promised talks with the opposition, but has yet to act on that promise. However, Ghana's President Nana Akufo-Addo and Alpha Conde of Guinea are involved as mediators to facilitate the organization of a political dialogue to be held "in a few weeks". In February 2020, Faure Gnassingbé was again re-elected for his fourth presidential term. The opposition had a lot of accusations of fraud and irregularities. Gnassingbé family has ruled Togo since 1967, meaning it is Africa’s longest lasting dynasty. Executive branch \|President \|Faure Gnassingbé \|Union for the Republic \|4 May 2005 \|- \|Prime	human rights abuses. In 2002, in what critics called a 'constitutional coup', the national assembly voted unanimously to change the constitution and allow Eyadéma to 'sacrifice himself again' and run for a third term during the 2003 presidential elections. The constitutional change eliminated presidential term limits. Meanwhile, Gilchrist Olympio's attempts to beat the man who overthrew his father were scuppered yet again when he was banned from running on a tax-law technicality. Despite allegations of electoral fraud, Eyadéma won 57% of the votes in the 2003 elections, which international observers from the African Union described as generally free and transparent. For many Togolese, there was little optimism for the future and a prevailing sense of déjà vu as Eyadéma extended his record as Africa's longest-serving ruler. Current political situation On February 5, 2005, Eyadéma died of a heart attack. Shortly afterwards, his son Faure Gnassingbé was named by Togo's military as the country's leader, raising numerous eyebrows. Army Chief of Staff General Zakari Nandja announced the succession, saying the speaker of parliament (who should have taken over under the constitution) was out of the country. African Union leaders described the naming of Faure Gnassingbé as a military coup. The constitution of Togo declared that in the case of the president's death, the speaker of Parliament takes his place, and has 60 days to call new elections. However, on February 6, Parliament retroactively changed the Constitution, declaring that Faure would hold office for the rest of his father's term, with elections deferred until 2008. The African Union described the takeover as a military coup d'état. International pressure came also from the United Nations. Within Togo, opposition to the takeover culminated in riots in which four people died. In response, Gnassingbé agreed to hold elections in April 2005. On February 25, Gnassingbé resigned as president, soon
Togolese Government introduced a series of austerity measures and major restructuring goals for the state enterprise and rural development sectors. These reforms were aimed at eliminating most state monopolies, simplifying taxes and customs duties, curtailing public employment, and privatizing major state enterprises. Togo made good progress under the international financial institutions' programs in the late 1980s, but movement on reforms ended with the onset of political instability in 1990. With a new, elected government in place, Togo negotiated new 3-year programs with the World Bank and IMF in 1994. Togo returned to the Paris Club in 1995 and received Naples terms, the club's most concessionary rates. With the economic downturn associated with Togo's political problems, scheduled external debt service obligations for 1994 were greater than 100% of projected government revenues (excluding bilateral and multilateral assistance). By 2001, Togo was embarked on an IMF Staff Monitored Program designed to restore macroeconomic stability and financial discipline but without any new IMF resources pending new legislative elections. New IMF, World Bank and Africa Development Bank (ADB) lending must await the willingness of Togo's traditional donors – the European Union, principally, but the US also – to resume aid flows. So far, Togo's problematic legislative and presidential elections and the government's continued unwillingness to transition from an Eyadéma-led autocracy to democracy have deterred these donors from providing Togo with more aid. As of the fall 2002, Togo was $15 million in arrears to the World Bank and owed $3 million to the ADB. Togo is one of 16 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The ECOWAS development fund is based in Lomé. Togo also is a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), which groups seven West African countries using the CFA franc. The West African Development Bank (BOAD), which is associated with UEMOA, is based in Lomé. Togo long served as a regional banking center, but that position has been eroded by the political instability and economic downturn of the early	is the namesake of an illegal market for stolen oil off the Niger Delta, called the Togo Triangle. IMF relationship Togo turned to the IMF for assistance in 1979, while simultaneously implementing a stringent adjustment effort with the help of a series of IMF standby programs, World Bank loans, and Paris Club debt rescheduling. Under these programs, the Togolese Government introduced a series of austerity measures and major restructuring goals for the state enterprise and rural development sectors. These reforms were aimed at eliminating most state monopolies, simplifying taxes and customs duties, curtailing public employment, and privatizing major state enterprises. Togo made good progress under the international financial institutions' programs in the late 1980s, but movement on reforms ended with the onset of political instability in 1990. With a new, elected government in place, Togo negotiated new 3-year programs with the World Bank and IMF in 1994. Togo returned to the Paris Club in 1995 and received Naples terms, the club's most concessionary rates. With the economic downturn associated with Togo's political problems, scheduled external debt service obligations for 1994 were greater than 100% of projected government revenues (excluding bilateral and multilateral assistance). By 2001, Togo was embarked on an IMF Staff Monitored Program designed to restore macroeconomic stability and financial discipline but without any new IMF resources pending new legislative elections. New IMF, World Bank and Africa Development Bank (ADB) lending must await the willingness of Togo's traditional donors – the European Union, principally, but the US also – to resume aid flows. So far, Togo's problematic legislative and presidential elections and the government's continued unwillingness to transition from an Eyadéma-led autocracy to democracy have deterred these donors from providing Togo with more aid. As of the fall 2002, Togo was $15 million in arrears to the World Bank and owed $3 million to the ADB. Togo is one of 16 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The ECOWAS development fund is based in Lomé. Togo also is a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), which groups seven West African countries using the CFA franc. The West African
2.5 million lines, 129th in the world (2010). Telephone system: fair system based on network of microwave radio relay routes supplemented by open-wire lines and cellular system; combined fixed-line and mobile-cellular teledensity roughly 50 telephones per 100 persons with mobile-cellular use predominating (2010). Satellite earth stations: 1 Intelsat (Atlantic Ocean) and 1 Symphonie (satellite) (2010). Communications cables: West Africa Cable System (WACS), a submarine cable linking countries along the west coast of Africa with each other and with Portugal and the United Kingdom; GLO-1 which links countries along the west coast of Africa to each other and to Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Internet Top-level domain: .tg Internet users: 278,442 users, 144th in the world; 4.0% of the population, 191st in the world (2012); 356,300 users, 123rd in the world (2009). Fixed broadband: 5,560 subscriptions, 158th in the world; 0.1% of the population, 170th in the world (2012). Wireless broadband: 47,892 subscribers, 125th in the world; 0.7% of the population, 135th in the world (2012). Internet hosts: 1,168 hosts, 170th in the world (2012); 1,165 hosts, 169th in the world (2011). IPv4: 13,312 addresses allocated, less than	west coast of Africa to each other and to Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Internet Top-level domain: .tg Internet users: 278,442 users, 144th in the world; 4.0% of the population, 191st in the world (2012); 356,300 users, 123rd in the world (2009). Fixed broadband: 5,560 subscriptions, 158th in the world; 0.1% of the population, 170th in the world (2012). Wireless broadband: 47,892 subscribers, 125th in the world; 0.7% of the population, 135th in the world (2012). Internet hosts: 1,168 hosts, 170th in the world (2012); 1,165 hosts, 169th in the world (2011). IPv4: 13,312 addresses allocated, less than 0.05% of the world total, 1.9 addresses per 1000 people (2012). Internet censorship and surveillance There are no known government restrictions on access to the Internet or reports that the government monitors e-mail or Internet
west. When construction in Liberia and Sierra Leone is finished, the highway will continue west to seven other Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) nations. A paved highway also connects Togo northwards to Burkina Faso and from there north-west to Mali and north-east to Niger. Waterways 50 km (seasonally navigable by small craft on the Mono River depending on rainfall. (2011)) Ports and harbours Kpémé Lomé - railhead Merchant marine total: 62 ships ships by type: bulk carrier 6, cargo 38, carrier 3, chemical tanker 5, container 3, passenger/cargo 1, petroleum tanker	Waterways 50 km (seasonally navigable by small craft on the Mono River depending on rainfall. (2011)) Ports and harbours Kpémé Lomé - railhead Merchant marine total: 62 ships ships by type: bulk carrier 6, cargo 38, carrier 3, chemical tanker 5, container 3, passenger/cargo 1, petroleum tanker 3, refrigerated cargo 1, roll on/roll off 1 (2010) Airports 8 (2012) Airports -