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Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally <ei1424>considered</ei1424>, because of objections from some European part... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally <ei1424>considered</ei1424>, because of objections from some European part... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After <ei1418>cabling</ei1418> world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European part... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European partners that four da... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After <ei1418>cabling</ei1418> world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European part... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European partners that four da... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After <ei1418>cabling</ei1418> world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European part... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally <ei1424>considered</ei1424>, because of objections from some European part... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he offered him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of <ei1425>objections</ei1425> from some European partners that four da... | = |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his <ei1419>intention</ei1419> to <ei1420>give</ei1420> Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he offered him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European part... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After <ei1418>cabling</ei1418> world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European part... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his <ei1419>intention</ei1419> to <ei1420>give</ei1420> Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he offered him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European part... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of objections from some European partners that four da... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of <ei1425>objections</ei1425> from some European part... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he <ei1422>offered</ei1422> him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally <ei1424>considered</ei1424>, because of objections from some European part... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 After cabling world leaders about his intention to give Saddam Hussein a final deadline to exit Kuwait, he offered him a week to withdraw fully , instead of the four days he originally considered, because of <ei1425>objections</ei1425> from some European partners that four da... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | = |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | = |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President <ei1430>took</ei1430> pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a <ei1429>talk</ei1429> lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev spoke about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to <ei1434>say</ei1434>, although he already had <ei1435>decided</ei1435> that the Soviet alternative to the allied dea... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 And when he and President Gorbachev <ei1427>spoke</ei1427> about the decision in a talk lasting nearly an hour, the President took pains to listen to what his counterpart had to say, although he already had decided that the Soviet alternative to the allied deadline was <ei1530... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush let the ground <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> begin as previously planned <t514>Saturday night</t514>.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> and the start <t514>Sat... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439>, Mr. Bush <ei1440>let</ei1440> the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439> and the end <ei1440... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush let the ground <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> begin as previously planned <t514>Saturday night</t514>.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> and the end <t514>Saturda... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush let the ground <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> begin as previously <ei1443>planned</ei1443> Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> and the start <ei14... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq <ei1437>failed</ei1437> to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush <ei1440>let</ei1440> the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1437>failed</ei1437> and the start <ei1440>le... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush let the ground <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> begin as previously <ei1443>planned</ei1443> Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> and the start <ei1443... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq <ei1437>failed</ei1437> to respond to the U.S. <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439>, Mr. Bush let the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1437>failed</ei1437> and the end <ei1439>ulti... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439>, Mr. Bush <ei1440>let</ei1440> the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439> and the end <ei1440>l... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq <ei1437>failed</ei1437> to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush <ei1440>let</ei1440> the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1437>failed</ei1437> and the end <ei1440>le... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq <ei1437>failed</ei1437> to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush <ei1440>let</ei1440> the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1437>failed</ei1437> and the end <ei1440>let<... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush let the ground <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> begin as previously planned <t514>Saturday night</t514>.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> and the end <t514>Satur... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush let the ground <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> begin as previously <ei1443>planned</ei1443> Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> and the end <ei1443>p... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush let the ground <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> begin as previously <ei1443>planned</ei1443> Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> and the end <ei1443... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq <ei1437>failed</ei1437> to respond to the U.S. <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439>, Mr. Bush let the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1437>failed</ei1437> and the start <ei1439>... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq <ei1437>failed</ei1437> to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush <ei1440>let</ei1440> the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1437>failed</ei1437> and the start <ei1440>... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq <ei1437>failed</ei1437> to respond to the U.S. <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439>, Mr. Bush let the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1437>failed</ei1437> and the start <ei1439>ul... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. ultimatum, Mr. Bush let the ground <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> begin as previously planned <t514>Saturday night</t514>.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1441>offensive</ei1441> and the start <t514>Satur... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq <ei1437>failed</ei1437> to respond to the U.S. <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439>, Mr. Bush let the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1437>failed</ei1437> and the end <ei1439>ul... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439>, Mr. Bush <ei1440>let</ei1440> the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439> and the start <ei1440... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 Finally, when Iraq failed to respond to the U.S. <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439>, Mr. Bush <ei1440>let</ei1440> the ground offensive begin as previously planned Saturday night.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1439>ultimatum</ei1439> and the start <ei14... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were taken in the first hours of the ground <ei1456>war</ei1456>, though some military officials later <ei1457>said</ei1457> the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1456>war<... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were <ei1455>taken</ei1455> in the first hours of the ground war, though some military officials later <ei1457>said</ei1457> the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1455>take... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were <ei1455>taken</ei1455> in the first hours of the ground war, though some military officials later <ei1457>said</ei1457> the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1455>ta... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were <ei1455>taken</ei1455> in the first hours of the ground <ei1456>war</ei1456>, though some military officials later said the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1455>take... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were taken in the first hours of the ground <ei1456>war</ei1456>, though some military officials later <ei1457>said</ei1457> the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1456>wa... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were <ei1455>taken</ei1455> in the first hours of the ground <ei1456>war</ei1456>, though some military officials later said the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1455>ta... | > |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were <ei1455>taken</ei1455> in the first hours of the ground <ei1456>war</ei1456>, though some military officials later said the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1455>take... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were <ei1455>taken</ei1455> in the first hours of the ground <ei1456>war</ei1456>, though some military officials later said the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1455>ta... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were taken in the first hours of the ground <ei1456>war</ei1456>, though some military officials later <ei1457>said</ei1457> the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1456>wa... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were <ei1455>taken</ei1455> in the first hours of the ground war, though some military officials later <ei1457>said</ei1457> the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the start <ei1455>ta... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were <ei1455>taken</ei1455> in the first hours of the ground war, though some military officials later <ei1457>said</ei1457> the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1455>take... | < |
Context:
Documents Creation Time: 02/25/91 U.S. commanders said 5,500 Iraqi prisoners were taken in the first hours of the ground <ei1456>war</ei1456>, though some military officials later <ei1457>said</ei1457> the total may have climbed above 8,000.
Question:
What is the temporal relation between the end <ei1456>war<... | < |
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